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RECORDS OF THE UNITED STATES

NUERNBERG WAR CRIMES TRIALS

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA v. CARL KRAUCH ET AL. (CASE VI)

AUGUST 14, 1947-JULY 30, 1948

Roll 36

Prosecution Document Books

I-VIII



THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES
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GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION

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INTRODUCTION

On the 113 rolls of this microfilm publication are reproduced the records of Case VI, *United States of America v. Carl Krauch et al.* (I. G. Farben Case), 1 of the 12 trials of war criminals conducted by the U.S. Government from 1946 to 1949 at Nuernberg subsequent to the International Military Tribunal (IMT) held in the same city. These records consist of German- and English-language versions of official transcripts of court proceedings, prosecution and defense briefs and statements, and defendants' final pleas as well as prosecution and defense exhibits and document books in one language or the other. Also included are minute books, the official court file, order and judgment books, clemency petitions, and finding aids to the documents.

The transcripts of this trial, assembled in 2 sets of 43 bound volumes (1 set in German and 1 in English), are the recorded daily trial proceedings. Prosecution statements and briefs are also in both languages but unbound, as are the final pleas of the defendants delivered by counsel or defendants and submitted by the attorneys to the court. Unbound prosecution exhibits, numbered 1-2270 and 2300-2354, are essentially those documents from various Nuernberg record series, particularly the NI (Nuernberg Industrialist) Series, and other sources offered in evidence by the prosecution in this case. Defense exhibits, also unbound, are predominantly affidavits by various persons. They are arranged by name of defendant and thereunder numerically, along with two groups of exhibits submitted in the general interest of all defendants. Both prosecution and defense document books consist of full or partial translations of exhibits into English. Loosely bound in folders, they provide an indication of the order in which the exhibits were presented before the tribunal.

Minute books, in two bound volumes, summarize the transcripts. The official court file, in nine bound volumes, includes the progress docket, the indictment, and amended indictment and the service thereof; applications for and appointments of defense counsel and defense witnesses and prosecution comments thereto; defendants' application for documents; motions and reports; uniform rules of procedures; and appendixes. The order and judgment books, in two bound volumes, represent the signed orders, judgments, and opinions of the tribunal as well as sentences and commitment papers. Defendants' clemency petitions, in three bound volumes, were directed to the military governor, the Judge Advocate General, and the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia. The finding aids summarize transcripts, exhibits, and the official court file.

Case VI was heard by U.S. Military Tribunal VI from August 14, 1947, to July 30, 1948. Along with records of other Nuernberg

NATIONAL ARCHIVES MICROFILM PUBLICATIONS

and Far East war crimes trials, the records of this case are part of the National Archives Collection of World War II War Crimes Records, Record Group 238.

The I. G. Farben Case was 1 of 12 separate proceedings held before several U.S. Military Tribunals at Nuernberg in the U.S. Zone of Occupation in Germany against officials or citizens of the Third Reich, as follows:

<u>Case No.</u>	<u>United States v.</u>	<u>Popular Name</u>	<u>No. of Defendants</u>
1	<i>Karl Brandt et al.</i>	Medical Case	23
2	<i>Erhard Milch</i>	Milch Case (Luftwaffe)	1
3	<i>Josef Altstoetter et al.</i>	Justice Case	16
4	<i>Oswald Pohl et al.</i>	Pohl Case (SS)	18
5	<i>Friedrich Flick et al.</i>	Flick Case (Industrialist)	6
6	<i>Carl Krauch et al.</i>	I. G. Farben Case (Industrialist)	24
7	<i>Wilhelm List et al.</i>	Hostage Case	12
8	<i>Ulrich Greifelt et al.</i>	RuSHA Case (SS)	14
9	<i>Otto Ohlendorf et al.</i>	Einsatzgruppen Case (SS)	24
10	<i>Alfried Krupp et al.</i>	Krupp Case (Industrialist)	12
11	<i>Ernst von Weizsaecker et al.</i>	Ministries Case	21
12	<i>Wilhelm von Leeb et al.</i>	High Command Case	14

Authority for the proceedings of the IMT against the major Nazi war criminals derived from the Declaration on German Atrocities (Moscow Declaration) released November 1, 1943; Executive Order 9547 of May 2, 1945; the London Agreement of August 8, 1945; the Berlin Protocol of October 6, 1945; and the IMT Charter.

Authority for the 12 subsequent cases stemmed mainly from Control Council Law 10 of December 20, 1945, and was reinforced by Executive Order 9679 of January 16, 1946; U.S. Military Government Ordinances 7 and 11 of October 18, 1946, and February 17, 1947, respectively; and U.S. Forces, European Theater General Order 301 of October 24, 1946. Procedures applied by U.S. Military Tribunals in the subsequent proceedings were patterned after those of the IMT and further developed in the 12 cases, which required over 1,200 days of court sessions and generated more than 330,000 transcript pages.

Formation of the I. G. Farben Combine was a stage in the evolution of the German chemical industry, which for many years led the world in the development, production, and marketing of organic dyestuffs, pharmaceuticals, and synthetic chemicals. To control the excesses of competition, six of the largest chemical firms, including the Badische Anilin & Soda Fabrik, combined to form the Interessengemeinschaft (Combine of Interests, or Trust) of the German Dyestuffs Industry in 1904 and agreed to pool technological and financial resources and markets. The two remaining chemical firms of note entered the combine in 1916. In 1925 the Badische Anilin & Soda Fabrik, largest of the firms and already the majority shareholder in two of the other seven companies, led in reorganizing the industry to meet the changed circumstances of competition in the post-World War markets by changing its name to the I. G. Farbenindustrie Aktiengesellschaft, moving its home office from Ludwigshafen to Frankfurt, and merging with the remaining five firms.

Farben maintained its influence over both the domestic and foreign markets for chemical products. In the first instance the German explosives industry, dependent on Farben for synthetically produced nitrates, soon became subsidiaries of Farben. Of particular interest to the prosecution in this case were the various agreements Farben made with American companies for the exchange of information and patents and the licensing of chemical discoveries for foreign production. Among the trading companies organized to facilitate these agreements was the General Anilin and Film Corp., which specialized in photographic processes. The prosecution charged that Farben used these connections to retard the "Arsenal of Democracy" by passing on information received to the German Government and providing nothing in return, contrary to the spirit and letter of the agreements.

Farben was governed by an Aufsichtsrat (Supervisory Board of Directors) and a Vorstand (Managing Board of Directors). The Aufsichtsrat, responsible for the general direction of the firm, was chaired by defendant Krauch from 1940. The Vorstand actually controlled the day-to-day business and operations of Farben. Defendant Schmitz became chairman of the Vorstand in 1935, and 18 of the other 22 original defendants were members of the Vorstand and its component committees.

Transcripts of the I. G. Farben Case include the indictment of the following 24 persons:

Otto Ambros: Member of the Vorstand of Farben; Chief of Chemical Warfare Committee of the Ministry of Armaments and War Production; production chief for Buna and poison gas; manager of Auschwitz, Schkopau, Ludwigshafen, Oppau, Gendorf, Dyhernfurth, and Falkenhagen plants; and Wehrwirtschaftsfuehrer.

Max Brueggemann: Member and Secretary of the Vorstand of Farben; member of the legal committee; Deputy Plant Leader of the Leverkusen Plant; Deputy Chief of the Sales Combine for Pharmaceuticals; and director of the legal, patent, and personnel departments of the Works Combine, Lower Rhine.

Ernst Buergin: Member of the Vorstand of Farben; Chief of Works Combine, Central Germany; Plant Leader at the Bitterfeld and Wolfen-Farben plants; and production chief for light metals, dyestuffs, organic intermediates, plastics, and nitrogen at these plants.

Heinrich Buetefisch: Member of the Vorstand of Farben; manager of Leuna plants; production chief for gasoline, methanol, and chlorine electrolysis production at Auschwitz and Moosbierbaum; Wehrwirtschaftsfuehrer; member of the Himmler Freundeskreis (circle of friends of Himmler); and SS Obersturmbannfuehrer (Lieutenant Colonel).

Walter Duerrfeld: Director and construction manager of the Auschwitz plant of Farben, director and construction manager of the Monowitz Concentration Camp, and Chief Engineer at the Leuna plant.

Fritz Gajewski: Member of the Central Committee of the Vorstand of Farben, Chief of Sparte III (Division III) in charge of production of photographic materials and artificial fibers, manager of "Agfa" plants, and Wehrwirtschaftsfuehrer.

Heinrich Gattineau: Chief of the Political-Economic Policy Department, "WIPO," of Farben's Berlin N.W. 7 office; member of Southeast Europe Committee; and director of A.G. Dynamit Nobel, Pressburg, Czechoslovakia.

Paul Haeffliger: Member of the Vorstand of Farben; member of the Commercial Committee; and Chief, Metals Departments, Sales Combine for Chemicals.

Erich von der Heyde: Member of the Political-Economic Policy Department of Farben's Berlin N.W. 7 office, Deputy to the Chief of Intelligence Agents, SS Hauptsturmfuehrer, and member of the WI-RUE-AMT (Military Economics and Armaments Office) of the Oberkommando der Wehrmacht (OKW) (High Command of the Armed Forces).

Heinrich Hoerlein: Member of the Central Committee of the Vorstand of Farben; chief of chemical research and development of vaccines, sera, pharmaceuticals, and poison gas; and manager of the Elberfeld Plant.

NATIONAL ARCHIVES MICROFILM PUBLICATIONS

Max Ilgner: Member of the Vorstand of Farben; Chief of Farben's Berlin N.W. 7 office directing intelligence, espionage, and propaganda activities; member of the Commercial Committee; and Wehrwirtschaftsfuehrer.

Friedrich Jaehne: Member of the Vorstand of Farben; chief engineer in charge of construction and physical plant development; Chairman of the Engineering Committee; and Deputy Chief, Works Combine, Main Valley.

August von Knieriem: Member of the Central Committee of the Vorstand of Farben; Chief Counsel of Farben; and Chairman, Legal and Patent Committees.

Carl Krauch: Chairman of the Aufsichtsrat of Farben and Generalbevollmaechtigter fuer Sonderfragen der Chemischen Erzeugung (General Plenipotentiary for Special Questions of Chemical Production) on Goering's staff in the Office of the 4-Year Plan.

Hans Kuehne: Member of the Vorstand of Farben; Chief of the Works Combine, Lower Rhine; Plant Leader at Leverkusen, Elberfeld, Uerdingen, and Dormagen plants; production chief for inorganics, organic intermediates, dyestuffs, and pharmaceuticals at these plants; and Chief of the Inorganics Committee.

Hans Kugler: Member of the Commercial Committee of Farben; Chief of the Sales Department Dyestuffs for Hungary, Rumania, Yugoslavia, Greece, Bulgaria, Turkey, Czechoslovakia, and Austria; and Public Commissar for the Falkenau and Aussig plants in Czechoslovakia.

Carl Lautenschlaeger: Member of the Vorstand of Farben; Chief of Works Combine, Main Valley; Plant Leader at the Hoechst, Griesheim, Mainkur, Gersthofen, Offenbach, Eystrup, Marburg, and Neuhausen plants; and production chief for nitrogen, inorganics, organic intermediates, solvents and plastics, dyestuffs, and pharmaceuticals at these plants.

Wilhelm Mann: Member of the Vorstand of Farben, member of the Commercial Committee, Chief of the Sales Combine for Pharmaceuticals, and member of the SA.

Fritz ter Meer: Member of the Central Committee of the Vorstand of Farben; Chief of the Technical Committee of the Vorstand that planned and directed all of Farben's production; Chief of Sparte II in charge of production of Buna, poison gas, dyestuffs, chemicals, metals, and pharmaceuticals; and Wehrwirtschaftsfuehrer.

NATIONAL ARCHIVES MICROFILM PUBLICATIONS

Heinrich Oster: Member of the Vorstand of Farben, member of the Commercial Committee, and manager of the Nitrogen Syndicate.

Hermann Schmitz: Chairman of the Vorstand of Farben, member of the Reichstag, and Director of the Bank of International Settlements.

Christian Schneider: Member of the Central Committee of the Vorstand of Farben; Chief of Sparte I in charge of production of nitrogen, gasoline, diesel and lubricating oils, methanol, and organic chemicals; Chief of Central Personnel Department, directing the treatment of labor at Farben plants; Wehrwirtschaftsfuehrer; Hauptabwehrbeauftragter (Chief of Intelligence Agents); Hauptbetriebsfuehrer (Chief of Plant Leaders); and supporting member of the Schutzstaffeln (SS) of the NSDAP.

Georg von Schnitzler: Member of the Central Committee of the Vorstand of Farben, Chief of the Commercial Committee of the Vorstand that planned and directed Farben's domestic and foreign sales and commercial activities, Wehrwirtschaftsfuehrer (Military Economy Leader), and Hauptsturmfaehrer (Captain) in the Sturmabteilungen (SA) of the Nazi Party (NSDAP).

Carl Wurster: Member of the Vorstand of Farben; Chief of the Works Combine, Upper Rhine; Plant Leader at Ludwigshafen and Oppau plants; production chief for inorganic chemicals; and Wehrwirtschaftsfuehrer.

The prosecution charged these 24 individual staff members of the firm with various crimes, including the planning of aggressive war through an alliance with the Nazi Party and synchronization of Farben's activities with the military planning of the German High Command by participation in the preparation of the 4-Year Plan, directing German economic mobilization for war, and aiding in equipping the Nazi military machines.¹ The defendants also were charged with carrying out espionage and intelligence activities in foreign countries and profiting from these activities. They participated in plunder and spoliation of Austria, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Norway, France, and the Soviet Union as part of a systematic economic exploitation of these countries. The prosecution also charged mass murder and the enslavement of many thousands of persons particularly in Farben plants at the Auschwitz and Monowitz concentration camps and the use of poison gas manufactured by the firm in the extermination

¹The trial of defendant Brueggemann was discontinued early during the proceedings because he was unable to stand trial on account of ill health.

NATIONAL ARCHIVES MICROFILM PUBLICATIONS

of millions of men, women, and children. Medical experiments were conducted by Farben on enslaved persons without their consent to test the effects of deadly gases, vaccines, and related products. The defendants were charged, furthermore, with a common plan and conspiracy to commit crimes against the peace, war crimes, and crimes against humanity. Three defendants were accused of membership in a criminal organization, the SS. All of these charges were set forth in an indictment consisting of five counts.

The defense objected to the charges by claiming that regulations were so stringent and far reaching in Nazi Germany that private individuals had to cooperate or face punishment, including death. The defense claimed further that many of the individual documents produced by the prosecution were originally intended as "window dressing" or "howling with the wolves" in order to avoid such punishment.

The tribunal agreed with the defense in its judgment that none of the defendants were guilty of Count I, planning, preparation, initiation, and waging wars of aggression; or Count V, common plans and conspiracy to commit crimes against the peace and humanity and war crimes.

The tribunal also dismissed particulars of Count II concerning plunder and exploitation against Austria and Czechoslovakia. Eight defendants (Schmitz, von Schnitzler, ter Meer, Buergin, Haeffliger, Ilgner, Oster, and Kugler) were found guilty on the remainder of Count II, while 15 were acquitted. On Count III (slavery and mass murder), Ambros, Bueteftisch, Duerrfeld, Krauch, and ter Meer were judged guilty. Schneider, Bueteftisch, and von der Heyde also were charged with Count IV, membership in a criminal organization, but were acquitted.

The tribunal acquitted Gajewski, Gattineau, von der Heyde, Hoerlein, von Knieriem, Kuehne, Lautenschlaeger, Mann, Schneider, and Wurster. The remaining 13 defendants were given prison terms as follows:

<u>Name</u>	<u>Length of Prison Term (years)</u>
Ambros	8
Buergin	2
Bueteftisch	6
Duerrfeld	8
Haeffliger	2
Ilgner	3
Jaehne	1 1/2
Krauch	6
Kugler	1 1/2
Oster	2
Schmitz	4
von Schnitzler	5
ter Meer	7

NATIONAL ARCHIVES MICROFILM PUBLICATIONS

All defendants were credited with time already spent in custody.

In addition to the indictments, judgments, and sentences, the transcripts also contain the arraignment and plea of each defendant (all pleaded not guilty) and opening statements of both defense and prosecution.

The English-language transcript volumes are arranged numerically, 1-43, and the pagination is continuous, 1-15834 (page 4710 is followed by pages 4710(1)-4710(285)). The German-language transcript volumes are numbered 1a-43a and paginated 1-16224 (14a and 15a are in one volume). The letters at the top of each page indicate morning, afternoon, or evening sessions. The letter "C" designates commission hearings (to save court time and to avoid assembling hundreds of witnesses at Nuernberg, in most of the cases one or more commissions took testimony and received documentary evidence for consideration by the tribunals). Two commission hearings are included in the transcripts: that for February 7, 1948, is on pages 6957-6979 of volume 20 in the English-language transcript, while that for May 7, 1948, is on pages 14775a-14776 of volume 40a in the German-language transcript. In addition, the prosecution made one motion of its own and, with the defense, six joint motions to correct the English-language transcripts. Lists of the types of errors, their location, and the prescribed corrections are in several volumes of the transcripts as follows:

- First Motion of the Prosecution, volume 1
- First Joint Motion, volume 3
- Second Joint Motion, volume 14
- Third Joint Motion, volume 24
- Fourth Joint Motion, volume 29
- Fifth Joint Motion, volume 34
- Sixth Joint Motion, volume 40

The prosecution offered 2,325 prosecution exhibits numbered 1-2270 and 2300-2354. Missing numbers were not assigned due to the difficulties of introducing exhibits before the commission and the tribunal simultaneously. Exhibits 1835-1838 were loaned to an agency of the Department of Justice for use in a separate matter, and apparently No. 1835 was never returned. Exhibits drew on a variety of sources, such as reports and directives as well as affidavits and interrogations of various individuals. Maps and photographs depicting events and places mentioned in the exhibits are among the prosecution resources, as are publications, correspondence, and many other types of records.

The first item in the arrangement of prosecution exhibits is usually a certificate giving the document number, a short description of the exhibits, and a statement on the location of the original document or copy of the exhibit. The certificate is followed by the actual prosecution exhibit (most are photostats,

NATIONAL ARCHIVES MICROFILM PUBLICATIONS

but a few are mimeographed articles with an occasional carbon of the original). The few original documents are often affidavits of witnesses or defendants, but also ledgers and correspondence, such as:

<u>Exhibit No.</u>	<u>Doc. No.</u>	<u>Exhibit No.</u>	<u>Doc. No.</u>
322	NI 5140	1558	NI 11411
918	NI 6647	1691	NI 12511
1294	NI 14434	1833	NI 12789
1422	NI 11086	1886	NI 14228
1480	NI 11092	2313	NI 13566
1811	NI 11144		

In rare cases an exhibit is followed by a translation; in others there is no certificate. Several of the exhibits are of poor legibility and a few pages are illegible.

Other than affidavits, the defense exhibits consist of newspaper clippings, reports, personnel records, Reichgesetzblatt excerpts, photographs, and other items. The 4,257 exhibits for the 23 defendants are arranged by name of defendant and thereunder by exhibit number. Individual exhibits are preceded by a certificate wherever available. Two sets of exhibits for all the defendants are included.

Translations in each of the prosecution document books are preceded by an index listing document numbers, biased descriptions, and page numbers of each translation. These indexes often indicate the order in which the prosecution exhibits were presented in court. Defense document books are similarly arranged. Each book is preceded by an index giving document number, description, and page number for every exhibit. Corresponding exhibit numbers generally are not provided. There are several unindexed supplements to numbered document books. Defense statements, briefs, pleas, and prosecution briefs are arranged alphabetically by defendant's surname. Pagination is consecutive, yet there are many pages where an "a" or "b" is added to the numeral.

At the beginning of roll 1 key documents are filmed from which Tribunal VI derived its jurisdiction: the Moscow Declaration, U.S. Executive Orders 9547 and 9679, the London Agreement, the Berlin Protocol, the IMT Charter, Control Council Law 10, U.S. Military Government Ordinances 7 and 11, and U.S. Forces, European Theater General Order 301. Following these documents of authorization is a list of the names and functions of members of the tribunal and counsels. These are followed by the transcript covers giving such information as name and number of case, volume numbers, language, page numbers, and inclusive dates. They are followed by the minute book, consisting of summaries of the daily proceedings, thus providing an additional finding aid for the transcripts. Exhibits are listed in an index that notes the

NATIONAL ARCHIVES MICROFILM PUBLICATIONS

type, number, and name of exhibit; corresponding document book, number, and page; a short description of the exhibit; and the date when it was offered in court. The official court file is summarized by the progress docket, which is preceded by a list of witnesses.

Not filmed were records duplicated elsewhere in this microfilm publication, such as prosecution and defense document books in the German language that are largely duplications of the English-language document books.

The records of the I. G. Farben Case are closely related to other microfilmed records in Record Group 238, specifically prosecution exhibits submitted to the IMT, T988; NI (Nuernberg Industrialist) Series, T301; NM (Nuernberg Miscellaneous) Series, M-936; NOKW (Nuernberg Armed Forces High Command) Series, T1119; NG (Nuernberg Government) Series, T1139; NP (Nuernberg Propaganda) Series, M942; WA (undetermined) Series, M946; and records of the Brandt case, M887; the Milch Case, M888; the Altstoetter case, M889; the Pohl Case, M890; the Flick Case, M891; the List case, M893; the Greifelt case, M894; and the Ohlendorf case, M895. In addition, the record of the IMT at Nuernberg has been published in the 42-volume *Trial of the Major War Criminals Before the International Military Tribunal* (Nuernberg, 1947). Excerpts from the subsequent proceedings have been published in 15 volumes as *Trials of War Criminals Before the Nuernberg Military Tribunal Under Control Council Law No. 10* (Washington). The Audiovisual Archives Division of the National Archives and Records Service has custody of motion pictures and photographs of all 13 trials and sound recordings of the IMT proceedings.

Martin K. Williams arranged the records and, in collaboration with John Mendelsohn, wrote this introduction.

MILITARY TRIBUNAL NO. ' '
CASE NO. VI
Prosecution Document Book No. L

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INDEX TO DOCUMENT BOOK I

I.G. Farben Case Count IA

Document Number	Exhibit Number	Description	Document Book Page
		Affidavit of Major William H. Coogan of 19 November 1945 on the capture and preservation of enemy documents, records and archives used by the IIT.	1
		Affidavit of Mr. Fred Niebergall of 3 December 1946 authenticating documents processed for trials subsequent to the IIT and not introduced into evidence in the IIT trial.	6
		Certification of General Telford Taylor of August 1947 as to competence of specified members of the Prosecution Staff to administer oaths in connection with the attestation of affidavits.	9
PS-1708 (USA 255) (USA 324)		Program of the Nazi Party-- extracted from the National Socialistic Year Book, 1941.	22
PS-2760-A (USA 256)		Excerpts from Hitler's MEIN KAMPF (1933) (41st Edition).	25
NI-9358- 2760-B-PS		Additional excerpts from MEIN KAMPF	29
NI-8531		Excerpts from I.G. Farben newspaper "Von Werk zu Werk", reprinting excerpts from Hitler's MEIN KAMPF.	32
PS-2433 (USA 596)		Excerpts from Rosenberg's Commentary on the Nazi Program (1934).	35
NI-8665		Hitler's speech on the master race at the Reich Party rally. Excerpts from Voelkischer Beobachter, 4 September 1933.	41
PS-3308 (USA 596)		Affidavit of Paul Otto Schmidt, Hitler's interpreter, of 28 November 1945, on objectivity of Nazi leadership.	45
NI-7765		Affidavit of Paul Otto Schmidt, of 3 July 1947, on knowledge of aggressive war.	48
NI-5196		Affidavit of the defendant von Schnitzler of 18 March 1947, on importance of I.G. Farben to German economy and armament.	54



INDEX TO DOCUMENT BOOK I

Document Number	Exhibit Number	Description	Document Book	Page
NI-1184		Article by Nonnenbruch. Economics Expert of the Volkischer Beobachter, on I.G. Farben, dated 31 July 1936.	80	
NI-4050 6763		Speech by the defendant von Schnitzler at the German- Spanish society on 10 Febr. 1943, stressing the scarcity of raw materials and the importance of I.G. Farben's contribution to Germany and the Four Year Plan.	85	
NI-6524		Affidavit of the defendant Krauch of 29 April 1947, on nitrogen production in World War I and synthetic gasoline development.	89	
NI-4043		Correspondence between Speer and Himmler of July 1944. Speer stated: "Nowadays we depend entirely upon the work of I.G. Farben for chemical progress. A modern chemical plant to work separately from I.G. Farben, therefore, does not seem advisable to me."	98	98
NI-4971		Letter by I.G. Farben to Reich Ministry of Economics of 3 July 1942, stating that "the methods (for Buna) found in Soviet Russia can be made workable for the Reich through the intermediary of only those experts whom I.G. Farben has put at the dis- posal of the Reich for that purpose.	95	101

19 November 1945

I, MAJOR WILLIAM H. COOGAN, O-455814, Q.M.C., a commissioned officer of the Army of the United States of America, do hereby certify as follows:

1. The United States Chief of Counsel in July 1945 charged the Field Branch of the Documentation Division with the responsibility of collecting, evaluating and assembling documentary evidence in the European Theater for use in the prosecution of the major Axis war criminals before the International Military Tribunal. I was appointed Chief of the Field Branch on 20 July 1945. I am now the Chief of the Documentation Division, Office of United States Chief of Counsel.

2. I have served in the United States Army for more than four years and am a practicing attorney by profession. Based upon my experience as an attorney and as a United States Army officer, I am familiar with the operation of the United States Army in connection with seizing and processing captured enemy documents. In my capacity as Chief of the Documentation Division, Office of the United States Chief of Counsel, I am familiar with and have supervised the processing, filing translation and photostating of all documentary evidence for the United States Chief of Counsel.

3. As the Army overran German occupied territory and then Germany itself, certain specialized personnel seized enemy documents, books, and records for information of strategic and tactical value. During the early stages such documents were handled in bulk and assembled at temporary centers. However, after the surrender of Germany, they were transported to the various document centers established by Army Headquarters in the

United States Zone of Occupation. In addition to the documents actually assembled at such document centers, Army personnel maintained and secured considerable documents "insitu" at or near the places of discovery. When such documents were located and assembled they were catalogued by Army personnel into collections and records were maintained which disclosed the source and such other information available concerning the place and general circumstances surrounding the acquisition of the documents.

4. The Field Branch of the Documentation Division was staffed by personnel thoroughly conversant with the German language. Their task was to search for and select captured enemy documents in the European Theater which disclosed information relating to the prosecution of the major Axis war criminals. Officers under my command were placed on duty at various document centers and also dispatched on individual missions to obtain original documents. When documents were located, my representatives made a record of the circumstances under which they were found and all information available concerning their authenticity was recorded. Such documents were further identified by Field Branch pre-trial serial numbers, assigned by my representatives who would then periodically dispatch the original documents by courier to the Office of the United States Chief of Counsel.

5. Upon receipt of these documents they were duly recorded and indexed. After this operation, they were delivered to the Screening and Analysis Branch of the Documentation Division of the Office of United States Chief of Counsel, which Branch re-examined such documents in order to finally determine whether or not they should be retained as evidence for the prosecutors. This final

screening was done by German-speaking analysts on the staff of the United States Chief of Counsel. When the document passed the screeners, it was then transmitted to the Document Room of the Office of United States Chief of Counsel, with a covering sheet prepared by the screeners showing the title or nature of the document, the personalities involved, and its importance. In the Document Room, a trial identification number was given to each document or to each group of documents, in cases where it was desirable for the sake of clarity to file several documents together.

6. United States documents were given trial identification numbers in one of five series designated by the letters: "PS", "L", "R", "C", and "EC", indicating the means of acquisition of the documents. Within each series documents were listed numerically.

7. After a document was so numbered, it was then sent to a German-speaking analyst who prepared a summary of the document with appropriate references to personalities involved, index headings, information as to the source of the document as indicated by the Field Branch, and the importance of the document to a particular phase of the case. Next, the original document was returned to the Document Room and then checked out to the photostating department, where photostatic copies were made. Upon return from photostating, it was placed in an envelope in one of several fireproof safes in the rear of the Document Room. One of the photostatic copies of the document was sent to the translators, thereafter leaving the original itself in the safe. A commissioned officer has been, and is, responsible for the security

of the documents in the safe. At all times when he is not present the safe is locked and a military guard is on duty outside the only door. If the officers preparing the certified translation, or one of the officers working on the briefs, found it necessary to examine the original document, this was done within the document room in the section set aside for that purpose. The only exception to this strict rule has been where it has been occasionally necessary to present the original document to the defendants for examination. In this case, the document was entrusted to a responsible officer of the prosecution staff.

8. All original documents are now located in safes in the document room, where they will be secured until they are presented by the prosecution to the court during the progress of the trial.

9. Some of the documents which will be offered in evidence by the United States Chief of Counsel were seized and processed by the British Army. Also, personnel from the Office of the United States Chief of Counsel and the British War Crimes Executive have acted jointly in locating, seizing and processing such documents.

10. Substantially the same system of acquiring documentary evidence was utilized by the British Army and the British War Crimes Executive as that hereinabove set forth with respect to the United States Army and the Office of the United States Chief of Counsel.

11. Therefore, I certify in my official capacity as hereinabove stated, to the best of my knowledge and belief, that the documents captured in the British Zone of Operations and Occupation, which will be offered in evidence by the United States Chief of Counsel, have been

authenticated, translated, and processed in substantially the same manner as hereinabove set forth with respect to the operations of the United States Chief of Counsel.

12. Finally, I certify, that all Documentary evidence offered by the United States Chief of Counsel, including those documents from British Army sources, are in the same condition as captured by the United States and British Armies; that they have been translated by competent and qualified translators; that all photostatic copies are true and correct copies of the originals and that they have been correctly filed, numbered and processed as above outlined.

WILLIAM H. COOGAN
Major, QMC
O-45531/

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A F F I D A V I T

3 December 1946

I, FRED NIEBERGALL, A.G.O. D150636, of the Office of Chief of Counsel for War Crimes, do hereby certify as follows:

1. I was appointed Chief of the Document Control Branch, Evidence Division, Office of Chief of Counsel for War Crimes (hereinafter referred to as "OCC") on 2 October 1946.

2. I have served in the U.S. Army for more than 5 years, being discharged as a 1st Lieutenant, Infantry, on 29 October 1946. I am now a reserve officer with the rank of 1st Lieutenant in the Army of the U.S. of America. Based upon my experience as a U.S. Army Officer, I am familiar with the operation of the U.S. Army in connection with seizing and processing captured enemy documents. I served as Chief of Translations for OCC from 29 July 1945 until December 1945, when I was appointed liaison officer between Defense Counsel and Translation Division of OCC and assistant to the executive officer of the Translation Division. In my capacity as Chief of the Document Control Branch, Evidence Division, OCC, I am familiar with the processing, filing, translation, and photostating of documentary evidence for the United States Chief of Counsel.

3. As the Army overran German occupied territory and then Germany itself, certain specialized personnel seized enemy documents, records and archives. Such documents were assembled in temporary centers. Later fixed document centers were established in Germany and Austria where these documents were assembled and the slow process of indexing and cataloguing was begun. Certain of these document centers have since been closed and the documents assembled there sent to other document centers.

4. In preparing for the trial before the International

Military Tribunal (hereinafter referred to as "IMT") a great number of original documents, photostats, and microfilms were collected at Nurnberg, Germany. Major Coogan's affidavit of 19 November 1945 describes the procedures followed. Upon my appointment as Chief of the Document Control Branch, Evidence Division, OCC, I received custody, in the course of official business, of all these documents except the ones which were introduced into evidence in the IMT trial and are now in the IMT Document Room in Nurnberg. Some have been screened, processed, and registered in accordance with Major Coogan's affidavit. The unregistered documents remaining have been screened, processed, and registered for use in trials before Military Tribunals substantially in the same way as described below.

5. In preparing for trials subsequent to the IMT trial personnel thoroughly conversant with the German language were given the task of searching for and selecting captured enemy documents which disclosed information relating to the prosecution of Axis war criminals. Lawyers and Research Analysts were placed on duty at various document centers and also dispatched on individual missions to obtain original documents or certified photostats thereof. The documents were screened by German speaking analysts to determine whether or not they might be valuable as evidence. Photostatic copies were then made of the original documents and the original documents returned to the files in the document centers. These photostatic copies were certified by the analysts to be true and correct copies of the original documents. German speaking analysts, either at the document center or in Nurnberg, then prepared a summary of the document with appropriate references to personalities involved, index headings, information as to the source of the document, and the importance of the documents to a particular division of OCC.

7

6. Next, the original document or certified photostatic copy was forwarded to the Document Control Branch, Evidence Division, OGC. Upon receipt of these documents, they were duly recorded and indexed and given identification numbers in one of six series designated by the letters: "NO", "NI", "NI", "NOI", "IG", and "NP", indicating the particular Division of OGC which might be most interested in the individual documents. Within each series documents were listed numerically.

7. In the case of the receipt of original documents, photostatic copies were made. Upon return from the Photostat Room, the original documents were placed in envelopes in fireproof safes in the Document Room. In the case of the receipt of certified photostatic copies of documents, the certified photostatic copies were treated in the same manner as original documents.

8. All original documents or certified photostatic copies treated as originals are now located in safes in the Document Room, where they will be secured until they are presented by the Prosecution to a court during the progress of a trial.

9. Therefore, I certify in my official capacity as herein above stated, that all documentary evidence relied upon by OGC is in the same condition as when captured by military forces under the command of the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Forces; that they have been translated by competent qualified translators; that all photostatic copies are true and correct copies of the originals, and that they have been correctly filed, numbered, and processed as above outlined.

/s/ FRED WILBERGALL
FRED WILBERGALL
Chief of Document Control Branch
Evidence Division, O.C.C.

8

CERTIFICATE

This certificate is made for the purpose of showing the authority of certain of the personnel of the Office of Chief of Counsel for War Crimes to administer oaths and properly to attest those affidavits which will be offered in evidence before the Military Tribunal for Case VI in United States v. Carl Krauch et al.

Pursuant to Executive Order 9547, 2 May 1945, attached hereto as "Tab A", Executive Order 9679, 16 January 1946, attached hereto as "Tab B", Memorandum No. 15 of Office of Chief of Counsel, 29 March 1946, attached hereto as "Tab C", General Order No. 301 of the Military Governor, 24 October 1946, attached hereto as "Tab D", and letter, USFET, 24 October 1946, Subject: Appointment of Chief of Counsel for War Crimes, attached hereto as "Tab E", I am authorized, and have been since 29 March 1946, to prepare and prosecute charges of atrocities and war crimes against leaders of the European Axis powers and their accessories.

In the discharge of the responsibilities conferred on me by the above-mentioned orders and instructions, I have authorized and detailed members of my staff who are engaged with me in the preparation and prosecution of cases, including attorneys, interrogators, and other investigators and agents of the Office of Chief of Counsel for War Crimes, to conduct interrogations and investigations and in the course of such interrogations and investigations to administer oaths.

Among those whom I have authorized to conduct interrogations and investigations and to administer oaths, with the effective date of their authorization, are the following personnel of Office of Counsel for War Crimes:

JOSIAH E. DUBOIS, JR., U.S.Civilian, A.G.O. identification
No. D-229485, Attorney, Office of Chief of Counsel for War Crimes,
authorized 10 January 1947.

DREXEL A. SPRECHER, U.S.Civilian, A.G.O. identification
No. A-473307, Attorney, Office of Chief of Counsel for War Crimes,
authorized 29 March 1946.

MORRIS AMCHAN, U.S.Civilian, A.G.O. identification
No. D-229649, Attorney, Office of Chief of Counsel for War Crimes,
authorized 1 February 1947.

EMANUEL MINSKOFF, U.S.Civilian, A.G.O. identification
No. D-230991, Attorney, Office of Chief of Counsel for War Crimes,
authorized 9 April 1947.

JAMES E. HEATH, U.S.Civilian, A.G.O. identification
No. D-416512, Attorney, Office of Chief of Counsel for War Crimes,
authorized 12 May 1946.

JAN CHARMATZ, Allied Civilian, E.T.O. identification
No. 402, Attorney, Office of Chief of Counsel for War Crimes,
authorized 30 September 1946.

SADI MASE, U.S.Civilian, A.G.O. identification No. X-018676,
Attorney, Office of Chief of Counsel for War Crimes, authorized
15 September 1946.

PAUL GANETT, U.S.Civilian, A.G.O. identification
No. D-417035, Attorney, Office of Chief of Counsel for War Crimes,
authorized 5 August 1946.

BELLE MAYER, U.S.Civilian, A.G.O. identification
No. D-429431, Attorney, Office of Chief of Counsel for War Crimes,
authorized 18 November 1946.

RANDOLPH NEWMAN, U.S. Civilian, A.G.O. identification
No. D-49712, Attorney, Office of Chief of Counsel for War Crimes,
authorized 29 December 1946.

MARY KAUFMAN, U.S.Civilian, A.G.O. identification,
No. D-230448, Attorney, Office of Chief of Counsel for War Crimes,
authorized 8 April 1947.

ALBERT GIDI LEVY, U.S. Civilian, A.G.O. identification
No. D-434708, Attorney, Office of Chief of Counsel for War Crimes,
authorized 29 August 1946.

VIRGIL VAN STREET, U.S. Civilian, A.G.O. identification
No. D-435500, Attorney, Office of Chief of Counsel for War Crimes,
authorized 6 September 1946.

JULIUS RUDOLPH, U.S. Civilian, A.G.O. identification
No. D-432800, Attorney, Office of Chief of Counsel for War Crimes,
authorized 29 July 1946.

MOSES L. KOVE, U.S. Civilian, A.G.O. identification
No. D-441500, Attorney, Office of Chief of Counsel for War Crimes,
authorized 1 July 1946.

LEO M. DRACHSLER, U.S. Civilian, A.G.O. identification
No. D-417115, Attorney, Office of Chief of Counsel for War Crimes,
authorized 1 June 1946.

H. RUSSELL THAYER, U.S. Civilian, A.G.O. identification
No. D-416413, Attorney, Office of Chief of Counsel for War Crimes,
authorized 10 April 1946.

WILLIAM A. ZECK, U.S. Civilian, A.G.O. identification
No. D-416341, Attorney, Office of Chief of Counsel for War Crimes,
authorized 19 April 1946.

BENJAMIN B. FERENCZ, U.S. Civilian, A.G.O. identification
No. D-417007, Attorney, Office of Chief of Counsel for War Crimes,
authorized 1 April 1946.

CHARLES C. COTTON, U.S. Civilian, A.G.O. identification
No. A-442789, Attorney, Office of Chief of Counsel for War Crimes,
authorized 9 September 1946.

MAX MANDELLAUB, U.S. Civilian, A.G.O. identification
No. D-432622, Attorney, Office of Chief of Counsel for War Crimes,
authorized 22 June 1946.

ZENON DE CHETMICK, U.S. Civilian, A.G.O. identification
No. D-429866, Consulting Economist, Office of Chief of Counsel for
War Crimes, authorized 15 December 1946.

HANS WOLFFSOHN, Allied Civilian, E.T.O. identification
No. 094485, Consulting Economist, Office of Chief of Counsel for
War Crimes, authorized 28 August 1946.

MORDECAI HEILPERN, U.S. Civilian, A.G.O. identification
No. X-046343, Research Analyst, Office of Chief of Counsel for
War Crimes, authorized 1 July 1946.

FRED FRAUTSCHI, Allied Civilian, E.T.O. identification
No. 225, Research Analyst, Office of Chief of Counsel for War
Crimes, authorized 23 July 1946.

JOHN GIGER, Allied Civilian, E.T.O. identification
No. 297, Research Analyst, Office of Chief of Counsel for War
Crimes, authorized 13 August 1946.

WILLIAM ACTON, U.S. Civilian, A.G.O. identification
No. D-117491, Research Analyst, Office of Chief of Counsel for
War Crimes, authorized 18 April 1946.

SAMU APOTEKER, Allied Civilian, E.T.O. identification
No. 415, Research Analyst, Office of Chief of Counsel for War
Crimes, authorized 18 November 1946.

OTTO HEILBRUNN, Allied Civilian, E.T.O. identification
No. 30140, Research Analyst, Office of Chief of Counsel for
War Crimes, authorized 11 December 1946.

WALTER SCHONFELD, Allied Civilian, E.T.O. identification
No. 34433, Research Analyst, Office of Chief of Counsel for
War Crimes, authorized 13 September 1946.

HERBERT UNGAR, Allied Civilian, E.T.O. identification
No. 419, Research Analyst, Office of Chief of Counsel for War
Crimes, authorized 23 April 1946.

HENRY BIRNBAUM, U.S. Civilian, A.G.O. identification
No. D-229216, Research Analyst, Office of Chief of Counsel for
War Crimes, authorized 17 February 1947.

JOHN BOLL, U.S. Civilian, A.G.O. identification
No. A-44412, Research Analyst, Office of Chief of Counsel for
War Crimes, authorized 24 November 1946.

ALFRED H. ELBAU, U.S. Civilian, A.G.O. identification
No. A-165513, Research Analyst, Office of Chief of Counsel for
War Crimes, authorized 20 March 1947.

MORIZ KANDEL, U.S. Civilian, A.G.O. identification
No. D-44542, Research Analyst, Office of Chief of Counsel for
War Crimes, authorized 4 February 1947.

KURT HAUPTMANN, U.S. Civilian, A.G.O. identification
No. D-246323, Research Analyst, Office of Chief of Counsel for
War Crimes, authorized 11 July 1946.

HERMAN LANG, U.S. Civilian, A.G.O. identification
No. D-143691, Research Analyst, Office of Chief of Counsel for
War Crimes, authorized 20 May 1946.

FRED OPEL, U.S. civilian, A.G.O. identification
No. D-11688, Research Analyst, Office of Chief of Counsel for
War Crimes, authorized 15 July 1946.

GEORGE MARTIN, Allied Civilian, E.T.O. identification
No. 20074, Research Analyst, Office of Chief of Counsel for
War Crimes, authorized 17 December 1946.

EMILE B. SKRALY, U.S. Civilian, A.G.O. identification
No. D-094236, Research Analyst, Office of Chief of Counsel for
War Crimes, authorized 26 August 1946.

MAX VON FRANKENBERG, Allied Civilian, E.T.O. identification
No. 20051, Research Analyst, Office of Chief of Counsel for
War Crimes, authorized 28 August 1946.

PAUL HAZENI, Allied Civilian, E.T.O. identification
No. 20050, Research Analyst, Office of Chief of Counsel for
War Crimes, authorized 26 August 1946.

GEORGE HALPERN, U.S. Civilian, A.G.O. identification
No. D-079094, Research Analyst, Office of Chief of Counsel for
War Crimes, authorized 24 October 1946.

KARL KALTHER, U.S. Civilian, A.G.O. identification
No. D-231664, Research Analyst, Office of Chief of Counsel for
War Crimes, authorized 23 May 1947.

W. LEWALD, U.S. Civilian, A.G.O. identification No. D-094412,
Interrogator, Office of Chief of Counsel for War Crimes,
authorized 31 December 1946.

15 August 1947

Telford Taylor

TELFORD TAYLOR
Brigadier General, USA
Chief of Counsel for War Crimes

EXECUTIVE ORDER 9547

Providing For Representation of the United States In Preparing And Prosecuting Charges of Atrocities and War Crimes Against The Leaders of the European Axis Powers And Their Principal Agents and Accessories.

By virtue of the authority vested in me as President and as Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy, under the Constitution and statutes of the United States, it is ordered as follows:

1. Associate Justice Robert H. Jackson is hereby designated to act as Representative of the United States and as its Chief of Counsel in preparing and prosecuting charges of atrocities and war crimes against such of the leaders of the European Axis powers and their principal agents and accessories as the United States may agree with any of the United Nations to bring to trial before an international military tribunal. He shall serve without additional compensation but shall receive such allowance for expenses as may be authorized by the President.
2. The Representative named herein is authorized to select and recommend to the President or to the head of any executive department, independent establishment, or other federal agency necessary personnel to assist in the performance of his duties hereunder. The head of each executive department, independent establishment, and other federal agency is hereby authorized to assist the Representative named herein in the performance of his duties hereunder and to employ such personnel and make such expenditures, within the limits of appropriations now named herein as he may deem necessary to accomplish the purposes of this order, and may make available, assign, or detail for duty with the Representative named herein such members of the armed forces and other personnel as may be requested for such purposes.
3. The Representative named herein is authorized to cooperate with, and receive the assistance of, any foreign government to the extent deemed necessary by him to accomplish the purposes of this order.

HARRY S. TRUMAN

THE WHITE HOUSE
May 2, 1945.

(E.R. DOC. 68-1156: Filed May 3, 1945: 10:57 a.m.)

EXECUTIVE ORDER 9679

Amendment of Executive Order No. 9547 of May 2, 1945, entitled "Providing for Representation of the United States in Preparing and Prosecuting Charges of Atrocities and War Crimes Against the Leaders of the European Axis Powers and Their Principal Agents and Accessories".

By virtue of the authority vested in me as President and Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy, under the Constitution and statutes of the United States, it is ordered as follows:

1. In addition to the authority vested in the Representative of the United States and its Chief of Counsel by Paragraph 1 of Executive Order No. 9547 of May 2, 1945, to prepare and prosecute charges of atrocities and war crimes against such of the leaders of the European Axis powers and their accessories as the United States may agree with any of the United Nations to bring to trial before an international military tribunal, such Representative and Chief of Counsel shall have the authority to proceed before United States military or occupation tribunals, in proper cases, against other Axis adherents, including but not limited to cases against members of groups and organizations declared criminal by the said international military tribunal.

2. The present Representative and Chief of Counsel is authorized to designate a Deputy Chief of Counsel, to whom he may assign responsibility for organizing and planning the prosecution of charges of atrocities and war crimes, other than those now being prosecuted as Case No. 1 in the international military tribunal, and, as he may be directed by the Chief of Counsel, for conducting the prosecution of such charges of atrocities and war crimes.

3. Upon vacation of office by the present representative and Chief of Counsel the functions, duties, and powers of the Representative of the United States and its Chief of Counsel, as specified in the said Executive Order No. 9547 of May 2, 1945, as amended by this order, shall be vested in a Chief of Counsel for War Crimes to be appointed by the United States Military Governor for Germany, or by his successor.

4. The said Executive Order No. 9547 of May 2, 1945, is amended accordingly.

/s/ HARRY S. TRUMAN

The White House,
January 16, 1946.

(F.R. Doc. 46-293; Filed Jan. 17, 1946; 11:08 a.m.)

OFFICE OF U. S. CHIEF OF COUNSEL
APO 124-A U. S. ARMY

29 March 1946

GENERAL MEMORANDUM NO. 15

Subject: Organization for Subsequent Proceedings.

In order to expedite the preparation of subsequent cases and to assure continuity in their management, it has been agreed that a division shall now be set up in the Office of Chief of Counsel temporarily, but eventually to be transferred intact to Military Government, and that such division function under a Deputy Chief of Counsel who, upon retirement of the present Chief of Counsel, shall become Chief of Counsel for War Crimes under Military Government.

Accordingly, the President of the United States on January 16, 1946, amended the Executive Order No. 9547 of May 2, 1945, which provided for representation of the United States in prosecuting war crimes, by adding:

"...2. The present Representative and Chief of Counsel is authorized to designate a Deputy Chief of Counsel, to whom he may assign responsibility for organizing and planning the prosecution of charges of atrocities and war crimes other than those now being prosecuted as Case No. 1 in the International Military Tribunal, and as he may be directed by the Chief of Counsel, for conducting the prosecution of such charges of atrocities and war crimes.

"3. Upon vacation of office by the present Representative and Chief of Counsel, the functions, duties, and powers of the representative of the United States and its Chief of Counsel, as specified in the said Executive Order No. 9547 of May 2, 1945, as amended by this order, shall be vested in a Chief of Counsel for War Crimes to be appointed by the United States Military Governor for Germany or by his successor."

NOW, THEREFORE, I do hereby

1. Name and appoint Colonel Telford Taylor as Deputy Chief of Counsel and assign to him responsibility for organizing and planning the prosecution of charges of atrocities and war crimes other than those now being prosecuted as Case No. 1 in the International Military Tribunal as provided in Article 2 of the Executive Order.

2. Transfer to the jurisdiction of the said Deputy Chief of Counsel the Subsequent Proceedings Division created by General Memorandum No. 13 on January 12, 1946,

subject however to the administrative control of the Executive Officer, Brigadier General Robert J. Gill. O. C. C. personnel which is no longer needed for the present trial may be assigned to the Subsequent Proceedings Division. Additional personnel necessary will be employed for or assigned to the Subsequent Proceedings Division and it is to be noted that certain restrictions applicable to O.C.C. personnel may not be applicable to the recruitment of new personnel which may be employed under Military Government regulations. All recruitment and activity of the Subsequent Proceedings Division is subject to the priority of Case No. 1 now pending. Nothing in this order affects the responsibility for conduct of Case No. 1 to its completion.

In so far as possible, separate records will be maintained of all personnel, salaries, expenses, and other administrative matters.

/s/ Robert H. Jackson
ROBERT H. JACKSON
Chief of Counsel

CERTIFIED TRUE COPY:

Alexander C. Granzin
ALEXANDER C. GRANZIN
Major, Infantry

HEADQUARTERS
US FORCES, EUROPEAN THEATER

GENERAL ORDERS)
NUMBER 301)

24 October 1946

Office of Chief of Counsel for War Crimes.....I
Chief Prosecutor.....II
Announcement of Assignments.....III

I- OFFICE OF CHIEF OF COUNSEL FOR WAR CRIMES: Effective this date, the Office of Chief of Counsel for War Crimes is transferred to the Office of Military Government for Germany (US). The Chief of Counsel for War Crimes will report directly to the Deputy Military Governor and will work in close liaison with the Legal Adviser of the Office of Military Government for Germany and with the Theater Judge Advocate.

II- CHIEF PROSECUTOR: Effective this date, the Chief of Counsel for War Crimes will also serve as Chief Prosecutor under the Charter of the International Military Tribunal, established by the Agreement of 8 August 1945.

III- ANNOUNCEMENT OF ASSIGNMENTS: Effective this date, Brigadier General TELFORD TAYLOR, USA, is announced as Chief of Counsel for War Crimes, in which capacity he will also serve as Chief Prosecutor for the United States under the Charter of the International Military Tribunal, established by the Agreement of 8 August 1945.

BY COMMAND OF GENERAL McNARNEY:

C. R. HUEBNER
Maj. General, GSC,
Chief of Staff

OFFICIAL:

s/t GEORGE F. HERBERT
Colonel, AGD
Adjutant General.

DISTRIBUTION D

HEADQUARTERS

U.S. FORCES, EUROPEAN THEATER

AG 201-Taylor, Telford (O) AGC

APC 757
24 October 1946

SUBJECT: Appointment of Chief of Counsel for War Crimes.

TO: Brigadier General Telford Taylor, O-918566,
Office of U.S. Chief of Counsel, APC 124A, U.S. Army

In accordance with paragraph 3 of Executive Order Number 9679 of the President of the United States, 16 January 1946, Brigadier General Telford Taylor, U.S.A., O-918566, is hereby designated Chief of Counsel for War Crimes, and will also serve as Chief Prosecutor for the United States under the Charter of the International Military Tribunal, established by the Agreement of 8 August 1945.

BY COMMAND OF GENERAL McNARNEY:

(S) GEORGE F. HERBERT

GEORGE F. HERBERT
Colonel AGD
Adjutant General.

CERTIFIED A TRUE COPY:

Alexander C. Granzin
ALEXANDER C. GRANZIN
Major, Infantry

Page 153 of:
National Socialistic
Yearbook 1941

(Nationalsozialistisches Jahrbuch 1941)

Edited by: Dr. Robert Ley
Published by: Central Publishing
House of the N.S.D.A.P. Franz Eher,
successor Munich

THE PROGRAM OF THE NSDAP

The program is the political foundation of the NSDAP and accordingly, the primary political law of the State. It has been made brief and clear intentionally.

All legal precepts must be applied in the spirit of the party program.

Since the taking over of control, the Führer has succeeded in the realization of essential portions of the party program from the fundamental to the detail.

The Party Program of the NSDAP was proclaimed on the 24 February 1920 by Adolf Hitler at the first large Party gathering in Munich and since that day has remained unaltered. Within the national socialist philosophy is summarized in 25 points:

- 1) We demand the unification of all Germans in the Greater Germany on the basis of the right of self-determination of peoples.
- 2) We demand equality of rights for the German people in respect to the other nations; abrogation of the peace treaties of Versailles and St. Germain.
- 3) We demand land and territory (colonies) for the sustenance of our people, and colonization for our surplus population.
- 4) Only a member of the race can be a citizen. A member of the race can only be one who is of German blood, without consideration of creed. Consequently no Jew can be a member of the race.
- 5) Whoever has no citizenship is to be able to live in Germany only as a guest, and must be under the authority of legislation for foreigners.
- 6) The right to determine matters concerning administration and law belongs only to the citizen. Therefore we demand that every public office, of any sort whatsoever, whether in the Reich, the county or municipality, be filled only by citizens. We combat the corrupting parliamentary economy, office-holding and according to party indications without consideration of character or abilities.
- 7) We demand that the state be charged first with providing the opportunity for a livelihood and way of life for the citizens. If it is impossible to sustain the total population of the State, then the members of foreign nations (non-citizens) are to be expelled from the Reich.
- 8) Any further immigration of non-citizens is to be prevented. We demand that all non-Germans, who have immigrated to Germany since the 2 August 1914, be forced immediately to leave the Reich.
- 9) All citizens must have equal rights and obligations.

- 10) The first obligation of every citizen must be to work both spiritually and physically. The activity of individuals is not to counteract the interests of the universality, but must have its result within the framework of the whole for the benefit of all.

Consequently we demand:

- 11) Abolition of unearned (work and labour) incomes. Breaking of rent-slavery.
- 12) In consideration of the monstrous sacrifices in property and blood that each war demands of the people, personal enrichment through war must be designated as a crime against the people. Therefore we demand the total confiscation of all war profits.
- 13) We demand the nationalization of all (previous) associated industries (trusts).
- 14) We demand a division of profits of all heavy industries.
- 15) We demand an expansion on a large scale of old age welfare.
- 16) We demand the creation of a working middle class and its consequent immediate communalization of the great warehouses and their being leased at low cost to small firms, the utmost consideration of all small firms in contracting with the State, county or municipality.
- 17) We demand a land reform suitable to our needs, provision of a law for the free expropriation of land for the purposes of public utility, abolition of taxes on land and prevention of all speculation in land.
- 18) We demand struggle without consideration against those whose activity is injurious to the general interest. Common national criminals, usurers, schismatics and so forth are to be punished with death, without consideration of confession or race.
- 19) We demand substitution of a German common law in place of the Roman law serving a materialistic world-order.
- 20) The state is to be responsible for a fundamental reconstruction of the whole national education system, to enable every capable and industrious German to obtain higher education and subsequently introduction into leading positions. The plans of instruction of all educational institutions are to conform with the experiences of practical life. The comprehension of the concept of the State must be striven for by the school (Staatsbürgerkunde) as early as the beginning of understanding. We demand the abolition of the system of a State of estates making intellectually blind children of poor parents without consideration of position or profession.
- 21) The State is to care for the elevating national health by protecting the mother and child, by outlawing child-labor, by the encouragement of physical fitness, by means of the legal establishment of a gymnastic and sport obligation, by the utmost support of all organizations concerned with the physical instruction of the young.
- 22) We demand abolition of the mercenary troops and formation of a national army.
- 23) We demand legal opposition to alcoholism and its propagation through the press. In order to enable the provision of a German press, we demand, that a) all writers and employees of the news papers appearing in the German language be members of the race: by German newspapers be required to have the express permission of the

State to be published. They are not to be printed in the German language.
c) Non-Germans are forbidden to have any financial interest in German publications, or any influence on them, and are punishable for violations the closing of such a publication as well as the immediate exclusion from the Reich of the non-German concerned. Publications which are counter to the general good are to be forbidden. We demand legal prosecution of artistic and literary forms which exert a destructive influence on our national life, and the closure of organizations opposing the above demands.

- 24) We demand freedom of religion for all religious denominations within the state so long as they do not endanger its existence or oppose the moral sense of the German race. The Party is such a movement the standpoint of a positive Christianity without binding itself fectionally to any one denomination. It combats the Jewish-materialistic spirit within and around us, and is convinced that a lasting recovery of our nation can only succeed from within in the framework of common utility preceded in individual utility.
- 25) For the execution of all of this we demand the formation of a strong central power in the Reich. Unfettered authority of the central government over the whole Reich and its organizations is general. The forming of state and professional chambers for the execution of the laws made by the Reich within the various states of the confederation. The leaders of the Party, too, if necessary by sacrificing their own lives, to support by the execution of the points set forth above without consideration.

Adolf Hitler proclaimed the following explanation for this program on the 12 April 1928:

EXPLANATION

Regarding the false interpretations of Point 17 of our program of the year on the part of our opponents, the following definition is necessary:

"Since the NSDAP stands on the platform of private ownership it happens that the present gratuitous expropriation concerns only the creation of new opportunities to expropriate if necessary, land which has been illegally acquired or is not administered from the view-point of the national welfare. This is directed primarily against the Jewish land-speculator concerns."

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO. 170-PS

19 November 1945

I, FRED HISEBERGALL, 2nd Lt Inf, O-1335567, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages, and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document No. 170-PS.

FRED HISEBERGALL
2nd Lt Inf
O-1335567.

"Mein Kampf"
by
Adolf Hitler

41st Edition 1933

Verlag Franz Eher Nachfolger G.m.b.H.
Munich
(Page 152 lines 10-33)

Moreover, such a territorial policy can not be accomplished in, let us say, Camerooon, but today almost exclusively in Europe. One must take the point of view, coolly and soberly, that it certainly can not be the intention of Heaven to give one people fifty times as much space (Grund und Boden) on this earth as to another. One should not permit himself to be diverted in this case by political boundaries from the boundaries of eternal justice. If this earth really has space (raum) for all to live, then we should be given the territory necessary for us to live.

Of course, one will not do that gladly. Then, however, the right of self-preservation comes into force; that which is denied to kindness, the first will have to take. If our forefathers had made their decisions dependent on the same pacifistic nonsense as the present then we would possess only a third of our present territory; a German people would then, however, scarcely have anymore worries to bear in Europe. No--we owe the two Eastern districts (Ostmark) of the Reich to the natural determination to fight for the self-existence and therewith that inner strength of the greatness of national and racial territory (Staats- und Volksgebiet), which alone have sustained us until today.

(page 153 line 13--page 154 line 6)

Accordingly, the sole possibility for Germany to carry out a healthy territorial policy consisted of acquiring new territory in Europe itself. For this purpose colonies cannot serve as long as they do not appear to be suitable to the greatest extent to be settled by Europeans. But there was no longer any possibility in the 19th Century to acquire such colonies in a peaceful way. Also such a colonial policy could have been carried out with severe struggles only, which then could have been fought more appropriately in order to gain

territory on the home continent itself and not for territories outside Europe.

Of course, such a decision then requires undivided devotion. It is not possible to undertake a task half-heartedly or hesitatingly if its execution seems to be feasible only by expending the very last ounce of energy. But then, the entire political leadership of the Reich had to be devoted to this purpose exclusively; never was any step to be taken which was guided by other considerations than the recognition of this task and its prerequisites. One had to become clear in one's mind that this goal could be achieved by fight alone and then had to face this armed conflict with calmness and composure.

Thus all the facts were to be examined solely from this viewpoint and evaluated according to their usefulness. If one wanted territory in Europe, this could be done on the whole at the expense of Russia, and the new Reich had to set out to march over the road of the former Knights, in order to give soil to the German plow by means of the German sword, and to give daily bread to the nation.

(page 365 line 34- page 366 line 5)

Thus the question of how to regain German power is not: How shall we manufacture-arms?, but: How do we create the spirit which enables a nation to bear arms? If this spirit governs a people, the will finds thousands of ways, each of which ends with a weapon! Let one give ten pistols to a coward and he still will not be able to fire a shot in case of attack. Therefore they are of less value to him than a knotted-stick would be to a courageous man.

(page 596 line 35 - page 597 line 9)

But there is of course again a natural explanation for this. The lack of a great creative idea means at all times an impairment of the fighting spirit. The conviction that it is right to use even the most brutal weapons is always connected with the existence of a fanatical belief that it is necessary that a revolutionary new order of this earth should become victorious. A movement which does not fight for these highest aims and ideals will therefore never

resort to the ultimate weapon.

(page 688 line 37 - page 689 line 18)

The prerequisite for regaining lost territories is the intensive furthering and strengthening of the remainder of the state, as well as the unshakeable conviction which slumbers in the heart, to devote at a given time the new strength which has been acquired in this way, to the service of liberating and uniting the entire nation; in other words, to place the interests of the detached territories into the background as compared to the sole interest to win for the remainder the amount of political might and power which is the prerequisite to counteract the will of the victorious enemy. Because oppressed countries are led back into the lap of a common Reich by a mighty sword and not by flaming protests.

It is the task of the inner political leaders of a people to forge this sword; to safeguard the work of the smith and to seek comrades in arms is the task of the foreign policy.

(page 738 line 33 - page 739 line 8)

The boundaries of 1914 do not mean anything for the future of the German nation. They did not represent either a defense of the past nor would they represent a power in the future. The German people will not obtain either its inner compactness by them, nor will its nutrition be secured by them, nor do these boundaries appear from a military standpoint as appropriate or even satisfactory, nor can they, in the last place, improve the relation which at present exists between us and the world-powers, or, in more accurate terms, with the real world powers. The distance from England will not become shorter, the size of the union will not be reached; not even France would suffer an essential reduction of its global importance.

(page 738 line 20 - page 740 line 2)

In contrast, we, National Socialists, have to hold on steadily to our

foreign political goals, namely, to secure on this earth the territory due to the German people. And this action is the only one which will make bloody sacrifice before God and our German posterity appear justified: Before God, in so far as we are placed upon this earth with the destiny to fight for our daily bread, as creatures to whom nothing is given free and who owe their position as rulers of the earth, solely to the geniality and courage with which they can achieve and keep it; but before our German posterity in so far as we have not shed a single citizen's blood which would not have given thousands of others to posterity. The soil on which in the future the generations of German peasants can beget strong sons will sanction the utilization of the sons of today and will acquit the responsible statesmen, even if persecuted at present, of blood-guilt and of the sacrifice of the people.

(page 754 line 13 - page 755 line 3)

The political testament of the German People for its foreign policy should and must always follow this line of thought:

Never tolerate the rise of two continental powers in Europe. See in every attempt to organize a second military power, even in the form of a state which has military potentialities, an attack against Germany and take therefrom not only the right but the duty to prevent by all means, including the use of arms, the rise of such a state, respectively to destroy such a state if it has already arisen. Take care that the strength of our people should have its foundation not in colonies but in the soil of the home Country in Europe. Never consider the Reich as secured as long as it cannot give to every descendant of our people his own bit of soil for centuries to come, never forget that the most sacred right on this earth is the right to own the soil which one wants to cultivate and the most sacred sacrifice, the blood which is shed for this soil.

17 November 1945

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO. 2760-A-PS

I, Willard E. Skidmore, Lt. (jg), USNR, 391590, Hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of the indicated excerpt from Document No. 2760-A-PS.

WILLARD E. SKIDMORE
Lt. (jg) USNR 28
391590

27413-25

TRANSLATION OF EXCERPTS FROM DOCUMENT No. NI-9358
OFFICE OF CHIEF OF COUNSEL FOR WAR CRIMES

(Cover Page)

MY STRUGGLE (MEIN KAMPF)

by

Adolf Hitler

Volume 1

A Reckoning

Stamp: Eagle
1935

Central publishing house of the NSDAP, Franz Eher Successor
Munich 2, NO

-.-.-.-.-

(page 1 of original)

I, p.322.

"Had it not been possible for them to make use of people of inferior race, the Aryans would never have been able to take the first steps towards their subsequent culture; just as, without the help of certain suitable animals which they were able to tame, the technical achievements, which have now enabled them gradually to dispense with these same animals, would never have been possible."

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(page 2 of original)

I, p.323.

"The presence of inferior peoples constituted one of the most essential prerequisites for the establishment of higher cultures."

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(2nd Cover Page)

MY STRUGGLE (MEIN KAMPF)

by

Adolf Hitler

Volume 2

The National
Socialist Movement

Stamp: Eagle
1936

Central publishing house of the NSDAP, Franz Eher Successor
Munich

-.-.-.-.-

(page 3 of original)

II, p.741.

"Just as our forefathers did not receive the earth on which we now live as a gift from Heaven, but had to struggle for it with their very lives, so in the future, land, and with it life for our people, will not be granted us by divine grace, but by the might of a victorious sword."

.....

(page 4 of original)

II, p.766.

"As long as the eternal conflict between France and Germany is waged only in the form of a German defense against the French attack that conflict can never be decided, and indeed from century to century Germany will lose one position after another. If we study the movements of the frontiers of the German language, from the twelfth century to the present day, we can hardly hope for a successful outcome from an attitude and a type of progress which has hitherto been so detrimental for us.

Only when this has been fully grasped in Germany, so that the national will to live is no longer allowed to exhaust itself in merely passive defense, but is mustered for a final decisive conflict with France, and flung into a last, conclusive struggle with major objectives for Germany: only then will it be possible to put an end to the eternal conflict, so fruitless in itself, between ourselves and France; presuming, of course that Germany sees in the annihilation of France nothing more than a means of thereby making it possible for our people

(page 5 of original)

II, p.767.

finally to expand in another quarter. Today there are eighty million Germans in Europe ! But our foreign policy will be recognized as rightly conducted only when, after barely a hundred years, 250 million Germans are living on this continent, not packed together like the coolies in the factories of the rest of the world, but as tillers of the soil and workers whose labor will be a mutual assurance for their existence."

.....

TRANSLATION OF EXCERPTS FROM DOCUMENT No. NI-9358
CONTINUED

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

15 August 1947

I, Patricia WOOD, No. 20139, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages and that the above is a true and correct translation of the Excerpts from Document No. NI-9358.

.....

Patricia WOOD
No. 20139

TRANSLATION OF EXCERPT OF DOCUMENT No. NI-6531
OFFICE OF CHIEF OF COUNSEL FOR WAR CRIMES

Cover Page

FROM WORKS TO WORKS (Von Werk zu Werk)

Monthly Periodical of the Works Combine of I.G. Farbenindustrie
Aktiengesellschaft
of April 1938

FROM WORKS TO WORKS (Von Werk zu Werk)

Monthly Periodical of the Works Combine of I.G. Farbenindustrie
Aktien-Gesellschaft

List of Contents for 1939

Ludwigshafen Edition

(page 60 of original)

.....

A word from Adolf HITLER's book: Mein Kampf ("My Struggle")
which was gloriously fulfilled.

Chapter I
Homo.

Today I consider it a propitious omen that fate should have allotted
to me of all places to be borne in Braunsau on the river Inn: little
town situated on the frontier between the two German States which we
of the younger generation at least, consider it our mission in life
at any price to reunite.

German Austria shall return to the great German Motherland: but not
for any economic reasons. No, no: Even if this union made no difference
from the economic point of view: even if its effects were positively
harmful, it must still be effected. One race must be united in one
Reich. The German People has no moral right to embark on a colonial
policy so long as it cannot even include its own children within the
borders of one state.

Only when the frontiers of the Reich embrace all Germans to the last
man without being able to provide for them, will the moral right
to the acquisition of foreign soil be borne from the nation's distress.

The plough will then become the sword and from the tears of War
shall spring the daily bread for future generations. Thus this small
frontier town of Braunsau appears to me to be the symbol of a great
task.

TRANSLATION OF EXCERPT OF DOCUMENT No. NI-6531
CONTINUED

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

4 June 1947

I, Leonard A. LAWRENCE, Civ. No. 30 138, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages and that the above is a true and correct translation of Excerpt of document No. NI-6531.

Leonard A. LAWRENCE
Civ. No. 30 138.

never to allow the necessary will for the third basic demand to be dulled:
 "We demand land and soil (colonies) to feed our people and to settle our
 surplus population".

National Socialism even sees in the manner of the State construction and state leadership a result of a certain racial character. If one allows a strange race - consequently other impulses - to take part in it, the purity of the organic expression will be falsified and the racial existence will be crippled. The history of the last centuries with its disintegrated parliamentarianism caused by the Jewish high finance, is a sad example of this. The history of Germany of the last decades, especially its history since 1918, is even more smattering in this respect.

This entire conception of state is countered with a basically different one by National Socialism. It recognizes, that individual tribes of the German language domain may be different, but they belong to races closely related to each other, that mingling among such tribal companions have produced new vital formations, among other the versatile and yet German man, but that a merger with the basically different and indeed Jewish counter race, completely different according to its entire spiritual and physical structure, and with similar rays emanating from Asia Minor only resulted in bastardization.

Therefore National Socialism demands as fourth fundamental point:
 "State citizen can only be the is a member of the German community. Member of the German community can only be who is of German blood, regardless of his religion. No Jew can therefore be a member of the German community".

Even this principle follows of course the belief, that the Jew - as far as he may stay in Germany at all - is to be regarded as a guest and consequently is subject to law as are all members of foreign states, peoples and races. Therefore the fifth point says:

"However is not a citizen of the state, may only live as a guest in Germany and must be subject to the laws for foreigners".

The present day depersonalized parliamentarianism has led to the deterioration of our entire public opinion, and was not only not conducive for choosing the elite of the best, but the best uncorruptible instead. If no additional elements have become the proto-type of the modern politician, all legislative parliamentary states and everywhere in the army they have made themselves willing tools of the high finance and of international big business recently also of industry, which, in order to defend itself, in the twelfth hour has also taken recourse to the means of organizing political parties, in order to support purely private interests with power politics.

From these premises the National Socialism demands in sixth place:
 "The right to direct the leadership and the laws of the state can only be relegated to the state citizen. Therefore we demand, that each public office no matter which, no matter whether in the Reich, province or community, must be occupied only by citizens of the state.
 "No right the corrupt parliamentary management of leading out officers for party favors, without regard to character and capabilities".

National Socialism regards as one of its most important tasks of a German people's government not so much the protection of a form of government in itself as of a few parliamentarily bankrupt ministers, than the guarantee of a people's protection. To what extent foreigners may be tolerated in Germany can only be determined by German life necessities. Therefore the following are points of the program says:

"We demand that the state be obligated to firstly take care of the chances to work and live of the state citizens. If it should not be possible to feed the entire state population, members of foreign nations (non-citizens) are to be expelled from the Reich.

All further immigration of non-Germans is to be prevented. ... demand that all non-Germans, who have immigrated into Germany since 2 August 1914, will be forced to leave the Reich immediately."

If one lets the welfare of the entire working people rally and truly take precedent over other so-called principles, the fight against usurers and profiteers can only be carried out with the utmost ruthlessness. Especially today since a supposedly revolutionary flood of all previously harmed influences has been set free. In such times no half measures can help, as experience has taught, but only a series of deterrent examples. The life of millions of usured people is worth more than that of several thousand usurers. If anyone today opposes the death penalty for usurers, he shows, that all his speeches about peoples' welfare, humanity and so on, are nothing but common lies, to cover up either cowardness of conviction or connection with the usurers. The conduct of Marxist labor leaders illuminates the situation with a flash...

National Socialism has only one interest: that of the intellectually and physically productive working man. Therefore the 18th principle says: "We demand that ruthless fight against those, who through their activities harm the common interest. Common criminals against the people, usurers, profiteers and others are to be punished by death, without consideration for their religion or race."

The dictators of Versailles knew that they did, what they abolished the German Army and put a troop of mercenaries in its place. And their Marxist and democratic friends in Germany knew equally well why they all supported the disarmament requests of the Entente, yes, why they actually demanded them. The place of sense of duty and honorability was to be taken by the sound of the coin, the spirit of democracy! But despite all prophecy the old character still lives on today, despite the shame and disgrace of the time.

Germany now stands in an extremely difficult world political situation. In spite of this it is vital for everybody - be he a laborer, civil servant or politician - never to dull the will, and to call back to life the traditions of a great time. Not in order to conquer the world, as external and internal enemies contend, but to cultivate the conception of honor and duty again against the corruption of the world of today. Therefore the 22nd point of our National Socialism laconically says:

"We demand the abolishing of the mercenary troop and the creation of a people's army."

That the blood shed by two million German heroes in all parts of the world has so far been in vain is primarily the fault of the people for whom the expression "press scoundrel" is still too mild. If a German Reich is once more to come in existence, the first indispensable prerequisite will be that all these poison centers must be exterminated and the still living guilty press-bandits must be brought to justice before a German court.

National Socialism holds the opinion, that all constructive and impulsive movements within the German people have of course the right to express themselves. But equally natural is to maintain the premise that the goal of all the different manifestations of a direction of will, is only the furthering of the welfare of the German people. No other goal has justification of existence in the German Reich and representatives of a direction which uses the German nation or parts thereof only as a means to reach international fame or power, will as a matter of course loose the German citizenship and if needed also the right to belong to the State.

Once one has the conviction, that the Japanese, the Negro or the Jew etc. according to his innermost character, only be himself and not European, it follows also - instinctively as well as consciously - that he pursues entirely different intellectual, political aims; all of these ideas which are the same in all phases of life lead to the 23rd demand:

"We demand the legal fight against conscious political lies and their dissemination through the press. To facilitate the creation of a German press

we demand that :

- a) A. Editors and collaborators on papers which appear in the German language must be members of the people.
- b) Non-German papers in order to appear require the specific permission of the state. They may not be printed in the German language.
- c) Each financial participation in German papers or their influencing through non-Germans be prohibited by law and no request as punishment for infringements the shutting down of such papers, as well as the immediate expulsion from the Reich of the non-Germans concerned.

Newspapers which violate the common good are to be forbidden. We demand the lawful fight against a direction of art and literature, which has a disintegrating influence on our national life and the closing of entertainments which violate the foregoing demands.

As previously stated it is impossible for any parliament to carry out even the slightest measures of liberating people. All parliaments today are directly, at best indirectly dependent on the high finance and its affiliated trusts, which are enslaving all peoples. Their reign, however, is built on the misery of the people. The representatives do not take care of the people's interest, but of those groups of economy which have paid for their elections. The situation is made more tragic by the fact that parliament is not confronted by a "constitutional" opposition. Ministers are appointed and dismissed by the majority party, and they are more irresponsible than ever a tyrant was. As each minister can take recourse to the untouchable decision of the majority of the people's representation, he is actually being trained for irresponsible action. The anonymous parliament today is the de facto lawmaker in all affairs of state, it is the executive branch and judiciary in one person; without the existence of an authority which really exercises control in the interest of the people.

Thus the real life of the nations developed completely outside of the people's representation. Everything active has long lost faith in parliaments and majority rule. The rootless unracial (unvolkisch) idea of democratic parliamentarism is dying today and no longer finds followers who are ready to give their lives at the barricades for this reform of constitution. No propaganda will ever be able to revive this corpse.

The division of ideas proceed with unerring logic. Those disappointed by democracy went over to socialism, those dissatisfied with it, the more active they are, the more energetically do they move into the ranks of the storm column of state destructing communism. Here lies the last consequence of the self-disintegrating parliamentarism.

On the other hand, however, all these active ones either together or the fight in principle the entire lying parliamentary system, inimical to the people - in political, economic and ideological respect -:

National Socialism recognizes that the fate of the German people will not be decided by compromises but by fights for power. Only a strong political power, uniformly directed in the general German sense, ruthlessly putting common good before individual welfare, will be able to clean up the evils of this time. Within the great power groups of the globe there can only be a strong national central power for interior and foreign politics if one strives at all for a position of Germany, which will make it once more fit for treaties with other nations.

But National Socialism still believes that its principles and ideology - though in individually different suitable ways of fight according to racial-national conditions - will be directives far beyond the borders of Germany and the inevitable fights for power in other countries of Europe and Africa. There too a decision of ideas must take place, and the racial-nationalistic fight against the every similar loan-capitalistic and marxist internationalism must be taken up. National Socialism believes that once the great world battle is concluded, after the defeat of the present epoch, there will be a time when the symbols will be woven into the different banners of the Germanic peoples as the Aryan symbol of rejuvenation. The German fight again today has become a world fight, even if the German National Socialists are led by

nothing, absolutely nothing, but their endless love for the German people and, born from it, the endless hatred against its destroyers...

If, however, in the great coming fight the thought of the personality is to take place of the majority ideal this will have to be realized on a small scale already. The elected leader will and must be leader. That means, that in the domain of the task put before him, the elected has full freedom of action and direction on the strength of his own responsibility, undeterred by restraining intermediate voices. Only in such way are accomplishment, purposefulness and final victory possible.

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT No. 2433 PS

9 January 1946

I, GOETZ MAYER, T/5, 33812169, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document No. 2433 PS.

GOETZ MAYER
T/5
33812169

No. 247

Voelkischer Beobachter Monday 4 September 1933

ADOLF HITLER'S FINAL ADDRESS AT THE CONGRESS

NATIONAL SOCIALIST LEADERSHIP HIERARCHY GERMANY'S EUROPEAN MISSION.

- - - - -

The gap which exists between the lowest type of what may still be classified as Man and our highest races is wider than that between the lowest Man and the highest Ape. Without certain races which in our time determine the cultural aspect of the world, there would be no such thing as human civilization. Neither climate nor education, but Man himself, endowed by Providence with this faculty, created it.

But even though this civilizing faculty is naturally inherent in certain races, it cannot be fully effective, unless certain favorable conditions do exist.

Man as an individual, no matter what strength he may be possessed of, will never be capable of achieving higher aims, unless he can mobilize the strength of many to act as one in the service of one idea, one conception, one Will. One glance at the workings of Nature shows us that the individual members of a pure race are more or less equal, not only physically, but also in character and as regards their faculties. This equality is the greatest obstacle in the way of forming a superior working community, for if every superior civilization receives its imprint by virtue of achievements which are due solely to a concentration of human labor, then the many must sacrifice part of their individual liberty and submit to the will of One.

Much as Reason may counsel it, it would be hard, in practice, to make a community of perfect equals see the reasons why in the end One individual must inevitably impose his will on the others. However, the two concepts "commanding and obeying" take on a basically different, more cogent meaning the moment individuals at different levels come into contact, when a common community is created for a special purpose by the stronger section. In the most primitive sense of the word, this happens already when Man imposes his will on the animals, robbing them of the freedom they have previously enjoyed integrating them into his animal

TRANSLATION OF EXCERPT OF DOCUMENT No. NI-8666
CONTINUED

(page 1 of original, cont'd)

economy, without bothering about the consent of his helpmates from the animal kingdom. Long before that happened, however, men had done the same among themselves.

The superior race - superior, in the first place, from the point of view of organisational ability, subjects itself to an inferior race thus entering into a relationship which now comprises races at different levels. It is not until then that the subjugation of the many to the will of just a few takes place, a few who are the product of the right is right principle, a right which - in nature - can be regarded as the only conceivable one, because it is rational.

No more voluntarily, let alone joyfully does a nation bow to the power of another, than does the mustang submit to the yoke of man.

However, in the course of a long development such coercion has frequently proved a blessing for all. It brought into existence those communities which, through the welding together of different races, formed the basis of organisation. The latter, however, demands the submission of the will and the actions of the many to the will and the energy of one and one alone!

In exactly the same degree as men discover the stupendous results of this concentration of their abilities and their labor they not only realize the expediency but moreover the necessity of such a course. Thus a great and significant Aryan civilization has not arisen where pure Aryans lived exclusively among themselves, but where they entered into a living relationship with different races not in the sense of a mingling of blood, but of an organisational special community. Thus, what the vanquished doubtlessly at first felt to be dire compulsion was to become a blessing for them later on,

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

25 June 1947

I, Mary Flack PERRY, Civ.No. 20 136, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages and that the above is a true and correct translation of excerpt of document No. NI - 8666.

Mary Flack PERRY,
20 136.

AFFIDAVIT

Statement of
Goschdter Paul Otto Gustav Schmidt

I, PAUL OTTO GUSTAV SCHMIDT, being first duly sworn on oath, state:

1. I was an interpreter in the German Foreign Office from 1923 - 1945. Prior to 1939, my duties consisted of interpreting and keeping the minutes of discussions at diplomatic conferences. Beginning in 1924 my primary assignments at diplomatic discussions included the following:

1924	Conference of Stresemann and Briand at London concerning Dawes Plan.
1924-1927	German-French trade negotiations in Paris.
1925	League of Nations.
1926	Meeting of League of Nations Assembly, Council and economic committees.
1927	World Economic Conference at Geneva.
1929	Hague Conference for final approval of Young Plan.
1930	Paris trade negotiations in reference to Saar, and other economic conferences.
1930ff	International cartel meetings.
1931	Laval visit to Berlin. Six Power Conference in London on economic matters. Visit of Brüning and Curtis to London.
1932	Geneva Disarmament Conference.
1933	League of Nations Assembly; other conferences in London.
1933-1935	Meeting of German and French trade delegations.
1935	Visit of Eden and Simon to Berlin.

I was first called to interpret for Hitler in connection with the 1935 visit of Simon and Eden to Berlin. In fact, I served at virtually every meeting at which Hitler and Ribbentrop participated, and was with Goering when important visitors called and when he represented Germany in diplomatic conferences abroad. In recognition of these services, I was made councillor of Legation in 1935, Minister II Class after Munich, and Minister I Class after Compiègne. Since 1939, I have been Director of WEH (Dienst des Reichsaussenministers), and in 1944 I was made Chief of the POW and Civilian Internee Section.

2. Whatever success and position I have enjoyed in the Foreign Office I owe to the fact that I made it my business at all times to possess thorough familiarity with the subject matter under discussion, and I endeavored to achieve intimate knowledge of the mentality of Hitler and the other leaders. Throughout the Hitler regime, I constantly endeavored to keep myself apprised as to what was going on in the Foreign Office and in related organizations, and I enjoyed such a position that it was possible to have ready access to key officials and to key personnel in their offices.

3. The general objectives of the Nazi leadership were apparent from the start, -- namely, the domination of the European continent, to be achieved, first, by the incorporation of all German-speaking groups in the Reich, and secondly, by territorial expansion under the slogan of "Lebensraum". The execution of these basic objectives, however, seemed to be characterized by improvisation. Each succeeding step apparently was carried out as each new situation arose, but all consistent with the ultimate objectives mentioned above.

4. The attempted putsch in Austria and the murder of Dollfus on 25 July 1934, seriously disturbed the career personnel of the Foreign Office because these events discredited Germany in the eyes of the world. It was common knowledge that the putsch had been engineered by the Party, and the fact that the attempted putsch followed so closely on the heels of the blood purge within Germany could not help but suggest the similarity of Nazi methods both in foreign and in domestic policy. This concern over the repercussions of the attempted putsch was again heightened by a recognition of the fact that these episodes were of influence in leading to the Franco-Soviet Consultative Pact of 5 December 1934, a defensive arrangement which was not headed as a warning by the Nazis.

5. The announcement in March of the establishment of a German

Air Force and of the introduction of conscription was followed on 2 May 1935 by the conclusion of a mutual assistance pact between France and the Soviet Union. The career personnel of the Foreign Office regarded this as a further very serious warning as to the potential consequences of German foreign policy, but the Nazi leaders only stiffened their attitude toward the Western Powers, declaring that they were not going to be intimidated. At this time, the career officials at least expressed their reservations to the Foreign Minister, Neurath. I do not know whether or not Neurath in turn related these expressions of concern to Hitler.

6. The reentry of the German Military forces into the Rhineland was preceded by Nazi diplomatic preparation in February. A German Communiqué of 21 Feb. 1936 reaffirmed that the French-Soviet Pact of mutual assistance was incompatible with the Locarno Treaties and the Covenant of the League. On the same day Hitler argued in an interview that no real grounds existed for conflict between Germany and France. Considered against the background statements in MEIN KAMPF offensive to France, the circumstances were such to suggest that the stage was being set for justifying some future act. I do not know how far in advance the march into the Rhineland was decided upon. I personally knew about it, and discussed it, approximately 2 or 3 weeks before it occurred. Considerable fear had been expressed, particularly in military circles, concerning the risk of this undertaking. Similar fears were felt by many in the Foreign Office. It was common knowledge in the Foreign Office, however, that Neurath was the only person in government circles consulted by Hitler who felt confident that the Rhineland could be remilitarized without armed opposition from Britain and France. Neurath's position throughout this period was one which would induce Hitler to have more faith in Neurath than in the general run of "old school" diplomats, whom he (Hitler) tended to hold in respect.

7. Although Italy did not consult Germany prior to commencement

of its war against Ethiopia, the Nazi policy makers were pleased with this technique for handling international affairs. They saw also the possibility in this war to draw Italy from Britain and France toward Germany, as well as the possibility of its undermining the collective security system of the League of Nations. The senior officials in the Foreign Office were very much concerned with the possibility of strong sanctions being applied, particularly if the war should be seized as an opportunity to apply pressure in the Fascist dictators. In this conflict, Germany gave assurances that it would assist Italy economically to the utmost. This was done in the beginning of the discussions regarding sanctions. I am unfamiliar with the details of the assistance granted, but it is probable that these matters were settled through the German commercial attache in Rome or by means of trade delegations.

6. Plans for annexation of Austria were a part of the Nazi program from the beginning. Italian opposition after the murder of Dollfuss temporarily forced a more careful approach to this problem, but the application of sanctions against Italy by the League, plus the rapid increase of German military strength, made safer the resumption of the Austrian program. When Goering visited Rome early in 1937, he declared that union of Austria and Germany was inevitable and could be expected sooner or later. Mussolini, hearing these words in German, remained silent, and protested only mildly when I translated them into French. The consummation of the Anschluss was essentially a party matter, in which von Papen's role was to preserve smooth diplomatic relations on the surface while the Party used more devious ways of preparing conditions for the expected move. The speech delivered by Papen on 18 Feb. 38, following the Berchtesgaden meeting, interpreted the Berchtesgaden agreement as the first step toward the establishment of a Central European commonwealth under the leadership of Germany. This was generally recognized in the Foreign Office as a clear prophecy of a Greater Germany which would embrace Austria.

9. The facts stated above are true to the best of my knowledge, information and belief. This declaration is made by me voluntarily and without compulsion. After reading over this statement I have signed and executed the same at OBERURSEL/Germany this 28 day of November 1945.

(Signed) Paul Otto Gustav Schmidt
PAUL OTTO GUSTAV SCHMIDT

Subscribed and sworn to before me at OBERURSEL/Germany this 28 day of November 1945.

(Signed) Rolf Martenberg
ROLF MARTENBERG
1st Lt, INF.

"THIS IS A TRUE CERTIFIED COPY"

- 5 -

END

(page 1 of original)
A F F I D A V I T

I, PAUL OTTO SCHMIDT, residing at Landhaus von Dary, Tegernsee, Bavaria, after having been warned that I will be liable to punishment for making a false statement, herewith state the following under oath of my own free will and without coercion:

From 1923 until 1945 I was interpreter of the German Foreign Office and in this capacity interpreted a great number of international conferences, both of a political and economic nature. The latter included, for example, the German-French Trade Negotiations in Paris (1924-1927), the Economic World Conference in Geneva and London (1927 and 1933 resp.) and a number of others. I met a large number of German businessmen, officially and unofficially through these conferences. Through these contacts, and because I have always been personally interested in economic affairs, I have been able to form an opinion of the impressions which the rise of the Nazi party and the political events before and after Hitler's seizure of power made on the German population in general, and the German businessmen in particular.

When the NSDAP was formed, the Party program was established which to my knowledge was never changed or amended until the party's dissolution in 1945. This program, which was later elaborated on in Hitler's book "Mein Kampf", contained among others the following major points:

(page 1 of original cont'd.)

The elimination of the treaties of Versailles and St. Germain, There was absolutely no doubt possible that in order to achieve this aim Hitler would not hesitate to use force. In speeches, conversations and negotiations it was frequently stated by Hitler and other high leaders of the Nazi Party that he would solve specific political and territorial problems, which emanated from the above treaties "so oder so". This German phrase means literally "one way or another"

(page 2 of original)

but had an increasingly threatening implication, viz. that the question would be settled either by agreement or by resorting to force. While there was never any doubt during the existence of the NSDAP that it advocated the elimination of these treaties by force, if necessary, it became increasingly obvious to everybody in Germany in 1938 and 1939 that force would actually be used.

The acquisition of territories lost by Germany as a result of World War I, of all other territories of Europe assertedly occupied by so-called "racial" Germans, and of such other territories in the world as might be "needed" by the Germans for "Lebensraum". The justification given for such a program was simply that according to the Nazis persons of so-called "German blood" were a superior race, and therefore entitled to leadership. The recurring German phrase was that because of being a superior race, they were entitled to the "Fuehrungsanspruch" (meaning that they were entitled to leadership over the other, inferior races, this word "leadership" being used as a synonym for the word

(page 2 of original cont'd.)

"domination"). During the war it should have become obvious, at least to those who spent any time in the occupied territories of the East, that this policy also included the extermination of such races as were deemed undesirable or inferior by the Nazis.

The virtues of soldiering, fighting and the use of force were proclaimed by the Nazis to be the highest German ideals. Every party office preferably carried a military designation, every party official proudly wore a uniform, young children were put into uniforms and given military training, and generally the party liked to surround itself with a warlike atmosphere.

The above and many other points of the Nazi platform were continuously repeated by the party's propaganda machine. Nobody in Germany could possibly overlook them, whether he had read "Mein Kampf" or not. They were daily and almost hourly proclaimed in speeches, over the radio, in films; the newspapers were full of them,

(page 3 of original)

the walls of the cities were plastered with posters extolling their virtues, and publications ranging from the one-paged leaflet being distributed from door to door or on the street corners to the most elaborate volumes were in circulation. Whatever doubt a person may have had during the time before the seizure of power with regard to the ultimate aim of the NSDAP or the methods by which it proposed to fulfil them, was dispelled by an intelligent observation of the methods of violence the party used originally in

(page 3 of original cont'd.)

electioneering and subsequently in fortifying its dictatorial powers.

The former is well illustrated by a political murder perpetrated in 1932 by two Nazis in a little town in Upper Silesia, where a Communist was trampled to death while peacefully sleeping in his home. These men were prosecuted in a regular court and as common murderers condemned to death. Thereupon, Hitler and Goering, the two top men in the then already powerful NSDAP, sent telegrams to the two murderers in which they identified themselves completely with these criminals. This affair was carried by all the papers in Germany and created such a sensation that everybody in Germany was aware of it. Every intelligent and fair minded person must have become conscious of the methods contemplated by the NSDAP, if its leaders thought nothing of identifying themselves with common murderers.

Some of the events following the Nazi seizure of power in 1933 served further to open the eyes of all those who wanted to see. I would mention only the indiscriminate use of "protective" custody, the persecution of religious groups within Germany, the suppression of the Communist Party in connection with the Reichstag fire, the methods by which the trade unions were eliminated, or the bloody political "purge" in 1934, particularly when considering Hitler's speech in the Reichstag in which he attempted to justify his lawless acts.

(page 3 of original cont'd.)

The Nazi foreign policy and the methods which the party was willing to employ to carry it out was clear from its established and frequently

(page 4 of original)

emphasized program, but it could also easily be anticipated by the events which took place inside Germany. The atmosphere of threats, of intimidation, of lawless acts, the spirit of force and the utter disregard for the basic rules of law which prevailed inside Germany were good indications of what the Nazis could be expected to do in the international field. This was more clearly indicated by the methods they used in connection with the withdrawal from the League of Nations, the remilitarization of the Rhineland and the repudiation of the Locarno Agreement, rearmament, etc. The final confirmation was easily obtained by observing the progressive trend of the foreign policy after 1938 as illustrated by the annexation of Austria, of the Sudetenland, and finally, and most strikingly, of the rest of Czechoslovakia.

I have carefully read each of the four pages of this declaration and have placed my signature at the bottom of each page. I have made the necessary corrections in my own handwriting and initialed each correction in the margin. I declare herewith under oath that I have stated the full truth to the best of my knowledge and belief.

gez.: Paul Otto Schmidt

PAUL OTTO SCHMIDT

(page 4 of original cont'd.)

Sworn to and signed before me this 3rd day of July
1947 at Murnberg, Germany, by Paul Otto Schmidt, known
to me to be the person making the above affidavit.

ge.: Arthur T. Cooper

ARTHUR T. COOPER

U.S. CIVILIAN, AGO number D 434534
Interrogator, Office of Chief of
Counsel for War Crimes,
U.S. War Department.

" A CERTIFIED TRUE COPY "

- 6 -

E N D

A F F I D A V I T

I, Georg von SCHNITZLER, member of the Vorstand of I. G. Farbenindustrie from 1925 until 1945, after having been warned that I will be liable to punishment for making a false statement herewith state the following under oath of my own free will and without coercion.

1. In the first four paragraphs of my affidavit of 4 March 1947; which I swore to before a representative of the Office of Chief of Counsel for War Crimes, I have stated the true circumstances under which I gave information, by means of statements and interrogations, concerning the I. G. Farbenindustrie and other matters to Allied investigators in 1945. These four paragraphs should also be considered as an introduction to this affidavit. Below I consider further statements or interrogations which I subscribed to during 1945, and which I have been shown and which I have re-read between 18 February 1947 and the present time. When I subscribed to these statements or interrogations in 1945, the matters to which I subscribed were true to the best of my knowledge and belief at that time. The errors I now find after re-reading the statements or interrogations mentioned below are set forth below after the text of each of the statements or interrogations. Below are given after the text of the statement I subscribed to in August 1945.

2. On 8 August 1945 I signed an eleven page statement covering many points in the development of the I. G. Farbenindustrie during the Nazi Regime. I worked on this statement for two or three days in seclusion in Frankfurt in August 1945 and wrote it up in longhand. After the statement was typed up from my longhand original, I signed and certified to the truth of the typewritten statement. The text follows:

"The I. G. by force had to follow the general development in Germany. Whatever government ruled Germany, the key position of the I.G. in the whole chemical field undisputed since I.G.'s foundation in 1925 had to play and always played the decisive role in everything which was connected with chemistry. I remember a remark of Stresemann made to me in 1927: 'What have I as a trump in my hands apart of you, the I.G., and the coal people? That I.G. would follow a line, which was not in conformity with the line of the government, was simply

(signed) G v Schnitzler

unimaginable and that I.G. could refrain from an order given by the government or take the attitude of an open or clandestine opposition was out of question - even at a time when Germany was a democratic state and government measures could be openly criticised.

Thus I.G. was "governmental" under Stresemann as well as under Brüning, as under Papen.

When Hitler legally came to power, instituted by old Reichspräsident von Hindenburg, in the beginning the attitude of I.G. in regard of the Nazi government was simply the continuation of the attitude I.G. had taken vis à vis former governments. - But very soon it became evident that the Nazi-regime which had started as a coalition-government together with Deutsch-Nationale Volkspartei - which latter party had 3 ministers in the cabinet - intended to go quite different ways from former governments and by and by we learned what a totalitarian state meant in reality and what consequence that had for us.

The party claimed all power for itself. "Die Partei befiehlt dem Staat" - "The party gives its orders to the state" - was the official device, and the state is the instrument through which the totality of its inhabitants is ruled.

No political influence of professional groups was anymore tolerated - and in short I.G. found itself entirely devoid of all political influence. This state of things in no way was regarded as satisfactory and without a special order given in that direction a large-scale subvention action was started. From the local little bosses up to Hermann Goering personally under the most varied names and through the most varied channels bigger and smaller sums were being given to the party, all with the aim to creating a better atmosphere, because very radical ideas in certain party-circles about the "Gross-Concerns" and particularly about the I.G. were common opinion.

The money was being taken but the result was more or less null and up to the last time of the war I.G. always was suspected to be "a state in the state" and the dismemberment of I.G. never left the clandestine party-program. On the other hand the party in the form of "Adolf-Hitler Spende" and "Winterhilfswerk" - W.H.W. and many other ways converted the subventions given formerly as a sort of bribery into a legal claim. -

When Hitler came to power he had promised to the masses the end of unemployment and he put this part of this program in the foreground.

In order to create work the industry had to get orders, and I.G. undoubtedly was one of the first ones to have advantages of it. As foreign currency was scarce - the great crash of 1931 lay only two years behind - an interior market had to be created and products which had before been imported had now to be manufactured in Germany - with the double aim, to save the foreign currency necessary for the import of textiles, metals, food, etc. and at the same time give additional work to German workmen. Thus, now 12 years later it is difficult to ascertain if the beginning of the "rearmament"-movement was rightout started as a military measure or if the first phase till the end of 1936 was not a primarily economic one in so far as the production of synthetic oil, synthetic rubber, rayon, synthetic fibres, a.s.o. was not only fostered to get materials for warfare but in order to make Germany in those products self-supporting and save the foreign currency for their importation. -

(signed) G v Schnitzler

(Page 2 of the original)

The policy of "autarchy" and "rearmament" was so closely interconnected with one another that it really represents unsurmountable difficulties to distinguish which element of both was the prevalent one.

However it was, I.G. very soon profited by it and whereas in 1932 I.G.'s total expenditure for new plants and equipments was, I think, only 10-12 million marks, it climbed in the years 1934 - 36 rapidly and from thereon took a raging trend.

The technical possibilities being involved in that trend had undoubtedly a great fascination upon our technical people. Plans for which they could not see any practical realisation as long as a normal economy existed, became realisable and the most fascinating prospects seemed to lie in the future. That this development in the last must lead 1) to impoverishment that means to a lowering of the standard of living, 2) to war, nobody did or wanted to realize. Even a man so strictly opposed to the Nazi-regime as Dr. Bosch who was the only one who once has dared to contradict openly Hitler - with disastrous result by the way, as I later on was told, had no hesitation to put Krauch at Goering's disposition, when being asked for a high ranking chemist who should take over the leadership of "Amt fur Wirtschaftsausbau" and Bosch was a convinced democrat, a convinced partisan of a peace-policy.

The whole development of I.G. in the years beginning with 1934 and accelerated since the end of 1936 is entirely due to the close team-work with government and Wehrmacht.

The export-trade remained stationary at some 400 - 450 million marks and the buying-capacity of the civil population was not highered (raised) as the nominally higher incomes in toto were counterbalanced by a loss in the so-called "Realeinkommen" and higher taxes.

Practically the whole augmentation in the turnover of I.G. from a little over 1 billion marks to 3 billions in 1943 is a 100% result of the rearmament and the war policy of the German government.

The totality of Buna, of metals, of high-octane oil, of most chemicals, at least 2/3 of the Nitrogen, and a great percentage of dyestuffs and pharmaceuticals went directly or indirectly to the Wehrmacht. A high percentage of this turnover from the very beginning was more or less guaranteed by the Wehrmacht. Agreements of the most different kind were being concluded but nearly all were based on solid ground insofar as the Reich guaranteed the amortization (light metals) or had arranged for a protective duty (oil, buna) or prescribed the use for the consuming industry (synthetic fibre). The result always was identical after a certain time the factories became or should become I.G.'s unburdened property. This latter result could be achieved with a raised rapidity with the so-called Ostwerke where the whole equipment could be amortized in the year of its investment provided that the owner made sufficient profits in the whole.

The direct consequence hereof was that I.G. notwithstanding that it spent some 500 million marks in the average of the last years had not substantially to augment its capital and that I.G.'s balance sheet under "plants and equipment" shows a practically unchanged figure. This state of things and the apparent splendid situation of I.G.'s balance weakened the central administration. - Young and active technicians like Ambros, Bittorf, Hurster, but even men in positions not ranking as high like Altwicker and Ziegler in Bitterfeld

(signed) G v Schnitzler

in the metal-field handled on their own, problems of the greatest importance, engaged I.G. in always greater commitments. They used the word "Auflage", - "impost" of Wehrmachtsstelle X, but sometimes it never became quite clear if our technical men themselves had not deliberately induced the Wehrmacht to that "Auflage". The central administration registered the facts, when it

(Page 3 of the original)

came to the settlement of the expenses, but had very little to say in the matter. - To a large extent Krauch's office was a governing factor in these relations as the "Amt" under Goering's responsibility in the domains reserved to it, decided what quantities and where the respective production should be erected. In Sparte I Dr. Bütelisch took the lead in this direction and practically rounded out Dr. Schneider in the oil field, but Dr. Müller-Gunradi in close contact with Dr. Krauch did the same in the different domains being connected with Oppau and including the whole high-pressure field with the exception of the oil - but still Dr. Müller-Gunradi being in charge of the new works in Heydebreck was hereby the head of the so-called Tannol-Anlage, which to the best of my knowledge represented a new high octane fuel. A similar development took place in Sparte II. Dr. Ambros and Dr. Wurster as well as the chemists in Bitterfeld, here mostly in the metal field, but in some other domains of chemistry destined for warfare just as well became entirely independent of the "Spertenleitung" and acted immediately with the different authorities of the Wehrmacht.

But things were very complicated in such a sense as the Wehrmacht had 3 or 4 quite independent departments and apart of the Wehrmacht Reichswirtschaftsministerium and Reichsbeauftragter Chemie had many functions reserved to them.

Between Reichsbeauftragter Chemie (Dr. Ungewitter) and Dr. Krauch quarrelling never ceased, as overlapping of authority happened all the time.

In the last phase of the war following ideas of President Kehrl of the Reichswirtschaftsministerium, the organization of the "Gewerbliche Wirtschaft" became entitled to act to a large extent as a decisive factor and in principle a corporative system was in full creation. The result for I.G. was - although I.G. men generally were not being put in the foreground, because President Kehrl was in strong opposition against I.G. - that the overwhelming technical position of I.G. rendered it the deciding factor.

As an example I only may cite Dr. Wurster's activity - he indeed was put in the foreground - in the field of sulphur and sulphuric acid, who in fact ruled that important item of warfare chemistry with sovereignty. This system of corporative development was neither invented nor in principle fostered by I.G. but the facts were stronger than Mr. Kehrl's ideas and the industrial potential of I.G. became bigger and bigger.

Surely personal ambition and the pleasure of expending, mostly of the younger chemists, played its role in that development, but on the whole it was natural consequence of the war becoming more and more "total" and because nobody else than I.G. could handle those problems.

The combination of highly qualified chemists, big laboratories, an enormous potential of patents and experiences and a great financial capacity was too strong as not always being the decisive factor to I.G.'s advantage whenever a problem arose which had to be solved.

Apart of this technical situation the development of I.G. during the last 12 years can't be separated from the Governments foreign policy.

(signed) G v Schnitzler

From the very beginning it was the government's intention to make the "Mitteleuropäische Raum" as far as possible self-supporting and direct German import from overseas to the continent. Intensifying trade-relations to the south and the south-east of Europe even at the price of material sacrifices was the "mot d'ordre"; the next one was the intensification of the South-America business on the basis of barter-trading in order to get from there the products which were not available any more for Germany in the U.S. as the Reichsbank did not dispose of the necessary Dollars. Although I.G. was not in the least a partisan of this policy and would have preferred to develop its great international business on the line of a "most favoured nation"

(Page 4 of the original)

basis it had to follow the new trend - on the simple reason, that there did not exist any other possibility. Occasional suggestions in order to get a better stand were successful in the case of England for instance, but on the whole the official policy was carried through without giving the export-industry a chance to intervene. During the years from 1933 to 1937 I.G.'s expansion outside of Germany did not make a substantial progress. It kept up its position and its participations, but very little as far as I can recollect, had or could have been done or was added to it in entirely new investments, but what has been done, did not yet happen in the S.E. countries but in the countries of I.G.'s old established industrial activities in the Anglo-Saxon and Latin countries, in England f.i. the foundation of the British Magnesium Co. A complete change took place since 1938. Firstly by purely private negotiations of course with the approval of the government with I.C.I. an important agreement was being concluded, the foundation of the Trafford Park Chemical Co.

Much greater problems, however, had to be approached in by the incorporation of Austria and Sudetenland into Germany, with the creation of the so-called "Gross-Deutschland". To both countries I.G. always had exported on a large scale, in both countries a chemical industry existed, of which the
vS "Aussiger Verein" and Dynamit A.G., Pressburg were old established enterprises, built upon a broad basis.

Relations of close team-work with the Aussiger Verein and I.G. had
vS been operating for decades. In the dyestuff field a cartel agreement with the Verein had been concluded in 1934.

This dyestuff position of the Verein was the key of the whole problem, I.G. being the only producer of dyestuffs in Germany except one small
vS Swiss-owned company in Grenchen on the German-Swiss border. Thus I.G. did not want anybody else enter that domain inside the German territory. As Chemische Fabrik V. Heyden had succeeded to get the permission of Reichswirtschaftsministerium to deal with the Verein about the purchase of the works in Aussig and Falkenau, I.G. had firstly to approach v. Heyden. An agreement was reached that both handled the question jointly on a 50:50 basis. In the then following negotiations the group v. Heyden-I.G. acquire the two factories with their coal-basis at a fair price, formed a new company, called it Chemische Werke Aussig-Falkenau G.m.b.H. and this latter company leased the dyestuff department by a long-termed agreement to I.G.

The relations with the Verein ^{remained} friendly. Not only was the Verein's position in the remaining Tschecho-Slovakia fully recognized, but a joint plant of synthetic fibre on I.G.'s processes was built up in Pressburg with a participation of 40% of the Verein, reserving to the Verein the supply of raw-materials from the Verein's factories in Nowaky and Handlowa.

(signed) G v Schnitzler

Undoubtedly the I.G. as well as v. Heyden took advantage of the cession of the Sudetenland to Germany, but on the other hand the Zivno-Bank and its Generaldirektor Dovrazek were of the opinion that the Verein could not keep the factories under the changed circumstances. Mr. Dovrazek himself took an active part in the negotiations and even helped to find the compromise-formula, upon which the two parties agreed.

Whereas in the Sudetenland no other industrial activity of I.G. became practical the industrialisation of Austria required a substantial participation of I.G. in it. After the Anschluss I.G. had acquired the majority of Skoda Wetzler works from Wiener Kreditanstalt and transformed this company into the Donau-Chemie A.G. The Donau-Chemie in the future became the stepping stone of the great development which took place in the chemical domain and culminated in the building up of huge installations in Moosbierbaum in the domain of power, sulfuric acid, hydrogenation of oil and magnesium. The latter plant, of course, never came to a start as the Luftwaffe stopped all work on it. In connection with this activity in Austria another great step to industrialisation took place in Slovakia. Since long years the D.A.G. (Dynamit A.G.) had a controlling interest in Dynamit Pressburg. Apart of the main works in Pressburg, D.A.G. owned a couple of smaller factories in Austria and participations in Hungary, Roumania and Jugoslavia.

(Page 5 of the original)

Of the Austrian factories part was consumed in Donau-Chemie (Bruckl and Landeck), the others remained as such in the form of independent Dynamite Cos. Pressburg itself took a gigantic expansion and developed a great export-trade to Hungary and the Balkan countries. - But the development in the S.E. was by far overrun by the industrial development which took place after the war against Poland. Based upon the coal of Upper-Silesia two gigantic works were being taken under construction, the one in Heydebreck on old German territory (recognised as German after the plebiscite of 1921), the other one on Polish territory in Auschwitz, between Kottowitz and Krakow. The factory in Heydebreck entirely belonged to Sparte I, the one in Auschwitz represented a combination of Sparte I and II, under the leadership of Sparte II and with Buna as the main-product. Both works for my opinion made slow progresses and came into fabrication only very late, with more substantial quantities in 1943 and 1944, but they never reached a state of real or full accomplishment. I think, some 800 million marks have been spent on them, half of which nearly, I would say, was written off.

Although at different times Dr. Ambros had invited me to visit Auschwitz, I have never been neither in Auschwitz nor Heydebreck and my knowledge solely reposes on reports given by Dr. Ambros and Dr. Müller-Cunradi. In connection with these works we acquired a controlling interest in a coal-mine - the Furstengrube - and were just dealing about a further interest in it. when the war entered in its last phase. Apart of this huge enterprises the Pharma had acquired land not so very far from Breslau on the Oder near Dyhrenfurt with the idea to construct there a pharmaceutical factory.

This never materialized and Dr. Ambros at a date unknown to me took over the leadership of that place. There under the firm of Anorgana G.m.b.H. for the account of the Reich I.G. fabricated the new, as I later on heard, in Elberfeld invented poisoned gases. This fabrication, of course, was kept so secret, that only in the beginning of the year 1945 (January to February) I heard for the first time of it, when Dr. Ambros in strictest confidence told me what I have given as my personal knowledge to Major Tilly at the end of April and what consisted of the fact that such gases based upon an inter-

(signed) G v Schnitzler

mediate of Ludwigshafen "Metaphenylendianine" had been made in a special equipment (all in glass) but that the whole production owing to the Russian advance had been shipped to the interior of Germany. Dr. Ambros at the time spoke of the great danger if ever smallest quantities of this product evaded. -

At that time (end of April) I was still under the impression that I.G. as a firm was only indirectly connected with the fabrication of that gas insofar as we had put chemists at the disposition of the Reich and supplied the intermediates. Later on by Major Tilly I heard that Anorgana which ran the plant was 100% I.G. and that the whole fabrication practically was an affair of I.G. He told me furthermore that these gases had been used by the Nazi authorities as a tentative in Auschwitz concentration camp.

In the last quarter of 1944 I should say, it was at the end of November or in the beginning of December, an allusion was made to me confidentially by Dr. Muller-Cunradi that terrible things had happened in the concentration camps of Auschwitz, that gases had been used there to kill people and that I.G. products were of something in it - of course it was only an allusion. Not knowing anything of Dyhrenfurt at the time, I could not bring this allusion in connection with the new gas, but I was so horrified by it that I only reacted "but do other people know that too", which he confirmed, yes, Ambros and the other men in Auschwitz know of these things. To Schmitz I made a remark about terrible things being connected with Auschwitz and Dyhrenfurt but without going into details. How far he was informed about it, I can't say, for my opinion he should have heard about the general happenings regarding Anorgana a.s.o. as financial interests of great importance were connected therewith and Ambros and Muller-Cunradi must have reported to him about the situation under all its aspects. - But that, of course, can only be heard from the 3 men themselves.

(Page 6 of the original)

I myself had never seen the agreement regarding "Anorgana" which was concluded before I took over my activity with the Chemikalien-business. I was of the opinion that the Reich owned plant and equipment of the so-called "Reichsbetriebe" at 100% and that Anorgana was a 50:50 position of Reich and I.G. for the handling of those products which were sold to manufacturers (Weiterver-arbeiter).

How secret all these matters had to be held by the men immediately concerned with them might become evident by the fact that Dr. ter Meer notwithstanding that we always worked together in the dyestuff domain in the closest cooperation never mentioned them to me and I was greatly surprised when I heard by Dr. Locher only a few days before I was taken in custody (May 7th) that under ter Meer's papers confidential material of this kind had been found. -

What motives induced Dr. Ambros to take over the factory in Dyhrenfurt, which primarily was destined for the management of the Pharma people of Elberfeld, I am completely at a loss to explain. I can only presume that his sometimes illimited technical ambition has driven him in this terrible job.

In Poland furthermore we acquired from Treuhandstelle Ost the Boruta and in connection with the Francolor transaction the Winnica, the latter one had to be liquidated as no economical basis for it was still existent.

Boruta practically belonged to the Polish state, the share capital was lost and a state-owned bank which had given the necessary credits to

(signed) G v Schnitzler

the Boruta was the real owner. As the German government in the parts of Poland which had become incorporated in Germany considered itself as the legal successor of the Polish state, no private interests were hurt by this transaction. This was unfortunately the case with Wola but the owners had to leave the place, fled to Warsaw and nobody was on the spot to look after the place. - The Wola had to be closed down as its economic value in war-times was null and the material, as far as it was transportable, was carried over to Boruta. In an extensive statement made on the Boruta/Wola question I explained the reasons for which it was necessary to acquire these factories. The factory of Wola was not acquired by I.G. The liquid assets had been sold out by the Kommissare and then the General Government Krakau sold the factory to a third party, Binder. As 85% of the dyestuff potential of I.G. was on the borders of the Rhine and as this whole territory had to be considered as endangered by air-raids, every capacity in the centre of the Reich and in the East had to be used.

Notwithstanding their relatively small volume the dyestuff factories of Aussig and Boruta became very valuable for keeping up the plans for the manufacturing of dyestuffs and intermediates. Thus Dr. tor Haer and I after the German troops had entered Poland proposed Dr. Schoner (technical chief of Wolfen) and Direktor Schrab, Frankfurt - commercial leader of dyestuff-business in Poland and Russia to the Reichswirtschaftsministerium as "Kommissare" and later on inaugurated the negotiations with the Treuhandstelle-Ost. In my above mentioned statement I said that I never believed we would keep these factories whenever it came to peace negotiations, still we could not let them fall into the hands of a third party and had to use them during the war in our and in the common interest and this was only possible if we secured for us their property.

About Norway it seems to be superfluous to report as these interests we had taken there in the light-metal field became invalid. The Luftwaffe decided that the works at Herøen scattered by air-raids should not be reconstructed.

In Holland and Belgium, to the best of my knowledge, no interests of importance have been acquired. Our relations with the group Solvay in

(Page 7 of the original)

in Belgium were immediately resumed and we ourselves interfered at the Reichswirtschaftsministerium that in the majority position of the group Solvay in Deutsche Solvaywerke, Bernburg, where Solvay held 75%, I.G. 25% no change should take place. Certain endeavours of the Salzdetfurth-concern to get part of Deutsche Solvaywerke with the aim to break up Solvay's majority position remained fruitless.

The plans we had elaborated for the handling of the industrial problems in the chemical sector in France are known.

In the first phase after the armistice we thought it necessary that the Government should sequester the whole chemical industry in order to make it work for the German war potential. Later on this policy was changed and after Monthoire the era of collaboration started. I do not think that any seizure had been carried through in this domain. - The key position very soon became the Francolor problem.

The guiding principle in its solution for I.G. was

- 1) the definite reparation of the injustice which I.G. had suffered when its factories in France had been taken away by the Versailles treaty,

(signed) G v Schnitzler)

- 2) a definite peace with the French dyestuff industry granting their industry a full occupation (7000 to of dyestuffs and a substantial development in the most varied fields).

We considered the whole affair as an equitable solution, nobody in France had lost one Franc by this transaction, on the contrary the value of the shares of the so-called mother-houses gained a considerable advance in the stock-exchange - as well as in their intrinsic value; the exchange basis for the I. G. shares being given as a counter-value could not be fairer. - In fact no money has been taken out of France, the dividend-clearing showed a "break-even", the factories not only remained intact but were improved in different domains. The arrangement had been considered by I.G. as a first step to a renewed European dyestuff-cartel, to the negotiating of which the German-French group should appear as one partner and we, that means ter Meer, Waibel, Ambros and I, always understood that Duchemin and Frossard would figure as partners in such negotiations.

The "Führungsanspruch" of I.G. once having been recognized in the handling of dyestuff matters, there was never a contrast or even a friction. I.G. helped Francolor in all its dealings with the Military Commander in France whenever this was possible or necessary and Francolor was a loyal partner. When Dr. Kramer left Paris, he told me, Duchemin said to him: "You have been loyal for us, you will see that we shall be loyal against you." The same principle of fair dealing was the aim of our negotiations with Rhone-Poulenc and Ugine in the field of Buna, plastics and pharmaceuticals. - Not having been an immediate participant in those different negotiations, which were conducted by Dr. ter Meer, v. Knieriem, and Amros or Menn - but having often seen M. Bau as well as M. Painvin, I have never heard the slightest complaint on their part of pressure or unfair dealing. When both gentlemen were in Leverkusen to visit the Buna installations in the late autumn of 1941 or 1942, an atmosphere of cordiality, if I may use that word, and not at all of animosity has reigned between the representatives of both sides.

Always in conformity with the principle of developing the continental Grossraum, I.G. was very active in Spain. The development of the two factories in and near Barcelona FENCE and Flix made substantial progress. In FENCE the installations for the (immediates) intermediates of Azo-dyestuffs were brought to termination, a pharmaceutical factory was in full construction, in Flix the new "Chloelectrolyse" was gradually improving and plans of making the "Inquiresa" a subsidiary company for the manufacturing of derivatives of Carbure,

(Page 8 of the original)

an active business proposition were being followed. - With "Unquinesa" in Bilbao license agreements in the field of Phenol and Formaldehyde for "Phenoplaste" were concluded and to "Altos Hornos" licenses for Nitrogene with technical help on the whole line were being granted. Apart of that the old friendship to Union Explosives Espanola was cultivated.

In Italy the participations in Acna and Bianchi kept on their normal development in the light-metal field the Samis tried to make progress and the two factories in which Buna was fabricated, came into production.

On the whole in all these countries as well as in the planning for a future industrialization of the South-East, I.G. fostered everywhere the industrial evolution with its patents, experiences and know how and, as far as the government allowed it to do so, also with capital. The men who did the actual work, mostly did not even think of the political meaning of this development in the direction of "European Grossraum-Wirtschaft" and even inside I.G.'s Vorstand that was often forgotten. Words like "rule" and "dominate" were never
(signed) G v Schmitzler

used, and I am sure that all these people having worked with I.G. in Spain and France, in Norway and Finland, in the South-East as well as in Italy have not had the feeling of being pressed or looted. On the contrary, they nearly all had personal profits of this collaboration and were after us to intensify our help. Dozen of files will and can prove that.

Coming back to the general policy: Undoubtedly I.G. had not only followed the government's "Grossraum-Politik" but had drawn substantial profit out of it. In figures as they appear on the balance-sheet an enormous progress has been made. As the export-figures in the whole remained unchanged and only a displacement from oversea to the European continent took place, the turnover in the so-called "Gross-Deutschland" up to the end of 1943 reached nearly four times the size of 1932. - Only part of it could be considered as being a perpetual asset. In Buna, in synthetic fibres and their raw materials and intermediates, in light metals and in hydrogenation many installations to a large extent are to be understood as war-dependent, but as a consequence of the close interdependency of autarkie and rearmament a great deal of the investments made under the four year's plan could be considered as valuable even under a complete peace-policy. - May I give as an example the "Nitrogene". The total German capacity should be - the destruction by air-raids not being taken into account - about 1.000.000 tons of "N". I.G.'s prewar share in N was about 70%. One generally estimated that for agricultural purposes in Gross-Deutschland nearly 700.000 to of N were needed. Thus with all the possibilities in the development of the "technical Nitrogene" the remaining 300.000 to. should have found a secure market - even without having to press on a forced export! The enormous amortizations which I.G. had been able to carry through would have given it an easy possibility of a revalorisation of its assets without having to lower the figures of its investments as participations on the balance-sheet of the so-called "Handelsbilanz".

Summarizing this part of I.G.'s activity: The close teamwork with Government and Wehrmacht in the joint endeavour to make Germany to a large extent autarchie and rearm her, involved a great amplification of I.G.'s potential and at the same time a substantial increase of her balance-figures.

The collaboration with the Wehrmacht followed two additional lines. In order to keep up a continuous contact in 1934 the Vermittlungsstelle W in Berlin was founded, in 1936 the so-called Abwehr-Delegierten were being designated. The Wehrmacht insisted on the highest secrecy of all its plans

(Page 9 of the original)

and let all people being in charge of planning or executing rearmament work, swear that they never let other people know what had been divulged to them in connection with their activity for Wehrmacht purposes. This had gone so far that for instance when Dr. Paul Muller of Dynamit A.G. in 1937 lead the members of Z.A. of I.G. over the Dynamit plant in Troisdorf, he refracted from showing to them entire departments saying "this is under strictest secrecy". Every infringement would have been punished with high penalties of hard labour. So practically everybody of the high-ranking staff was in such a way sworn in, the survey of what I.G. really did make or not make for the Wehrmacht became more and more a pure guess-work and one abstained of asking in order not to put one's technical colleagues in a difficult position. How far Schmitz himself was informed, who had the last responsibility for the balance figures, I am unable to say. My impression was that even he had only partly a more profound knowledge of what really happened and that a full picture of what had been done can only be got when one has heard every single one of the high ranking I.G. technical leaders, and not only the Vorstands-Mitglieder but also most of the Direktors and Prokurists just as well. -

(signed) G v Schnitzler

But speaking of responsibilities in general Schmitz was responsible insofar as he was in charge of the distribution of the different domains of activity to the individual "Vorstands-Mitglieder". Thus each Vorstandmitglied in the case of having to take a graver and far reaching decision was bound to report about it to the chairman, that means to Schmitz. -

Independently of Abwehr and Vermittlungsstelle W the Wehrmacht engaged I.G. in active helps by asking it to get news out of axis and neutral countries. I reported on that matter in a former statement. I.G. put its means at the disposition of the Wehrmacht but it was understood that I.G. people whenever they were asked for such help had not to enter the typically military espionage but only had to report about economic matters in the largest sense. How far the Wehrmacht had made use of I.G.'s readiness to participate in this service can only be guessed by the satisfaction explained by O.K.W. of what had been done. Every individual man acting under secrecy and being prohibited of speaking about it under highest penalties.

A further team-work between Wehrmacht and I.G. developed under the heading "M-Fragen". This comprised all personal questions regarding men to be made free from service, special plans for the distributions of key-commodities to the different branches of I.G.'s technical activity and the so-called "Kriegsspiele", furthermore all questions arising in the military field, eventually not covered by the different activities I have mentioned before.

As I stated in the beginning of this report since 1934 the Wehrmacht first being only an additional factor to the relations having always existed between I.G. and the different Ministerien more and more developed to be the decisive or at least the most important factor.

The Nazi government acted on I.G.'s business through these different Ministerien, but the party itself interfered continuously in the following two directions.

1) After having dissolved all trade-unions, associations of employers a.s.o. the so-called Deutsche Arbeitsfront was constituted. Everybody practically had to participate in it, it became the decisive factor for the handling of all personal problems and found its legal basis in the law "Zur Ordnung der nationalen

(Page 10 of the original)

Arbeit". By this law the responsibility of the owner or undertaker of the Co. was not altered insofar as the conduction of the business and the fulfillment of its financial obligations was concerned but rules for the interior functioning were established which had to be strictly observed. Based on that law and in connection with the so-called Nurnberger Gesetze the party exercised a continuous pressure on all I.G. organizations to fulfil all the clauses of the party program, particularly the Nurnberger Gesetze.

Whilst I.G. was a compliant partner in regard of all demands of the Wehrmacht, it tried to refract with all means from this latter intervention into its relations with its leading as well as the other personal. For years it maintained all its jewish employees, to begin with Messrs. von Weinberg and Mr. von Simson, being members of the then still existing Verwaltungsrat, the highest institution of I.G. (a committee of the Aufsichtsrat) on their posts and did not dismiss a single one of these individuals, before his living abroad was guaranteed. Thus Mr. Flechtheim, Mr. von Simson, Mr. Kalisches, Mr. Hummel, Mr. Carl von Weinberg, whenever at last it became necessary to suggest to them to leave Germany, it has taken care of them in such a way that they had not to endure emergency. Only

(signed) G v Schmitzler

Mr. Arthur v. Weinbert, who always had believe that they would except him and some other men like Karf, for whom a prepared situation in England in the last moment did not materialize because the owner of that firm retracted or retired, became victim.

The party resented that attitude and gave I.G. continuous warnings that I.G. was not fulfilling the obligations incumbent to it and a state of tension always subsisted.

The same attitude was that being taken by the A.O. of the party in regard to the foreign representatives. In the first years practically nothing had been done on I.G.'s side to alter anything in the existing conditions. By and by by friendly negotiations and with lump sums generously fixed to satisfy them financially I.G. had to sever the connection with those representatives but when going over the files one will recognise that I.G. in every case tried to do its utmost to protect the men who had loyally served it and whom I.G. would never have dismissed if not this hard pressure would have been exercised upon it. That a company at last has to obey its government's orders is inevitable, but I.G. by conviction has always done its best to create as little hardship as possible and often only could get the Governments and the A.O.'s approval to the agreements with these employees by pretending that an ungenerous attitude on the side of I.G. would damage its international prestige. I.G. was driven from A.O. from concession to concession and the agreement made by Mr. Waibel with A.O. in autumn 1937 that in the future only such young men would be sent out who firstly belonged to the vSD.A.F. and secondly were ready to participate in the meetings, a.s.o. on the spot was a compromise on long negotiations by which Mr. Waibel succeeded that at least upon the "old" men on the spot the pressure was lowered.

vs Altogether those relations and negotiations with D.A.F. and A.O. remained and were always a most unpleasant chapter in I.G.'s activity but one may not forget that all the power was with the party and I.G. always was in the position of the defendant.

Apart of these two main domains of party-activity the Gauleiters interfered continuously in local questions but seldom in direct business, mostly in personal questions and then generally in the favour of such employees who were being considered as "confidential men".

(Page 11 of the original)

But up to the last time I.G. could refract from taking any typical party-men on Vorstand or Aufsichtsrat, a fact which should not be overlooked, as pressure from the most different sides in this direction never has ceased. Gauleiter Sprenger for instance always hinted at Avieny of Metall- Gesellschaft becoming member of the Aufsichtsrat.

I stated at the beginning of this report that after Hitler had come to power and before the official subventions of Adolf Hitler-Spende and W.H.V. had been inaugurated subventions of the most different kind had to be given and were given. I had never heard that I.G. before 1933 had fostered NSDAP financial-ly, as I.G. had always done with the so-called "bourgeois-parties". If considered vs this as improbable as Dr. Kalle who presided the committee being charged with these questions always was strongly opposed against the Nazi-party. If notwithstanding this had been done in 1932 Geheimrat Schmitz only can explain it, the question never having come to a discussion in the Zentral-Ausschuss.

To summarize the following must be stated:

(signed) G v Schnitzler

1) With the growing of the military interest in the government's program I.G.'s relations to the Wehrmacht firstly became an additional factor in I.G.'s official relations to the different other ministries, by and by the Wehrmacht became by far the most important one, and with the beginning of the 4 years plan the investment-policy of I.G. was not to be separated anymore from the policy of the Wehrmacht. Nearly all investments were made directly or indirectly for the Wehrmacht. I.G. was on the whole a loyal and compliant partner of the Wehrmacht. That the Wehrmacht was not a typical Nazi-institution and only followed itself in material the line prescribed by the party is well known. The higher officers doing their duty as law-abiding officers were not Nazis by conviction, they have proved it on July 20th, 1944.

2.) I.G. followed the "Grossraum-Politik" of the government because there was no other economic policy to be made.

That I.G. itself would have preferred a policy of "most favoured nation treatment" and "world-wide trade" became a pure theory and could not lead to any real consequences.

3.) In the handling with party matters I.G. acted after the policy "muddling through" with the result that in the last it always had to yield.

4.) Thus in acting as it had done, the I.G. contracted a great responsibility and constituted a substantial and in the chemical domain decisive help to Hitler's foreign policy, which led to war and to the ruin of Germany.

5.) Thus I must conclude that I.G. is largely responsible for Hitler's policy.

Frankfurt, August 8th, 1945.

Signed: G. von Schnitzler."

This statement still appears to me to be entirely true to the best of my knowledge and belief, except that:

(a) Generally speaking, it does not sufficiently separate the pre-war from the war period.

(b) At page two, paragraph 4, it was erroneous to say that "The whole development of I.G. in the years beginning with 1934 and accelerated since the end of 1936 is entirely due to the close team work with government and Wehrmacht." I would say now that this development "is due to the development of chemistry in general, to autarchy, to rearmament and, finally, to the war itself." I would now make the same qualification to the sixth paragraph on page 2, where I said the whole augmentation of I.G.'s turnover "is a 100% result of the rearmament and the war

(signed) G v Schnitzler

policy of the German government."

(c) In the last paragraph on page 2, I meant no reproach against the technical men of I.G. when I said "It never became quite clear if our technical men themselves had not deliberately induced the Wehrmacht to that "Auflage." An "Auflage" was more or less an order to or imposition of a task upon a concern or plant by the Wehrmacht. In working upon the "Auflage" as team workers with the Wehrmacht, I.G.'s technical men had the opportunity to suggest modifications of an old "Auflage" or to suggest a further project which later became an "Auflage."

(d) At the top of page 3, I should qualify the statement that the various plants became independent of the leadership of the Sparte heads and acted directly with the different Wehrmacht authorities. This result came completely to a head only after the war began, although it began as early as 1938, particularly after the Anschluss in March 1938.

(e) In the last paragraph of page 5, I wish to make some corrections. I stated here that Dr. Muller-Cunradi made "an allusion" in late 1944 that gases had been used in Auschwitz concentration camps to kill people and that I.G. products "were something in it." By this I meant I.G. products could have something to do with it. This was more of a reference to a rumour than it was an "allusion" to the fact. Since August 1945, I have talked to Schmitz and he does not recall that I ever mentioned the matter to him. However, my recollection is that I mentioned the matter to Dr. Schmitz at a lunch in Heidelberg when we were there for a Vorstand meeting in January or February 1945. Schmitz did not say anything at the time and since the Russians at that time were before the doors of Auschwitz, nothing thereafter could have been done about the matter.

(f) At page 6, paragraph 3, I stated that I could only presume that the unlimited technical ambition of Dr. Ambros had driven him to take
(signed) G v Schnitzler

over the factory Dyhernfurt. That was my impression in August 1945. But in the meantime I have learned that this was not because of the ambition of Dr. Ambros, but because of an "Auflage" from the Wehrmacht.

(g) At page 6, paragraph 5, I stated that the raw materials of the WOLA plant in Poland "was carried over to" the BORUTA plant in so far as it was transportable. It should be added that this was done before I.G. acquired control of the BORUTA plant during the period when the Reichskommissars Schoener and Schwab were administering the Polish chemical plants for the Reich. I.G. had suggested that Schoener and Schwab, who were I.G. officials, be appointed as experts to administer the Polish chemical plants for the Reich. I also wrote in the statement that I had made an extensive statement as to why it was necessary to acquire "these factories". Instead of "these factories" I should have said "the BORUTA factory". As far as the WOLA is concerned, the owner, old Mr. Szpielvogel with his family, had fled to Warsaw. The place had remained deserted. The "Kommissare" for the "Reichs-account" liquidated the dyestuffs-department. The whole property, as Schwab had stated, was later on sold out by the General Government, Krakow, to a third party, whose name I only heard in the summer of 1945: Binder. Shortly after the occupation of Poland I once gave a hint to Schwab that he should try to assist the old gentleman if ever possible, and I think he did something, but later on all traces of him were lost.

(h) On page 9, second full paragraph, the reports of the Vermittlungsstelle W and the Sales Organizations to the Abwehr were reports about economic matters which I.G. required in the normal course of business. It was not a typical

Page
16
orig.
Doc.

military espionage. Of course where the Wehrmacht chose and engaged an individual of our sales organizations for its special purposes, I.G. could not influence that and the individual was sworn to secrecy. It only became evident that an I.G. representative abroad had Abwehr duties when we sought to recall the man or to free him for military service and then came a general order that we should keep him. VOWI must be dealt with separately, since the Wehrmacht at first wanted to take over VOWI's entire organization at the beginning of the war and Dr. Kurt Krueger, then head of Berlin N.W. 7, was at the same time mobilized as an officer with the Wehrmacht.

(i) On page 9, third paragraph from the bottom, I overstated by saying, without qualification, that the Wehrmacht became the decisive or at least the most important factor in I.G.'s development. I should have said "During the war" The Wehrmacht War Ministry was an important agency after 1934, but between 1934 and 1939, the Ministry of Economics, and between 1936 and 1939, the Four Year Plan were the principal agencies with which I.G. dealt. I might also point out that Hans Kehrl of the Ministry of Economics had continuously frictions with Krauch of the Four Year Plan.

(j) On page 10, paragraph 2, I believe the typist misquoted my left hand at one point. I wrote "refrain" and she typed "refract".

(k) On page 11, paragraph 3, subheading 1), I made a mistake due to my lack of more detailed knowledge of technical matters. The technical development of I.G. concerning bauxite, artificial fibres, and synthetic oil was not as dependent upon the Wehrmacht's intentions as I thought in 1945. As I have since found out by discussions with my technical

colleagues, these matters were developed under the Autarchy Program with the Ministry of Economics and the Four Year Plan and the Wehrmacht did not interfere at all. However, with magnesium, the Wehrmacht had a direct interest from the very beginning. In the other fields the Wehrmacht only became by and by more interested and of course, interested overwhelmingly when the war broke out.

Page 17
Orig.
Doc. (1) On page 11, paragraph 3, subheading 1), I said the Wehrmacht followed the party line "in material." I meant in the Latin "in Materia" or in the German "in der Sache, aber nicht in der Ueberzeugung," which can be translated "in the fact but not with conviction."

(a) On page 11, paragraph 3, subheadings 4) and 5), I must now make the following qualifications: I believe that I and I.G. Farben as a whole have contracted a great responsibility before God in that our acts constituted a substantial help to Hitler's foreign policy. However, I did not mean that I accept any responsibility in the legal sense. To the best of my conviction we never did anything unlawful against humanity. But we were in this terrible boat with Hitler, and since we have participated in handling this boat, we have a responsibility before God and consequently before mankind. I can explain this in the words of the "Matthaeus Evangelium": There are two duties for a Christian, the love of God and the love for your neighbor. Concerning mankind, we acted against the love of our neighbor, and that is what I mean when I say we consequently have a responsibility before mankind. The last two paragraphs were inserted because I felt a moral, but not a legal responsibility, because I.G. had contributed a substantial, and in the chemical domain a decisive, help to Hitler's foreign policy which led to war

and to the ruin of Germany and Europe, by the mere fact that without a substantial chemical industry modern warfare is impossible. It would not have been possible to carry through in the years 1939 to 1945 without the potential of the chemical industry. By this I do not mean to indicate a graver moral responsibility for I.G. than I believe should also be accepted by other Germans or other German concerns who made a comparable contribution with the necessary implements of warfare in the broadest sense.

3. On 15 August 1945, Dr. Max Ilgner and I signed a one-page statement simply entitled "Statement," the text of which follows:

Page 18
orig.D cc. "Since 1936, I.G. officials paid by I.G. and assisted by a large staff of technicians and personnel all paid by I.G., planned for the Nazi Government, the Rearmament phase in the chemical sector with concentration on the building up of such war industries as magnesium, synthetic rubber, oils, etcetera. This was handled by the Reichsamt fuer Wirtschaftsausbau and the Generalbevollmachtigter fuer Sonderfragen der Chemischen Erzeugung, under Dr. Krauch.

(signed) G.v Schnitzler

(signed) M. Ilgner"

Frankfort on the Main
August 15, 1945.

This statement still appears to me to be entirely true and correct, except that I would now qualify it in two places as follows:

(a) For the words "The rearmament phase" I would substitute "the autarchy and rearmament phase."

(b) For the phrase "such war industries as magnesium, synthetic rubber, oils, etcetera," I would substitute the words "such industries as magnesium, synthetic rubber, oils, etcetera, which were important industries for the autarchy program and the rearmament program and which we

cont. also hoped would be economically workable under a peace
Page 18 time regime."
orig.
D oc.

4. On 21 August 1945, I signed a one-page statement
entitled "Statement re Mobilization in the Summer of 1938,"
the text of which follows:

"Since the peaceful invasion into Austria the whole
German country practically was on the foot of mobi-
vs lization.

This state of things became even more accentuated,
when Hitler had entered into Prague and preparations
for a campaign against Poland were started. Since
July 1939 many of our employees and particularly
the officers of the reserve of the so-called new
army were called to their regiments and lined upon
the Polish frontier.

Simultaneously the industry was mobilized. Mobilization-
plans what in the case of war was allowed or ordered
to be produced, had a long time ago been prepared.

These plans, which beginning with 1934 had been made
up by individual firms in close team-work with Wirt-
schaftsgruppe Chemie and the competent ministries -
became effective in such a way, that Wigrü returned
them to the individual firm with his approval
stamped on them.

For my opinion the respective plans had been handed over to the firms in the current of the summer 1939, mostly with the instruction that they should be applicable at the moment of the outbreak of the war. Thus the plan for dyestuffs as far as I can remember became effective the first of September. For some commodities of purely military character, as the so-called implements of war, the mobilisation-order must have become effective to a much earlier date.

I should say, beginning with the spring of 1939, one after another of these latter products or objects has been put in the state of mobilization. The orders by Wirtgen-Chemie did not pass through the hands of the commercial administration; or they were sent straight to the producing works or passed through Tea-Büro. - I myself was so firmly convinced, that at the last moment an agreement about Danzig and the so-called Corridor would be reached, that I left Frankfurt about August 11th or 12th on a vacation-trip by car with my wife and my unmarried daughter to Yugoslavia - and was called back about the 27th or 28th of August from Bled.

Frankfurt, Aug. 21st 1945.

(signed) G. von Schnitzler."

This statement still appears to me to be entirely true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief, except that:

(a) Instead of the word "mobilization" in the title, and in the first paragraph, I would now use the word "preparedness." The mobilization (in the German "Mobilmachung") had been prepared, both personnel and war materials being mobilized in a certain sense, but the order placing the mobilization plans in final effect was not given until war broke out, as I have been informed since 1945. Therefore, the use of the word mobilization ("MOBILISATION" in the German is a technical term) without qualification might be misleading.

(b) In the second line, first paragraph, I meant to use the word "footing" instead of the word "foot."

5. On 28 August 1945, I signed two one-page statements, the longer one entitled "Statement re 'Tense Situation' in Summer 1939" and the shorter one entitled simply "Statement of Dr. von Schnitzler." These statements are complementary and can be properly combined upon together. The text of each follows:

(signed) G v Schnitzler

"28 August 1945

Statement by Dr. von Schnitzler

VS I would say that in my capacity as Deputy Chairman of the Wirtschaft Gruppe Chemie I had occasion to meet with Mr. Ungewitter at least once a month in Berlin. There we discussed official business regarding the different matters concerning the chemical industry. It was in July 1939 at one of these meetings in the presence of Mr. Barmann, Deputy to Ungewitter, that Mr. Ungewitter told me that Hitler was determined to invade Poland and that, in view of the assurance given by England and France to Poland, we must be prepared for an attack on our western front. There could be no doubt in my mind from the manner in which Mr. Ungewitter spoke that the attack would take place as soon as the harvest was collected, which meant some time in September. Ungewitter told me also that the Ministry of War and the Ministry of Economics had informed him that our "Kriegswichtigen", that is, the Ludwigshafen and Oppau works must be moved from the western frontier because they were too close. We feared also that they might have guns which could shoot over the 80 km. distance between our factories and the French frontier. I said at once to Mr. Ungewitter that this idea of moving the works seemed quite impossible to me. When I spoke to Dr. Ter Meer one of the next days, he told me that he was well aware of the plan and he confirmed that it was impossible to move the works and I am certain that Mr. Ungewitter has talked over these questions much more strongly with Dr. Wurster and Dr. Ambros than he did it with me, who was not responsible for the Ludwigshafen - Oppau works. It is incontestable that Mr. Ungewitter acted on behalf of the government, that means the Vier Jahres Plan, when he informed me in the beforementioned way.

(signed) G. von Schnitzler

"Statement re "Tense Situation" in Summer 1939

When Hitler had entered into Prague, one could not have any doubts that he was ready to go for war. The tension which since the Anschluss of Austria lay over Europe, became nearly intolerable. The German country was in a continuous state of mobilization. This had gone so far that even men like myself being not under any military obligation in March 1939 got a "Mobilisierungs-Order" to be in the case of war, at the disposition of their firm. The plans for the mobilization of the key-industries were handed out to the individual firms, partly, for the so-called implements of war, they at once had to become efficient, for other domains it was provided for that they should enter in force with the outbreak of war -- this applied for instance to the best of my knowledge for dyestuffs.

Shortly afterwards, it may be in June, the first incidents were provoked at the German/Polish border, riots in Danzig were "arranged" and as we knew from last year in the Sudetenland, how such things were being managed, we were absolutely sure that Hitler would attack Poland, if Poland should not accept his demands.

Optimists like myself remained hopeful that at the last moment an arrangement should be found but the earnestness of the situation could not be hidden as the guaranty of England for Poland was a fact. The public about this was misled by the announcement of the great apothosis which should happen in Tannenberg at the end of August in order to celebrate the anniversary of the battle of Tannenberg as well as to disclose the sepulchrum for old Marshall Hindenburg.

(signed) G v Schnitzler

I think it was in July 1939 that I had in Berlin a conversation with Dr. Ungewitter in the presence of his deputy, Mr. Ehrmann. In this conversation, Dr. Ungewitter informed me that the conflict with Poland could break out at any time and that after the opinion of the competent ministerium in principle the manufacturing of all chemical products important for warfare should be removed from Ludwigshafen/Oppau and be transferred to other works not so near to the French frontier.

I said at once to Dr. Ungewitter that this seemed quite impossible to me as such producing capacities in the other works were not existent.

The same was confirmed one of the next days by Dr. Ter Meer when I talked to him about that conversation and I am certain that Dr. Ungewitter had talked over those questions much more thoroughly with Dr. Wurster and Dr. Ambros, than he did it with me, who was not responsible for Ludwigshafen/Oppau. It is incontestable that Dr. Ungewitter acted on behalf of the government, that means the "Vier Jahres - Plan," when he informed me in the before-mentioned way.

Frankfurt, Aug. 28th, 1945

(signed) G. von Schnitzler

Both these statements were made upon the basis of a strong impression I had in August 1945 and they were firmly written in my recollection. The statements both still appear to me to be entirely true to the best of my knowledge and belief except that I would like to make the following explanations:

(a) Recollecting all my anxieties of that summer of 1939, all the wild fury which I felt against Hitler's policy, I am inclined to believe that unknowingly or subconsciously I might have interpolated (unterschieden) certain of my own worries and concerns to Dr. Ungewitter and I believe that this is a psychological and understandable error. Ever since the invasion of Prague, which happened the very day when we were sitting in Dusseldorf on the so-called Anglo-German industrial committee, and after having exchanged reactions on that event with Sir Francis Lark, the head of the British steel industry, my anxieties about the future steps which Hitler might take never came to an end. Apart from some personal friends not being connected with I.G., I only showed from time to time my deep worries and concerns to Carl von Weinberg, Dr. Hans Kugler, and Richard von Szilvinyi.

(signed) G v Schnitzler

(b) It is clear that I had a specific conversation with Dr. Ungewitter in about July 1939 in which he stated that it was opinion of the competent Reich authorities that the Ludwigshafen/Oppau plant would have to be closed down because they were too close to the French frontier. But as I now view it, he must have meant and must have stated that this order was prepared so that it would go into effect in case of war. Moreover, I am now doubtful if Dr. Ungewitter actually said that Hitler was determined to attack Poland. He could not have known this then. However, since he was the link between the government and the chemical industry, I know he was speaking on behalf of the Four-Year plan concerning the closing down of Ludwigshafen/Oppau plant and I was very impressed by the manner in which he spoke. When he additionally expressed himself to the effect that the international situation was grave and that it was quite possible there could be a war with Poland, which would involve France and England, I probably read into his statement that he said Hitler was determined to attack Poland.

(c) In the second paragraph of the longer statement, I said "we were absolutely sure that Hitler would attack Poland". This was my firm impression in August 1945, but I should have only spoken for myself and not said "we". Moreover, I thought Hitler's foreign policy of bluff backed by the strong fist would probably cause Poland to give in to his demands. However, I was a very worried man, particularly after the invasion of Prague, since I felt that England, France and America were bound to take a stiffer attitude to Hitler's words and actions, and that ultimately Hitler's policy would bring Europe to war and ruin.

6. On 22 August 1945, I signed a one-page statement concerning war preparations, the text of which follows:

"Even without being directly informed that the government intended to wage war, it was impossible for officials of I.G. or any other industrialists to believe that the enormous production of armaments and preparation for war starting from the coming into power of Hitler accelerated in 1936 and reaching unbelievable proportions in 1938 could have any other meaning but that Hitler and the Nazi Government intended to wage war come what may. In

(signed) G v Schnitzler

view of the enormous concentration on military production and of the intensive military preparation, no person of I.G. or any other industrial leader could believe that this was being done for defensive purposes. No of I.G. were well aware of this fact as were all German industrialists and on a commercial side, shortly after the Anschluss in 1938, I.G. took measures to protect its foreign assets in France and the British Empire.

(signed) G. von Schnitzler"

This statement represents my impression in August 1945. This statement offers an appropriate basis for making some additional statements concerning the feelings I held before the outbreak of war in September 1939. I resented Hitler's rearmament policy, and I was terribly oppressed by it. I mentioned my feelings confidentially to my close collaborators and to my personal friends, such as Professor Rousselle, Carl von Weinberg, Richard von Szilvinyi, and Dr. Hans Kugler. I often said confidentially that that madman (referring to Hitler) would bring us to ruin because the world in the long run would not tolerate his actions and his offensive speeches. I disapproved of the movement of troops into both Austria and Czechoslovakia. However, my feelings concerning the use of force to effect the Anschluss were influenced by a strong feeling, which I held to this day, that Austria and Germany are basically one nation and that the Austrians wanted a union with Germany. Therefore, the propaganda and the reports which came out concerning Austria, just before and just after the Anschluss, did not necessarily appear exaggerated to me. The military occupation of Czechoslovakia (leaving aside the occupation of the Sudetenland after the Munich Agreement) in March, 1939, was an entirely different matter for me. This military invasion simply shocked me to the deepest depths of my heart. The occupation occurred when I was in Dusseldorf at the German-English Conference of industrialists. On the way to a luncheon party at this time Sir Francis Lerk of England gave his reaction to this terrible step. My opinion was identical to his. I was just as shocked as he was and had neither an explanation nor an excuse. I always considered that Czechoslovakia was a godchild of the United States and that this occupation would deeply offend America. The 13th of March 1939 is the decisive date for me with respect to the foreign policy of the Hitler Regime. On that date it

(signed) G v Schnitzler

became absolutely clear to me that Hitler would lead Europe to ruin. I so expressed myself to my close friends, and proof of this can be obtained from them. From the very first moment it was clear to me that it was a terrible wrong to mankind which was done by the occupation of Prague. I know only too well many Czech people not to be fully aware that they were not Germans and that they did not want to have a German domination. After the Sudetenland was incorporated into the German Reich, I did not believe a word of the propaganda against Czechoslovakie. With respect to the Polish question, I distinctly disapproved from the first moment of any coercive or forceful measure. I didn't accept the Polish border "incidents" as true nor did I accept the propaganda concerning Poland. But, on the other hand, I didn't believe them to be as artificial as I recognized them to be after the collapse of Germany, because I felt that hatred was being made by both sides and that there was injustice concerning the Polish Corridor and East Prussia. I did not think the Polish question would come to war because I thought Hitler, following his policy of bluff, backed up by the strong fist, would secure his demands of the Poles by his bluff. However, I was among that group of Germans who were worried that Hitler might not get away with his bluff toward Poland and that this would mean war not only with Poland but as well with France and England. After Ungewitter had told me in July 1939, that the government was concerned about the proximity of the Ludwigshafen/Oppau plant to the the French border, I was worried by the prospect of war. As head of the Kaufmannische Ausschuss of I.G., and as the person in charge of the biggest part of I.G.'s export trade, the dyestuffs field, I quite naturally took every precaution of a cautious and considerate business man in case a clash should occur. I was not a gambler myself, and I considered gambling too mild a word to describe Hitler's foreign policy. I then considered Hitler's foreign policy a matter of "Verbrecherisches Spekulieren", which can properly be translated as criminal speculations. The steps I took to protect I.G.'s

(signed) G v Schnitzler

foreign assets abroad were the natural protective steps of a cautious business man against this criminal speculation. At the time in 1939, I felt that a captain should stay with his ship, that I owed certain obligations to my employees, and that I had a responsibility to I. G. Farben, in total, including the shareholders. For these reasons I did not resign or withdrew to an unimportant position in spite of my aversion feelings concerning Hitler's policy.

7. I have carefully read each of the 25 pages of this declaration and have placed my signature at the bottom of each page. I have made the necessary corrections in my own handwriting and initialed each correction in the margin of the page. I declare herewith under oath that I have stated the full truth to the best of my knowledge and belief.

(signed) Georg von Schnitzler
GEORG VON SCHNITZLER

Sworn to and signed before me this 18th day of March 1947, at the Palace of Justice in Nurnberg, Germany, by Georg von Schnitzler, known to me to be the person making the above affidavit.

(signed) Drexel A. Sprecher
DREXEL A. SPEECHER

U. S. Civilian, Attorney, AGO No. 473307
Office of Chief of Counsel for War Crimes

CERTIFICATION

I, ERNA E. UIBERALL, AGO No. D-150096, hereby certify that the above is a true and correct copy of Document No. NI-5196, the original of which is in the English language.

ERNA E. UIBERALL
U. S. Civilian
AGO No. D-150096

end

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT No. NI-1184
OFFICE OF CHIEF OF COUNSEL FOR THE CRIMES

Mario Passarge

Berlin NW 7, 8 August 1938
Unter den Linden 82

TO: Director Dr. von Schnitzler,
I.G. Farbenindustrie Aktiengesellschaft,
Initial: Frankfurt (Main) 20,
vs Gruenburgerplatz.
(von
Schnitzler)

Dear Dr. von Schnitzler.

The attached article by Dr. Fritz Nonnenbruch, the well known chief editor of the Voelkischer Beobachter, published in No. 212 Voelkischer Beobachter on 31 July this year, will, I believe, also be of interest to you. It is the first time that, out of this political atmosphere, the fundamental question of the rights of large combines (Grosskonzerne) such as I.G. Farben has been dealt with in such a positive manner.

The article was produced after Dr. Nonnenbruch had visited Leverkusen immediately prior to the celebration of the 75th anniversary, and after personal relations between him and myself had been improved at every available opportunity.

With sincere respects and

Heil Hitler

yours truly

Signature : Passarge

(page 2 of original)

Völkischer Beobachter

No. 212

31 July 1936

I. G. FARBEH

There are many insignificant looking houses in Germany in which a great man was born or has lived. There are other just as insignificant looking houses which are not connected with a great man but with a great enterprise which from that place started its climb to world fame. One of these houses is in Barmen. On 1 August 1863 Friedrich Bauer and Friedrich Bockert founded an enterprise from which the Elberfelder Farbenfabriken (Dye-Factories) have been developed, and which is one of the roots of the present German international firm of I.G. Farben.

There is a reason for us to remember this anniversary, that is because we are in the midst of a great technical revolution. Chemistry, in these years, is exerting an influence on national production to an extent which, in spite of the importance which the chemical industry already had previously, could not have been foreseen. What the chemical industry is today is evident from the fact that it, above all, has succeeded in securing national independence with regard to raw materials, an accomplishment which, previously, had frequently been considered impossible. One of the piers of the bridge across this " impossible " is I.G. Farben. One could judge this enterprise as one wished and in a manner which formerly was perhaps justified; now this enterprise is a bastion in Germany's struggle for independence with regard to raw materials.

It is sufficient to quote the terms synthetic gasoline and synthetic rubber. The value of these two processes alone to German national economy cannot be expressed in terms of money, any more than the price of a glass of water to a person who needs this water urgently for the preservation of his life. The fact that we have synthetic gasoline and synthetic rubber not only enriches our production, but it is more, it is a contribution to the safeguarding of our liberty. Synthetic gasoline and synthetic rubber are not the only products the I.G. Farben has given us, following the supply in former years of synthetic nitrogen to the German nation, the plants of this enterprise. At the present time - just to mention one item - the introduction of nipolene into our raw material resources is being worked on. Here there are possibilities which can only be imagined by one who has the necessary imagination and the necessary confidence in the creative ability of the German people.

Synthetic raw materials once ranked as substitutes. The work of I.G. Farben has contributed towards them no longer being classed as such. It has been the achievement of its chemists that the synthetic product has surpassed the quality of the natural raw material. It is the aim of this enterprise to make it an internationally recognized fact, proved by German example, that the human brain is overcoming dependency on the natural raw materials.

(page 2 of original, cont'd)

It is indeed the task of our generation to establish the superiority of brains over dead matter. That it has successfully contributed and continues to work for the achievement of this aim, justifies the remembrance of the anniversary of a principal branch of I.G. Farben.

In this connection we are particularly pleased about one thing. The National Socialist State intends to direct economy, but not to assume itself the administration of economy. Owing to the lack of initiative prevailing in certain branches of industry it was compelled to become an economic administrator itself and to build its own plants. We thank the I.G. Farben for having exerted their own initiative in the national struggle for independence of raw materials. This is especially pleasing to us because this initiative is an indication to us of the initiative that prevails, in general, throughout this enterprise; that also is the case in the field of research. Had the state had to erect its own plants for the manufacture of synthetic raw materials, to a large extent, independent of the I.G. Farben, it would then also have been necessary to construct new research laboratories in these plants. It is of great value that this has not been necessary and that further research in the plant laboratories can continue to be carried out in accordance with the old and so successful tradition of these same laboratories. In the initiative with which the I.G. Farben has entered the struggle for national independence of raw materials we see a yardstick for the initiative which is being displayed in its laboratories and which we need in order to carry through the present technical revolution. This initiative is important for the work in these laboratories will result in increase of production and, therewith, will contribute to the new German national economy and to socialism.

Obviously, the I.G. Farben is a major combine. The best that could be said on the occasion of its anniversary is, that it has proven the necessity for major combines, that is not because it has created social institutions that smaller and medium sized enterprises could not afford. As important as these social institutions are, the existence of socialism is not dependent on them; these institutions, if provided out of kindness of heart, demonstrate the union of management and employees, they could, however, also be merely charity if provided for other motives. It is important, however, that I.G. Farben, had it not been the major combine that it is, would not have been able to develop its chemical processes. What could we have done during the world war without artificial nitrogen? What would we do now without synthetic gasoline and synthetic rubber? And how restricted would be our hopes if we had not positive knowledge of new synthetic processes which will follow? These achievements confirm the necessity of major combines.

(page 2 of original, cont'd)

These, however, just because they are major combines, must work especially for the benefit of the people. That is not in the elaboration of unescapable, monopolistic methods of market domination but only through creative achievements. The existence of the major combine can then be considered justified if it does not assume the character of a consolidated economic power, but rather provides a foundation so that creative intelligence can be assembled to work together for the nation.

I.G. Farben, itself, shows how narrow-minded it is for the profits of this type of enterprises to be questioned. Obviously I.G. Farben could have made several hundred million less on its paint products before the war and on synthetic nitrogen after the war, without collapsing. For the people, however, it is more important that it (Farben) has earned these several hundred million, and therewith has secured for the German people the lead in the technical revolution of this generation, and through these processes which have been evolved and which cost money, has placed in the hands of the nation a weapon in the struggle for its independence of raw materials.

The merit which I.G. Farben has won for the nation is characterized by the expectations which we hold for the future work of this enterprise. They are expectations which are worthy of a large enterprise with this creative tradition. We expect new processes, but that is not all. We expect I.G. Farben, furthermore to make its contribution towards establishing a new working organization in the factories which will give each individual the opportunity to expand his creative ambition. The greatest claim to glory for an enterprise is in the number of its leading men who have been able to rise from the bottom to the top. This bears witness to the fact that the management is not ossified, but, conscious of its responsibility, seeks the best workers for the fulfillment of its tasks. Even though the number of these men in the present management of I.G. Farben is not small, we wish, for the enterprise and the nation, that this number will continue to increase. The larger it is the greater is the human productive energy encompassing the whole works which will be freed. And in just such a concern as I.G. Farben in whose workshops one finds many technical installations but few workers, it should be possible to find new methods so that the intelligence and the productive energy of the workers can expand freely. At the present time it is often considered impossible for the chemical worker to be a skilled worker. If that is impossible now, is that not possibly due to the present organization of work in the factories which, of course, has become obsolete all over the world? And will it not be of advantage to research work if the workers become a broad basis for inventive genius and searching intelligence?

(page 2 of original, cont'd)

The I.G. Farben has contributed much to the struggle for our independence of raw materials. To express further requests in this respect would be presumptuous in view of the achievements in the past. But may it contribute its share in the fight for freedom of labor which is included in the freedom of opportunity for the development of all creative energy which, again, depends on a new method of work organization in the plants.

75 years ago the firm of Friedrich Bayer & Co. was comprised of a small building in Barmen. Today the I.G. Farben is an international enterprise. May it have the fame, 75 years hence, of having been one of the starting points of a technical revolution of this generation, the importance of which can only be judged then. May this small house in Barmen have the same significance for the second stage in the development of production methods which the forces of nature make subservient to man, as the first steam-engine had for the first stage.

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

20 May 1947

I, John FOSBERRY, Civ. No. 20 179, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages and that the above is a true and correct translation of the document No. NI-1184.

.....
John FOSBERRY, Civ. No. 20 179

I.G. F R A N K F U R T

To Messrs:
Bergwardt Dr. Kugler
Bermann Ludwigs (Transl's note): several illegible
Haeffliger Dr. Stein initials.
v. Heider Dr. Overhoff 15/2
Höhlner
Dr. Kuepper

Your ref. Your letter of Our letter of Our telephone call Our Ref. Frankfurt Direct. (Main) 20 Dept. Par'on 11.2.43

Subject:

German-Spanish Company, Branch Office Pfm(Frankfurt/Main)
A reception in I.G.'s Skyscraper.

On the occasion of the reception of the Spanish Ambassador, Dr. v. Schnitzler made yesterday an address as attached.

Because of the comments on pages 5 and 6 we pass it on to you for your information.

Directorate Department Dyestuffs
Signature Illegible.

(Page 2 of original)

(Transl's note: two illegible initials).

To-day, the significance of chemistry has been recognized all over the world. Therefore, branches of chemical industry can be found in almost every country. They mostly serve to improve technical capacity, to promote export and as a basis for the military economy of the country.

Going further than that, the chemical industry became for the German political economy a factor of economically truly fundamental significance. It did not confine itself to improve technical possibilities or to increase the superiority of existing goods, thereby making life more beautiful and more pleasant, but it created the very foundations for the supply, and with it for the existence, of our nation. This development had its origin to a large degree in the first world war with its hard effects on Germany. Due to the loss of her colonies and other separated territories Germany was cut off from the raw materials sources of the world and she was dependent on her own inland resources. In this way chemistry became the sole and indispensable resource to relieve the problems of raw materials.

These tasks of the German chemical industry have experienced a tremendous and new stimulus, by the Four Year Plan of our Fuehrer Adolf Hitler. On account of the scarcity of vital materials, chemistry has to safeguard the freedom of economic movement for our people. The task is for chemistry to procure the which nature does not give to us in a sufficient

(page 3 of original)

measure or in a usable form. By way of a chemical change thousands of valuable new materials are being created from basic substances as for instance water, air and coal, which are available in sufficient quantities.

In the scarcity of raw materials is also found the real cause for the unique development of the chemical industry in Germany, and it did not happen just by accident that the synthesis of raw materials from abundant and comparatively inferior constituent elements of the earth had to be the special contribution in the field of chemical technique which Germany bestowed on the world. It can rather be said that just because of the adverse situation in regard to raw materials the German chemistry was spurred over and over again towards new inventions and technical accomplishments. Herein lies, -in spite of the narrow limits of the German living space of life (Lebensraum)-, an unmistakable power, and it becomes more and more evident that also advantages may arise from it which may possibly remain denied to a country which on account of the abundance of its sources of raw materials is not forced to such efforts.

But not until wartime came was the German Chemistry able to stand the great test of its excellence. It is no exaggeration to say that without the accomplishments effected by German chemistry under the Four Year Plan, modern warfare could not at all be possible.

The increasing volume of scientific research, the complexity and expensiveness of technical apparatus, the close technical

(Page 4 of original)

and economic interlacing of the individual branches favored and brought forcibly about a concentration of plants and enterprises in chemical industry at an early time. An element of strong support in this movement towards concentration was first of all I.G. Farbenindustrie Aktiengesellschaft whose (capital) stock after the additions and the genuine raise of the preceding year amounts today to 1.4 billion Reichsmark in round figures. But it might nevertheless appear that its share in the German chemical production is often being over-estimated by the general public. On the whole and going by press reports on the subject it will be in order to estimate the share of the Dyestuffs Konzern as about one-third of the total German industry. In that respect pronounced deviations prevail, upwards as well as downwards.

The share is, of course, outstanding in that branch from which it derives its name, the production of aniline dyes (Teerfarbstoffen). Also as regards nitrogen, I.G. is in the lead, leaving the rest far behind, and the same applies to most of the light chemicals. But the heavy chemicals, for instance those which are compounded into the aniline dyestuffs going into many high-grade products and those which in considerable quantities go also into the processing of nitrogen are largely being produced to cover own requirements only.

(Page 5 of original)

In the field of pharmaceuticals especially the trade-mark products of the founders' firms which merged since 1925 are known at home and abroad; but here, too, there exist a series of large-scale manufacturers, of equal value, not to mention the great number of medium-size and small firms with frequently remarkable scientific and therapeutic achievements.

As a part of the more recent fields of chemistry it is well known that alongside of the old producers, I.G. and Glanzstoff, quite a number of new, independent establishments took up and scientifically and technically developed the field of artificial fibre (Kunstfaser).

In the sphere of gasoline, the Montan industry and the brown coal industry are working besides the I.G. on the broadest basis, and in that of electro-chemically produced a considerable number of other big enterprises are also active, aside from I.G.

In most recent times I.G. became furthermore known to an especially high degree and all over the world by the production of its Buna. Experience shows, that Buna is not only a fully equivalent substitute for the spheres of application heretofore known of natural hard rubber, but that because of its especially favorable qualities it breaks also into spheres of application in which natural rubber cannot be applied.

Ladies and gentlemen, it is not my intention to give you here a review of the total achievement of German

(Page 6 of original)

Chemistry and of that of my own firm comprised therein. It is merely my desire to initiate you with a few introductory words in the subject of chemistry for which the approach is often difficult to a layman, and to give you by means of the samples displayed before you a slant of what German Chemistry is supplying today to the national economy and to that of the whole of Europe. Not only is it a presupposition for the waging of war in itself - of which not a single building-stone can be dispensed with in the happenings of war - but to a no lesser degree has it become a necessary part of the economic apparatus of all other continental countries. And especially in activities concerning foreign countries I.G. Farbenindustrie has from the beginning held a towering leader position in German Chemistry.

We are maintaining friendly relations with all of the greater chemical enterprises of Spain.

Together with the Cross Group, whose chief, Herr Ripoll, is a personal friend of Herr Weber-Andreue who is present here we are handling jointly a chlorinè electrolysis and related chemical products with Flix on the Ebro.

Within the Fabrication national de colorantes y explosives, originally a family enterprise of the families Sagnier, Pellicer and Nila y Camps, we are operating a big dyestuffs factory jointly with the former at Barcelona where, at the present time, also

a big pharmaceutical department is being developed for the proposed production of Salvarsan and Prontosil.

With the Union española de explosivos, whose chief Herr Thiebaut,

(Page 7 of original)

I may include among my personal friends, close relations have been maintained by way of our Nobel-Group, for decades which, in their technical aspects are suspended, it is true, but which in the future are to be resumed in old friendship.

Quite recently we have taken up closer relations with the industry at Bilbao where the head of the Banco de Vizcaya, Conde del Cadagua, in particular assumed an interest in the industrialization of territory in the chemical sector situated in Northern Spain. Large nitrogen establishments are being created there, and a new, young enterprise has taken up the production of plastics on a phenol and formaldehyde basis.

It is our desire jointly with the Spanish chemical industry and its chiefs who are our personal friends to promote the industrialization of Spain, within the frame of its economic potentialities and as far as our Spanish friends want this and to assist them in the care and control of it. Besides this we are supplying the Spanish market with those products which Spain needs for the feeding of her people, and we are convinced that with peaceful times reestablished, the exchange of our experience will be further intensified and our scientific as well as our commercial relations in the chemical sphere will be considerably broadened.

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

I, HERTHA C. KNUTH, U.S. Civilian, AG X-046355, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document No. NI-4958.

HERTHA C. KNUTH,
U.S. Civilian,
AG X-046355

END

AFFIDAVIT

I, Professor Karl GLAUCH, having been duly warned that I will be liable to punishment for making false statements, herewith declare voluntarily and without coercion under oath:

In 1913, the Haber-Bosch process for the production of nitrogen out of air had been adapted for large-scale production by the Badische Anilin- und Sodafabrik. In November 1914, after the outbreak of the World War, the Ministry of War approached BOSCH with the request to change over the production of nitrogen at Oppau, which was destined for fertilizers, to sodium nitrate which was needed for the manufacture of gunpowder. As nobody had any previous experience of large-scale sodium nitrate production, it took about six months until the nitrogen factory at Oppau was able to produce sodium nitrate instead of ammonium sulphate. In the meantime, however, certain quantities of sodium nitrate were being produced on a small scale with the existing platinum apparatus. Then the sodium nitrate process began on a big scale, so that the entire nitrogen production could be changed over to the production of sodium nitrate. At that time, the capacity of Oppau amounted to 20 000 tons of nitrogen, and that corresponds to a quantity of 100 000 tons of sodium nitrate.

Besides the Oppau works, there were also the Kalkstickstoff-Werke in Piesteritz which were producing nitrogen of lime, which could also be transformed into ammonium by a suitable process. Ammonium, treated by a catalytic process, yielded sodium nitrate. The production capacity of Priesteritz amounted to approximately 30 000 to 40 000 tons. Besides that, the coking plants produced approximately 150 000 tons of the so-called cokery-ammonium sulphate. Those were, in 1914, the only three sources for nitrogen compounds, with a total production capacity of approximately 280 000 tons of sodium nitrate.

After the battles fought by sheer weight of metal on the Western Front the end of 1915, the Army's requirements for ammunition raw materials grew considerably; consequently the available quantities of nitrogen were not sufficient any more, and the Ministry of War demanded the enlargement of the Oppau works, the production of which was doubled in the course of one year. Only six months later, in mid 1916, the Ministry of War requested us to erect a factory for production according to the Haber-Bosch process at another site, since still greater

(page 2 of original)

requirements for gunpowder and high explosives were to be expected with the extension of the war. Another reason for this project was the idea of decentralizing these important factories since even then Oppau had been the target of enemy aeroplanes.

BOSCH then chose the Harsburg area as site for this second factory and subsequently, in 1916, the construction of Harsburg-Leuna

(page 2 of original, cont'd)

was begun. Leuna was completed within one year and started production in April 1917, at first with a capacity of 100 000 tons. In 1917 the Ministry of War already requested us to increase the production capacity still further. In Leuna itself ammonium only was being produced. The sodium nitrate plants were simultaneously built in Wolfen, Bitterfeld, Hoechst. I.G. erected, at its own expense, the ammonium combustion plants in which sodium nitrate was produced. Later, further suggestions for enlargements were made, so that in the end a production capacity of 1 Million tons of sodium nitrate was reached. Oppau, too, increased its production and finally achieved an output of 500 000 tons of sodium nitrate.

After the end of the war, the entire production of nitric acid was changed over to the manufacture of nitrogen fertilizers. Then, enormous quantities of nitrogen fertilizers were demanded by German farmers who had not received any fertilizers during all the war years. After the war, I.G. decided to acquire a share in the Ammoniak-Werk Merseburg with I.G. Farben money ^{and} the shares belonging to the Reich were bought back, and consequently the Ammoniak-Werk Merseburg came into I.G.'s possession. Production continued in Oppau as well as in Leuna, so that the total production of both plants reached 4 Million tons of sodium nitrate. Demands from abroad too increased very considerably, and therefore interest in the establishment of their own nitrogen factories also appeared abroad. The need for becoming independent of foreign nitrogen imports for armaments arose in other countries too. It was not to be expected that these newly erected nitrogen plants, which, because of their high depreciation rates, had to work less cheaply than the German ones, would be forced by cut price competition in the nitrogen market to sell out to us, since the countries concerned followed the policy to safeguard their own nitrogen production by immediately imposing protective import duties.

(page 3 of original)

This led to the idea of establishing a World Nitrogen Combine. To this end, the German manufacturers had to be won over first. In Germany now nitrogen factories had come into existence too: Hibernia, owned by the Prussian State, Bergbau in the Ruhr-Chemie Combine, Kaliindustrie in Wintershall. The Kalkstickstoffwerke too had extended their plants in Trostberg and Hardt so that the German production too had increased considerably. All manufacturers of synthetic and cokery-nitrogen were united within the sales combines of the Nitrogen Syndicate. Here, a quota agreement was concluded as to how the production of the German consumers was to be (Translator's note: Error in original. Should read: ... of the German producers...).

After the conclusion of these quota agreements with the German manufacturers, foreign countries were approached. The first were Frenchmen and Englishmen who were quite willing to negotiate so that an agreement with them was reached quickly, since for both countries the home requirements were planned (Translator's note: Error in original, should read: ...the home production ...). Further negotiations took place with Norsk-Hydro at that time (in 1925). During the period

(page 3 of original, cont'd)

of the rapid development of nitrogen production I.G. had had the intention of erecting a nitrogen factory of its own in Norway. The idea of erecting a factory in Norway was conceived and an agreement reached with Norsk-Hydro to have the Haber-Bosch process introduced by the I.G. and thereby to double Norsk-Hydro's production. It was possible to double the 200 000 tons previously produced to 400 000 tons.

Further negotiations on nitrogen with Italy then followed. Italy had developed processes of its own through the Firm Montecatini. Still more negotiations were necessary with Belgium and Holland, countries which had also established their own nitrogen factories. Here, too, a nitrogen combine, called the CIA (Convention Internationale De L'Azote), was finally agreed upon after prolonged negotiations. After the conclusion of this agreement, negotiations were started with regard to Chile-Salpater. Here, too, agreement was reached, so that the world nitrogen market was consolidated. Export at stable prices was now possible for Germany - and therefore for the I.G. as well. During the years after 1927, German agriculture began to decline very greatly, a development which immediately made itself felt in the figures for fertilizer sales. Whereas previously I.G. had still sold 500 000 tons of nitrogen to German farmers, sales within Germany were reduced to 250 000 tons, so that a great part of the nitrogen production capacity had to be closed down.

(page 4 of original)

In 1923, BOSCH had ordered the development of new processes - since sales reductions could be foreseen even then - in order to set the installations to work on other processes in good time if they became free. At the beginning of 1926 the conversion of Leuna from nitrogen production to hydrogenation of coal was begun. It was planned to have an initial production of 100 000 tons of gasoline per year. Production started, under enormous difficulties, in 1927, and therefore production at full capacity could not be achieved until 1930. Then, in 1933, the Feder-Bosch agreement was concluded which led to an increase of production to 200 000 tons by the use of the appropriate units for high pressure processes and hydrogen production which formerly had been used for nitrogen manufacture. Nitrogen sales had fallen so far as to face us with the question whether Leuna should not be closed down completely and the entire nitrogen needed should be manufactured at Oppau. It had almost been decided to give up Leuna in 1929 or 1930 in face of the enormous difficulties which had, at that time, arisen with regard to the gasoline manufacture. Influential executives of I.G. were at that time of the opinion that it would be the right thing to do to close down the big Leuna works. They were DUISBERG and his followers. They wanted to give up the production of gasoline altogether on this occasion, whereas BOSCH still retained his point of view that work at these plants had to be continued at any price for the sake of fighting unemployment in Germany, the more so as the plants now covered expenditure although they made no profit.

(page 4 of original, cont'd)

In 1934, nitrogen consumption by German agriculture again began to rise after the prices for agricultural products had been stabilized by the German Government. The increase of nitrogen consumption became very considerable when, on GOERING's orders, the nitrogen prices were lowered by 30 % in 1937. This led to an increase of nitrogen consumption by 40 to 50 % during the next year or two. Thus, the effects of the price reduction for nitrogen were balanced. Total nitrogen sales of 1.5 Million tons were expected within Germany at that time if things developed steadily on the same scale.

(page 5 of original)

After 1930, production therefore gradually increased to 100 000 tons but stopped at this figure because there cost price just equalled selling price. The risk of increasing production further could not yet been taken since the technical difficulties of putting a heavy load on the apparatus were not yet solved. Prices could only be kept stable with the help of the Government which introduced an increase of import duties to 10 pfennings, so that world market price plus protective customs duty was equal to cost price plus interests on invested capital and depreciation.

As the Government, through FSDER, requested us to increase production in Launa for the purpose of giving employment to more workers, a new agreement was concluded in 1933. This is the so-called Feder-Bosch-agreement, the basic principle of which was a guarantee for a price equal to the cost price at a production rate which was to be increased from 100 000 tons to 200 000 tons of gasoline. At the same time, we were to be obliged to allow price controllers to examine the details of the works' calculations at all times.

Our previous production experiences had fixed or at least shown a certain cost price which could be kept stable as long as production continued along the same lines. This price was equal to the world market price plus customs duties. It was to be expected that heavier loads on the apparatus might lead to consequences which could alter the cost price to such an extent that considerable losses might be incurred by I.G. At the request of I.G., a new system, better adapted to changing conditions of production, was applied by fixing a sliding scale of selling prices proportional to the actual cost prices. The system was used in such a way that in case of an increase of cost prices I.G. was compensated for the difference between the usual selling price in Germany and the cost price by a payment made out of the customs revenue of the Reich Ministry of Finance. On the other hand, if the cost price was lower than the selling price, the difference was credited to the Ministry of Finance. For use as raw material, coal tar was bought in the free market which was transformed into gasoline in the hydrogenation plant. Up to then, tar had been used as coal tar mainly for the manufacture of dyes and roofing felt and for road construction. The refining of tar by the hydrogenation process allowed us to pay a high price for it which served as

(page 6 of original)

a greater incentive to start proper low combustion manufacture of tar from coal. At the same time, a better and more lucrative use for low temperature carbonization gases was the result, so that the lignite industry became especially interested in starting low combustion processes on a large scale and to increase its production. The low combustion plants suitable for this process were mostly owned by the State or by Municipal authorities. The I.G., too, has increased its production in the former Liebeck Montan plant in some parts. But as I.G. intended to change over later to a direct process of coal hydrogenation, the production of gasoline from tar represented only a transitory stage for I.G. Within one year, an output of 200 000 tons of gasoline manufactured, at that stage, from tar was achieved, and after initial difficulties the cost price was balanced against the selling price. In 1934, KEPLER had planned an increase of gasoline production, by using tar as a basis as well. At the request of SCHACHT, the Braunkohlen-Benzin A.G. was founded. This consisted of the owners of the lignite mines in Central Germany, and the shares were allotted in proportion to the ownership of the lignite mines. At first, the construction of three works was planned: Boehlen, with a production capacity of 200 000 tons, Magdeburg, with 220 000 tons, Ruhland with a production capacity of 100 000 tons; Zeitz, with a production capacity of 350 000 tons, was to come later. Boehlen, Magdeburg and Zeitz were to use the hydrogenation process of I.G., whereas Ruhland was scheduled to use the Ruhrchemie's process developed by Fischer-Tropsch. The industrialists themselves were approached by SCHACHT who explained his project for founding the Braunkohlen-Benzin A.G. to them. It was SCHACHT who, in his capacity as Reich Minister of Economy, had to take the initiative for founding this new company, since economical development came within the jurisdiction of that ministry. SCHACHT also drew the attention of the industrialists to the fact that he was endeavoring to let the industrialists themselves have free control and management of this new enterprise in order to prevent the development of purely Party enterprise. I.G.'s management willingly followed SCHACHT along the road he had taken because it was not thought advisable to achieve I.G. monopoly of such an absolutely vital product as gasoline, as it had previously happened with regard to nitrogen. Because of the great increase of nitrogen production, I.G. had

(page 7 of original)

achieved a monopoly : for which it had been attacked severely in public. It was entirely in accordance with BOSCH's general attitude to avoid a similar development with regard to gasoline. I.G. agreed without hesitation to granting licences for its process to other manufacturers, a procedure which I.G. had always declined to follow with regard to nitrogen up to approximately 1928.

In 1928/29, I.G. had changed its policy concerning nitrogen and had granted licences for use of its process to other interested firms, for example to Hibernia. As early as 1925 the course of

(page 7 of original, cont'd)

granting licences to firms abroad had been taken, for example to Norsk-Hydro. Originally it had been projected to erect a factory in Norway under the sole ownership of I.G. This plan was however relinquished in accordance with the newly adopted nitrogen policy, and a licence agreement was concluded with Norsk-Hydro which formed the basis for the joint nitrogen production in Norway. Brabag (Braunkohlen-Benzin A.G.) started production in 1935. KEPPLER was the principal originator of a new process developed in the laboratory and technical school of Ruhrchemie, which he, in accordance with reports received from there, thought much more economical than the I.G. process. SCHACHT was the cause for the fact that the hydrogenation process chosen for the first two plants, Boehlen and Magdeburg, was a process developed by I.G. which already been tried out in actual production. For the third plant, Ruhland, however, the Ruhrchemie process was chosen which resulted in the setbacks we had expected. Production in the Zeitz plant only started during the war; its construction was finished in 1938. When the Four Year Plan came into force and through it it became easier to find money for the development of big plants, a number of coal mining industrialists approached the Office of the Four Year Plan who were interested in, and came for the purpose of participating more than before in coal refining processes. Examples are: Hibernia, the company representing the mines owned by the Prussian State; Rheinische Braunkohlen A.G., Gelsenberg, which was backed by the Vereinigte Stahlwerke. The owners of the bituminous coal mines in Upper Silesia proposed the erection of a big gasoline factory in Blechhammer with Upper Silesian bituminous coal as raw material. Later, a group consisting of the subsidiary of the Standard Oil, the D.M.P.G. (Deutsch-

(page 8 of original)

Amerikanische Petroleum-Gesellschaft) and of the Rhénania, approached I.G. with the project of building a gasoline factory in Poelitz near Stettin which was to use imported crude oil as raw material. In 1928, an agreement had been concluded with Standard Oil, to which Anglo-Persian became a partner later on, according to which the oil companies received permission to direct the use of the hydrogenation process abroad for which I.G. had to give technical assistance. As a compensation I.G. was given the right to develop the process at will in Germany, and the sales organization of the big oil companies was put at I.G.'s disposal at cost price. The idea was to base the hydrogenation process in America on crude oil in order to achieve advantages regarding the proportion of gasoline to crude oil and the value of the output, in comparison with the cracking process used before. Such plants were erected at Baton-Rouge and Bayway. It was planned, furthermore, to apply other chemical methods and processes in order to manufacture refined products from crude oil, e.g. organic acids, alcohol, fatty acids etc. Ruhrchemie was the first to enlarge its plant which had previously been tried out on an experimental scale, to a total production capacity of 100 000 tons of paraffin, Diesel oil and lubricants. The Rheinische Braunkohlen A.G. erected near Wesseling a plant for the I.G. process with

(page 8 of original, cont'd)

a production capacity of 250 000 tons of gasoline. The Vereinigte Stahlwerke erected a plant near Gelsenberg also for the I.G. hydrogenation process, with a capacity of 350 000 tons and Hibernia built a plant near Scholven with a capacity of 220 000 tons. The plant at Poelitz near Stettin was enlarged for an output of 500 000 tons. The plant belonging to Hugo Stinnes, which worked on the Pott-Brosche process based on the extraction of bituminous coal by using heavy oils, and produced fuel oils of a high specific gravity, was enlarged to a production capacity of 150 000 tons. Blechhammer, the plant belonging to the Upper Silesian coal mining industry, was enlarged to produce 500 000 tons. Later, during the war, the Reichswerke Hermann Goering in Bruex were enlarged and reached a production capacity of 650 000 tons. In Moosbierbaum, a plant of 150 000 tons capacity was built by Donauchemie which was to be used for the I.G. process. Additionally, there was a smaller plant at Oppau for 50 000 tons, and another one at Luetzendorf, West of Louna, with 60 000 tons. Industrialists interested in starting the production of mineral oils and gasoline approached the Staff for Raw Materials

(page 9 of original)

and Foreign Currency first which was, after the proclamation of the Four Year Plan, called the Office for German Raw Materials and Synthetics, and was still later renamed Office for Economic Development. Here, the process was examined by experts and, if it appeared suitable on principle, incorporated into the general development plan. At this stage, the prospective manufacturer could talk with the Finance Department of the Ministry of Economics about the financing of his enterprise. Apart from financial questions, this incorporation into the general development plan also ensured the sale of the products manufactured in the plant by contracts to that effect. Principal contents of the contracts were: guaranteed cost price plus payment for depreciation, interest, and a modest profit, which was to replace part of the expenses incurred during the experiments which had to be made in order to develop the process further and/or to achieve a lower cost price. At the same time, the allocation of the necessary labor and materials was also ensured by the incorporation of the project into the general development plan.

After the beginning of the war, several alterations had to be made in the set-up of the plants since - for example at Poelitz - the raw material previously imported no longer came in and the management was compelled to take Upper Silesian crude oil to Poelitz instead and to hydrogenate it there. A plant for the refining of crude oil was built in Moosbierbaum near Vienne in connection with the Austrian oil deposits. Besides that, it had been planned to erect a gasoline producing plant at Haydebrock, but this plan was not carried out during the war. The production capacities were exploited to the full, according to the figures previously given. Some plants, e.g. Zeitz, Bruex, Blechhammer, were still further enlarged during the war. The Bruex plant with total output of 650 000 tons of gasoline was erected during the war. Blechhammer, the erec-

(page 9 of original, cont'd)

tion of which had been planned and ordered before the war, was developed to its full size during the war. The same applies to Zeitz which was built by Brabag.

At the end of 1940, after the campaign in France, the production of that whole industry had been reduced considerably because of the further development of the Four Year Plan. At that time, all available materials were to be used for the development of the housing program and of the transportation system since it was generally expected that peace with England would come soon; therefore, a great part of the materials available was already taken out of the stocks earmarked for the Four Year Plan at that time.

(page 10 of original)

Equally, interest in the development of mineral oil production had diminished after Polish Galicia had been occupied and the plants there had taken up production again. Later, interest in mineral oil production disappeared entirely after part of the Caucasus had been occupied since it was expected that the oil fields would come into the possession of the German troops. For the task of repairing and reconditioning the oil fields an organization had been built up, and the envoy NEUBACHER had been appointed as its head. He was assisted by Dr. E.R. FISCHER as expert of mineral oils. A big organization had been created for the reconstruction and the repairs of the Baku oil fields with thousands of workers waiting behind the lines for the moment when access to the oil fields would be made possible. Interest in mineral oil production began to increase again only when, in April/May 1944, the British and the Americans started to make systematic bombing attacks on the fuel producing plants.

I have carefully read each one of the 10 (ten) pages of this affidavit and initialled them in my own handwriting, have made the necessary corrections in my own handwriting and countersigned them with my initials, and herewith declare on oath that in this affidavit I have stated the whole truth to the best of my knowledge and belief.

(Signature) Carl KRAUCH
(Signature)

Sworn to and signed before me this 29 day of April 1947 at Nurnberg by Professor Carl Krauch, known to me to be the person making the above affidavit.

(Signature) Jan F. CHARNITZ
Allied Civilian ETO 420
Office of Chief of Counsel
for War Crimes
U.S. War Department.

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT No. NI-6524
CONTINUED

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

2 July 1947

I, Dorothea L. GALEWSKI, No. 34079, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages and that the above is a true and correct translation of the document No. NI-6524.

Dorothea L. GALEWSKI
No. 34079

The Reichsfuehrer SS

Field Command, 31 July 1944

Day Book No. (Illegible)
RF/Bn

Re: Your letter 26 July 1944 -- 370-929/44 gRs --

Reich Minister for
Armament and War Production
Party Member Speer
Berlin, Pariser Platz 3

5 copies
5th copy

(TRANSLATOR'S NOTE:
Illegible handwritten notes and
figures)

Dear Party Member Speer,

I thank you for your letter of 26 July 1944. In the meantime, I have talked to SS Obergruppenfuehrer JUETTNER. We will first undertake tests of the "W-Stoff" ("W-Product"). I naturally agree that I.G. Farben should take over the plant in Falkenhagen, or rather that I.G. should run the plants.

Only the question of the sale and the method of payment have still to be examined more closely. About this you will however be informed later on.

Heil Hitler!

Yours,

(signed) H. HIMMLER

Copy has been sent for information:

- 2.) To Chief of SS Main Direction Office
SS-Obergruppenfuehrer JUETTNER, Berlin
- 3.) To Chief of SS Main Economic Administration Office
SS-Obergruppenfuehrer POHL, Berlin
- 4.) SS-Obergruppenfuehrer GROTHMANN.

A copy of the letter of Reich Minister SPEER dated 26 July, 1944 is enclosed.

By order: Illegible signature

1 Encl.

SS-Hauptsturmfuehrer, 30 July

(Page 2 of original)

The Reich Minister for
Armament and War Production
370-929-44 gRs

Top Secret (Reich) Matter

Berlin, 26 July 1944
Pariser Platz 3

Reichsfuehrer SS and Commander
of Reserve Army HIMMLER
Berlin W 35

Dear Party Member Himmler,

At the end of June, the Fuehrer referred to the insufficient tests

of the "N-product" by the Army Ordnance Office and told me about his intention to transfer the responsibility for the production and the tests of the "N-product" to the Waffen SS.

At that time, I convinced the Fuehrer that the production should for the time being not be taken over by "Waffen-SS", but that it would be sufficient if the "Waffen SS" were to take over the testing of "N-product".

Even today, I do not yet agree that the production of "N-product" should be taken over by "Waffen-SS", because after all in Germany there is only I.G. Farben that has available the necessary specialists for the constant innovations in chemical processes.

(Page 3 of original)

I do, however, regret that in the course of the Four Year Plan, no competitive firm to the I.G. Farben concern was established, as with the Hermann Goering Works. This would have been easily possible at the time when the numerous new plants of the Four Year Plan were established.

Nowadays, we depend entirely upon the work of I.G. Farben for chemical progress.

A modern chemical plant to work separately from I.G. Farben therefore does not seem advisable to me.

For that reason, I ordered that the Falkenhagen plant which was at first independently run by the Ordnance Office, be handed over for operation to I.G. Farben, into the hands of the best-qualified chemist of I.G. Farben, Dr. Ambros, who succeeded lately in producing a perfect Buna of a quality equal to that of natural rubber.

Furthermore, I cannot agree that the production in Falkenhagen be taken over, (Translator's Note: Handwritten addition:) by the "Waffen-SS", because in connection with and next to the "N-product" - installation, there is an important installation for chemical warfare agents.

KH

Top Secret (Reich) Matter

(TRANSLATOR'S NOTE: Handwritten
Notes and Figures:)

370-429/44 gRs

III 6 (?)

TELETYPE

Reich Minister for Armament and War Production
Attention Hauptdienstleiter SAUK

Gttd. Ch H Ruest und BAKE, /Stab u. Wa A/Stab (?)
Letter Reichsfuehrer SS

The Fuehrer has ordered that through the Reichsfuehrer SS further experiments with "N-product" be carried out - Chief of Army Armament and Commander of the Army Reserve: Ordnance Office is to submit to Reichsfuehrer SS all the Files, Reference Material and knowledge gathered up to now about the "N-product" and to support purpose of "Reichsfuehrer SS" with all means.

Chief Supreme Command Wehrmacht
Army Staff II, No. 1731/44
G.K.

by order: (signed) BUHLER

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT No. HL-4043
(Cont'd)

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

I, DOROTHEA L. GALEWSKI, DFO No. 34079, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages, and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document No. HL-4043.

DOROTHEA L. GALEWSKI
DFO No. 34079

(E N D)
- 3 -

I.G. Farbenindustrie Aktiengesellschaft, Ludwigshafen a. Rh.

(stamp) Secret!

1. This is top secret according to paragraph 88, Reich Penal Code.
2. Pass-on only sealed; if forwarded by mail, as "Registered Letter" only.
3. Addressee is responsible for keeping this letter in a well secured place.

(handwritten initial)

To the
Reichs Ministry of Economics ,
for the attention of Herrn REINBOTHE,
Ministerial Counsellor.

B e r l i n W 8
Behrenstrasse 43.

Dr. E/Ho. 3 July 1942.

(Subject:) Synthese-Kautschuk-Ost G.m.b.H.

On the basis of the discussion of 12 June 1942 at your ministry and the meetings of experts that followed, far reaching agreement has been reached concerning the Synthese-Kautschuk-Ost G.m.b.H. The outcome of these discussions is recorded in the draft of 20 January 1942.

One main question only remained unanswered in these discussions, namely: to what extent and under what conditions shall we be entitled to make use, within the Greater German territories, of those manufacturing methods and experiences which we came across in Soviet Russia. Our draft of the trustee contract of 17 December 1941 provided that all manufacturing methods and experiences found in Russia as well as their improvements developed by the Company, were to be handed over to us exclusively and duty free for use within Greater German territory. At the meeting of 12 June 1942, Herr Min. Rat REINBOTHE raised some objections against declaring this surrender in the contract as duty free from the start, since the extent of production reached by I.G. Farben on the basis of the trustee-contract on one side - and the value of the Soviet Russian manufacturing methods on the other - would still depend on so many unknown factors, that it would be impossible, at the present moment, to weigh them one against the other.

(page 2 of original)

I.G. Farbenindustrie Aktiengesellschaft Ludwigshafen a. Rh.

- 2 -

During the discussions of experts that followed, the representatives of your ministry thought they were unable to give their full consent to the exclusive surrender of Soviet Russian manufacturing methods for our utilization within the territory of the Greater German Reich as desired

- 1 -

761

(page 2 of original, continued)

by us, requesting that we state our reasons in a special memorandum why we considered it best that the Reich renounce its claim to utilize these manufacturing methods and experiences within Germany. Our reasons are as follows:

As you know, I.G. Farben, at considerable cost in labor and money, has started to develop Buna in such good time, and, at the risk of private funds, has established large plants for the manufacture of Buna to such an extent, that the amount of rubber requested for the war by the German Army and German Economy, can be met. In view of the services rendered by I.G. Farben to the Reich, we do not think it fair if the Reich were now to enter into competition with I.G. Farben in Germany over the utilization of manufacturing methods by using those methods found in Soviet Russia, the more so since these methods can be made workable for the Reich through the intermediary of those experts only whom I.G. Farben has put at the disposal of the Reich for that purpose. We therefore beg that the following appendix, according to our draft of 17 December 1941, be added to paragraph 14, section 3, of the trustee-contract:-

"The Reich will renounce its claim on any utilization of manufacturing methods, experiences, inventions and improvements according to paragraph 1 and 2, within the territories of the Greater German Reich."

Should you be willing to share our points of view, we in turn would be ready to agree with Herrn REINBOTH concerning the question of tax exemption and could postpone the problem of eventual tax obligations for the period after the expiration of trusteeship, according to paragraph 14, section 3, of the contract of 20 June 1942, to be settled at some later date and in a more appropriate way. The mutual interests could then be

(page 3 of original)

I.G. Farbenindustrie Aktiengesellschaft Ludwigshafen a. Rh.

Dr. H/Ho. 3 June 1942 3

examined and all justified economic needs of I.G. Farben, taken into consideration.

We should be grateful to you if you could, in case of need, arrange for a final discussion on these two aforementioned items at your earliest convenience. In view of the fact that our experts received word yesterday, to be ready to take charge of the Soviet Russian plants, which we expect to take into possession very soon, due to the renewed advance of the German Army, we think it urgently desirable that final agreements be reached in order to enable the Synthese-Kautschuk-Ost G.m.b.H. to start production at once, if called upon to do so.

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT No. NI-4971
CONTINUED

(page 3 of original, continued)

Heil Hitler!

I.G. Farbenindustrie Aktiengesellschaft

(signed) LEBROS (signed) pp HEINTZELER

Copy to: Herrn Director Dr. ter MEER, Frankfurt a/Main
" " Dr. LEBROS, Ludwigshafen
" " Dr. LOEHR, Frankfurt a/Main
" " Dr. ROELL, Ludwigshafen.

No. 1354 (printed in red).

23-2612-1001-412
P 0267

Copy

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

24 June 47

I, Joseph M. Frankenstein, A-442842, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages and that the above is a true and correct translation of the document No. NI-4971.

Joseph M. Frankenstein
A-442842

- 3 -

" END "

MILITARY TRIBUNAL NO. 7
CASE NO. VI
Prosecution Document Book No. 17

Engl.



INDEX TO DOCUMENT BOOK II

Document Number	Exhibit Number	Description	Document Book Page
NI-9763		World Map showing I.G. Farben's participations abroad.	1
NI-9286		List of I.G. Farben's domestic participations.	2
NI-9503		Affidavits of Otto Hauck and Adolf Hoshle of 7 August 1947 certifying source of NI-9286.	20
NI-9510		List of I.G. Farben's foreign participations.	22
NI-10033		Map of Germany showing I.G. Farben plants, their main products and capacity as of 1933.	49 A
NI-10034		Map of Germany showing I.G. Farben plants, their main products and capacity as of 1944.	49 B
NI-9443		Affidavit of Ernst Struss, giving source of information for documents NI-10033 and NI-10034.	49 C
NI-16000		Chart showing plants owned and operated by I.G. Farben in Germany as of 1944, certified by Ernst Struss on 16 July 1947.	50
NI-10080		Chart of plants owned and operated by Dynamit-Nobel A.G., certified by Ernst Struss on 16 July 1947.	51
NI-6234		Affidavit of Buetevisch of 21 April 1947 on ownership of D.A.G.	52
NI-7235		Affidavit of Paul Dencker of 7 June 1947 concerning 1926 agreement between Farben and D.A.G.	53
NI-5520		24 September 1926, contract between I.G. Farben and D.A.G.	55
NI-9032		Affidavit of Werner Hassert 26 July 1947 on position power of I.G. Farben in Germany and throughout the world.	



INDEX TO DOCUMENT BOOK II

Document Number	Exhibit Number	Description	Document Book Page
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NI-5107		Affidavit of the defendant von Schnitzler of 27 March 1947 showing importance of I.G. Farben and its position in the German economic life.	67
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NI-5101		Affidavit of the defendant von Schnitzler of 4 March 1947 stating that the "industrial position of I.G. Farben in Germany has no parallel with any other enterprise", etc.	107
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NI-6520		Speech of the defendant von Schnitzler on the German chemical industry, July 1938, reprinted in I.G. Farben's monthly publication "Von Werk zu Werk", August 1938, stressing Germany's deficiency in raw materials and the importance of chemistry and I.G. Farben for the Four Year Plan, etc.	119
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NI-6520		Extract from article by Dr. Bruno Kiesevetter, professor at Faculty of Political Science, entitled "The New Tasks of German Political Economy" (1937) dealing with Germany's lack of raw materials.	123
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
NI-7270		Quotation from Hitler's speech on Germany's lack of raw materials, 1 May 1937, printed in the Four Year Plan, May 1937.	125
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
NI-6620		Article by Frauch on Germany's lack of raw materials and the role of chemistry and the Four Year Plan to make Germany independent, printed in the Four Year Plan, August 1937.	126.
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NI-6310		Excerpts from Frankfurter Zeitung, quoting Goering's speech on the Four Year Plan and containing an editorial on Goering's speech stressing the importance of synthetic nitrogen, gasoline, production, etc.	131
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NI-9618		Report of Oil Division of United States Strategic Bombing Survey, January 1947	133
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NI - 9763





Listing of I.G. Farben's Domestic Participations as set forth in the
Books and Records of I.G. Farben, located at Frankfurt a.M., namely
Document No. NI-2518 of 15 October 1945, arranged alphabetically for
the convenience of the court.

Actiengesellschaft fuer Chemische Industrie, Gelsenkirchen-Schalke
Actiengesellschaft der Kohlenwertstoff-Verbaende, Bochum
Actiengesellschaft fuer Lithoponefabrikation, Wienschendorf/Elster
Actiengesellschaft zur gemeinnuetzigen Beschaffung von Wohnungen,
Frankfurt/Hoechst

A.G. fuer Stickstoffduenger, Knapsack

A.G. fuer Stickstoffduenger, Koeln

Agfa-Film-Export G.m.b.H., Berlin

"Agfa" Gemeinnuetzige Bauges. m.b.H., Berlin

"Agfa"-Photo G.m.b.H., Breslau

"Agfa"-Photo G.m.b.H., Dresden

"Agfa"-Photo G.m.b.H., Duesseldorf

"Agfa"-Photo G.m.b.H., Frankfurt a.M.

"Agfa"-Photo G.m.b.H., Hamburg

"Agfa"-Photo G.m.b.H., Hannover

Agfa-Photo G.m.b.H., Koeln

"Agfa"-Photo G.m.b.H., Koenigsberg

"Agfa"-Photo G.m.b.H., Leipzig

"Agfa"-Photo G.m.b.H., Muenchen

Agfa-Photo G.m.b.H., Stettin

Agfa-Photo G.m.b.H., Stuttgart

Aktivkohle-Union Verwaltungs-Gesellschaft m.b.H., Frankfurt a.M.

Alkali G.m.b.H., Frankfurt a.M.

Aluminium-Verkaufs-G.m.b.H., Berlin

Aluminiumwerk G.m.b.H., Bitterfeld
Aluminium-Zentrale G.m.b.H., Berlin
Alzwerke G.m.b.H., München
Ammoniakwerk Merseburg G.m.b.H., Leuna-Werke
Anhaltische Rohstoff G.m.b.H., Dessau
Anorgana Gefolgschaftshilfe G.m.b.H., Ludwigshafen
Anorgana G.m.b.H., Frankfurt
Anorgana G.m.b.H., Ludwigshafen
"Astra" Grundstücks-A.G., Berlin

Bad Homburger Heilquellen G.m.b.H., Bad Homburg
Badisch-Pfalzische Flugbetrieb A.-G., Mannheim
Badische Saphir-Schleifwerke G.m.b.H., Elzach
Barnag-Moguin A.G., Berlin
Baryt-Monter G.m.b.H., Kassel
Carl Bauer & Co., Berlin
Baugenossenschaft Premnitz G.m.b.H., Premnitz
Baugenossenschaft, Rheinfelden
Baustoffe und Kohlen G.m.b.H., Halle/Saale
Bayerische Essig-Essenz-Verkaufsstelle Cr. Dederer G.m.b.H., München
Bayerische Stickstoffwerke A.G., Berlin
Bayerische Stickstoffwerke A.G., München
Bohringinstitut Berlin G.m.b.H., Berlin
Behringwerke A.-G., Marburg

Bergbau A.-G. Lothringen, Bochum
Bergbau A.-G. Lothringen, Gerthe
Bergsdorf-Gessthachter Eisenbahn A.-G., Geesthacht
Bergmannswohnstaetten-Ges. Offleben G.m.b.H., Magdeburg
Beskiden Erdoel Verarbeitungs-G.m.b.H. i.L., Berlin
Bielefelder Sackfabrik G.m.b.H., Bielefeld
Blankenburger Grundstueckerwerbe- u. Verwertungs-G.m.b.H., Blanken-
burg/Harz
Boden- und Werkstoff-Forschungs-G.m.b.H. Hessen-Nassau, Frankfurt
Bourjau & Co. K.G., Schoeningen
Braunkohle-Benzin A.G., Berlin
Braunkohlenhaus G.m.b.H., Bitterfeld
Brikettverkauf G.m.b.H., i.L., Leipzig
Buna-Werke G.m.b.H., Schkopau
A. Basse G.m.b.H., Nordhausen

Carbidkontor G.m.b.H., Muerenberg
Carbid-Vereinigung G.m.b.H., Berlin
Carbo-Morit-Union-Verwaltungs-Ges.m.b.H., i.L., Frankfurt a.M.
Celluloid-Verkaufsgesellschaft m.b.H., Berlin
Chemie Ost G.m.b.H., Berlin
Chemiewerke Homburg A.-G., Frankfurt a.M.
Chemische Fabrik Holten G.m.b.H., Oberhausen-Holten
Chemische Fabrik Marienhutte G.m.b.H., Fuerstenwalde
Chemische Fabrik Stockhausen & Cie., K.-G., Krefeld

Chemische Forschungs G.m.b.H., Muenchen
Chemische Verwertungsgesellschaft Oberhausen G.m.b.H., Oberhausen
Chemische Werke Huels G.m.b.H., Huels
Chemische Werke Zscherndorf G.m.b.H., Leipzig
Chlorzinkprodukte G.m.b.H., Frankfurt a.M.
Citrovin-Fabrik G.m.b.H., Frankfurt a.M.
Clarashell G.m.b.H., Koeln
Consortium fuer elektrochemische Industrie G.m.b.H., Muenchen
Cuprena-Spinnfaser G.m.b.H., Berlin
Garta & Co. G.m.b.H., Berlin

Dampfmolkerei Stennowitz o.G.m.b.H., Stennowitz
Decker & Cie., G.m.b.H., Koeln
Deutsch-Koloniale Gerbstoff-Gesellschaft m.b.H., Karlsruhe
Deutsche Aktivkohle Ges.m.b.H., Frankfurt a.M.
Deutsche Bank, Berlin
Deutsche Celluloid-Fabrik A.G., Eilenburg
Deutsche Celluloid-Fabrik Eilenburg Gefolgschaftshilfe G.m.b.H., Eilenburg
Deutsche Edelsteinggesellschaft vorm. Hermann Wild A.G., Idar-Oberstein
Deutsche Gasolin A.G., Berlin
Deutsche Gesellschaft fuer Schaedlingsbekaempfung G.m.b.H., Frankfurt a.M.
Deutsche Gold- u. Silberscheide-Anstalt A.G., Frankfurt a.M.
Deutsche Grube A.-G., Halle
Deutsche Heraklith-A.G., Muenchen

Deutsche Industriebank, Berlin
Deutsche Industriebank A.G., Berlin
Deutsche Magnesit A.G., Muenchen
Deutsche Molybdänwerke G.m.b.H., Teutschenthal
Deutsche Oxhydric G.m.b.H., Berlin
Deutsche Pyrotechnische Fabriken G.m.b.H., Bernau
Deutsche Pyrotechnische Fabriken G.m.b.H., Neumark/Oberpfalz
Deutsche Riechstoff G.m.b.H., Leipzig
Deutsche Solvay-Werke A.G., Bernburg
Deutsche Sprengchemie G.m.b.H., Berlin
Deutsche Superphosphat-Industrie G.m.b.H., Berlin
Deutscher Aero-Lloyd A.G., Berlin
Donar G.m.b.H. fuer Apparatebau, Wesermuende-Walsdorf
G. C. Dornheim A.G., Berlin
Drawin G.m.b.H., Muenchen
Dresdner Bank, Berlin
Drugofa Chemische Produkte G.m.b.H., Berlin
Duisburger Kupferhuetten, Duisburg
Dynamit-Aktien-Ges. vorm. Alfred Nobel & Co. (V.A.), Troisdorf

Eckert & Ziegler G.m.b.H., Koeln-Braunsfeld
Elbia G.m.b.H. fuer chemische Produkte, Domnitz
Einsatz G.m.b.H., Leuna
I.F. Eisfeld Silberhuetten G.m.b.H., Silberhuetten
Elektrochemische Produkte G.m.b.H., Frankfurt a.M.
Elektroschmelzwerk Kempten A.G., Muenchen
Elite Grundstuecke G.m.b.H., Berlin
Erdoel- und Kohlenverwertung A.G., Berlin
Ertel, Bieber & Co. G.m.b.H., Hamburg
Essig-, Oel-, und Senf-Vertriebs-G.m.b.H., Hamburg-Altona
Essigsaeure-Gesellschaft m.b.H., Frankfurt a.M.
Ethyl G.m.b.H., Berlin

Faserholz G.m.b.H., Goettingen
Fassholzfabrik Goldbach G.m.b.H., Goldbach
Fluorit-Werke G.m.b.H., Leverkusen
Fluerprodukte G.m.b.H., Frankfurt a.M.
Flusspatwerke G.m.b.H., Berlin
Fluss- und Schwerspatwerke Pforzheim Doeppenschmidt & Co. G.m.b.H.,
Ludwigshafen
Foerderstedter Kalk- und Cementkalkwerke Schenk & Vogel G.m.b.H.,
Magdeburg
Fordwerke A.G., Koeln-Riehl
Forschungsgesellschaft fuer Faserrohstoffe m.b.H., Berlin
Fraenkische Wein- und Konserven-Fabriken G.m.b.H., Schweinfurt

Gartenstadt Genossenschaft Brehna und Umgebung e.G.m.b.H., Brehna
Gefolgenschaftshilfe der A.G. fuer Stickstoffduenger G.m.b.H., Koeln
Gefolgenschaftshilfe der I.G. Bergwerke G.m.b.H., Halle/Saale
Geiseltal Grunderwerbges.m.b.H., Halle/Saale
Gemeinnuetzige A.-G. fuer Wohnungsbau, Ludwigshafen
Gemeinnuetzige Aktiengesellschaft fuer Wohnungsbau, Koeln
Gemeinnuetzige Baugenossenschaft fuer das Amt Marl G.m.b.H., Marl
Gemeinnuetzige Baugenossenschaft G.m.b.H., Dornagen
Gemeinnuetzige Baugesellschaft m.b.H., Frankfurt-Griesheim
Gemeinnuetzige Bau- und Siedlungs-A.-G., Krefeld
Gemeinnuetzige Bau- und Siedlungs-A.-G., Krefeld
Gemeinnuetzige Bau- und Wohnungs-G.m.b.H., Weissenfels
Gemeinnuetzige Bauverein G.m.b.H., Opladen
Gemeinnuetzige Eigenheim G.m.b.H., Leverkusen
Gemeinnuetzige Eigenheim-Gesellschaft m.b.H., Leverkusen
Gemeinnuetzige Genossenschaft fuer Gefolgenschaftsverpflegung G.m.b.H.,
Breslau
Gemeinnuetzige Kulturfilm-Vertrieb G.m.b.H., Berlin
Gemeinnuetzige Siedlungsbau Gen. e.G.m.b.H., Oberlar
Gemeinnuetzige Siedlungsgesellschaft Duisburger Kupferhuetten G.m.b.H.,
Duisburg
Gemeinnuetzige Siedlungsgesellschaft Kalle G.m.b.H., Wiesbaden-
Biebrich
Gemeinnuetzige Siedlungsgesellschaft Rheinische Heim G.m.b.H., Bonn
Gemeinnuetzige Wohnungsgesellschaft fuer den Kreis Herzogtum Lauenburg,
Lauenburg
Gemeinnuetziger Bauverein Gartenstadt e.G.m.b.H., Halle
Gemeinnuetziger Bauverein Gartenstadt e.G.m.b.H., Halle
Gemeinnuetziges Wohnungsunternehmen Chemische Werke Huels G.m.b.H.,
Huels
Generatorkraft-A.G. fuer Tankholz und andere Generatorkraftstoffe,
Berlin

Gustav Genschow & Co., A.G., Berlin

Gesellschaft fuer Aufbereitung m.b.H., Frankfurt a.M.

Gesellschaft fuer Landeskultur m.b.H., Halle/Saale

Gesellschaft fuer Synthese-Produkte m.b.H., Frankfurt a.M.

Gesellschaft fuer Teerverwertung m.b.H., Duisburg-Neiderich

Gesellschaft m.b.H. zur Verwertung chemischer Erzeugnisse, Berlin

Gesellschaft m.b.H. zur Verwertung chemischer Erzeugnisse, Koeln

Gewerkschaft Admiral, Moerde i.W.

Gewerkschaft Auguste Victoria, Huels

Gewerkschaft Bernhardsglueck, Witten/Ruhr

Gewerkschaft Clara-Verein, Halle/Saale

Gewerkschaft des konsolidierten Steinkohlenbergwerkes "Breitenbach",

Halle

Gewerkschaft Gutzonhain, Darmstadt

Gewerkschaft Graf Karl Martin, Nordhausen

Gewerkschaft Kreuzbruch IV, Halle

Gewerkschaft Morgenglueck, Essen

Gewerkschaft Stein V, Huels

Gewerkschaft Stein VII, Huels

Gewerkschaft Stein IX, Huels

Gewerkschaft Stein X, Huels

Gewoge G.m.b.H., Leuna

Gleisgesellschaft Sedafabrikgeleende m.b.H., Nuernberg-Doos

"Griesogen" Griesheimer Autogen-Vorverkaufs-Ges.m.b.H., Frankfurt/Gries-

heim

Grudofuehrung G.m.b.H., Leipzig

Guano-Werke A.G., Hamburg

Th. Hagemann Kohlenhandels-gesellschaft m.b.H., i.L., Eisleben
Hallescher Verkaufs-Verein fuer Ziegelfabrikate A.-G., Halle/Saale
Haus der Chemiefaser G.m.b.H., Berlin
Heinstaette Westmark G.m.b.H., Neustadt a.d.W.
Heinstaette Westmark G.m.b.H., Neustadt/W.
Heckenscheid G.m.b.H., i.L., Wuppertal-Barmen
Hoffmann & Engelmann, Neustadt/H.
Hoffmann & Engelmann Gefolgschaftshilfe G.m.b.H., Neustadt a.d.W.
Hruby & Co., Hachenburg
Huettenzucht-Verband G.m.b.H., Duesseldorf
Hydrierwerke Poolitz, Poolitz

I.G. Farbenindustrie Aktiengesellschaft, Frankfurt/M.
I.G.-Gefolgschaftshilfe G.m.b.H., Frankfurt/Main
Igorusako Handelsgesellschaft m.b.H., Berlin
Indanthron-Haus Frankfurt G.m.b.H., Frankfurt/Main
Indanthron-Haus G.m.b.H. Berlin Lemmer, Berlin
Indanthron-Haus Hamburg G.m.b.H., Hamburg
Indanthron-Haus Koeln, Koeln
Indanthronhaus Leipzig G.m.b.H., Leipzig
Indanthron-Haus Muenchen G.m.b.H., Muenchen
Indanthron, Stuttgart,
Injecta A.G. Fabrik zur Fabrikation chirurgischer Instrumente, Berlin
Friedr. Josan vorm. Wilh. Rausch G.m.b.H., Halle/Saale

Kali-Chemie A.G., Berlin-Niederschöneweide
Kalle & Co. A.-G., Wiesbaden-Biebrich
Kalle & Co., Gefolgschaft Hilfe G.m.b.H., Wiesbaden-Biebrich
"Karato" G.m.b.H., Rattenburg
Kamid-Vereinigung G.m.b.H., Berlin
Katholisches Vereinshaus, Troisdorf
Kieselchemie G.m.b.H., Kieselbach
Kleinbahn Aktiengesellschaft Genthin, Genthin
Kleinwohnungsbrau Halle A.-G., Halle/Saale
Kleinwohnungsbrau A.-G., Halle
Klueser & Co. K.G., Wuppertal-Elberfeld
Kodin-Rottweil Aktiengesellschaft, Berlin
Kohlenhandels-gesellschaft "Blueckauf" Abt. Beck & Co., Kassel
Kohlenhandels-gesellschaft "Hansa" Kallmeier & Co., Koeln
Kohlenhandels-gesellschaft Dueders, Montzen & Co., Bremen
Kohlenhandels-gesellschaft "Mark", Siepmann, Schreder & Co., Hagen
Kohlenhandels-gesellschaft "Niederrhein", Weyer, Franko & Co., Duisburg
Kohlenhandels-gesellschaft "Westfalen", Wiesbrock, Schulte & Co.,
Hannover
Kohlenhandels-gesellschaft "Westmark" Ellenbeck, Mey, Mueller & Co.,
Saarbruecken
Kohlenkontor Weyhannoyer & Co., Mannheim
Kontinentale Oel Aktiengesellschaft (V.A.), Berlin
Kreisbaugewerkschaft Rottweil o.G.m.b.H., Rottweil
Kunstseide Verkaufsbuero G.m.b.H., Berlin
Kupferhuette Ertel, Bieker & Co., Hamburg
Kupferkunstseide-Syndikat G.m.b.H., Wuppertal-Oberbarmen

Mitteld deutsches Braunkohlensyndikat 1937 G.m.b.H., Leipzig
Mitteld deutsches Braunkohlensyndikat 1937 G.m.b.H., Leipzig
Mitteld deutsches Braunkohlensyndikat 1937 G.m.b.H., Leipzig
Molkereigenossenschaft o.G.m.b.H., Rerpin
Molkereigenossenschaft Schafstadt o.G.m.b.H., Schafstadt
Monturon G.m.b.H., Briesen/Marc
"Hoven" G.m.b.H., Muenchen
Eduard Mieller G.m.b.H., Halle

Naumann & Riets G.m.b.H., Stettin
Neue Norddeutsche und Vereinigte Flussschiffahrts A.G., Hamburg
Niederbarnau Oel G.m.b.H., Berlin
Niedersachsen-Oel-Gesellschaft m.b.H., Berlin

Obstbaugesellschaft Vorderpfalz, Linburgerhof
Oelsaat-Verwertungsgesellschaft m.b.H., Berlin
Ostbayerische Schleif- und Fracswerke G.m.b.H., Zwiesel
Joh. Oswaldowski A.G., Hamburg
Oxo-Gesellschaft m.b.H., Oberhausen-Kolten

Fallas G.m.b.H., Konzernversicherung, Frankfurt a.M.
Fankrens-Verwertungs-Gesellschaft m.b.H., Berlin
Parkhotel Hans Becken Bochum G.m.b.H., Bochum
Patronen-, Zündkneten- und Metallwaren-Fabrik A.G. vormals
Solter & Bollot, Schönebeck/Elbe
Pfeifische Pulverfabriken St. Ing. G.m.b.H., St. Ingert
Pfeiffersche zu Bad Frankenhausen (Wylf.), Bad Frankenhausen
Plasticon Tropen G.m.b.H., Berlin
Plastro-Gesellschaft m.b.H., Vertriebsgesellschaft fuer Kunstharzwaren,
Berlin
Preussische Gewerkschaft "Neue Hoffnung" b. Doornik, vormals
Preussische Gewerkschaft Neue Hoffnung, Schönebeck/Elbe
Propan G.m.b.H., Berlin
Pulverfabrik Hasloch G.m.b.H., Hasloch
"Pyrocur" Vereinigte Hartmaschinen-Ges.m.b.H., Frankfurt/Main
Pyrokor-Metallgesellschaft A.G., Essen-Werden

Reichskraftspirit G.m.b.H., Berlin
Röntgengutsgesellschaft Marsburg G.m.b.H., Leipzig
Rheinisch-Westfälische Sprengstoffe A.-G., Muenberg
Rheinisch-Westfälisches Kohlen-Syndikat, Essen
Rheinische Elektrodienfabrik G.m.b.H., Koenig
Rheinische Gummi- und Celluloidfabrik, Mannheim
Rheinische Senf- und Weissig-Industrie P. Eisenhardt G.m.b.H.,
Duesseldorf

Rheinische Stahlwerke, Essen

Rheinisches Braunkohlen-Syndikat G.m.b.H., Kohn

Rheinisches Spritzgusswerk G.m.b.H., Kohn Brunsfeld

Rheinmetall-Feld-Vertriebs- und Vertriebsges.m.b.H., Berlin

Riebeck-Werke G.m.b.H., Halle

Riebeck'sche Montanwerke A.G., Halle/Saale

Rohisenverkaufsges. Duisburger Kuppelrotte G.m.b.H., Mupperfeld
Ruberfeld

Ruhrgas A.G., Essen

Ruhrorter Transport-Gesellschaft m.b.H., Duisburg

Rummenen Mineraloel G.m.b.H., Berlin

RW-Geco Munitionsgesellschaft fuer Polen o.H.G., Danzig

Sachtleben A.G. fuer Bergbau und chemische Industrie, Kohn

Sauerstoffabrik Berlin G.m.b.H., Berlin

Schuldirekte Rheinische Dauerwasche- und Kunstseifenfabrik

G.m.b.H., Mannheim-Neckarau

Schneidfeldter Anschluss-Ges.m.b.H., Breslau

H. und W. Schmitz-Stiftung, Ludwigshafen

Richard Schuber A.G. Schenck, Ergebirge

Jos. Schuermann G.m.b.H., Lüneburg

Hermann Schwarz K.G., Wittensteind b. Götting.

Schwefel-Gesellschaft m.b.H., Berlin

Schwefelkohlenstoff-Verkaufsges. m.b.H., Frankfurt/Main

Schwefelnatrium G.m.b.H., Frankfurt/Main

Selvo-Kronbiogel-Dornheim A.G., Seemorden

"Sestra" Schaeffel-Extraktions- und Raffinations G.m.b.H., Frankfurt/
Main

Modlung Hoeschling G.m.b.H., Halle

Soda- und Aschekation Ost G.m.b.H., Berlin

Spreyer & Grund G.m.b.H., Berlin-Weissensee

Sprungstoff- und Zündschwarzwerke Gnaschwitz A.-G., Gnaschwitz

Sprungstoff-Vereinfachungs-G.m.b.H., Berlin

Sprungstoff-Vereinfachungs-G.m.b.H., Treisdorf

Stoodener Kalkwerke G.m.b.H., Dahn/Lahn

Steinkohle-Elektrizität A.G., Essen

Stickstoff-Ost G.m.b.H., Berlin

Stickstoff-Syndikat G.m.b.H., Berlin

Walter Strahl G.m.b.H., Berlin

Stallungsgesellschaft fuer Metallgewinnung m.b.H., Frankfurt/M.

Stollen- und Verwertungs-G.m.b.H., Kahlheim/Ruhr

Suchautsche Kalksteinstoffwerke A.-G., Trostberg

Sulfat-Vereinigung G.m.b.H., Frankfurt a.M.

Superphosphatfabriken G.m.b.H., Hannover

Syndikat deutscher A. Stanzmaschinen-Fabriken G.m.b.H., Bornburg

Carl Tinner o.H.G., Berlin

Titangesellschaft m.b.H., Lovershausen

Transocean G.m.b.H., Berlin

Friedr. Ude Kon.Ges., Dortmund

Friedr. Ude Kon. Ges. Ingenieurbureau, Dortmund

Ugine-Perrin-Verfahren G.m.b.H., Berlin

"Union" Fabrik chemischer Industrie A.G., Stuttgart

Union Generatoren G.m.b.H., Berlin

Universum Film A.G. (UFA), Berlin

Vanadin Gesellschaft G.m.b.H., Berlin

"Venditor" Kunststoffvertriebsgesellschaft G.m.b.H., Troisdorf

Vereinigte Spurestoffwerke G.m.b.H., Berlin

Vereinigte Zunder- und Kabelwerke A.G., Meissen

Vereinigung Sulfatlauge G.m.b.H., Berlin

Verkaufsgenossenschaft Pyrotechnischer Fabriken G.m.b.H., Berlin

Verkaufsgesellschaft fuer Kunststofferschnisse G.m.b.H., Frankfurt/M.

Verkaufsgesellschaft f. Kunststofferschnisse G.m.b.H., Frankfurt/M.

Verkaufsstelle fuer Oxalsaeure und Ammonsaeure G.m.b.H., Frankfurt/M.

Verkaufsvereinigung deutscher Flusapetritfabriken G.m.b.H., Erfurt

Verkehrsbetriebe Cosel-Heydebreck G.m.b.H., Heydebreck

Versuchswerk fuer Kautschukverarbeitung G.m.b.H., Leverkusen

Dr. Alexander Wacker G.m.b.H., Muenchen
Gebr. Wandeleben G.m.b.H., Stromberg
Gebr. Wandeleben G.m.b.H., Stromberg/Aunsrueck
Korn-Commissions Aktiengesellschaft Hamburg
Kunststoff-Emulsions-Werke G.m.b.H., Schwerzenberg
Kunststoff-Emulsions-Werke G.m.b.H., Bitterfeld
Westfälisch-Luhntische Sprengstoff A.G., Chemische Fabriken, Berlin
Kunstf. Kohlenkammer Handel, Buschmann & Co., Hamburg
Westfälische Kohlenhandels-Gesellschaft G.m.b.H., Dortmund
Westfälische Kohlen- u. Koks-Verkaufsges. Ramm & Co., Magdeburg
Westfälische Kohlenverkaufsgesellschaft, Vollrath Koch & Co., Berlin
Westfälische Metallwerke G.m.b.H., Nachrodt
Westges G.m.b.H., Marl
Wohnungsbaust. Stassfurt G.m.b.H., Stassfurt
Wohnungsbaugesellschaft G.m.b.H., Treisdorf
Wolff & Co. K.G. auf Aktien (S.A.), Walsrode
Wortenbergische Kattunmanufaktur A.-G., Weidenheim

Zellglas-Exportyndikat G.m.b.H., Wiesbaden-Börsch
Zellwolle-Faser-Spinnerei G.m.b.H., Dorkendorf
Zement-Gesellschaft Nord G.m.b.H., Berlin
Ziegelei Graesbeck G.m.b.H., Walsrode
Zuckerfabrik Edeborn G.m.b.H., Edeborn
Zuckerfabrik Reitzsch G.m.b.H., Reitzsch
Zuckerfabrik Stoebnitz, K. Pach & Co., Stoebnitz
Zuenderwerke Ernst Bruhn A.G., Krefeld-Linn
Zuendschnur Verkaufsgesellschaft m.b.H., Berlin

CERTIFICATE

I, HANS J. WOLFFSOHN, No 004485, hereby certify that the foregoing is a true and complete listing of I.G. Farben's Domestic Participations as set forth in the Books and Records of I.G. Farben, located at Frankfurt a.M., namely Document No. NI-3518 of 15 October 1945, arranged alphabetically for the convenience of the court.

5 August 1947

(s) H. J. Wolffsohn
(t) H. J. WOLFFSOHN
War Department
Civilian No. 004485

- E n d -

A F F I D A V I T

I, Otto HAUCK, commercial employee of Ammoniakwerke Merseburg G.m.b.H., LEUNA Plant, since 19 April 1927, and taken over by the I.G. Farbenindustrie Central Finance Department, Berlin, since 1 July 1935, have been working from 5 July 1945 until today as employee of the Control Office of the I.G. Farbenindustrie, Frankfurt (Main).

After having been warned that I shall be liable to punishment for giving false information, I herewith state under oath of my own free will and without duress;

The list entitled "Exhibit No. 2, Direct and Indirect Participation of I.G. Farbenindustrie A.G. in Germany", on pp. 1156 to 1164 of "Part 10, Hearings before a Sub-Committee of the Committee on Military Affairs, United States Senate", was prepared by me and Mr. Adolf Hoehle on 15 October 1945.

I herewith state that this is the pure truth according to the best of my knowledge and conscience.

(signature) Otto HAUCK
/t/ Otto Hauck

Sworn to me and signed before me on the
7th August 1947 by Otto Hauck, known to me to be the
person making the above affidavit.

(signed) Karl KALTER
/t/ Karl Kalter, U.S. Civilian
 AGO D-231664, Office Chief of
 Counsel for War Crimes,
 U.S. War Department.

(Page 2 of original)

A F F I D A V I T

I, Adolf HOEHLE, Commercial Employee of Leopold CASSELLA & Co. G.m.b.H. Frankfurt a/Main, since 1 April 1921, and taken over in the same position by the I.G. Farbenindustrie A.G., Frankfurt/Main, since 1 January 1925, was given power of attorney on 27 May 1938 and worked in this capacity until 5 July 1945. From 5 July 1945 until this day, I am an employee of the I.G. Farben Control Office.

After having first been warned that I shall be liable to punishment for giving false information, I herewith state under oath of my own free will and without duress:

The list entitled "Exhibit No. 2, Direct and Indirect Participation of I.G. Farbenindustrie A.G. in Germany" on pages 1156 until 1164 of "Part 10, Hearings before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Military Affairs United States Senate", was prepared by me and Mr. Otto Hauck on the basis of a list dated 15 October 1945, that had been prepared by me regarding the direct participations of the I.G. Farbenindustrie A.G.

I herewith state that this is the pure truth according to the best of my knowledge and conscience.

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT No. NI-9503
(Cont'd)

(signature) Adolf HOEHLE
/t/ Adolf Hoehle

Sworn to me and signed before me on the
7th August 1947 by Adolf Hoehle, known to
me to be the person making the above affidavit.

(signature) Karl KALTER
/t/ Karl Kalter,
U. S. Civilian
AGO D-231664
OCCWC - War Department

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

I, JOHN J. BOLL, U.S. Civilian, AGO A-444412, hereby certify that I am
thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages, and that the
above is a true and correct translation of Document No. NI-9503.

JOHN J. BOLL
U.S. Civilian
A-444412

(E N D)

Listing of I.G. Farben's Foreign Participations and Sales Agencies as set forth in the Books and Records of I.G. Farben Located at Frankfurt/Main, namely, Document Nos. NI-9540-A, NI-9540-B and NI-9540-C, arranged geographically for the convenience of the Court.

Explanation of Symbols:

- * Participations under 10%
- ** Participations under 5%
- *** Sales Agencies

A F R I C A

ABYSSINIA

- *** Dr. Demetrio Leonardi, Addis Abeba

ALGERIA

- *** Marchal & Lobey, Algier
- *** Edmond Miral & Cie., Paris, Depot Algier: Apotheker D. Hote, Algier

CANARY ISLANDS

- *** La Quimica Comercial y Farmaceutica S.A., Las Palmas and Santa Cruz de Tenerife
- *** Pedro Ramos, Las Palmas
- *** Walter Sauermann, Las Palmas
- *** H.K. Schmidt Suco. C.H.E. Kuehler, Las Palmas
- *** Hans Zinsel, Santa Cruz de Tenerife

FERNANDO POO

- *** Alfonso Casajuana, Santa Isabel

CAMEROONS

- *** Dekage Handels-Aktiengesellschaft, Duala, Jaunis, Eden
- *** Westafrikanische Pflanzungs-Gesellschaft "Victoria", Victoria

EGYPT

- "Dayer" Pharma Langener & Co., Cairo, Alexandria
- Heerdt-Lincolner, Cairo

- *** Hielscher & Badr el-Din, Cairo, Alexandria
- *** Philipp Mittelstaedt, Cairo
- *** Sabet Sabet & Co., Cairo, Alexandria
- *** Societe de Matieres Colorantes Allemandes, Waibel & Co., Cairo, Alexandria

ERYTHREA

- *** Cav. Vittoria Minneci, Asmara

GOLD COAST

- *** N.V. Handelsmaatschappij v/h J.F. Sick & Co., Accra, Kumasi
- *** Woermann & Co., Accra

IVORY COAST

- *** Le Commerce Africain, Abidjan

KENYA AND UGANDA

- *** Hansing & Co., (E.A.), Nairobi, Mombasa, Kampala

LIBERIA

- *** A. Woermann, Monrovia

MADEIRA

- *** Gesche & Schnitzler Ltda., Funchal

FRENCH MAROCCO

- *** Maurice Lebeau, Casablanca

SPANISH MAROCCO

- *** Fernando Arriaga Arnel, Melilla
- *** Otto Ulrich, cont. de Alfred Giese, Ceuta, Larancho Tetuan

MOZAMBIQUE

- *** Richard Garlipp & Dene Limitada, Beira
- *** Philippi e Ca., Ltda., Mozambique, Beira
- *** Georg Schroeder e Leidenberg, Lourenco Marques

NIGERIA

- *** N.V. Handelsmaatschappij v/h J.F. Sick & Co. Lagos

NYASSALAND

- *** J. Abegg, Blantyre

PORTO GUINE

- *** Zuid Afrikaansch Handelshuis, Bissau

RHODESIA

- *** Dayer Pharma (Pty), Bulawayo
*** Tauber & Corssen (Rhodesia) Ltd., Salisbury, Bulawayo

SEIERA LEONE

- *** Dekage Handels Akt.-Ges. Freetown
*** Woermann & Co., Freetown

SPANISH GUINEA

- *** Woermann & Co., Elobey Department, Bata, Kato, Benito

TANGANYIKA

- *** Usagara Co., Ltd., Dar-es-Salam, Tanza

TUNISIA

- *** Edmond Migal & Cie., Paris, Depot Tunis: Etablissements Paul Luciani,
Tunis

UNION OF SOUTH AFRICA

- *** "Dayer" Pharma (Pty) Ltd., Johannesburg, Cape Town, Durban, Port Elizabeth
Ernst von Mallinckrodt (Pty) Ltd., Windhoek
Oxalid South Africa Ltd., Johannesburg
*** Tauber & Corssen (Pty), Ltd., Johannesburg, Cape Town, East London,
Port Elizabeth, Luederitzbucht, Windhoek, Durban

AMERICALATIN AMERICAARGENTINA

- Agfa Argentina Dr. Kurt Oppenheim & Cia., Buenos Aires
 Anilinas Alemanas S.A., Buenos Aires, Catamarca, Cordoba, Mendoza,
 Rosario, Salta, San Luis, Santiago del Estero, Tucuman (3 agents
 in Tucuman)
 (listing crossed out in Farben records with the following
 notation: "Sold (sale by straw men; 100% via Spebu)")
 "Farma" Platense S. de R.L., Buenos Aires
 Geco Compania Industrial y Comercial S.A., Buenos Aires
 *** "Indunidas" Sociedad Anonima Mercantil de Industrias Unidas, Buenos
 Aires
 Instituto Behring de Terapeutica Experimental Ltda., Buenos Aires
 Laboratorios Suarry S.A., Buenos Aires
 *** La Plata Ozalid, S.R.L., Buenos Aires
 La Quimica "Bayer", S.A., Buenos Aires, La Plata, Parana, Mendoza,
 Cordoba, Bahia Elanca, Tucuman
 *** La Quimica "Bayer" S.A., Rosario
 *** Bela Muchlich, Buenos Aires

BOLIVIA

- *** Compania de Representaciones y Comercio en General Hero S.A. La Paz
 *** Gustavo Schomann y Co., La Paz

BRAZIL

- *** A Chimica "Bayer" Ltda., Victoria (state of Espirito Santo)
 *** A Chimica "Bayer" Ltda., Sao Luiz do Maranhao (states of Maranhao
 and Piahy)
 A Chimica "Bayer", Weskott & Cia., Rio de Janeiro, Bahia, Belém-Pará,
 Bello Horizonte, Blumenau, Campos, Curitiba, Fortaleza, Juiz de
 Fora, Maceio, Manaus, Parnahyba, Pelotas, Porto Alegre, Recife,
 Sao Paulo
 *** Allianca Commercial de Anilinas Ltda., Bahia (Sao Salvador), Aracaju
 *** Allianca Commercial de Anilinas Ltda., Porto Alegre (state of Rio
 Grande do Sul), Boa Vista do Erechim, Novo Hamburgo, Pelotas,
 Santa Cruz
 *** Allianca Commercial de Anilinas Ltda., Recife (states of Pernambuco and
 Parnahyba)
 Allianca Commercial de Anilinas Ltda., Rio de Janeiro, Belém Pará,
 Bello Horizonte, Blumenau, Curitiba, Fortaleza, Juiz de Fora,
 Itabirito, Maceio (2 agencies), Manaus, Mossoro, Natal, Victoria
 (listing crossed out in Farben records with the following
 notation: "Sold (sale by straw men; 100% via Spebu)")
 *** Allianca Commercial de Anilinas, Ltda., Sao Paulo
 *** Adam A. Buchweitz & Cia., Corumba
 Cia. Electro-Chimica Fluminense, Rio de Janeiro
 *** Companhia Anilinas e Productos Quimicos do Brasil, Rio de Janeiro,
 Bahia, Belém-Pará, Bello Horizonte, Curitiba, Fortaleza, Porto
 Alegre, Recife, Santos, Sao Paulo, Sta. Catherina, Juiz de Fora

Companhia de Productos Quimicos Industrias, M. Hamers, S.A., Rio de Janeiro

- *** Ernesto Pflueger, Manaus
- Farmaco, Ltda., Rio de Janeiro
- Instituto Lehning de Terapeutica Experimental, Ltda., Rio de Janeiro
- *** Jayme Coelho de Rezende, Parnahyba
- Ozalid Brasil Ltda., Sao Paulo
- Quebracho Brasil, S.A., Rio de Janeiro
- Sociedade Geco Ltda., Rio de Janeiro

CHILE

- Compania Geco Ltda., Santiago
- Compania General de Anilina y Productos Quimicos Soc. Ltda., Santiago
- Hegemann & Cie., S.D.R.L., Ltda., Santiago
(listing crossed out in Farben records)
- Laboratorios Hegemann & Cia., Ltda., Santiago
- La Quimica "Bayer", Wescott y Cia., Santiago
- *** Marten Witt, Punta Arenas
- *** Mex y Cia., Valparaiso
- *** Vorwerk & Co., Santiago
- *** Vorwerk & Co., Valparaiso

COLOMBIA

- Anilinas Alemanas Cia., Ltda., Bogota, Barranquilla and Cali
- Industria Quimica Colombiana, S.A. (Inquico), Medellin
- "Instituto Lehning" de Terapeutica Experimental Cia., Ltda., Bogota
- La Quimica "Bayer" Wescott y Cia., Bogota, Barranquilla, Cali

COSTA RICA

- *** Alfonso Altschul y Cia., San Jose
- *** Frederico Sauter, San Jose
- La Quimica "Bayer", S.A., San Jose
- *** Libreria Lehmann & Cia., San Jose

CUBA

- *** The Dayer Company Inc., Habana
- *** Caribbean Photo Co., Habana
- *** Machinery & Chemical Supply Co. Inc., Habana

CURACAO

(Dutch West Indies)

- *** Walter Sachs, Willemstadt

ECUADOR

- *** Drueckmann & Co., Guayaquil
- *** Juan H. Krueger, Guayaquil
- *** Rischaneck & Doeckmann, Guayaquil

GUATEMALA

- *** Biener & Co., Guatemala C.A.
- *** Herm. Kaltwasser & Co., Guatemala C.A.

GUAYANA

- *** Booker Bros. McConnell & Co. Ltd., Georgetown (British Guayana)
- *** C. Kersten & Co., Paramaribo (Dutch Guayana)

HAITI

- *** W. Duch, Port-au-Prince
- *** Ernst Lueders, Port-au-Prince

HONDURAS

- *** G. Ayuso & Son, Lrit. Honduras, Belize
- *** I.E. Doesch, San Salvador
- *** Juan Doborow, Tegucigalpa, San Pedro Sula
- *** Werner Rischbieth & Cia., Tegucigalpa, San Pedro Sula

JAMAICA

- *** Th. A. Deters, Kingston
- *** Jamaica Agencies, Ltd., Kingston
- *** Winthrop Chemical Company Inc., Kingston

MEXICO

- *** Agencia "Bayer", Guadalajara, Merida, Monterrey
- *** Casa Bayer S.A., Mexico
- *** Compania General de Anilinas S.A., Mexico, Guadalajara, (Jal.), Leon, Puebla
- *** Instituto Lehring de Terapeutica Experimental S.d.R.L., Mexico
(listing crossed out in Farben records)
- *** La Union Quimica S.A., Mexico, Guadalajara, Leon, Puebla
(listing crossed out in Farben records)

NICARAGUA

- *** Agencia "Bayer", Managua
- *** I.E. Bosch, San Salvador
- *** Hans Langschwager, Managua
- *** La Quimica "Bayer", S.A. Agencia en Nicaragua, Managua
- *** M. Puschendorf & Compania Limitada, Managua
- *** W. Schoeneke, Managua

PANAMA

- *** Augusto Dziuk & Cia., Panama
- *** John de Haseth, Inc., Panama

PARAGUAY

- *** Anilinas Alemanas, S.A., Branch of Buenos Aires
- *** Eberhard Lewkowitz, Asuncion
- *** Scavone Hnos., S.A., Asuncion
- *** Staudt y Cia., S.A.C., Asuncion

PERU

- Compania General de Anilinas S.A., Lima
- *** Helmut W. Kessel y S., Lima
- *** Juan Tidow y Co. S.A. Ltda., Arequipa
- La Quimica "Bayer" S.A., Lima
- *** Sauter y Lahrius, Lima
- *** E. Strassberger & Cia., Iquitos

PUERTO RICO

- *** Proprietary Agencies, Inc., San Juan

EL SALVADOR

- *** H. Wilnes y Cia., San Salvador

TRINIDAD

- *** J. N. Harriman & Co., Ltd., Port-of-Spain
- *** H. Strong Ltd.

URUGUAY

- *** Anilinas Alemanas, S.A., Montevideo
- *** Drehmer & Cia., Montevideo
- Compania General de Drogas, Montevideo
- La Quimica "Bayer" Weskott y Cia., Montevideo

VENEZUELA

- *** C. Hollmund W. & Co., Caracas
- *** La Quimica "Bayer" Weskott y Cia., Caracas

AMERICA

NORTH AMERICA

CANADA

- Agfa Ansco Ltd., Toronto
(listing crossed out in Farben records with the following
notation: "Amalgamated with General Aniline Works Inc. into
General Aniline and Film Corporation in 1939")
Chemicals, Ltd., Montreal
Consolidated Dyestuff Corporation Ltd., Toronto
Sterling Products Ltd. (Canada)
The Dayer Co. Ltd., Windsor
*** The Hughes Owens Co. Ltd., Montreal
*** Winthrop Chemical Company Inc., Windsor

UNITED STATES

- Advance Solvents & Chemical Corporation, New York, San Francisco,
Chicago, Kansas City, Los Angeles, Jacksonville (Fla).
Agfa Ansco Corp., -inghenton, N.Y., Boston, New York City,
Cincinnati
(listing crossed out in Farben records with the following
notation: "Amalgamated with General Aniline Works Inc. into
General Aniline and Film Corporation in 1939")
Agfa Rawfilm Corp., New York, Hollywood
(listing crossed out in Farben records with the following
notation: "Amalgamated with General Aniline Works Inc. into
General Aniline and Film Corporation in 1939")
Alba Pharmaceutical Co., New York
*** American Cyanamid & Chemical Corporation, New York
American I.G. Chem. Corp., New York
(listing crossed out in Farben records with the following
notation: "General Aniline and Film Co.")
American Magnesium Corp., Wilmington, Delaware
(listing crossed out in Farben records with the following
notation: "American Norit Company Inc., Jacksonville, Fla.")
American Norit Company, Inc., Jacksonville, Fla.
Antidolor Manufacturing Co. Inc., New York
** Atlas Powder Company, Delaware
Dayer Semesan Co., New York
** Bristol Myer & Co., (Delaware)
California Fig Syrup Co., (California)
Chemmyco, Inc., New York, N.Y.
Cleveland Chemical Associates Inc., Cleveland, Ohio
Cook Laboratories Inc., Chicago
*** Ivan D. Dahl Inc., New York
** Eastman Kodak Co., Rochester
Electron Metals Corporation of America, New York
** European Gas & Electric Co., New York
General Aniline & Film Corporation, New York
General Aniline Works Inc., New York
*** General Drug Company, New York
General Dyestuff Corporation, New York, N.Y., Boston, Charlotte,
Chicago, Philadelphia, Providence, San Francisco

- ** Hercules Powder Company, Delaware
- Hutz & Joslin (formerly Patent Research), New York
- Hydro Engineering & Chemical Co., New York
- Hydro-Patents Co., New York
- *** Interstate Chemical Co., New York
- Joint American Study Company Inc., Jasco, New York
- * Life Savers Corp. (Delaware)
- Magnesium Development Corp. (Alig), Wilmington, Delaware
- Metz & Co., New York
- Mountain Mill Paper Co., Massachusetts
- North American Industries Ltd., (Canada), New York
- Ozalid Corp., New York
- Ozophan Corp. of America, Stamford
- Pen-Chlor Incorp., New York
- (listing crossed out in Farben records)
- Chas. H. Phillips Chemical Co., New York
- Plaskon Co. Inc., Toledo, Ohio, New York
- (listing crossed out in Farben records)
- *** Roehm & Haas Company Inc., Philadelphia
- Standard I.G. Company, New York
- ** Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey
- ** Sterling Products, Inc. Wheeling
- (listing crossed out in Farben records)
- Synthetic Nitrogen Products Corp., New York
- The Antidolor Manufacturing Co., Inc., New York, Chicago, San Francisco
- The Jayer Co. Inc., New York
- The Owl Drug Co., Nevada
- ** United Drug Inc., (Delaware)
- ** Verex Incorporated, New York
- Vic Chemical Inc., (Delaware)
- Winthrop Chemical Co. Inc. Delaware, New York City
- Winthrop Chemical Co. Inc., New York, New York City, Atlanta (Ga),
Boston, Chicago, Cleveland, New Orleans, San Francisco, St. Louis

ASIA

ARABIA

- *** A. Lesse & Co., (Aden) Ltd., Pharm. Prod. "Bayer", Aden

BURMA

- *** D. A. Ahuja, Rangoon
*** Bayer Remedies Ltd., Rangoon
*** Chemdyes Ltd., Rangoon
*** Chas. R. Cowie & Co., Rangoon

CEYLON

- *** Bayer Remedies Limited, Colombo
*** Hansatic Trading Co., Ltd., Colombo
*** Heller & Co., Colombo

CHINA

- Agfa China Co. (Otto & Co.), Shanghai
"Bayer" Pharma Co., Shanghai, Hankow
*** China Export-, Import- und Bank Co. Ltd., Tientsin, Canton, Hongkong
Deutsche Farben-Handels-Gesellschaft (Walbel & Co.), Shanghai,
Hongkong, Hankow, Chungking, Tsinanfu, Tsingtao, Tientsin,
Changsha, Mukden
Deutsche Stickstoff-Handels-Gesellschaft Krauch & Co., Shanghai
*** Jepsen & Co., Shanghai, Canton, Hongkong
Shanghai Chemical Co., Kuehn & Co., Shanghai
*** Siemens & Kohn, Foochow, Shanghai
Tientsin Chemical Co., Kuehn & Co., Tientsin

CYPRUS

- *** Costas Christodoulou, Nicosia
*** Mangoian Bros., Nicosia
*** P. M. Tserioti, Nicosia

FRENCH - INDOCHINA

- *** Pharmacie Principale L. Solirene, Saigon

INDIA

- Agfa-Photo Company Ltd., Bombay, Calcutta, Delhi, Madras
"Bayer" Remedies Limited, Bombay, Calcutta, Lahore, Madras, Rangoon
Chemdyes Ltd., Bombay, Adoni, Ahmedabad, Alorway, Amritsar,
Bangalore, Belgaum, Calcutta, Cawnpore, Delhi, Indore, Karachi,
Madras, Madura, Nagpore, Salem, Sholapore, Surat

- *** Heller & Co., Calcutta, Madras
- Indanthren Co., Ltd., Bombay
- *** Radhakishan Rajaram & Co., Bombay

IRAN

- *** Agha Hossein Ali Herati, Yazd
- *** Doulatoff, Meshed
- *** Martin Brothers, Teheran
- *** Richter & Schmanow, Teheran
- *** Ed. Schlueter, Teheran, Isfahan
- *** F. Unduetsch & Co., Shiraz
- *** C. Wolfinger, Tebriz

IRAQ (Mesopotamia)

- *** Fritz Puettmann, Bagdad
- *** The Crescent Photo Stores, Bagdad

JAPAN

- Ayfa Gomei Kaisha, Tokyo
- H. Ahrens & Co., Nachflg., Tokyo
- Asahi Denberg Kabushiki Kaisha, Osaka
- "Dayer" Yakuin Gomei Kaisha, Kobe, Fukuoka, Maruya, Sapporo, Taihoku, Tokyo
- Cassella Gomei Kaisha, Kobe
- *** Delacamp, Piper & Co., Kobe
- Doitsu Senryo Gomei Kaisha, Kobe, Tokyo
- Hippon Tokushu Seizo K.K., Tokyo
- Ozalid Gomei Kaisha, Kobe
- Titan-Kogyo Kabushiki Kaisha, Tokyo

KOREA

- *** Carl Wolter & Co., Gomei Kaisha, Chemulpo-Korea

MANCHUKUO

- *** China Export- Import- und Bank Co. A.G., Harbin-Fristan, Dairen

PALESTINE

- *** Paul Aberle, Jaffa
- *** Grun Brothers (J. Green & Co., Palestine) Ltd., Haifa, Tel-Aviv
- *** Hagenlocher & Finan, Jaffa

RHODOS

- *** A. Dermann & Fils, Rhodes
- *** Costa Em. Costaridi, Rhodes

SIAM (Thailand)

- *** Arnold Otto Meyer, Bangkok
- *** "Dayer" Distributors, Mentzel & Co., Bangkok
- *** D. Grimm & Co., Pharm. Prag. "Dayer", Bangkok
- *** Hamburg Siam Co., Bangkok
- *** Windsor & Co., Bangkok

SYRIA

- *** Bucher & Cie, Beyrouth, Damascus
- *** Cheik Jamil El-Khazen, Beyrouth
- *** Marius Ged, Aleppo
- *** Joseph A. Moussalli, Aleppo
- *** Yordan Obeqi, Damascus, Aleppo

TURKEY

- *** Cemil Akman, Gazi-Antep
- *** Carl Diller, Istanbul-Debek
- *** Droguerie Max Ung ve Seriki, Izmir
- *** Foyzi Dural formerly Rasih Zade Freres, Adana
- *** Hilmi Naili Carlo, Istanbul
- *** Hochstrasser & Cie., Trabson, Gireson, Samsun
- *** Tuerkanil, Hans Moenius ve Sei., Istanbul-Galata
- *** Tuerk Ozalid Fabricasi, Istanbul
- *** Widmann & Co., Istanbul, Izmir

A U S T R A L I A

A U S T R A L I A

- *** Abel, Lemon & Co. Pty. Ltd., Brisbane
- "Laver" Pharma Pty., Ltd., Sydney
- *** Norman H. Catt, Adelaide
- Dychem Trading Co. Pty., Ltd., Melbourne, Sydney
- *** Harold Hald & Co., Sydney
- *** Swift & Company Pty., Ltd., Sydney
- *** Watson Bros., Perth

N E W G U I N E A

- *** Wm. Dreckwoldt & Co., Rabaul, Suva Apia, Papeete

N E W Z E A L A N D

- *** Dyes & Chemicals, Ltd., Wellington
- *** W. H. Grove & Sons Ltd., Auckland

EUROPE

ALBANIA

- *** "Assim" Depot de produits pharmaceutiques et vétérinaires, Tirana
- *** Dip. Ing. Assim Abdurrahman, Tirana

AUSTRIA

- Arfa-Photo G.m.b.H., Vienna
- Alpenlaendische Bergbau-Ges.m.b.H., Zillertaler Magnesitwerke, Mayrhofen
- Alpenminen-Aktiengesellschaft, Salzburg
(listing crossed out in Farben records)
- Anilinchemie A.G., i.L., Vienna
(listing crossed out in Farben records with the following notation: "Merged into Donau Chemie A.G.! General meeting of 10.12.1941")
- Apotheke zum Heiligen Geist, Vienna
(listing crossed out in Farben records with the following notation: "Amalgamated with General Aniline Works Inc. into General Aniline & Film Corporation in 1939")
- Carbidwerk Deutsch-Matrei A.G., Vienna
(listing crossed out in Farben records with the following notation: "Merged into Donau Chemie A.G.! General meeting of 10.12.1941")
- Chemikalien-Verkaufsgesellschaft Donau G.m.b.H., Vienna
- Chemische Fabrik Ambrasit Dr. Kurt Klostermann & Co., Vienna
(listing crossed out in Farben records)
- Chemische Fabrik Wilhelm Neuber A.G., Vienna
- Chemosan Gefolgschaftshilfe, G.m.b.H., Vienna
- Chemosan-Union A.G., Vienna
- Deutsche Gasolin Aktiengesellschaft, Verkaufsniederlassung Wien G.m.b.H., Vienna
- Donau Chemie A.G., Vienna
- Donau-Oel G.m.b.H., Vienna
- A.G. Dynamit Nobel, Vienna
- Elektrizitaetswerke der Oesterr. Chem. Werke G.m.b.H., Vienna
(listing crossed out in Farben records with the following notation: "Amalgamated with Oesterreichische Chemische Werke G.m.b.H., Vienna")
- Elektrochemia Suedosteuropaeische Handels-gesellschaft m.b.H., i.L., Vienna
(listing crossed out in Farben records)
- Enzesfelder Metallwerke A.G., Enzesfeld
(listing crossed out in Farben records with the following notation: "Transferred to Gebr. Boehler & Co. A.G., Vienna, in 1936")
- Fabrik Chemisch-Technischer Papiere Sauter & Co., Vienna
- Fabrik Chem. u. Pharm. Praeparate, Dr. Franz Stohr G.m.b.H., Vienna
(listing crossed out in Farben records)
- * Ferrosilicium-Gesellschaft m.b.H., Vienna
- Franz Wilhelm & Co., A.G., Vienna
(listing crossed out in Farben records with the following notation: "Taken over by Chemosan A.G., Vienna")

Gustav Genschow & Co. G.m.b.H., Vienna
Indanthrenhaus Wien G.m.b.H., Vienna
Kalkstickstoff-Verkaufs-G.m.b.H., Vienna
(listing crossed out in Farben records with the following
notation: "Merged into Donau Chemie A.G.! General meeting
of 19.12.1941")
Kalle & Co., Vienna
Kaningwerk-Aktiengesellschaft Radenthein
Kamid-Gesellschaft m.b.H., i.L., Vienna
Landgenossenschaft Ennstal a.G.m.b.H., Stainach
* Niederdonau Erdoel G.m.b.H., Prinzendorf
Oesterreichische Chemische Werke G.m.b.H., Vienna
Oesterreichische Dynamit Nobel A.G., Vienna
(listing crossed out in Farben records)
Oesterreichische Haig Werke G.m.b.H., Vienna
Oesterreichische Kunstduenger-, Schwefelsaure- und chemische Fabrik
A.G., Vienna
(listing crossed out in Farben records with the following
notation: "Merged into Donau Chemie A.G.! General meeting
of 19.12.1941")
Oesterreichische Magnesit A.G., Radenthein
Ostmaerkische Pflanzenschutz-Gesellschaft m.b.H., Vienna
(listing crossed out in Farben records with the following
notation: "Merged into Donau Chemie A.G.! General meeting
of 19.12.1941")
"Prokon" Farfuemerie und Seifenfabriks-A.G., Vienna
(listing crossed out in Farben records)
"Pyrochemie" Flammenschutz G.m.b.H., Vienna
A. Schmidt G.m.b.H., Vienna
** Schrottverband der Oesterr. Stahl- u. Eisenwerke G.m.b.H., Vienna
Serotherapeutisches Institut Wien G.m.b.H., Vienna
Stickstoffwerke Ostmark A.G., Linz
TEWEGA G.m.b.H. zur Herstellung u. zum Vertrieb veterinaer-
~~chemischer Produkte, Vienna~~
Unterstuetzungseinrichtung der Wiener Edelsojawerk Gesellschaft
~~G.m.b.H. in Wien-Schwechat, Vienna~~
"Vedepha" G.m.b.H. i.L., Vienna
Wiener Edelsojawerk G.m.b.H., Vienna

BELGIUM

Agfa-Photo S.A., Brussels
Delge-Pharma Produits pharmaceutiques, Brussels
*** Comptoir Chimique et Industriel A. Dognarts, Société de personnes à
responsabilité limitée, Brussels
*** Etablissements Raoul Simon, Brussels
"GMC" La Generale des Matieres Colorantes, Produits Chimiques et
Pharmaceutiques Société Cooperative, Brussels, Verviers
*** Papier Proost S.P.R.L., Brussels
S.A. "SACIC", Brussels
(listing crossed out in Farben records)
Société Internationale d' Energie Hydro-Electrique Sydro, Brussels
*** Spécialités pour Enduits S.A., Brussels

BULGARIA

"BACRIL" (Farbstoff) A.G. fuer Handel mit Farbstoffen und chemischen
Produkten, Sofia

Dayer-Pharma A.G. fuer chemische und pharmazeutische Produkte, Sofia
"Behring" Institut fuer Serologie, Bakteriologie und Biologie G.m.b.H.,
Sofia

- Chemische Fabrik "Coloriska" A.G., Sofia
*** Christo Chr. Bayew, Sofia, Rustschuk
"Chromag" Deutsch-Bulgarische Chromerzbergbau A.G., Sofia
*** Hans Golowitsch, Sofia
"Soja" Bulgarische Aktiengesellschaft fuer den Anbau u. Export von
Oelseaten, Sofia
Verkaufsgesellschaft Deutscher Anilinabriken Waibel & Co., Sofia

CITY OF DANZIG

- Chemische Fabrik Milch A.G., Danzig
Chemische Industrie A.G., Danzig
*** Johannes Marquardt Nachf.
*** Otto Koehler G.m.b.H.
*** G. Pohl, Chemische Pharmazeutische Fabrik
RWS-Geco Munitionsges. m.b.H.
*** Walderar Ehlert
*** Richard Moywed & Co.

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

- Acetat Kunstseide Vertriebs G.m.b.H., Prague
Agfa-Foto G.m.b.H., Bratislava
Aktiengesellschaft Dynamit Nobel, Bratislava
Aktiengesellschaft zur Verwertung von Industriegasen, Bratislava
Apollo Mineraloelraffinerie A.G., Bratislava
Apollo-Maghta-Handels-A.G., Prague
Aussiger Entzinnungswerk G.m.b.H. & Co. K.G., Aussig
Bentlin'sche Chemische Fabriken A.G., Porecin
Dayer Pharma Martineck & Co., Bratislava
"Dituma" Leinwand- und Chemische Industrie A.G., Aussig
Chemische Industrie A.G., Bratislava
Chemosen-Hellco A.G., Prague
(listing crossed out in Farben records)
Chem. Werke Aussig-Falkenau G.m.b.H., Aussig
"DEGESCH" Gesellschaft fuer Schaedlingsbekaempfung G.m.b.H., Prague
Degussa-Keramisch-Chemische Werke G.m.b.H., Prague
"DEHAG" Slowakische Gesellschaft fuer Handel mit Kunstduenger und
Chemikalien G.m.b.H., Bratislava
Gefolgshaftshilfe der Chemischen Werke und Teerfarbenwerke Aussig
G.m.b.H., Aussig
Gemeinschaft der Acetat-Gernerzeuger Gesellschaft m.b.H., Prague
Hellco A.G., Troppau
Kaliwerke A.G., Prague-Kolin
Keramisch-Chemische Werke Aktiengesellschaft, Prosetitz
Kreditanstalt der Deutschen o.G.m.b.H., Reichenberg
Nobel-Dickford A.G., Bratislava
"OLEA" Vereinigte Slowakische Oelindustrie A.G. i.L., Bratislava
Ostslowakische Chemische Fabrik A.G. Kostolany, Kostolany
Ozalid-Gesellschaft Gude & Co., Aussig
"Pharma Dayer" Grobel & Co., Prague
Sprengstoff- und Zuendmittel-Handelsgesellschaft Dynano, Bratislava
Teerfarbenwerke Aussig G.m.b.H., Aussig
"TEFA" Teerfarben- und Chemikalien-Handels A.G., Prague, Brno
Verein fuer chemische u. metallurgische Produktion, Prague
"Visco" Chem. Werk G.m.b.H., Aussig

DENMARK

- *** Emil V. Abrahanson, Copenhagen
- Affa-Foto A/S., Copenhagen
- A/S Anilinkompaniet, Copenhagen
- *** Fr. Brandes A/S., Copenhagen
- Danigefa A.S., Copenhagen
- *** Johan Ullstad & Sonner, Copenhagen
- Vepro A.S., Verdens Propaganda Aktieselskab, Copenhagen
- *** Emil Warthoe & Sonner, Copenhagen

ESTHONIA

- *** Agentur "Estanil", Kursell und Raudsep, Tallinn
- *** O-ue Eugen Sewer ja Co. A.G., Tallinn
- *** Eugen Sacharias, Agenturen, Tallinn

FINLAND

- Finnish Chemicals O.Y., "Aetsa"
- *** A.B. Herrann Lindell, Helsinki
- *** A.B. Mercantile, Helsinki
- O/Y. Anilin A/B, Helsinki, Tammerfors
- O/Y. Igefa Fennica A/B., Helsinki
- *** O/Y. Propaganda A/B., Helsinki
- *** Sooren Berner & Co., Helsinki

FRANCE

- *** Abrahamson, Strasbourg
- "Cayer" Agro-Chemie S.A.R.L., Paris
- *** Emile Berthier, Troyes
- *** Louis Boyer, Graulhet
- Chemische Werke Dornach G.m.b.H., Mulhouse-Dornach
- Comp. Nationale de Matieres Colorantes et Manufactures de Produits Chimiques du Nord Reunion Etabl. Kuhlmann, Paris
- *** Paul Desfontaines, Nice
- Droguerie pharmaceutique de France, Paris
- (listing crossed out in Farben records)
- *** Djavakhoff, Paris
- *** R. Einbeck, Paris
- *** Emile Fontere, Castres
- *** J. Gourian, Marseille
- *** Henri Jammet, Quillan
- *** La Cellophane, S.A., Dexons
- *** Les fils de Maurice Duclos, Paris
- *** Les successeurs de M.H. Galland, Lyon
- *** Mme. Vve. Ch. Jourjon, Paris
- Nitrolac S.A., Paris
- Papeteries Louis Muller & Fils, Paris
- *** V. Paschal, Paris
- *** Porges, Sevres
- Produits Bayer S.A.R.L., Paris
- *** Prosper Niemo, Angoulême
- *** Pierre Quine, Grasse
- Edmond Rigal & Cie., Paris, Strasbourg
- Société Anonyme de Matieres Colorantes et Produits Chimiques
- "Francolor", Paris

- Société Anonyme des Produits Chimiques et Matières Colorantes de
Mulhouse, Mulhouse
Soc. Div. Immob. de la Chambre de Commerce Internat., Paris
** Société des Produits Azotés, Paris
Société des Produits Peroxydés, Paris
*** Société des Représentations Industrielles (anct. Henri Kisler & Co.),
Paris
Société Française Agfa-Photo S.A.R.L., Paris
Société Française de Fumigation, Paris
Société Générale d'Applications Thérapeutiques "Thérapiex", Paris
*** Société Industrielle des Cires & Dérivés, R. Elissague, Clichy
* Société Industrielle des Dérivés de l'Acétylène, Paris
Société pour l'Importation de Matières Colorantes et de Produits
Chimiques, SOPI, Paris, Lille, Lyon
*** J. L. Tenye, Mulhouse
*** Louis Vernassal, Millan

GREAT BRITAIN AND IRELAND

- Agfa-Photo Ltd., London
Argentographica (USA) Ltd., London
Bayer Products Ltd., London, Manchester, Dublin
British Breda Silk Ltd., London
British Carbo-Merit-Union, Ltd., London
British Industrial Solvents Ltd., London
British Light Metal Co., Ltd., London
Continental Photographic Importers Ltd., I.L., London
** Courtaulds Ltd., London
*** Edenborough & Richardson, London
Explosives Industries, Ltd., London
*** J. & W. C. Gaw, Belfast
*** Wm. Gaw Ltd., Dublin
*** Glutoline Company, London
Homburg PHARMA Ltd., London
*** F.A. Hughes & Co., Ltd., London
*** I.G. Dyestuffs Ltd., Glasgow, Bradford, London
* I.G. Dyestuffs Ltd., Manchester, Bradford, Glasgow, London Belfast
International Nitrogen Association Ltd., London
* International Sugar and Alcohol Co. Ltd., London
Magnesium Electron Ltd., London
*** John McWade, Dublin
Merlin Trust Ltd., London
Oxalid Co. Ltd., London
*** Smith Brothers, Belfast
J. M. Steel & Co. Ltd., London, Manchester
The London Fumigation Co. Ltd., London
Trafford Chemical Co. Ltd., Manchester
* Transparent Paper Ltd., London

GREECE

- Agfa-Photo A.G., Athens
*** Rudolf Aurich, Karlovassi-Samos
*** Ernst Blohm, Athens
Farben- und Chemikalien-Handels-Aktiengesellschaft "Athanil" A.G.,
Athens, Kalamata, Patras, Syra, Volo
*** Jenny & Vock, Thessaloniki
*** Richa G. Krueger, Canea

- "Phatina" Handels- und pharmazeutische Gesellschaft A.G., Athens,
Thessaloniki
*** M. Stuermer, Candia
*** Zacharias A. Pricvolos, Athens

HUNGARY

- "Arafphoto" Verkaufs- A.G. fuer photographische Artikel, Budapest
"Dehrin:" Serum Institut A.G., Budapest
*** "Dudanil" Farben- und Chemikalienverkaufs-A.G., Budapest
"Dudanil" Farbenverkaufs A.G., Budapest
Chemische Fabrik des Graf Lajos Batthyany A.G., Budapest
Ipari Robbananyag r.t., Budapest
"Krypton" K.f.T., Budapest
Magyar Pharma Gyogyszeru R.T., Budapest
*** "OZALID" (Fenymasolepapiert K.f.t.), Budapest
Soroksar Chemische Industrie A.G., Soroksar (notation: "Secret!")
"Terrachemia" Chemische Fabrik A.G., Budapest
Zyklon Gazipari es Kereskedelmi, R.T., Budapest

ICELAND

- *** A.J. Bertelsen & Co. h/f., Reykjavik
*** H.F. Bfnagord Rykjavikur, Reykjavik
*** Dr. Max Keil, Reykjavik

ITALY

- "A.R.C.A." Aziende Riunite, Coloranti e Affini S.A., Milan, Biella,
Naples, Prato, Turin
Aifa-Foto S.A. Prodotti Fotografici, Milan, Genova, Rome, Turin
Aziende Colori Nazionali Affini A.C.N.A. S.A., Milan
*** "Co-Fa" Compagnie Farmaceutica S.A., Milan and Naples
*** Dino Collevati, Bologna, Rome
*** Domenico Pestiglione, Milan
*** Dott. Gino Nanni, Turin
*** Dott. Guido Bricarello, Turin
Fabbrica Automobile Isotta-Fraschini, Milan
(listing crossed out in Farben records)
*** Gennaro Gori, Schio
*** Umberto Groppo, Verona
*** Dr. Roberto Maino, Rome
*** Dr. Gino Russo, Venice
S.A. Desiderio, Milan
S.A. Immobiliare "La Dominica", Milan
S.A. Immobiliare "La Galvani", Milan
S.A. Magnesio Italiano Sulcis, Turin
"Siprozolfi", (Societa per Incremento Produzione Zolfi), Rome
*** Soc. An. Azienda Vendita Prodotti Chimici, Milan
Soc. Italiana Carboni Attivi "S.I.C.A.", Milan
Societa Chimica Lombarda A.E. Bianchi & Co., Rho
Societa Immobiliare di Biella An., Milan
Societa Italiana del Litopone, Milan
*** G. Enrico Tomagno, Genova
** Unione Produttori e Consumatori Materie Coloranti, Milan

LATVIA

- Agenturhaus "Latani" Augusts Kallning & Co., Riga
(listing crossed out in Farben records)
"Baltpharma" Purns & Folks, Riga
*** Alberts Grabens, Riga
I.G. Kontor Riga G.m.b.H., Riga
*** K.F. Neuland, Riga
Pankreas-Verwertungs-G.m.b.H., Riga
*** B. Ozolins & Struchs, Riga
*** Ernst Stieda, Riga

LIECHTENSTEIN

International Hydrogenation Patents Co. Ltd., Vaduz

LITHUANIA

- *** Jergen Buch, Kaunas
*** W. Felgenhauer vorm: Emil O. Kretzmaris, Kaunas
*** Otto Wittkopp, Kaunas

LUXEMBOURG

- *** M.P. Eichner, Luxembourg
Explosifs Luxite S.A.R.L., Luxembourg
*** H. Nieldner, Luxembourg
*** Mathis Prost, Grevenmacher
*** Edward Reuss, Luxembourg

MALTA

- *** Boris Darmanin & Co., Valletta
*** Francis Tabone & Sons, Valletta

NETHERLANDS

- *** H. de Wit Wz., Hilversum
Havero Handel- Maatschappij N.V. i.L., Rotterdam
(listing crossed out in Farben records with the following
notations: "New firms: Chemdyes Ltd., Bombay (dyes, chemicals)
Lager Remedies Ltd., Bombay (Pharma)
Agfa Photo Ltd., Bombay (Photo)
*** Heinrich Hushahn, Den Haag
*** O. Lots, Rotterdam
Maatschappij voor Industrie en Handelsbelangen, Amsterdam
*** A.E. Melster, Enschede
N.V. Agfa-Photo, Arnheim
N.V. Associatie voor Overzeehandel "Lithos", Den Haag
N.V. "Chemo" Maatschappij voor Chemische Onderneemingen, Amsterdam
N.V. "Dofa" Maatschappij voor Verfstoffenhandel, Arnhem
N.V. Dornheims Jacht- en Sportartikelen, Arnhem
N.V. Eerste Nederland'sche Celluloidwarenfabriek o.d.A.N. Honig,
i.L., Hilversum
N.V. Haag'sche Maatschappij voor Bank-Beleggings- en Credietzaken,
Den Haag

- N.V. Handel- en Scheepvaart Maatschappij "Waar", Rotterdam
- N.V. Handelsmaatschappij "Jet Indanthrenhuis", Amsterdam
- N.V. Handelsmaatschappij "Wedigerha", Amsterdam
- N.V. Internationale Maatschappij voor Hydroerings-Techniek en Chemie, Den Haag
- N.V. Lichterdruckpapierfabriek "De Atlas", Utrecht, Delft
- N.V. Maatschappij Algemeen Beheer, Utrecht
- N.V. Nederlandsche Verf- und Chemicalien-Fabriek, Delft
- N.V. voor Vloeiopontontginning "Fluorit", Amsterdam
- ** Steenkolen-Handelsvereniging, Utrecht
- *** Swagemakers & Hosemans, Tilburg
- *** S. Tattersall, Enschede

NORWAY

- A/S. Anilin, Oslo, Bergen
- *** A/S. Carl A. Knudsen, Oslo
- A/S. Norsk Staal, Oslo
- *** A/S. Stormbuhl, Oslo
- A/S. Torkopi, Oslo
- *** A/S. Trygve Irgens, Bergen
- Agfa-Foto A/S., Oslo
- *** Egeberg & Mohm, Oslo
- *** Kaddell & Esmen, Oslo
- Nordisk Lettmetall A/S., Oslo
- "Norrigga" A.S., Oslo
- Norsk Hydro-Electrisk Kvaestofaktieselskab, Notodden/Oslo
- Studieselskabet for Norsk Kraftexport A.S., Oslo
- *** Th. Bide, Trondheim

POLAND

- Agenturhaus "Barwanil" Stanislaw Messing & Co. i.L., Lodz
(listing crossed out in Farben records)
- Agenturhaus "Bielanil" Kurt Koenig i.L., Bielitz,
(listing crossed out in Farben records)
- Agfa-Foto G.m.b.H., Warsaw
- *** R. Aleksandrowicz, Cracow
- "Bayer" Agro-Chemie G.m.b.H., Cracow
- *** "Bayer", Pharma Bureau for Esthonia, Latvia and Lithuania, Gdynia
- "Bayer-Pharma Dr. W. Roemer & Co., Warsaw, Lwow
- Behring-Institut G.m.b.H., Lwow
- *** B. Braszczok, Katowice
- *** Henryk Braszczok, Gdynia
- A. W. Broemmer, Wschf., Lichttranspapierfabrik, Lodz
- Chemische Industrie "Boruta" A.G. Zgierz (listing crossed out in Farben records)
- Chemische Werke Winnica A.G., Winnica
- *** Alfred G. Damski i Ska., Katowice
- Deutsches Teerfarben- und Chemikalien-Verkaufskontor G.m.b.H. Warsaw
- Dom (Agentorowy) Handlowy "Remedia" B. Pulde i-Ska, Warsaw
(listing crossed out in Farben records with the following notation: "Renamed Bayer-Pharma, Dr. W. Roemer & Co., 27.1.41")
- "Elektro" A.G. fuer angewandte Elektrizitat, Ober-Lazisk
- Fuerstengrube G.m.b.H., Katowice
- B. Pulde y Ska, Warsaw
(listing crossed out in Farben records)
- Indanthrenhaus Litzmannstadt G.m.b.H., Lodz

- Industriegas Posen von Hahn K.G., Poznan
Kalkwerke Kressendorf G.m.b.H., Kressendorf near Cracow
Lignose A.G., Katowice
*** Ernst Nordmann, Bydgoszcz
*** Hugo Peter Jr., Bialystock
Sprengstoffwerke Oberschlesien G.m.b.H., Katowice
Teerfarbenwerke Litzmannstadt G.m.b.H., Zgierz
Wytownia Papierow Swiatocznych "Ozalid" Otto Soederstroem, Lodz
*** A. Zaborski, Warsaw

PORTUGAL

- Bayer, Limitada, Lisbon., Porto
*** Ferraz, Lynce Lda., Lisbon
*** Hitzemann & Cia., Lda., Porto
*** Alfred Lopes da Silva, Lisbon
Sociedade de Anilinas Ltda. "Sodanil", Porto, Lisbon., Covilha,
Castanheira de Pera, Cebolaes, Gouveia, Guarda, Guimaraes,
Manteigas, Mira d'Aire, Vizela
Sociedade Nacional de Industria Mineira Ltda., (Sonimi),
Oliveirinha

ROMANIA

- Agfa-Foto S.A., Bucharest
"Azot" S.A.R. pour Engrais Chimiques, Bucharest
"Carbonit" Prima Societate Anonima Romana pentru Fabricarea
carbunelui aktiv, Bucharest
"Ceranil" S.c.g.l. pentru comertul cu aniluri si produse chimice,
Czernauti
(listing crossed out in Farben records)
"Coloranil" S.A., pentru comertul cu colorante de anilina si
produse chimice, Bucharest
"Coloram" Chem. Fabrik R.A.G., Codlea, Zeiden
"Nitramonia" S.A., Bucharest
Prima Societate Romana de Explosivi, Bucharest
"Romigefa" S.A.R., Bucharest, Cluj
"Romanil" Aktiengesellschaft fuer Teerfarben- u. Chemikalien-
Handel, Bucharest, Timisoara, Brasov
*** A. Silberling & Gh. Paunvec, Bucharest
(listing crossed out in Farben records)
*** Simper S.A.R., Bucharest
"Soja" Rumaenische A.G. fuer den Anbau und Export von Oelseaten,
Bucharest
(listing crossed out in Farben records)
Timanil S.A., colori dianilina si produse chimice, Timisoara

SPAIN

- Agfa-Foto S.A., Barcelona, Bilbao, Vigo
Cloratita S.A., Barcelona
Colorantes y Productos Quimicos Jose Rodriguez y Cia. S.L.,
Valladolid,
(listing crossed out in Farben records with the following
notation: "From 1.4.39 branch of Unicolor")
Experiencias Industriales, S.A., Madrid
Fabricacion Nacional de Colorantes y Explosivos S.A. (Fence),
Barcelona

- *** Farmacia Calpe, Gibraltar
- Industrias Químicas Reunidas, S.A. "Inquiesas", Barcelona
- Instituto Behring de Terapéutica Experimental, S.A., Barcelona
- *** José Gil Balaguer Colorantes y Productos Químicos, Palma de Mallorca
- La Química Comercial y Farmacéutica, S.A., Barcelona, Bilbao, Granada, Oviedo, Zaragoza, Sevilla, Torrejón de Ardoz, Valladolid, Vigo
- Química Industrial Española, S.A. (Quiesas), Sevilla
- Sociedad Electroquímica de Flix, Barcelona
- Unicolor S.A. Colorantes y Productos Químicos, Barcelona, Madrid, Valladolid
- ** Unión Española de Explosivos, S.A., Barcelona-Bilbao
- * Unión Salinera de España, Barcelona

SWEDEN

- A.B. Anilinkompaniet, Goeteborg, Boras, Malmö, Norrköping
- *** A.B. Adolf Johnson & Co., Stockholm
- *** A.B. Vitkopia (Inh. Erich Dingel), Stockholm
- Agfa-Foto A/B., Stockholm
- *** Akt.Bol. Fr. Brandes, Generalagenturer, Malmö, Stockholm
- Aktiebolaget Arto, Malmö
- (listing crossed out in Farben records with the following notation: "Sold in 1940!")
- *** Georg Dolle, Goeteborg, Stockholm
- *** Vilh. Dahl & Co., Aktiebolag, Stockholm
- Igefa Svenska, A.B., Stockholm
- *** Idealkopia, Inh. Eric Ohlson, Malmö
- *** Henrik Johnson & Co., Goeteborg
- *** Dr. Ing. Herbert Lickfett, Stockholm
- *** Vilhelmsen & Co., A.G., Stockholm

SWITZERLAND

- Agfa-Photo A.G., Zuerich
- ** Alliance Aluminium Cie., Basle
- *** Otto Angst, Basle
- *** W. Braendli, Berne
- *** Bodmer & Co., Zuerich
- *** Karl Eubenhof, Gossau
- *** Chemische Fabrik Brugg A.G., Brugg-Aargau
- Chemische Fabrik Rohner & Co. A.G., Pratteln
- *** Christen & Co., Berne
- Continental Gesellschaft fuer angewandte Elektrizitaet A.G., Basle
- (listing crossed out in Farben records with the following notation: "Merged into Donau Chemie A.G. General meeting of 19.12.1941")
- Durand & Eugenin A.G., Basle
- (listing crossed out in Farben records with the following notation: "No participation any more")
- Eduard Greutert & Cie., Basle
- Hausmann & Co. A.G., St. Gallen
- Igepha, A.G., Zuerich
- Internationale Gesellschaft der Stickstoff-Industrie A.G., Basle
- Internationale Gesellschaft fuer Chemische Unternehmungen A.G. (I.G. Chemie), Basle
- * Kraftwerk Ryburg Schwoerstadt A.G., Rheinfelden

- Leukon Aktien-Gesellschaft, Fabrikation und Handel in chem.
Produkten, Zuerich
(listing crossed out in Farben records)
- ** Office International du Carburé, Geneva
 - * Office International du Carburé, Geneva
 - Osmon-Werke A.G., Bern
 - *** L. Speich, Techn. Papiere, Kuessnacht-Zuerich
 - Technik und Finanz A.G., Basle
 - * Teerfarben A.G., Zuerich
 - Treupha A.G. fuer chem.-pharma. u. kosmetische Produkte, Baden
 - *** Emil Vogel, Zuerich

YUGOSLAVIA

- A.G. fuer Sprengstoffe und chemische Produkte (Explochemia),
Zagreb
- "Adir" A.G. fuer Erzlagerstaettenforschung, Belgrade
- Agas-Rast Aktiengesellschaft, Maria Rast near Marburg
- Aktiengesellschaft Dynamit Nobel, Belgrade
- Anilin A.D., Belgrade
- Anilokemika d.d., techn.chem.Industrie, Zagreb
- "Dayer-Pharma" k.d. Chemisch-Pharmazeutisches Industrieunternehmen,
Zagreb
- "Dayer" k.d., Belgrade, Zagreb
- Dosnische Elektroizitaets-A.G., Jajce
- "Delft" Anilinfarbenhandel Maks Alkalax, Belgrade
(listing crossed out in Farben records)
- *** Francois de Choch Inh. Dominik de Choch, Skopelje
 - *** Francois de Choch, Skopelje
 - Juganil k.d., Zagreb
 - Juganil K.D., Zemun
 - "Jugefa" Georg Kleinschmidt k.d. chemisch pharmazeutische Produkte,
Zagreb, Belgrade
 - Jugoslavenski Serum Zavod DD., Zagreb
 - Kalkwerk Cille G.m.b.H., Ruse
 - Moster Lack- u. Farben-Fabrik A.G., Zagreb
 - "Ozachel" proizvodnja na Svjetlo Osj. papira i prodaja prozirnik
folija iz celuloze, Zagreb
 - "Ozachel" Proizvodnja na svetlo osjetljivih papira i prodaja
prozirnih folija iz Celuloze, Zagreb
 - Stickstoffwerke A.G., Maria Rast (Ruse)
 - "Theseus" G.m.b.H., Zagreb/Maribor

U.S.S.R.

- Vereinigte Stahlwerke, Eisenhandel und Stahlbau, Ukraine G.m.b.H.,
Kiew

PACIFIC ISLANDS

DUTCH EAST INDIES

- *** N.V. Behn Meyer & Co., Batavia, Soerabaya, Palembang, Denpasar
- N.V. Handel-Maatschappij "Deli-Atjeh", Medan
- *** Harmsen Verweij & Co., N.V. Semarang
- N.V. "I.M.P.L.A." (Import Mij. voor Pharmaceutische and Land-
bouwkundige Artikelen), Weltevreden, Batavia-Centrum,
Soerabaya
- *** N.V. Internationale Crediet en Handelsvereniging "Rotterdam",
Batavia, Padang, Palembang
- *** W. B. Ledeboer & Co., Makassar
- *** Rheinborn A.G. Hennemann & Co., Bandjermasin
- *** Geo Wehry & Co., Batavia, Semarang, Soerabaya, Cheribon/Tjilatjap,
Djambi, Medan, Padang, Palembang, Bandjermasin, Pontianak,
Samarenda, Makassar, Menado

BRITISH BORNEO AND SARAWAK

- *** N.V. Straits Java Trading Co., Singapore

BRITISH MALAYA

- *** N.V. Straits Java Trading Co., Kuala Lumpur, Penang

PHILIPPINES

- Bayer Yakunin Gomei Kaisha, Manila
- *** Menzi & Co., Inc., Manila, Cebu, Davao, Iloilo, Zamboanga
- *** Philippine-American Drug Co., Manila
- *** M. Verlinden, Manila
- *** Winthrop Chemical Company Inc., Manila

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO. NI-9540
OFFICE OF CHIEF OF COUNSEL FOR WAR
CRIMES

ERRATA SHEET

Page 26, line 20 of translation of Document No. NI-9540 should read:

This book, which has the number NI-9540-A, and
which was shown to me by

Page 26, line 23 of translation of Document No. NI-9540 should read:

3. In addition to this book, now numbered NI-9540-A,
I also recorded

Page 26, line 31 of translation of Document No. NI-9540 should read:

me on 11 August 1947 and which is now numbered
NI-9540-B

Errata Sheet prepared by:

HANS J. VOLFFSOHN
W.D. Civilian
No. 094485

- END -

46A

A F F I D A V I T

I, Willi DAGNE, Frankfurt/Main, Gutleutstrasse 41, after having been informed that I shall be liable to punishment for giving false information, herewith state under oath of my own free will and without duress the following:

1. From 1920 - 1931, I worked for I.G. Farben in Ludwigshafen. From 1931-1939, I worked in the office of the Central Committee of I.G. Farben in Frankfurt on Main. After a short period in the Army, I returned in 1940 to my job in the office of the Central Committee and remained there until the Allied occupation of Germany in March 1945.
2. From 1940 on, among other duties, I kept the list of foreign and domestic participations of I.G. Farben. When I returned to my job in the Office of the Central Committee in the year 1940, I took over at the direction of my immediate superior, Dr. Walter HOYER, a book entitled: "List of the Participations of the I.G. Farbenindustrie A.G., Frankfurt on Main; Office of the Central Committee, Frankfurt on Main, December 1938". Also, in the top right corner of the title page, the word "Secret" was printed by means of a rubber stamp. It was my job to enter in this book new participations of I.G. Farben and to keep it up to date. Georg von SCHNITZLER was the chief man in charge of the Office of the Central Committee. This book, which has the number NI-9483, and which was shown to me by Mr. H. J. Wolffsohn on 11 August 1947, is the same book which I kept from the year 1940 to approximately December 1944.
3. In addition to this book, now numbered NI-9483, I also recorded many new participations of I.G. Farben on loose sheets of paper as appendices. These were filed in a green folder, on which is written: "Participations, Supplement, Office of the Central Committee, Original".

(Page 2 of original)

I recorded participations in this supplement, when there was not sufficient space in the original ledger for their recording. The Supplement which I kept is the document which Mr. H. J. Wolffsohn showed me on 11 August 1947 and which is now numbered NI -9484.

4. My entries were based on the following sources of information:
 - 1) The records of the Central Bookkeeping Department;
 - 2) The annual business reports of I.G. Farben's participations and sub-participations, as well as of firms in which we were only indirectly interested. All of these reports came into my office. On the basis of these reports I could make accurate checks of the subsidiaries of the firms in which I.G. Farben participated by way of stock ownership or other means of influence. The Central Bookkeeping Department under the supervision of Director Paul DENCKER did not have this information, except as to the most important firms.
 - 3) Minutes of the meetings of the Vorstand and the various commissions, including the Technical Committee, Commercial Committee, Legal Committee, and other committees in which participations were discussed;
 - 4) The Reich legal gazette in which all changes in capitalization and management of these firms were published.

- 5) Lists, which were sent by the Central Finance Administration in Berlin to the Office of the Central Committee. (yearly, according to my recollection).

(Page 3 of original)

5. The two documents described by me above were, according to my knowledge, the most complete listings of I.G. Farben participations within the organization of I.G. They were used mainly in order to answer inquiries regarding selling, buying and inquiries from the various Legal Departments of the I.G. Farben Organization and they were regarded as reliable by the various officials and departments with which I had to work.

I have carefully read every one of the three pages of this affidavit and signed them personally, I have made the necessary corrections in my own handwriting and countersigned them with my initials and I herewith state under oath that in this statement I have said the pure truth according to the best of my knowledge and conscience.

(signature) Willi Dagne
/t/ Willi Dagne

Sworn to and signed before me this 12th day of August 1947 at Nuernberg, Germany, by Willi Dagne, Frankfurt/Main, Gutleutstrasse 41, known to me to be the person making the above affidavit.

(signature) H. J. WOLFFSOHN
/t/ H. J. Wolffsohn
Civilian, No. 094485
Office of Chief of Counsel for War Crimes
U.S. War Department

(TRANSLATOR'S NOTE: Document continues in English):

A F F I D A V I T

1. I, HANS J. WOLFFSOHN, No. 094485, hereby certify that the foregoing is a listing of I.G. Farben's foreign participations and sales agencies as set forth in the records of I.G. Farben, namely Document Nos. NI-9540-A, "List of Participations of I.G. Farbenindustrie A.G., Frankfurt A.M., Office of Central Committee, Frankfurt a/M., December 1938"; NI-9540-B, "Participations, Supplement, Office of Central Committee, Original"; and NI-9540-C, "List of Agents and Business Connections".

2. The sources of the first two Document Nos. NI-9540-A and NI-9540-B are described in the affidavit of Willy Dagne above. Document No. NI-9540-C was taken from the records of I.G. Farben in Frankfurt A.M.

3. The above listing contains every firm recorded in the three basic documents set forth above including any and all notations entered in these records after the name of the firm. The only difference between this listing and the original record is that the participations have been listed geographically and alphabetically for the convenience of the Court.

4. As will appear from the above listing, some of the firms enumerated in Farben records have a line drawn through them, indicating in most instances, that the listing was "sold". These firms were nevertheless included in the above list (together with the notation appearing in Farben

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT No. NI-9540
(Cont'd)

records) because (1) it was desired to make a listing identical with Farben's records; and (2) all of these participations were "transferred" after 1940, in anticipation of war. Some of the notations set forth above specifically stated that the firm had been transferred for camouflage purposes.

5. With the exception of the sales agencies, the participations set forth above represent only interests by way of stock-ownership.

(signed) HANS J. WOLFFSOHN
/t/ Hans J. Wolffsohn

Certified to and signed before me this 15th day of August 1947, at Nuernberg by HANS J. WOLFFSOHN, known to me to be the person making the above certification.

(signed) BELLE MAYER
/t/ Belle Mayer
U.S. Civilian, Attorney,
AGO No. D-429431
Office of Chief of Counsel
for War Crimes


CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

I, JOHN J. BOLL, U.S. Civilian, AGO No. A-444412, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages, and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document No. NI-9540.

JOHN J. BOLL
U.S. Civilian
AGO No. A-444412


(E N D)

GERMANY




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GERMANY

SWITZERLAND



AFFIDAVIT

I, Dr. Ernst A. Struss, director of I.G. Farbenindustrie Aktiengesellschaft from 1934 - 1945, Chief of the Office of the Technical Committee from 1926 - 1945, Secretary of the Technical Committee of the Vorstand from 1924 - 1945, Head of Sparte II of Vermittlungsstelle II and from 1943 - 1945 Production Manager of the whole German dyestuffs industry within the framework of Economic Group Chemical Industry, since 1 December 1945 employee of Control Office, I.G. Farbenindustrie A.G. (OMGUS) APO 757, Postn. U.S. Army, after having been warned that I will be liable to punishment for making a false statement, herewith declare under oath of my own free will and without coercion:

1. The two maps "Plants of I.G. and Participations", position as in 1932, and "Plants of I.G. Participations and operated Plants" (sic), position as in 1943, have been drawn up according to data given by me. The maps are marked NI-10033 and 10034.

2. I have taken the data contained in the maps from I.G. files, mainly from the files of the Central Committee and of the Technical Committee, as well as the I.G. yearly reports. The 1932 map contains all I.G. plants, the plants of its participations, as well as sub-participations known to me, if the participation or sub-participation amounted to 50% or more. The map for 1943 contains, in addition to these factories, all plants which were operated by I.G. participations or sub-participations.

The maps do not contain plants which were planned but whose construction had not begun at the time in question.

In 1932, no plant was operated by I.G., its participations or sub-participations, which was not owned by the I.G.-Konzern.

(signature) Ernst A. Struss

(page 2 of original)

3. Both maps list the plants in three different groups according to size. The smallest sign has been used for small plants, i.e. plants with a staff of up to 600, the medium-sized sign has been used for medium-sized plants, i.e. for plants with a staff of 600 - 7,000 and the large sign for plants with a staff exceeding 7,000.

4. For reasons of space, only the most important products have been listed for each plant. Mines are marked on the map with crossed hammers.

5. To the best of my knowledge and belief, both maps are a true presentation of the plants of the I.G.-Konzern.

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT No. NI-9445
CONTINUED

(page 2 original cont'd)

I have carefully read each of the two pages of this affidavit and signed them with my own hand. I have made the necessary corrections in my own handwriting and marked them with my initials. I herewith declare under oath that I have told the full truth to the best of my knowledge and belief.

(signature) Dr. Ernst A. Struss
(Dr. Ernst A. Struss)

Sworn to and signed before me this 6th day of August 1947 at Frankfurt/Main by Dr. Ernst A. Struss, known to me to be the person making the above affidavit.

(signature) Otto Heilbrunn
Otto Heilbrunn
Civilian, ETO 30140
Office of Chief of Counsel
for War Crimes
U.S. War Department

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

22 August 1947

I, SAMUEL S. HORN, AGO 443113, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages and that the above is a true and correct translation of the document No. NI-9445.

SAMUEL S. HORN, AGO 443113.

SPARTE:
(DIVISION)

I Schneider Dr. Christian

Hdq. LEUNA

WORKING COMBINE:

UPPER RHINE

Bütefish Dr. Heinrich
Hdq. LEUNA

Wurster Dr. Carl
Hdq. LUDWIGSHAFEN

LEUNA			
Chief:	v. Staden Dr. Hans Adolf * † 1943		
* :	Giesen Dr. Johannes * (Since 1944)		
Pers. Dept.:	Polster Dr. Hans **		
Nitrogen	70	Methanol	39
Gasoline	299	Org. Interim.	50
Lubric. Oil	27	Mersol	28
Prod.:	1, 2, 3, 8, 11		

* Prokurist-Director Ammoniakwerk Merseburg G.m.b.H.
** Prokurist

AUSCHWITZ * 1941	
Chief: (Bütefish Dr. Heinrich) Dürrfeld Dr. Walter	
Dep. Chief: Braus Dr. Karl	
Pers./Welf. Dept.: Rossbach Dr. Martin	
Commissary and Housing: Reinhold Paul	
Prod.:	11, Methanol
Total Investm. Sparte I 165	

MOOSBIERBAUM * 1940	
Chief: Henning Dr. Friedrich *	
Gasoline	42
Magnes.	42
Lubric. Oil	7
Sulf. Acid	13
Prod.:	1, 6, 11, 14

* Prokurist Ammoniakwerk Merseburg G.m.b.H.

LINZ * 1940	
Chief: Naumann Dr. Max *	
Nitrogen est.	150
Prod.:	1

* Member-Vorstand Stickstoffwerke Ostmark A.G.

NIEDERSACHSWERFEN	
Chief: Grimmel Paul *	

OPPAU			
Chief:	Müller-Cunradi Dr. Martin † 1945		
Welf. Dept.	{ see Ludwigshafen		
Pers. Dept.	{		
Nickel	6	Org. Interim.	21
Nitrogen	67	Plastics	11
Gasoline	61	(Pilot Plants)	
Prod.:	1, 2, 3, 5, 11		

HEYDEBRECK * 1940	
Chief: Sönksen Dr. Hans	
Pers. Dept.: Schütze Dr. Erwin	
Total Investm.	356
Prod.:	1, 3, 8, 11

WALDENBURG * 1939	
Chief: Beck Dr. Christoph	
Total Investm.	15
Prod.:	1, 2, 3

GAPEL * 1936	
Chief: Krägeloh Dr. Franz	
Total Investm.	3
Prod.:	1, 2

FROSE * 1938	
Chief: Chall Dr. Paul	
Total Investm.	6

SCHKOPAU	
Chief: V	
Dep. Chief: /	
Pers. Dept.: /	
Total Inv	
Prod.:	1

* Prokurist-Director
** Prokurist

HÜLS	
Chief: H	
Dep. Chief: G	
Total In	
Prod.:	1

* Manager Chemi

BUNAT	
Chief: M	
Prod.: Syn	
Chief: (Eymann Dr. Fritz)	
Prod.: Lin	

AUSCHWI	
Chief: D	
Dep. Chief: E	
Pers./Welf. Dept.: F	
Commissary and Ho	

I.G. OWNED AND OPERATED

II ter Meer Dr

Hdq. FRANKFURT A.M.

R RHINE

Wurster Dr. Carl
LUDWIGSHAFEN

LUDWIGSHAFEN	
Chief:	Wurster Dr. Carl
Dep. Chief:	Ambros Dr. Otto
Welf. Dept.:	Weiss Dr. Albrecht
Pers. Dept.:	Hoffmann Kurt
Büro Pfeiffer:	Pfeiffer Ernst
Inorganics 79 Buna 94 Plastics 73 Org. Interm. 54 Solvents 20	
Prod.:	1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 7, 8

Ambros Dr. Otto

SCHKOPAU (BUNA I) 1936	
Chief:	Wulff Dr. Carl *
Dep. Chief:	Moll Dr. Friedrich *
Pers. Dept.:	Ecarius Dr. Fritz **
Total Investm. 401	
Prod.:	1, 2, 3, 5

* Prokurist-Director Buna-Werke G.m.b.H.
** Prokurist

HÜLS (BUNA II) 1938	
Chief:	Hoffmann Dr. Ulrich *
Dep. Chief:	Günther Dr. Hans *
Total Investm. 260	
Prod.:	1, 2, 3, 5

* Manager Chemische Werke Hüls G.m.b.H.

BUNA III LUDWIGSHAFEN 1941	
Chief:	Niemann
Prod.: Synthetic Rubber	
STEEDEN 1942	
Chief: (Eynann Dr. Ernst)	Rohde Dr. Alfred
Prod.:	Lime Stone Quarry

AUSCHWITZ (BUNA IV) 1941	
Chief:	Dürrfeld Dr. Walter
Dep. Chief:	Eisfeld Dr. Kurt
Pers./Welf. Dept.:	Rosbach Dr. Martin
Commissary and Housing: Reinhold Paul	

KARLSRUHE	
Chief:	Wappes Dr. Hanns *
Prod.: Tanning extracts	

* Manager Deutsch-Koloniale Gerbstoff G.m.b.H.

ZWECKEL* 1936	
Chief:	Hasenclever Dr. Robert
Total Investm. 10	
Prod.:	Ethylene Oxide

HOLTEN	
Chief:	Feller Dr. Albert *
Prod.: Ethylene Oxide	

* Manager Chem. Fabrik Holten G.m.b.H.

Wurster Dr. Carl

GOLDBACH	
Chief:	Mählert Adolf *

MAIN VALLEY

Lautenschläger Prof. Dr. Carl Ludwig
Hdq. HÖCHST

HÖCHST	
Chief:	Lautenschläger Prof. Dr. Carl Ludwig
Dep. Chief:	Jähne Friedrich
Welf./Pers. Dept.:	Schwaborn Wilhelm (till 1941) Hirschel Dr. Otto (since 1941)
Spiess Dr. Franz (Direction of foreign labour)	
Pers. Dept.:	Landmann Dr. Fritz-Rolf
Sect. VI:	Flach Joseph
Inorganics 43 Org. Interm. 21 Solvents 28 Plastics 13 Pharmac. 24	
Prod.:	1, 2, 3, 5, 7, 9, 10

GRIESHEIM (OLD WORKS)	
Chief:	Jacobi Dr. Constantin (till 43)
" :	Engelbertz Dr. Ernst (since 44)
Pers. Dept.:	Lorenz Dr. Georg
Inorganics 9	
Prod.:	1, 2, 6

GRIESHEIM (AUTOGEN)	
Chief:	(Jähne Friedrich) Holler Prof. Dr. Hermann
Pers. Dept.:	Lay Otto
Total Investm. 15	
Prod.: Welding & Cutting Equipment, Compressed Gases	

24 SMALL OXYGEN PLANTS	
BITTERFELD BREMEN DIEDENHOFEN DORTMUND DUISBURG ESSEN-STEEL FRANKFURT A.M. GLEIWITZ O.S. HEILBRONN HERRENWYK KARLSRUHE KASSEL-BETTERSDORF	KASSEL-MITTELWALD KRAFTBORN KREFELD LEIPZIG LEVERKUSEN LUDWIGSHAFEN RODINGEN SAARBROCKEN STRASBURG-SCHILTIGHEIM STUTTGART WEIDENAU A.D. SAAR WUPPERTAL-ELBERFELD

MAINKUR	
Chief:	Jacobi Dr. Constantin (till 43)
" :	Giesler Dr. Paul (since 1944)
Pers. Dept.:	Krämer Dr. Adolf

OWNED AND OPERATED P

II ter Meer Dr. Fritz

Hdq. FRANKFURT A.M.

MAIN VALLEY

LOW

Lautenschläger Prof. Dr. Carl Ludwig
Hdq. HÖCHST

KÜ
Hdq.

LUDWIGSHAFEN

Chief: Wurster Dr. Carl
Dep. Chief: Ambros Dr. Otto
F. Dept.: Weiss Dr. Albrecht
S. Dept.: Hoffmann Kurt
Pfeiffer: Pfeiffer Ernst
Inorganics 79 Buna 94 Plastics 73
Org. Intern. 54 Solvents 20
Prod.: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 7, 8

Ambros Dr. Otto

NA I) 1936

Dr. Carl *
Dr. Friedrich *
Dr. Fritz *
401
5
Werke G.m.b.H.

KARLSRUHE

Chief: Wappes Dr. Hanns *
Prod.: Tanning extracts
*Manager Deutsche Koloniale Getööl G.m.b.H.

NA I) 1938

Dr. Ulrich *
Dr. Hans *
m. 260
5
erke Hüls G.m.b.H.

ZWECKEL* 1936

Chief: Hasenclever Dr. Robert
Total Investm. 10
Prod.: Ethylene Oxide

SHAFEN 1947

Rubber
1942
Dr. Alfred
Quarry

HOLTEN

Chief: Feller Dr. Albert *
Prod.: Ethylene Oxide
*Manager Chem. Fabrik Holten G.m.b.H.

Wurster Dr. Carl

GOLDBACH

Chief: Mähler Adolf *

UNA IV) 1941

Dr. Walter
Dr. Kurt
Dr. Martin
Reinhold Paul

HÖCHST

Chief: Lautenschläger Prof. Dr. Carl Ludwig
Dep. Chief: Jähne Friedrich
Welf./Pers. Dept.: Schwaborn Wilhelm (Hilf. Jähne end 1944) Hirschel Dr. Otto (since 1941)
Spiess Dr. Franz (Direction of foreign labour)
Pers. Dept.: Landmann Dr. Fritz-Rolf
Sect. VI: Flach Joseph
Inorganics 43 Org. Intern. 21
Solvents 28 Plastics 13 Pharm. 24
Prod.: 1, 2, 3, 5, 7, 9, 10

GRIESHEIM (OLD WORKS)

Chief: Jacobi Dr. Constantin (Hilf. 43)
Engelbertz Dr. Ernst (since 44)
Pers. Dept.: Lorenz Dr. Georg
Inorganics 9
Prod.: 1, 2, 6

GRIESHEIM (AUTOGEN)

Chief: (Jähne Friedrich) Holler Prof. Dr. Hermann
Pers. Dept.: Lay Otto
Total Investm. 15
Prod.: Welding & Cutting Equipment, Compressed Gases

24 SMALL OXYGEN PLANTS

BITTERFELD
BREMEN
DIESENHOFEN
DORTMUND
DUISBURG
ESSEN-STEEL
FRANKFURT A.M.-GRIEHEIM
GLEIWITZ O.S.
HEILBRONN
HERRENWYK
KARLSRUHE
KASSEL-BETTENHAUSEN
KASSEL-MITTELWELDE
KRAFTBORN
KREFELD
LEIPZIG
LEVERKUSEN
LUDWIGSHAFEN
RODINGEN
SAARBRÜCKEN
STRASSBURG-SCHILTHOFEN
STUTTGART
WEIDENAU A.D. RHEIN
WUPPERTAL-ELBERFELD

MAINKUR

Chief: Jacobi Dr. Constantin (Hilf. 43)
Giesler Dr. Paul (since 1944)
Pers. Dept.: Krämer Dr. Adolf

LEV

Chief:
Dep. Chief:
Pers. Dept.:
Inorganics
Org. Intern.
Prod.: 1

Ü

Chief:
Pers. Dept.:
Inorganics
Prod.: 1

WUPPE

Chief:
Dep. Chief:
Pers. Dept.:
Prod.: 1

PA

Chief:
Pharm.
Prod.: 1

D

Chief:
Acet.
Syn.

AND OPERATED PLANTS

II ter Meer Dr. Fritz

Hdq. FRANKFURT A.M.

MAIN VALLEY

Lautenschläger Prof. Dr. Carl Ludwig
Hdq. HÖCHST

HÖCHST	
Chief:	Lautenschläger Prof. Dr. Carl Ludwig
Dep. Chief:	Jähne Friedrich
Welf./Pers. Dept.:	Schwaborn Wilhelm (till 1941) Hirschel Dr. Otto (since 1941)
	Spiess Dr. Franz (Direction of foreign labour)
Pers. Dept.:	Landmann Dr. Fritz-Rolf
Sect. VI:	Flach Joseph
Inorganics	43
Solvents	28
Org. Intern.	21
Plastics	13
Pharmac.	24
Prod.:	1, 2, 3, 5, 7, 9, 10

GRIESHEIM (OLD WORKS)

Chief:	Jacobi Dr. Constantin (till 43)
" :	Engelbertz Dr. Ernst (since 43)
Pers. Dept.:	Lorenz Dr. Georg
Inorganics	9
Prod.:	1, 2, 6

GRIESHEIM (AUTOGEN)

Chief:	(Jähne Friedrich) Holler Prof. Dr. Hermann
Pers. Dept.:	Lay Otto
Total Investm.	15
Prod.:	Welding & Cutting Equipment, Compressed Gases

24 SMALL OXYGEN PLANTS

BITTERFELD	KASSEL-MITTELWALD
BREMEN	KRAFTBORN
DIESENHOFEN	KREFELD
DORTMUND	LEIPZIG
DUISBURG	LEVERKUSEN
ESSEN-STEEL	LUDWIGSHAFEN
FRANKFURT A.M.	RODINGEN
GRIEßWITZ OS.	SARBRÜCKEN
HEILBRONN	STRASBURG-SCHILTIGHEIM
HERRENWYK	STUTTGART
KARLSRUHE	WEIDENAU A.G.
KASSEL-BETTERHAUSEN	WUPPERTAL-ELBERFELD

MAINKUR

Chief:	Jacobi Dr. Constantin (till 43)
" :	Giesler Dr. Paul (since 1944)
Pers. Dept.:	Krämer Dr. Adolf
Prod.:	1, 2, 5, 7, 9, 10

LOWER RHINE

Kühne Dr. Hans
Hdq. LEVERKUSEN

LEVERKUSEN	
Chief:	Kühne Dr. Hans (till Aug. 1943)
" :	Haberland Dr. Ulrich (since Aug. 43)
Dep. Chief:	Brüggemann Dr. Max
Pers. Dept.:	Popp Dr. Hermann
Inorganics	47
Org. Intern.	41
Buna	20
Plastics	4
Prod.:	1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 7, 9, 10

ÜRDINGEN

Chief:	Haberland Dr. Ulrich
Pers. Dept.:	Faubel Fritz
Inorganics	22
Org. Intern.	18
Prod.:	1, 2, 5, 6, 7

WUPPERTAL/ELBERFELD

Chief:	Hörlein Prof. Dr. Heinrich
Dep. Chief:	Lutter Dr. Clemens
Pers. Dept.:	Hoffmann Dr. Wilhelm (43 or 44)
Prod.:	2, 9, 10

PARCHWITZ * 1941

Chief:	Hörlein Prof. Dr. Heinrich
	(in construction)
Pharmaceuticals	4
Prod.:	9

DORMAGEN

Chief:	Harz Dr. Walter
Acetylcellulose	8
Synthetic Fibres	19

CEN

Chief:	
" :	
Pers. Dept.:	
Welf. Dept.:	
Magn	
Inorg	
Prod.:	

W

Chief:	
Welf. Dept.:	
Inorg	
Prod.:	

WUPPERTAL/ELBERFELD

Chief:	Hörlein Prof. Dr. Heinrich
Dep. Chief:	Lutter Dr. Clemens
Pers. Dept.:	Hoffmann Dr. Wilhelm (43 or 44)
Prod.:	2, 9, 10

PARCHWITZ * 1941

Chief:	Hörlein Prof. Dr. Heinrich
	(in construction)
Pharmaceuticals	4
Prod.:	9

DORMAGEN

Chief:	Harz Dr. Walter
Acetylcellulose	8
Synthetic Fibres	19

TEU

Chief:	
Welf. Dept.:	

III Gajewski Dr. Fritz

Hdq. WOLFEN/FILM

CENTRAL GERMANY

Bürgin Dr. Ernst
Hdq. BITTERFELD

BITTERFELD	
Chief:	Pistor Dr. Gustav (till the end 1937)
" :	Bürgin Dr. Ernst (since 1938)
Pers. Dept.:	Frey Fritz
Welf. Dept.:	Perschmann Dr. Hans
Magnesium and Aluminum 128 Inorganics 45 Plastics 21	
Prod.:	1, 2, 5, 14

WOLFEN-FILM	
Chief:	Gajewski Dr. Fritz
Dep. Chief:	Kleine Dr. Johannes
Pers. Dept.:	Schulze Dr. Paul
Welf. Dept.:	Perschmann Dr. Hans
Photographics 35 Rayon 22 Cellulose and Spun Rayon 91	
Prod.:	12, 13

WOLFEN/FARBEN	
Chief:	Schöner Dr. Bernhard
Welf. Dept.:	Perschmann Dr. Hans
Inorganics 50 Org. Inter. 40	
Prod.:	1, 2, 3, 6, 7, 8, 10

MÜNCHEN	
Chief:	Lingg Dr. Alfred
Cameras lateron Fuses 5	
Prod.:	12

PREMNITZ	
Chief:	Zetzsche Dr. Walter
Synthetic Fibres 39	
Prod.:	13

AKEN * 1934	
Chief:	Bauer Dr. Erich
Welf. Dept.:	Perschmann Dr. Hans
Magnesium, Aluminum 46	
Prod.:	14

BOBINGEN	
Chief:	Schumacher Dr. Richard
Prod.:	13

LICHTENBERG (BERLIN)	
Chief:	Huber Dr. Joseph
Total Investm. 13	
Prod.:	13, Acetate and Superpolyamide Fibres

STASSFURT * 1935	
Chief:	Schmid Dr. Walter
Welf. Dept.:	Perschmann Dr. Hans
Magnesium 50	
Prod.:	14

ROTTWEIL	
Chief:	Osterburg Dr. Fritz
Rayon 11	
Prod.:	13

LANDSBERG * 1938	
Chief:	Hofmann Dr. Rudolf
Films, Foils, Synth. Fibres 72	
Prod.:	12, Foils

TEUSCHENTHAL * 1937	
Chief:	Reubke Dr. Emil
Welf. Dept.:	Perschmann Dr. Hans
Magnesium 4	

EILENBURG	
Chief:	Fausten Dr. Alfons *
Nitrocellulose (Total) 6	

BIEBRICH	
Chief:	Anderhub Dr. Jakob Heinrich *
Pers. Dept.:	Kuhl Max **
Total Investm. 20	

Chief: Naumann Dr. Max * 2
Nitrogen est. 150
Prod.: 1
*Member-Vorstand Stickstoffwerke Ostmark A.G.

NIEDERSACHSWERFEN
Chief: Grimmel Paul *
*Prokurist Ammoniakwerk Merseburg G.m.b.H.

Chief: Krägeloh Dr. Franz
Total Investm. 3
Prod.: 1, 2

FROSE * 1938
Chief: Chall Dr. Paul
Total Investm. 6
Prod.: 1, 5, 11

Chief: Niemann
Prod.: Synthetic Rubber
STEEDEN 1942
Chief: (Eymann Fritz) Rohde Dr. Alfred
Prod.: Lime Stone Quarry

AUSCHWITZ (BUNA IV) 1941
Chief: Dürrfeld Dr. Walter
Dep. Chief: Einfeld Dr. Kurt
Pers./Welf. Dept: Rossbach Dr. Martin
Commissary and Housing: Reinhold Paul
Prod.: 1, 2, 3, 5
Total Investm. Sparte II 157

Chief: Feller Dr. Albert *
Prod.: Ethylene Oxide
*Manager Chem. Fabrik Moltten G. m. b. H.

Wurster Dr. Carl
GOLDBACH
Chief: Mählert Adolf *
Prod.: Staves for casks
*Manager Faltholzfabrik G. m. b. H.

SITTERFELD
BREMEN
DIESENHOFFEN
DORTMUND
DUISBURG
ESSEN-STEEL
FRANKFURT
GLEIWITZ OS
HEILBRONN
HERRENWYK
KARLSRUHE
KASSEL-BETTERHAUSEN

MAINK
Chief: Jacobi
* : Giesler
Pers. Dept: Krämer
Prod.: 2, 5

AFFIDAVIT

I, Dr. Ernst A. STRUSS, Frankfurt (Main), partnerweg 59, after having first been warned that I will be liable for punishment for making a false statement, state herewith under oath, of my own free will and without coercion, the following:

I was Director of I.G. Farben, Chief of TEABureau of I.G., Secretary of the Technical Committee of I.G., Manager of Division II (Sparte II) of the Vermögensstelle W and, since 1943, Production Manager of the entire German dyestuff industry within the framework of the Economic Group Chemical Industry and since 1946 I have been employed in the Control Office, I.G. Farben.

By virtue of said offices I acquired full and complete knowledge of the I.G. owned and operated plants. I have been shown and have carefully examined this graph captioned "I.G. Owned and Operated Plants".

This graph is to my best knowledge and belief a true and faithful representation of the topic.

I declare herewith under oath that I have given the pure truth to the best of my knowledge and conscience.

Dr. Ernst A. Struss

Dr. ERNST A. STRUSS

Sworn to and signed before me this 16 day of July 1947 at Frankfurt (Main) by Dr. Ernst A. Struss known to me to be the person making the above affidavit.

Dr. Otto Heilbrunn

Dr. OTTO HEILBRUNN

CIVILIAN, ETO 30140 Office of Chief of Counsel for War Crimes US War Department.

7. WIFO* PLANTS

- 1 EMBSEN *
 - 2 LANGELSHEIM *
 - 3 DOBERITZ *
 - 4 WOLFEN *
 - 5 PIESTERITZ *
 - 6 LINZ *
 - 7 WALDENBURG *
- Prod.: Nitric Acid
Prod.: Synth. Toluene

LIGNITE AND COAL MINES Mining Administration Halle

Chief: Scharf Dr. Otto till 1941 † 1942
" : Lennartz Ludwig * Since 1942
Pers. Dept.:
1934 "Carl Bosch" * 12,9
1937 "Otto Scharf" * 42,4
1938 "Gustav Pistor" * 37,8
1938 "Hermann Schmitz" * 40,1
Deuben Low Temp. Carb. & Power Stat 58,7
Nadterstedt " " " 45-
"Elise" 37,4
"Auguste Victoria" 52, "Stein X" 5, "Wachtberg" 46-

*Chairman-Vorstand A. Riebeck'sche Montanwerke A.G.
**Member-Vorstand

GENDORF * 1940

Chief: Wittwer Dr. Max *
Investm. not known
Prod.: 2, 15
*Manager Anorgana G. m. b. H.

DYHERNFURTH * 1940

Chief: Palm Dr. Albert *
Prod.: 15
*Prokurist Anorgana G. m. b. H.

FALKENHAGEN *

Prod.: 15

Anorgana G. m. b. H., Ludwigshafen
Reich owned, I.G. operated plants

Monturon G. m. b. H., Briesen
Reich owned, I.G. operated plant

MARBURG

Chief: Demnitz Dr. Albert
Prod.: Sera

OFFENBACH

Chief: Hager
Pers. Dept: Schröder
Prod.: 2, 7

GERSTHOFEN

Chief: We
Prod.: 1, 2

Chief: Krägeloh Dr. Franz
Total Investm. 3
Prod.: 1, 2

FROSE * 1938
Chief: Chall Dr. Paul
Total Investm. 6
Prod.: 1, 5, 11

WIFO * PLANTS
N *
SHEIM *
ITZ *
N *
RITZ *
Nitric Acid *
NBURG *
Synth. Toluene *

TE AND COAL MINES
Administration Halle
Scharf Dr. Otto till 1941 † 1942
Lennartz Ludwig ** Since 1942
Carl Bosch " * 12,9
Otto Scharf " * 42,4
Gustav Pistor " * 37,8
Hermann Schmitz " * 40,1
Low Temp. Carb. & Power Stat 58,7
stedt " " " 45,-
Victoria " 37,4
Victoria " 52, Stein " 5,-, Wadnberg " 46,-
A. Riebeck & Co. Montanwerke A.G.

Chief: Niemann
Prod.: Synthetic Rubber
STEEDEN 1942
Chief: (Eymann Dr. Karl) Rohde Dr. Alfred
Prod.: Lime Stone Quarry

AUSCHWITZ (BUNA IX) 1941
Chief: Dürrfeld Dr. Walter
Dep. Chief: Einfeld Dr. Kurt
Pers./Welf. Dept: Rossbach Dr. Martin
Commissary and Housing: Reinhold Paul
Prod.: 1, 2, 3, 5
Total Investm. Sparte II 157

GENDORF * 1940
Chief: Wittwer Dr. Max *
Investm. not known
Prod.: 2, 15
* Manager Anorgana G.m.b.H.

FALKENHAGEN *
Prod.: 15

* Anorgana G.m.b.H., Ludwigshafen
Reich owned, I.G. operated plants
** Monturon G.m.b.H., Briesen
Reich owned, I.G. operated plant

Chief: Feller Dr. Albert *
Prod.: Ethylene Oxide
* Manager Chem. Fabrik Mollten G.m.b.H.

WURSTER Dr. Carl
GOLDBACH
Chief: Mähler Adolf *
Prod.: Staves for casks
* Manager Falzholzfabrik G.m.b.H.

DYHERNFURTH * 1940
Chief: Palm Dr. Albert *
Prod.: 15
* Prokurist Anorgana G.m.b.H.

BITTERFELD
BREMEN
DIESENHOFEN
DORTMUND
DUISBURG
ESSEN-STEEL
FRANKFURT-AM-MAIN
GLEIWITZ OS.
HEILBRONN
HERFENWYK
KARLSRUHE
KASSEL-BETTERHAUSEN
KRAFTBOHN
KREFELD
LEIPZIG
LEVERKUSEN
LUDWIGSHAFEN
RODINGEN
SAARBRÜCKEN
STRASBURG-SCHILTIGHEIM
STUTTGART
WEIDENAU A.D. RHEIN
WUPPERTAL-ELBERFELD

MAINKUR
Chief: Jacobi Dr. Constantin (till 43)
* : Giesler Dr. Paul (since 1944)
Pers. Dept: Krämer Dr. Adolf
Prod.: 2, 5, 7, 8, 9

OFFENBACH
Chief: Hagenböcker Dr. Alfred
Pers. Dept: Schröter Kurt
Prod.: 2, 7

GERSTHOFEN
Chief: Weber Dr. Karl
Prod.: 1, 2, 3, 5

MARBURG
Chief: Demnitz Dr. Albert
Prod.: Sera

EYSTRUP
Chief: Geiger Dr. Wilhelm
Prod.: Sera

Chief:
Prod.: Pharm

Chief:
Prod.: Acetyl Synth

Chief:
Prod.: Inorganic Process
* Member - Vorstand

Chief:
Prod.: KNA
* Member - Vorstand

Chief: Feller Dr. Albert

Prod.: Ethylene Oxide

*Manager Chem. Fabrik Holten G.m.b.H.

Wurster Dr. Carl

GOLDBACH

Chief: Mählert Adolf

Prod.: Staves for casks

*Manager Faßholzfabrik G.m.b.H.

DYHERNFURTH*1940

Chief: Palm Dr. Albert

Prod.: 15

*Prokurist Anorgana G.m.b.H.

ENHAGEN *

15

H., Ludwigshafen
6 operated plants

H., Briesen
G. operated plant

BITTERFELD
BREMEN
DIESENHOFEN
DORTMUND
DUISBURG
ESSEN-STEEL
FRANKFURT-AM-MAIN
GLEIWITZ O.S.
HEILBRONN
HERRENWYK
KARLSRUHE
KASSEL-BETTENHAUSEN

KASSEL-MITTELWEG
KRAFTBORN
KREFELD
LEIPZIG
LEVERKUSEN
LUDWIGSHAFEN
RODINGEN
SAARBROCKEN
STRASBURG-SCHILTGEN
STUTTGART
WEIDENAU A.D. SAAR
WUPPERTAL-ELBERFELD

MAINKUR

Chief: Jacobi Dr. Constantin (N 43)

* : Giesler Dr. Paul (since 1944)

Pers. Dept.: Krämer Dr. Adolf

Prod.: 2, 5, 7, 8, 9

OFFENBACH

Chief: Hagenböcker Dr. Alfred

Pers. Dept.: Schröter Kurt

Prod.: 2, 7

GERSTHOFEN

Chief: Weber Dr. Karl

Prod.: 1, 2, 3, 5

MARBURG

Chief: Demnitz Dr. Albert

Prod.: Sera

EYSTRUP

Chief: Geiger Dr. Wilhelm

Prod.: Sera

Chief: Hörlein Prof. Dr. Heinrich

(in construction)

Pharmaceuticals 4

Prod.: 9

DORMAGEN

Chief: Harz Dr. Walter

Acetylcellulose 8
Synthetic Fibres 19

Prod.: 1, 13

DUISBURG

Chief: Wolf Dr. Hermann *

Inorganics and Metals 39

Prod.: Processing residues from pyrite

*Member-Vorstand Duisburger Kupferhütte

KNAPSACK

Chief: Bachmann Dr. Max

Dep. Chief: Winter Dr. Ernst ^{also Weibezahn Dr. Karl}

Pers. Dept.: Kortmann (during the war)

Prod.: 1, 3

*Member-Vorstand A.G. für Stickstoffdünger

SCHARZFELD*1941

Chief: Lange v. Stockmeier Dr.

Total Investm. 3

Prod.: Dolomite Quarry

LEIPZIG * 1941

Chief: Bolle Hans *

Total Investm. 5

Prod.: Light Metal Casting

*Manager Metallgussgesellschaft m.b.H.

STASSFURT*1935

Chief: Schmid Dr. Walter

Welf. Dept.: Perschmann Dr. Hans

Magnesium 50

Prod.: 14

TEUSCHENTHAL*1937

Chief: Reubke Dr. Emil

Welf. Dept.: Perschmann Dr. Hans

Magnesium 4

Prod.: 14

RHEINFELDEN

Chief: Liebich Dr. Karl

Inorganics 11

Prod.: 1, 3, 5

D'BERITZ

Chief: Schneider Dr. Hans

Organic Intermediates 14

Prod.: 1, 2

NACHRODT * 1940

Chief: Bothmann Hans ^{Zöllner Hans}

Total Investm. 7

Prod.: Light Metal Sheets

*Manager Westfälische Leichtmetallwerke G.m.b.H.

ROT

Chief: Os

Rayon

Prod.: 1

EILEN

Chief: Fa

Nitrocellulose

Prod.: Ni

*Member-Vorstand Deutsche

MITTELWELDE
ORN
D
KUSEN
SHAFEN
DEN
ROCKEN
SCHLITZHEIM
ART
AUF A. S. G.
TAL-ELBERFELD

R
stantin (1843)
bul (since 1944)
Adolf
9

H
ker Dr. Alfred
Kurt

EN
r Dr. Karl
5

EYSTRUP
Chief: Geiger Dr. Wilhelm
Prod.: Sera

Chief: Hörlein Prof. Dr. Heinrich
(in construction)
Pharmaceuticals 4
Prod.: 9

DORMAGEN
Chief: Harz Dr. Walter
Acetylcellulose 8
Synthetic Fibres 19
Prod.: 1, 13

DUISBURG
Chief: Wolf Dr. Hermann *
Inorganics and Metals 39
Prod.: Processing residues from pyrite
*Member-Vorstand Duisburger Kupferhütte

KNAPSACK
Chief: Bachmann Dr. Max *
Dep. Chief: Winter Dr. Ernst * (also Weisbecker Dr. Karl)
Pers. Dept.: Kartmann (during the war)
Prod.: 1, 3
*Member-Vorstand A.G. für Stickstoffdünger

STASSFURT * 1933
Chief: Schmid Dr. Walter
Welf. Dept.: Perschmann Dr. Hans
Magnesium 50
Prod.: 14

TEUSCHENTHAL * 1937
Chief: Reubke Dr. Emil
Welf. Dept.: Perschmann Dr. Hans
Magnesium 4
Prod.: 14

RHEINFELDEN
Chief: Liebich Dr. Karl
Inorganics 11
Prod.: 1, 3, 5

SCHARZFELD * 1941
Chief: Lange v. Stockmeier Dr.
Total Investm. 3
Prod.: Dolomite Quarry

LEIPZIG * 1941
Chief: Bolle Hans *
Total Investm. 5
Prod.: Light Metal Casting
*Manager Metallgussgesellschaft m.b.H.

ROTTWEIL
Chief: Osterburg Dr. Fritz
Rayon 11
Prod.: 13


EILENBURG
Chief: Fausten Dr. Alfons *
Nitrocellulose (Total) 6
Prod.: Nitrocellulose
*Member-Vorstand Deutsche Cellulosefabrik A.G.

LANDSBERG 1938
Chief: Hofmann Dr. Rudolf
Films, Foils, Synth. Fibres 72
Prod.: 12, Foils


BIEBRICH
Chief: Anderhub Dr. Jakob Heinrich *
Pers. Dept.: Kuhl Max **
Total Investm. 20
Prod.: Cellophane, Ozalide Paper
*Member-Vorstand Kalle & Co. A. G.
**Prokurist

CLASSES OF PRODUCTION

- 1 Inorganic Products and Nitrogen
- 2 Organic Intermediates
- 3 Solvents, Plasticizers, Methanol
- 4 Synthetic Tanning Agents
- 5 Plastics, Synthetic Rubber, Accelerators
- 6 Products for Various Fields of Application
- 7 Dyestuffs
- 8 Dyeing and Printing Auxiliaries, Detergent Raw Materials
- 9 Pharmaceuticals
- 10 Insecticides
- 11 Gasoline, Lubricating Oils
- 12 Photographic Materials
- 13 Synthetic Fibres
- 14 Light Metals
- 15 Poisonous Gas and Intermediates



New Plants since 1933
First year of construction
Investments in Mill. R.M.



Old Plants
Important Enlargements since 1933
Investments in Mill. R.M.

Chief:	Feller Dr. Albert *
Prod.:	Ethylene Oxide

*Manager Chem. Fabrik Kollten G. m. b. H.

Wurster Dr. Carl

Chief:	Mählert Adolf *
Prod.:	Staves for casks

*Manager Faltholzfabrik G. m. b. H.

Chief:	Palm Dr. Albert *
Prod.:	15

*Prokurist Anorgana G. m. b. H.

ENHAGEN *

15

H., Ludwigshafen
16. operated plants

H., Briesen
G. operated plant

BITTERFELD BREMEN DIESENHOFEN DORTMUND DUISBURG ESSEN-STEEL FRANKFURT-AM-MAIN GLEIWITZ P.S. HEILBRONN HERRENWYK KARLSRUHE KASSEL-BETTENHAUSEN	KASSEL-MITTELFELD KRAFTBORN KREFELD LEIPZIG LEVERKUSEN LUDWIGSHAFEN RODINGEN SAARBROCKEN STRASSBURG-SCHILTHOFEN STUTTGART WEIDENAU A.D. SAAR WUPPERTAL-ELBERFELD
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Chief:	Jacobi Dr. Constantin (N. 43)
Pers. Dept.:	Krämer Dr. Adolf
Prod.:	2, 5, 7, 8, 9

Chief:	Hagenböcker Dr. Alfred
Pers. Dept.:	Schröter Kurt
Prod.:	2, 7

Chief:	Weber Dr. Karl
Prod.:	1, 2, 3, 5

Chief:	Demnitz Dr. Albert
Prod.:	Sera

Chief:	Geiger Dr. Wilhelm
Prod.:	Sera

Chief:	Hörlein Prof. Dr. Heinrich (in construction)
Prod.:	9

Chief:	Harz Dr. Walter
Prod.:	1, 13

Chief:	Wolf Dr. Hermann *
Prod.:	Processing residues from pyrite

*Member-Vorstand Duisburger Kupferhütte

Chief:	Bachmann Dr. Max *
Dep. Chief:	Winter Dr. Ernst (also Weibezahn Dr. Karl)
Pers. Dept.:	Kortmann (during the war)
Prod.:	1, 3

*Member-Vorstand A.G. für Stickstoffdünger

Chief:	Lange v. Stockmeier Dr.
Prod.:	Dolomite Quarry

Chief:	Bolle Hans *
Prod.:	Light Metal Casting

*Manager Metallgussgesellschaft m. b. H.

STASSFURT * 1935

Chief:	Schmid Dr. Walter
Welf. Dept.:	Perschmann Dr. Hans
Prod.:	14

Chief:	Reubke Dr. Emil
Welf. Dept.:	Perschmann Dr. Hans
Prod.:	14

Chief:	Liebich Dr. Karl
Prod.:	1, 3, 5

Chief:	Schneider Dr. Hans
Prod.:	1, 2

Chief:	Bothmann Hans Zöllner Hans *
Prod.:	Light Metal Sheets

*Manager Westfälische Leichtmetallwerke GmbH

Chief:	Ose
Prod.:	13

Chief:	Fau
Prod.:	Ni

*Member-Vorstand Deutsche

MITTELWELDE
RN
SEH
HAFEN
EN
CKEN
SCHILTHOFHEIM
RT
U A.D. 588
AL-ELBERFELD

Danin (1843)
ul (since 1944)
Adolf

H
er Dr. Alfred
Kurt

EN
Dr. Karl

EYSTRUP
Chief: Geiger Dr. Wilhelm
Prod.: Sera

Chief: Hörlein Prof. Dr. Heinrich
(in construction)
Pharmaceuticals 4
Prod.: 9

DORMAGEN
Chief: Harz Dr. Walter
Acetylcellulose 8
Synthetic Fibres 19
Prod.: 1, 13

DUISBURG
Chief: Wolf Dr. Hermann *
Inorganics and Metals 39
Prod.: Processing residues from pyrite
*Member-Vorstand DuisburgerKupferhütte

KNAPSACK
Chief: Bachmann Dr. Max *
Dep. Chief: Winter Dr. Ernst *
Pers. Dept.: Kortmann (during the war)
Prod.: 1, 3
*Member-Vorstand A.G. für Stickstoffdünger

STASSFURT * 1935
Chief: Schmid Dr. Walter
Welf. Dept.: Perschmann Dr. Hans
Magnesium 50
Prod.: 14

TEUSCHENTHAL * 1937
Chief: Reubke Dr. Emil
Welf. Dept.: Perschmann Dr. Hans
Magnesium 4
Prod.: 14

RHEINFELDEN
Chief: Liebich Dr. Karl
Inorganics 11
Prod.: 1, 3, 5

SCHARZFELD * 1941
Chief: Lange v. Stockmeier Dr.
Total Investm. 3
Prod.: Dolomite Quarry

LEIPZIG * 1941
Chief: Bolle Hans *
Total Investm. 5
Prod.: Light Metal Casting
*Manager Metallgussgesellschaft m.B.H.

ROTTWEIL
Chief: Osterburg Dr. Fritz
Rayon 11
Prod.: 13

EILENBURG
Chief: Fausten Dr. Alfons *
Nitrocellulose (Total) 6
Prod.: Nitrocellulose
*Member-Vorstand Deutsche Gellulosefabrik A.G.

D'BERITZ
Chief: Schneider Dr. Hans
Organic Intermediates 14
Prod.: 1, 2

NACHRODT * 1940
Chief: Bothmann Hans * Zöllner Hans *
Total Investm. 7
Prod.: Light Metal Sheets
*Manager Westfälische Leichtmetallwerke GmbH

LANDSBERG 1938
Chief: Hofmann Dr. Rudolf
Films, Foils, Synth. Fibres 72
Prod.: 12, Foils

BIEBRICH
Chief: Anderhub Dr. Jakob Heinrich *
Pers. Dept.: Kuhl Max **
Total Investm. 20
Prod.: Cellophane, Ozalide Paper
*Member-Vorstand Kalle & Co. A. G.
**Prokurist

CLASSES OF PRODUCTION

- 1 Inorganic Products and Nitrogen
- 2 Organic Intermediates
- 3 Solvents, Plasticizers, Methanol
- 4 Synthetic Tanning Agents
- 5 Plastics, Synthetic Rubber, Accelerators
- 6 Products for Various Fields of Application
- 7 Dyestuffs
- 8 Dyeing and Printing Auxiliaries, Detergent Raw Materials
- 9 Pharmaceuticals
- 10 Insecticides
- 11 Gasoline, Lubricating Oils
- 12 Photographic Materials
- 13 Synthetic Fibres
- 14 Light Metals
- 15 Poisonous Gas and Intermediates



New Plants since 1933
First year of construction
Investments in Mill. RM.



Old Plants
Important Enlargements since 1933
Investments in Mill. RM.

Dynamit Aktiengesellschaft
vorm. Alfred Nobel & Co.,
Troisdorf
(D. A. G.)

PLANTS:

1 **Troisdorf**

2 **Krümmel**

3 Schlebusch

4 Empelde

5 Nürnberg/Stadeln

6 Düneberg

7 Würgendorf

8 Nürnberg

9 Förde

10 Saarwellingen

11 Ueckermünde *

PLANTS OF

SUBS

Rheinische Gummi-
u. Celluloidfabrik A.G.,
Mannheim-Neckarau

PLANT:

Mannheim - Neckarau

Gustav Genschow
& Co. A.G.,
Berlin

PLANTS:

1 Wolfratsweier

2 Durlach/Baden

3 Treptow

Hruby & Co.,
Hachenburg

PLANT:

Hachenburg

Wag
Commissi
Trois
Reich owned,
PL

Dra

J.F. Ei
Silberhü
Silber
PLA

1 Silberh

2 Kiesel

Patronen-Zü
u. Metallware
vorm. Sell
Schöneb

PLA

Schöne

Deutsche Deutsche

DS

Central Administration
of the Dynamit Aktiengesellschaft vorm. Alfred Nobel & Co.
Troisdorf

SUBSIDIARIES IN GERMANY

PLANTS OF SUBSIDIARIES

Waaren-
Commissions A.G.,
Troisdorf

Reich owned, D.A.G. operated

PLANT:

Dragahn *1,3.

Sprengstoff u.
Zündschnur - Werke
Gnaschwitz A.G.,
Gnaschwitz near Bautzen

PLANT:

Gnaschwitz

Aktiengesellschaft
Dynamit Nobel
Bratislava
(Czechoslovakia)

PLANT:

Bratislava

J.F. Eisfeld
Silberhütte G.m.b.H.,
Silberhütte

PLANTS:

1 Silberhütte

2 Kieselbach

Eckert & Ziegler
G.m.b.H.,
Köln-Braunsfeld

PLANT:

Köln-Braunsfeld

Aktiengesellschaft
Dynamit Nobel
Wien
(Austria)

PLANT:

Wien

Patronen-Zündhütchen-
u. Metallwarenfabrik A.G.
vorm. Sellier & Bellot,
Schönebeck/Elbe

PLANT:

Schönebeck/Elbe

Rheinisches
Spritzgusswerk G.m.b.H.,
Köln-Braunsfeld

PLANTS:

1 Köln-Braunsfeld

2 Weissenburg *

Lignoza A.G.,
Kattowitz
(Poland)

PLANT:

* Kattowitz

Central Administration
of the Dynamit Aktiengesellschaft vorm. Alfred Nobel & Co.
Troisdorf

S IN GERMANY

Sprengstoff u.
Zündschnur - Werke
Gnaschwitz A.G.,
Gnaschwitz near Bautzen

PLANT:

Gnaschwitz

Eckert & Ziegler
G.m.b.H.,
Köln-Braunsfeld

PLANT:

Köln-Braunsfeld

Rheinisches
Spritzgusswerk G.m.b.H.,
Köln-Braunsfeld

PLANTS:

1 Köln-Braunsfeld

2 Weissenburg *

Selve-Kronbiegel-

PLANTS OF SUBSIDIARIES ABROAD

Aktiengesellschaft
Dynamit Nobel
Bratislava
(Czechoslovakia)

PLANT:

Bratislava

Aktiengesellschaft
Dynamit Nobel
Wien
(Austria)

PLANT:

Wien

Lignoza A.G.,
Kattowitz
(Poland)

PLANT:

* Kattowitz

Sprengstoffwerke
Oberschlesien G.m.b.H.,
Kattowitz
(Poland)

PLANTS:

1* Oberlazisk (POLAND)

2* Kriewald (POLAND)

Luxit
Sprengstoffe G.m.b.H.,
Luxembourg

PLANT:

* Luxembourg

* taken over 1940

PLANTS OF THE DYNAMIT AKTIENGESELLSCHAFT

VORM. ALFRED NOBEL & TROISDORF

Gesellschaft m.b.H.
zur Verwertung chemischer
Erzeugnisse, Troisdorf
(Verwertchemie)

Reich owned, D. A.G. operated

PLANTS:

1 Allendorf	1.T, 3.	* 1939
2 Bromberg	1.T, 2.C, 2.P, 1.B, 3.	* 1940
3 Christianstadt	1.H, 1.T, 2.C, 3.	* 1940
4 Hessisch-Lichtenau	1.T, 1.P, 1.E, 3.	* 1936
5 Malchow	1.E, 4.	* 1938
6 Aschau	2.C	* 1939
7 Bobingen	1.H	* 1938
8 Boizenburg/Elbe		*
9 Clausthal	1.T, 3.	* 1937
10 Döberitz	1.H	* 1939
11 Dömitz	1.T, 1.P, 3.	*
12 Ebenhausen	2.C, 2.	* 1939
13 Erfurt		*
14 Ettringen/Obb.	not in operation	*
15 Eschenstruth (near Hess-Lichtenau)	tools	* 1940
16 Glöwen	1, not in operation	*
17 Grünberg/Schlesien		* 1940

Westfälisch-Anhaltische
Sprengstoff A.G.,
Berlin
(Wasag)

A) Westfälisch-Anhaltische Sprengstoff A.G.
B) Wasag-Chemie Aktiengesellschaft

PLANTS:

1 Reinsdorf near Wittenberg	1.
2 Elsnig near Torgau	1.
3 Koswig/Elbe	
4 Sythen near Haltern/Westf.	
5 Pionki (Poland)	2.

Deutsche Sprengchemie
G.m.b.H.,
Berlin

Reich owned, Wasag operated

PLANTS:

5 Nürnberg
6 Düneberg
7 Würzburg
8 Nürnberg
9 Förde
10 Saarwellingen
11 Ueckermünde *
12 Reichweiler *
13 Hamm
14 Bilitz
15 Adolz furth

Hruby & Co., Hachenburg
PLANT:
Hachenburg

Deutsche Pyrotechnische Fabriken G.m.b.H., Neumarkt/Oberpfalz
PLANTS:
1 Neumarkt/Oberpf.
2 Kleebronn

Patronen u. Metallw. vorm. S. Schön
Schön

P. Pul. St. Ing. St.
St.

Pul. Has. Has.
Has.

Classes of Production

1. Explosives
 - 1.T Trinitrotoluene
 - 1.P Picric Acid
 - 1.H Hexogen
 - 1.E Nitropentaerithrite
 - 1.G Nitroguanidine
 - 1.A Trinitroanisol
 - 1.B Binitrobenzene
2. { C Nitrocellulose
P Gunpowder
3. Loading of Bombs and Grenades
4. Fuses and Detonators
5. Plastics

☒ New Plants since 1933

First year of construction

☐ Old Plants

Patronen-Zündhütchen-
u. Metallwarenfabrik A.G.
vorm. Sellier & Bellot,
Schönebeck/Elbe

PLANT:

Schönebeck/Elbe

Pfälzische
Pulverfabriken
St. Ingbert G.m.b.H.,
St. Ingbert

PLANT:

St. Ingbert

Pulverfabrik
Hasloch G.m.b.H.,
Hasloch/Main

PLANT:

Hasloch/Main

Rheinisches
Spritzgusswerk G.m.b.H.
Köln-Braunsfeld

PLANTS:

1 Köln-Braunsfeld

2 Weissenburg *

Selve-Kronbiegel-
Dornheim Aktien-
gesellschaft
Sömmerda

PLANT:

Sömmerda

Lignoza A.G.,
Kattowitz
(Poland)

PLANT:

* Kattowitz

Patronen-Zündhütchen-
u. Metallwarenfabrik A.G.
vorm. Sellier & Bellot,
Schönebeck/Elbe

PLANT:

Schönebeck/Elbe

Pfälzische
Pulverfabriken
St. Ingbert G.m.b.H.,
St. Ingbert

PLANT:

St. Ingbert

Pulverfabrik
Hasloch G.m.b.H.,
Hasloch/Main

PLANT:

Hasloch/Main

Rheinisches
Spritzgusswerk G.m.b.H.,
Köln-Braunsfeld

PLANTS:

1 Köln-Braunsfeld

2 Weissenburg *

Selve-Kronbiegel-
Dornheim Aktien-
gesellschaft
Sömmerda

PLANT:

Sömmerda

Lignoza A.G.,
Kattowitz
(Poland)

PLANT:

* Kattowitz

9	Clausthal	1.T, 3.	*1937
10	Döberitz	1.H	*1939
11	Dömitz	1.T, 1.P, 3.	*
12	Ebenhausen	2.C, 2.	*1939
13	Erfurt		*
14	Ettringen/Obb.	not in operation	*
15	Eschenstruth (near Hess-Lichtenau)	Tools	*1940
16	Glöwen	1, not in operation	*
17	Grünberg/Schlesien		*1940
18	Güsen	2.C, 1.A, 4.	*
19	Herzberg	3.	*1939
20	Hohensaaten	2.C	*1938
21	Kaufbeuren	2.	*1939
22	Kaufering	2.C, not in operation, 3.	*1939
23	Ludwigsdorf near Glatz	3.	*1940
24	Malmitz	3.	*1938
25	Munich	4.	*1939
26	Mühdorf/Obb.		*
27	Premnitz	3.	*
28	Ueckermünde	2.C, 1.G	*1938
29	Wolfratshausen	1.E, 4.	*1939
30	Hertine (Czechoslovakia)	3.	*1940
31	Kuchelna (Poland)	3.	*1940
32	Petersdorf (Poland)	3.	*1940

Deutsche Sprengchemie G.m.b.H., Berlin

Reich owned, Wasag operated

PLANTS:

1	Kraiburg/Bayern-Fichte I	2. * 1937
2	Geretsried near Munich	3. * 1938
3	Torgelow/Pommern	2. * 1936
4	Klietz/Elbe	2. * 1935
5	Moschwig (Schmiedeberg)	2. * 1936
6	Oderberg	2. * 1937
7	Dreetz (Neustadt/Dosse)	2. * 1938
8	Forst/Lausitz	2. * 1939
9	Dannenwalde/Brandenburg	*

AFFIDAVIT

I, Dr. Ernst A. STRUSS, Frankfurt (Main), Gärtnersweg 59, after having first been warned that I will be liable for punishment for making a false statement herewith under oath, of my own free will and without coercion, the following:

I was Director of I.G. Farben, Chief of TEA Bureau of I.G., Secretary of the Technical Committee of I.G., Manager of Division II (Sparte II) of the Vermischte Werke, since 1943, Production Manager of the entire German chemical industry within the framework of the Economic Group Chemicals, and since 1945 I have been employed in the Control Office I.G. Farben.

By virtue of said offices I acquired full and complete knowledge of the plants of Dynamit A.G. and its controlled companies. I have been shown and carefully examined this graph captioned "Plants of Dynamit A.G. and its controlled companies."

This graph is to my best knowledge and belief a true and faithful reproduction of the topic.

I declare herewith under oath that I have given the pure truth to the best of my knowledge and conscience.

Dr. Ernst A. Struss

Dr. Ernst A. STRUSS

Sworn to and signed before me this 16 day of July 1947 at Frankfurt (Main) by Dr. Ernst A. Struss known to me to be the person making the above affidavit.

CIVILIAN, E

* taken over 1940

Lignoza A.G.,
Kattowitz
(Poland)

PLANT:

Kattowitz

9	Clausthal	1.T, 3.	* 1937
10	Döberitz	1.H	* 1939
11	Dömitz	1.T, 1.P, 3.	*
12	Ebenhausen	2.C, 2.	* 1939
13	Erfurt		*
14	Ettringen/Obb.	not in operation	*
15	Eschenstruth (near Hess-Lichtenau)	Tools	* 1940
16	Glöwen	1., not in operation	*
17	Grünberg/Schlesien		* 1940
18	Güsen	2.C, 1.A, 4.	*
19	Herzberg	3.	* 1939
20	Hohensaaten	2.C	* 1938
21	Kaufbeuren	2.	* 1939
22	Kaufering	2.C, not in operation, 3.	* 1939
23	Ludwigsdorf near Glatz	3.	* 1940
24	Malmitz	3.	* 1938
25	Munich	4.	* 1939
26	Mühdorf/Obb.		*
27	Premnitz	3.	*
28	Ueckermünde	2.C, 1.G	* 1938
29	Wolfratshausen	1.E, 4.	* 1939
30	Hertine (Czechoslovakia)	3.	* 1940
31	Kuchelna (Poland)	3.	* 1940
32	Petersdorf (Poland)	3.	* 1940

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9 Clausthal	1.T, 3.	*1937
10 Döberitz	1.H	*1939
11 Dömitz	1.T, 1.P, 3.	*
12 Ebenhausen	2.C, 2.	*1939
13 Erfurt		*
14 Ettringen/Obb.	not in operation	*
15 Eschenstruth (near Hess-Lichtenau)	Tools	*1940
16 Glöwen	1, not in operation	*
17 Grünberg/Schlesien		*1940
18 Güsen	2.C, 1.A, 4.	*
19 Herzberg	3.	*1939
20 Hohensaaten	2.C	*1938
21 Kaufbeuren	2.	*1939
22 Kaufering	2.C, not in operation, 3.	*1939
23 Ludwigsdorf near Glatz	3.	*1940
24 Malsitz	3.	*1938
25 Munich	4.	*1939
26 Mühldorf/Obb.		*
27 Premnitz	3.	*
28 Ueckermünde	2.C, 1.G	*1938
29 Wolfratshausen	1.E, 4.	*1939
30 Hertine (Czechoslovakia)	3.	*1940
31 Kuchelna (Poland)	3.	*1940
32 Petersdorf (Poland)	3.	*1940

Deutsche Sprengchemie G.m.b.H., Berlin

Reich owned, Wasag operated

PLANTS:

1 Kraiburg/Bayern „Fichte I“	2. * 1937
2 Geretsried near Munich	3. * 1938
3 Torgelow / Pommern	2. * 1936
4 Klietz / Elbe	2. * 1935
5 Moschwig (Schwiedeberg)	2. * 1936
6 Oderberg	2. * 1937
7 Dreetz (Neustadt/Dosse)	2. * 1938
8 Forst / Lausitz	2. * 1939
9 Dannenwalde/Brandenburg	*

AFFIDAVIT

I, Dr. Ernst A. STRUSS, Frankfurt (Main), Gärtnerweg 59, after having first been warned that I will be liable for punishment for making a false statement, state herewith under oath, of my own free will and without coercion, the following:

I was Director of I.G. Farben, Chief of T.E.A. Bureau of I.G., Secretary of the Technical Committee of I.G., Manager of Division II (-Sparte II) of the Vermittlungsstelle W and, since 1943, Production Manager of the entire German dyestuff industry within the framework of the Economic Group Chemical Industry and since 1945 I have been employed in the Control Office I.G. Farben.

By virtue of said offices I acquired full and complete knowledge of the „Plants of Dynamit A.G. and its controlled companies.“ I have been shown and have carefully examined this graph captioned „Plants of Dynamit A.G. and its controlled companies.“

This graph is to my best knowledge and belief a true and faithful representation of the topic.

I declare herewith under oath that I have given the pure truth to the best of my knowledge and conscience.

Dr. Ernst A. Struss

Dr. Ernst A. STRUSS

Sworn to and signed before me this 16 day of July 1947 at Frankfurt (Main) by Dr. Ernst A. Struss known to me to be the person making the above affidavit.

Otto Heilbrunn

Dr. OTTO HEILBRUNN

CIVILIAN, ETO 30140 Office of Chief of Counsel
War Crimes U.S. War Department

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT No. NI-6234
CONTINUED

AFFIDAVIT

I, Dr. Heinrich BUETEFISCH, Nuernberg, Court House, having been informed that I render myself liable to punishment if I make false statements, herewith state under oath and without duress the following:

The capital participation of I.G. Farbenindustrie in the Dynamit A.G., formerly Alfred Nobel at Troisdorf amounted to more than 50 %. I know this because I once saw a circular of the I.G. in which the D.A.G. was listed under "capital participations of the I.G." with more than 50 %. That the I.G. owned a capital participation of more than 50 % is also shown by the fact that otherwise, owing to the contract with the Stickstoffsyndikat, I.G. could not have delivered commercial nitrogen directly to the D.A.G.; as a matter of fact, however, large supplies of nitrogen from the I.G. have always been sent direct to the D.A.G. as their own delivery-quotas.

I have carefully read through this affidavit consisting of one page and signed it with my own hand, I have made the necessary corrections in my own handwriting and countersigned them with my initials and declare herewith, under oath, that according to the best of my knowledge and belief I have stated the full truth in this affidavit.

DR. HEINRICH BUETEFISCH

Sworn to and signed before me this 21st day of April 1947 at Nuernberg, Justizgebäude by Dr. Heinrich BUETEFISCH, known to me to be the person making the above affidavit.

Dr. OTTO HEILBRUNN
Civilian AGO 30140
Office of Chief of Counsel for War
Crimes, War Department.

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

23 May 1947

I, JOHN FOSBERRY, Civ. No. 20 179, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages and that the above is a true and correct translation of the document No. NI-6234.

JOHN FOSBERRY
Civ. No. 20 179.

Affidavit.

I, Paul Heinrich Doncker, residing at Kronberg in Taunus, Gnaibstrasse 16, Titular Director of I.G., Frankfurt on Main since 1927, and Chief Manager of the Central Accounting Department since 1931, having been duly warned that I shall render myself liable to punishment for making false statements, and that withholding facts is equivalent to perjury, herewith depose the following under oath and of my own free will and without coercion.

About 1941 in legal proceedings taken by Dynamit-Nobel A.G. previously named Alfred Nobel, acting as plaintiff, and at their request the Reich Finance Court, the supreme German court for financial matters, decided that Dynamit-Nobel A.G. (DAG) was dependent on I.G. as regards finances, economy, and organization.

1. In 1926 I.G.-Farben concluded an Interessengemeinschaft agreement with DAG. As a result of this Interessengemeinschaft agreement, DAG needed I.G.'s approval on all decisions going beyond ordinary business transactions.

I.G. owned all preferential shares and approximately 45% of the original shares. I.G. commanded the majority vote in the general meeting of DAG. In the various years I.G. was represented in the Aufsichtsrat of DAG by Bosch, Flechtheim, Gajowski, and Schmitz. From 1938 until 1945 Schmitz was chairman of the Aufsichtsrat and for a number of years before that, he was deputy chairman of the Aufsichtsrat as far as I remember.

(page 2 of original)

2. DAG's financial dependence is shown by the following: I.G. commanded the majority vote in the general meeting. Beyond that, as a result of the Interessengemeinschaft agreement, I.G. had to approve all annual balance sheets. Finally by virtue of the clauses in the Interessengemeinschaft agreement, DAG could not increase its capital without I.G.'s approval.

3. DAG was economically dependent on I.G. to the following extent: I.G. was DAG's main supplier of nitric acid, ammonium nitrate and preliminary products for the production of plastics. I.G. predominated the market in all these lines. Thus, the prices of these products were more or less dictated by I.G.. I remember that Director-General Dr. Mueller of DAG repeatedly complained about the fixing of prices by I.G..

I know of one case in which the Central Committee interfered in DAG's business; in about 1932 the Central Committee instructed me and Director Mueller, to examine the plastics business of DAG. Had any differences of opinion arisen out of the results of this examination, the final decision would have rested with the Aufsichtsrat of DAG.

Dr. Paul Mueller, Director-General of DAG, was a member of the Technical Committee (TEK) of I.G.. The TEK had to decide on all credit applications, both for new equipment as well as for replacements. As all the other people in the TEK were members of I.G., it stands to reason that as regards intended investments, DAG could be outvoted.

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT No. NI-7239
CONTINUED

(page 3 of original)

4. Organizationally DAG was incorporated in the I.G. through being grouped in Sparte III, i.e., just as if it had been an I.G. plant. Dr. Gajewski in his capacity as the head of Sparte III, had the right and duty towards the I.G. Vorstand to watch the technical development of DAG and for this purpose could order investigations to be carried out at the DAG.

5. I.G. also exercised its influence on DAG as regards personnel. Before changing over to DAG, Dr. Pungs, deputy member of the DAG Vorstand, had been working in the I.G. plant at Ludwigshafen as a chemist. Further, Dipl. Ing. Schindler was sent from Welfen to the DAG by I.G. where he was appointed Chief Engineer.

I have carefully read each of these three pages of this affidavit and counter-signed them with my own hand, I have made the necessary corrections in my own hand-writing and initialled them with the first letters of my name, and I herewith declare under oath that to the best of my knowledge and belief I have told the pure truth in this affidavit.

Signature: Paul Dencker

Sworn to and signed before me this 7th day of June 1947 at Nuremberg by Paul Heinrich Dencker, known to me to be the person making the above affidavit.

Otto Heilbrunn
Dr. Otto Heilbrunn
Civilian AGO No. 30140
Office of the Chief of Counsel
for War Crimes

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

22 July 1947

I, ARTHUR MACMILLERA, No.20191, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages and that the above is a true and correct translation of the document No.NI-7239.

ARTHUR MACMILLERA, No.20191.

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT No. NI-5827
OFFICE OF CHIEF OF COUNSEL FOR WAR CRIMES

Copy

Certified Copy

Negotiated

in this free and Hanseatic city of Hamburg on Friday the 17th (seventeenth) of September, 1926 (nineteen hundred and twenty six).

There appeared before me,

Dr. Frenz Joseph CLASEMANN, notary in Hamburg,

at the Europa-Haus, Alsterdamm 39, the following persons known to me, the notary, personally,

- 1) Otto DOERMER, Justizrat, residing in Opladen,
- 2) Wilhelm HOLM, residing in Wiesdorf,

acting as members of the Vorstand of the Aktiengesellschaft located in Frankfurt on Main known as

"I.G. Farbenindustrie Aktiengesellschaft"

- 3) Ernst HUELSEMAN, residing in Berlin-Charlottenburg,
- 4) Willy SCHMIDT, residing in Hamburg, Voltkestr. 41,

acting as 3 as deputy member of the Vorstand, and 4 as Prokurist (Deputy director) of the Aktiengesellschaft located in Berlin known as "Deutsche Leanderbank Aktiengesellschaft",

- 5) General director Dr. Paul HUELLER, residing in Koeln,
- 6) Director Dr. jur. Rudolf SCHMIDT, residing in Hamburg,

acting as members of the Vorstand of Aktiengesellschaft in Hamburg known as

"Dynamit-Aktien-Gesellschaft formerly Alfred Nobel & Co.,

Hamburg"

(page 2 of original)

and, according to the local commercial register, authorized, collectively, to represent the Aktiengesellschaft and sign on its behalf and made the following statement recorded by me:

(page 2 of original, cont'd)

The following joint-interest-agreement is hereby concluded
between

1. I.G. Farbenindustrie Aktiengesellschaft in Frankfurt a/M.

(hereinafter referred to as I.G.)

2. Deutschen Laenderbank Aktiengesellschaft in Berlin

(hereinafter referred to as Laenderbank),

on the one part, and

3. Dynamit-Aktien-Gesellschaft formerly Alfred Nobel & Co., Hamburg
in Hamburg (hereinafter referred to as D.A.G.),

on the other part.

§ 1.

D.A.G. shall conduct its business in such a manner as to ensure the highest possible benefit for the combine. Prior to effecting transactions which do not fall within the scope of the normal business of its commercial activities the approval of I.G. shall be obtained. Hereby the responsibility of members of the Vorstand and Aufsichtsrat of D.A.G. established by law or agreement shall not be affected.

§ 2.

The preliminary balance of D.A.G. sheets shall be drawn up in accordance with certain rules to be established with I.G.'s consent, with the provision that D.A.G. is authorized to make at least the following deductions for depreciation based on the purchase value.

(page 3 of original)

For apartment houses	3%
For other buildings	5%
For rail ways- super and sub structure	5%
For machines and apparatus	10%
For equipment	10%

(page 3 of original, cont'd)

I.G. shall be credited or debited with the profit or loss shown on these balance sheets as of December 31st of each financial year. Similarly, however, D.A.G. shall be credited by I.G. as of December 31st with an amount, enabling it to pay the same dividend for each nominal 200 Reichsmark of its current common share capital - provided such capital is not exempted from payment of dividends by law or agreement - as that paid by I.G. for each nominal 100 Reichsmark of its own common shares for the same financial year.

Example: If I.G. pays a dividend of 10% for a financial year, D.A.G. must be placed in a position to pay holders of common shares a dividend of 5% for the same financial year.

In addition, similarly as of every 31st of December, I.G. shall credit D.A.G., annually, with the amount necessary to cover the latter's expenditure for profit bonus due, by agreement, to members of the Aufsichtsrat.

If, in any year, after transfer of D.A.G.'s profit or loss, I.G.'s balance-sheets should show a loss, D.A.G. shall be debited with a portion thereof, in the same proportion to the balance-sheet loss remaining debited to I.G., as the dividend sums which would have been calculated for both parties under the above-mentioned provision, had I.G. paid a dividend in that same year.

(page 4 of original)

§ 3.

Should I.G. grant its shareholders, directly or indirectly, the right to subscribe to new shares, in the event of an increase in capital, the Laenderbank will offer I.G. shares to holders of D.A.G. shares - either new issue or equal priority old issue, at the discretion of the Laenderbank - on the same terms, with the provision that I.G. shares of the same nominal value be offered to holders of D.A.G. shares of a nominal value of 200 Reichsmark as are offered to holders of I.G. shares of a nominal value of 100 Reichsmark.

§ 4.

I.G. can, at any time, declare to D.A.G. its intention to absorb all D.A.G. assets by merger in accordance with articles 305, 306 of the commercial code (HGB), by providing I.G. shares with dividend coupons attached for the same period for D.A.G. shares in the proportion of 100 Reichsmark to 200 Reichsmark nominal value respectively. In this case, the Vorstand shall immediately call a general meeting of shareholders to decide on this proposal. Should the general meeting reject the merger although all the shares held by I.G. as konzern property vote in favor of the merger - in so far as they are not precluded from voting by legal regulations - I.G.

(page 4 of original, cont'd)

is entitled to give notice of the termination of the contract as from the end of the current financial year. Furthermore, regardless of whether or not I.G. takes advantage of its right to give notice of the termination of the contract, it is entitled to demand from D.A.G. the transfer of all real estate, buildings, apparatus and participations, which are available at the end of the current business year, or such part of these items as may be determined by and at the discretion of I.G. on the basis of book-values shown in the last balance-sheet.

(page 5 of original)

§ 5.

This agreement is retroactive as of the 1st of January, 1926, and shall terminate on the 31st of December, 2024.

§ 6.

The Laenderbank shall pledge itself directly to the D.A.G. shareholders, as of 1 January 1937, to deliver, at the request of each individual D.A.G. share-holder, against surrender of D.A.G. shares to the value of 200 RM. at par, either old I.G. shares or shares newly issued for that purpose and bearing equal priority, at the discretion of the Laenderbank, to the value of 100 RM. at par. The exchange shall take place within 3 months after receipt of the shareholders declaration by the Laenderbank. If the general meeting of D.A.G. should decide in favor of the merger with I.G. during the exchange period, all requests for exchange not dealt with up to that date will become void.

The individual shareholder shall be entitled to request exchange from the Laenderbank, even should the current contract be declared void for any reason whatsoever, particularly by mutual agreement, or notice of termination including that laid down in § 4, or if the contract should be modified by agreement of the parties. If the contract should be declared void, either by agreement or by notice of termination, the right of exchange shall be forfeited, unless validated within 3 months of the date on which shareholders are called upon in the company's publications to file applications for exchange.

After expiry of the exchange period, D.A.G. shall also be obliged to compensate I.G. for profit due to share-holders, who did not avail themselves of their right of exchange, and had acquired I.G. shares in accordance with § 3 of this agreement, or would have acquired I.G. shares, had

(page 6 of original)

they exercised their rights. This profit shall be assessed at the average daily exchange-rate, quoted at the Berlin Stock exchange for the stock rights of holders of D.A.G. shares in accordance with § 3. Should no such quotation have been made, the average Berlin daily exchange rate quoted

(page 6 of original, cont'd)

for the stock rights of I.G. shares shall be taken as basis for compensation.

Example: I.G. issues new common shares and grants its common-share holders the right to subscribe to new shares either directly or through their banks as intermediaries, in a proportion of 1000 Reichsmark of old common shares at par to 200 Reichsmark of new common shares at par. The average Berlin daily exchange rate of these stock rights for I.G. shares, is assessed at 10% of the value of the shares. D.A.G. must consequently reimburse I.G. with an amount corresponding to 5% of that portion of its common-share capital, which was not offered for exchange before expiry of the exchange period.

§ 7.

D.A.G. shall pledge itself to transfer its participation in the "Adastra" Verwaltungs-Gesellschaft m.b.H. in Hamburg at par to I.G. or to another party to be nominated by I.G. with the proviso that it shall, beforehand, transfer to the "Adastra" Verwaltungs-Gesellschaft m.b.H. the following shares in its possession at their book-value, payment being postponed, interest-free.

- 1) 250,000 Reichsmark (par) of the Deutsche Celluloidfabrik in Eilenburg,
- 2) 200,000 Reichsmark (par) of the Carbonit Aktiengesellschaft, Hamburg,
- 3) 100,000 Reichsmark (par) of preference shares of the Dominitwerke Aktiengesellschaft, Koeln.

(page 7 of original)

§ 8.

The costs arising from this contract shall be born in equal parts by I.G. and D.A.G.

Herewith the above proceedings are recorded, the original of this record to remain with me, after having been read, approved, and signed by the parties and signed and sealed by me, the notary.

(L.S.)
(not)

Otto DOERFER
Wilhelm HOHM
Ernst HUELSMANN
Willy SCHMIDT
Paul MUELLER Dr.
Dr. SCHMIDT
F.J. CRASERLANN Dr.

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT No. NI-5827
CONTINUED

(page 7 of original, cont'd)

This third copy will be issued to the

I.G. Farbenindustrie Aktiengesellschaft
in Frankfurt a/M.

Hamburg, the 24th (twentyfourth) of September, 1926
(one thousand ninehundred and twenty six).

L.S.

Signed: F.J. CRUSEMANN

Duty in accordance with the Duty tariff of
26 Feb. 1926, Article 31, Reichsmark 3.60

The notary:

Signed: C.

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

11 June 1947

I, John FOSBERRY, No. 20179, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant
with the English and German languages and that the above is a true and
correct translation of the document No. NI-5827.

John FOSBERRY
No. 20179

- 6 -
"END"

AFFIDAVIT

I, Dr. Werner HAGERT, living at present in Hilchenbach, Westphalia, Gerberstrasse 168, from 1937 to 1939 employed with the mobilization department of the Economic Group Chemical Industry, after having been warned that I am liable to punishment for false statements, herewith declare voluntarily and without coercion:

1. The dominating position of I.G. Farben Industrie in the world had already been created a generation before the National Socialists came to power. There were two reasons for it: firstly, the superior position of I.G. on the world dye-stuffs market, and secondly, the development of synthetic nitrogen by means of the Haber-Bosch process.

a. In 1904, the most important German dyestuff manufacturers combined into two Interessen-Gemeinschaften, which later amalgamated into the I.G. These firms were:

Badische Anilin & Soda Fabrik, Ludwigshafen,
Farbenfabriken vorm. Friedr. Bayer & Co, Ludwigshafen,
Farbwerke vorm. Meister Lucius & Brüning, Höchst/Main,
Aktiengesellschaft fuer Anilinfabrikation, Berlin,
Leopold Cassella & Co. GmbH., Frankfurt/M.
Kalle & Co. AG., Biebrich.

The consequence of this amalgamation was that the Interessengemeinschaften had a world monopoly for the production of and for the trade in dyestuffs even before 1914. Approximately 90% of all textiles used all over the civilized world and dyed with aniline dyestuffs, e.g. dresses, curtains, etc., had been dyed with dyestuffs produced by the Interessengemeinschaften.

Simultaneously with the development of aniline dyes and because of it, the two Interessengemeinschaften succeeded in achieving a superior position in the sphere of the production of organic intermediates, especially with regard to nitration, amidization, sulphurization, chlorination, etc. of the products resulting from the distillation of coal tar. Other results of these intermediate products are pharmaceuticals and photographic articles which had a secure market all over the world even before the first world war.

(page 2 of original)

b. The dominating position of the Interessengemeinschaft into which the two then existing Interessengemeinschaften had amalgamated in 1916 was increased considerably by the development of the Haber-Bosch process for the production of nitrogen from air. Germany was, as were all other countries, completely dependent on Chile for saltpetre supplies. Under the leadership of I.G., Germany succeeded not only in becoming self-sufficient with regard to saltpetre, but beyond that, in superseding Chile on the world markets. This fact became

(page 2 of original, cont'd)

evidently clear during the second half of the 1930's in the various agreements of I.G. and other European producers with Chile in which Chile's export quota to Germany was limited to approximately 4% of the total German requirements and the predominance of I.G. on the world markets was confirmed.

2. In 1925, the I.G. Farben Industrie Aktiengesellschaft was founded. This company was the biggest combine ever founded in Germany, with a share capital of 1.1 billion Reichsmark in 1926. None of the other industry combines in Germany reached even approximately the figure of this share capital, and the capital of none of the other chemical enterprises in Germany reached even 10 % of this figure. The most important chemical enterprises in Germany outside the I.G. are the following: (Amounts of share capital taken for the year 1926)

Deutsche Solvay Werke AG.	75 Mill.
Deutsche Gold & Silberscheideanstalt	35,6 Mill.
Kali-Chemie	35 "
Schering-Kahlbaum	30 "
Rudgers Werke	27,8 "
Ruhrchemie (1927)	27 "
Mitteldeutsche Stickstoffwerke	20 "

All other chemical enterprises outside the I.G. had still less share capital. The predominant importance of I.G. within the German chemical industry becomes also visible in the following figures: the total amounts of the share capital of 15 chemical enterprises with a share capital of more than 10 million Reichsmark each amounted at that time to 383 millions. Independent of I.G. were 13 of the 15 firms with a total share capital of 323 million Reichsmark. The share capital of

(page 3 of original)

I.G., without the firms dependent on I.G., was, therefore, more than three times as big as that of all the other chemical factories of some importance outside I.G.

3. Before the beginning of the second world war, I.G. was far superior to all other industrial enterprises in Germany with regard to influence and widespread interests.

a. I.G. had, in the area of chemicals, a complete monopoly for the German market, more so than any chemical combine in any other country had ever achieved. I.G. had a complete monopoly on the German dyestuffs market, I.G. and its licensees were the sole producers of synthetic nitrogen in Germany; 90% of Germany's synthetic fuels were produced by I.G. or its licensees; synthetic rubber was produced exclusively by I.G., and 60-70% of all German chemicals including solvents were produced by I.G. For the production of the German production of cellulose wool, the experience gained by I.G. was a decisive factor. Because of its connection with the Dynamit AG. Nobel, I.G. was the biggest combine for the produc-

(page 3 of original, cont'd)

tion of High explosives and gun powder in Germany. German production of cellulose wool, high explosives and gun powder depended to a great extent on the primary products (Vorprodukte) of I.G.

All important chemical syntheses for bulk production came from the laboratories of I.G.: after the synthetic production of nitrogen came the synthetic productions of gasoline, Buna and methanol, the cellulose wool, and it was I.G. which had completed these processes for bulk production.

b. I.G. had 47 works of its own and beyond that 50 oxygen works of its own. I.G. controlled to 100% 70 firms with 32 factories. I.G. controlled to 50-100% a further 119 firms with 106 factories. The I.G. combines, therefore, consisted of 200 factories which were to 50% or more under the control of I.G.

Classified according to their products, the works can be grouped as follows: 26 out of the 47 I.G. works are solely chemical factories, 10 of which produced dyestuffs, pharmaceuticals and certain special products, whereas the remaining 16 factories manufactured basic chemical products. Among the latter were the most important I.G. works, each of which employed more than

(page 4 of original)

5,000 people.

The 200 factories belonging to the I.G. combine produced mainly the following:

Production:	Factories	Production:	Factories:
Basic chemicals	22	closed down	4
Dyestuffs	6	on lease	2
Nitrogen	7		
Special Products	16	<u>Mines:</u>	
Synthetics	12		
Pharmaceuticals	11	Bituminous coal	4
Synthetic gasoline		" " fields	6
and lubricants	3	Soft coal	6
Synthetic rubber	2	" " fields	7
Bituminous tar extracted		Lead	1
by low temperature		Zinc	1
coking.	4	Iron	1
Wax and candles	2	Fluor spar	8
Photographic articles	6	Ponderous spar	2
Rayon, cellulose wool	7	Lime works	3
Metals	2	Gypsum "	4
Light metals	10		
High Explosives, ammunition	56		
Oxygen	16		

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NI-9052
CONTINUED

(page 4 of original, cont'd)

Production:	Factories:	Production:	Factories:
Construction of apparatus and machinery	4		
Others (packing)	7		
Power stations	2		

Of the other companies controlled to more than 50% by I.G., 52 are trading companies (12 of them syndicates), 17 companies for workers' settlements and for workers' assistance, 8 mining companies, 6 companies founded to lease plants, to exploit licenses, or to undertake research, one company for insurance within the combine, one shipping company, etc.

4. The more important shares in other companies held by I.G. are the following:

Firm:	Share Capt. Mill. RM.	Share in per cent	Works:	Main Products:
Ammoniak-Werk, Mers- burg GmbH.	287,875	100		Gasoline, nitrogen Chemicals
Buna Werke GmbH.	100	100		Buna
Chem. Werke Huels GmbH.	120	74		Buna, chemicals
Hydrierwerk Poolitz AG	110	31,25		Gasoline
Brabag AG.	100	13,2	5	"
Dr. A. Wacker GmbH.	40	50	5	Chemicals
Deutsche Solvaywerke AG	75	25	5	Soda, Caustic soda
Kali-Chemie	35	25		Chemicals
Wesag Chemie AG.	25	50		"
Wesag AG.	25	50		High Explosives
Bayr. Stickstoffwerke	25	100		Carbide, Calcium nitra
AG. fuer Stickstoff- duenger	16	100		" " "
Kalle & Co.	20	100		Cellulose derivatives
Deutsche Zelluloid- fabrik Eilenburg	10	100	3	Synthetics
Duisburger Kupfer- huette	12	90,5		Metal Refinery (Me- tallabroestung)

(page 5 of original)

Rheinische Stahlwerke	180	ue. 50		Coal, coke, pure Benzol
A. Riebeck'sche Mon- tanwerke	75	89		Extraction of Bitu- minous tar Soft coal, low tempe- rature tar extrac- tion

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NI-9052
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(page 5 of original, cont'd)

Firm:	Share Capt. Mill. RM.	Share in per cent:	Works:	Main Products:
Dynamit AG. Nobel	47,125	uo.50	30	High explosives and gun powder Synthetics
Genschu & Co. AG.	4,138		4	Gun powder and high explosives
Wolff & Co.	2,5	78,8		High explosives and gun powder
3 Pulverfabriken	8,45	uo.50		" " "
Westf. Leichtmetall- werke GmbH. Nachrodt	30	50		Light metal foil
Metallwerk Michler GmbH Leipzig	2	100		Light metals
Metall-Guss GmbH.	1	100		" "
Deutsche Gasolin AG.	16,5	41		Gasoline sales company
Donau-Chemie AG.	20	98		Chemicals
Chem. Werke Falkenau GmbH.	14	50		"

By acquiring these shares, the dyestuffs combine of 1926 became the German raw materials combine of 1938.

The real estate belonging to I.G., including Louna, Buna Works and mines owned by I.G., covered, according to the Manual of German Companies 1940 (Aktion Handbuch) an area of 140 square kilometers, 20% of which were built up. The works belonging to I.G., including Louna, had, in 1940, altogether 1200 kilometers of its own railway tracks, 13 thousand of its own railway cars and 360 railway locomotives.

5. With regard to technical and financial influence as well as to the extent of its interests and connections, I.G. held the leading position among all German firms. I.G. had a share in more than 400 firms at home and in about 500 abroad. I.G.'s sales combines, research companies and other agencies were represented in every important center of trade and industry of the world. I.G. was a member of all important international chemical trusts, as for example, those for nitrogen, dyestuffs, high explosives, etc. I.G. owned the greatest number of patents in all important spheres of chemical production. I.G.'s share in the construction projects of the Four Year Plan was by far bigger than that of any other German firm.

I have read each of the 6 (six) pages and signed them with my own hand, have made the necessary corrections in my own handwriting and countersigned them with my initials, and herewith declare under oath that I have stated, in this affidavit,

(page 6 of original)

the full truth according to my best knowledge and belief.

(signature) Dr. jur. Werner HAGERT
Dr. Werner HAGERT

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NI-9052
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(page 6 of original, cont'd)

Sworn to and signed before me this 26th day of July 1947 at the
Palace of Justice, Nurnberg, Germany, by Dr. Werner HAGERT, known
to me to be the person making the above affidavit.

(signature) Otto HEILBRUNN
Dr. Otto HEILBRUNN
ETO 30140
Office of Chief of Counsel
for War Crimes
US War Department.

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

29 July 1947

I, Walter K. GALEWSKI, ETO 20145, hereby certify that I am thoroughly
conversant with the English and German languages and that the above
is a true and correct translation of the document No. NI-9052.

Walter K. GALEWSKI
ETO 20145

- 6 -
"END"

A F F I D A V I T

I, GEORG VON SCHNITZLER, member of the Vorstand of I.G. Farbenindustrie from 1925 until 1945, after having been warned that I will be liable to punishment for making a false statement herewith state the following under oath of my own free will and without coercion.

1. In the first four paragraphs of my affidavit of 4 March 1947, which I swore to before representatives of the Office of Chief of Counsel for War Crimes, I have stated the true circumstances under which I gave information, by means of statements and interrogations, concerning the I.G. Farbenindustrie and other matters to Allied investigators in 1945. These four paragraphs should also be considered as an introduction to this affidavit. Below I consider further statements or interrogations which I subscribed to during 1945, and which I have been shown and which I have re-read between 18 February 1947 and the present time. When I subscribed to these statements or interrogations in 1945, the matters to which I subscribed were true to the best of my knowledge and belief at that time. The errors I now find after re-reading these documents are set forth below after the text of the respective statement or interrogation.

2. On 21 August 1945, I signed a two page statement principally concerning I.G. and the chemical industry of Germany and of Europe generally, the text of which follows :

"When one tries to compare the I.G. with the rest of the chemical industries of Germany, one should never forget that the mother houses of I.G. which constituted the merger in 1925 themselves were by far the biggest enterprises in the chemical domain in Germany. After the revaluation of the mark in 1923 and 1924, the three greatest of the I.G. firms, Badische, Bayer, Hoechst each had a share capital of 150,000,000 marks and by capital turnover, earning capacity, or by whatever aspect is being taken were each at least three to four times bigger in size than anyone of the other chemical firms. It has always been characteristic for the German chemical industry that there was on one side this huge agglomeration of industrial power called I.G. and on the other hand an extremely great number of small enterprises split over the whole country. Wigras-Chemie gathered four thousand firms and very few of them had a turnover of more than RM 1,000,000. I.G., at the top of her activity, showed a turnover of three billion marks and their subsidiaries including Dynamit A.G. had a turnover of another billion marks. Of this latter billion marks, of course half at least can be considered as typical armament business without importance for peace time. Compared with this, three and one-half or

(signed) G v Schnitzler

four billion marks, the next one on the list, the so-called Henckel concern of Dusseldorf, manufacturers of soap and other washing products, figures only with a turnover of somewhat two hundred million marks and this gives a true picture of how outstanding I.G.'s position was. As a third firm, the Deutsch Solvay Werke and Schering A.G. of Berlin in fourth place has a turnover of between one hundred and two hundred million marks and that probably closes the list of the combines with over one hundred million marks of yearly turnover. Altogether the German chemical industry in the top year of 1943 including Austria and Sudetenland might have had a turnover of approximately ten billion marks. But if one only compares the six and the four billion, one is far from a true picture of what the potential of I.G. in relation to the combined total of the other German firms represented. Not only that new inventions of outstanding importance practically were alone made by I.G. and that research work on a large scale was exclusively done by I.G., the real importance of I.G. in her qualities as a supplier of all basic products to the other chemical industries was even much higher. Entire groups of chemistry like the varnish and the lacquer industry and dyestuffs and solvents were entirely dependent on I.G. and in the pharmaceutical domain even firms like S&Böhring and Hoeck also possessing a big share in the pharmaceutical business of finished products depended on I.G. in her basic organic products like aniline and the different derivatives of acetic acid. It has once been made an analysis which part I.G. had in the pharmaceutical business and as a test case one had analysed the turnover of two Krankenkassen in different parts of Germany. The analysis only showed a share of I.G. of somewhat as 20%, but on the one hand the Kassen did not take articles with a standard name like Aspirin, buying as little as possible and trying to place their orders in the market of the products without the special brand of a firm so that practically I.G.'s share will have to be much bigger (but it must not be forgotten that practically all pharmaceutical products as before said are based on raw materials and intermediates bought from I.G.). It is not exaggerated to make this statement that the entire pharmaceutical industry literally would come to a standstill if I.G. would stop production. The same applies to the entire textile industry which reposes on I.G. for dyestuffs and all kinds of auxiliary products including the cleansing and wetting process.

vs. There is only the soap industry, properly speaking, which to a large extent is self-supporting on their own basis and then of course Solvay and the other less important producers of carbonate of soda and chlorine and caustic soda

To summarize I may give some samples of I.G.'s relative share in the different key domains of chemistry: dyestuffs - 100%; auxiliary products at least 50%, probably in pharmaceuticals at least 1/3, the other 2/3 all depend on the supply of basic organic products through I.G.; nitrogen, before the war - 70%; general chemicals apart from I.G.'s own consumption

(page 2 of original)

between 20% and 80%; photographic articles - 80%; carbides at least 80%; brass - 100%; plastics, etc., modern thermoplastics made by polymerization - 100%, the old products, phenoplast 30-50%; light metals, magnesium at least 90%; only one small producer apart from I.G., Wintershall, aluminum only, a modest participation. Thus from whatever angle one takes up the problem, I.G. has the key position as producer in the whole range in inorganic and aromatic organic products and a walkover position in the aliphatic field. This taken together with the overwhelming position I.G. has in the field of photographic products and the strong majority in nitrogen, one has to make the statement that chemistry in Germany and I.G. is to a great extent synonymous. But it does not cover the entire position of I.G. in the chemical field, if one does not analyse the interconnection between the German chemistry and that of the neighboring countries. None of these countries including France is self-supporting in such a sense that

(signed) G v Schnitzler

they under normal economic circumstances can get rid of I.G.'s supplies and the intercourse with her. Not only the textile industry of Scandinavia, Holland, France, Czechoslovakia can be separated from the supply of dyestuffs, auxiliaries, etc., from I.G., but also the chemical industry of these countries is closely related to her and it is fairly unimaginable that for instance Holland, Belgium, and Scandinavia will renounce to any intercourse with the I.G.'s chemical works located on the borders of the Rhine River. Also the pharmaceutical products of "Bayer" can not be thought away from a Belgian or Dutch or Swedish dispensary. Even in France where a much stronger chemical industry exists than in the aforementioned other countries, I.G.'s products as well as I.G.'s licenses will be in many important domains and as well the Kuhlman group as Rhone Poulenc will be only too glad to resume these relations. I can not imagine that England or United States can entirely replace this position which had been held for such a long time and which is based upon scientific and business relations as well as the reciprocal knowledge of the language. After World War I, relations with Holland were being resumed at once, with Belgium after a very short interval, and with France in a slowly climbing tendency up to 1927 when Germany became the first industrial supplier of France and this without competing against the domestic industry in France. The business done in these countries by I.G. was not directed against the English and American importation, which only partly materialized in the same fields and which as far as the English were concerned were mostly protected by cartel agreements. Speaking generally of exports, I.G.'s share in the export of German chemical industries can be considered as being the half of the total export. Exact figures were never available because the official figures did not always coincide with the figures made up by the individual firms and as the handling of turnover figures of subsidiaries of I.G. was not identical in the official way compared with the handling inside of I.G.

G. von Schnitzler."

This statement still appears to me to be entirely true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief, except that in the second paragraph, page one, I exaggerated the importance of the dependence of the other German pharmaceutical firms upon I.G. I.G. did have at least a one-third share of the German pharmaceutical interest, but balance of the German pharmaceutical industry did not all depend on I.G. to supply the basic organic products. I really am not able to make an accurate estimate of the dependence of other pharmaceutical plants upon organic products produced by I.G.

2. On 9 August 1945, I signed a one page statement concerning I.G.'s investment and amortization policy, the text of which follows:

"Whenever the I.G. had to make substantial investments for the Wehrmacht's needs and wanted to take the whole risk upon her own shoulders or was compelled to do so, then of course in the agreements, she always endeavored, and to the best of my knowledge, succeeded in getting the high amortizations necessary to write the factories off in the shortest possible time. Apart from the amortization, I.G., tried to get protection of

(signed) G v Schnitzler

such a kind that the product in question should not be replaced by other products in the event of a change in market conditions. The normal amortizations for I.G. installations were calculated at 5 percent for buildings and 10 percent for equipment. In installations for Wehrmacht purposes, we tried to get higher percentages, and for example, in the case of Alken Leichmetal in Aken, we succeeded in getting 15 percent on the equipment, which meant that in the seventh year the whole equipment was written off. Protection was asked and granted for buna in such a way that for the import of natural rubber, a sliding scale was fixed that the consumer always had to pay as much duty for the imported rubber to the Reich as to cover the difference between the price paid for natural rubber "CIP" Hamburg, and the prices fixed by the government for buna. This price for buna was from time to time modified and continuously lowered with the progressive production and the higher efficiency of I.G. processes.

I think the last price for buna has been something like 2 marks 30 pfennings (2.30) per kilogram weight (KG), but it was hoped that it would go down further to 1 mark, 90 pfennings (1.90) per kilogram weight or to 1 mark, 80 pfennings (1.80) per kilogram weight. A similar scheme was fixed for the importation of natural oil, and the last price basis which I can recollect should be 22 pfennings per kilogram weight, as compared with 7 pfennings per kilogram weight "CIP" Hamburg.

- vs. In the field of synthetic fibre a number of regulations of the textile industry made secure that the production of synthetic fibre which, if I am not mistaken, went to three hundred thousand tons per year, would be consumed.

The so-called Ost Steuer Hilfe permitted equipment to be immediately written off by 80 percent, and I believe 20 percent for the plant. Thus I.G. was able to amortize the two great factories at Auschwitz and Heydebrück to almost half the cost value, and these works never had, up to the end of the war, been in full production. Of course, this provision was only granted when the profit of the total enterprise was sufficient to pay the normal taxes on it.

I have read this statement and swear that the facts stated therein are true.

G. v. Schnitzler."

This statement still appears to me to be entirely true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief. Of course, I can be mistaken on certain percentages, but the general idea I wanted to demonstrate is absolutely clear from this statement. Dr. Fritz ter Meer, aided by Dr. Buhl, represented I.G. in the negotiations with the Reich Government which resulted in the tax on natural rubber which was equal to the difference in the cost between natural rubber and buna. Dr. Heinrich Büttfisch and Dr. Ernst Fischer represented I.G. for the same purpose with respect to a tax on natural oil equal to the difference in the cost between natural oil and synthetic oil. In securing the government regulations to secure the

(signed) G v Schnitzler

consumption of synthetic fibers, I.G. was represented by Dr. Fritz Gajewski and Mr. Wilhelm Otto.

3. On 18 August 1945, I signed a two page record of interrogation principally concerning the Wirtschaftsgruppe Chemie, the text of which follows :

"Q. When was the Wirtschaftsgruppe Chemie organized?

A. The Wirtschaftsgruppe Chemie was organized in 1933. It grew out of a private association of the chemical concerns which was a very old organization. However, in 1933 it became a semi-official organization and its functions were to advise the government on policy matters in the chemical industries.

Q. What was your position in the Wirtschaftsgruppe Chemie?

A. In the Wirtschaftsgruppe Chemie I was member of the "engerer Beirat", (the inner Board) since 1933.

Q. What official position did you held?

A. I was deputy chairman of the Wirtschaftsgruppe Chemie which was a component of the "Reichsgruppe Industrie."

Q. Who appointed you deputy chairman of the Wirtschaftsgruppe Chemie?

A. In so far as I can remember the chairman of the Wirtschaftsgruppe Chemie was appointed by the Ministry of Economics. I think I was appointed by the chairman of the Wirtschaftsgruppe Chemie as his deputy. Of course, my appointment could not have been made without the consent of the Ministry of Economics.

Q. Who was the manager of the Wirtschaftsgruppe Chemie?

A. Dr. Ungewitter.

Q. Who was Dr. Ungewitter appointed by?

A. Dr. Ungewitter was formerly in the Verein the manager of the Wirtschaftsgruppe Chemie and then, of course, he was appointed by the Ministry of Economics.

Q. Who paid the salaries?

A. The Wirtschaftsgruppe.

Q. How did the Wirtschaftsgruppe get its money?

A. In the form of an "Umlage" on account of the chemical firms based on the totality of wages and the number of employees. Membership in the Wirtschaftsgruppe was compulsory.

Q. In regard to important steps or decisions to be made by the Wirtschaftsgruppe were you informed?

A. Yes. When important steps were to be taken the leader convoked the "engerer Beirat".

(signed) G v Schnitzler

- Q. Can you give me an example of a policy decision made by the Wirtschaftsgruppe Chemie?
- A. The two most important things the Wirtschaftsgruppe Chemie has done were: Firstly the Z.A.V., the "Umlage" of the Z.A.V. on the industry. That was in 1934 or 1935, and secondly during the war it handled the question of the statements of the excess profits from the standpoint of the price commissars.

(page 2 of original)

- Q. What were the "Mob" plans?
- A. The Wirtschaftsgruppe or its different affiliations had the function to control the entire production in the chemical field and to prepare the distribution of the available and the needed commodities. This was done for every important product of the chemical industry. I remember that the most important commodities figures on a special list which was particularly supervised by Dr. Ungewitter personally. The production plans of the different branches of the chemical industry could only be made up in accordance with the prescription of Dr. Ungewitter. Dr. Ungewitter in his person united different functions.
- Q. Can you give us the history of the development of the production plans for war, i.e. the "Mob" plans?
- A. From the very beginning of the Nazi regime the Wirtschaftsgruppe was charged with semi-official functions in order to prepare an eventual German mobilization for war. In this connection they made an analysis of every chemical firm in Germany what their producing capacity was and what they had in stock, etc. For the so-called great commodities a production plan has been made up and the distribution for the needs of an eventual war was prepared. Representatives of the Wirtschaftsgruppe, that means officials, acted in close collaboration with the Ministry of Economics and the Ministry of War to collect that material and got from the different firms these plans which he did approve or disapprove. With the beginning of the war the long prepared system was put into action and functioned with the greatest accuracy. No firm was allowed to go beyond the production plans fixed beforehand and the commodities used for their manufacturing were strictly controlled. Thus Wirtschaftsgruppe and the other affiliations were from the first beginning an instrument which served as an intermediary between the Ministries of Economics and War and the individual firms.
- Q. When was the order putting the plans into action issued?
- A. All the German industries were mobilized in summer 1939 and in summer 1939 the Wirtschaftsgruppe Chemie issued an order that the plans for war were in action. In June or July 1939 I.G. and all heavy industries as well knew that Hitler had decided to invade Poland if Poland would not accept his demands. Of this we were absolutely certain and in June or July 1939 German industry was completely mobilized for the invasion of Poland.

G. von Schnitzler."

(signed) G v Schnitzler

The statements made in this record of interrogation still appear to me to be entirely true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief, except that my last answer in this interrogation should be qualified by the explanation of Ungewitter's statement to me in June or July 1939 which I have previously given in paragraph 5 of my affidavit of 18 March 1945, where I discuss together two statements I signed on 28 August 1945.

4. On 21 July 1945, I subscribed to a five page record of interrogation principally concerning the Mob-Fragen (Mobilization Questions), the text of which follows :

"Q. What was the M-question?

A. The M-question contained everything with regard to personnel questions connected with the war.

Q. Will you please explain it?

A. For instance, it started in the year 1940, that the Reich permitted that the years 1906 and 1907, if they were occupied in a "wehrwichtige" organization, could stay with their firms. Later on from time to time, the question how far one could ask people to be what we call uk = unabkömmlich, free from army service, was dealt with. Then it contained the regulations to the Wehrmacht, generally spoken but not "Abwehr" questions - sometimes Abwehrfragen too - (i.e. C.I.C.) not active but the passive defense against enemy espionage), the inner organization of army questions as far as of interest to us, which ministry was competent for what purposes, always only as far as the commercial side of the problem was concerned.

Q. What does "I." mean?

A. "I" is an abbreviation of "Mobilmachung" (Even I had a yellow slip stating that in case of Mobilmachung to be at the disposal of I.G.)

Q. In respect to I.G. "I" meant what I.G. must do in regard to the war programme?

A. But mostly from the standpoint of organization and to put people into disposition for military authorities. For example, we would not have discussed the erection of a new magnesium plant under "I" questions.

Q. What kind of discussion would you consider that? -----

A. That would be a separate point of business at the same time of military interest. Under "I" we did not take altogether what has to be done and should have to be done in connection with war but mostly the personal side.

Q. Were espionage questions "I" questions?

A. Yes, as well as counter-espionage. Generally the circle was too great in the Kaufmännische Ausschuss. We would have not spoken of things like that.

(signed) G v Schnitzler

Q. To whom would you speak about things like that?

A. Only between 2 or 3 men.

Q. Which men?

A. Possibly I and Ilgner, Kugler and Frank Fahle. I with von Heider or Kugler, the three of us, Ilgner, Frank-Fahle and I have made statements for Mr. Glaser as regards the relation to the Wehrmacht.

Q. In regard to the actual military phases you and Fahle and Kugler and Ilgner discussed those?

A. If they came up.

Q. Did they ever come up?

(page 2 of original)

A. Yes. For example, the discussions which we had with officials of the so-called Kanaris staff.

Q. What is that?

A. The Kanaris staff was the head of the Intelligence Department of the Wehrmacht. The men I know in this staff were Oberst Piopenbrock and Major Blech.

Q. What did you discuss with them?

A. They were interested to get news of an economic character out of neutral and axis countries.

Q. They were not interested in getting news from enemy countries?

A. They were of course interested.

Q. Did they speak to you?

A. Yes. They applied for our help to get news out of neutral and axis countries eventually.

Q. They were speaking about countries hostile to Germany. Did they ask for news in regard to those?

A. Not from me.

Q. From whom did they ask information?

A. I can't tell you.

Q. Don't you want to tell us or you don't know?

A. I don't know it.

Q. Whom did they ask in regard to the U.S.? Who made reports on U.S. production?

A. If for instance Col. Piopenbrock would have asked me what I know of U.S. - before 1937 of course I would have told him.

(signed) G v Schnitzler

Q. Did he ask any other I.G. officials?

A. We never spoke with one another. All was under strictest secrecy, when we had to deal with these matters.

Q. Is it not true that before the invasion of France, I.G. officials sat down with the Wehrmacht and planned the invasion in respect of the matters which I.G. knew?

A. I remember in the first years of the war I was once to visit a department of the Wehrmacht, head was an Oberst Becker, and he asked me what I knew of the different plants of the Imperial Chemical Industries.

Q. When was this?

A. In the first years of the war, 1939/1940. I would not call that a sort of espionage or whatever it is.

Q. Prior to the invasion of each country that Hitler attacked, I.G. officials were called in by the Wehrmacht and planned the part of the military attack with which I.G.

A. I am sure they have asked what we knew about the factories, say of I.C.I. in England.

Q. Whom did they ask?

A. Different people.

Q. Did they ask you?

(page 3 of original)

A. I can remember only as far as England is concerned. There was only an occasion in Berlin when Oberst Becker showed me a map of England which was much more complete than my knowledge. He asked me whether I knew something of the British Magnesium plant in Coventry. I said no. I have never been there.

Q. Who else were called for to give this information?

A. They asked most technical people of I.G. All these people who were technicians and specialists in the chemical field, and then our Volkswirtschaftliche Abteilung under Dr. Reithinger in Berlin which belonged to Ilgner's organization did a lot of work for the Wehrmacht as well as for the government. They succeeded in getting so many men free of military service only on account of the work they made.

Q. I show you a biography of the Aussigen-Hayden Company. Is that an example of the type of report about which you are speaking?

A. Yes. The ministries, the foreign office, etcetera based their knowledge on these biographies.

Q. In regard to the purely military aspects of the campaign against France, Russia, etcetera, didn't I.G. experts sit down with members of the Wehrmacht and plan the chemical aspects of that campaign?

A. Not to my knowledge. I know we made up these biographies as correct as possible and, of course, we made them for ourselves and we made them at the same time for the Wehrmacht and the ministries.

(signed) G v Schnitzler

Q. When did you begin to make them?

A. This department is nearly over 10 years old.

Q. Is it not true that prior to an invasion and in planning that invasion, I.G. experts and technicians were called in to assist the Wehrmacht on the purely military aspects? And to locate the plants, to be exactly informed where the plants were located, for example?

A. For all European countries they made up plans. Every plant of chemical interest was indicated in a complete map.

Q. Prior to the attacks on France, Russia, etcetera, did I.G. experts and technicians assist the Wehrmacht in making its plans?

A. I don't think so. I never heard it. I know that technicians helped the Wehrmacht to prepare a map. I object to "prior to an attack".

(page 4 of original)

Q. Before they attacked France, they sat down and made out their military plans, in Holland, Belgium and all the conquered countries? Isn't it true that before these plans were carried out, I.G. officials and technicians sat down with the Wehrmacht and planned these campaigns insofar as they touched the chemical industry?

A. I am sure that they asked our technicians about any and every chemical installations and factories, whatever is fabricated in those countries, but if they sat together with technical people of ours to make real plans what has to be destroyed, that I can't tell you.

Q. Who would know that?

A. A lot of our technical people could tell you. You must ask Tordoff and Butefisch, Schneider, and Gajewsky perhaps, then Wurster and Muller-Gunradi, he is an expert on all kinds of nitrogen.

Q. Isn't true that by the M-plans I.G. meant every aspect which was of military nature?

A. Yes, this is absolutely true.

Q. Under what heading would they discuss it?

A. They have had fancy names.

Q. So that in its commercial meetings the military methods were discussed under the heading "M"? In regard to the other committee, like the technical committee, what were the military plans known as?

A. I think they called it also "M" questions.

Q. So I.G. at all times, since the beginning of Hitler's wars, had a separate section which was called the "M" section or some other letter section?

A. You know in Berlin the Vermittlungsstelle W. It is rather complicated. We had to centralize our commercial activities as far as this domain is concerned at Berlin. In the commercial field, H. Fragen/handled partly by Volkswirtschaft A.B.T. and partly by Frank-Fahle. Under H. Fragen, were discussed the military domain, personal defense against

(signed) G v Schnitzler

espionage, eventual working in neutral countries. With the technical people, it was more complicated because they did not have that unification. They had in Berlin an organization which they called Vermittlungsstelle W. They dealt through this Vermittlungsstelle W. with the different departments, etc. of the Wehrmacht. It seemed that the 3 Sparten inside I.G. never were in full agreement about this Vermittlungsstelle and so Sparten I made use of Vermittlungsstelle W. and did it only partly, and Dr. Gajewsky of Sparte III

(page 5 of original)

did not want to have to deal with the Vermittlungsstelle W. and did it on his own. So, for instance, say when it came to Agfa film of highest value in competition with Kodak, Gajewsky dealt those questions personally with the Wehrmacht and did not go through the Vermittlungsstelle. I think they used different names on the technical side of I.G. It was not so concentrated as on the commercial. The man for the Vermittlungsstelle in Frankfurt who was the superior of 3 or 4 chemists, is Dr. Struss. He did that for Dr. Ter Meer. Of course, they were in constant contact with the different military authorities. For example: When Russia was invaded, a staff of chemists was kept together - of Buna chemists - to be at once on the spot. They were sitting there. And then when the farthest point was reached, near Kaluga or so, there in a team they found a great Buna plant and they were able to stay there for 6 hours and they came back with the impression that the Russians were able to make buna in alcohol, not as we do from carbide. Under that heading our technicians would for instance, have called this buna action for Russia, I don't know. I think that goes much further than "I" questions.

Q. Isn't it true that I.G. maintained, in regard to the chemical industry, its own warfare planning section which was of service to the Wehrmacht and used by the Wehrmacht in a commercial sense, in an economic sense, in the technical sense and in a military sense, whether it was known under the name "I" or by some other letter it devoted itself to all military matters, and it handled military matters?

A. That is true.

Q. When was the "I" plan founded?

A. I think the real "I" plan in such a way, was only founded when war broke out, I think in September, 1939, and then very quickly.

"I have read the record of this interrogation and swear that the answers therein given by me to the questions of Mr. Weissbrodt and Mr. Devine, are true".

G. von Schnitzler
(signature)

Vorstandsmitglied I.G. Farben-
industrie Aktiengesellschaft
Position in I.G. Farben "

The statements in this record of interrogation still seem to me to be entirely true to the best of my knowledge and belief, except that the last answer needs amplification. When I answered that "the real "I" plan" was founded when the

(signed) G v Schnitzler

war broke out, I was not referring to the mobilization plans of the Wirtschaftsgruppe or of the Government, but only to the mobilization plans of the Vermittlungsstelle W.

5. In paragraphs six through ten below, are contained records of interrogations which I subscribed to between July and September 1945, which involve Vermittlungsstelle W (V/W) among other things. On my statements on V/W, I would like to point out the following. I am certain that if I had been in seclusion during the entire period of the last one and a half years and would be asked the same questions today, then I would make those statements exactly in the same words as I did in the summer of 1945. But having been together with my technical colleagues in Gransberg, having received so much information from them and having Dr. Fritz Ter Meer's statement of 30 March 1946 concerning V/W at hand, I must now make certain corrections on the basis of this information from my technical colleagues and state that I perhaps made V/W more important than it really was. On the other hand I have no explanation myself for the fact that one of I.G.'s first technical men, Prof. Dr. Karl Krauch, was made head of this section if it were so unimportant as my technical colleagues say. I must thus answer that I have no explanation, because in my own field or domain I would never have put one of my first men on an unimportant job. Not only was Krauch placed to head V/W when it was created, but when Krauch was transferred to other jobs, he was succeeded as the head of V/W by Gustav ^{von} Brüning, who was considered a first grade technician and one of I.G.'s future factory leaders. From what my technical colleagues have told me since 1945, I think that I have not put sufficiently in the foreground V/W's function as an intermediary between I.G. and the Wehrmacht. Moreover, in these interrogations the distinction between rearmament and autarchy, always a difficult distinction to establish, is not sufficiently shown.

6. On 25 July 1945, I subscribed to a two page record of interrogation which principally concerned the "Mob Fragen", the text of which follows :
(signed) G v Schnitzler

VS. "Q. In our discussions relative to H. Fragen, you told us a little about the relations between I.G. and the Wehrmacht in regard to military matters. Can you give us more details in regard to this?

A. Yes. Just now I wanted to tell you that the VOMI, after war had begun, was practically working more for general staff of the Wehrmacht. That they did was more interesting for us, but in the main they worked directly for the Wehrmacht. I think the Chief, Mr. Reithinger, a well known economist, was sworn in by the Wehrmacht.

Q. Would you say that Mr. Ilgner knew it?

A. He was ill at the time.

Q. Would you say that he knew it? When he came back was he informed of it?

A. I should say so. Ilgner became ill in the winter before the war -- the winter of 1938-39. He was a long time ill. His deputy was Dr. Kruger, and he was an official in OKW. (Oberkommando Wehrmacht).

Q. Isn't it a fact that Reithinger was preparing his bombing surveys for the Wehrmacht before the outbreak of war?

VS. A. I can't tell you when the OKW began to take a keen interest in Mr. Reithinger's work. I think this was an independent development and it grew more and more important and of course during the war it took a typically war trend.

VS. Q. But before the Nazi programs of aggressions these surveys contained fragmentary commercial information. They were more or less balance sheets, and it was on I.G.'s initiative that they began to contain more and more information which could be useful for military purposes, and it was on Mr. Reithinger's and Mr. Ilgner's initiative that the Wehrmacht became convinced that these I.G. surveys could be very useful for purely military purposes?

A. I would say that you were right. The Wehrmacht got these reports. The interest of the Wehrmacht was aroused and then Mr. Reithinger developed them and followed the suggestions of the Wehrmacht. What I know in effect was that practically the whole VOMI was under the initiative of the OKW, and given a draft exempt status.

Q. The inference, or conclusion, you draw from their draft status is that the VOMI was officially recognized?

VS. A. For the Foreign Office just as well. The military value of the VOMI was officially recognized.

Q. The Vermittlungstelle W was organized in 1933, soon after Hitler came into power. Is that right?

A. I am not sure about the date.

Q. But you are sure that it was organized by I.G. after Hitler came into power?

A. I am sure -- yes.

Q. How many groups comprised the Vermittlungstelle W?

(signed) G v Schnitzler

A. Only group 2 worked on Vermittlungstelle W matters. Later on Group 1 joined to a certain extent.

Q. What was the function of Group 2 of the Vermittlungstelle W?

A. All negotiations with military and quasi military authorities for questions (secret questions) regarding the four-year plan and rearmament.

Q. Isn't it true that soon after it was established Group 2 began to prepare plans for the Chemical industry in the case of war?

A. I see it so that the Vermittlungstelle W was a consequence of the rearmament plan.

(page 2 of original)

Q. But one of the functions of Group 2 as a consequence of the Hitler military plan was to prepare plans for the Chemical Industry in the case of war?

vs. A. The V.W. did not prepare. As its name implies, it means that it should be an intermediary between the military and the I.G. and the leading men in ^{the} factories.

Q. Did you know that Group 2 of the V.W. was requested by the Wehrmacht in 1933 to prepare plans for the Chemical industry in the case of war?

A. I don't think that is probable.

Q. If that is true, Mr. Struss or Mr. ter Meer would know it?

A. Yes.

Q. In 1933, I.G. prepared what they called war games to enable the Luftwaffe to practice bombing of industrial establishments. Is that right?

vs. A. I can only tell you what I know about these things. Of course when the new plants were erected which were considered as safe from the military standpoint, there was a close contact between the different military authorities. As an example, I might recite when the ~~chemical~~ ^{magnesium} factories were erected at Aachen (1935), the man responsible there in Bitterfeld with representatives of the Luftwaffe made a tour in the airplane around that country and the General of the Luftwaffe in charge of the problem did not find the place in Aachen. He said, "If I, an expert, cannot find the place in Aachen I think you have chosen the right spot." All plans were made with the military authorities that any place chosen from a military standpoint would be as secure as possible.

Q. I am speaking of plans made to assist the Luftwaffe in its bombing, to prove its bombing technique in case of war.

A. I am sure that they did because for example this magnesium plant was to a large extent meant for incendiary bombs. That was very clear.

(signed) G v Schnitzler

Q. Did Mr. Struss or Mr. ter Meer tell you in 1933, or did you learn in any other way, that I.G. was engaged in these so-called Kriegsspiele?

A. The word came that I.G. was engaged in war plant games. It can be possible that inside the Group I they used the word Kriegsspiele to refer to that. In 1932 our expenses for new plants were very low, about 10 or 12 million marks. And then it climbed slowly. In 1933 or 1934 what has been spent or planned, I am not so sure, it was not of so great importance. In 1935 it started and of course it grew and climbed tremendously.

I have read the record of this interrogation and swear that the answers therein given by me to the questions of Mr. Weissbrodt and Mr. Devine are true.

G. von Schnitzler
(Signature)

Vorstandsmitglied I.G.
Farbenindustrie Aktien-Gesellschaft
(Position in I.G. Farben)

The statements I subscribed to in this record of interrogation still appear to me to be entirely true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief, except that:

(a) This record of interrogation should be considered along with paragraph 5, above, of this affidavit.

(b) My technical colleagues have informed me since 1945 that V/T was originally established to concern itself with questions arising under the High Treason clauses of the penal code which punished every unauthorized bringing of industrial secrets to foreign countries.

(c) V/T did not act as intermediary between I.G. and the Government in working out materials for mobilization questions (M-Fragen), as one might deduce from this interrogation. The plants, Sparten, and the TEA dealt directly with the Wirtschaftsgruppe Chemie on this matter.

(d) Page 2, fourth answer, lines 4 and 5, "Auch..." should be "Aber".

7. In August 1945 I subscribed to a three page record of interrogation of both Dr. Max Ilgner and me which was held on the morning of 4 August 1945, the text of which follows:

"Q. When were the first discussions held with the Wehrmacht in regard to the establishment of the Vermittlungsstelle?"

(signed) G v Schnitzler

- A. (Ilgnor) I don't know exactly. The first negotiations were made by Krauch and Solck.
- Q. (Von Schnitzler) I think it was in the year 1933 or 1934, but I am not quite sure. Struss should know.
- Q. What was the gist of these discussions and what was the basis of the establishment of the Vermittlungsstelle W. Why should the Wehrmacht have come to I.G. in 1933 or 1934 for the establishment of a military office in the I.G.?
- A. (Von Schnitzler) I think there were some chemists put into this Vermittlungsstelle W. and they were in constant contact with the Wehrmacht for the reason that the works of I.G. were spread over the whole of Germany.
- (Ilgnor) One of the reasons was that the Wehrmacht prevented us from exporting our technical know how and patents.
- Q. So that in your opinion, Mr. Ilgnor, one of the reasons the Vermittlungsstelle W. was first set up was in order to prevent I.G. from giving out to other countries its experiences, know how, patents, whenever the Wehrmacht felt that it should not go out?
- A. (Ilgnor) This is what I always felt. Yes.
- (Von Schnitzler) This was a part of it, and the other part was its relationships to the Wehrmacht in the whole field of re-armament. As I said at another hearing, it was mostly all Sparte II. Sparte III wanted to conduct its own affairs.
- Q. What was the function of Sparte III?
- A. (Von Schnitzler) This was the whole cellulose chemistry field. That means rayons, textiles and synthetic fibres and also the photographic field.
- Q. So that, since 1934, the Wehrmacht and I.G. were on a war basis in the chemical field. Is that right?
- A. (Von Schnitzler) That is saying too much. Because the German Government considered itself as having left the League of Nations in Geneva. The German nation considered itself free of international obligations. I understood it with others when the Wehrmacht began warfare developments again, lots of questions did arise in the domain of chemical warfare in the large sense, such as munitions and the light metal field, acids and oils. The questions arose as to how far one was technically to take over synthetic rubber. All these questions became of interest for the Wehrmacht, which got in contact with I.G. It seemed to me that the questions and dealings were so many that for this purpose, the technical leaders of I.G. thought it advisable that they put some man in Berlin, who was in closest continuous contact with the Wehrmacht.
- (Ilgnor) Technical people handled things on their own, so how the Vermittlungsstelle W. originated, in my opinion, can only be told by those technical men who made the negotiations, and the name of one of the men was Krauch. I think Solck must also be informed on this too, as I know he had to handle the organization of the Vermittlungsstelle W. So, it is a matter of fact that if such arrangements were made, with the authorities, it could happen that the commercial men were not told at all.

(signed) G v Schnitzler

Q. Did you know, Mr. Ilgner, that the Vermittlungsstelle W. had been established?

A. Yes, certainly. It was directed against my organization.

Q. Why was it directed against your organization. What was your organization doing that made them organize the Vermittlungsstelle W., to combat your organization?

A. (Ilgner) Well they didn't want my organization to become bigger.

Q. Did they feel that if they didn't do it, you would do it?

(page 2 of original)

A. They didn't want my organization to handle these questions at all because they were technical matters, and they wanted to handle it by a special technical organization.

Q. Was your organization prepared to handle the technical matters?

A. No, they were not prepared for that. They were afraid that the Vermittlungsstelle W. would be made a part of my organization, and they wanted their own organization, and therefore my organization had to keep our hands out of the pie.

Q. Did you indicate to them that you would take them over?

A. No.

Q. Then, how did you know that they were afraid of your organization taking over?

A. Because Salek told me this personally.

Q. When?

A. When I came back after my far eastern trip in the fall of 1935.

Q. Did you ever make any attempts to get the Vermittlungsstelle W. within your organization?

A. Yes. When I heard it, I said to Mr. Salek that I think it is stupid that you have in Berlin an organization with all the central departments and now you organize other departments. My organization was the central organization in Berlin, and therefore it seems appropriate to me that all centralized affairs should be part of my organizations, and that the Vermittlungsstelle W. should therefore have been included in my organization, especially as I saw that the Vermittlungsstelle W. on these matters I mention, like "industrial-works", had to do with the same official authorities as my organization.

Q. Who would have handled the technical matters Mr. Von Schnitzler was talking about?

A. In this case, it would have been quite a new organization.

Q. Were you informed of the real functions of the Vermittlungsstelle W.?

A. (Ilgner) I don't know.

(Von Schnitzler) Yes. As I have explained above.

(signed) G v. Schnitzler

Q. Now, since 1934, I.G. had an organization to handle all Wehrmacht affairs. That organization was the Vermittlungsstelle W. Is that right?

A. Yes.

Q. Who was the first head of the Vermittlungsstelle W.?

A. (Ilgnier) My impression was always that the three leaders of the Sparten were the chiefs. Termeer of Sparta II and Krauch of Sparta III, and in regard to Sparta III, I am not sure as to the leader. However, I believe, Gadowsky.

II.

Q. Now what did Sparta III do?

A. (Von Schnitzler) We do not know exactly.

Q. When did Mr. Krauch go over to Mr. Goering's four year plan?

A. (Von Schnitzler) At the end of 1936, because the four year plan was born in that year.

Q. And what was Mr. Krauch's position in the four year plan?

A. He was head of the Department of Wirtschaftsausbau.

Q. What did the Wirtschaftsausbau do for the four year plan?

A. The Wirtschaftsausbau handled the department of the new great factories, answering the demands of the military in the domains of the chemical industry as well as oil and magnesium and Buna, and then to a certain extent, and for a certain time I think, the synthetic fibres, and certain raw materials necessary for the synthetic fibres.

Q. Who paid the salary of Mr. Krauch while he was functioning under Mr. Goering?

A. (Von Schnitzler) I think I.G. continued to pay Mr. Krauch.

Q. And did Mr. Krauch take any other I.G. technicians with him to assist him in his work for Mr. Goering?

A. Yes.

Q. Can you tell us who they were, and how many he took with him?

A. Oh, quite a lot.

Q. And who paid their salaries while they were working for Mr. Goering?

A. I think they all remained on the I.G. payroll.

Q. So, since 1936, I.G. officials, paid by I.G., and assisted by a large staff of technicians and personnel, all paid by I.G., planned for the Nazi Government, the rearmament phase in the chemical sector with concentration on the building up of such war industries as magnesium, synthetic rubber, synthetic fiber and oil, etcetera. Is that right?

II. A. (Ilgnier) Yes. The Krauch office was not only ^{Abt. Wirtschafts}Wirtschaftsausbau, but also general befohrung für sonder fragen der chemischen erzeugnisse.

(signed) G v Schnitzler

Q. Now, would you say that I.G. increased its capital investments tremendously during the re-armament years under the four year plan?

A. (Ilgnor) Yes.
(Von Schnitzler) Yes.

Q. Is it a fair statement to say that this tremendous capital increase of I.G. was mainly in the field in which the Wehrmacht was interested?

(page 3 of original)

A. (Ilgnor) Yes.
(Von Schnitzler) Yes.

Q. And is it a fair statement to say that I.G. Benefitted tremendously insofar as its capital investments were concerned from the rearmament program of the Nazi Government?

vS. A. (Von Schnitzler) I would say that it is very right and even more. Many of our chemists believed that this new investment was of continuous use even for peace time because, they thought, that the enlargement of Buna, oil and nitrogen, would also serve for peace purposes in filling out the market. We distinguished the purely war plants, mostly financed by the Reich and which were taken under Montona and Organa, etcetera, from those developments which we considered as being of perpetual and peace time use. Our technical people wanted to have them built by I.G. because they thought they would be more independent in ruling these factories. Of course after a certain time, even the war plants all became unburdened property, because the amortization rates were very favorable. We spoke of Aken yesterday which was started about 1935 and also of the beginning of 1944, when Haefliger, Von Holder and I, paid our first visit to Bitterfeld. We saw that the investment in Aken was almost completely written off. And I might also say that side by side with the development of the rearmament program, Germany became more and more autarchic, more corporate, more fascist. ~~*****~~

vS.

"I have read the record of this interrogation, and swear that the answers given therein by me to the questions of Mr. Weisbrodt and Mr. Devine, are true."

G. v. Schnitzler

Vorstandsmitglied I.G. Farben-
industrie Aktiengesellschaft.

Ilgnor
Signature

Member of Board
Position in I.G. Farben Co.,

The statements I made in this record of interrogation still seem to me to be entirely true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief, except that:

(a) This record of interrogation should be considered along with paragraph 5, above, of this affidavit.

(b) After Dr. Ilgnor answered that one of the reasons V/W was set up was so that the Wehrmacht could prevent I.G. from exporting trade secrets
(signed) G v Schnitzler

(Ilgnor's third answer on page one), I added that V/W also had relationships to the Wehrmacht in the whole field of rearmament. Also, on page two, eighth question and answer, I answered affirmatively to the statement that V/W was the I.G. organization for handling all Wehrmacht affairs. On the basis of information given me by my technical colleagues since 1945, those two statements are exaggerated.

(c) My last answer, page three, is mainly to be understood under developments taking place after the war broke out.

8. In August 1945 I subscribed to a five page record of interrogation of 4 August 1945, entitled "Continuation of Interrogation of Von Schnitzler and Ilgnor", the text of which follows :

"Q. In your opinion what did the Vermittlungs W. do for the Wehrmacht?

Von S. A. I can only guess. I think they had talks with high officers of the Wehrmacht and took the plans and suggestions of I.G. to the Wehrmacht and brought the plans and suggestions of the Wehrmacht to the I.G. I consider the activity more or less as an ambassador of a country who has nothing to say on his own, but who had to explain and inform and receive information himself.

Q. What kind of information did the Wehrmacht take from I.G. and what kind of plans do you think I.G. submitted to the Wehrmacht from Vermittlungs W.?

Von S. A. Let us take for example the Alton plant. Everything from the entire range of matters from where the plant would be located, what the plant would produce, what the Wehrmacht required, what transportation was necessary would be matters which would be taken up between the Vermittlungs W. representing I.G. and the Wehrmacht.

Q. Actually you told us this morning that on behalf of the appropriate Nazi government agency in the chemical field, an I.G. man, assisted largely by an I.G. staff and paid by the I.G., planned the building up of the chemical industries and metal industries for the Wehrmacht?

Von S. A. To a very large extent.

Ilgnor A. Yes, in the fields which had been reserved for Mr. Krauch's organization

Q. In regard to the rearmament policy in special fields, I.G. personnel largely determined that policy. Is that right?

Von S. A. Yes.

Q. And I.G. benefited considerably in capital investments from the rearmament program laid down by I.G. personnel?

(signed) G v Schnitzler

Von S. A. If you go by the balance sheet. You see, a large part of these new investments would have no post-war use to I.G. and we would be left with big factories and a lot of personnel.

(page 2 of original)

Q. Would I.G. have preferred to negotiate with Japan for natural rubber instead of developing the synthetic rubber industry in Germany?

Von S. A. We did not have the necessary counter value to pay for an unlimited amount of natural rubber. We could have bought certain quantities but it would have been insufficient to meet the demands of the Wehrmacht.

Q. Did the Vermittlungs.W. of I.G. handle I.G.'s relations with the Japanese Military?

Von S. A. I don't believe that. I have never heard of it. That would be a very delicate matter and I think the chiefs would do that themselves so that I know that in respect to the hydrogen agreement which was just concluded in January of this year, Dr. Butefisch, Mr. Ringer, and Mr. Pier handled those negotiations themselves.

Q. Did you ever participate in any negotiations with the Japanese? Are you familiar with any negotiations with the Japanese?

Ilgnor A. I was only invited for the lunch in Berlin at which the contract was signed and I know that with my foreign exchange department, Mr. Gierlich and Mr. Montze of the office of the commercial committee, Mr. Saxner assisted in some special questions.

Q. When did I.G. establish its Counter-Espionage Department?

Von S. A. I think it was in the war.

Ilgnor A. I think it must be in the end of the year 1940 or the beginning of the year 1941 because Fahl was back from the army. I know that.

Q. What were the functions of the Counter-Espionage Department?

Von S. A. It was the centralization of the questions arising out of that domain. Every I.G. branch factory had its own Counter-Espionage Department. This was a counter-espionage agency in the factory and the men were named Abwehrbeauftragter, Mr. Schneider was made chief of the Berlin central counter-espionage office.

Q. What did the IM-7 have to do in regard to Vermittlungs W. questions?

Ilgnor A. The IM-7 really had nothing military to do with Vermittlungs W. matters. However, we had been handling questions in regard to the export of

(page 3 of original)

know-how and licences and patents to foreign countries with which the Wehrmacht was directly concerned.

Q. What did you have to do with the export of know-how, licences, and patents to other countries which concerned the Wehrmacht?

(signed) G v Schnitzler

Ilgnor A. We required the agreement of the Reichsstellechemie and handled the foreign exchange matters.

Q. So that you should be competent to tell me all cases in which the Wehrmacht prevented the export of I.G.'s know-how, patents and licenses to foreign countries?

Ilgnor A. As far as these questions have come up to our foreign exchange department, we would be able to give you from the files a history of the cases in which the Wehrmacht interfered. In the technical field, the technical people dealt directly with the foreign representatives and we wouldn't know about it.

Q. In every case in which it was an export of know-how either technical or not, wouldn't the foreign exchange authorities have to be informed about it to arrange for the financial end of the transaction?

Ilgnor A. Certainly they would have to know about it, but please ask Mr. Gierlich for the details.

Q. What did your agency do for the Wehrmacht and when did it begin to do it?

Ilgnor A. Beginning in 1939, the economic department of my organization established relations with Wehr Wirtschaft Thomas and I have already told you about Mr. Deithinger's preparation of material for the Wehrmacht and that Mr. Kruger, in the year 1939 before the war, was sworn into the Wehrmacht and handled the relations between my organization and the Wehrmacht. Before 1939, there certainly would have been occasionally contacts between my departments and Thomas, but I can't tell you precisely what the contacts were.

Q. What was Mr. Thomas' job?

Ilgnor A. He was the mobilizer of the German economy in preparation for war. He was a member of the general staff of the O.K.W.

(page 4 of original)

Q. Before the war, before Germany began its military aggression, did your organization establish close contact with the Vermittlungs W. and begin to actively work for the Wehrmacht?

Ilgnor A. As to the best of my knowledge, no.

Von S. A. I don't know.

Q. Then to the best of both of your knowledge, the W. 7 or any of its departments did not actively engage in Wehrmacht matters either directly or through the Vermittlungs W. even though your department, Mr. Ilgnor, went on a war basis before the war with your permission?

Ilgnor A. If you ask me so precisely, I must say that I wasn't there.

Q. Were you there in 1936, in 1937?

Ilgnor A. Certainly.

Q. Then are you telling me that, if you were there, you wouldn't have participated in assisting the Wehrmacht in its plans for aggression?

(signed) G v Schnitzler

Ilgnor A. I would have done the things that have been ordered by the authorities.

Q. But you told us this morning that in regard to Vermittlungs W., you wanted to assimilate the Vermittlungs W. in your department. Had you been ordered to assimilate the Vermittlungs W. in your department in 1935 and 1936?

Ilgnor A. I explained my purpose in this morning's interrogation.

Q. Before the war broke, Mr. von Schnitzler and Mr. Ilgnor, did you intend to establish close working relationships with the Wehrmacht in your own fields?

Von-S. A. The Wehrmacht was another agency with which we were in continuous contact.

Summary by Von Schnitzler

In 1934 the Wehrmacht became important and, with increased tempo after 1936, the Wehrmacht became the prominent factor in the whole picture. Since 1934, a strong movement for investments in our plants for commodities of decisive military importance became more and more pronounced with the main objective of increasing the military potential of Germany. At first, autarchic principles to make Germany independent of importation from abroad was one of the leading objectives. Since the

(page 5 of original)

declaration of the 4-year plan in 1936, this movement took an entirely military character and military reasons stood in the foreground. Hand in hand with this, the relations between I.G. and the Wehrmacht became more and more intimate and a continuous union between I.G. officials on one side and the Wehrmacht representatives on the other side was the consequence of it.

I have read the record of this interrogation and swear that the answers therein given by me to the questions of Mr. Weissbrodt and Mr. Devine - and my summarized statement - are true.

G. von Schnitzler

Vorstandsmitglied I.G.
Farbenindustrie Aktiengesellschaft

The statements I made in this record of interrogation still appear to me to be entirely true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief, except that:

(a) This record of interrogation should be considered along with paragraph 5, above, of this affidavit.

(b) In the "Summary by von Schnitzler", beginning bottom of page 4, I over-exaggerated the degree of I.G.'s relations of the Wehrmacht before the

(signed) G v Schnitzler

outbreak of the war. In the beginning it was not the Wehrmacht, but rather
representatives
vs the RLM and the Four Year Plan which acted as ~~regulations~~ for the Reich in the
different dealings re synthetic oil, bunk, synthetic fibers, n.s.o., and
the Wehrmacht was primarily not directly engaged in these so-called
"autarchy-dealings". Of course, the Wehrmacht was highly interested in
them and made tests with all the products contained in that program.

(signed) G v Schnitzler

9. In August, I subscribed to a four page record of interrogation of Dr. Ernst Struss, Dr. Oskar Loehr and myself which was held on the afternoon of 11 August 1945, the text of which follows:

"Q. I am interested in the development of the "Auflage" Wehrmacht-stelle X. How did the development take place?

A. (Von Schnitzler) It is characteristic for I. G. that its relationship to the Wehrmacht became more and more intimate. From a relatively small start, a huge investment of 400-500 million marks yearly directly or indirectly by the Wehrmacht was the end. In this way, the central administration lost entirely the survey what had been done or could be done. It was split up in so many different places inside I.G. so that the control and what really happened was difficult to survey by the central administration.

In the intercourse between our men and Wehrmacht it was difficult to say whether it was a real "Auflage" which came from the Wehrmacht or whether the individual technician was interested to produce and brought the "Auflage" for himself from the Wehrmacht. All that has weakened the central management of I. G. and strengthened the local.

My first strong impression I got at my visits to Bitterfeld. They told me there how they had gone into new fields, for example the new alloys of magnesium, etc., and I said to myself: "Is this the Wehrmacht, or is it Mr. Altwicker of I. G.?"

(Struss) -- In the last years, Dr. ter Meer had the opinion that all what we must build was "Auflage". But it came not directly from the Wehrmacht but from Krauch. In most cases, the Wehrmacht was going to Krauch and his men and then I. G. must construct the works. I think we had in the last time the inventions of Dr. Bayer of Leverkusen of "desmophene".

(Loehr) It was a rather new and interesting development that had begun in the laboratories in Leverkusen prior to the war. Dr. Bayer found a new reaction which resulted in products called "diisocyanates", which were useful for a great many purposes. For instance, one purpose which was very outstanding was that these compounds could bind together rubber and metal in such a way and so close if you put stress on it, it would not break. By combining this diisocyanate with a certain kind of ester you could get coatings which were very hard and flexible so that you could fold a sheet of metal without breaking the coating. That was not only applied to metal surfaces, but to other kind of material too, wood or plastics. That was the start in 1937/39.

(Struss) The time when it was ripe was 1942.

Die Wehrmacht hat sich an Krauch gewandt und Eckell beauftragt. Eckell hielt eine Sitzung ab, an der 60 Offiziere von allen Wehrmachts-teilen anwesend waren. Sie verlangten 10 mal so viel wie möglich war. Diese Sache ging durch Krauch

(Translation by Dr. Loehr)
The Development from the laboratory stage to the stage of production took about 4 years. At that time, Dr. Krauch called a meeting at which at least 60 officers of the Wehrmacht were present almost everyone brought forward his requirements and it was quite a lot. That was a complicated case.

(signed) G v Schnitzler

(Struss) Einfache Fälle waren Gasoline und buna, centralit, da wurde einfach von einer Stelle bestimmt und uns wurde die Auflage gemacht.

Q If a research was carried on by I. G. personnel in Leverkusen, and you had the necessary materials in Leverkusen, how did the Wehrmacht become familiar with this work of yours?

A (Loehr) There is one point. We had to submit our patent applications to a certain agency who examined it according to their use for the Wehrmacht. By that agency the Wehrmacht knew what was going on.

(Page 2 of the original)

Q You filed your applications up in 1937. Did the Wehrmacht immediately send a man to the plant?

A They met at this meeting with the I. G. officials.

Q Who brought it to the Wehrmacht? Was it Krauch?

A Struss. From the technical men.

Q Tell me how it got to Krauch?

A (Loehr) These were kept as secret patent applications. I don't think that scheme applied to the applications in 1937, that was introduced later on.

Struss:

Ich glaube nicht immer auf dem gleichen Wege. Es war doch wohl zwischen den leitenden Herren, z.B. Ambros, ein enger Konnex mit den militärischen Stellen, dass es ohne weiteres bei den Militärs bekannt werden musste, wenn etwas Neues da war. Es wurde durch die Patente bekannt, keineswegs ist es durch die Zentralstelle gegangen

(Translation by Loehr:

In this case such an interesting development became quickly known in other I. G. Works. Thus, Ambros of course in regard to the Wehrmacht dealt with many things. It might have been that he brought the matter to the Wehrmacht, but that is only a presumption. It might be Dr. Haberland, who had also to do with Wehrmacht authorities. In one way or the other it might have come to the Wehrmacht's attention.

Loehr:

I think, but I don't know, some experiments had to be made with articles, for instance some rubber puffer and in the workshops, Wehrmacht people went out and they might have heard of that in that way too. Outside, the works you never were sure whether the matter was in your hands or the Wehrmacht had it.

Struss:

Der aktivste Teil der Wehrmacht war die Luftwaffe. Die Luftwaffe brauchte Leichtmetall and ging direkt zu den Werken, manchmal unter Ausschaltung von Krauch.

The most active part of the Wehrmacht was the Luftwaffe. It kept close touch with the technicians of I. G. And they very often went after such development without the help of Krauch.

(signed) G v Schnitzler

Besonders bei solchen Endprodukten, die direkt den Wehrmacht-zwecken dienten, wie Centralit, explosives, da, glaube ich, hat die Wehrmacht meistens direkt verhandelt.
zum Beispiel die dritte Centralit-Anlage kam über Krauch, die zweite kam noch direkt von der Wehrmacht.

If a products was concerned as a final product, it originates from the Wehrmacht. The first plant came from the Wehrmacht and was dealt with Wehrmacht and Uerdingen direct. The second plant in Wolfen came also direct from Wehrmacht. In any way, the initiative came from the Wehrmacht and they dealt with the plant. The third plant was Moosbierbaum and later on Auschwitz, that came from Krauch. But the initiative came from the Wehrmacht and they used Krauch to look after the matter.

The reason was that there were too few men and too little steel. Till 1941/42 the Wehrmacht could itself give the iron and steel and other things to the factories. They had a large allocation. Later on they have not get any steel, that was why it had to be handled by Krauch, because he handled the allocation of raw materials.

(Page 3 of the original)

Q The work of I. G. and the Wehrmacht became a completely cooperative one. I. G. went to Wehrmacht, Wehrmacht to I. G. Is that true?

A Struss:
Das hat sich langsam so entwickelt.

That was the end of the development. result came to be slowly

Q In 1934 according to your own Tea-Buro files, the contact between I. G. and Wehrmacht became so close, there were so many discussions that you had to set up an office to handle that business, - the Vermittlungsstelle W?

A. Struss:
Wir hatten in der Vermittlungsstelle W. schatzungsweise in 1934 einen Patentmann, der allen 4 Wehrmachtstellen die Patente einreichen musste.

In 1934 the Wehrmacht had so many problems to deal with us that it seemed advisable to have an agency in Berlin to handle these problems.

Q Then in 1936 the I. G.-Wehrmacht connection, and the work by I.G. for the Wehrmacht was so great and they (I.G.) wanted a man in the government offices who was familiar with I.G. and Wehrmacht matters, who could handle it efficiently. Therefore they sent Krauch to that office?

(Struss)

A Ich bin nicht genau in Bilde. Man wusste nicht, wie Herr Krauch überhaupt an diese Sache gekommen ist. Krauch hat eines Tages ter Meer mitgeteilt, dass er diese Stelle in Berlin übernommen hätte. In der I. G. war man sehr überrascht, dass einer der führenden Leute einen derartigen Posten in Berlin übernahm. Dann wurde Krauch in diese andere Stelle

(signed) G v Schnitzler

hineingezogen und daraus ergab sich, dass die Vermittlungsstelle ihre ursprüngliche Bedeutung verlor, da nunmehr ja der erste Mann von Brüning war, der ja für Wehrmacht und I. G. verhältnismässig wenig bedeutete. Die Wichtigkeit der Vermittlungsstelle ging an die neue Reichsstelle über. Die enge Verbindung kann nicht geloungnet werden. Natürlich war Krauch nicht nur für die I. G. dort, sondern auch für die andere chemische Industrie in Deutschland.

(Von Schnitzler)

It was Bosch himself who put Krauch at Goering's disposal. He saw in Krauch the possibility of making great developments in the chemical field. He wanted that "keine Dumheiten gemacht wurden" - that it should be done in a reasonable way. It was more autarchy than rearmament.

However, as soon as Goering went in, it was absolutely clear to me that it was a rearmament program.

Loehr:

In 1937 I was convinced too that it was a rearmament program.

Struss:

I feared it was a rearmament program.

(Page 4 of the original)

Q But Krauch was put in under Goering, i.e.: nominated by Bosch to go into the "Amt" under Goering. If that is so, how could there have been in I. G.'s mind any question of autarchy. This was rearmament. Is that right?

A (Struss) There was no doubt that it was a rearmament, but I have hoped that it wouldn't come to war.

Q So you all went along with the rearmament program and you put an I. G. man in to manage the rearmament program?

A (Schnitzler) We knew that with the rearmament program in 1936, the situation was very dangerous insofar as the possibilities of war were concerned.

(Loehr)

In 1937, I became convinced of it, because I was abroad and saw the opinion abroad.

Q In all these rearmament questions, in all the building up of new plants and the war machine, Mr. Schmitz had been advised and he consented. Is that right?

A (Struss) Yes, that is sure.

(signed) G v Schnitzler

Q Which department of I. G. handled the construction of new plants?

A (Struss) That was the TEA - "The Technical Committee".

Q Schmitz was the chairman of the board?

A (Von Schmitzler) Yes. He was also informed beforehand.

Q Who signed the agreement with the Wehrmacht?

A (Loehr) It was signed by the people concerned, Bitterfeld, or the others.

Q They signed it because they had the approval of the technical committee and the board?

A Yes.

Q Was Schmitz's prior approval always received?

A Yes. (Von Schmitzler and Loehr)

(Struss) The works exchanged their projects figures before the TEA meetings, and so the figures were available to the board members. There was a short report on the credits and it was recommended for approval by the board.

"I have read the record of this interrogation and swear that the answers therein given by me to the questions of Mr. Weissbrodt and Mr. Devine, are true."

(signed) Struss	(signed) G. von Schmitzler
(signature)	(signature)
(signed) Director	(signed) Oskar Loehr
Position in I. G.	Position in I. G.

The statements I made in this record of interrogation still appear to me to be entirely true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief, except that.

(a) This record of interrogation should be considered along with paragraph 5, above, of this affidavit.

(b) In my first answer, page one, I only wanted to show the close team work which had developed between the Wehrmacht and the different plants. I did not want to criticize the attitude of the technical man in question.

10. On 24 September 1945, I signed a four page record of interrogation principally concerning Vermittlungsstelle W, the text of which follows:

(signed) G v Schmitzler

- Q When was the Vermittlungsstelle W formed and what was its purpose?
- A It was formed in 1934 and was designed to hold up or maintain continuous contact with the Wehrmacht.
- Q Who was in charge of the activities of the Vermittlungsstelle W?
- A Professor Krauch was the head of it, until 1937, and then there were different chemists in charge of the Vermittlungsstelle W., to begin with, there was von Bruening and the last one I think was Dieckman.
- Q What section of the Vermittlungsstelle W were Bruening and Dieckman in charge of?
- A The Vermittlungsstelle W was always in the first instance for Sparta II. It was busy in the interests of Sparta I just as well, but in the case of Sparta III there was never a special delegate in or for the Vermittlungsstelle W. I think Dr. Gajewsky did it by himself.
- Q Was not Sparta II in charge of the preparation of mobilization plans for war?
- A I think all Spartas were busy in that. In Sparta II, there were buna and metals, like light metals, and all the chemical products.
- Q Did the various sections of Vermittlungsstelle W draw up mobilization plans to be used in the event of war, or were these done by the individual plants.
- A I should say they were done by the individual plants. Of course this was done with the help of the delegates from the Vermittlungsstelle W.
- Q And the Vermittlungsstelle W would act as intermediary?
- A Yes.
- Q Were these MOB plans first drawn up in 1934 and then submitted to the Wehrmacht?
- A They would be submitted through the office of the Vermittlungsstelle W, which was at that time under the direct charge of Professor Krauch. As far as I am informed, all these things were very secret. I only knew from personal knowledge of the MOB plans for the dyestuffs domain. This mobilization plan came through the Reichsbeauftragts Fuer Chemie. It was approved by Dr. Ungewitter. It was of course made up in the individual plants in the dyestuff domain. It was likewise made up by Dr. Struss in the so-called Teabureau.
- Q With respect to the MOB plans, what function, if any, did Dr. Krauch serve?
- A I think that Dr. Krauch only made up the programs for the production. I don't think he made the MOB plans himself. Of course he might have been occupied with some parts of it, and then in the products for which he had specially the duty to

(signed) G v Schnitzler

develop. His offices were called Amt für Wirtschaftsausbau. This means the creation of something new.

(Page 2 of the original)

- Q I thought we were talking about 1934. In that year, was Dr. Krauch spending all his time with Farben?
- A Yes. He was head of Sparta I.
- Q Do you mean with respect to his own products, like buna, hydrogenation, etcetera, that he had drawn up the MOB plan?
- A I thought you asked me of Krauch's activity when he became head of the other plants. I think the only MOB plans for which he was responsible were for Sparta I.
- Q When Krauch assumed his new position in the Four Year Plan in 1936, in addition to certain technicians whom he took with him, did he likewise take a section of the personnel who were employed in the Vermittlungsstelle W?
- VS A No, I do not think so.
- Q When Krauch went to work for Goering, did he take along with him certain I. G. personnel, including technicians?
- A Yes, quite a substantial lot.
- Q In connection with his moving to Goering's plan, did he likewise take persons from the Vermittlungsstelle W?
- A I am not quite sure.
- Q When and where were the Kriegsspiele held with respect to I.G. plants?
- A My Kriegsspiele experience comes second hand. It is not of great value. These were carried out in Louna and Leverkusen too.
- Q Approximately when was this?
- A In 1934 or 1935 it may have started.
- Q Under whose supervision were these Kriegsspiele held, both from the standpoint of I. G. and also from the military standpoint?
- A All four parts of the Wehrmacht were participants in this. And then probably in the factories where it happened, there was the first director, who arranged it.
- Q According to your knowledge, did Dr. Krauch have an important part with respect to the Kriegsspiele?
- A I think he must have known of this Kriegsspiele. Whether he himself arranged this, I don't know.

(signed) G v Schnitzler

Q How active was professor Krauch in the management of I.G.F. after 1936?

A Not at all. He refrained entirely.

Q Were the reports of Dr. Reithinger made available to Dr. Krauch while he was in charge of the chemical section of the Four Year Plan?

A Surely.

(Page 3 of the original)

Q And did these reports contain statistics on production capacities and production figures for chemical firms outside of Germany?

A Yes. Reithinger made analyses of all big chemical companies in the world.

Q Since what date were such compilations made available to Dr. Krauch would you say?

A I would think always since Krauch assumed his position in the Four Year Plan. Dr. Reithinger was proud of his work. He made no secret of this at all.

Q Were the reports considered to be very thorough and first-class work?

A Yes. The Reich itself had not so good an organization, and these reports were very valuable to all of us.

Q Do you know whether Krauch informed Dr. Bosch, possibly in 1933, that Germany was going to war?

A No. I don't know about that.

Q Are you acquainted with an attempt by Dr. Bosch to see Goering in June or July of 1938, because of his (Bosch's) concern about Germany going to war?

A I have no information at all on this.

Q Prior to the invasion of Russia, did I.G. or the government keep a staff of chemists available to immediately go into Russia to examine its Buna plant?

vS A Yes. I think so. I can't tell all the details. Dr. Ambros/ could tell you. I know that in Dresden, quite a lot of able chemists were conducting experiments and got together on this, but only after the outbreak of the war, to start at once with the manufacture of the Russian processes for buna. I was informed that for a few hours in one of the Russian factories, they were able to make certain investigations with the result that they were very much impressed with how highly technically developed the Russian processes were.

Q Were those chemists gotten together by the Reich?

(signed) G v. Schnitzler

- A Yes. By the Reich.
- VS Q At that time was Dr. Krauch or Dr. Ambros/ charged with the responsibility of productive capacity of buna?
- VS A Yes. It could be said that Ambros/ was charged with the direct responsibility.
- Q In what capacity?
- A He was the head of buna, with ter Meer still over him, but he had
VS no factory to run himself, but Ambros/ was in charge.

(Page 4 of the original)

- VS Q Ambros/ was an employee of I.G. Farben. Was he acting in some capacity for the Reich at that time? Were the chemists who were convoked, brought together on behalf of I.G. Farben or on behalf of the German government?
- A No. On behalf of the German government.
- Q If they were brought together on behalf of the government for the further exploitation of rubber or buna in Russia, was that not then under the jurisdiction of Professor Krauch?
- A Yes. That must be right.
- Q These men were collected at one point and were prepared to go into Russia as soon as it was possible to get to the particular plants involved.
- A Yes. That is right.

I have read the record of this interrogation and swear that the answers given by me to the questions of Mr. Glaser are true.

(signed) Georg von Schnitzler
Georg von Schnitzler

Vorstandsmitglied I. G. Farben
(Position in I.G.)

Interrogator:

(signed) Bernard Glaser

The statements made in this interrogation still seem to me to be entirely true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief, except that:

(a) This record of interrogation should be considered along with paragraph 5, above, of this affidavit.

(signed) G v Schnitzler

(b) Answer five, page one, is wrong according to information I have received from my technical colleagues to the effect that Vermittlungsstelle W did not assist the plants or the Sparten in preparing materials for the MOB plans. The principal liaison between the government and private industry concerning the "MOB Fragen" was the "Wirtschaftsgruppe". The materials collected for the "Wirtschaftsgruppe" were made up directly by the plants concerned with a particular type of chemical production. The various plants submitted the information to the appropriate Sparte, and thereafter it was registered with the TEA Buero. The TEA Buero forwarded the material directly to the "Wirtschaftsgruppe". The plants often acted directly with the "Wirtschaftsgruppe" and only informed the TEA Buero of the completed result.

(c) Answer two, page two, is subject to the correction I have
vs made before: I.G. did not make up the MOB plans but only prepared the material for them.

(d) Beginning at the middle of page two, I discuss the "Kriegsspiele" or war games. The Kriegsspiele involving the Wehrmacht and the I. G. Farben plants at Launa and Leverkusen were handled secretly between the plant directors and the Wehrmacht. There were no damages, since the
vs Kriegsspiele were conducted on a purely theoretical basis. It was only never brought up in Vorstand meetings and, in my presence, it was never brought up before the TEA Buero.

(e) On page 3, the sixth question and answer may be misleading. Mr. Glaser asked me if I.G. or the government kept a staff of chemists "prior to the invasion of Russia" who were "available to go immediately into Russia to examine its Buna plant." My answer, which begins, "Yes. I think so," is misleading unless one takes from the rest of my answer what I really meant to say, namely, that the assembling of the chemists in Dresden took place after the invasion of Russia. Nothing was prepared by

(signed) Gv Schnitzler

I.G. chemists prior to the invasion of Russia.

11. Concerning plans for industrial and commercial activity in occupied Russia, I can add this. I was a member of a committee of the Wirtschaftsgruppe Chemie which was established to prepare for the sales of chemicals in Russia and for the eventual exploitation of the chemical industry in Russia, but this never materialized and so far as I know there was not a single session of this committee. Upon the demand of the government, the entire German chemical industry inside the Wirtschaftsgruppe Chemie (Economic Group Chemistry) was to deal with eventual problems arising out of the Russian situation. A small "G.m.b.H.", a firm with limited liability, was founded to deal with Russian problems and in this firm all the bigger German Chemical Companies were represented -- I.G., Schering, Heyden, and Ruetgerswerke. It was clear from the very first moment that buna should be reserved to I.G., that nitrogen should be reserved to the Stickstoff Syndicat, and that other requests to produce in Russia should be dealt with jointly by the chemical industry in total under the leadership of Dr. Ungewitter, manager of the Wirtschaftsgruppe Chemie. But all those plans never materialized. I.G.'s Boyer Concern created for the pharmaceutical industry an important plant for the manufacture of sera in Lemberg (Lwow), Poland.

12. On 23 July 1945, I wrote up a two page statement entitled "Plans regarding England", the text of which follows :

"To the best of my recollection as far as plans for England are concerned, only preparatory work had been done. Through Terhaar we were told that the Reichswirtschaftsministerium had complaint that in the case of France we had not have had any plans ready at the day of the armistice.

This should not take place a second time, and the necessary material should be prepared, that in the case that England should ask for peace-terms the R.W.M. would have material on hand.

When the question was raised in the K.A., it met strong opposition, I remember that Dr. Mann energetically refused to participate in an endeavour so absolutely premature, and Dr. Krüger joined him. - The others felt more or less the same way. Thus,

(signed) G v Schnitzler

what the different departments had prepared, did not pass the competent authorities inside the I.G., and I am of the opinion, that the R.W.M. never officially got this preparatory material. How far R.W.M. inofficially was informed of it, can only be testified by Terhaar.

I myself have a clear recollection only of the preparatory material of the Verkaufsgemeinschaften Farben and Chemikalien, which had been made up in the Gröneburg, but I think that Stickstoff and Agfa had developed certain ideas too.

The general aims, as Farben (dyestuffs) are concerned, were:

- 1.) a greater share in the U.K.,
- 2.) certain restrictions of the British Industry in export markets,
- 3.) replacement of the positions lost in the British Empire.

There was never raised the question of a capital interest in I.C.I., but all parties concerned were of the opinion, that normal business relations to I.C.I. should be reestablished.

Sacrifices of I.C.I. in the dyestuff-domain were being proposed in the following directions :

- 1.) I.G. did not ask for the abolishment of the license-act, but for a new distribution of the market, which meant an augmentation of the I.G.'s share by ca. 50%. I.G. asked for 1/3 of the total market. It was left open, if this additional volume had to be taken partly by curtailing the Swiss importation or had to go entirely at the charge of I.C.I.

(page 2 of original)

- 2.) Restraint in export trade was asked

- a) for the European Continent) but I can't re-
- b) for the Far East) member the details.

The propositions in the Chemical Field were of a very varied character and included certain improvements of the I.G.'s position in the British market and certain sacrifices for the British industry in the export-markets.

For the so-called military chemicals a far reaching suppression was aimed at, but I should say, that this question had not yet found its definite solution. As the whole problem very soon lost all actuality, after five years very little of it has remained in my memory.

Frankfurt, July 28th, 1945.

gez. G. von Schnitzler."

This statement still appears to me to be entirely true and correct according

(signed) G v Schnitzler

to the best of my knowledge and belief.

13. On 17 July 1945, I signed a two-page record of interrogation, the text of which follows :

"Q. Yesterday we talked about the use of I.G. technicians and I.G. chemicals in the development of poisonous chemicals to be used in warfare.

A. Yes, we spoke shortly about it yesterday.

Q. Tell me what you told Major Tilly the first time when he asked about poisonous gases?

A. To the best of my knowledge at that time I.G. made not itself poisonous gases nor had it been discussed inside I.G. as far as I know in I.G. laboratories they have not worked on it.

Q. But only in the so-called Reichs laboratories with I.G. technicians and I.G. directors and full knowledge of this fact.

A. Yes. But I knew at that time, it was in winter. Dr. Ambros told me only privately that in Dyhernfurt they produced a poisonous gas from an intermediate of.....coming from Ludwigshafen, and this gas is fabricated in an equipment only consisting of glass and one has to be very cautious that nothing can get out of this equipment because even very slight quantities are very dangerous. All the finished stuff had been removed in time to middle of Germany.

Q. Who is Dr. Ambros?

A. He is one of our first younger technicians. He was in charge of Dyhernfurt as well as Auschwitz and Gendorf.

Q. Where was this gas manufactured?

A. In Dyhernfurt.

Q. Who owned the plant?

A. It was owned partly by the Reich and partly I.G. You must hear Direktor Dancker about the details.

Q. How much by I.G. and how much by the Reich?

A. The plant for the gases was owned by the Reich. I think so. But it was run by a company, called Anorgana.

Q. To whom belonged this company?

A. It belonged 50:50 to the Reich and I.G. but Major Tilly told me, it is practically all I.G. The only thing I really know was what I said to Major Tilly.

Q. The plant was owned by the Reich?

A. Yes.

(signed) G v Schnitzler

Q. What was owned by I.G.? The company?

A. Anorgana, which run the plant for the Reich.

Q. And all production by I.G. of this plant was on behalf of the Reich?

A. Not entirely.

Q. What proportion was on behalf of the Reich?

A. By far the biggest part.

Q. Who owned Anorgana? Who of I.G. should know that?

A. Herr Dencker.

Q. Who was in charge of the chemical sector of I.G.?

A. That was Mr. Weber-Andren. He died in October 1943.

(page 2 of original)

Q. Who succeeded him?

A. I succeeded him as chairman of the chemical committee (commercial committee?).

Q. And you as head of the commercial field in chemicals did not know the ownership?

A. No. I don't know. I know of the existence of the Anorgana Company, but I did not know what all was behind it.

Q. Who of I.G. knew about it?

A. Schmitz, as chairman, Ambros and ter Meer.

Q. During the last quarter 1944 (you said yesterday) that a Mr. Muller-Cunradi alluded to you that the poisonous gasses and the chemicals manufactured by I.G. were being used for the murder of human beings held in concentration camps?

A. So I understood him.

Q. Didn't you question these employees of yours further in regard to the use of these gases?

A. They said they knew it was being used for this purpose.

Q. What did you do when he was told you that I.G. chemicals was being used to kill, to murder people held in concentration camps?

A. I was horrified.

Q. Did you do anything about it?

A. I kept it for me because it was too terrible. I was always under the impression that these gases were not manufactured by us. I asked Muller-Cunradi is it known to you and Ambros and an other

(signed) G v. Schnitzler

directors in Auschwitz that the gases and chemicals are being used to murder people.

Q. What did he say?

A. Yes, it is known to all I.G. directors in Auschwitz..

G.v. Schnitzler.

I have read the record of this interrogation and swear that the answers therein given by me to the questions of Mr. Weisbrodt and Mr. Devine are true.

G.v. Schnitzler."

The statements I made in this interrogation still appear to me to be entirely true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief.

14. I have carefully read each of the 39 pages of this declaration and have placed my signature at the bottom of each page. I have made the necessary corrections in my own handwriting and initialled each correction in the margin of the page. I declare herewith under oath that I have stated the full truth to the best of my knowledge and belief.

(signed) Georg von Schnitzler.
GEORG VON SCHNITZLER

Sworn to and signed before me this 27th day of March 1947, at the Palace of Justice in Nurnberg, Germany, by Georg von Schnitzler, known to me to be the person making the above affidavit.

(signed) Drexel A. Sprecher
DREXEL A. SPECHER

U.S. Civilian, Attorney, AGO No. 473307

Office of Chief of Counsel for War Crimes.

CERTIFICATION

I, ERNA E. UIBERALL, AGO No. D-150096, hereby certify that the above is a true and correct copy of Document No. NI - 5197, the original of which is in the English language.

ERNA E. UIBERALL
U. S. Civilian
AGO No. D-150096

END

- 40 -

A F F I D A V I T

I, GEORG VON SCHNITZLER, member of the Vorstand of I.G. Farbenindustrie from 1925 until 1945, after having been warned that I will be liable to punishment for making a false statement herewith state the following under oath of my own free will and without coercion.

1. I was living near Frankfurt, Germany in late March 1945 when the American armed forces occupied the area. I was taken into custody on 7 May 1945 by the American authorities and I have remained in detention ever since that time, except for three periods when I was granted authority to be with my wife under house arrest. During the period from May until the late Fall of 1945, I was regularly questioned by American and Allied investigators, particularly by the American investigators, Mr. Ritchie, Mr. Weisbrodt, Mr. Glaser, Mr. Linville, Mr. Hollander and Mr. Devine. During this period of investigation I was ordinarily brought from Freungesheim prison in Frankfurt, Germany to the Reichsbank building in Frankfurt nearly every day along with a number of other former officials of the I.G. Farbenindustrie. There I and the other officials were asked to give information concerning the history of the I.G. Farbenindustrie and other matters either through interrogations or by writing up or dictating various statements concerning topics which were given to us by one or more of the investigators.

2. It has always been my intention to give the truth according to the best of my knowledge and belief to the Allied investigators. I never intentionally gave false information of any kind. The relationship between the investigators and me in Frankfurt during 1945 was very free and open and very cordial. In Freungesheim American soldier prisoners were also detained. On a number of occasions I felt that I was mistreated in the jail because of the dislike which certain of the soldiers had for me. When I reported some of these incidents to the

(signed) G v Schnitzler

investigators, they interceded on my behalf with some success and sometimes without success. The investigators generally stated that they wanted me to give my best recollection of events without access to documents. Except for a few occasions when my recollection was refreshed by being shown a document, the statements I made and the interrogations to which I subscribed were based entirely upon my recollection and belief as of the time I was interrogated and made the particular statements. At no time during the investigations of 1945 was I prevented from correcting any statement which I made if thereafter I thought I had made an error. The typewritten statements which I signed were made in the following manner: I would first be asked to give information on a certain topic. Thereafter I would go to a room where I could be alone and write up the matter in longhand or else make long-hand notes which I later used as a basis for dictating a statement to a German or American stenographer who took English stenography. Sometimes it took me less than a day to write up some of the statements. With some of the longer statements, however, it took me as long as three days to complete them. After the stenographer or typist reduced the statement to writing I went over the statement to make any corrections and then certified to the truth of the statement. The records of the interrogations were made as follows: Sometimes the questions and answers were immediately reduced to writing as originally made. Sometimes, after a period of discussion between the interrogator and me, a question or answer would be written down for the record which summarized the results of the matters discussed. Whichever of these methods was followed in these interrogations, I thereafter went over the written record of the interrogation to correct any errors and thereafter certified to the truth of the matters stated in the interrogation. In October I was removed from prison and placed under house arrest and thereafter re-arrested again. Mr. Edelman, CIG Finance Chief,

(signed) G v Schnitzler

informed me this was done on orders of higher headquarters because I was in the category of mandatory arrest. At that time I was informed in writing by Mr. Devine that the reason for my further imprisonment was not because of any failure to cooperate with the American authorities. This same letter states that my "assistance from an information gathering standpoint has been invaluable."

3. After these interrogations in 1945 were concluded I was detained in a number of prisons or detention camps along with leading officials of the I.G. Farbenindustrie. After discussing a number of matters concerning which I had given information with my colleagues, I came to the conclusion that I gave some erroneous information to the investigators in 1945. In no instance do I feel that I gave erroneous information intentionally. What I stated and concluded in the statements and interrogations in 1945 represented the truth as I saw it then to the best of my recollection and belief. I account for any errors which I made entirely for the following reasons: After the collapse of Germany I was in a state of great mental depression. I felt clearly that the Hitler regime had caused the ruin of Germany and of a great deal of Europe. Under these circumstances I associated some events together which I do not now feel should have been associated together in making some of the conclusions which I made. Moreover, I was asked to give my recollection and my conclusions concerning a number of events which were connected with I.G. Farben in the technical or in other fields where my duties had not given me a full insight into the true facts and concerning which I could then, in 1945, obtain no assistance by reference to the I.G. files. What I stated to the investigators in 1945 was true to the best of my recollection and belief at that time. However, since then I have talked to some of my colleagues who were better informed of these matters than I was and I must conclude I made certain errors which I certified as the truth to the Allied investigators.
signed) G v Schnitzler

4. Between 18 February 1947 and the present time, representatives of the Office of the Chief of Counsel for War Crimes showed me many of the statements and interrogations to which I had subscribed in 1945. I have been asked to point out any falsehoods or errors which I made in these statements or interrogations. I have stated to them under oath that I had made no false statements, because the statements I made were true to the best of my knowledge and belief at the time that I made them in 1945. However, where I unintentionally made errors in these statements, I have pointed out these errors. The errors I now find after re-reading the statements or interrogations mentioned below are set forth below:

5. On the 11 September 1945 I signed a three page statement entitled "Curriculum Vitae / George Von Schnitzler," the text of which is as follows:

"I am born in Cologne on the Rhine Oct. 29th 1884.

My father: Paul von Schnitzler was a judge

my mother: Fanny Joest, 84 years old still lives in Godesberg on the Rhine.

Having finished school (Humanistsches Gymnasium), I visited the Universities of Bonn and Berlin, became Dr. jur. and Gerichts-Assessor, qualification for becoming a judge or lawyer.

I am married to Lilly von Hallinckrodt, born in Cologne June 25th 1889.

Her father Wilhelm von Hallinckrodt was German,
her mother Charlotte Günther Belgian.

We have married in Antwerp. We have two married daughters, the elder one lives separated from her husband, and 4 grand-sons.

I entered business in Hoechst am Main at Farbwerke vorm. Meister Lucius & Brüning, one of the mother-houses of I.G. Farbenindustrie A.G., July first 1912. Thus I am 33 years with the company.

I started with commercial apprenticeship, going over all commercial departments including the technical departments for the application of dyestuffs and was sent to Munich as a first post..

When world war I broke out, I volunteered with the Infantry-Leib-Regiment Munich, but on account of a timely deficiency of my heart I was appointed to the Generalkommando of the I. Bavarian

(signed) G v Schnitzler

Army-Corps in Munich with the rank of a sergeant and did not become an officer of the army. In 1916 I was registered as "Intendantur-Beamter for war-time," as a military I remained sergeant (Unteroffizier).

After my demobilisation I returned to Frankfurt and was charged in Hoechst with the negotiations with the French occupation-authorities. In June 1920 I became a deputy member of the Vorstand and in summer 1923 an ordinary member of it, having in the meantime very quickly acquired the highest commercial position in the Farbwerke. My first experience in foreign dealings I acquired as right hand man of late Mr. Carl von Weinberg, whom I accompanied continuously on his voyages to Paris in order to settle the questions arising out of the Versailles-treaty (1919-1924).

After the merger 1925 I became deputy-chairman of the so called Farben-Ausschuss, the chairman was Dr. Schuon, and when Schuon retired, at the end of 1927 I became his successor.

In 1931 Zentral-Ausschuss of I.G. was formed and from the very beginning I was its member, first under the leadership of Bosch and later on under Schmitz.

In 1929 Stresemann asked me through Geheimrat Duisberg to become Commissioner of the Reich for the world-exhibition of Barcelona. I accepted and since that time I always was considered as being one of the first experts in Germany in the domain of fairs and exhibitions and acted for a certain time as chairman of that committee in the International Chamber of Commerce in Paris.

Politically I have never been active, I considered myself as belonging to the Deutsche Volkspartei (Stresemann-party) and fostered this party financially. I gave them 11 500.- for every election. Unfortunately this party entirely lost its standing, it came down to only two representatives.

When Hitler came to power I like many men of my kind felt it my duty to endeavour a certain influence when ever possible in order to check the most senseless and the revolting clauses of the party program particularly the handling of the Jewish problem. In the years 33-36 I always hoped that things might get better if men of sense and morality would win some influence and partook in the socialistic part of the Hitler-program gaining the confidence of the masses back. - This attitude might explain the following steps.

At the end of 1933 practically all owners of private cars among the directors of I.G. Frankfurt were asked to enter the NSKK. Being at the time 42 years of age I agreed to enter it but practically did not do any service. Thus in the year 1934 in the month of May on another call addressed to me directly by the president of Frankfurt police I was taken over from NSKK which at the time was part of SA to SA group-staff in order to help them in the unemployment problem, which at the time stood in the foreground. At the end of 1936 this question being practically solved my advisory capacity came to an end. It had only been exercised by coming into the office of SA group-staff, studying papers and applications for employment and eventually giving suggestions but

(signed) G v Schmitzler

I did not handle any questions myself under my own responsibility. The titles of "Sturmführer" merely honorary were conveyed on me as an acknowledgement of the before-mentioned help; they did not include any functions nor was any kind of service to be performed. As I did not want to be mixed up with the policy of the Party and agreeing only with the socialistic part of the party-program - the creation of "Die klassenlose Gesellschaft" - that means abolishment of the struggle between the social classes - I refracted and abstained from the membership of the party as long as ever possible. After having become the first of January 1938 Betriebsführer, that means first officer, in I.G. Frankfurt, a position which in the interest of the company as well as of the people employed in Frankfurt I accepted, I was inevitably enlisted as a party member.

The application was made in February 1938, my number is high above 5 million, it should be something like 5.385.000. I never got a party-book, but only the so-called red-card which will be found with my files in I.G. The date of entry was dated back on May first 1937.

I have never had any advantages financial or other through the party or party affiliations. As beforementioned I am a member of Zentral-Ausschuss of I.G. since 1931. 1931 was the year of my highest income, it never reached that height later on again.

My personal record is well known in Frankfurt, in the first instance by personalities having been asked in office lately by the American Administration, namely Mr. Holbach, Dr. Mertens, Dr. Beutler Piltow, Dr. Euler, Reiffenberg and the new president of the Chamber of Commerce, Dr. Petersen. About this Mr. Redecker, former US Consul in Frankfurt, who as I heard has been newly appointed as Consul here, will surely be ready to refer about me.

From 1935-41 I was deputy-chairman of Wirtschaftsgruppe Chemie; when in 1942 the Wirtschafts-Gruppe was transformed in a corporative institution under a "Präsidium" with a strong party-note I with the other members of the "Engerer Beirat" including Dr. Hess, the former chairman, were dismissed.

In Oct. 1943 when Weber-Andreas died, a new solution had to be found for his succession. - I became the chairman of a Zentral-Direktorium of "Verkaufsgemeinschaft Chemikalien". Apart from myself Haefliger, Borgwardt and von Heider were members."

Frankfurt, Sept. 11th, 1945.

(signed) G. VON SCHNITZLER.

This statement still appears to me to be entirely true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief, except, referring to page 2, I believe my Party Card Number was about 5,835,000 instead of about 5,385,000.

6. On 20 August 1945 I signed a three page statement entitled

"Statement of Mr. Von Schnitzler", the text of which is as follows:

(signed) G v Schnitzler

"The I.G. is what is called in German language a "concern."
The term "concern" means that an enterprise has taken up an evolu-
tion that it comprises not only different domains, but that dif-
ferent firms of a varied character are united under the heading and
the guidance of the controlling enterprise. Apart from I.G., the
best known old established concerns in Germany are Vereinigte
Stahlwerke and Siemens-Schuckert. The development of I.G. from a
number of independent firms to a concern was performed in a rela-
tively short time. It is publicly known that I.G. has been con-
stituted in 1925 by a merger of six chemical firms which took over
the shares of the seventh one, "Cassella." Even at that time
although the bigger ones of the so-called mother houses represented
a high potential of economic power -- the term "concern" did not
apply to the whole combine. The activities of I.G. could be
strictly distributed in the (1) inorganic chemistry (acid, caustic
soda, etc.) (2) the aromatic organic field (dyestuffs and pharma-
ceuticals) and (3) the high pressure industry (nitrogen and
methanol). Thus I.G.'s activity was strictly limited to the purely
chemical domain and had not yet entered the many new fields which
led her on the way of the metallurgical as well as of the oil, and
the domain of plastic masses, including rubber. The germs of the
new developments were laid, but had not yet come to blossom and
nobody could foresee how fantastic the results of the development
would be. Retrospectively seen, the growing to a concern was a
continuous and uninterrupted one year after year even in the time
of the deepest depression. In the years of the world crisis of
1931, the technical progress did not come to a standstill and when
the program of autarky and rearmament came to execution, the speed
of the expansion became an overwhelming one. The aliphatic
chemical industry which had been developing as a third big part of
chemical activity and which apart of the limited quantities of
ethylene made by coke gases entirely reposes on carbide reached a
volume in weight ten times as big as was represented by the aromatic
organic chemistry. This aliphatic chemical industry was only taken
up in 1917 and up to that time, the aromatic industry represented
practically along the organic chemical industry. The main pro-
ducts in this aliphatic domain were Buna and different new plastics,
but the progress made was not smaller in the domain of the electro-
chemical field where Bitterfeld and its affiliations realized an
enormous expansion in aluminum and magnesium and exactly the same
happened in the cellulose chemical field where rayon and photo-
graphic articles showed a continuously climbing turnover, in the
synthetic fabrics altogether where indeed I.G. had a relatively
small share (18%), but for which I.G. had to supply the bulk of
the raw materials -- caustic soda and sulphur S.G.2, a development
from nil to nearly 300,000 tons a year was realized. It can not
be the object of this statement to enumerate the different en-
deavors which succeeded in the bringing up of so vast an expansion.
The laboratory work prepared and continued since decades the pro-
perty of a huge range of patents and a staff of highly trained and
gifted chemists cooperated to constitute the basis for an industrial
achievement, which, in this country, had no parallel. The economic
result for the company was no less brilliant than the chemical
achievement. Up to the end of 1943, not only the turnover but just
as well the profit figures showed an upward trend. In the meantime,
following the decree of the first days of the war regarding prices,
at least 120,000,000 R. per annum were sacrificed on the original
pre-war prices and all that was achieved notwithstanding that
equipment and material during the war always became more expensive

(signed) G v Schmitzler

and that the quality of the workmen showed a decrease, instead of of the skilled men who more and more got to be mobilized, women and foreign workmen became employed and it was inevitable that they could not realize the same performance as the men whom they had replaced. It had often been complained of in I.G. circles that I.G. practically alone showed in the chemical field an activity in inventing and carrying through technical processes which met the corresponding efforts of the American chemical industry, where at least half a dozen big firms were devoting themselves to new inventions and processes. The poor endeavors and the feeble results of the other chemical industries (partly due to a lack of enterprise and readiness to take over substantial commercial risks) meant for I.G. a strong obstacle in her relations with them. Notwithstanding that, I.G. always had to protect that industry by the most varied methods in supplying them with raw materials, intermediates, licenses and know-how. The jealousy of this industry was never to be quieted and the unpopularity of I.G. to a large extent was due to that jealousy which never or seldom openly came to expression but was always like a gleaming fire under the surface. However it was, I.G. could not bring science to a stand-still because the smaller chemical industrialists would have liked her to do so and the progress of science brought up another development in an additional field. In former times, I.G. always had taken the standpoint that it should limit its activities on the proper domain of chemistry and not interfere with their customer's business. Thus I.G. never took an interest in textile factories or in dyer's trade and even refused every participation in the lacquer and varnish industry, although some of the pigment dyes were made simultaneously by those producers and I.G. itself. The newly developed products in the field of aliphatic chemistry as well as in the light metal field demanded a change of this policy. In order to teach the consumers industry the employment of these new products, I.G. had to erect or to buy entire plants in which these products were transformed into the finished articles, the fabrication of which normally would have been the task of the consumers. As to an example, I may only refer to the tire factory in IEV, which had to play a pioneer's role in the employment of Buna, and in the great laboratories of Bitterfeld as well as in the Dynamit A.G. works in Troisdorf, a substantial manufacturing of finished articles in all kinds of plastics, tubes, wires, entire parts of machinery, etc., was done. In the light metal field, a great firm Hegu in Leipzig was acquired which was in the first line a foundry in order to give practical application for magnesium alloys and even a rolling work in Letmathe was taken over jointly with Vereinigte Stahlwerke for rolling tentatives of such alloys. I.G. had to engage specialists for these different tasks, men who were not acquainted with I.G.'s main activities and only could have a loose connection with the chemical field in general. The more I.G. became a concern in the aforementioned way, the less efficient became the power and survey of the central administration. Bookkeeping and financial control more and more replaced the immediate knowledge of the technical and commercial methods in which one was engaged and the central committees developed to registry offices where scientific reports were given and where one took notice of figures. The management of I.G. was in no way satisfied with that development and for years the question was discussed if by splitting up I.G. and creating new independent companies one could not achieve the following three

(signed) G v Schnitzler

aims: (1) to withdraw from I.G. the reproach to be a "state within the state." (2) to separate the original old business of dyestuffs, pharmaceuticals and chemicals from the newly developed great commodities like nitrogen, Buna and oil over which perpetually the danger of nationalization was pending, (3) to have the newly put factories of Auschwitz and Heydebrek with the coal mines united in Ost-Chemie A.G. None of these aims ever materialized and even from the Nazi government, also being strongly opposed to I.G. as an institution, never came any suggestions as to what in their opinion I.G. should do. The difficulty of splitting up augmented from year to year as the interconnection of the factories became more and more complex. Heydebrek, for instance is practically a repetition of Oppau, the whole scientific work being done in Oppau, and even for Leuna up to now Oppau is to a large extent the scientific brain center. Generally speaking, the historical evolution from the Rhine to middle Germany and Upper Silesia materialized in such a way that a new works always were a kind of colonies of the old ones and a great responsibility would have to be taken over when one would have tried to separate the young works from the old ones. Also from the aspect of the shareholder it was extremely difficult to find an equitable solution. In offering him for instance shares of a newly built Ost-Chemie, A.G., had I.G. not to take a guarantee for the dividends and would such guarantee not make any illusion the whole construction of the new so-called independent company?

VS Thus everything as far as the general structure of I.G. was concerned remained unchanged and every month added something new to the existing potential. The industrial position of I.G. in Germany had no parallel with any other enterprise. Vereinigte Stahlwerke employed more people and the state-owned Hermann Goering Works had collected so many different enterprises that their capital and their turnover might even have been higher than that of I.G., but both their domains of activity, their earning capacity and scientific performance, was incomparably smaller than what I.G. could show in these domains. Compared with the great companies abroad, even in the United States, no single individual company had so large a field of progressive scientific enterprise as I.G. Dupont, next to I.G., the greatest chemical combine in the world, has the great merit to have brought out the first marketable synthetic rubber, neoprene, and was just as active in the whole chemistry of polymerization as I.G. Apart from that, Dupont invented the nylon fiber and realized substantial progress in the field of vat dyestuffs in bringing them into new and efficient forms. Also in the general chemical field, Dupont was highly progressive; the same applies to the Union Carbides, the American Celanese, as well as to Eastman Kodak, but all these enterprises were much more specialized than I.G. and did not cover so large a field as I.G.'s research work did. Of course one must not forget the entirely different structure of the American and of the German economy. Germany was a small country, was of relatively poor soil having only a strong coal basis and relatively strong basis in water power. Transportation was well-developed and the distances short. Thus the inducement to produce commodities, which in countries being larger and richer than Germany were available by the gift of nature, was far bigger in this country and it is not a pure hazard that as well the nitrogen as the Buna has come from Germany, the traditional country of the synthesis. The predominant role which I.G. had to play in this development was

(signed) G v Schmitzler

indicated by the fact that I.G. represented the combined force of the firms which even before the merger were the strongest and the most active ones in the chemistry of all Europe, if not of the world. It is the Badische Anilin and Soda-Fabr. and Farbenfabriken in Leverkusen, the laboratories of which constituted the cells from which the whole technical expansion originated."

(signed) G. von Schnitzler

This statement still appears to be entirely true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief, except that:

(a) At page 2, I perhaps exaggerated by saying I.G.'s "Central committees developed to registry offices", but that does give the sense of the development.

(b) At page 2, eighth line from the bottom "a new works always were a kind of colonies" should be written "the new works always were a type of colonies".

(c) At page 2, second line from the bottom "illusion" should be "allusion".

7. On 18 July 1945 I signed the transcript of a one page interrogation on the "Auslandsorganisation", the text of which is given below:

Q. What do you know about the A.O. and your foreign Agencies?

A. The A.O. is a department of the party under the guidance of Herr Bohle.

Q. What was the purpose of the A.O.?

A. The famous work "Gleichschaltung". That means going on a certain line.

Q. What is the line?

A. The line was firstly to want no Jews; secondly to want as few foreigners as possible; thirdly all that was German "Verein" should disappear and only one unique Nazi social organization should result in everything forthly collect as much money as possible.

Q. How would you classify foreign propaganda?

A. The propaganda department was just a department of the whole. They wanted the absolute control of German firms abroad, except the USA. But even there they interfered in the "Deutsche Verein" in New York, which blew up. Victor Riddler left the Deutsche Verein in New York.

Q. What was the relation between I.G. and A.O.?

A. We were for the first years under continuous pressure, we had more and more to follow the official line.

Q. When did the relationship between I.G. and A.O. begin?

A. About 1932. In 1933-1934.

Q. It improved so much that I.G. completely harmonized its policy with the policy of the A.O.?

A. Not completely harmonized.

(signed) G v Schnitzler

- Q. What were the frictions?
A. The A.O. considered certain men not fit to represent the I.G.
in foreign countries.
Q. For example?
A. In many countries in the Southeast."

I have read the record of this interrogation and swear
that the answers therein given by me to the questions of Mr.
Weissbrodt and Mr. Devine are true.

(signed) G. von Schnitzler

Vorstandsmitglied I.G. Farben-
industrie Aktiengesellschaft

The answers to the questions as written in this interrogation transcript
still appear to me to be entirely true and correct to the best of my
knowledge and belief. A typographical error in the second answer should
be corrected. "Famous work" should be "famous word". In the third
vS answer a semi-colon should be placed after "everything". Of course much
vS be said concerning the relations between A.O. and the I.G. much more is to

8. I have carefully read each of the eleven pages of this declara-
tion and have placed my signature at the bottom of each page. I have
made the necessary corrections in my own handwriting and initialed each
correction in the margin of the page. I declare herewith under oath
that I have stated the full truth to the best of my knowledge and belief.

(signed) Georg von Schnitzler
Georg von Schnitzler

Sworn to and signed before me this 4th day of March 1947, at the
vS Palace of Justice in Nuernberg, Germany, by George von Schnitzler,
known to me to be the person making the above affidavit.

(signed) Drexel A. Sprecher
Drexel A. Sprecher

U. S. Civilian, Attorney, AGO No. 473307
Office of Chief of Counsel for War Crimes

CERTIFICATION

I, ERNA E. UIBERALL, AGO No. D-150096, hereby certify that the
above is a true and correct copy of Document No. NI-5191, the original
of which is in the English language.

ERNA E. UIBERALL
U. S. Civilian
AGO No. D-150096

END

- 12 -

Excerpts from
"VON WERK ZU WERK"

Monthly publication of I. G. Workers' Community
Ludwigshafen Edition
of August 1938
pages 172/175

THE CHEMICAL INDUSTRY OF GERMANY

An address by Dr. von Schnitzler, Frankfurt a. Main

The Internationale Gesellschaft fuer kaufmaennisches Bildungswesen (International Company for Training in Commerce) arranged in July of this year, an international economic course, which was attended by over 400 persons from more than 20 countries. The participants in this economic course, in their educational journey through Germany, also went to Frankfurt a. M., where, among other things, they visited the administration building of I.G. Farben. Here, the Chief of the Management (Fuehrer des Betriebes), Director Dr. von Schnitzler, after warmly welcoming the guests, gave an address on the importance of the chemical industry of Germany, which was received with utmost approval. As his considered remarks on the many aspects of the work of the German chemical industry and their national political tasks will also be of particular interest to the members of our staff, we reproduce below the text of the address:

The importance of chemistry is to-day acknowledged all over the world. Branches of chemical industry are, therefore, found in practically all countries. They serve mostly to improve technical production capacity, to promote export and as a foundation for their war economy.

On top of all that chemical industry has become, for German political economy, an economic factor of positively fundamental importance. It is not confined to perfecting technical possibilities or making the best of existing resources, thereby making life more beautiful and more pleasant, but it creates so to speak the sources of supply for our people, thereby laying the foundation of its very existence. This development was caused largely by the world war and its disastrous consequences for Germany. Important sources of raw material were at that time taken from Germany through the loss of her colonies and other territories. Germany was cut off from the raw material resources of the world and left to her own home resources. Chemical science thereby became the sole and indispensable means of alleviating the shortage of raw materials.

These tasks of the German chemical industry have received a tremendous new impulse through the Four Years' Plan of our Fuehrer Adolf Hitler which is known to you. In the insufficiency of natural resources, it is up to chemical science to guarantee to our people their freedom of economic action. It is its task to procure what nature does not give us in adequate quantity or in useable form. In the way of chemical conversion, thousands of valuable new materials are thus created from raw materials, of which there is an ample supply such as water, air and coal.

In the deficiency of natural resources also lies the real reason for the unique development of the chemical industry in Germany, and it is by no means an accident that Germany should have given to the world as her special contribution in the field of chemical technology synthetic materials made from these very elements which are common and of little value. It can indeed be said that it was precisely the prevailing

deficiency of raw materials which has again and again spurred the chemical industry of Germany on to new discoveries and technical achievements. Therein lies, despite the narrow confines of our German Lebensraum, an undoubted asset and it is becoming ever more apparent that certain advantages can be derived from this situation which are beyond the reach of a nation, which because of an abundance of natural resources is not constrained to make the same effort.

A typical basic material for the manifold products which the inventive skill of the chemical science has presented to the German people, is coal; a material which fortunately is at Germany's disposal in fairly large quantities. As far back as the sixties of the last century the aniline dyestuffs industry in Germany took its starting point from coal. The revolutionary discoveries which were at that time made in the dyestuffs industry, thereby allowing it to develop rapidly are well known. I need only mention in this connection the replacement remarkable for its economic consequences of the two most important natural dyestuffs Krapp and Indigo by synthetic products. Parallel with the aniline dyestuffs industry went the sudden rise in pharmaceutical production, which contributed along with medical man's discoveries its share to lengthening man's average expectation of life.

Apart from this it was frequently only the development of new pharmaceutical preparations, which made economic activity overseas possible. There again German inventions played a part, although Germany, after the loss of her colonies, derived no direct benefit from this development. I need only mention ^{here} the wellknown remedy against sleeping sickness, Germanin, and the malaria remedies Atobrin and Plasmochin.

It is on coal, moreover, that the synthetic fuel industry is built up, the importance of which cannot be stressed too much, and which, owing to the rapid progress of the mechanization of all means of transport in Germany has become of the greatest economic importance in the execution of the Four Year Plan. Germany is not in a position to meet its gasoline requirements from her own resources of mineral oils. This has become increasingly obvious, owing to the loss of the oil fields of Alsace Lorraine after the war. Full utilization of the highways already constructed in Germany and those still planned, can therefore be realized only through production of synthetic petrol. Allow me to mention in this connection, that here, the high pressure hydrogenation process developed by I. G. Farben A. G. in difficult, long drawn out and costly research, a process which has been used for years on a large scale at the Louna Works, takes first place.

* * * * *

(page 6 of original)

It is only natural that the political revolution of Germany in 1939 should also have had some effect on Science. But the view, occasionally voiced abroad, that the leaders of the National Socialist State underestimate the importance of Science and research, involves a complete misreading of the facts. Exactly the contrary is true.

Not only do the great tasks awaiting solution demand, as of necessity, an intensification of scientific research, but it must moreover be stated, that one of the fundamental ideas of National Socialism is identical with the motives which provide the incentive for research; for just as we, the citizens of the third Reich, are caught up in a continuous process of

TRANSLATION OF EXCERPTS OF DOCUMENT No. NI-6529
CONTINUED

(page 6 of original continued)

Becoming, and are unceasingly endeavouring to make ourselves the masters of our fate, there may be found in all research a similar unceasing inner urge which serves as a spur to the true, the singleminded, investigator, and forces Science to surrender to him her profoundest mysteries. There have been times when one generation of men lived on the achievements of another and rested on the scientific laurels of its forbears: But it can be claimed today that at least here in Germany the problems of the distant future have never been tackled with more energy or greater zeal.

There can be no doubt that the 4 Year Plan has given many new stimuli to chemical research in Germany and will continue to do so; or that it will prove to be a forcing house and a sign post to chemical technology (chemische Technik). We are once more upon the threshold of a new and glorious era in the annals of chemical science. Scientific discoveries are laying the foundation stones of our national existence: they are, for that reason, attracting, in ever greater measure, the attention of the public. That means that today chemical science is perhaps farther removed than any other branch of Science from isolating itself in abstract theoretical calculations: it is indeed, more deeply rooted in life than ever, appointed to stand sentinel, amidst the problems of our time, over our economic independence.

* * * * *

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO. NI-6529

19 May 1947

We, VICTORIA ORTON, 20 129, and LEONARD LAWRENCE, D 427458, herewith certify that we are thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of excerpts of document no. NI-6529.

VICTORIA ORTON
20 129

LEONARD LAWRENCE
D 427458

- 4 -
END

ERRATA SHEET

Title page of translation of Document No. NI-6528 should read:

THE NEW TASKS OF GERMAN

NATIONAL ECONOMY

by

Dr. Bruno Kieseewetter

Chairman of studies at the German College of Politics

1937

Junker and Duennhaupt Publishing House / Berlin

Errata sheet prepared by:

JOHN J. BOLL
U. S. Civilian
AGO # 1-444412

- End -

Publications
of the German College of Politics
edited by
Paul Meier-Benneckenstein

Dr. Bruno KIESE ETTER
THE NEW TASKS OF GERMAN NATIONAL ECONOMY

Publishers Junker and Duennhaupt / Berlin

(page 2 of original)

(Page 21 of book)

The New Tasks of German National Economy.

.....

The raw materials we actually possess within our frontiers, such as wool, iron, copper, lead, zinc, petroleum, are for the most part present only in insufficient quantities, while other raw materials, such as cotton, jute, mineral phosphate, tin, rubber, we do not possess at all. We are therefore faced with the task of exploring our German Fatherland for mineral wealth. Hermann Goering has pointed out that only a tenth part of our German earth has been geophysically explored for mineral wealth. There are areas in Germany which have been known for centuries to contain ore deposits, but which have not been mined, because it was considered preferable to buy the cheaper and, in fact, richer ore from abroad. So great is our need for raw materials that we must at the same time set about the total salvage and putting to account of all available scrap materials. One of the most important raw materials of the iron-producing industry is scrap-iron, of which at present nine or ten million tons is required, amounting in value to nearly

(page 3 of original)

a quarter of a billion Reich marks. We must exert ourselves, wherever possible, to replace raw materials and metal, which we formerly had to obtain from abroad, by new, artificial products. Metals cannot, it is true, be synthetically produced. Here we can proceed only with the help

(page 3 of original, cont'd)

of alloys, by hardening, for example, light metals such as aluminium, magnesium, electron and others with the appropriate alloy and giving these metals qualities otherwise possessed only by the heavy metals. German aluminium production shows a remarkable increase from 18,900 tons in 1933 to 95,200 tons in 1936. Research on alloys and technical processes in the field of precious and non-precious metals, as in the field of light and heavy metals, promises good results. The substitution of zinc-die casting for brass is calculated to effect a saving in foreign currency of £ 1000 for every 100 tons of brass.

In the case of those raw materials, however, which possess organic components, artificial production is easier and great progress has already been made. I am thinking here mainly of the liquefaction of coal to produce petroleum. We are already carrying this out on such a scale that, as the Fuehrer has announced, we shall in about one to one and a half years be independent of liquid fuel imported from abroad. 80% of our motor fuel requirements depended on these imports. Germany is faced with a mighty problem in view of the constantly increasing demand for mineral oil. From 1933-1936 we imported in thousands of tons: 2648 - 3094 - 3767 - 4203. Of the two million tons of light fuels used by Germany in 1935, 45%, in other words almost half, was produced at home. The second major achievement of German economy and technical science is the production of synthetic rubber, called Buna, produced from coal and lime, to which, being artificial material, those qualities have been largely imparted, which natural rubber does not possess.

.....

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

24 June 1947

I, Victoria OXTON, No. 20129, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages and that the above is a true and correct translation of Excerpts from document No. NI-6528.

Victoria OXTON
No. 20129

- 2 -
"END"

124

The
FOUR YEAR PLAN

Periodical of national socialist Political Economy with the official
statements of the Commissioner for the Four Year Plan, Minister
President Generaloberst Goering.

Publisher: Dr. Erich Gritzbach Chief Editor: Dr. Kurt Peterse

Central publisher for the NSDAP., Franz Eher Nachf. GmbH.,
Berlin SW 68

Series 5 Berlin, May 1937 1st Year

We Germans have less raw materials than other nations. It is now
our task to secure by every means within our power the raw materials
which we lack for production. In so far as we are able to do this
through exchange with other countries, all is well. In so far as this
is impossible, we cannot say: "It cannot be done!" No, that is the
time when the human intellect and the human will must exert themselves
to find a remedy in their own resources. That is how the Four Year Plan
was born. But what should we achieve with such a plan, did not a
multitude of millions of firmly united people stand behind it? This
mighty task, the fulfilment of which will now involve the whole of
our nation for four years, can truly succeed only through the united
endeavour of the entire German people. The greatest exertions and the
greatest achievements are necessary if we are to fulfil this task.
For there stands at the head of our national socialist economic policy,
not the word "theory", not the word "money", nor "capital", but the
word "production".

Adolf Hitler in his speech of 1 May 1937.

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT No. NI-7276

15 July 1947

I, BERYL C. BESWICK, D 427459, herewith certify that I am thoroughly
conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above
is a true and correct translation of the document no. NI-7276.

BERYL C. BESWICK
D 427459

END

125

ERRATA SHEET

Translation of Document No. NI-6628 should be preceded by the following statement:

(Translator's note: the following article is taken from the periodical

" THE FOUR YEAR PLAN "

8th issue, Berlin, August 1937, first year of publication.)

Errata sheet prepared by:

JOHN J. BOLL,
U.S. Civilian,
AGO A-444412.

C. KRAUCH

YOUTH TO THE FORE

The Problem of Training in Science and Engineering.

The cry of the overcrowding of the colleges, the warnings against academic studies, the complaints of an academic proletariat still ring in our ears. Quite suddenly a decisive change has come about, a change still unnoticed by the public at large. In industry today, some 5,000 engineers are already required to meet demands. The figures for the technical colleges dropped half from 1930 to 1935. Enrollments declined to a third. Labor service and military service now postpone the completion of the professional training of present students by 2½ years. By 1942, the total of 250,000 engineers available will be 30-35,000 short of the total required. The same state of affairs exists as far as chemists, the second largest professional group of scientists, are concerned.

Today the colleges are short of lecturers and, above all, of assistants. This fact has already led to a considerable decline in the standard of examination results of the final examination candidates of colleges and technical schools. Before going into the reasons for this development and making practical proposals, I consider it necessary to say a few words about the significance of these tendencies for the destiny of our people.

The German people is forced to live in much too restricted a space. Exclusion from the possession of the world's sources of raw materials compels us to produce the materials necessary for her national security by chemical means from her own resources - from coal, salts, lime and other materials, as well as from air and water. That is the purport of the Four-Year-Plan, as described by the Fuehrer in the words: "I present this today as the new Four-Year-Program. In four years, Germany must be

(page 2 of original)

completely independent, as far as concerns all those materials from abroad which it is in any way possible for German skill to produce through our chemical and engineering industries and through our mining industry itself".

Besides this great, comprehensive task, the second vital need of the German people, is to produce and constantly to improve the quality of the goods for export which, as assets in international trade, will secure for the German people the goods and services from abroad which are necessary to maintain and to raise its standard of living.

To fulfil these great obligations, everyone in his place must give of his best. The final result can, however, only be achieved if

(page 2 of original, cont'd)

no one drops out or falls short of the utmost within his power. With the best will in the world and the greatest effort possible, the worker in the factories will not be able to reach the target set, if the engineers or chemists fail to fulfil expectations or are not sufficient in number. The scientist and the technician are indispensable to the farmer, for they provide him with the means to reap and to increase the harvest of his labor and place at his disposal the machinery and fertilizers essential to his work. The soldier also needs the co-operation of science and engineering, which, in a world of constantly improving armaments, supply him with the weapons to enable him successfully - and this from the point of view of technical superiority - to meet any attacks which might threaten our people.

It is apparent, therefore, that, besides the worker, the foreman and the soldier, the scientist and the technician too have a great and important task to fulfil in the destiny of our people. The scientist and the technician seldom appear in the public view; their activities are made known only when great and revolutionary discoveries are made. And yet it is they whose efforts can and must exert the decisive influence on the survival of the German people in the present and its security and progressive development in the future, an aim the achievement of which we, together with the Fuehrer, all desire.

We see, therefore, that the maintenance and development of German science and the training of German engineers and chemists are of the greatest importance to the community and that backwardness in this sector of the front could ultimately endanger the success of the German people and its leadership in the struggle for the ascendancy.

Now what are the reasons for the development indicated above?

The economic progress achieved by the National Socialist leadership, and rearmament has absorbed for practical ends all that was available in the field of technical and chemical training. In order to judge the future development, let us start by considering how the young man, standing on the threshold of his career, today views his future: The high school senior who belongs to the Hitler Youth, the SS or the SA, acquires there, as in school, an earnest sense of responsibility which induces him to consider it his duty to devote his life and his work to the building up and the progress of his Fatherland. To this end he must acquire in his youth, comprehensive knowledge, so that, while establishing a family, he may soon be able to use it for the good of his country. Above all, the merits of the "practical" callings, that of the skilled workman, the merchant and above all of the officer and political leader ^{are} repeatedly brought to his notice;

(page 3 of original)

the scientist and scholar, on the other hand, and especially the expert in natural sciences, who is occupied with things "mathematical", is unfortunately often looked upon as a solitary stay-at-home, past

(page 3 of original, cont'd)

whom the stream of life flows unobserved. For this reason, a bright and lively youth, when considering the question of his future career is more inclined, despite his marked talents for natural sciences, to become an officer, or, if his home circumstances favor it, a business man, or possibly a doctor, as being one who can render practical help to suffering humanity. He finds it, however, much less easy to resolve to pursue so "theoretical" a subject as Natural Sciences. In addition, the young student taking up engineering and chemistry perhaps sees at first too long a program of studies and training before him. Naturally, he cannot yet see sufficiently clearly what certain chances will be open to him if he displays personal industry and suitable talents in the economic field. It is no longer by any means an exclusively American privilege to facilitate the climb of the young technician to the highest peak. In the Germany of today the economic field also offers manifold possibilities for the display of knowledge and ability in responsible posts.

How can the tendency which must lead to a neglect of natural-scientific and technical professions be arrested? In replying to this question, let us make an attempt in the following to say something which should be considered as suggestion. The situation is such that matters can be altered by unanimous co-operation of all departments and organizations concerned with these matters.

The following measures seem important:—

I. The clarification of public opinion on the importance of science and engineering to our nation and particularly on the following points:

1. The exploitation of valuable scientific and technical achievements is indispensable to the realization of our political aim.
2. Scientific and technical work in college and laboratory, in drawing office and in industry is direct co-operation in the safeguarding of the present and the future of our nation.
3. The utmost exertion during the training period, as well as later in the practice of the profession will be required of every scientist and technician as his absolute duty towards the nation.

II. Special instruction of Youth on the tasks set and prospects afforded by science and engineering.

Lectures illustrated with slides (and possibly conducted visits) should be organized for the high school seniors by competent University and industrial men. In the course of these, the importance of engineering and chemistry to German economy and the important role and task of the chemist should be brought to their attention.

III. Improvement of the future prospects of the student of natural sciences.

(page 3 of original, cont'd)

The training and the prospects of the would-be technician and chemist must be so arranged that the school-leaver can be told that he can look forward, as a student of chemistry to graduating from the University at the age of 25 and to marrying at 26. This is to be achieved in the following ways:

(page 4 of original)

1. The period of study for the second intermediate examination is reduced to seven semesters;
2. Further ways and means are being sought for giving to the young soldier during his period of military service the opportunity to attend lectures on chemistry, physics and mathematics.

By followin- up these points, it can be brought about that the student leaves school at 18 years of age, and, although at 19½ he still has another year of military service ahead of him, he attends the elementary lectures on natural sciences and obtains his degree at the age of 25 years.

3. By public recognition and acknowledgment of good scientific and technical achievements, the pride of the technician in his profession can be increased, the respect of the whole nation for technical achievement heightened and the general conception of engineering established on deeper foundations. It must be recognized to a greater and greater extent that it is precisely natural sciences and engineering which can provide for the young man the opportunity to develop his intellectual talents and make direct use of them for the good of his people.

IV. The improvement of scientific research in the colleges. Scientific research in the colleges must be enriched by new and vital problems. The students who do practical work in the college laboratories should, besides abstract theoretical investigations, frequently be set to work on problems which are of importance to the practical development of engineering and chemistry. The suggestions to be utilized for this purpose must be the outcome of the collaboration between practice and theory. From Germany's colleges to the world of economic practice there must flow once again a great stream of fresh knowledge. To be sure, this demands an increase in the number of college lecturers and assistants in Germany.

For this purpose, it will be necessary to institute a fund which will make available two or three millions annually. The object of the fund is to make possible, by the granting of scholarships for the duration of the necessary training period, the preparation after graduation from High School, of good young students of chemistry and engineering for the profession of college lectures.

The execution of all these proposals depends, of course, on the energetic determination and willingness of all concerned. The nation

(page 4 of original, cont'd)

has a right to the fullest possible development of the intellectual ability of its sons. The young man who feels that he possesses the requisite strength and the ability should join the proud front of those who are continually presenting to the German people new scientific and technical creations. He, like every one of our people, must give of his best. Tradition and the work of his fathers enjoin it upon him. Just as everywhere today, a new generation surges forward beyond the goals attained by their forbears, so a new impetus must be given by Youth to science and engineering. The achievements of Runge, Liebig, Kekulé, of Krupp, Siemens and others, have won for Germany the consideration of the world. Nothing must be allowed to prevent our youth from winning consistently the struggle for this world-wide consideration by means of new and major achievements, the products of her best brains. In the fight for the economic future of our people, our young engineers and chemists must be shock troops, devoting their utmost efforts to the fight for the highest aims. Thus a menacing gap in the German People's front will be closed and nothing more will hinder the advance towards a great future.

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

25 June 1947

I, Beryl C. BESWICK, No. D 427459, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages and that the above is a true and correct translation of the document No. NI-6628.

Beryl C. BESWICK
No. D 427459

- 5 -
"END"

Number 556-557

Reichsausgabe der Frankfurter Zeitung Page 3

FRANKFURTER ZEITUNG
und Handelsblatt

30 October

GOERING's Appeal.

.....
One may take comfort, abroad in the thought that the German market constitutes only a section of the world market but the future will show ^{not} shortsighted such considerations are because it is a certain beyond doubt that the Four Year Plan will promote the synthetic production of raw materials in quite an extraordinary manner. Wood, and even more so coal, have recently developed undreamed of properties in the hand of the chemist, they are being transformed into fuel and lubricating oil, into caoutchouc; textile fibers and artificial resin, even into fats and fodder. Goering mentioned incidentally that soap is already being produced from coal. Moreover most of the artificial materials are technically superior to the natural products if for no other reason but because it is within human domain to give them the desired properties by slight modifications in the chemical process. It is only the costs which today give the natural products a certain advantage but, in view of the state of emergency in which Germany finds herself they do not play a decisive role. Furthermore, we have once before witnessed -in the case of nitrogen- that the artificial product developed within one decade the ability to corner the natural product even on the world market. Therefore, what is going on in Germany today is for the rest of the world anything but an experiment the success or failure of which one can anticipate while sitting back complacently. This is an event which is of the greatest importance for the future of the world economy and which may lead to decisive structural changes.
.....

(second page of original)

Reichsausgabe der Frankfurter Zeitung Page 10
Issue 556-557

.....
GOERING ON THE FOUR YEAR PLAN

The big Rally of the Sportpalast in Berlin.

(Private wire of the "Frankfurter Zeitung")
.....

In his introduction Minister President GOERING took issue with the food situation. As already set forth yesterday in our report on the opening of the rally, he pointed out that in spite of the increased endeavors made to secure our food program not all the food requirements could be fully covered in Germany herself.
.....

.....
A similar situation exists in the field of raw materials. It is quite self-evident that here too, we have a shortage of raw materials and once again, primarily because of the simple reason that we have no colonies. This is not the time, however for me to take up that issue. The fact is that we do not have them. Therefore, we must ponder which are the raw materials which we can produce ourselves thanks to the spirit of inventiveness which lives in us as Germans. And there we can do very great work in many fields.

I should like to acknowledge an indebtedness on this occasion and stress that here too, many and in part great things have been accomplished already by the Minister of Economics, President SCHACHT competent in that field; as well as by the Fuehrer's previous Delegate for Economics, Dr. Koppler. Both men have made great achievements and using their work as a basis I shall proceed to build. It is important however, that now we leave the phase of experiments and preparatory experiments behind us. In the near future new plants will arise, plants in which we shall produce our own rubber, plants in which we shall produce our own clothing out of cellulose fibers, in which we shall no longer need the cotton which now costs us millions in foreign exchange.

.....
.....We shall now produce gasoline and mineral oils from German coal, and I shall make true the word of the Fuehrer : "In 18 months German gasoline will be ready and we shall be independent as far as gasoline is concerned". Mineral oils of all kinds we shall extract from German coal. We shall mine our own iron and ore deposits and, first of all, one thing: Up to now we have not sufficiently explored Germany. From now on we shall no longer content ourselves with the fact that only one tenth of Germany has been explored geophysically. In the field of light metals, of aluminium, we have an inexhaustible supply at our disposition. Coal, wood and German ores will be the primary basis on which in the future the plants for the production of our own German raw materials and synthetics will be established. Huge constructions, powerful plants shall be established to show the world that

GERMANY DOES NOT CAPITULATE,

Germany insists on her existence and she will shape it.

.....
CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

I, HERTHA C. KNUTH, AGO X-046355, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of excerpts of Document No. NI-6615.

HERTHA C. KNUTH,
U.S. Civilian,
AGO X-046355.

END

-2-

DOCUMENT NO. NI-9618
OFFICE OF CHIEF OF COUNSEL
FOR WAR CRIMES

THE UNITED STATES
STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY

OIL DIVISION
FINAL REPORT

OIL DIVISION
January 1947

(Page 1 of original)

GENERAL SUMMARY

An Empire Built on Coal, Air, and Water

Wartime Germany was a chemical empire built on coal, air, and water. Eighty-four and a half per cent of her aviation fuel, 86 per cent of her motor gasoline, all but a fraction of 1 per cent of her rubber, 100 per cent of the concentrated nitric acid, basic component of all military explosives, and 99 per cent of her equally important methanol were synthesized from these three fundamental raw materials.

Until the late thirties, most of Germany's liquid fuels were imported - she produced only a third of her 1936 liquid fuel requirements (Figure 1). Then extremely ambitious synthetic oil and war chemicals programs were started. Germany's military and economic planners were so convinced that this program could be completed and maintained without enemy interference that they went to war in 1939 with reserve stocks equal to only:

- 3.2 months' war needs for aviation gasoline,
- 1.9 months' war needs for motor gasoline,
- 1.8 months' war needs for tetraethyl lead,
- 2 months' war needs for nitrogen satisfactory for explosives, and
- 2.4 months' war needs for rubber.

Germany never recovered from this precarious position, and throughout the war her oil stocks, particularly critical items like aviation and motor gasolines, were so tight that her whole military effort in the air and

(Page 1 of original cont'd.)

on the ground would have collapsed like a pricked balloon in three or four months had her oil supply been dried up.

Killing the German Industrial Octopus

The oil, chemical, explosives, and rubber industries of Germany were bound together into a vast interlinking complex, so that attacking them was like fighting an octopus. Hydrogen from Leuna was used in making half of Germany's rubber. In the Ludwigshafen-Oppau Chemical Works, the production of oil, chemicals, rubber, and explosives was interdependent. The five synthetic nitrogen plants which produced 84.6 per cent of the country's synthetic nitrogen also made the process gas required for the production of 20.6 per cent of the synthetic oil. The body of this industrial organism was the gas-generating plants which turned coal into process gases; its arms were the many plants that used those gases and other material drawn from the coal to produce synthetic fuels and lubricants, chemicals, rubber, and explosive products. The largest German chemical plant, at Leuna, consumed 338,000,000 cubic feet of hydrogen-containing process gas a day and 54,000,000 cubic feet of fuel gas, a total of nearly twice the peak winter-time consumption of all New York City. The arms of this gigantic man-made creature could be damaged or severed without killing it, but when the gas plants were hit the whole organism was weakened. When these plants could no longer function, the whole group of industries died.

(Page 1 of original cont'd.)

Primary Target: Oil

In the spring of 1944, when the U. S. Strategic Air Forces reached full maturity, the German oil industry was selected as a top priority target group. The first four heavy attacks on oil took place on 12 May 1944, but the heat was really turned on when General Carl A. Spaatz dispatched his memorable cable of 8 June to the Air Forces: "Primary strategic aim of U.S. Strategic Air Forces is now to deny oil to enemy air forces." All oil plants were to be hit as systematically and severely as air strength permitted, and they were to be hit with sufficient frequency to insure their being kept out of production.

Up to May, 1944, the RAF and the USAAF together had dropped 509,206 tons* of bombs on

(Page 2 of original)

enemy targets in Europe, of which 5,670 tons, or 1.1 per cent, went down on German oil targets. None of these attacks caused important loss

* All bomb tonnages are short tons (2,000 lb) and all production tonnages are metric tons (2,205 lb). In German oil production. From 12 May 1944 to 8 May 1945 (V-E Day), the combined air forces dropped 191,256 tons on the 37 German oilproducing targets, and production took the downgrade. The output of aviation gasoline tobogganed (Figure 2). The initial reaction of the Luftwaffe was to offer increased resistance, and consumption increased with a consequent terrific drain on the

(Page 2 of original cont'd.)

storage tanks. From August to the end of the war (except December), consumption always exceeded production (Figure 3). Less than 500 tons of aviation gasoline were made during February, 1945, only 40 tons were made in March, none at all in April. Stocks of aviation gasoline on 1 February were only 82,000 tons - barely enough to wet the tank bottoms.

With both production and stocks declining rapidly, the most drastic curtailment of aircraft operation was put into effect. Training was eliminated in September, and essentially all operations except flying were prohibited. In the closing months of the war, Luftwaffe pilots were sent into combat with only 40 to 45 hours of flight training - sitting ducks for our well-trained air crews. Germany's large reserve of military aircraft stayed on the ground with empty tanks, unable to oppose the advancing forces. The situation with regard to motor gasoline was no less disastrous. Tanks and armored vehicles were moved to the front by oxen. Every motor trip exceeding 60 miles had to be approved by a commanding general. A speed limit of 17 miles per hour was imposed.

Synthetic Bottlenecks: Chemicals, Rubber, Explosives

Among Germany's key war chemicals were synthetic nitrogen, methanol (synthetic wood alcohol), tetraethyl lead, and rubber. Without nitrogen, not a single ton of military explosives or propellants could have been made, and there would have been no fuel for some of the

(Page 2 of original cont'd.)

rocket devices. Certain military explosives were entirely dependent on synthetic methanol. Without tetraethyl lead, the octane number of the Luftwaffe's aviation gasoline would have been so low that a 2,000-hp fighter engine would have been able to deliver only 1,200-hp in the pinches - inadequate against Allied planes. Without rubber, the war machine could not have rolled.

Germany's synthetic nitrogen and synthetic methanol plants were few in number, though of large capacity, but an ambitious expansion program was undertaken just as war broke out. With this program in view, the war planners were apparently not too uneasy about the minute stock piles in September, 1939.

Tetraethyl lead, with all production prior to 1939 centered in one plant, was too scarce and concentrated for comfort. A second plant was built, coming into operation in July, 1939, a French plant was captured, and a third German unit was scheduled for completion in 1945. An underground plant was also planned, but no equipment was ever installed. The stock pile of tetraethyl lead in September, 1939, was equal to just 1.8 months' war requirements. Ethylene dibromide, a vital ingredient for ethyl fluid, was manufactured in only one plant.

Rubber for the war machine was also critically scarce, but the development and fabrication of synthetic rubber had advanced successfully by 1936 and 1937. The first large synthetic plant (at Schkopau) was in operation well before the war, and a second

(Page 2 of original cont'd.)

large plant at Huels came into production in August, 1940, while a third plant at Ludwigshafen opened in March, 1943. The rubber stock pile in September, 1939, was equal to 2.4 months' requirements.

The planned expansion in the military explosives and propellants industries began secretly in 1934. Many plants were built, and the expansion and dispersal plans were well worked out, except that the military were always reluctant to approve adequate facilities for their basic raw materials, apparently finding it difficult to understand that without such raw materials their many over-capacity powder and propellants plants could not run.

Air Attacks on Chemicals, Rubber, and Explosives

Neither the German chemical industry nor any vital segment of it was selected by the Allied air forces for deliberate concentrated attack. As

(Page 3 of original)

far as Oil Division personnel could ascertain, no single attack was dispatched against synthetic nitrogen and methanol, despite the readily perceptible military consequences. Yet both of these vital chemicals were knocked out as a bonus - fortuitous perhaps and until the end of the war unrecognized - resulting from the vigorous campaign against oil (Figure 4). When two plants (Leuna and Ludwigshafen) were shut down by air attacks dispatched against oil targets, Germany was deprived of 63 per cent of her synthetic nitrogen, 40 per cent of her synthetic

(Page 3 of original cont'd.)

methanol, and 65 per cent of her synthetic rubber. Damage to five additional oil plants increased the loss in synthetic nitrogen to 91 per cent, in synthetic methanol to 86 per cent. When the nitrogen supply began to vanish, agriculture was the first to feel the pinch. No synthetic nitrogen was available for fertilizer after September, 1944, and the anticipated drop in the 1945 harvest from this cause alone was estimated at 22 per cent.

From September on, the Wehrmacht felt the blow, and in spite of frantic attempts to install plants for converting by-product coke-oven nitrogen into a form satisfactory for explosives manufacture, stocks of explosives had dropped by January, 1945, to less than two months' requirements (Figure 5). High explosives were only 33 per cent and ammonium nitrate 12 per cent of peak production. Thousands of finished shell cases remained unfilled, and those that were filled contained up to 70 per cent of rock salt to stretch the small supply of explosives. The reduction in munitions effectiveness was about equal to the percentage of rock salt used. Supplies of anti-aircraft ammunition were so short, according to General von Arthelm of the Flak Artillery, that battery commanders were ordered not to fire at enemy aircraft overhead unless (a) the airplanes were attacking target which the battery was supposed to protect, (b) the commander was sure he could hit the airplanes:

That nitrogen plants were given a higher repair priority than oil plants is easy to understand. Why Allied military intelligence - at least as far as Oil

(Page 3 of original cont'd.)

Division personnel could learn -- failed to pick up knowledge of the situation until the plants were available for inspection is less comprehensible.

There were 35 large explosives and propellants plants, seven of which made 70 per cent of the total production of high explosives. These plants were never selected for serious strategic attack, although it may be argued that knocking out these key plants might have curtailed production of explosives with less expenditure of effort than the incidental knockout of synthetic nitrogen plants. As the result of a single raid by two Halifaxes which dropped two 2,000-lb. bombs and 1,748 incendiaries, half of the TNT production capacity of one of these plants was destroyed and never recovered.

I, FRED M. OPEL, A-441688, research analyst, OCCWG, hereby certify that the foregoing is a true and correct copy of the title-page and of pages 1, 2 and 3 (partial) of the Final Report of the Oil Division of the United States Strategic Bombing Survey, photolithographic edition of January 1947.

FRED M. OPEL
AGO # A-441688
Office of Chief of
Counsel for War Crimes,
APO 696-A

MILITARY TRIBUNAL NO. 3
CASE NO. VI
Prosecution Document Book No. 1113

Englisch



INDEX TO DOCUMENT BOOK III

Document Number	Exhibit Number	Description	Document Book Page
PS-2514		Excerpts from German Statistical Year Book concerning statistics on the results of the Reichstag elections between 1913 and 1933, showing the increase of votes for the Nazi Party in 1932.	1
NI-4833		Affidavit of Gattineau of 13 March 1947, showing that I.G. started in 1932 to make payments to Funk's press service and that Bosch arranged in 1932, through Hess and Haushofer a meeting between Gattineau, Buete-fisch and Hitler.	4
NI-5170		Statement of defendant Gattineau of 31 May 1947 "withdrawing signature" from affidavit of 13 March 1947.	8
NI-7788		Affidavit of Gattineau of 12 June 1947, stating that he and Buete-fisch visited Hitler in 1932 in order to "clarify the position of the NS Party regarding the German gasoline production."	9
NI-8637		Signed interrogation of Buete-fisch of 18 April 1947 on visit of Hitler in 1932 (p.14).	18
NI-6767		Signed interrogation of Krauch of 16 April 1947 on visit of Hitler in 1932 of Gattineau and Buete-fisch (pp. 8-10).	35
NI-6765		Statement by Jaehne of 2 May 1947 stating that I.G. Farben could not continue gasoline production after 1941, without subsidies.	47
PS-3901 (USA-837)		Memorandum addressed to Hindenburg in November 1932, asking for the appointment of Hitler to the Chancellery.	48
NI-6622		Excerpt from Goebbels' "Vortrag Hof zu Reichskanzlei" (1936) containing the quotes from Goebbels' diary of the indictment.	



INDEX TO DOCUMENT BOOK III CONT'D

Document Number	Exhibit Number	Description	Document Book Number
NI-799C		Affidavit of von Schroeder of 21 July 1947 on political situation in Germany before Hitler's seizure of power.	55
IS-5375 PS-3337		Affidavit of von Schroeder of 5 December 1945, on political situation in Germany before Hitler's seizure of power.	61
EC-439 (USA-618)		Affidavit of defendant Schnitzler, of 16 November 1945 on his participation in the meeting of industrialists on 20 February 1933.	62
D-203 (USA-767)		Report of Address by Hitler to German industrialists on 20 February 1933 and speech by Goering, excerpts of which are quoted in the indictment.	64
D-204 (USA-768)		Memorandum by Krupp von Bohlen, stating that on 20 February 1933 he had "expressed to Reich Chancellor Hitler the gratitude of 25 industrialists present for having given us such a clear picture of the conception of his ideas", and stressing that "it is also our opinion that only in a politically strong and independent state can economy and business develop and flourish."	74
NI-406		Interrogation of Schacht, 20 July 1945, on 26 February 1933 meeting.	75
NI-9764		Affidavit of Schacht dated 18 August 1947 identifying document NI-406.	110
NI-9550		Affidavit of Schacht of 12 August 1947 concerning collection and distribution of funds collected after 20 February meeting.	111
NI-391		File of the Delbrueck, Schickler & Co. Bank, Berlin, containing correspondence and account of March 1933, election fund covering period from February to June, 1933.	112

INDEX TO DOCUMENT BOOK III (CONT'D)

Document Number	Exhibit Number	Description	Document Book Page
NI-9784		Exhibit 1493 accompanying Part 12 of hearings of December 12, 1934, before the Special U.S. Senate Committee Investigating the Munitions Industry, concerning conferences held in Germany in July 1933 between representatives of the E. I. DuPont De Nemours & Co., and I. G. Farben.	115
PS-2828 (USA-654)		Excerpts from interrogation of Goering of 25 June 1945 stating that "we had the support of all industry in the 1933 elections".	124
NI-6766		Affidavit of Wilhelm Keppler, of 9 May 1947 stating that many leading industrialists, among them Bosch of I. G. Farben, rushed to call upon Hitler after the seizure of power in 1933.	127
NI-628		Document on General Council of German economy, 15 July 1933.	128
NI-9285		Excerpt from Frankfurter Zeitung, 18 July 1933, explaining purposes of the General Council of the Economy.	129
NI-1105		Meeting of the counsel for economic propaganda in the Ministry of Economics, 30 October 1933, with Schnitzler, Mann, Gattineau and Weinberg of I. G. present.	131
PS-1390		Decree of Hindenburg and Hitler suspending constitutional systems, RGbl 1933, Part I, p. 83.	136
NI-6903		Excerpts from Voelkischer Beobachter 11/12, 17, 21 March 1933, on measures against exclusion of communist and other parties from the Reichstag.	137a 138
PS -2001		Enabling Act of 1933 giving the Reich Government legislative power and the power to deviate from the constitution.	141
PS-1947		Letter from von Fritzsche to Baroness von Schnitzler referring to the fight against the working classes, the Catholic Church and the Jews.	143

STATISTICAL YEARBOOK OF THE GERMAN REICH
1933
STATISTISCHES JAHRBUCH FÜR DAS DEUTSCHE REICH 1933

Verlag von Reimer Hobbing in Berlin S7 61

Page 539

XXI. Elections and Plebiscites
1. Elections to the German Reichstag from 1919 to 1933

Elections to the German Reichstag to the Reichstag									
Qualified Voters Votes Cast Designation of Party	To the National Assembly 19 Jan. 1919	I Election Period 1920/22	II Election Period 4 May '24	III Election Period 7 Dec. '24	IV Election Period 20 May '28	V Election Period 14 Sep. '30	VI Election Period 31 Jul. '32	VII Election Period 6 Nov. '32	VIII Election Period 5 Mar. '33
TOTAL NUMBER OF POPULATION AND VOTERS BY THOUSANDS									
Population of last census	63,052.0	59,198.8	59,198.8	59,198.8	62,410.6	62,410.6	62,410.6	62,410.6	62,410.6
Qualified Voters	36,766.5	35,949.8	38,375.0	38,987.3	41,224.7	42,957.7	44,226.8	44,373.7	44,685.8
NUMBER OF VOTES CAST IN THOUSANDS									
Valid votes	30,400.3	28,196.3	29,281.8	30,290.1	30,753.3	34,870.9	36,882.4	35,471.8	39,343.3
% of voters	82.68	78.43	76.30	77.69	74.60	81.41	83.39	79.93	88.04
Invalid votes	124.5	267.2	427.6	414.9	412.5	254.9	279.7	287.3	311.7
% of voters	0.34	0.74	1.11	1.06	1.00	0.59	0.63	0.64	0.69
THE VALID VOTES - IN THOUSANDS - WERE CAST FOR MEMBERS OF THE FOLLOWING PARTIES									
German National People's Party	3,121.5	4,249.1	5,696.5	6,205.8	4,381.6	2,458.3	2,177.4	2,959.0	3,136.8
National Socialist German Labor Party (Hitler Movement)	-	-	1,918.3	907.3	810.1	6,409.6	13,745.8	11,737.0	17,277.2
German People's Party	1,345.6	3,919.4	2,694.4	3,049.1	2,679.7	1,578.2	436.0	661.8	432.3
Center Party	5,980.2	3,845.0	3,914.4	4,118.9	3,712.2	4,127.9	4,589.3	4,230.6	4,424.9
German State's Party	5,641.8	2,333.7	1,655.1	1,919.8	1,505.7	1,322.4	371.8	336.5	334.2

3

German Farmers' Party	-	-	-	-	8	6	2	3	2
Country League	-	-	10	8	3	3	2	2	1
Reichs Party of the German									
Middleclass (Economy Party)	4	4	10	17	23	23	2	1	-
German Hannoverian Party	1	5	5	4	3	3	-	1	-
Other Parties	2	-	4	-	4	18	4	5	4

CERTIFICATE OF PARTIAL TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO. 2514-PS

17 Nov. 1945

I, WILLARD E. SKIDMORE, Lt (jg), USNR, 391590, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct partial translation of Document No. 2514-PS.

WILLARD E. SKIDMORE
Lt (jg), USNR, 391590

A F F I D A V I T

=====

I, Dr. Heinrich GATTINEAU, at present at the Palace of Justice in Nuernberg, after having first been warned that I will be liable for punishment for making false statements, declare herewith under oath, of my own free will and without coercion, the following:

I was born on 6 January 1905 in Bucharest; I am married. Since January 1928 I have been an employee of I.G. Farbenindustrie, first as the secretary to DUISBURG. In 1931 I became head of the sub-department (Referat) for Commercial Policy -- which was the precursor to the Political Economy Department -- and head of the Press Office of I.G. which was under the supervision of Prof. Erwin SELCK. From 1933 until January 1938 I was head of the Political Economy Department (WIPO) of I.G. Farbenindustrie in Berlin NW 7, and in January 1939 I became business manager of A.G. Dynamit NOBEL in Fressburg.

I was made chief of the Political Economy Department (WIPO) because apart from my knowledge in the field of commercial policy and by reason of my journalistic activity and acquaintances I had the necessary contacts with the Government and the agencies of the Party and thus I could render I.G. good services as Verbindungsmann (liaison officer). In the efforts of the management of I.G. to establish contact with the new men in power, my contacts and old friendships -- which in part went back to the time of my membership in the Bund Oberland, of which I had been a member since 1923 -- proved extremely useful. From this period, for instance, I know HINKEL (Kulturwalter of the NSDAP -- administrator for matters pertaining to culture -- who established contacts for me with the press, Prof. HAUSHOFER, who among others presented me to HESS, the deputy of the Fuehrer. In mid-1933 I was given the title of Sturmbannfuhrer z.B.V. (for special assignment) in the Supreme Command of the SA, and at the end of 1933 I was promoted Standartenfuhrer z.B.V.. There my activity was to act for cases as they came up as economic-consultant to ROEHM, the SA chief of staff. On 30 June 1934 I was arrested by the Gestapo because of my being a member of ROEHM's Staff, and after my release I withdrew from the SA. As far as I know no other member of I.G.'s management received at that time the same title or a similar one. The connection was

(Page 2 of original)

important for the SA because apart from the current general donations which did not come to me, other requests for contributions to the SA -- in amounts of 2000 to 250000 -- were through me taken up with the management of I.G. The biggest donation of approximately 200,000 Reichsmarks for SA topcoats was made in the winter 1933/34. These requests when they exceeded 2000 Reichsmarks were passed on by me to Dr. Max ILGNER as the member of the Vorstand who was competent and who then discussed them with Geheimrat Hermann SCHMITZ. From the period dating prior to 1933 I know of various payments made out of the so-called Kalle-funds to political parties and also to the National Socialists for election purposes. Minor payments like, for instance, the monthly contributions which since 1933 were being paid to the political economy press service of FUNK (defendant in Trial No. 1) were made out of funds of the Press Office and since 30 June 1934 required Dr. Max ILGNER's approval (previously that of Prof. Erwin SELCK) and my own.

Upon Dr. ILGNER's initiative the Circle of Economy Leaders (Wirtschaftsfuehrerkreis) which cooperated closely with the Propaganda Ministry (so-called F-circle) was established at the beginning of 1933. This Circle consisted of the representatives of industry i.e., among others, of von WINTERFELD (Siemens), Dr. HAHN (Mitteloeuropaeischer Wirtschaftstag (Central European Economic Diet) and Westliche Schwerindustrie (Western Heavy Industry)), O.C. FISCHER, Dr. ILGNER and myself of I.G. Farben. In conjunction with the Propaganda Ministry this organization had set for itself the task of abating events in Germany which were detrimental to the German reputation abroad, to attenuate them and to see to it that the situation in "New Germany" would appear in a more favorable light abroad. It also was the task of the Circle of the Economy Leaders to prevent awkward actions of the Ministry of Propaganda and to substitute for them more suitable ones. The Circle of Economy Leaders was well qualified for this because its members knew the situation abroad well; they had good connections abroad and were acquainted with the mentality of the respective countries. The development of events in Germany had greatly disturbed the export policy and the representatives of industry were now wishing

(Page 3 of original)

to counteract this unfavorable development by appropriate propaganda. One tried to shift the attention from political questions to cultural ones. To the Propaganda Ministry this development was very desirable because in that manner the connections which industry had abroad could be used for its purposes. Besides, it was an advantage to use people not known to be paid propagandists. This propaganda activity was financed not by the Propaganda Ministry but by the firms of the respective sub-department chiefs. In that manner I handled Scandinavia and Dr. Max ILGNER North America. Among other things also trips by foreign newspapermen to Germany were financed. The negotiations with and the payment to the propagandist Ivy LEE also occurred during that period. Payments made for such purposes were accounted for by Dr. ILGNER with the Zentral-Finanzverwaltung of I.G. and Geheimrat SCHMITZ was informed about them. Dr. ILGNER's Office was used as the business office of the Circle of Economy Leaders. Other propaganda organizations which had been established upon ILGNER's initiative are the Association of Karl SCHURZ and the Mitteloeuropaeische Wirtschaftstag. This activity of Dr. ILGNER's also was an expression of his efforts to make himself useful to the new men in power, thus to obtain a prominent position for himself. He was in a position to do this because as head of the NW 7 organization of I.G. he had an insight into all of I.G.'s affairs and he thus could be of service to other people and authorities. For example, his ambition became apparent also in that from the very beginning he tried to have WIPO and the Press Office placed under his supervision; he succeeded in this in the year of 1934.

After HITLER had taken over the power the various leading members of I.G. tried to establish their admission to Nazi circles. Geheimrat SCHMITZ, for instance, became a member of the Kuratorium (Supervisory Council) for the "Haus der deutschen Kunst" and a member of the Reichstag; Prof SELCK was in the SS and his connections originated there. Georg von SCHNITZLER opened his "salon" in Berlin so as to keep close contact with the leading persons. Most of the members of the Vorstand

(Page 4 of original)

and many leading personalities of I.G. Farben were appointed Military Economy Leaders (Wehrwirtschaftsfuehrer). These titles were conferred by the Ministry of Economy for merits in the field of military economy and armament

production.

It was the task of the Political Economy Department to maintain contact with the government agencies and semi-official agencies which became more and more numerous. Among other things it was the task of WIPO to maintain connection with the Foreign Organization (Auslands Organisation) of the NSDAP. We procured the political "no-objection" certificates of A.O. (Foreign Organization) which were necessary to obtain exit-permits for I.G. employees. One of the prerequisites for issuance of this permission was that the gentlemen who were to depart had to report to the A.O. abroad and in their activity to practice National Socialist principles. This "no-objection" certificate was issued only to people with a positive attitude toward National Socialism, i.e. political opponents and non-arians could not obtain this permission. Whenever the travellers were functionaries who belonged to one of the party organizations they had to report to the A.O. also after their return to give an account on the economic and political situation in the respective countries. It also frequently happened that employees in the I.G. management abroad - among them also many Verbindungsmaenner - were at the same time functioning in behalf of A.O. It goes without saying that all of the German representatives of I.G. were subject to A.O.'s control politically and otherwise. A.O. desired, I.G. Farben consenting to it and after 1937 insisting that all the I.G. representatives abroad who were German, participated in all activities and arrangements of A.O.

In the year 1932 I.G. was interested in the introduction of the so-called standard fuel because they had invested huge sums in the hydrogenation process for synthetic benzine products. It was therefore important to know what HITLER intended to do in this question should he come into power. By order of C. BOSCH I arranged this meeting for BUETEFISCH through HAUSHOFER and Rudolf HESS.

(Page 5 of original)

HITLER promised that he too would give our gasoline production the necessary protection.

The institution of the I.G. Farben Verbindungsmaenner was an idea of Dr. Max ILGNER. These Verbindungsmaenner were accountable to the Commercial Committee and they were mostly appointed by the Commercial Committee upon the recommendation of ILGNER or of the Sales Combine. Their monthly reports were dealing with matters pertaining to currency policies with narratives on the political situations, with surveys on the industry of the respective countries and their productions etc. These reports were sent to the Office of the Commercial Committee and from there were channelled to the interested offices. Thus they came also to the Economics Department (VOMI - Volkswirtschaftliche Abteilung) where they were being put to further use. Thus they also found their way later on to the various military and government offices which received VOMI reports. WIPO (Wirtschaftspolitische - Political Economy Department) too received those parts of the reports it was interested in, i.e. those on political and commercial-political questions, and I know that important reports of this kind were passed on to the Vorstand. All of the Verbindungsmaenner were people whose appointment had first been talked over with the A.O. and who were agreeable to A.O. or at least could be tolerated by it.

In 1936 or 1937 Under-Secretary POSSE of the Ministry of Economics approached I.G. to ascertain what production capacities were available with I.G. for the various substitute materials (Austauschstoffe) - for instance cellulose,

light metals and synthetic gasoline - so as to have information on hand, I presume, as regards possibilities for economizing foreign exchange and in the event of war. I.G. made indeed statistics available for this work by way of the offices of the Sparten. The Economic Groups in which I.G., in turn, was represented by the heads of its Sparten passed these statistics on to the Reich Ministry of Economics.

(Page 6 of original)

I read carefully each of the six pages of this affidavit, countersigned them in my own handwriting, made the necessary corrections in my own handwriting and countersigned them with my initials and I herewith state under oath that in this statement I have spoken the pure truth according to my best knowledge and conscience.

(Signature) Dr. Heinrich GATTINEAU.
Dr. Heinrich GATTINEAU

Sworn to and signed before me this 13th day of March 1947, at Nuerenberg, by Dr. Heinrich GATTINEAU, known to me to be the person making the above affidavit.

(Signature) Otto VERBER.....
Otto VERBER
U.S. Civilian A-444385,
Interrogator
Office of Chief of Counsel
for War Crimes,
U.S. War Department

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

I, HERTHA C. KNUTH, AGO NO. X 046355, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document No. NI-4833.

1

HERTHA C. KNUTH
U. S. Civilian
AGO NO. X 046355

END

4

7

Rudolf ASCHENAUER
Counsel for defendant
Dr. GATTINEAU

Muernberg, 4 June 1947

To the Prosecution
Case 6

Enclosed you will find the following statement signed by Dr. GATTINEAU:

"The affidavit of 13 March 1947 which was presented to me by Mr. Vorber, contains a number of mistakes and incorrect and erroneous formulations. I mentioned them verbally and afterwards requested a written rectification of those points which seemed particularly important to me. On close examination, however, for which I had no time then, I found that the statement is also incorrect in other respects. I therefore withdraw my signature from the affidavit of 13 March 1947.

Muernberg 31 Mai 1947

(signed) HEINRICH GATTINEAU."

T E L E G R A M

THE AFFIDAVIT OF 13 MARCH 1947 WHICH WAS PRESENTED TO ME BY Mr. VORBER, CONTAINS A NUMBER OF MISTAKES AND INCORRECT AND ERRONEOUS FORMULATIONS. I MENTIONED THEM VERBALLY AND AFTERWARDS REQUESTED A WRITTEN RECTIFICATION OF THOSE POINTS WHICH SEEMED PARTICULARLY IMPORTANT TO ME. ON CLOSE EXAMINATION, HOWEVER, FOR WHICH I HAD NO TIME THEN, I FOUND THAT THE STATEMENT IS ALSO INCORRECT IN OTHER RESPECTS. I THEREFORE WITHDRAW MY SIGNATURE FROM THE AFFIDAVIT OF 13 MARCH 1947"

(s) HEINRICH GATTINEAU
(s) Dr. RUDOLF ASCHENAUER

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

I, ERMA E. UIBERALL, U.S. Civilian, D-150096, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages, and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document No. NI-5170.

ERMA E. UIBERALL,
U.S. Civilian,
AGO No. D-150096

(E N D)

8

AFFIDAVIT

I, Dr. HEINRICH GATTINEAU, at present in Nuernberg, having been warned that any false statement on my part will render me liable to punishment, state herewith under oath of my own free will and without duress:

1.) Early course of my life.

I was born on 6 January 1905 in Bukarest the son of JULIUS GATTINEAU. I was baptised as a catholic. My parents being natives of Germany living abroad were residents of Bukarest. My father was a technician-dentist.

After having attended different schools in Switzerland and Germany, I completed my studies by attending the last classes at the Neues Realgymnasium in Munich in 1923. As a grammar-school-boy I was rather actively engaged in athletics and about this time (1923) I also joined the "Oberland" league. In 1925 I received the diploma in economics.

In 1926 I passed my first legal examination and in compliance with the existing regulations started serving my practical term at the local court (Amtsgericht) in Munich.

In 1927 I passed the "examen rigorosum" and was conferred the degree of "Doctor oeconomiae publicae".

2.) Professional activities 1928 - 1945.

As a student I also passed a short apprenticeship as a commercial employee and in order to earn my studying expenses I also engaged in other work. At the suggestion of Professor HAUSHOFER I wrote my doctor's thesis on the subject: "The significance of urbanisation in Australia on the future development of the white race".

I started my commercial career in 1928 by assuming the position of a scientific assistant to DUISBERG at Leverkusen. A short time afterwards I was attached to the Reichsverband der deutschen Industrie (Reich Association of German Industry) in Berlin for further training. After having returned to Leverkusen I was entrusted, first together with R. KISSEL, later alone, with the management of the secretariat to DUISBERG which had to deal with all matters arising from DUISBERG's position as a president of the Reichsverband der deutschen Industrie and from his positions as member of relief organisations for students. In addition, later I was still appointed manager of the central Department for economic problems (written) "at Leverkusen". At the end of 1931 Geheimrat DUISBERG resigned as chairman of the Reichsverband der deutschen Industrie, in consequence of which the secretariat at Leverkusen became redundant. At the suggestion of Geheimrat Karl BOSCH I then took over the Press Center of the I.G. in Berlin; in 1932 I was appointed Prokurist of the I.G. In 1933 or 1934 the political economy Department (WIPO) of the I.G. was created as an annex to the Press Center, the management of which was entrusted to me. At the end of 1937

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(Page 2 of original)

I was ordered to participate in the trip of an industrial commission to South Africa. Having returned from there by mid-April of 1938 I was assigned the job of assisting in the work on the problem of the newly to be established "Donau-Chemie" in Austria. In the course of this year I also was appointed managing director in the I.G.

At the end of 1938 I was given the assignment, in cooperation with my technical associate Dr. MEYER, to carry out the reconstruction of the A.G. Dynamit NOBEL-Pressburg, in accordance with instructions of the Verwaltungsrat. We were appointed acting managing directors.

3.) Positions I held on 30 January 1933.

On 30 January 1933 I was the manager of the Press Center and Prokurist of the I.G. Farben-Industrie Berlin.

From 30 January 1933 till 1 September 1939 I have further held the following offices and positions in industrial firms or enterprises:

<u>Firms or enterprises:</u>	<u>Office or position:</u>	<u>Date of appointment:</u>
I.G. Farben-Industrie	Manager of the Political Economy Department	1933 or 1934
I.G. Farben-Industrie	Managing Director	1938
A.G. Dynamit NOBEL Pressburg	Acting managing Director	Beginning of 1939
NOBEL BICKFORD Pressburg	Verwaltungsrat Deputy Chairman	1939
IP ARI-ROBANJO ANJAG-Budapest	Verwaltungsrat	1939
Elektro-Bosna JACE	Verwaltungsrat	1939
Höster-Lackfabrik	Verwaltungsrat	1939
Prima SOCIETATE Explosibili-Bukarest	Verwaltungsrat	1939
Nitramonia-Bukarest	Verwaltungsrat	1939
Stickstoffwerke Maria-Rast	Verwaltungsrat	1939

In connection with the events of 30 June 1934 I withdrew from my position as manager of the Press Center of the I.G. in about 1935.

On account of other assignments I was relieved from the position as Chief of the Political Economy Department (WIPO) in 1938. All other positions were held by me until the capitulation of Germany in May 1945.

(Page 3 of original)

In connection with my new job in Pressburg I, from 1 September 1939 till 8 May 1945, in addition, took over the following positions in industrial firms or enterprises:

<u>Firms or enterprises:</u>	<u>Office or position:</u>	<u>Date of appointment:</u>
Apollo Raffinerie- Pressburg	Verwaltungsrat	about 1940
Apollo NAPHTA-Handels- ges. Prag	Vorwaltungsrat	about 1940
Chemische Industrie A.G. Pressburg	Acting managing Director	about 1940
Ost-Slowakische-Chemische Fabrik	Verwaltungsrat Chairmanship altered every year in accordance with contract with partner SVAESS	about 1942
DEHAG-Duengerhandels- ges. Pressburg	Chairman of the Management	about 1942
A.G. Dynamit-Belgrad	Verwaltungsrat	about 1942
Donau-Chemie-Vienna	Member of the Vor- stand	1942

I presume that by the acts of war (expulsion of the Germans) I have ceased to hold any position with the A.G. Dynamit, Pressburg, and all its affiliated companies as well as with the Donau-Chemie-Company Vienna, as from the end of the war.

5.) Income between 1933 - 1945.

In 1933 I had a yearly income of about RM 30,000.—. Following my appointment as a managing director, as well as the new organizational tasks conferred on me and the greater field of activity resulting therefrom, this income increased to RM 40,000.— in 1938. By my appointment as an acting managing director of the A.G. Dynamit Nobel, Pressburg, my income rose to RM 80,000.— in 1939. In 1940 it again rose to about RM 124,000.— which breaks down as follows:

salary from Germany	RM 24,000.—
special allowance	RM 25,000.—
salary in Pressburg in kronen	RM 20,000.—
allowance for expenditures in kronen	35,000.—
special allowance and shares in profit in kronen	20,000.—

In 1944 the special allowances and shares in profits in Pressburg further increased to about RM 65,000.— which brought my income to a total of about RM 169,000.— in 1944.

(Page 3 of original, cont'd)

The allowance for expenditures was granted me because of my double house-hold expenses and in order to cover representation expenses. Special allowances and shares in profits were in accordance with the turn-over and profit. By developing the new manufacture and by technically improving the old one the turn-over could be increased about 10-fold from 1938 to 1944. The profit resulting therefrom was reflected in my special allowances and shares in profit.

At no time I gained a direct or indirect income from the NSDAP or from party organisations.

(page 4 of original)

I could not acquire any Personal property before 1943. The financing of my studies and the maintenance of a family of 8, the prolonged illness of my father and expenditure for professional purposes, caused debts which could be repaid only by the end of 1943. It is only at the end of 1944 that my property included about RM 6000.-- in cash and I.G. Farben shares - nominal value: RM 1000.-- each, and also some insurance policies.

6.) Positions in industrial or economic organizations.

Industrial or economic organizations	office or position	date of appointment and membership
German- Bulgarian Chamber of Commerce	member of the presiding board	about 1933 - 1934
Chamber of Commerce Vienna	member of the advisory committee	about 1943 - 1945
German Slovakian industrial committee	member	about 1943 - 1945
Publicity Council of German Industry	member	about 1934 - 1945
South-East-Committee of Wirtschaftsgruppe Chemie (Economic Group for Chemistry)	member	1938 - 1945

I acted in all these positions only in advisory function.

7.) Economic position under the Nazi-regime.

At the end of 1932 it was suggested to me by Prof. BOSCH to arrange to HITLER for Dr. BUETEFISCH. I did so through Prof. HAUSHOFER and a friend HESS and took part in the visit myself. It was intended, for purposes of information to clarify the position of the NS-party regarding the question of German gasoline production. In 1932, I came also in social contact with SCHACHT. When I worked at the press center, it seemed useful to me to further the mutual understanding and acquaintance between Germans and their neighbors and, in this sense, to work for Goodwill for Germany.

From 1933 to the beginning of 1935, I was active in this direction particularly as far as Scandinavia was concerned. In doing so, I was also chiefly thinking of strengthening the commercial relations and of furthering export; I worked in the so-called group of economic leaders (Wirtschaftsfuehrerkreis) which had been formed by private initiative.

(page 4 of original, cont'd)

This group aimed at furthering Goodwill for Germany. In this connection I was in frequent contact with the Propagandaministerium (Ministry of propaganda). In 1934 FUNK made me a member of the Werberat (publicity board) of German Industry. As chief of the press center and later the Wirtschaftspolitischen Abteilung (Political Economy Department) of I.G., I was, more than before, in charge of liaison between I.G. and Public Agencies and associations and had to deal with questions of economic policy.

(page 5 of original)

8.) My attitude as a student.

In my college time I became a member of the Korps "Bavaria" (students' club "Bavaria"); but I soon withdrew from the club.

9.) My political attitude.

I was a member of the Konservative Volkspartei (Conservative people's party) from 1931 to the dissolution (beginning of 1933). On the list of this party I was a candidate for the Reichstag election for a West-German constituency; I managed to get the financial help of I.G. for this party. When I was in the highest grade at High School, in 1923 - probably in spring -, I joined the Bund Oberland (association Oberland). It was not on political grounds that I did so. Nor did I engage in politics, when I was a member. In the Bund Oberland I came in contact with anti-communist elements.

After 1933 I became a member of the following organizations:

Organization	time	highest rank	from:	to:
SA	1933	SA Colonel (Standartenfuhrer) for special disposition	middle of 1933	to June 30, 1934
NSD.F	July 1, 1935	member	to the end	
NSKK (Nat.Soc. Motor Corps)	August 1, 1936	supporting member	to the end	
DAF (German Labour Front)	1934	member	to the end	
NSV (Nat.Soc. Welfare Org.)	1934	member	to the end	
NS-Reichsb.f. Leibesuebungen (Reich-Association for gymnastics)	1934	member	to the end	

(page 5 of original, cont'd)

Organization	time	highest rank	from	to:
Deutsche Studenten- tenschaft (Association of German students)	1923	member	1927	
Deutsche Jaeger- schaft (German hunters' League)	1933	member	to the end	

In the middle of 1933, I was appointed honorary SA-Major (SA-Sturm-Jaenfuhrer) z.b. V. (for special disposition) by the then chief of staff ROEHM. At the end of 1933, I was in the same way, promoted to SA-Colonel (SA-Standartenfuhrer). When I was a member of the SA, I occasionally used my influence in the firm in favor of gifts for the SA.

On June 30, 1934, I was arrested by the Gestapo because I was a member of ROEHM's staff. It is only by chance that I was not shot. After this experience, I resigned - when I was released - my SA title and withdrew from the SA. I then tried to get abroad as soon as possible, but was told that given my antecedents, I could not possibly get the necessary permission to leave the country unless I joined the Party. HINKEL, whom I knew at Munich, as a member of "Oberland" or Schuetzen- und Wandverbund (rifle and ramblers' club) recommended my application which was carried through although admissions were blocked at that time.

(page 6 of original)

10.) Meeting with important leaders of the Reich or NSDAP.

At the end of 1932 I procured a visit to HITLER for Dr. BUETEFISCH; this was done at the suggestion of Prof. BOSCH through Prof. HAUSHOFER and HESS; I took part in the visit. In 1932 I came in social contact with SCHACHT. In my capacity as chief of the press office of I.G. I had frequent contact with Dr. GOEBBELS and FUNK. Frequently, I had dealings with HUENDELIN and HINKEL in questions concerning the press. In 1933 and 1934 SA chief of staff ROEHM, occasionally, invited me to talks about economic questions. Since 1934 - 1937, I had sometimes dealings with FOSSE; we talked about I.G. affairs connected with customs and commercial policy. In May, June 1938 I met NEUBACHER, FISCHDOECK and SEYS-INVART to discuss "Donau-Chemie" affairs.

1939 I met Hans KEHRL, to get the supply of construction material for Pressburg authorized.

(page 6 of original, cont'd)

1940 or 1941 I met KEFFLER, at his suggestion; - about a deposit of pyrites without interest for Pressburg. I can remember this meeting with KEFFLER with certainty.

11.) Publications and speeches.

In 1929, I published my enlarged Doctor's thesis under the title "Urbanization and workers' rule an examination of the Australian problem". In Geopolitik I wrote an essay about the subject of Urbanization. In the Arbeitgeberzeitung (Employers' Journal) too I published a theoretical inquiry on the subject "can a strike be helpful to the striker". About 1932 I published a compilation of Geheimrat DUISBERG's speeches and publications as a special book on the occasion of DUISBERG's 70th birthday; this was done in conjunction with Dr. HEMLE I never made public speeches myself.

12.) Titles and decorations.

These are the decorations I received:

Kriegsverdienstkreuz
(cross for distinguished service in war time) II. class
about 1942,
Kriegsverdienstkreuz I. class about 1944
and

Reich sport badge in 1935. In the middle of 1933 I was appointed honorary St. Major (St. Sturmbannfuhrer) for special disposition and at the end of 1933, I was promoted to St. Colonel (Standartenfuhrer).

13.) Personal status:

On May 2, 1929 I married Dr. Wera FRITZSCHE; there are five children. Four are alive, namely:

Ruediger born Febr. 11, 1930, Karin September 23, 1932,
Peter June 29, 1934, Heinrich VOLKER June 28, 1940.

I have carefully read and counter-signed with my own hand each of the 7 (seven) pages of this affidavit have made the necessary corrections in my own handwriting and have countersigned them with my initials and, hereby, state under oath that in this statement, I have said the pure truth, to the best of my knowledge and belief.

Nuernberg
June 12, 1947.

Dr. Heinrich GATTINEAU
(Signature of deponent)

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT No. 8788
CONTINUED

(page 7 of original)

Sworn to and signed before me this 12th of June 1947 at Palace of Justice, Nuremberg, Germany, by Dr. Heinrich GATTINEAU, known to me to be the person making the above affidavit.

(signature:) Werner LEWALD
Interrogator, U.S. Civilian
094412
Office of Chief of Counsel
for War Crimes U.S. War
Department.

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

10 July 1947

I, BORINSKI, No. AGO-34486, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages and that the above is a true and correct translation of the document No. NI-8788

BORINSKI
No. AGO-34486

Interrogation of Dr. Heinrich Bueteifisch
on 16 April 1947, from
9.45 until 11.45
Interrogator: Dr. Otto Heilbrunn

German Court Reporter: Elii Wunderlich

Q.: Are you aware that today also your statements are under oath ?

A.: Yes.

Q.: We need some information from you beyond the usual affidavit.
You have already made a deposition to that effect in your question-
naire. Please dictate: Your curriculum vitae, as briefly as pos-
sible.

(Dictation of curriculum vitae follows, together with
list of offices held. Deposited in affidavit of 18.4.47)

Q.: Today we will talk about "MOB". Who in your field of work was
responsible for MOB questions ?

A.: Mobilization plans ? Our opinion on this was not asked, it was
not our competence. It was the task of the Economic Group as such
to collect production figures and these were passed on to the Mi-
nistry of Economics.

Q.: No, I mean in the Works.

A.: We had nothing to do with the Works. Only the Betriebsfuehrer
could have dealt with that. When you say MOB question, I do not
know how to answer this. If a question was put to the Works,
then the manager had to supply the answer. We did not have an of-
fice dealing with "MOB". But I wish to elucidate one point: The
question of protection, so-called protective measures which had to
be taken in case of war. That did concern the Works. In case the
Works were attacked, the tasks were split up. Mr. Deinhardt was
responsible for taking protective measures.

Q.: Did you hold practices at Leuna ?

A.: Yes, that's what I meant, Mr. Deinhardt was responsible for that.

Q.: When was the first practice ?

A.: The Luftwaffe turned up with several generals, Milch among them.
I do not remember the year, it must have been in 1935 or 1936.
A practice was arranged. It was given out: "An air fleet is at-
tacking Leuna". What do you do to protect yourselves ?

Q.: Round a conference table or in the open air ?

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT No. NI-8637
CONTINUED

(page 1 of original, cont'd)

- A.: A squadron flew over, a telephone message was received, and work was stopped. This was followed by a discussion as to whether the correct measures had been taken.
- Q.: First the squadron approached, then it was sighted and a message sent out ?
- A. No, it was done on a larger scale. The air raid alarm post signalled the approach and the idea was to see ...
- Q.: Who received the message ?

(page 2 of original)

- A.: A telephone call was received from the alarm post. We sighted the squadron. The point was whether the order to stop work could be carried out without confusion before the arrival of the squadron.
- Q.: What do you mean by "stop" ?
- A. The whole of the Leuna Works from gas production to the completed production hung together like a honeycomb. Every plant was linked with the other. If work was seriously interrupted in one plant, then it might have thrown the whole Works out of gear. That is why the whole Works was sealed off. The various plants were sealed off by shutting the sliding-doors and supply pipes, so that the damage could be localized.
- Q.: Was that really done during air-raid practices ?
- A.: It was only done on paper.
- Q.: Did production go on ? How was the signal given ?
- A.: The message was: "Squadron approaching". They noted the time. The anti-aircraft commandant had to say whether he recognized them in time; he shot. The raider then signalled, either "I got away" or "I have been hit".
- Q.: Were they shot at ?
- A.: No, it was only practice. They did it in order to make use of the experience in case it came to the real thing.
- Q.: Was there any low altitude flying and diving ?
- A.: Yes.
- Q.: Did the raiders drop anything ?
- A.: No.

(page 2 of original, cont'd)

Q.: Did they fire duds ?

A.: No, I really don't know whether a 2cm gun was used for the defence - it is quite possible.

C.: An anti-aircraft gun ?

A.: I don't remember exactly.

Q.: The raiders didn't drop any dud bombs ?

A.: No, that would have meant a certain danger for the Works.
If a load had been dropped on the pipe-line, it might have been unpleasant.

C.: And what happened afterwards ?

A.: There the practice itself ended. We were then told what we should have done; whether the signal was given too late or too early.
Mr. Deinhardt then made use of the experience gained.

Q.: Were you as a Works criticized by the Luftwaffe ?

A.: No, I would not know, I did not hear the criticism of the experiences gained. All we said was that if the raiders should succeed in diving down as low as that, then it would be a very serious thing for us.

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led:)

(page 3 of original)

Bu. Q.: Was Colonel Thomas present at these practices ?

A.: I cannot say it for certain, I remember General Milch. There were a few Luftwaffe generals. It is possible that Thomas was there. I saw him.

Q.: At these practices ?

A.: No.

C.: How often did these practices take place ?

A.: I only witnessed one such practice. However, now and then we were ordered to practise on a certain day. Every now and again we had to give the order to cease work.

Q.: Do you remember the approximate date ?

A.: It is difficult to say. After this large scale practice, Deinhardt every now and then held such a practice on his own account. I have forgotten.

(page 3 of original, cont'd)

Q.: That part did the Vermittlungsstelle W play in all this ?

Bu. A.: The Vermittlungsstelle W, as far as I am informed, had been established to determine the question of treason in connection with the giving away of military secrets to foreign countries. It was announced that a Vermittlungsstelle W had been established. That was set up by Krauch and Knieriem. A Mr. Dickmann had an office in Berlin and worked on patent questions.

Q.: Is that all you know about this Office ?

A.: I had nothing to do with this Office.

Q.: If the Wehrmacht required some information from you, did it approach this Office ?

Bu. A.: If Mr. Thomas wanted to know anything, he called for me. It was the same with the Luftwaffe; the Luftwaffe had a liaison through Mr. Muedlich.

Bu. Q.: What do you know about Dr. Reitingen ?

A.: He was Ilgner's man. Dr. Reitingen was the man who dealt with statistics. He compiled lists and wrote reports.

Bu. Q.: Did Reitingen work together with the Luftwaffe ?

A.: I don't know.

Q.: To what extent were you in touch with Ilgner ?

A.: He was member of the Vorstand.

Q.: Name some concrete cases.

A.: South Eastern Committee (Suedostausschuss), he belonged to various companies.

Q.: What do you know about his espionage activities, Schollenberg ?

A.: I don't know anything about that.

(page 4 of original)

Q.: Let us come back to "MOB". The Buna part is only one side of it. Who was responsible for MOB questions in the field of synthetic motor fuel ?

A.: Krauch was, in fact.

Q.: No, in the Works ?

(page 4 of original, cont'd)

A.: That would have been myself.

Q.: Were you never asked about it ?

A.: No.

Q.: Dr. Buetefisch, it's no use talking like that.

A.: Who was to ask me ?

Q.: You can imagine that I do not ask without knowing why.

A.: We only issued production plans.

Q.: What did you call them ?

A.: Production plans.

Q.: Did you call them plans for the MOB case ?

A.: That is possible.

Q.: Who was responsible for these questions in the field of synthetic motor fuel for Leuna ?

A.: I was responsible.

Q.: What was the purpose of the "MOB" plans ?

A.: To state production figures in case Germany should be involved in a war. Every one responsible for production had to state: "what can you do, if ..."

Q.: Why were the Mob requirements constantly increased ?

A.: In order to make certain of an increased resistance power.

Q.: Because one felt war approaching ?

A.: In the case of fuel it was not obvious. Fuel consumption in Germany was enormous. Deliveries of synthetic and from our own production were very small. They were increased under the "self-sufficiency" plan. When it was asked, "what is required for MOB", the answer can only be: "Everything".

Q.: Were you present at meetings in which Krauch spoke about war ?

A.: No.

Q.: Did you speak to Krauch in connection with the production of synthetic gasoline ?

(page 4 of original, cont'd)

A.: He asked what the total production of aviation gasoline amounted to.

Q.: Did Krauch drop any hints that considerable quantities would be required at a certain date?

A.: No, I know nothing of that.

(page 5 of original)

Q.: Someone from his Staff?

A.: No, I wouldn't know.

Q.: Did Ungewitter make such intimations?

A.: That was Economic Group Chemical Industry.

Q.: Erdmann?

A.: I don't know him.

Q.: Anybody else?

A.: I wouldn't know. It must have been Thomas who said that we were ready to fight at any time. Herr Muecklich urgently insisted he wanted fuels with high anti-knock qualities.

Q.: What quantities?

A.: Quantities named were very big, practically unobtainable from us. Iso-Octane (Iso-Okten), for example.

Q.: Was any date given by which certain quantities must be available? Think of 1938.

Bu. A.: Concerning Iso-Octane, there was the controversy in the Reich Air Ministry as to whether Iso-Octane or Aromatics was a suitable fuel and, owing to these discussions, the technical development of Iso-Octane fell behind, so that when war broke out, there were only a few thousand tons available; there was thus no date set for us.

Q.: Did you supply the WIFO?

A.: Aviation gasoline for the Wehrmacht.

Q.: Did they hold stocks?

A.: Yes, they had stocks.

Q.: How big were they?

(page 5 of original, cont'd)

A.: That is beyond my knowledge. It was delivered to the WIFO direct
Bu. from the works in tank-cars. Whether the stocks there consisted
Bu. of 10,000 or 20,000 tons, I am not able to say.

C.: Did you have storage depots in the I.G. ?

A.: We only had depots in Leuna, only depots for the manufactured stocks
and some rented or leased alternative depots. The Standard Shell
and Gasolin saw to the disposal.

- Here there was a pause of some minutes -

Q.: What would you describe as the aim of National Socialist economic
policy ?

A.: I should say: It is planned economy under State control.

Q.: To what end ?

A.: To the end of subordinating everything to the requirements of the
State, that is to say, no free economic activity, but economy to be
dependent on policy. Policy has priority.

Q.: In what did the policy consist ?

(page 6 of original)

A.: It consisted, so far as it was at first understood, in the strengthen-
ing of the nation, on the assumption that a nation is independent
within its own living space.

Q.: What for ?

A.: In order to become a stronger and more established State.

C.: Further ?

A.: As it now appears, this national strengthening led to expansion, in
certain circumstances with violence. Without doubt, however, it
was not communicated to the people in that form. That was how they
were led astray.

Q.: You know Goering's famous saying: "Guns ...

A.: "Guns are more necessary than butter". Certainly, it must be owned
that a State is only strong in itself if it is secured against its
neighbours, that is to say, when it can conduct its policy without
fear of attack, without the intervention of a third party. That
was in all probability the opinion of the leaders.

Q.: Would you say that the aim was so to strengthen the Wehrmacht as to
be able to win an unlimited living space ?

(page 6 of original, cont'd)

A.: I should not have assumed that; I should have thought that it was to strengthen it so that the living space already possessed could be defended.

Q.: And then ?

A.: That is the aim which I held to be reasonable.

Q.: And when did you realise that that was not the official aim ?

A.: I must say I was surprised; I always said it was going too far and showed how little the other side - the leadership of the national-socialist movement - knew about it and how they under-estimated the power of the others.

Q.: When did it first become clear to you that the aim of the national-socialist economic and military policy was an absolute self-sufficiency in Germany ?

A.: It dawned on me during the years 1936/37, when they spoke always about "self-sufficiency", whereas we said that this, as such, was an obstruction in the way of every kind of development, that free exchange was the only ...

Q.: When did it become clear to you that the military policy was an aggressive policy ?

A.: I was surprised, when steps began to be taken to realise this aim.

Q.: When ?

A.: With the invasion of Poland.

Q.: Not 1938 ?

A.: I regarded Austria as a political step.

Q.: Czecho-Slovakia ?

A.: I said then that this was an act that looked like sheer violence that it was scarcely a policy of security and that it looked like the lust for power. Even though it was said it was a political action, taken in order to bring about a good understanding with Czecho-Slovakia.

(page 7 of original)

Q.: Did you realise that Czechoslovakia would only be the first chapter ?

A.: My opinion was and still is that they used bluff, and I said: "Now he will leave it alone".

(page 7 of original, cont'd)

Q.: Then it began with Poland.

A.: When the abrupt invasion of Poland took place, it was as if scales had fallen from my eyes.

Q.: I mean the preparation.

A.: These matters were presented to us powerfully through the press, where Hitler said, "I only want the path to the Corridor".

Bu. Q.: Was it not clear to you that it was not a question of the Corridor, but of Poland? The atrocities that were featured in the press had nothing to do with the Corridor.

A.: With regard to the atrocities, I thought it did not seem quite to fit in.

Q.: When you received the telegram on the 28 August 1939 from the Vermittlungsstelle W?

A.: It was then clear to us that there would apparently be a resort to arms.

Q.: Measures that concern the direction of an army are events that cast their shadows before?

A.: Not absolutely. Fischer rang me up and said it would not come to war, it would all be arranged.

Q.: Can the mobilization of economy for total war be countermanded?

A.: I must say, we did not have any very great change, we merely continued to manufacture gasoline.

Q.: I am talking of the IG.

A.: As regards the IG as a whole, I am of the same opinion, there was no armaments preparation.

Q.: It was a complete regrouping.

A.: There existed a program to close down Ludwigshafen.

Q.: What do you know about that?

A.: I only know that Ludwigshafen received a telegram.

Q.: When?

A.: On 1st or 2nd September 1939 - the works were to be closed down.

(page 7 of original, cont'd)

Q.: From whom ?

A.: From Ungewitter.

Q.: What did you think of that - they want the Polish Corridor and close down Ludwigshafen ?

A.: In order to get labor immediately. I think the declarations of war from France and England came simultaneously with this matter. The telegram may also have come on 3.9.39.

Q.: If it came on 3.9., then it was a matter of course.

A.: I do not know exactly

(page 8 of original)

Q.: What do you know of the telegram ?

A.: It was discussed.

Q.: Where ?

A.: In Leuna; I think Schneider told me that Ludwigshafen had received the order to close down.

Q.: You must recollect whether it was before the outbreak of war with France and England.

Bu. A.: Ludwigshafen was not my Works, I cannot say the exact day.

Q.: Can it have been after 3.9. ?

A.: It can have been, but if I have to swear to it, I cannot do so. This information must certainly be in the possession of the gentlemen of Ludwigshafen.

Q.: I want to know from you when you got to hear about the telegram.

A.: It was during the days of the greatest tension, I cannot say exactly.

Q.: If you heard of it on 3.9., then it would have been to some extent a matter-of-course procedure, which would not necessarily have stuck in your memory -.

A.: Yes, I also consider that logical, but in spite of that, as I was not the Betriebsfuehrer at Ludwigshafen I am not able to say.

Q.: This is not a question affecting you personally and I would ask you to make a special effort. When did you get to know about the telegram ?

(page 8 of original, cont'd)

A.: First came the Mobilization order on the 28 August; at that time I did not know anything about Ludwigshafen. Some days later, I heard about it, but whether before or after the 3.9. —

Q.: The 3 September was a Sunday; were you in your office ?

A.: In Leuna, in any case. We were of course at the Works every Sunday morning. It is also not the case that they would have informed us of it immediately; we learned of it afterwards, that is why I am not able to say.

Q.: On 28 August, your local Military District Commander informed you that the Mobilization Project was impending and at the same time it was stated that the Mobilization production was to begin. What agency was it that issued the order - the President of the Province (Regierungs-Präsident) or the Military District Plenipotentiary (Wehrkreis-Beauftragte) ?

A.: It may have been the President of the Province who issued it.

Q.: What did he issue to you - a telegram ?

Bu. A.: That I am not able to say, it went direct to Schneider. In any case, it was announced on 28.8 or 29.8.

Q.: Who was present ?

A.: The Departmental Managers, so far as I know.

Q.: How many were there ?

A.: Perhaps altogether 20 gentlemen.

(page 9 of original)

Q.: What did Schneider say ?

A.: "The Mobilization project is in force, and you must direct the production in your works and the output of work-people in accordance with it."

Q.: Did he give any sort of personal explanations ?

A.: He did not make any speech.

C.: No speech --

A.: He said that everybody must quietly perform his duty, that it was now war and that he expected from everyone that he would stay at his post.

(page 9 of original, cont'd)

Q.: On the 28.8. you were under the impression that this only meant war with Poland ?

A.: Yes, but I must say that, in view of the reports on the 29. of the Re-insurance Treaty of Beck (the General of Poland), I said that it was questionable whether England and France would permit it.

Q.: What happened on the 29.8. ?

A.: Was there not in the press an offer of mediation by England to compose the matter ? That happened in the meantime when Hitler said "I will not allow myself to be dictated to".

Q.: Did you expect war with England on the 29. ?

A.: I must say that when Hitler said that and knocked away the ground from under the political negotiations, I said: this means war, how can a man give so abrupt an answer !

Q.: When did the Ludwigshafen telegram arrive then ?

A.: That remark was made, I think, on the last day of August, and then I heard, if I am to take the matter chronologically, that Ludwigshafen was to be closed. It is possible that I heard this on the 1. or 2. September, 1939.

Q.: You said on 29. or 30.8.

A.: I don't think so.

Q.: I wish to know, whether before or after 3.9.

Q.: Were any further meetings held in Leuna on the 29. and following days owing to the outbreak of war ?

A.: Certainly separate meetings in the departments.

Q.: The departmental managers with their subordinates ?

A.: The departmental managers called their plant managers (Betriebsleiter) together and transmitted to them the words of Schneider.

Q.: How many plant leaders (Betriebsfuhrer) were there ?

A.: 50 or 60.

Q.: 20 departmental managers and 50 or 60 plant leaders (Betriebsfuhrer) ? These were informed in their departments on 28. August 1939 that war had broken out?

A.: Yes.

(page 10 of original)

Q.: What did the Betriebsfuehrer do, on their part ?

A.: They called together the work chiefs, the head foremen (Obermeister) and foremen (Meister) and will certainly have communicated to them what Schneider had said, whereupon they would have had at once to examine their lists to find out who would be drafted - there were red, yellow and green slips - who had to report without awaiting orders; this all had to be settled. After that, detailed work would begin.

Q.: Is it correct to say that on 28 August 1939 all employees of the Leuna plant realized that "this means war" ?

A.: I would say on 29 August. It would not all have been possible to settle up everything so quickly, we had shifts of 8 hours each.

Q.: When war broke out, would still another order have been issued to Leuna by the Wehrmacht or by the President of the Province (Regierungspraesident) ?

A.: At any rate, the one ordering all protective measures to be taken all arrangements to be made, in case Leuna should be attacked.

Q.: That was on 3.9.

A.: When war broke out, on 1.9., it was already war.

Q.: No further orders concerning production were issued after the 28.8. ?

A.: That changed, when it was said ...

Q.: Of a fundamental nature

A.: No. That only came later, when new productions were started.

Q.: Were you aware of the fact on 28 August 1939 that the aim of National Socialist economic policy was the industrial preparation of Germany for a war of aggression ?

A.: Yes.

Q.: Do you think the Wehrmacht could have conducted the war without synthetic gasoline ?

A.: No, it could not have done so without nitrogen, without gasoline, without Buna. That I consider is impossible.

Q.: Do I understand your answer to mean that the war could not have been conducted without IG-production ?

A.: Yes, that is clear, but you single out IG - there were other products that could not have been done without, either.

(page 10 of original, cont'd)

Q.: What was Hitler's motive when he took the gasoline industry under his special protection ?

A.: In my opinion, it was in the first place purely the desire for self-sufficiency, to be to a large degree independent of foreign fuels and to abolish unemployment.

Q.: What was Bosch's motive, when in 1932 he approached Hitler through you and Gattineau ?

(page 11 of original)

A.: Bosch's motive was to keep what seemed to him a highly promising development in the field of high pressure synthesis from being smashed.

Q.: Why did he choose Hitler as an indirect partner in the negotiation ?

A.: In my opinion, Hitler was not his negotiating partner, but Bosch had to fight the press of many parties, who strongly opposed the development of synthetic fuel. He said: "They want to kill something which I consider for the general good".

Q.: Did Bosch commission you to go to Hitler ?

A.: Gattineau must have telephoned him that I would probably be in the position to give technical information. I was to go there at Bosch's request.

Q.: What did Hitler promise at the time ?

A.: He said only: "I shall see to it that such articles do not appear in my press any more".

Q.: Did he say: I expect IG to behave decently toward the Party ?

A.: No. Not a word about that. There was never any talk about politics at all, which I considered very fair.

Q.: At the time, he needed money badly.

A.: Yes. That may be, but there was not a word about it.

Q.: And Hess ?

A.: Not one word.

Q.: Did Gattineau give any hints ?

A.: After Hitler said: "That is my conception of it", I was asked about the technical aspects of coal hydrogenation. I gave the explanation and that was all.

(page 11 of original, cont'd)

Q.: What did you talk about with Hess ?

A.: He told me of his flight over Garmisch, the exertions it took and so on.

Q.: The matter in question was not discussed with Hess ?

A.: No.

(page 12 of original)

Q.: Did you communicate this to Bosch ?

A.: Yes, verbally. I said that I had given the technical aspects of the matter and that Hitler had said, that he would see to it that no more such attacks appeared in his press. For the rest, he said that he considered the development sound and if gasoline could be made from coal it should be pursued.

Q.: What did Bosch say ?

A.: "Then the man is more sensible than I thought".

Q.: Did Bosch say that one ought to show one's gratitude ?

A.: No.

Q.: In connection with this discussion was anything done to show a more friendly attitude toward the party by IG ?

A.: Not as far as I know. That would have been Bosch's concern.

Q.: How large were the investments in the field of synthetic fuel up to that time ? Altogether ?

A.: Expenditures must have amounted to approximately 300 Millions.

Q.: Does it not seem probable to you that if a politician makes a statement which will bring in 300 Millions, one does something in return ?

A.: In my opinion Bosch never looked at it from that point of view.

Q.: What did Hitler promise ?

A.: He merely promised to stop the articles attacking the synthetic gasoline production, because "if gasoline is already being produced in Germany, the manufacturers ought to receive their costs for it"; by costs he meant payment at current prices.

(page 12 of original, cont'd)

Q.: He not only said that the attacks would be stopped but he also said that he needed gasoline? That meant therefore that the economic policy of National Socialism would give financial support to industry for synthetic gasoline production?

A.: You can say the same for quite a number of products.

(page 13 of original)

Q.: How did you interpret Hitler's statement that he considered synthetic gasoline production in Germany economically desirable?

A.: That it is right to produce from German raw materials anything that could possibly be produced, provided it is economically practicable. From the financial point of view, considering the foreign exchange situation existing in the Reich ---

Q.: What caused Hitler to abandon his hostile attitude toward IG which he expressed in the first edition of "Mein Kampf"?

A.: In my opinion, he realized that an economy cannot be run without the rational work of the industrial combines, that it does not do to put everything under state control.

Q.: Because of your lecture?

A.: Because of my lecture? - He probably realized it in general, not because of my lecture.

Q.: Did he demand any production promise from IG?

A.: No.

END

I have carefully read each of the 13 pages of this affidavit and signed it, have made the necessary corrections in my own handwriting and have initialled them and declare under oath that I have told the truth in this interrogation to the best of my knowledge and belief.

(Signature) Heinrich BUETEFISCH
Dr. HEINRICH BUETEFISCH

(Signature) Otto HEILBRUNN
Dr. OTTO HEILBRUNN
Interrogator

(Signature) Elly WUNDERLICH
ELLY WUNDERLICH
German Court-Reporter

Nuernberg, 30 April 1947

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT No. NI-8637
CONTINUED

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

1 July 1947

We, Victoria ORTON, No. 20129, and Anne MARTIN, No. 20144, hereby certify that we are thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages and that the above is a true and correct translation of the document No. NI-8637.

Victoria ORTON
No. 20 129

Anne MARTIN
No. 20 144

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT No. NI-6767
OFFICE OF CHIEF OF COUNSEL FOR WAR CR.

INTERROGATION of Carl KRAUCH, on 16 April 1947
by Mr. CHARLITZ, in the afternoon.
Others present: Annolie HIGHER, German Court
Reporter

- Q.: You are aware of the fact that you are making your statements under oath, Herr KRAUCH ?
- A.: Yes.
- Q.: First one question: Some time ago I read - I can't quite remember where it was - that BOSCH recommended you to GOERING in 1936.
- A.: I can't say that. In 1942, on the occasion of a meeting of the Aufsichtsrat of the Kontinentale-Oel-Gesellschaft FUNK approached me and told me that VOEGLER at that time had mentioned my name for the first time, naming me as the man who would know about matters of research and would therefore be the right one for the position in the Four Years Plan. BOSCH did not speak with GOERING, I believe.
- Q.: But it is possible that in this indirect way BOSCH did recommend you via VOEGLER.
- A.: VOEGLER was good friends with BOSCH and he knew me too from his various visits at Ludwigshafen, where he was usually shown the laboratories and places of research and at which occasion I had to give a lecture.
- Q.: If I may ask you again: If BOSCH recommended you to GOERING, how could you explain that ?
- A.: There is only an indirect possibility of BOSCH having talked to VOEGLER and my name having been mentioned on that occasion. That's what I conclude from FUNK's remark. May I add that BOSCH was not in the least astonished when I told him about Berlin. He must have known something, but he did not tell me anything.
- Q.: Something else: You told me that you got that call from LOEB at that time, during May. What did you think when that call came ?
- A.: I may have assumed that it was because of benzine, because I had sort of a name in connection with the synthesis of benzine and I concluded that he wanted to ask me some questions concerning its development.

(Page 1 of original, cont'd)

Q.: Did the name of LOEB mean anything at all at that time ?

A.: Not to me.

Q.: How could you then assume, that LOEB was going to ask you something in connection with benzine ?

A.: This was always the usual question when I was called to Berlin during those years.

(Page 2 of original)

Q.: Was SCHACHT interested in those things at that time, during the first three months of 1936 ?

A.: Yes, through the Prabag. After all, he was the founder of the Prabag and had called me into the Prabag. He knew BOSCH.

Q.: You said, to the Ministries.

A.: The Ministry of Finance, because they had to fix the prices.

Q.: And who else ?

A.: The Department of Weapons (Waffenamt), General LIESE. He was interested whether the benzine would satisfy their requirements.

Q.: Any other Ministry or state office ?

A.: I don't think so.

Q.: Did you ever have anything to do with the Ministry of Air (Luftfahrtministerium), where LOEB was a functionary ?

A.: Once I was invited by VOEGLER; MILCH was present too.

Q.: When was that ?

A.: In 1934/35.

Q.: Did you personally have a lot to do with MILCH ?

A.: With regard to these questions. He often approached me personally.

(Page 2 of original, cont'd)

Q.: In connection with the Drabag: what was the impression you and SCHUCHT, too, had of KEPPLER in 1934 ?

A.: I had the feeling that KEPPLER wanted to build up a party economy, a state economy, that he wanted to bring the State into the industry. I was under the impression that he wanted to found a sort of a State concern, in order to build up a new National Socialist economy on a different basis..

Q.: I can't remember very well, but I don't think that KEPPLER, if we should ever talk to him about that, will say that he wanted to build up a State or Party economy. KEPPLER, as you know, was an idealist in a fanatical way. What he wanted first of all, was to develop German raw materials. This was his idea. But I did not have the impression that KEPPLER was a supporter of State economy or of a State economy directed by the Party.

(Page 3 of original)

A.: You will have to consider the situation of the economy at that time. We all were under that impression. It is quite possible to imagine that later on KEPPLER saw this right. But at that time, when theories were still important, he certainly thought that way.

Q.: At that time you were not so much interested in the technical problem, that KEPPLER really wanted to make synthetic raw materials; at that time you were thinking first of all of political and financial economic factors. You mentioned the Ministry of Finance. You know, that with regard to benzine, protective tariffs have always played an important part. How did this whole tariff policy develop ? Can you give me a survey on that ?

A.: The price at which we produced at Leuna, was much higher than the price on the world market.

Q.: Was there a tariff at that time, in 1930 ?

A.: There were some low tariffs.

Q.: In 1930 ?

A.: Yes.

(Page 3 of original, cont'd)

Q.: This was a purely financial tariff ?

A.: Yes.

Q.: Could you give me an approximate idea concerning the imported benzine ?

A.: The way you said it. It is about 10:12, then the costs of production.

Q.: How high were your costs of production at Louisa at that time, in 1930 ?

A.: 40 - 50 Pfennig.

Q.: How high was your sales price ?

A.: 30 - 35 Pfennig.

Q.: What happened after 1930 ? You produced at 40 Pfennig.

A.: We know that those costs of production were too high. The amount of the entire amortization and interest had to be carried by the small production. At that time we already realized that we would not reach the world market for quite some time.

Q.: What did the Government do to make the synthetic production of benzine possible ?

A.: They increased the tariff.

Q.: When was that ?

(page 4 of original)

A.: 1929 or 1930

Q.: At the time, when you started to produce for the market, did the Government increase to how much?

A.: To 4 Pfennig .

Q.: That did not help you very much.

A.: No, that was not sufficient. Thereupon we submitted more requests.

Q.: To whom?

A.: To the Minister of Finance DIETRICH.

Q.: How did it go on?

A.: Step by step, up to an increase of 10 Pfennig.

Q.: So that the import duty at that time was 12 Pfennig?

A.: Yes.

Q.: When was that?

A.: 1932.

Q.: Was that still the BRUENING-Government, or the PAPEN-Government?

A.: That was the BRUENING-Government.

Q.: What happened then?

A.: Then came the era HITLER - FEDER.

Q.: And what about PAPEN?

A.: You did not talk to PAPEN, DIETRICH did that.

Q.: From when till when did actually nothing happen?

A.: 1932 - 1934 nothing else happened. At that time things were even.

Q.: And in 1934?

A.: The Ministry of Economy requested an increased production. The I.G. refused that, because they were afraid of the risk of an increased production.

(page 4 of original, cont'd)

Q.: What do you mean by that?

A.: It was to be assumed that damages would occur, which would have considerable repercussions, in consequence of which the usual amortization could not be covered.

(page 5 of original)

Q.: Were the I.G. at that time approached to build new works, or to make better use of the existing ones?

A.: Yes, of course, to make better use of the existing ones.

Q.: In what proportion would an increased utilization have been possible?

A.: 100 - 200 000.

Q.: Therefore in the ratio 1:2.

When were the I.G. approached in this respect?

A.: In summer of 1934.

Q.: What was the reason for this?

A.: A certain Herr LA ROCHE and Professor UHLENHOFER asked HUETEFISCH and PIER, whether it would be possible to increase the production.

Q.: Which legitimation did these gentlemen have?

A.: The legitimation from FEDER.

Q.: Were they voluntary collaborators of FEDER?

A.: Yes.

Q.: Did the Ministry of Economy have voluntary collaborators?

A.: They were Party Members.

Q.: Were they working in this office of FEDER's in the Reich directorate (Reichsleitung)?

A.: I don't know that, anyhow, they were close collaborators of FEDER.

Q.: What did SCHMIDT say about that? Who was the originator, FEDER or SCHMIDT?

A.: Probably FEDER.

(page 5 of original, cont'd)

Q.: Then these 2 gentlemen appeared in the I.G.?

A.: I believe, that UEBELONDE knew PIER.

Q.: How did these people get there? UEBELONDE on one hand had purely egoistical interests on the other hand he was the representative of FEDER.

A.: He was looked at as a Party representative.

A.: And what happened then?

Q.: Pretty soon I was asked by BUETEFISCH and PIER, to take part in a conference.

(Page 6 of original)

Q.: And what resulted from this?

A.: We could state, that the UBELOHDE method was not ready yet.

Q.: That was a distilling method?

A.: Yes.

Q.: And what did the gentlemen remark in regard to the method?

A.: FEDER proposed the mixed price on the basis of a price control. He said, we cannot increase the tariff to an unlimited extent, we cannot keep on increasing the tariff. Therefore let us leave the tariff and guarantee a price as purchasing price to the factory. However, that can only be guaranteed, if the Ministry of Finance has insight into this calculation and on this basis a contract was concluded, which was signed by FEDER and BOSCH. Subsequently I.G. decided to proceed with the production.

Q.: Now you said, that the tariff was not increased and before, I believe, you said the tariff was increased.

A.: No. It was increased in the period during 1930 - 32.

Q.: Then, not anymore at all?

A.: No.

Q.: You stated, this contract between FEDER and BOSCH was concluded in 1934. But as far as I know, the so-called gasoline-contract was concluded in December 1933.

A.: I cannot positively say that. The first meeting with FEDER took place in the Summer of 1933, and this affair was settled in the winter.

Q.: HITLER also was greatly interested in this contract. What do you know about it?

A.: I know nothing about that. I only spoke with FEDER.

Q.: Didn't FEDER ever made a remark, this initiative did not stem from him?

A.: They never admitted that.

Q.: Then in November 1932, GATTINAU and BUETEFISCH went to Munich to see ITLER. Is that not so? What do you know about it?

A.: The winning over of the press was at stake. Strong attacks against synthetic gasoline were made in the press, which probably in some way was guided by the automobile industry, and now utilized all kinds of newspapers, including the "Frankfurter Zeitung".

Q.: Was that such a concentrated attack? I cannot imagine

(Page 7 of original)

the Frankfurter Zeitung echoing the others.

A: Still, that was the case. Of course, they also contributed corresponding editorials.

Q: But what has all this to do with HITLER?

A: The National-Socialist press rose at that time in the same manner, and HITLER had very strongly supported the auto industry, so that attacks resulted from there too, and attention was being drawn to cheap fuels. GATTINAU and BUETEFISCH discussed that with HITLER and HITLER agreed and then gave directions accordingly to the press.

Q: Why was HITLER consulted right away and not WEISS or ROSENBERG, the editors in chief.

A: It was commonly known, that HITLER managed the whole works. There was absolutism already then.

Q: But he couldn't know of all those attacks from everybody?

A: Still, it was like that. Even the "Voelkische Beobachter" wrote only what was submitted to it and what it represented.

Q: One thing doesn't quite fit in: That the "Voelkische Beobachter" followed the same line as the "Frankfurter Zeitung".

A: But it was like that.

Q: That can be determined historically. Then you stated you had knowledge of it, as soon as GATTINAU and BUETEFISCH reported to you.

A: They came to me while I was in Berlin and told me.

Q: What was the reason to send those two, and not you?

A: The I.G. did not want any of its prominent people to confer with the National Socialists. I was more or less official.

Q: And wasn't BUETEFISCH official?

A: No he was not on the Vorstand.

Q: And on the other hand, did BOSCH give the order?

A: I do not believe that BOSCH knew about it.

Q: If BOSCH had definitely not liked HITLER as you say of now 2 people from the I.G. - I emphasize now I.G., because the I.G. always valued its reputation, if two men from my firm go to a man, I don't care for, have a conference there and the danger exists

(Page 8 of original)

it is being published; I would fire those 2 people were I in BOSCH's place. And they also had to count on this. BUEPFISCH and GATTIMAU, did not assume such a risk without BOSCH knowing about it.

A: BOSCH finally put up with something then. At the moment, when the gentlemen reported to him, that HITLER gave directives to his press, he was also satisfied. I had that feeling.

Q: In one interrogation you mentioned, and we already talked about it, that the Party program demanded the dissolution of I.G. But nothing was said about it in "Mein Kampf"?

A: No. I cannot confirm that as I never read it completely.

Q: We spoke about the synthetic gasoline program before and you said FUNK had been the driving power. I asked you then whether HITLER wasn't the initiator, the stronger personality. The reason I asked you was, because BOSCH was with HITLER in March or April and reported to HITLER on the economy. During this conference the entire hydration program was also discussed. I have thought it over why BOSCH did not say that of FUNK.

FUNK was Reich press chief at that time and attended the conference in this capacity, not officially, however. As to FUNK's description this conference between BOSCH and HITLER also revolved about the entire synthetic program.

A: I also thought it over, why BOSCH did not tell me this about FUNK. It is possible, BOSCH regarded FUNK as a sort of recorder of the minutes.

Q: At any rate it is also a fact, that HITLER had the gasoline contract submitted to him.

A: I cannot say that, of course.

Q: Is it known to you, what BOSCH reported to HITLER beside the general report on the economy?

A: He gave the hydration as an example for an international cooperation, international trade and economic relations.

Q: And what did he say, what did HITLER remark to it?

A: BOSCH felt as if he had spoken to a wall, since HITLER did not react.

Q: What did BOSCH want? -

A: BOSCH wanted the assurance, that the economy retained its independence. That was his basis.

Q: But there was no interference into private economy, till at least 1936.

(page 9 of original)

A.: This was feared though.

Q.: Now let's talk purely psychologically. In the course of these discussions in March and April, when all these difficulties already existed and now that HITLER is Chancellor and they had already attempted to protect and nurse along this gasoline process in 1932, BOSCH goes to HITLER to call his attention to it. That is something I do not understand. Perhaps we can talk about it another time. When did BOSCH die?

A.: In May 1940.

Q.: That is when you became a member of the Aufsichtsrat.

A.: Yes, shortly after that I became a member of the Aufsichtsrat.

Q.: Herr KRAJICH, you remember that I saw you here once many months ago. At that time I asked you about the GOERING speech of 14 October 1933. Who was present during this speech?

A.: There were quite a few people present.

Q.: Was the speech held in the Preussenhof?

A.: No, in the Luftfahrt Ministry.

Q.: Who was present there?

A.: There were at least 50 people. Just by chance I remember the notorious FRIEDRICH, HAIDER was there too, also men from the Navy and Army.

Q.: What kind of a speech was that? For the industries or for the Ministries?

A.: For the Ministries, there wasn't anybody present from the industry.

Q.: You know that at that time in September the Four Years Plan was started. When did Goering explain and comment on this Four Years Plan anyway?

A.: As far as I know GOERING spoke about the Four Years Plan for the first time during his speech in the Sportpalast.

Q.: Do you know the date?

A.: That must have been in October.

Q.: In October. And his official appointment was being published in the Reich Law Gazette in October, too. What was this speech like?

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT No. NI-8767
CONTINUED

(page 9 of original, cont'd)

A.: All the Ministers were sitting up there, LOEB, of course, was there and then he spoke freely about his program.

Q.: After the Four Years Plan officially became the Four Years Plan, were there

(page 10 of original)

any changes in the internal organization or aims with regard to the economic policy?

A.: I did not have this impression.
Recently you asked me when I had heard the word Four Years Plan for the first time, I meditated on that. I think this was in LOEB'S office.

Affidavit

I have carefully read and signed with my own signature each of the 10 pages of this record of my interrogation of 16 April, have made the necessary corrections by hand and initialed them, and I herewith declare under oath that this record is a true statement of my interrogation.

Nuernberg,.....

signature: J. P. CHAMATZ
(Interrogator)

(signature) Earl KRAUCH

signature: Annelie AIGNER
(Court Reporter)

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

23 June 1947

I, E. ROSENBERG, Civ.No. 20 076, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages and that the above is a true and correct translation of the document No. NI-6767.

E. ROSENBERG
Civ.No. 20 076.

Subject: Leuna Gasoline.

In the year of 1931, an assignment was given to me by the Administration Committee (Verwaltungsausschuss) to prepare in conjunction with Dr. MOEG, of Wolfen Farben, and de Gaus of Ludwigshafen, an experts' opinion on the situation as a whole of the production of gasoline. The finding was that at that time a minimum price of 23 Pfennigs per liter had been reached, which even further improvements could not help to reduce considerably. Up to then, approximately 400 million Reichsmarks had been spent for experiments and the development of Oppau and Leuna.

One therefore was of the opinion that such high expenditures which had to be paid for out of the profits from other products could no longer be justified.

In my opinion one could not continue to work without special subventions. On principle, I was, as a matter of fact, against any kind of subventions by the State because this would lead of necessity to influence by the state. One should rather close down the plant.

I heard from others that though the production of gasoline was unprofitable, by-products were obtained on the basis of which a new chemistry could be built up, offering great prospects for the future.

2 May 1947

(signature): JAEHNE

Written and signed in my presence

(signature): Peter H. MILLER, Interrogator
U.S. Civ. D-145338, O.C.C.W.

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

I, HERTHA C. KNUTH, AGO No. X-046355, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages, and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document No. NL-6765.

HERTHA C. KNUTH,
U.S. Civilian
AGO No. X-046355

(E N D)

(Note: This revised translation to be substituted for all previous translations of Document 3901-PS as they contain certain technical inaccuracies)

November 1932

Your Excellency;

Much Esteemed Herr Reich President:

Filled, like your Excellency, with profound love for the German people and the fatherland, the undersigned welcome hopefully the fundamental change which your Excellency has initiated in the conduct of state affairs. We agree with your Excellency on the necessity of a government run ^{more} independently from parliamentary party matters; the ideas which your Excellency formulated with regard to a Presidial Cabinet bring this thought into the open.

The outcome of the Reichstag elections of November 6 of this year has demonstrated that the former cabinet, whose sincere intentions none among the German people doubted, did not find adequate support within the German people for the pursuit of its course; it also demonstrated that the goal at which your Excellency is aiming has the support of a full majority of the German people if we -- as we should -- exclude the Communist party whose attitude is negative to the State. Not only the Black-White-Red party and its related smaller groups, but the National Socialist German Workers Party as well are fundamentally opposed to the former parliamentary party regime; thereby they have agreed to the aim of your Excellency. We consider this result extremely gratifying and cannot imagine that the realization of the goal should now founder at the maintenance of ineffective methods.

It is evident that an oft-repeated dissolution of the Reichstag with increasingly frequent and sharpening elections would not only be detrimental to a political pacification and solidity, but to

an economic one as well. It is equally clear, however, that any constitutional change which is not supported by the broad masses would elicit even worse economic, political, and psychical results.

We therefore consider it a moral duty to ask your Excellency respectfully that, in order to attain the goals of your Excellency which all of us support, the reorganization of the Reich Cabinet be carried out in a manner which would line up the greatest possible popular force behind it.

We confess to be free of any narrow party-political attitude. We recognize in the national movement which penetrates our people the promising beginning of an era which, through over-coming of class contrasts only now creates the essential basis for a rebirth of German economy. We know that this rebirth will claim many sacrifices yet. We believe that these sacrifices can be made willingly only when the largest group of this national movement receives a leading share in government.

Entrusting the leader of the largest national group with the responsible leadership of a Presidial Cabinet which harbors the best technical and personal forces will eliminate the blemishes and mistakes with which any mass movement is perforce afflicted; it will incite millions of people who today are still standing apart, to a positive effort.

With full confidence in the wisdom of your Excellency and your Excellency's feeling of solidarity with the people, we greet your Excellency with the most profound respect.

(Pencilled list of possible signatories -- corrected spelling:)

Helfferrich x	Schacht x	Hecker x	Tischbein	Lueninek
Krogmann x	Reinhart x	Voegler	Jaenicke	Kalckreuth x
H. Sloman x	Schroeder x	Rosterg x	Rob. Bosch	v. Oppen
Witthoeft x	Finck	Silverberg	Schmitt	Kudell
Cuno	Kurt Eichborn x	Thyssen x	Ullrich	Rabbethge
Kiep		Reusch	Luebbert x	Wenzel
Albert		Haniel	Beindorff x	Keyserlingk
Much		Ki...	Ventski x	Brandes
Kurt Hoermann x		Siemens		
		Springerum		

x Krogmann	x Schmitt ? B	x Ullrich R
x Helfferrich	x Thyssen Sch	Rabbethge
x Schacht	x Reusch ? Sch	Wenzel
x Reinhart	x Voegler ? x	x Krupp
Schroeder	x Haniel ? Sch	Brandes
x Hecker	x Rob. Bosch ? K	
x Rosterg	x Finck ? B	
A. Sloman H.	Kalckreuth B	
x Witthoeft H.	v. Lueninck x	
x Cuno - Kiep H.	v. Oppen B	
x Albert (Hecker) x	Eichborn R	
x Silverberg ? x	x Much H.	
x Tischbein ? K	Luebbert B	
x Jaenicke K	Kudell B	

REVISED TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 3901-PS
U.S.A. EXHIBIT NO. 837
OFFICE OF THE U.S. CHIEF OF COUNSEL

Copy

Helferich
Krogmann
R. Slemann
Witthoof
Cuno
Kiep
Albert
Much
Kurt Woermann
Schecht
Reinhart
Schroeder
Fink
Kurt Eichborn

from scratch paper

Hecker
Voegler
Rosterg
Silverberg
Thyssen
Reusch
Haniel
Krupp
Siemens
Springerum
Tischbein
Jaenicke
Reb. Bosch
Ullrich
Laebbert
Beirdorff oder Reindorff
Wentzky (Name difficult to read)
Kalkreuth
von Oppen
Kudell
Rebothge
Wenzel
Keyserling

* * * * *

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

I, Edith H. Simon, Civ., D-150458, herewith certify that I am
thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages and
that the above is a true and correct translation of Document
No. 3901-PS.

Edith H. Simon, Civ.
D-150458

TRANSLATION OF EXTRACTS OF DOCUMENT NO. NI-6,22
OFFICE OF CHIEF OF COUNSEL FOR WAR CRIMES

(Translator's Note: Handwritten Notation:
"The Book was in good condition on 9 Jan. 1942
apart from a few fingerprints" Illegible initial)

Dr. Joseph GOEBBELS

FROM THE KAISER'S COURT

TO THE REICH CHANCELLERY

A historical account in the form of diary entries
(1 January 1932 to 1 May 1933)

(Translator's Note:
Stamp: BAVARIAN
DISTRICT COURT
MUNICH)

5th Edition

121th - 140th Thousand

Handwritten Note:
Gef. Fahrn.Term.Verz.I
No. 165

(Translator's Note:
Trade Mark of
F. Eher Nachf.)

Kas. 222

1934

Central Publishing House of the NSDAP, Frz. Eher NACHF, G.m.b.H. Muenchen

(4th Page of original -
Page 218 of original)

8 December 1932.

Deep depression prevails in the organization. The financial
difficulties make purposeful work impossible.

There are rumors that STRASSER is planning a Palace revolution.
I have not yet been able to find out exactly how this is to be done.

One is mentally so sore that one has no other wish but to escape
from this bustle for a few weeks.

At noon the news is out: STRASSER has written the Fuehrer a letter
resigning from all his positions in the Party. He gives very bad and
indisputable reasons for this move. The Party should be brought close
to the State, the time had come to come around.

(5th Page of original -
Page 219 of original)

the movement was wasting energy on useless opposition; he could no longer
approve this policy and declined responsibility for it.

TRANSLATION OF EXTRACTS OF DOCUMENT
No. NL-6522 (Cont'd)

(7th Page of original --
Page 255 of original)

.....
2 February 1933.

The preparations for the election campaign are going very well. This time it is a question of hitting and stabbing. We will show no mercy and will assert ourselves by every means.

(8th Page of original --
Page 256 of original)

The Gauleiter are gathered in Berlin. I am speaking to them about the technique and tactics of the election campaign which is to begin. It must be our target to get an absolute majority with those parties participating in the Government. The rest remains to be seen.

.....
3 February 1933.

I am discussing the election campaign which is starting now in detail with the Fuehrer. Now it is easy to conduct the fight because we can lay claim to all the means of the States for our purposes. We will produce a masterpiece in the way of agitation. This time money is of course not lacking either.

.....
(8th Page of original --
Page 257 of original)

.....
I am somewhat worried about the radio. The old Weimar bosses are still in all the important positions. They must be kicked out as quickly as possible, by the 5 March, so that the end of our election campaign cannot be endangered any more.

.....
(9th Page of original --
Page 266 of original)

20 February 1933.

.....
(10th Page of original --
Page 267 of original)

.....
We are raising a very big sum for the election which will eliminate our financial worries with one stroke. I will alert the entire propaganda machine straight away and in an hour's time the rotary presses will be turning. Now we will go into top gear.

Unless some extraordinary obstacle arises now, we have already won all along the line.

(11th Page of original -
Page 276 of original)

7 March 1933

.....
This evening I am meeting the men from Munich in the Reich Chancellery. The situation in Bavaria is now ripe. In Hamburg, a Reichskommissar was already appointed on the evening of the election day. Why should this not be possible elsewhere too? Now that our enemies are beaten and shattered, we must act with decision and exploit the situation. Next it will be BADEN's turn; we will create order there now.

We must not let ourselves be restrained by petty obstacles. A revolution is

(11th Page of original -
Page 277 of original)

after all a revolution. Even when it comes to power legally, it has the job of creating a new legal basis.
.....

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

I, DOROTHEA L. GALEWSKI, EPO No. 34079, hereby certify that I am thorough conversant with the English and German languages, and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document No. NI-6522

DOROTHEA L. GALEWSKI,
EPO No. 34079

(E N D)

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT No. NI-7990
OFFICE OF CHIEF OF COUNSEL FOR WAR CRIMES

AFFIDAVIT

I, Kurt Freiherr von SCHROEDER, having been duly advised that I should render myself liable to punishment by making false statements, herewith depose the following on oath, voluntarily and without coercion:

When PAPEN was first appointed Chancellor of the Reich, he had the confidence of HINDENBURG and, in a great measure, the support of members of the Parties of the Right. At that time, he was instructed by HINDENBURG to form a Government, but the instruction was given without the approval of the Reichstag. It was his intention to exclude from his Government all Social Democrats and Communists and all other members of the Parties of the Left. In these circumstances, the NSDAP declared its preparedness to support PAPEN. PAPEN's Government had, then, in the beginning, the support of all Parties of the Right, including the Nazis. With the latter, however, differences of opinion arose after a short time. When political murders, committed, for the most part, by Communists, began to increase to unmanageable proportions, PAPEN made a law in accordance with which political murder was punishable by the death penalty. Up to this time, the death penalty had been non-existent in Germany. Shortly after this, a communist was attacked by two Nazis in his house in a small town in Silesia, and trampled to death. Both culprits were indicted, convicted by the court and sentenced to death, and thus the law made by PAPEN, which, in fact, was originally aimed at the Communists, was first applied to two Nazis. As a result, a storm of indignation arose in Nazi circles. HITLER and GOERING sent telegrams to the two murderers who had been condemned to death, dubbing them brothers in arms and, to all intents and purposes, identifying themselves with them.

(page 2 of original)

At the same time, HITLER sent a telegram of protest to PAPEN, in which he warned PAPEN that he would himself be guilty of murder if the two condemned men were executed. Von PAPEN replied that he was powerless to take any action against the judgment which had been pronounced in accordance with the law. PAPEN had planned to suggest to HINDENBURG that he pardon the two murderers, but had not informed HITLER of this. PAPEN was thereupon strongly attacked by all the speakers at a meeting of the NSDAP, which took place a short time later. This was the first of the incidents which led to a breakdown in the collaboration between HITLER and PAPEN.

The second incident occurred in August 1932, after the NSDAP had won a large number of seats in the election. HINDENBURG, who was staying on his estate in East Prussia at the time, had stated that he was prepared to discuss with HITLER and PAPEN the situation produced by the results of the election. It seems possible that

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT No. NI-7990
CONTINUED

(page 2 of original cont'd)

PAPEN and HITLER were of the opinion that the time had come for HITLER to be made Chancellor of the Reich, and HITLER had apparently received from PAPEN, the impression that HINDENBURG would suggest this, or at least that he wished to discuss the possibility of making HITLER Chancellor of the Reich. I assume that General von SCHLEICHER had spoken to HINDENBURG, in the meantime and had persuaded him that it was absolutely impossible to make HITLER Chancellor. When HITLER and PAPEN came to visit HINDENBURG, therefore, the latter was prepared to discuss the situation, but prefaced his remarks with the statement that he was not in any way in favor of HITLER's being made Chancellor. This enraged HITLER, for he assumed that PAPEN had deliberately deceived him and intended to bring about his political downfall.

Because of these two incidents and because he was of the opinion.

(page 3 of original)

that PAPEN had not kept the promises which he had made when he was first appointed Chancellor, HITLER consistently levelled attacks at PAPEN during political gatherings from this time onwards, thus causing relations between HITLER and PAPEN to become more and more strained. During this time, SCHLEICHER was secretly working against PAPEN, although ostensibly he was supporting him. Then, one day, a vote of no-confidence was passed against PAPEN in the Reichstag. This vote of no-confidence was skilfully manoeuvred by GOERING, in such a way that PAPEN was unable to produce the HINDENBURG decree for the dissolution of the Reichstag, which he had kept in readiness for such an eventuality. Thus PAPEN had to resign from the Chancellorship of the Reich and shortly afterwards, SCHLEICHER was appointed Chancellor of the Reich by HINDENBURG. After all these incidents, relations between PAPEN and HITLER became so strained that there was no longer any possibility of collaboration.

Although many supporters of the Conservative and Nationalist Parties stood behind PAPEN, and, like a large number of Conservative Nationalist Socialists, believed it essential for HITLER and PAPEN to work together if the foundation of a strong nationalist Government was to be laid, it was impossible to bring PAPEN and HITLER together within the first few months after the former's fall from office as Chancellor. As SCHLEICHER was not acquitting himself with distinction in the office of Chancellor, however, HITLER and PAPEN both realized that the omity between them was serving no particularly good or useful purpose. I assume that HITLER gradually realized that PAPEN had not betrayed him and that a great part of the mistrust existing between them was SCHLEICHER's work. When, in the latter months of 1932, the situation in Germany under SCHLEICHER deteriorated still more, HITLER AND PAPEN realized

(page 4 of original)

that the most advisable course of action would perhaps be for them to work in collaboration with each other if possible. When I saw PAPEN in December, he said to me, "I believe that it would perhaps be possible now to bring about a meeting, in order to settle the points of dispute. We must find some way of rendering possible collaboration between the Parties of the Right". This is the history of the meeting between HITLER and PAPEN in my house.

On 4 January 1933, HITLER, von PAPEN, HESS, HIMMLER and KEPPLER came to my house in Cologne. HITLER, von PAPEN and I proceeded to my study, where a discussion, lasting two hours, took place. HESS, HIMMLER and KEPPLER did not take part in the discussion, but remained in the adjoining room. KEPPLER, who had helped to arrange this meeting, came from Berlin; von PAPEN came alone from his house in the Saar district; and HITLER brought HIMMLER and HESS with him, as they had attended an election meeting at Lippe on the way. The discussion took place exclusively between HITLER and PAPEN. I took no part in it. The discussion began at approx. 1103 hours, and the first point to be raised was the question of why it had been necessary to punish the two Nazis who had killed the Communist in Silesia. Von PAPEN stated that it had been necessary to punish these two Nazis - they had not been put to death - because the law did exist, and infringements of the law, no matter by whom committed, had to be expiated. He stated in addition that it would perhaps be possible to obtain a pardon for the two men from HINDENBURG. PAPEN then stated that he had, in fact, urged HINDENBURG to make HITLER Chancellor of the Reich, at the time when he, PAPEN, had visited HINDENBURG with HITLER, and that HINDENBURG seemed entirely willing to discuss the matter with HITLER. He said that he had been exceedingly

(page 5 of original)

surprised and upset when HINDENBURG refused to do this, and that it was his opinion that someone else, probably von SCHLEICHER, was responsible for the change in HINDENBURG's attitude. PAPEN explained, in addition, that he considered it best to form a Government in which the Conservative and Nationalist elements which had supported him, should be represented together with the Nazis. He suggested that this new Government should, if possible, be headed by HITLER and PAPEN together. HITLER thereupon delivered a lengthy speech, in which he said that if he were appointed Chancellor, PAPEN's supporters could become Ministers in his (Hitler's) Government, provided they were willing to support his policy which aimed at many changes in existing conditions. He sketched these changes, including the removal from leading positions in Germany of all Social Democrats, Communists and Jews and the restoration of order in public life. Von PAPEN and HITLER were aiming at a basic unity as a result of which many of the points which had given rise to the conflict could be settled and the possibility of collaboration introduced. It was agreed that further details were still to be worked out and that this could be done in Berlin or in some other suitable place. This happened, as I learnt later, during a meeting with RIBBENTROP. The conference at my house ended at approximately 1330 hours. We three then set down to table with HESS, HIMMLER and KEPPLER, and there the conversation turned to general matters. At about 1600 hours, all the guests left my house.

(page 6 of original)

This meeting between HITLER and PAPEN on 4 January 1933 in my house in Cologne was arranged by me after PAPEN had requested me to make the arrangements on about 10 December 1932. Before I took this step, I discussed the matter with a number of industrialists and gained a general impression of the attitude of industry towards collaboration between the two. The general aim of the industrialists was to see a strong leader come to power in Germany, a leader who would form a Government which would long remain in power. When, on 6 November 1932, the NSDAP suffered its first set-back and had thus passed its peak point, the support of German Industry became a matter of particular urgency. One interest common to the whole of industry was the fear of Bolshevism and the hope that the National Socialists, once in power, would establish Germany on a firm political and economic foundation. A further point of common interest was the desire to implement HITLER's industrial program. In this, one essential point was that industry itself must direct its efforts to the solution of the problems set by matters political. For the practical execution of this program, it was expected - and, in fact the expectation was later fulfilled - that industry as a whole would be reorganized and established on a new foundation, unions being formed, which, in contrast to the unions existing at that time, it would be obligatory for all industrial undertakings to join, and the administration of which would be the work of industrialists and business men, whose responsibility it would be to ensure equal distribution of production, so that, if necessary, these new unions would be able to exert more influence than had previously been the case. Furthermore, it was expected that an industrial boom would be caused by the placing of

(page 7 of original)

fairly large State contracts. The following should be mentioned in this connection: HITLER's project for an increase in the strength of the Wehrmacht from 100,000 to 300,000 men, construction of Reich Autobahns and the loans which would have to be forthcoming for public purposes (provincial governments and municipal councils) for the construction of new streets and the improvement of those already in existence, orders for the improvement of the transportation system, especially the Reich Railroads and the promotion of industries such as the automobile and aircraft industries and others connected with them.

It was generally known that one of the most important points of HITLER's program was the abolition of the Treaty of Versailles and the restoration of a strong Germany, strong from the point of view both of military and of economic strength. It was apparent that in a strong Germany, industry would flourish too, and furthermore, it was clear that economic strength implied a state of affairs in which Germany was no longer dependent on foreign countries. It may be that for reasons not of idealism but of pure desire for profit, these efforts to make Germany self-sufficient were greeted by certain industrial undertakings as a possible method of increasing their own

(page 7 of original, cont'd)

sphere of power. Such a possibility undoubtedly presented itself in the field of synthetic oil and rubber production.

HITLER's Economic Program was known to industry as a whole and was welcomed by it. Information on it was spread by HITLER and other Nazi leader in speeches at Party meetings, through the Press etc. An example of this is given by HITLER's speech made at THYSSEN's request on 27 January

(page 8 of original)

1932 before a fairly large group of Industrialists at the Industrialists Club at Duesseldorf. The contents of this speech were also known to persons not taking part in this conference of whom I myself was one. This meeting was, moreover, a great success for HITLER. By the presentation of his ideas on industry, he convinced the industrialists, who had originally distrusted him, that collaboration with him was a goal to be desired.

After HITLER's seizure of power, the only meeting of the so-called General Advisory Committee for Industry (Generalrat der Wirtschaft) took place in July or August 1933 at the Reich Ministry of Economics in Victoriastrasse, Berlin. At the invitation of SCHMIDT, the Minister of Economics in office at the time, approximately 40 to 50 men from all circles of industry participated in this conference. Among those whom I personally remember to have been present were REINHART of the Kommerzbank, URBIG of the Deutsche Bank and Carl BOSCH of I.G. During this meeting, HITLER again discussed his program in general and in particular the essential point which was that the Government was to fix the goal and industry itself to undertake the execution of the program leading to that goal.

The Economic Program of the NSDAP having already been embarked upon and the Four Year Plan drawn up, HITLER and GOERING again explained the trend and aims of the Program. To this end, GOERING invited a large number of Reich officials and industrialists, among them BOSCH, KRAUCH and von SCHNITZLER of I.G. to Preussenhaus in Berlin on 17 December 1936. On this occasion, GOERING and HITLER delivered speeches in which they called upon industry, in terms of the utmost emphasis, to give the fullest possible support to the rearmament program, making the following statements, among others: "The struggle which we face demands an enormous production capacity."

(page 9 of original)

It is impossible to tell when rearmament will come to an end. Victory or destruction alone can decide. Should we conquer, victory will bring compensation enough to industry." And, "We live at a time when the ultimate struggles are announcing themselves. Mobilization and war are already upon us, but for the fact that no shot has been fired."

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT No. NI-7990
CONTINUED

(page 9 of original)

I have read carefully the 9 (nine) pages of this affidavit and have countersigned them with my own hand, I have made the necessary corrections in my own handwriting and have countersigned them with my initials, and I herewith declare on oath that, to the best of my knowledge and belief, I have spoken the full truth in this affidavit.

Signature: Kurt Frhr.v. Schroeder
Kurt Freiherr von SCHROEDER

Sworn to and signed before me this 21st day of July, 1947 at Nuremberg by Kurt Freiherrn von SCHROEDER, known to me to be the person making the above affidavit.

Signature: Arthur T. Cooper
Arthur T. Cooper
U.S. Civilian IDO number D 434534
Interrogator, Office of Chief
of Counsel for War Crimes
U.S. War Department.

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

6 August 1947

I, Beryl C. BESWICK, No. D 427459, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages and that the above is a true and correct translation of the document No. NI-7990.

Beryl C. BESWICK
No. D 427459

(Place) Nurnberg, Germany

(Date) 16 Dec 1947

CERTIFICATE

I, Edward J. Orpen of the Evidence
Division of the Office of Chief of Counsel for War Crimes,
hereby certify that the attached document, consisting of
8 photostated pages and entitled
Affidavit of von Schroeder re political situation in Germany
just before the assumption of power by the National Socialists and the
part played by the industrialists .
dated 5 Dec 1945 , is a true copy of a document which
was delivered to me in my above capacity, in the usual course
of official business, as a true copy of a document found
in German archives, records and files captured by military
forces under the command of the Supreme Commander, Allied
Expeditionary Forces.

To the best of my knowledge, information and belief,
the original Document is held at:
OCC files, Nurnberg

s/ Edward J. Orpen

The Document is not available in English

AFFIDAVIT OF GEORG VON SCHNITZLER.

I, Georg von Schnitzler, a member of the Vorstand of I.G. Farben, make the following deposition under oath:

At the end of February 1933, 4 members of the Vorstand of I.G. Farben including Dr. Bosch, the head of the Vorstand, and myself were asked by the office of the president of the Reichstag to attend a meeting in his house. The purpose of which was not given. I do not remember the two other colleagues of mine who were also invited. I believe the invitation reached me during one of my business trips to Berlin. I went to the meeting which was attended by about 20 persons who I believe were mostly leading industrialists from the Ruhr.

Among those present I remember:

Dr. Schacht, who at that time was not yet head of the Reichsbank again and not yet Minister of Economics.

Krupp von Bohlen, who in the beginning of 1933 president the Reichsverband der Deutschen Industrie which later on was changed in the semi-official organization "Reichsgruppe Industrie".

Dr. Albert Vogler, the leading man of the Vereinigte Stahlwerke.

Von Lowenfeld from an industrial work in Essen.

Dr. Stein, head of the Gewerkschaft Auguste Victoria, a mine which belongs to the I.G. Dr. Stein was an active member of the Deutsche Volkspartei.

I remember that Dr. Schacht acted as a kind of host.

While I had expected the appearance of Goering, Hitler entered the room, shook hands with everybody and took a seat at the top of the table. In a long speech he talked mainly about the danger of communism over which he pretended that he just had won a decisive victory.

He then talked about the "Bundnis" (alliance) into which his party and the Deutsch-Nationale Volkspartei had entered. This latter party in the meantime had been reorganized by Herr von Papen. On the end he came to the point which seemed to me the purpose of the meeting. Hitler stressed the importance that the two aforementioned parties should gain the majority in the coming Reichstag election. Krupp von Bohlen thanked Hitler for his speech. After Hitler had left the room Dr. Schacht proposed to the meeting the raising of an election fund of - as far as I remember - RM 3.000.000.

The fund should be distributed between the two "Allies" according to their relative strength at the time being. Dr. Stein suggested that the Deutsche Volkspartei should be included which suggestion when I rightly remember was accepted. The amounts which the individual firms had to contribute were not discussed.

I did not take part in the discussion but reported the matter the next day or the overnext to Dr. Bosch in Frankfurt who together with Geh. Rat Schmitz had reserved exclusively for themselves the handling of distribution of money to political parties, the press etc. and had made a special appoint of "Vertraulichkeit" (secrecy) in this respect.

Dr. Bosch did, as far as I remember, not make any remark to my report, but shrugged his shoulders.

I never heard again of the whole matter but I believe that either the bureau of Goering or Schacht or the Reichsverband der deutschen Industrie had asked the office of Bosch or Schmitz for payment of I.G.'s share in the election fund. As I did not take the matter up again I not even at that time know whether and which amount had been paid by the I.G. According to the volume of the I.G. I should estimate I.G.'s share being something like 10% of the election fund, but as far as I know there is no evidence that I.G. Farben participated in the payments.

I understand the English language.

G. von Schnitzler

Sworn to before me this 10th day of November 1945 at Frankfurt, Germany.

Otto P. Streubel ?
end. Lt. Inf.

" A CERTIFIED TRUE COPY "

- 2 -

END

63

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO D-203
OFFICE OF CHIEF OF COUNSEL FOR
WAR CRIMES

TRANSLATOR'S NOTE: "Report of Speech by Hitler to German Industrialists on 20 February 1933, found in Krupp's "Private correspondence 1933/34" file).

With the year 1918 an entire system collapsed. That it had to come about was often predicted also by economic leaders, especially by Geheimrat KIRDORF. The revolution which the year 1918 brought us was only conditional. In any case, it did not bring about the revolution such as in Russia, but only a new school of thought which slowly initiated the dissolution of the existing order. Bismarck's statement: "Liberatism is the pacemaker of Social-Democracy" is now scientifically established and proven for us. A given school of thought - thought direction - can unsuspectingly lead towards the dissolution of the foundation of the State. In our country also, a new direction of thought had gained ground which slowly led to internal disruption and became the pacemaker of Bolshevism.

Private enterprise cannot be maintained in the age of Democracy; it is conceivable only if the people have a sound idea of authority and personality. Everything positive, good and valuable, which has been achieved in the world in the field of economics and culture, is solely attributable to personality. Then, however, the defence of the existing order (des Geschehenen), its political administration, is left to a majority it will irretrievably go under. All the worldly goods which we possess, we owe to the struggle of the chosen (Auserlesenen).

(Page 2 of Original)

Would we have had the present conditions in the Middle Age, the foundations of our German Reich would never have been laid.

The same mentality that was the basis for obtaining these values must be used to preserve the values. All values which make up the height of our culture originated from an entirely different mentality than that seized its administration since 1918. The revolution is the first conclusion of a decade-old development of discord in our people. All over the world we experience this crisis of disunity. The people, however, react differently towards it, as for example in Russia and Italy. In the other countries, Germany included, this crisis, in its last possibilities and consequences, is not yet being recognized. Our people has not yet sufficiently recognized that there are two souls struggling for it. Our entire life is based upon common agreements. The smallest example of this is the family it leads on up to the State. It is an impossibility that part of the people recognize private ownership while another part denies it. Such a struggle splits the people. The struggle lasts until one side emerges victorious. Then a man deserts his unit he can be punished. When however 15% to 20% disregard their oath of allegiance, the unit must fail as a military instrument. The same applies to a State, if 15% of the people deny the State as a permanent recognized social order, no sound system can be set for the general public.

(page 3 of original)

Therefore, it is impossible to maintain Culture, Art, Religion and Science, if a large percentage of the Nation refuses to abide by the thoughts which created such a Culture. Justice also can only be established upon generally recognized theories. Therefore, it can also be Bolchevistic, if it has to protect the Bolchevist cause.

Such a condition of discord leads slowly but surely to agony, to the death of an ideology. No two ideologies can continuously live alongside one another. In such struggles the strength of a people eats itself completely up internally and therefore cannot act externally.

It does not rest. This condition of attrition lasts until one party emerges victorious or the State itself dissolves, whereby a people loses its place in history. To live in such times now, when the die must be cast, and when we must decide whether we want to adopt a form of life that supports the State or to have Communism. The latter is also thinkable. It is often being said that Communism is the lowest step of humanity. I believe the very opposite; it is the origin of human development. It represents the most primitive form of human life.

The deeper one delves into nature, the more alike be-
its achievements, they become
come/less in Communism more and more homogeneous. The
Communist principle cannot be maintained. It is not by
chance that one

(page 4 of original)

more
person accomplishes / than the other. The principle of
private ownership which has slowly gone into the general
conception of justice and has become a complicated process
of economic life, is rooted in this fact. The course
which we have to take is clearly indicated. It is, how-
ever, not enough to say: We do not want Communism in
(our) Economy. If we continue on our old political
course, then we shall perish. We have fully experience
in the past years that Economics and Politics cannot
be separated. The political conduct of the struggle is

the primary decisive factor. Therefore politically clear conditions must be reached. As Economics alone has not made the German Reich so did politics not make Economics. But each one built steadily higher upon the other. As a hand-in-hand working of Politics and Economics brought us to our height, so meant the working against one another, as we experienced it after the revolution, continuous downfall. As I lay in the hospital in 1918 I experienced the revolution in Bavaria. From the beginning I saw it as a crisis in the development of the German people, as a period of transition. Life always tears up humanity. It is therefore the noblest task of a leader to find ideals that are stronger than the factors that pull the people apart. I recognized even while in the hospital that one had to search for new ideas conducive to reconstruction I found them in Nationalism, in the value of personality, in the denial of reconciliation between nations, in the strength and power of

(page 5 of original)

individual personality. On this basis I tried to reach an understanding between two souls struggling with one another within the German people. The struggle which undertook was so much harder because it was conducted during a time when the law for the protection of the weak and decadent held true, a law under which every nation is doomed to perish. Of course, nothing is being accomplished by simple denial of such ways of thought, one has to offer new thoughts. If one rejects pacifism, one must have a new idea in its place immediately. Everything must be pushed aside, must be replaced by something better.

For 40 years we are experiencing a continuous growth of Social Democracy. Bismarck said shortly before he retired: "If this keeps up, Marx must remain victorious".

The creative and decomposing forces in a people always fight against one another. In this struggle one side always gains ever greater heights than the other and therefore I have been following the development of Social-Democracy with steadily growing concern and said to myself, we must come to a decision. I have repeatedly taken the occasion to point out to responsible people what danger was threatening the German people. Time and again it was argued amongst other, by von Seeckt, that at the present this would mean civil war. and when, a few years ago, the number of Socialist seats went back a little, I was told triumphantly: "Look here, the danger is already over". They always comforted themselves with the hope that the Socialist

(page 6 of original)

movement would slow down by itself. The danger, however cannot be overcome by such means. Human beings are nothings less but equal, and if human beings are not led, they drop back into the most primitive ancient state.

It was this perception that moved me to found a new Nationalist movement, which after 14 years of struggle has become a leading force in the German Reich. We must not forget that all the benefits of culture must be introduced moreover less with an iron fist, just as one upon a time the farmers were forced to plant potatoes. For all this however, courage, and iron-will and perseverance are essential.

We stand today facing the following situation:
impressed
Weimar upon us a certain constitutional order
by which they put us on a democratic basis. By that
we were, however not provided with an able government-
tal authority. On the contrary, as I criticized Demo-
cracy before, Communism had to bore its way constantly
deeper into the German people. The result was an ever
increasing tension, by which also - and that is almost
the worst - the courts did not remain uninfluenced.
Two fronts have thus showed themselves which put to
us the choice: - either ^{Marxism} in its purest form or
the other side. One cannot assume the point of view
and say - the other side will gradually break through
again. Such an attitude means defeat. When I wanted
to act, I was advised

(page 7 of original)

to wait a while. But I did not agree to such toleration.
With the very same courage with which we go to make
us for what had been sinned during the last 14 years,
we have withstood all attempts to move us off the right
way. To have turned down the benevolence of the Catholic
Center Party(Zentrum) to tolerate us. Hugenberg has
too small a movement. He has only considerably slowed
down our development. We must first gain complete power
if we want to crush the other side completely. While still
gaining power once /We should not start the struggle against the opponent.
Only when one knows that one has reached the pinnacle
of power, that there is no further possible upward de-
velopment, shall one strike. In Prussia we must gain
another 10 seats and in the Reich proper another 33.
That it is not impossible if we throw in all our strength.

Then only begins second action against Communism.

Now we stand before the last election. Regardless of the outcome there will be no retreat (Rueckfall) even if the coming election does not bring about a decision. One way or another, if the election does not decide, the decision must be brought about even by other means (eben auf einem anderen Weg fallen) I have intervened in order to give the people once more the chance to decide their fate by themselves. This determination is a strong asset for whatever must possibly happen later. Does the election bring no result, well, Germany will not go to ruin. Today, as never before, every one is under the obligation to pledge himself to success. The necessity to make sacrifices has never been greater than

(page 8 of original)

now. For Economy I have the one wish that it goes parallel with the internal structure to meet a calm future. The question of restoration of the Wehrmacht will not be decided at Geneva, but in Germany, when we have gained internal strength through internal peace. There will however, be no internal peace until Marxism is eliminated (erledigt). Here lies the decision which we must go to meet, hard as the struggle might be. I put my life into the struggle day after day as do all those who joined me in this struggle. There are only two possibilities, either to crowd back the opponent on constitutional grounds, and for this purpose once more this election, or a struggle will be conducted with other weapons, which may demand greater sacrifices.. I would

like to see them avoided. I hope the German people thus recognize the greatness of the hour. It shall decide over the next 10 or probably 100 years. It will become a turning point in German history, to which I pledge myself with glowing energy.

GOERING - He counted on it that with political appeasement, domestic economy will also quiet down. No experiments would be made, However, to attain the goal, all forces must be mustered on March 5th. Above all it is important to penetrate into the circles that are still disconcerted with Marxism and slumber uselessly in aggravation and bitterness. Most of the internal political obstacles have been removed after

(page 8 of original)

unity with the other groups of similar ideology was achieved under one plan. This present unity should be made deeper. No matter how the election comes out, the distribution of forces should remain the same. In the coming struggle everyone must perform in his own field. The German Nationals (Deutschnationalen) will attack where successes can no longer be achieved by the National-Socialists. On the other hand the National-Socialists will be given a task which has no prospects for the other. Without any doubt we must do the most work, for we must penetrate with our SA. men into the darkest quarters of the cities and operate there from mouth to mouth and fight for every single soul.

Goering considered to some extent the great dangers connected with this election battle. He then led over very cleverly to the necessity that other circles not

taking part in this political battle should at least make the financial sacrifices so necessary at this time. These were so much more necessary because not even one penny of the tax-payers money would be asked for. Government funds would not be used. The sacrifices asked for purely would be so much easier for industry to bear if it realised that the election of March 5th will surely be the last one for the next ten years, probably even for the next hundred years.

(Translation checked by Mr. B. Fall)

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

I, ERNA E. UIBERALL, AGO No D-150095, hereby
certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English
and German languages; and that the above is a true and
correct translation of Document No. D-203.

ERNA E. UIBERALL

U.S. Civilian

AGO No. D-150096

M e m o r a n d u m .

On the 20th of this month I expressed to Reich Chancellor Hitler the attitude of approximately 25 industrialists present, for having given us such a clear picture of the conception of his ideas. I then emphasized that it would not be advisable to enter into a detailed discussion, but that I would like to underline three points with which all present would be in agreement :

1. That it is highest time to finally clarify the questions pertaining to domestic politics in Germany.
2. That we, just as he, consider that the object of every resolution is to benefit the interest of the German people as a whole, not that of individual professions or classes.
3. That it is also our opinion that only in a politically strong and independent State could economy and business develop and flourish.

22 February 1933

(Translator's Note : As certified by Major A. KEAVE, this Memo-
was made by Krupp arising out of Hitler's speech to Industrialists
on 20 February 1933)

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

I, ELLA F. URBALL, AGO No. D-150 096, hereby certify that I am
thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and
that the above is a true and correct translation of Document
No. D-204

"A CERTIFIED TRUE COPY"

-1-
END

14

Interrogation of Hjalmar Schacht — 2:45 p.m., 20 July 1945.

Q. I want to discuss with you this afternoon the same matters I have discussed with Mr. Fritz Thyssen, namely your early relationships with the Nazi Party and the methods you used and the circumstances in which you later broke away from the party. When did you first hear of Hitler, as far as you can remember?

A. About November 1923.

Q. When did you first meet Hitler or any of his associates?

A. I met Goering in the middle of December 1930 for the first time in my life. It was after my resignation from the Reichsbank.

Q. Before we go into the Goering meeting, let me have your account of your joining up. You told Major Tilly you resigned from the Reichsbank because you were opposed to Mueller's view in relation to the Young Plan?

A. The Young Plan was drafted in the summer of 1939, and it was accepted by the Hague Conference at the beginning of 1930, and between the draft and the acceptance, the German government gave away a good many advantages.

Q. What were they?

A. I have outlined most of these points in a written and printed memorandum which I published the sixth of December 1929.

Q. Will you give a brief outline of the points?

A. I can't remember them. The essential one was the all inclusive reparations clause of the Young Plan, which was not kept: that all the claims which Germany had against the Poles under the Young Plan should be settled.

Q. Those were claims arising out of the resettlement of German nationals?

A. Claims of two billion marks for German property which was left behind in Poland, and for which the Poles had to pay. Those claims

were given up without any reciprocal advantages. Other features of the Young Plan were discussed and several other points.

Q. Do you remember the other points?

A. No, I do not. Just ask the Reichsbank to send you the memorandum. It is in the files.

Q. These advantages were gratuitously given away by the Mueller Government? Was that the primary reason for your leaving the Reichsbank?

A. Yes.

Q. Were you ever opposed to the Young Plan?

A. I could not be against it. I was never opposed to the Young Plan, which I had drafted and signed with the other experts.

Q. You regard the Young Plan then, from a German point of view, as being better than the Dawes Plan?

A. I think the Young Plan was a progress towards the definite solution of the reparations problem.

Q. You knew, of course, that Fritz Thyssen has quite different views, and that he regards the Dawes Plan as more satisfactory from the German point of view than the Young Plan?

A. In this respect, I differ from Thyssen.

Q. Do you have any other comment on that difference?

A. No, I have not.

Q. Are there any other prominent Germans who took Thyssen's point of view?

A. I cannot tell you.

Q. You don't know of any?

A. No. His point of view was rather startling to me.

Q. When was your resignation from the Reichsbank effective?

A. Second of April, 1930.

Q. And when did you meet Goering for the first time?

A. In December, 1930.

Q. How did you meet him?

A. A mutual friend of ours, a Mr. v. Stauss of the Deutsche Bank, invited me to his house in order to meet Goering.

Q. Were there any other Nazis present?

A. Nobody else was present.

Q. What was the nature of that conversation you had with Goering?

A. The nature of the conversation was generally about the German financial situation and the economic difficulties.

Q. Did Goering at that time impress you as a man who understood the basic problems of Germany's economic life?

A. No, he did not.

Q. You left the meeting with an unfavorable reaction or attitude toward the Nazi Party?

A. Well, no, we did not talk about the Nazi Party as a whole, and I had no special impression of the party either good or bad. Goering merely impressed me as having little knowledge or understanding of finance and economics generally.

Q. When did you next see Goering?

A. He invited me to a party in his house for the 5th or 6th of January 1931, where I met Hitler.

Q. Did you meet anybody else?

A. At that party Fritz Thyssen was also present, and that evening Hitler made a long speech, for almost two hours, although the company was a small one.

Q. Was that a monologue?

A. An entire monologue and everything that he said was reasonable and moderate that night.

Q. What did he say?

A. Oh, ideas he expressed before, but it was full of will and spirit.

Q. What did he say?

A. He elaborated his program as it was outlined more extensively in his book.

Q. Said in the party platform?

A. Yes, also the party platform. But the platform is very short and brief, it is not so full of general phrases.

Q. Were there any other prominent officers present?

A. No.

Q. Any industrialists like Fritz Thyssen?

A. No.

Q. What was your impression at the end of that evening?

A. I thought that Hitler was a man with whom one could cooperate.

Q. Did you think he was a man of the future and that you had to deal with him as a man of the future?

A. Well, I could not know that at the time.

Q. Did you think it desirable to join the Nazi Party at that time?

A. I can't tell you as to that time, but if his ideas, which he developed that night, were backed by a big party, as it seemed to be, I think that one could join that group for public purposes.

Q. I take it you have read "Mein Kampf" very carefully?

A. Yes.

Q. Did he denounce and renounce any of the ideas he presented in his book "Mein Kampf"?

A. We had not mentioned the book at all.

Q. I wanted to understand whether his speech was more or less along the lines of "Mein Kampf", which is quite inconsistent with your social attitudes, as you stated to Major Tilly. For example, the question of the Jew. You were opposed to the anti-semitic activities of the Nazi Party.

A. Yes.

Q. Being a banker, you undoubtedly believed in law and order?

A. Yes.

Q. And you did not believe in revolution or seizure or violence which Hitler expressed in "Mein Kampf". Now, do you mean that he gave a more moderate presentation of his views?

A. I think at that particular night, he was very moderate.

Q. What was your feelings regarding the Versailles Treaty?

A. I did not approve. I think the Versailles Dictat was not a good thing.

Q. What were some of the ideas of moderation which convinced you that it might be possible to cooperate with Hitler?

A. A great deal of all this stuff in "Mein Kampf" is of course written for propaganda, and I did not think that everything which is written down is to be carried out verbally afterwards. If that were so, I would be pleased to give you more definite answers, but you see, people talk to the public on one way, and act more moderately the other way.

Q. In 1931, I suppose the most difficult question confronting any German Government was the question of unemployment?

A. Yes.

Q. What did Hitler say that evening on that issue, do you remember?

A. Yes, he developed his ideas to employ people by giving work to them.

Q. What kind of work?

A. Oh, mostly in public works, there was a great program of repairs on housing, machinery and so on, and there was a program for buildings auto roads and similar large scale programs.

Q. What about the armaments?

A. He did not say anything about armaments that night as far as I can remember, but that was not the outstanding idea discussed, to employ people.

Q. Did he discuss the Versailles Treaty?

A. Oh, certainly,

Q. Also the necessity of becoming free?

A. Certainly.

Q. And you were generally in agreement?

A. Certainly.

Q. Did you express to him at this meeting your intention to join him or support him or help him by advice or otherwise in securing control of the German Government by lawful means?

A. I did not express views of approbation or any similar feelings, but left it to the future whether we should meet again and how things would develop.

Q. I see. When did you meet him or Goering again?

A. In the course of the year 1931, I have perhaps met Goering and

Hitler once or twice only.

Q. When did you make up your mind and announce it to your friends and to Goering and to Hitler, etcetera, that you were going to support the Nazi Party?

A. In the second part of 1932.

Q. What was the occasion for that announcement?

A. I think it was at the election campaign in July, 1932.

Q. Was that the presidential election?

A. No. It was the Reichstag election when Papen was Chancellor. After the elections, I met Hitler several times.

Q. When did you announce your intention to support Hitler?

A. On those occasions I told him that I was in favor of his becoming Chancellor.

Q. Was this announcement made by you to Hitler, of common knowledge?

A. It became publicly known in, I should say, November, 1932.

Q. When did you make that speech in Denmark praising Hitler?

A. In the spring, 1931.

Q. Did you support Hitler then?

A. I did not say very much about Hitler then. I said a good many things about the Versailles Treaty, but not about Hitler. I said if I were Chancellor, I would denounce reparations payments and this is still my view. This speech was in the beginning of March, three or four month before the Hoover Moratorium.

Q. You met Hitler then in January 1931?

A. Yes.

Q. Was this speech discussed with anyone in the Government?

A. No sir.

Q. Was it discussed with any of your friends in financial circles?

A. No sir.

Q. It represented your ideas exclusively?

A. Yes.

Q. Now, you said you met Hitler or Goering one or two times in 1931. Do you remember where or when?

A. No, I don't remember.

Q. Did you have any discussions with Funk in 1931?

A. I don't remember, I doubt it. I had very little relations with him at that time, and only in a private capacity.

Q. Do you recall any conversations with Funk in 1932, or any time prior to March 1933, when you were reappointed to the Reichsbank about your support of the party?

A. I don't remember.

Q. When you decided in the middle of 1932 to lend your support to Hitler's becoming chancellor, what measures did you take to carry out that intention, by speeches or by talking to influential people?

A. I did not do anything. I just expressed my own opinion, but not to any crowd or to any assembly.

Q. But you did talk to friends in financial circles?

A. Yes, occasionally, I did not do any propaganda work in 1932 nor before.

Q. Let us then direct our attention to February and March, 1933. I have been told by Goering and by Funk and Baron von Schnitzler and also by Thyssen, that there was a meeting held in the house of Goering of certain prominent German industrialists at which you were also present in 1933. This was after Hitler became chancellor but before the elections of that spring. Hitler came into the meeting and made a short speech and left. Then, according to the testimony of Funk, you passed the hat. You asked the industrialists to support the Nazi Party financially to the tune of approximately 7, 8, 9 or 10 million marks. Do you recall that?

A. I recall that meeting very well. And I have answered the same question to Major Tilley. It must be in one of my former memorandums or in the hearings done by Major Tilley. As far as I remember, the meeting was not in Goering's house, but in some hotel room I think, or some other more public room. After Hitler had made his speech the old Krupp von Bohlen answered Hitler and expressed the unanimous feeling of the industrialists to support Hitler. After that I

spoke for the financial part only, not on political principles or intentions. And the amount which I collected was 3 million marks. The apportionment amongst the industrialists was made not by me but by they themselves and the payments afterwards were made to the bank of Delbrueck Schickler. The books will certainly show

the amounts which were paid in, and which went to the party. I had nothing to do with that account. I just played the role of cashier or financial treasurer at the meeting itself.

Q. Were there any representatives of any of the large banks or insurance enterprises at the meeting?

A. I would say that almost nobody had been left out. All the prominent industrialists and bankers must have been present.

Q. Leron von Schnitzler told me that I.G. Farben paid 700,000 marks. If that figure were true, the 3 million figure looks somewhat small. Funk told me 10 million marks. Are you certain of this million mark figure?

A. I am certain of that figure, the 3 million marks. And I guess that the payments at that time from the I.G. Farben were much lower. But it could be verified by the books of the bank.

Q. We have the records of payment of the I.G. Farben accounts, which indicate payment of 700,000 marks.

A. I don't know anything about that because that was left to the firms themselves.

Q. Thyssen has told me that in steel it was based on the amount of steel production. Can you tell me anything about its apportionment in the banking world?

A. No, I cannot. I was not in a bank at that time, but I was a private man, and I had nothing to do with the apportionment. This meeting was held, I think, around the 25th of February.

Q. And you were appointed president of the Reichsbank?

A. March 17, 1933.

Q. Prior to your appointment, apparently in the month of February, you are reported as boasting privately that you were the Fuhrer's financial advisor, and that the Nazis would not undertake anything

in the realm of economics and finance without your approval. Were any such commitments made by you to Hitler or Goering?

A. Never.

Q. Did you ever make any such statements as the statement just quoted?

A. I think the statement is the usual exaggerated talk which grows by spreading it.

Q. What did you think the original statement was?

A. The original statement might have been that I hoped to do reasonable financing and that if I had a chance, I would see to it. I have never boasted in this way as the statement tells. It seems to me a little bit foolish.

Q. Yes, I agree with you. It seems foolish. Was there any discussion in 1932 at any time what your function in the government would be if Hitler became Chancellor?

A. Never. There was never any discussion of making use of my services.

Q. What other persons at this time were giving advice or were being sought by Hitler and Goering and Company, besides you?

A. I can't tell you.

Q. As far as you know, you were the principal financial advisor of Hitler during this period to the extent that he was willing to listen to advice.

A. He has not listened much to my advice. In 1932, I did not advise anything. We have never had any discussion along these lines, only a few in the field of politics. I did not want to be mixed up with politics too much. I wanted to remain a "Fachman", an expert in this special business.

Q. You have said that you regarded yourself primarily as a "Fachman" and you were not interested in politics?

A. Yes, not too much.

Q. I asked you whether you had any discussions with Hitler on subjects falling within your special knowledge, namely, finance, and you have said no. There was apparently nothing then in the

way of your specialty that would lead you to support Hitler.

A. I discussed agricultural subjects, discussed small industries, discussed social matters, how to represent the women and other points of view.

Q. Well, in this respect, would it be appropriate in describing you

as one of his economic advisors, or consultant?

A. No. He did not consult with me. You asked me about my conversations with him and if there was a conversation with him. It was of course with these matters, but the conversations with Hitler were mostly monologues from his side, which is generally known in the meanwhile, I think.

Q. Was there anything that he said along economic lines or financial lines which convinced you that he might make a good leader for Germany or, were you convinced primarily on other grounds?

A. He had never objected to any of my economic ideas, or acts or actions. He let me work entirely freely. Before I became President of the Reichsbank he hadn't objected to my ideas. My ideas were the same ideas I have today in economic principles.

Q. Let us have at this time a systematic recapitulation of your economic principles?

A. Very difficult. I think that in my statements which I gave to Major Tilley there is a good deal of these principles contained. In the matter of reemployment, I was in favor of building streets and autobahn roads of all kinds, also all kinds of public works. I was in favor of extending small business and industries, not so much the big business and industries. I was in favor of certain state control of the big concerns.

Q. For what purpose?

A. For keeping them within the lines of general welfare.

Q. Did you propose changing the economic life of the nation?

A. I did not.

Q. What about cartels?

A. My views on that are known, I think.

Q. Any other ideas?

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Q. Any other ideas?

A. Along agricultural lines, I was greatly in favor of technical improvements, using more modern machines and using investments for raising the production of agricultural products. I was very much in favor of settling the workmen outside of the cities with houses and small garden properties where they could raise their own vegetables hard to procure elsewhere. They could all year round raise,

vegetables and keep small animals for breeding purposes and so on. And all of these ideas were quite in the same line as Hitler expressed himself on. At least he never said to the contrary.

Q. Did you have any discussions with respect to the problem of Germany's foreign trade?

A. No. I did not believe that any change of foreign trade was discussed at this time. I have always believed that Germany's goods should be exported with other nations on a fair exchange basis. Hitler did not object to that.

Q. Did I understand your statement that Hitler's appeal to you lay in the fact that he did not object to your economic proposals?

A. Yes. He approved of them.

Q. Did he say that he would try to carry them out?

A. Yes. At least, -I took that feeling from the conversations, that he would do this.

Q. What positive premises did Hitler make outside of the realm of economics, which were appealing to you.

A. None, whatever.

Q. Were you in the German Government employ at the time of the Versailles Treaty?

A. No. I was a private banker connected with the Danabank from 1916 to 1923.

Q. Have you written or spoken publicly on the Versailles Treaty prior to 1931?

A. Many times.

Q. Do you recall when you initially published criticism of the Versailles Treaty?

A. I think it was in 1921. At that time, I went to Paris and to London and discussed the Versailles matter with industrialists and merchants.

Q. This was in your private capacity as a banker?

A. Yes.

Q. What was the nature of your criticism of the Treaty at that time?

A. I think I put all the criticism in my book "The End of Reparations", which appeared in Germany and in England and in America.

Q. Your criticisms were primarily in terms of the reparations clause of the Versailles Treaty, is that correct?

A. Primarily with the reparations problem, but I think I have also touched other problems such as the "14 points" which were broken afterwards, which were never a part of the Versailles Treaty.

Q. With whom did you have your discussions in Paris in 1921?

A. In Paris, I had a conversation with the Finance Minister Le Lasterie. He invited me to see some common friend of ours. And in London, I had talks with some members of the British commonwealth industrial union.

Q. What was the reaction to your criticisms of the treaty in France and elsewhere?

A. Well, the British people saw the difficulties which arose from the Versailles Treaty and from the reparations question.

Q. What about the French?

A. Well, Le Lasterie was an official and could not admit anything.

Q. What is the next event in your criticisms of the Versailles Treaty?

A. I don't recall them all, as on every occasion I have made speeches.

Q. Which speech most fully reflected your views, the speech you made in Denmark?

A. In the course of 1930 in October and November, I made a lecture tour through the United States, and there, I think, I have outlined every point of view which I raised in criticism of the Versailles Treaty as far as economics and general ideas are concerned.

Q. Have these speeches ever been collected in a publication or are they available only through the press?

A. The press has reported on them and they form the basis of my book "The End of Reparations".

Q. Were you also a critic of the Weimer Republic?

A. No. On the contrary, I was with the "Democraten Party" until

1925 and I left the party because they wanted to take away the property of the former princes and royal houses.

Q. You realize that was provided for in the Weimer Constitution?

A. Yes. But they wanted to do things against the constitution and they did not want to keep within the lines of the constitution. In fact, they did not succeed. They wanted to take more than they were entitled to under the Weimer Constitution.

Q. That puzzles me Mr. Schacht. I have read the Weimer Constitution and under that provision, there are no limitations on compensations or anything else.

A. Well I cannot explain to you the exact details of opinions at that time, but my feeling was that it was a bad example to show in the way of protection of private property if the desires of the "Democraten Party" would go through, and it did not go through. I cannot tell you the difference between them and me.

Q. Why do you regard this as dangerous or undesirable from the point of view of private property?

A. If a man has taken away private property against the established law, I think it is dangerous for the future development of private property principles.

Q. But these were princes. If you recall the rise of the Russian State and undoubtedly you have studied Czarism, the distinction between the property of the princes and the property of the state is a very tenuous one?

A. It was not that point. It was the point of the existing law and I cannot recall now what point it was, but it was not because I thought they were historically entitled to something, but because the law protected them. The existing law.

Q. The term "them" refers to the princes?

A. Yes. It refers to princes.

Q. Am I correct in understanding you that you broke with the "Democraten" Party in 1926 entirely on the issue of the treatment

to be accorded the property of the former princes of the royal houses?

A. Quite so, and I stated that in the letter to the President of the Party.

Q. That party did you then join?

A. No party at all.

Q. So that you were not a member of any party in the middle of 1930?

A. Correct. I have never been or become a member of the Nazi Party.

Q. You were given honorable membership?

A. Yes. In January 1937. Between 1925 and 1937, I was not a member of any party.

Q. And it is further correct that you broke with the "Democraten Party" on the issue which they conceived to be the implementation of the Weimar Constitution?

A. I don't know whether they conceived it or not, but I disagreed with the intended measure.

Q. Would you wish to reexamine that provision of the Weimar Constitution in order to answer that question in terms of whether or not it is correct, that you broke on that issue? I have asked you whether you were a critic of the Weimar Republic. Your testimony discloses that you broke away from one of the "Democraten" Party on the issue of the treatment of the property of the royal princes. I am suggesting to you that their proposals were consistent with pertinent provisions of the Weimar Constitution?

A. I simply want to state that the "Democraten" party intention at that time was not in agreement with the constitution.

Q. You are unable at this time I take it, to cite any particular language of that document?

A. No.

Q. In order to discuss this matter further, it will be necessary to have the document in front of us.

A. It will be necessary to have the "Democraten" proposal of the time before you and then to see whether this proposal was in agreement with the Weimar Constitution or not.

Q. Did you support publicly any political personalities in the period between 1926 and 1932, when you came out for Hitler?

A. I don't think so.

Q. That was a period of complete political inactivity?

A. Quite.

Q. Did your resignation from the Reichsbank in 1930 have any effect in your mind upon the continuance in power of Hermann Mueller's administration?

A. I can't tell you.

Q. How shortly after your resignation was his government replaced by Bruening?

A. I think I made my resignation known on the 7th of March.

Q. Did Bruening ask you to remain?

A. No.

Q. I have been told, Mr. Schacht, that your resignation from the Reichsbank, justified or not as the case may be, was widely construed in Germany as a repudiation of the Weimar political system. Is that correct to the best of your knowledge?

A. I do not know whether it is correct. Some people might think that or might have thought so.

Q. How do you think?

A. It was the least of my intentions to do any political action.

Q. In the period between your resignation from the Reichsbank and your reappointment, were you engaged in activities which produced income or were you living on savings?

A. I had still my contract with the Reichsbank, and I still drew a salary from the Reichsbank. I don't know how long, but it was not more than a pension which was stipulated in my contract. I had no business connections whatever.

Q. When you made up your mind in 1923 to more or less support Hitler within the framework of his program as you then understood it, would it be correct to say that you were the most prominent financier or man with financial knowledge who was supporting Hitler?

A. I don't think very highly of my prominence. There might have been others. I don't know of others.

Q. I have not heard of any other either. I take it that neither you
or I know of anyone else who was of your influence?

A. I know, for instance, of Herr von Schroeder in Cologne.

Q. Did you have any discussions with Baron von Schroeder about supporting Hitler?

A. I don't believe so. I don't think so.

Q. You are familiar with the fact that the initial contact between von Papen and Hitler was established through the intermediary of Baron von Schroeder? I have heard of that, have you?

A. Yes, I have heard of that.

Q. There is nothing about that fact that you can tell us?

A. I heard it only afterwards. I don't know the details.

Q. Do you regard Baron von Schroeder as a competent financier?

A. I don't think that he has great experience.

Q. Is von Schroeder considered a competent financier?

A. He himself used to be an army officer before he entered the firm, but the firm is amongst the most prominent firms in the banking firms of Germany, and I think they must have considered Baron von Schroeder as competent.

Q. Did you see any reasons for doubting that judgment?

A. None, except for his former career as an army officer. I know Herr von Stein rather well and he is the real head of that firm.

Q. Did you have any discussions with von Stein in 1931 or 1932, or any time prior to March 1933 with reference to the support of Hitler?

A. I don't think so.

Q. I want you to reconsider that question?

A. I might say that I might have had, at social gatherings, general talks with Herr von Stein as well as with Herr von Schroeder, but not of any importance as to supporting Hitler or similar aims.

Q. Now what persons were you dealing with in the early part of 1933, and the later part of 1932, when you decided to throw whatever weight you might have, because of your standing in the commercial world in Germany? What were the people or circles that you were trying to persuade that it would be a good idea to perhaps support Hitler?

A. I have not held any important discussions or seen larger circles at that time.

Q. Did you have any discussions with Baron von Schroeder about supporting Hitler?

A. I don't believe so. I don't think so.

Q. You are familiar with the fact that the initial contact between von Papen and Hitler was established through the intermediary of Baron von Schroeder? I have heard of that, have you?

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Q. Now what persons were you dealing with in the early part of 1933, and the later part of 1932, when you decided to throw whatever weight you might have, because of your standing in the commercial world in Germany? What were the people or circles that you were trying to persuade that it would be a good idea to perhaps support Hitler?

A. I have not held any important discussions or seen larger circles at that time.

Q. Suppose we forget about large discussions and suppose you leave to me to judge whether or not the meetings were important, and suppose you answer the question in this manner, "With whom in German finance or industry did you have discussions between the time you came out publicly for Hitler and the time he became Chancellor in January 1933?"

A. I don't think I had any discussions of that kind with any industrial groups or financial circles.

Q. I have discussed this question at some length with Walter Funk, and he has indicated that there were 3 or 4 people who served in organizing German industry and finance to throw its weight behind Hitler. He was one of them, especially in the Ruhr Districts. Baron von Schroeder was another in the lower Rhine, and you were the third.

A. That is not correct, as far as I am concerned. I have never made propaganda for Hitler except by the public statements which went to the press.

Q. It will probably be necessary to come back to this question later. It stated here in this report: "Schacht is known to have helped some of his former Jewish friends who were oppressed by the Nazis."

Is that correct?

A. That is right, very correct.

Q. "Schacht did declare publicly that the Jews must realize that there is no room for them in the Nazi economy."

A. That is entirely untrue. When in August 1934, I took over the management of the Ministry of Economics, I discussed with Hitler the problem of how to treat the Jews in the economic life. The answer of Hitler was that in the economic life, the Jews should be treated as any other citizen. This rule I have maintained very strongly against all party desires of the opposite kind. I have had many cases where I could protect Jews against unjust claims of party

members. A good deal of those cases I had to bring before Hitler, and as long as I was in power in the Ministry of Economics, no Jews have suffered from injustice in the economic field.

.. Your answer does not explain how someone could say that you publicly declared "Jews must realize etc." How was that possible?

A. I have made my answer and I believe it is very distinct. I said this statement is absolutely untrue. If I had made such a statement, it must have appeared somewhere without my knowledge, and I should like to see that source of information.

Q. We shall see.

Q. The last statement I have here is that "Schacht was awarded the Honorary Emblem of the Nazi Party" for his role in financing Germany's rearmament. He was publicly acclaimed for his contributions in this respect by General von Blomberg who said, "Without your help, my dear doctor, none of this rearmament would have been possible."

A. The golden swastika was not given to me with any special motive attached to it, be it written or verbal. It was given to all the members of the cabinet at the 4th anniversary of the Party, on January 30, 1937. The public statement of thanks given to me was done by Hitler in January 1939, when I left the Reichsbank, by a letter which expressly stated that I had only financed the first period of rearmament, thus indicating that I was not willing to finance the second period. In fact, I was dismissed from the Reichsbank in January, 1939, because I refused to give money from the Reichsbank for armament, as I have stated before. I do not remember any public statement of von Blomberg, and I doubt it very much that any such declaration was made by General von Blomberg, about the financing of the armament, since the end of 1936.

Q. When was the first period of the German rearmament?

A. Approximately in the beginning of 1933, or the end of 1934.

Q. If General von Blomberg were to have made such a statement in January, 1937, it would have been a true statement that without your

help in the Reichsbank, it would never have been possible to finance the German rearmament?

A. It would

... so that your denial is not to the contents of the statement but only to the fact whether the statement was made at all?

A. Yes Sir.

Interrogation ended at 4:35.

I state that the answers given by my in this statement, consisting of 21 to 38 pages each initialled by me are true and correct.

s. Dr. Hjalmar SOERACHT.

"CERTIFIED TRUE COPY"

- 38 a - to 45 inclusive
(ENL)

1007

A F F I D A V I T

I, Dr. Hjalmar SCHACHT, after having been warned that I will be liable to punishment for making false statements, state herewith under oath, of my own free will and without coercion, the following:

I have been shown the document entitled "Interrogation of Dr. Hjalmar SCHACHT,--2:45 pm, 20 July 1945", which has been numbered NI-406. The pages numbered at the top begin at page # 21 and end at page # 38. My initials appear on each page and my signature appears on the last page.

I made all of the statements appearing in this interrogation to Clifford Hynning, a financial investigator of the American forces, of my own free will and without coercion. I have reread this interrogation today and can state that all of the facts contained therein are true to my best knowledge and belief.

I declare herewith under oath that I have stated the full truth to the best of my knowledge and belief.

Dr. HJALMAR SCHAFT

Sworn to and signed before me the 18th day of August 1947 at Nurnberg, Germany, by Dr. Hjalmar Schacht, known to me to be the person making the above affidavit.

JAN F. CHARNATZ, ETO 402
Attorney, Office of Chief
of Counsel for War Crimes
APO 696-A

(Page 1 of the original)

A f f i d a v i t .

I, Dr. Hjalmar SCHACHT, after having been warned that I will be liable to punishment for making false statements, state herewith under oath, of my own free will and without coercion, the following :

The amounts contributed by the participants in the meeting of 20 February 1933 at Goering's house were paid by them to the Bankers Delbrueck Schickler & Co., Berlin, to the credit of an account " Nationale Treuhand " (which may be translated as " National Trusteeship "). It was arranged that I was entitled to dispose of this account, which I administered as a trustee, and that in case of my death, or that in case the trusteeship should be terminated in any other way, Rudolf Hess should be entitled to dispose of the account.

I disposed of the amounts of this account by writing out checks to Mr. Hess. I do not know what Mr. Hess actually did with the money.

On 4 April 1933 I closed the account with Delbrueck Schickler & Co. and had the balance transferred to the " Account Ic " with the Reichsbank which read in my name. Later on I was ordered directly by Hitler, who was authorized by the assembly of 20 February 1933 to dispose of the amounts collected, or through Hess, his deputy, to pay the balance of about 600,000 Marks to Ribbentrop.

I have carefully read this affidavit (one page) and have signed it. I have made the necessary corrections in my own handwriting; and initialled each correction in the margin of the page. I declare herewith under oath that I have stated the full truth to the best of my knowledge and belief.

(signed) Dr. Hjalmar Schacht

Sworn to and signed before me this 12th day of August 1947 at Nurnberg, Germany, by Dr. Hjalmar Schacht; known to me to be the person making the above affidavit.

" A CERTIFIED TRUE COPY "

- 1 -
E F D .

(signed) J.P. CHAMBLATZ
ETO 402 Attorney, Office of Chief
of Counsel for War Crimes. APO 696-A.

111

National Trusteeship

Reichsbank President A.D., Dr. Hjalmar SCHACHT, Berlin-Zehlendorf

3					
Feb.	23	(Dedibk) (Deutsche Bank - Diskonto Gesellschaft, Verein fuer die Bergbaulichen Interessen, Essen	Feb. 23	200,000.	
"	24	Transfer to account Rudolf HESS, at present, Berlin 100,000.--	" 24		
"	24	Karl Hermann, Automobile exhibition, Berlin	" 25	150,000.	
"	24	Automobile Exhibition, Berlin	" 25	100,000.	
"	25	Director Al Steinke	" 27	200,000.	
"	25	Demag A.G., Duisburg	" 27	50,000.	
"	27	Telefunken Gesellschaft fuer Drahtlose Telegraphie, Berlin	" 28	35,000.	
"	27	Oscar G.m.b.H., Berlin	" 28	40,000.	
"	27	Bayrische Hypotheken & Wechsel Bank, branch office Munich, Kauffingerstr. 100,000.--	" 28		
"	27	in favor of Verlag Franz Eher Nachf, Munich	" 27		
"	27	Transfer to account Rudolf Hess, Berlin 100,000.--	" 27		
"	28	I.G. Farbenindustrie A.G. Frankfurt/M	March 1	400,000	
"	28	Telegraph Giroexpenses for Girotransfer to Munich-8.--	Feb. 28		
March	1	Your Payment	March 2	125,000	
"	2	Telegr. Girotransfer to Bayrische Hypotheken & Wechselbank Munich branch office Bayerstr. for Account Josef Jung 400,000.--	" 2		
"		Telegr. transfer expenses 23.--	" 2		
"		Account transfer Rudolf Hess 300,000.--	" 1		
"	2	Reimbursements from Director Karl Lange, Berlin	" 3	30,000	
"	3	Dir. Karl Lange Maschine industrie	" 4	20,000	
"	4	Society for Mining Interests, Essen	" 4	100,000	
"	4	Karl Hermann, Berlin, Dessauerstr. 23/9	" 4	150,000	
"	4	Allgemeine Elektrizitaetsgesellschaft	" 4	60,000.	
"	7	General direktor Dr. F. Springorum, Dortmund	" 8	36,000.	
"	8	Reichsbank for Girotransfer: Bayrische Hypotheken & Wechselbank, branch office Kauffingerstr. 100,000.--	" 8		
		1,100,031.--		1,696,000.	
		(Page 2 of original)			
		1,100,031.--		1,696,000.	
"	8	Bayrische Hypotheken & Wechselbank, Munich	" 8		
"		Branch office Bayerstr. 100,000.--	" 7		
"		Transfer to account Rudolf Hess 250,000.--	" 11	25,000.	
"	10	Accumulatorwerk A.G. Berlin	" 14	300,000.	
"	13	Verein f.d. bergbaulichen Interessen Essen	" 14		
"	14	Transfer to Rudolf Hess 200,000.--	" 29		
"	29	" " 200,000.--			
April	4	Commerz- & Privatbank Dep.Kasse N. Berlin W.9 Postdamerstr. 1	April 4		
"		f. Special account S 29 99,000.--	" 5	404	
"	5	Interests according to list 1 %	" 5		
"		Phone bills 1.--	" 5		
"		Postage 2.50	" 5		
"		Balance 72,370.--	" 5		
		Balance carried over 2,021,404.50	April 5	72,370	

112

TRANSLATION OF EXTRACTS OF DOCUMENT
No. NL-391 (Cont'd)

Lvi Errors possible

Berlin, 5 April 1933
DELBROCK SCHICKLER & Co.

ppa.

ppa.

illegible signature illegible signature

(Page 15 of original)

TO
Reichsbank President A.D. Dr. H. SCHACHT,
BERLIN

Nationale Treuhand (National Trusteeship)

FOR
Reimbursement of I.G. Farbenindustrie A.G. Frankfurt/M.
1 March 400,000.-

FOR
Girotelegram expenses for Telegraphic girotransfer to
Munich 28 Feb. 8.-

(Page 64 of original)

BANK TO BANK ORDER

Receipt for Acceptor-Bank

Transfer from
DRESDNER BANK
Berlin W 56

Urgent Local Advice Note

Sta. 43.

Value RM 400,000

Reichsmark
(in full) Four hundred thousand

Transfer received by:

Account No. I.G. Farbenindustrie A.G. Frankfurt a/M.

To
Dolbruck, Schickler & Co., Berlin
Account No.

For:

(Translator's Note:
Handwritten: Tick, cross and
illegible initial)

from
219.81 Dresdner Bank in Frankfurt/M., Frankfurt/M.

Berlin W 56, 28 February 1933
Dresdner Bank.

(Translator's Note:
Illegible signature)

113

(Page 65 of original)

I. G. FARBENINDUSTRIE AKTIENGESSELLSCHAFT
Bank Department

Address	Telegraph:	Telephone:	BUSINESS	ACCOUNTS
I.G. Farbenindustrie	Igefarben	Local: Key No. 20027	HOURS	Reichsbank-
Aktiengesellschaft,	Frankfurt/Main	Long distance:	8-17	Giro-Accou
Bank Department		55549	Saturday	Frankfurt/
Frankfurt (Main)			8-13 1/2	Postal Chec
20, Grunoburgpl.				Account 241
				Frankfurt/

(Translator's Note:
Handwritten: 28 Feb.)

Firm
Delbrueck Schickler & Co.,

BERLIN W. 8
Mauerstrasse 63/65

Your Ref: Your letter of: Our Ref.:
(Mention in reply)

FRANKFURT (MAIN) 20
27 February 1933

Re:

We are informing you herewith that we have authorized the DRESDNER
BANK in FRANKFURT/M., to pay you to-morrow forenoon:
RM 400,000
which you will use in favor of the account
"NATIONALE TREUHAND" (National Trusteeship)

Respectfully,
I.G. Farbenindustrie Aktiengesellschaft
(signatures) SELCK pp. RANGERT

By express delivery

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

I, DOROTHEA L. GALEWSKI, ETO No. 23079, hereby certify that I am thoroughly
conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true
and correct translation of Document No. NI-391.

DOROTHEA L. GALEWSKI
ETO No. 34079

(E N D)

No. 34

WB/1
911-

United States of America



THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES

all to whom these presents shall come, Greeting:

I Certify That the annexed copy, or each of the specified number of copies, of each document listed below is a true copy of a document in the official custody of the Archivist of the United States.

Exhibit No. 1093 accompanying Part 12 of hearings of December 12, 1934, before the Special U. S. Senate Committee Investigating the Munitions Industry:

This document is from the records of the United States Senate.

Witness my hand, I, SOLON J. BUCK, Archivist of the United States, have hereunto caused the Seal of the National Archives to be affixed and my name subscribed by the Chief or Acting Chief of the General Reference Division of the National Archives, in the District of Columbia, this 10th day of July 1947.

Solon J. Buck

Archivist of the United States

W. Neil Franklin

Chief, General Reference Division

NI-9784

6 - 2 -

(so)

Exhibit No.

109

*of
close*

*one
copy*

11

I. G. Meetings

E. I. Du Pont De Nemours & Company
Wilmington, Delaware

London Office

BUSINESS

ALBANY, N. Y. C. 3.

Letter No. 1097

July 17, 1933

F. S. D.

E. K. B. D.

MR. WENDELL R. SWINT, DIRECTOR
FOREIGN RELATIONS DEPARTMENT

CONFERENCES IN GERMANY WITH MR. JAMES E. CRANE,
VICE PRESIDENT, JULY 9 to 14, 1933, INCLUSIVE

I am including in the following paragraphs results of Mr. Crane's and the writer's conversations during trip to Germany July 9 to 14, inclusive. I am not writing separately to the respective departments, but am enclosing two extra copies of this report, Mr. Crane already having received a copy here in the office.

PROF. DR. CARL BOSCH, HEIDELBERG, JULY 10

Messrs. Crane and Ewing met with Prof. Dr. Carl Bosch at his home in Heidelberg on Monday afternoon, July 10. We found Professor Bosch looking extremely well considering his long period of sickness.

Mr. Crane explained that he was on a trip to Europe to renew old friendships, this being the first trip to Germany in six years. There followed a general discussion of the economic situations in Germany and in the United States, and Prof. Bosch confirmed our opinion that times in Germany at present are very difficult, and for industry the last few weeks have been especially difficult. Whereas the Revolution of 1918 consisted of the middle and upper classes against the lower, the present revolution consists of the lower and middle classes against the upper class and industry. Just now it is a question of Fascism and Bolshevism, and industry must support the present government to prevent further chaos. In the beginning, Hitler did not consult industrial leaders, but in recent weeks he has shown his stability by curbing the more extreme element of the Party and bringing the industrial leaders into consultation with him. Dr. Bosch has been in Berlin in direct contact with the government, and in fact spends practically all of his time between his dwelling in Heidelberg and the Government Offices in Berlin, thus leaving little, if any, time for the affairs of the I. G. Farbenindustrie.

Pencil Markings.

Special U. S. Senate Committee
Investigating The Munition Industry
403 Senate Office Bldg.

I-G MEETINGS

- 2 -

6 NI-9784
- 4 -

Dr. Bosch expects a relief in unemployment taxes through the spreading of work similar to the scheme which has been adopted in America. The unemployment figure is decreasing, and from a high of about 7,000,000, there are now unemployed in Germany only about 4,800,000 to 5,000,000.

The home trade is improving, although the export business has been badly hit. According to Dr. Bosch, Germany must export. Of the total business of the country, the normal export is 20%, but I.G. normally exports about 30%.

Dr. Bosch then told us of the I.G. Farbenindustrie plans for oil from coal. Up to the present, they have been manufacturing 50,000 tons per annum of gasoline from tar. Now they have succeeded in manufacturing gasoline direct from brown coal, and are at present operating at the rate of 80,000 tons per year from tar and 20,000 tons from brown coal. Plans are underway to increase the production fourfold, thus producing 400,000 tons of gasoline per year. We understand that all of the increase will be manufactured from brown coal, and production will therefore be divided 80,000 tons per year from tar and 320,000 tons per year from brown coal.

Mr. Crane recalled to Prof. Bosch the splendid cooperation which we enjoy with I.G.I., and in this Prof. Bosch was much interested. He asked regarding collaboration in research work, saying that, in his opinion, there must be competition in research. Mr. Crane explained that even in the respective companies we have competition between different departments on research work, but that collaboration between the two companies has eliminated unnecessary duplication. Prof. Bosch indicated approval of the idea of collaboration in research.

Prof. Bosch stated that he wanted to retire from active participation in industry and to devote his time to his scientific hobbies. When asked who would head up the I.G. Farbenindustrie, he replied, Dr. Krauch, Dr. ter Meer, and Dr. Gajewski, and indicated that Dr. Gaus was due to retire.

Special U. S. Senate Committee
Investigating The Munitions Industry
403 Senate Office Bldg

184-151
I. G. MEETINGS

NI-9784

6

-5-

- 3 -

After our conversation, Prof. Bosch took us on a tour of his laboratories, during which he showed us also his excellent crystal collection -- one of the best in Germany -- and his collection of beetles and butterflies.

Mr. Crane explained that Grasselli had produced quantities of indium metal, and Professor Bosch asked for a sample of a few grams. (Will you kindly arrange for transmittal of a representative quantity direct to Prof. Bosch?)

I.G. FARBENINDUSTRIE INVESTMENT *file Ital*

On Tuesday, July 11, we met in Dr. Schmitz' office at the Deutsche Laender Bank, Berlin. Present also were: Dr. Krauch of I.G. Farbenindustrie and Mr. Akers of I.G. I. Mr. Crane explained to Dr. Schmitz the situation regarding our investments in I.G. Bonds and Shares and our desire to convert the entire investment either to cash, if that were possible, or to shares in the Swiss company or the American I.G., giving as the reason that the Dollar is now off and Marks will buy more Dollars than at the former rate. Mr. Crane said he felt that our investment in I.G. Farbenindustrie was so small as to be relatively unimportant to I.G. Farbenindustrie. Furthermore, the growth of Nationalism in different countries would indicate that in these small investments it would be a better plan to sell the interest.

Dr. Schmitz emphasized the fact that I.G. does not control the I.G. Chemie-Basle, which is strictly a Swiss company governed by a Swiss Board of Directors. He also impressed upon us the wisdom of his action several years ago in setting up the I.G. Chemie-Basle, as the trend of recent events shows that his plans were well founded. I.G. Chemie-Basle, according to Dr. Schmitz, is set up to control practically all investments of I.G. Farbenindustrie outside of Germany, and I.G., Germany, does not own one share. We presume that a dummy Swiss director holds the I.G. interests in this company. It was Dr. Schmitz' opinion that it would be quite impossible to convince the Board of I.G. Chemie-Basle to transfer our German holdings in return for shares in the Swiss company or in the American company, and neither the Swiss directors nor the directors of the American I.G. would consent. In speaking with Mr. Mitchell of I.G. I. later, he said very definitely that Dr. Schmitz' analysis of the situation is untrue.

U. S. Senate
Investigation
The Munitions Industry
403 Senate Office Bldg.

#4524 175

Dr. Schmitz agreed to determine if we can sell in Switzerland our German Bonds and Shares and buy I.G. Chemie-Basle Shares in Switzerland. However, as the Bonds are quoted in Switzerland at about 70% as against 118% in Germany (which difference accounts for the swissmark transaction of 40 to 50%), it is not likely that the exchange will be attractive.

Dr. Schmitz stated that he wanted to keep us as investors in the German company and felt that it was only feasible to sell the Bonds in Germany and to buy I.G. shares in Germany, which, according to the regulations, would be blocked for five years. He promised to advise us further on this point, but at the same time agreed to assist us in carrying through the transaction within Germany upon our request.

In discussing the question later at lunch, Dr. Schmitz told Mr. Crane that it might be possible to convert our I.G. holdings to I.G. Chemie-Basle, providing we would take the revenue therefrom in the form of blocked Marks. This scheme is unattractive, as the I.G. Chemie-Basle shares would not be salable with the dividend restriction.

Present at the luncheon, in addition to Mr. Crane and the writer, were:

Dr. Schmitz,
Mr. Akers,
Dr. Jacobi, Commercial Director, Nitrogen Dept.,
I.G.,
Mr. Oster, Director, Stickstoff-Syndicate,
Dr. Krauch, Director, Nitrogen Dept., I.G.,
Dr. Mueller, Manager of Oppau,
Mr. Ehrenhorst, Asst. Manager of Oppau,
and
Mr. Schneider, Manager of Merseburg.

12-21-35

HYDROGEN & NITROGEN CO-OPERATION)

Following the luncheon, we met in Dr. Krauch's office with Mr. Akers, Dr. Mueller, and Mr. Pfarenhorst to discuss Hydrogen and Nitrogen co-operation. In principle, the representatives of the I.G. agree that a technical exchange of Nitrogen is desirable, but they would prefer to discuss the situation further with their commercial people, who at the moment do not see how the two companies could continue to compete in neutral markets. While agreeing in principle, I.G. Farbenindustrie cannot reduce the contract to written form because of the present chaos in the government and the suspicion which would follow an international co-operative movement of this kind. The government men in high place are being changed daily, which also makes it difficult to discuss the situation. Dr. Krauch also confirmed that Dr. Bosch is in constant touch with the government and believes that in the end same views will prevail.

MEETING WITH KOKSBERGER JULY 11

At 3.30 we met with Dr. Berckemeyer, Dr. Bie, Dr. Borner, and Dr. Weltzien, at Koksberger's office, when the economic situations in Germany and the United States were discussed. Later, Mr. Crane visited Spindlersfeld in company with Dr. Borner, and in the evening we dined with Dr. Weil, Dr. Borner, and Dr. Weltzien before taking the train for Frankfurt.

MEETING WITH SCHEIDEMANN JULY 12

Having learned by telephone from Berlin that Dr. Busemann was leaving early on Wednesday morning for holiday, we called upon him at 9 o'clock at the Scheidemann offices in Frankfurt. Respective affairs in the two companies were discussed, and Dr. Busemann touched upon the proposed du Pont-Scheidemann Agreement. He also referred to the proposal to curtail or eliminate the Downs Process royalties and referred to the history of the development of this situation and the different events with Dr. Carveth.

Special U. S. Senate Committee
Investigating The Munitions Industry
403 Senate Office Bldg.

NI-9784

-8-

Later we saw Mr. Schlosser, who confirmed the feeling of Scheideanstalt with respect to the Downs process. Mr. Schlosser stated that Mr. Berwind would be returning to Frankfurt from New York in a few days following his discussions in the U.S.A. with the R. and H. Chemicals Department and would no doubt have some comment with respect to our intentions on the Downs agreement.

MEETING WITH I.G. FARBENINDUSTRIE JULY 12 *ital lcr*

At 10 o'clock we called at the main offices of I.G. Farbenindustrie and spent some time with Dr. von Zohnitzler and Dr. ter Meer, and were later joined at luncheon by Mr. Weber-Andreas. Mr. Crane related the trend of developments in the United States and emphasized the fact that a strong feeling of nationalism pervades our country today. The German gentlemen discussed the political situation in Germany, with particular reference to the positive position of the government against the Jews. They also explained how Herr Krupp had developed a scheme, whereby industry could contribute to the Party Organization funds, and in fact every industry is called upon to pay 1% of the annual wage and salary roll to the Nazi Organization. For the I.G. Farbenindustrie, the annual amount is about RM. 1,000,000, which would indicate a combined annual wage and salary payment of the I.G. Farbenindustrie of RM. 200,000,000, or \$50,000,000 at par. Later it was learned that the employees of I.G. total 68,000, exclusive of mine workers and those in affiliated companies.

During the course of the morning, I took occasion to explain to Dr. ter Meer the functions of Dr. W. F. Zimmerli, attached to the London Office, and received a very favorable reaction from Dr. ter Meer, who has already met Dr. Zimmerli personally. It was Dr. ter Meer's expressed idea that Dr. Zimmerli and I.G. Farbenindustrie should collaborate more closely on research and development ideas, and he would be glad to have Dr. Zimmerli confer with the different laboratory heads. (Although Dr. Zimmerli has already met many of the leaders in I.G. Research; he has purposely refrained from making any direct contact with them until after his first meeting with Dr. ter Meer. Accordingly, the way seems to be clear now for Dr. Zimmerli to pursue his work through the I.G. Farbenindustrie organization.)

Special U.S. Senate Committee
on Un-American Activities
440 Senate Office Building

-9-
END

Following luncheon, we visited Dr. Carl von Weinberg, who is now 73 years old and who comes to the office daily for consultation with the active members of the I.G. Dr. von Weinberg also discussed the situation in Germany, and although he is a Jew, has given the movement his full stamp of approval. He stated further that all of his money is invested in Germany and he does not have one pfennig outside the country. We spoke of the proposed increase in collaboration with I.G., to which he was in hearty agreement. In touching upon I.G.'s interest in the U.S.A., Dr. von Weinberg indicated that I.G. was very well pleased with the investment, and by suggestion gave us to understand that they had no intention of retiring from that market.

Interviews in general with I.G. Farbenindustrie were of a very pleasant nature, and indicated the closer cooperation which is manifest between du Pont and that company.

DR. PAUL MUELLER, COLOGNE, JULY 13

We made a brief call on Dr. Paul Mueller in Cologne, when Mr. Crane mentioned that we would probably want to dispose of our German holdings if possible. Dr. Mueller showed keen disappointment and regretted exceedingly that we would want to part with our interests in D.I.G., and felt that, if for no reason other than for sentimental attachment, we should try if possible to retain them. While he would not object if we had good reasons for selling, yet he would feel a personal loss if we were to dispose of our equity. We left it that we would probably not dispose of our D.I.G. shares, but that if the time should ever come when our holding of these shares would prove to be an embarrassment to Dr. Mueller, he would advise us immediately, when disposal arrangements could be made.

Dr. Mueller spoke of the development at Troisdorf, saying that their present rate of production is 4,000 kilos. celluloid daily, divided between four factories. In fact celluloid is declining at a rapid rate and is being replaced by the new synthetic resins, such as urea formaldehyde and phenyl formaldehyde.

HOMER H. EWING. □

HHE/AAD

Special U. S. Senate Committee
Investigating The Munitions Industry
403 Senate Office Bldg

(page 1 of originals)

DOCUMENT No. - 2828 PS -
OFFICE OF CHIEF OF COUNSEL
FOR WAR CRIMES.
EXCERPT

Secret

SECRET

AUTH : CG, US Op CC

INIT:

Date : 21. July 45

SPECIAL DETENTION CENTER " ASHCAH "

TRANSCRIPT OF RECORD OF FINANCIAL INTERROGATIONS OF

Hermann Goering

Walther Funk

Schwerin von Krosigk

Hans Lammers

NOTE : These interrogations were conducted by Major Hiram
Gans, Financial Branch, G - 5, SHAFT, on June 2, 3, and 4,
and by Mr. Clifford J. Hynning, Finance Division, US Group
CC (Germany), and Lt; Herbert Dubois, Financial Branch, G-5,
SHAFT, on June 25, and 26, 1945

INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL

NUREMBERG, GERMANY

USA Exhibit 654

— Filed Jan 11, 1946.

((page 78 of original)

SECRET.

INTERROGATION OF GOERING
25 June 1945 (Evening)

.....
(page 84 of original)
.....

Q : Would Germany have ever entertained this large program of
aggression if they had not had full support of the indust
rialists all the way through ?

A : The industrialists are Germans . They had to support their
country.

(page 84 of original cont'd)

Q : Were they forced to do so or did they do so voluntarily ?

A : They did it voluntarily but if they would have refused the state would have stepped in.

Q : Do you think the state would have been strong enough to have forced the big industry into war if it did not want war ?

A : When the call came for war every industry followed without any difficulty from inner convictions.

.....

(page 87 of original)

Q : After the party came into power in 1933 and following the Reichstag fire would they not have lost the election if there had been no fire ?

A : The outcome of the election had nothing to do with the fire. There was a wave going through the country and everybody was flocking to the party.

Q : I mean the election in March 1933 ?

A : There were several elections but when the party got into power one of its first acts was to have a general election right away and the date was fixed before the fire, but in that election the party got more than half of the votes. There was also a second election that year.

Q : It did not have two - thirds majority required under the Constitution ?

A : Only in the second election.

Q : In both elections it had the general support of German industry, did it not ?

A : Yes, we had the support of all industry .

Q : this support took the form of large financial contributions to the party, did it not ?

A : I don't remember what funds were paid after the party got into power. That's a question for the treasury of the party.

(page 87 of original cont'd)

Unity between the State and Party never existed. They were
always two separate things. In the end there was only the
Party. It stood over the State.

" A CERTIFIED TRUE COPY "

- 3 -
E N D .

11/16

A F F I D A V I T

I, Wilhelm KEPLER, at present in Nuernberg, after having been warned that I will be liable to punishment for making false statements testify herewith under oath, of my own free will and without coercion, to the following:

In the year 1933, I was HITLER's economic adviser. Shortly after the taking over of power the heads of many of the leading enterprises paid formal calls to Hitler. Of I.G. Farben, came BOSCH, then Chairman of the Vorstand, who was one of the most important industrialists of Germany. Neither I, nor apparently anyone else, of Hitler's circle had invited these people; on the contrary, they were extremely insistent in their wish to be allowed to see Hitler. Later on, I was told that BOSCH had misgivings when he went to the Fuehrer, but that he was content when he returned (Translator's Note: this last sentence was added as a handwritten statement).

Even before that, I had been invited by SCHMITZ together with BOSCH. This invitation was of a private nature.

Towards the end of the year 1934, I took charge of the field of synthetics. In this connection I negotiated with several of the I.G. gentlemen for instance, with Professor KRAUCH as regards hydrogenation; with GAJEWSKI as regards cellulose, and with ter MEER and AMBROS as regards Buna.

Shortly after the creation of the Four Year Plan, in the autumn of 1936, the Generalrat (General Council) was created under KOERNER, the Under-Secretary; it held meetings regularly. Regular attendants were: KOERNER, NEUMANN, HANNACKEN, BAEKE (for food and agriculture), SYRUP (for the Arbeits-einsatz (allocation of labor), KOEHLER (for the collecting of materials) and the then Colonel LOEB (for development of industry). Later Professor KRAUCH also was often invited.

I have carefully read and countersigned in my own handwriting each of the two pages of this affidavit, and made the necessary corrections in my own handwriting and countersigned them with my initials, and I state herewith under oath that in this statement I told the pure truth according to my best knowledge and conscience.

(signature) Wilhelm KEPLER
/t/ Wilhelm Keppler

Sworn to and signed before me this 9th day of May 1947 at Nuernberg by Wilhelm KEPLER, known to me to be the person making the above affidavit.

(signature) Paul H. KATSCHER
/t/ Paul H. Katscher
U.S. Civilian, AGO No. D-150641
Office of Chief of Counsel for
War Crimes, U.S. War Department

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

I, Hertha C. KNUTH, SOO No. X-046355, hereby certify that I am fully conversant with the English and German languages and that this is a correct translation of Document No. NI-6766.

HERTHA C. KNUTH
AGO No. X-046355
U. S. Civilian

(E N D)

121

(Translator's Note: Handwritten Notes:

W.T.B.

No. 1721

Saturday, 15 July 1933)

Proclamation of a General Economic Council by Reich Chancellor Adolf Hitler.

Berlin, 15 July. The Reich Economics Minister announces the following:

In order to utilize the experience of practical economy for the tasks of the Reich Government, the Reich Chancellor nominates a General Council of Economy members of which are to be at the disposal of the Reich Government in regard to all economic questions. The General Economic Council meets by special invitation. The Reich Chancellor has made the following appointments to the new Generalrat for the time being:

Herbert BACHE, Domain Bailiff (Domaenenpächter), Berlin
Prof. Dr. Carl BOSCH (Heidelberg)
Geh. Landesbaurat, Dipl. Ing. Eugen BOEHRINGER,
Director of the Maximilianhütte (Rosenberg) Oberpfalz)
Director - General August DIEHL, Deutsches Kalisyndikat (German Potash
Combine), Berlin
Banker August von FINCK, Munich
Dr. Otto Christian FISCHER, President of the Zentralverband des
Deutsches Bank- und Bankiergewerbes (Central Association of the
German Banking Business, Berlin
Dr. Albert HACKELBERGER, Factory-owner, Oefflingen/Eden
Burgomaster v. KROGMANN, Hamburg
Dr. G. KRUPP von BOHLEN und HALBACH, Essen
Prussian State Counsellor, Dr. Robert LEY, Leader of the DAF (German
Labor Front), Berlin
Dr. Carl LUER, President of the Chamber of Commerce and Trustee of Labor,
Frankfurt/M.
Prussian Staatsrat, Friedrich REINHART, Bank Director, Berlin
Dr. Hermann REISCHLE, Leader of the Landhandel (Agricultural Trade
and the Landwirtschafts Genossenschaften (Agricultural Cooperatives),
Berlin
Kurt Freiherr von SCHROEDER, President of the Chamber of Commerce,
Cologne
Karl Friedrich von SIEMENS, Berlin
Prussian Staatsrat, Dr. Fritz THYSEN, Muelheim/Ruhr
General-direktor Dr. Albert VOEGLER, Dortmund

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

I, DOROTHEA L. GALEWSKI, M.P. NO. 34079, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document No. NL-628.

DOROTHEA L. GALEWSKI
M.P. NO. 34079

END

TRANSLATION OF EXCERPTS FROM DOCUMENT No. NI-9285
OFFICE OF CHIEF OF COUNCIL FOR WAR CRIMES

Sunday, 16 July 1933 25Pf. (week days 20 Pf.) Reich Edition
77th Volume No. 521 - 523 (Sunday No. 29) (Collective number of
3 editions)

FRANKFURTER ZEITUNG.
und Handelsblatt
(Frankfurter Handelszeitung) (Neue Frankfurter Zeitung)
founded by Leopold Sonnenschein

Collective Telephone Number: Local 2 0202, long distance: 2 0301
Telegram address: Zeitung Frankfurt/Main, Postal checking account:
Frankfurt H 4430

General Economy Council.

Berlin, 15 July.

The Reich Minister of Economics announces the following: To utilize the experiences of practical economy for the tasks of the Reich Government, the Reich Chancellor appoints a General Economy Council, whose members have the task of advising the Reich Government on all economic problems. The General Economy Council meets only when specially convened. To start with, the Reich Chancellor has appointed the following gentlemen for the General Economy Council: Herbert BÄCKE, Lessee of state-owned estates (Guttenberg), Berlin, Professor Dr. Carl Brack (Heidelberg), Senator Landeshaupt Dipl. Ing. Eugen Richter, Director of the Maximilianshütte (Eisenberg), General Director August Dohm, Deutsches Kalisyndikat (Berlin), Banker August von Finck (Hamburg), Dr. Otto Chr. Fischer, President of the Zentralverband des Deutschen Bank- und Bankiergewerks (Berlin), Dr. Albert Hackelsberger, factory-owner (Köfling am Bodensee), Captain Meyer v. Kroschmann (Hamburg), Dr. G. Krupp von Böhlen und Halbach (Essen), Prussian Councillor of State Dr. Robert Loy, Leader of the German Labor Front (Berlin), Dr. Carl Luer, President of the Chamber of Commerce, Labor Trustee (Frankfurt/Main), Prussian Councillor of State Friedrich Reinhardt, Bank Director (Berlin), Dr. Hermann Reichle, leader of the Rural Trade Organization and the Agricultural Co-operatives (Berlin), Kurt Frohner v. Schroeder, President of the Chamber of Commerce (Cologne/Main), Karl Friedrich v. Siemens (Berlin), Prussian Councillor of State Dr. Fritz Thyssen (Muelheim/Ruhr), General Director Dr. Albert Weisler (Dortmund).

It seems that this General Economy Council is to take over the advisory functions of the Reich Economy Council to a certain extent. One can expect that the persons called into the General Economy Council represent the concepts of efficiency and reality which were laid down as guiding principles for the future economic policy by the Reich Chancellor and the Reich Minister of Economics in their last addresses. It remains to be seen to what extent the Reich Economy Council will carry on their activities in those circumstances, especially, since a reduction is to take place in the speed of development of the corporate structure of the state, the head of which the Reich Economy Council is supposed to be.

TRANSLATION OF EXCERPTS FROM DOCUMENT No. NI-9285
CONTINUED

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

8 August 1947

I, BRIGITTE TURK, ETN 35 130, herewith certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document No. NI-9285.

BRIGITTE TURK, ETN 35 130

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO. N I - 1105
EXCERPTS
OFFICE OF CHIEF OF COUNSEL FOR WAR CRIMES

FIRST AFTERNOON EDITION.

84th year No. 2729

WOLFF's Telegraphisches Buero (Telegraph Office)
(W.T.B.)

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Berlin, Monday, 30 October 1933

THE PUBLICITY BOARD OF THE GERMAN ECONOMY. SOLEMN OPENING
SESSION AT THE PROPAGANDA MINISTRY.

BERLIN, 30 OCTOBER. The Reich Minister for the enlightenment of the People and Propaganda had invited to attend the opening session of the Publicity Board of the German Economy held today at noon. The members of the Publicity Board had gathered in the Coronation Room of the old Frederic-Leopold Palace; apart from them one also saw the deputy Gauleiter Staatsrat (state councillor) Goerlitzer; under Secretary Milch of the Aviation Ministry; Ministerial Councillor Dr. Jahnoke of the Propaganda Ministry, the entire chairmanship (Praesidium) of the Publicity Board; President Ministerial Director Ernst Reichhardt; the former Ost-hilfskommissar (Eastern Subsidies Commissioner); Deputy, President Dr. Heinrich Hunke (former minister); the economic advisor for the Gau Gross-Berlin and the business managers

Erich Finkenzelle and Councillor of the Local Court Karl Edler von Braunmuehlen, as well as other prominent representatives of the Party and of economy.

On the basis of the Law of 12 September the Publicity Board of the German Economy has to control all publicity, to concentrate it and to prevent disunion in the publicity field.

UNDER-SECRETARY FUNK

opened the meeting and welcomed the Ministers, Under-secretaries and the representatives of economy who were present. In this connection he made known the composition of the chairmanship and announced that in order to stress the close relationship with the Propaganda Ministry he himself will be chairman in the administrative council of the Publicity Board. Under-secretary Posse has been appointed second and Under-secretary Backe third chairman.

Thereupon, Under-secretary Funk discussed the tasks of the Publicity Board. He stated:

I am opening the meeting and I welcome the Reich Ministers, State Ministers, and Under-secretaries who are present as well as the gentlemen representing economy who have followed our invitation to attend the opening session of the Publicity Board of the German Economy.

.....

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO. N I - 1105
EXCERPTS * CONT'D

For the time being the following gentlemen have been appointed members of the Publicity Board of the German Economy:

.....

8. Dr. Gattineau, nitrogen industry;

.....

(page 2 of original)

.....

24. Consul Mann, Leverkusen, I.G. Farben;

.....

38. Dr. v. Schnitzler, Chairman of the Exhibition and Fair Committee in the Reich Estate of German Industry (Reichsstand der deutschen Industrie);

.....

By order of my minister I am functioning myself as the chairman of the administrative council. Under-secretary Dr. Posse of the Reich Ministry of Economics will act as third chairman so as to guarantee in this manner the close cooperation between the three main government offices (Reichsressorts) participating.

.....

(page 3 of original)

.....

After Under-secretary Funk

REICH MINISTER DR. GOEBBELS

took the floor. He stated:

Gentlemen!

The German revolution did not halt before any field of public and private life. It is a revolution which changes the people and places their mental and personal relationship to all the events of life under a new angle of vision. Herein the basic formula of the German revolution is the demand to replace the unrestrained individualism by a manner of thinking and feeling which is closely connected with the life and feeling of the people (volksmaessig)

(page 4 of original)

which no longer regard the individual person as the center and the goal of all striving but the people as a whole.

Therefore, the National Socialist revolution could not pass the previous economic concept without leaving its imprints. Especially the field of economic publicity for which the liberalist concept of economy had permitted chaotic conditions to arise, had to be reorganized according to National Socialist principles and to be reincorporated as a servant into the political economy as a whole

(page 5 of original)

.....

The Publicity Board is an educational instrument with which we want to convince the German people of the correctness and of the aims of the German trade

.....

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO. N I - 1105
EXCERPTS - CONT'D

(page 6 of original)

.....

Let us go ahead in the spirit of National Socialist
vigor and conviction. Here, too, the goal leads us onward
like a flag waving in the wind

.....

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

I, HERTHA C. KNUTH, U.S. Civilian, AGO # 046355, hereby
certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English
and German languages; and that the above is a true and
correct translation of excerpts of Document No. N I -1105.

HERTHA C. KNUTH
U.S. Civilian
AGO # 046355.

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1390-PS
OFFICE OF U S CHIEF OF COUNSEL

(page 1 of original)
1933 REICHSGESETZBLATT, PART 1, PAGE 83

Decree of the Reich President for the Protection of the
People and State of 28 February 1933

Verordnung des Reichspräsidenten zum Schutz von Volk und
Staat vom 28. Februar 1933

In virtue of Section 48 (2) of the German constitution,
the following is decreed as a defensive measure against
Communist acts of violence, endangering the state;

Article 1

Sections 114, 115, 117, 118, 123, 124, and 153 of the
Constitution of the German Reich are suspended until further
notice. Thus, restrictions on personal liberty, on the right
of free expression of opinion, including freedom of the
press, on the right of assembly and the right of associa-
tion, and violations of the privacy of postal, telegraphic,
and telephonic communications, and warrants for house-
searches, orders for confiscations as well as restrictions
on property, are also permissible beyond the legal limits
otherwise prescribed.

Article 2

If in a state the measures necessary for the restoration
of public security and order are not taken, the Reich Govern-
ment may temporarily take over the powers of the highest
state authority.

Article 3

According to orders decreed on the basis of Article 2,
by the Reich Government, the authorities of states and pro-
vinces (Gemeindeverbände), if concerned, have to abide
thereby.

Article 4

Whoever provokes, or appeals for or incites to the dis-
obedience of the orders given out by the supreme state au-
thorities or the authorities subject to them for the execution
of this decree, or the orders given by the Reich Government
according to Article 2, is punishable - insofar as the deed
is not covered by other decrees with more severe punishments -
with imprisonment of not less than one month, or with a
fine from 150 up to 25,000 Reichsmarks.

Whoever endangers human life by violating Article 1, is
to be punished by sentence to a penitentiary, under mitigat-
ing circumstances with imprisonment of not less than six
months and, when violation causes the death of a person,
with death, under mitigating circumstances with a
penitentiary sentence of not less than two years. In addi-
tion the sentence may include confiscation of property.

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1390-PS CONT'D

(page 1 of original-cont'd)

Whoever provokes or incites to an act contrary to public welfare is to be punished with a penitentiary sentence, under mitigating circumstances, with imprisonment of not less than three months.

Article 5

The crimes which under the Criminal Code are punishable with penitentiary for life are to be punished with death: i.e., in Sections 81 (high treason), 229 (poisoning), 306 (arson), 311 (properties), 324 (general poisoning).

Insofar as a more severe punishment has not been previously provided for, the following are punishable with death or with life imprisonment or with imprisonment not to exceed 15 years:

(page 2 of original)

1. Anyone who undertakes to kill the Reich President or a member or a commissioner of the Reich Government or of a state government, or provokes to such a killing, or agrees to commit it, or accepts such an offer, or conspires with another for such a murder;

2. Anyone who under Section 115(2) of the Criminal Code (serious rioting) or of Section 125(2) of the Criminal Code (serious disturbance of the peace) commits the act with arms or cooperates consciously and intentionally with an armed person;

3. Anyone who commits a kidnapping under Section 239 of the Criminal Code with the intention of making use of the kidnapped person as a hostage in the political struggle.

Article 6

This decree enters in force on the day of its promulgation.

Berlin, 28 February 1933.

The Reich President
von Hindenburg
The Reich Chancellor
Adolf Hitler
The Reich Minister of the Interior
Frick
The Reich Minister of Justice
Dr. Guertner

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO 1390-PS

3 October 1945

I, FRED NIEBERGALL, 2nd Lt Inf. O-1335567, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document 1390-PS

FRED NIEBERGALL
2nd Lt Inf. O-1335567

- 2 -

E N D

137

Case 6
Proc. Rk 38

TRANSLATION OF EXCERPTS FROM DOCUMENT
NO. NI-6903
OFFICE OF CHIEF OF COUNSEL FOR WAR
CRIMES

ERRATA SHEET

Page 2, No. 80 VOELKISCHER BEOACHTER Tuesday 21 March 1933

Paragraph 1, 1st sentence should read:

It is up to the Laender governments to take
action as regards the carrying into effect of the
announcement made by the Minister of the Interior
"No more Communists in the German Parliaments".

Errata Sheet prepared by:

JOHN J. BOLL
U. S. Civilian
AGO NO. A-44412

END

.....

Reich Minister of the Interior Dr. Frick:

LET THERE BE AN END TO THE MARXISTS HAVING A SAY IN
ANY OF THE PARLIAMENTS.

Frankfurt/Main, 10 March.

At a National Socialist mass-meeting Party member Prince
August Wilhelm and Reich Minister of the Interior Dr. Frick
spoke in the overcrowded Festival Hall, the latter commenting
on the events of the last days as follows:

.....

THERE MUST BE AN END TO THE COMMUNISTS STILL HAVING
ANYTHING TO SAY IN THE PARLIAMENTS OF THE CITIES, THE
LANDER AND THE REICH.

When the new Reichstag convenes on 21 March the Communists
will be prevented from attending the meeting by urgent and more
useful work. These gentlemen must be made to get used again
to more productive work. We shall give them an opportunity for
that in the concentration camps. If then they let themselves
be educated to become again useful members of the nation, we
shall welcome them as equals in racial fellowship, otherwise we
shall know how to make them innocuous for ever.

.....

(Translator's note: stamp:) Official copy (Belegsexemplar)

South German Edition/Edition A South German Edition/Edition A
Liberty and Bread

76th issue, 46th year, retailer price 20 Pfennigs.
Austria: 40 Grosch., Italy 1 Lira 20,
Switzerland 30 Rappen, other foreign
countries 25 Pfennigs.

Munich, Friday 17 March 1933.

VOELKISCHER BEOBDACHTER

Editor: Adolf Hitler

.....

.....

NATIONAL SOCIALIST MAJORITY
IN THE REICHSTAG (German Parliament)
AND LANDTAG (Provincial or State Legislature)

The Chancellor's Declaration for the Reich Cabinet before the
Reichstag presumably Thursday

Important changes in the Code of Procedure of the Reich Cabinet.

Berlin, 16 March.

Inasmuch as according to the orders of the competent authorities the Communists will not be allowed to participate in the parliamentary work done in the Reichstag or by the Prussian Landtag, the National Socialists Faction by itself will command a simple majority in both Houses. The Reichstag which would cover 647 mandates when including the Communists counts after the elimination of the 81 K.P.D. (Communist Party of Germany) deputies 566 members only so that even 284 seats suffice for a simple majority. The NSDAP (National Socialist German Workers Party), however, has 288 mandates. After the elimination of the Communists 376 votes would still be necessary for the two thirds majority in the Reichstag; the National Socialists with 288 and the Kampffront Schwarz-Weiss-Rot (Combat Front black-white-red) with 52 command together 340 votes so that there is still a shortage of 36 votes.

After the elimination of the 63 Communist deputies there still remain 411 mandates in the Prussian Landtag. Here, therefore, the National Socialists with their 211 votes command by themselves an ample majority. In the Prussian Landtag the two thirds majority would require 274 votes. The National Socialists with 211, and the Kampffront Schwarz-Weiss-Rot with 43 command together 254 mandates, i.e. they are 20 short. In the building of the Reichstag, with black-white-red and swastika banners flying from its 4 steeples a lengthy discussion took place between the leaders of the new Reichstag faction and President GOERING on the course of next week's Reichstag sessions for which the Communists were not invited. Of the National Socialists the Reichstag members Dr. FRICK and Dr. FABRICIUS participated.

.....

Page 2, No. 80 VOLKISCHER BEOACHTER Tuesday 21 March 1933

.....

100% CABINET MAJORITY IN THE REICHSRAT.

No more Marxists in the Prussian Staatsrat.

Berlin, 20 March.

The carrying into effect of the announcement by the Minister of the Interior "No more Communists in the German Parliaments" remains a matter of procedure as regards the parliamentary body of the Laender. As far as Prussia is concerned it has already become a fact that the Communists will be excluded not only from the Landtag but also from the provincial parliaments District Congress (Kreis tags), town council (Stadtverordneten) and community council meetings. By this defensive fight against avowed enemies of the State the majority ratio has shifted some more.

Thus the government parties have succeeded in becoming independent of the Centre also in the Rhineland and in Westphalia whilst in the East and North of Germany throughout the National Socialists alone are winning the majority. The most essential thing, however, is that after the coordination of the Laender with the policy pursued by the government in the Reich, the new Reichsrat will consist of National Socialists and German Nation (Deutschnationale) only, from which results a 100% majority for

TRANSLATION OF EXCERPTS OF DOC.No.NI-6903
Cont'd

the government, something which never before was the case for this important agency of control. The Prussian Staatsrat may possibly comprise a few members of the Centre but the elimination of the Social Democrats has already become a fact.

.....

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

I, HERTHA C. KNUTH, AGO X 046355, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of excerpts of Document No. NI-6903.

HERTHA C. KNUTH,
U.S. Civilian,
AGO X-046355

END

Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, Page 141

Law to remove the distress of people and State of
24 March 1933

Gesetz zur Behebung der Not von Volk und Reich vom
24. März 1933

The Reich-Parliament has resolved upon the following law which is promulgated herewith with approval of the Reich-Council after it has been established that all the requirements of legislation for changing the constitution have been complied with.

Section 1

Laws for the Reich can be resolved upon also by the Reich-Government besides the procedure provided by the constitution of the Reich. This also applies to the laws pursuant to sections 85 sub-section 2 and 87 of the Reich-Constitution.

Section 2

The laws for the Reich resolved upon by the Reich-Government may deviate from the Reich-Constitution insofar as they do not deal with the institution of the Reich-Parliament or the Reich-Council as such. The powers of the Reich-President will remain intact.

Section 3

The laws for the Reich resolved upon by the Reich-Government are issued by the Reich-Chancellor and promulgated in the Reichsgesetzblatt. They will become effective, insofar as they don't determine otherwise on the day following their promulgation. Section 66 to 77 of the Reich-Constitution are not applicable to the laws resolved upon by the Reich-Government.

Section 4

Treaties of the Reich with foreign countries relating to matters of the legislation of the Reich do not require the approval of the bodies participating in the legislation. The Reich-Government issues the rules necessary for the execution of such treaties.

Section 5

This law will become effective on the day of its promulgation. It becomes ineffective on 1. April 1937. Moreover it becomes ineffective if the present

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT No. 2001-PS
OFFICE OF U S CHIEF COUNSEL
continued

Reich-Government should be replaced by another.

Berlin, 24 March 1933

The Reich-President
von Hindenburg

The Reich-Chancellor
Adolf Hitler

The Reich-Minister for the Interior
Frick

The Reich-Minister for Foreign Affairs
Freiherr von Neurath

The Reich-Minister for Finances
Count Schwerin von Krosigk

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT 2001-PS

12 November 1945

I, Fred Niebergall, 2nd Lt. Inf. O-1335567, hereby certify that I
am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and
that the above is a true and correct translation of Document 2001-PS

Fred Niebergall
2nd Lt. Inf.
O-1335567

From: Freiherr v. Fritsch.

To: Baronin Margot v. Schutzbar.

Achterberg, 11 Dec 38.

My dear Baroness:

Many thanks for your two letters. It is really peculiar that so many people should look to the future with increasing fears, in spite of the Fuehrer's indisputable successes during the past years. Herr von Wiegand's letter interested me very much and I am returning it herewith. Unfortunately, I am afraid he is right when he speaks of the profound hate which is directed to us by a large part of the world.

Soon after the war I came to the conclusion that we should have to be victorious in three battles, if Germany were to become powerful again:

1. The battle against the working class - Hitler has won this.
2. Against the Catholic Church, perhaps better expressed against Ultramontaniam, and
3. Against the Jews.

We are in the midst of those battles and the one against the Jews is the most difficult. I hope everyone realizes the intricacies of this campaign.

.

(signed): FRITSCH

"A CERTIFIED TRUE COPY"

MILITARY TRIBUNAL NO. 7
CASE NO. 6
Prosecution Document Book No. IV

Englisch




INDEX TO DOCUMENT BOOK IV

Document Number	Exhibit Number	Description	Document Book Page
D-151 (USA 831) (GE-256)		Documents on the initiation of the Adolf Hitler Fund by the Reich Association of German Industry.	1-3 E
WI-3799		Note for the files by Duisberg, dated 16 June 1933, on Adolf Hitler Fund contributions by chemical industry.	3
WI-595		Circular letter, dated 13 October 1934, signed by Krupp von Bohlen, stating that firms giving money to the Adolf Hitler Fund are exempt from contributions to other funds except the Winter Relief (WER).	7
WI-2912		Letter by Achenbach, Secretary of the Adolf Hitler Fund, dated 6 December 1939, to Krupp von Bohlen, showing that the money from the Adolf Hitler Fund went through Bormann's hands.	9
WI-4056		List of Z.A. (Central Committee of I.G. Farben), dated October, 1944, giving the amounts paid by I. G. Farben to the Adolf Hitler Funds from 1933 to 1944/45, totaling more than 13 million Reichsmarks (which does not include contributions of many subsidiaries).	11
WI-4863		Minutes of 92nd meeting of the Working Committee of the Vorstand, dated 21 June 1935, showing approval by the Central Committee of a payment to the Hitler Fund. (Defendants Schmitz, Buete-fisch, Gajewski, Hoerlein, Krauch, Kuehne, Mann, ter Meer were present).	30
WI-4865		Minutes of 102nd meeting of the Working Committee of Vorstand, of 24 June 1937, Schmitz reports that the Central Committee approved contributions to the Adolf Hitler Fund. (Defendants Schmitz, Buete-fisch, Gajewski, Hoerlein, Ilgner, Knieriem, Mann, ter Meer, Oster, Schneider, Schnitzler and Haeffliger were present).	22
WI-9200		Affidavit of Brossler of the Central Committee summarizing contributions by Farben amounting to 40 million Reichsmarks to the party and party organizations between 1933 and 1945.	26
WI-4442		Certificate for D.A.G. Treisdorf showing their participations in the Hitler Fund.	58
D-157 (USA-765)		Letter from Krupp von Bohlen to Goebbels, dated April 1933, stating that the reorganization of the Reich Association of German Industry will be "guided by the idea of bringing a new organization into agreement with the political aims of the Reich Government".	60
WI-5982		News bulletin of the official German News Agency (DPA) of 4 May 1933, making public the declaration of Reich Association of German Industry as contained in Krupp's letter to Hitler.	65

D 317

67a+b



INDEX TO DOCUMENT BOOK IV

Document Exhibit Number	Description	Document Book Page
D-317 (13A-770)	Speech written by Krupp von Bohlen to be delivered at the University of Berlin in January 1944, stressing the Fuehrer Principle in Industry.	68
VI-9086	Affidavit of Felix Schumann, deputy in office of Economic Group Chemical Industry concerning organization of Reich Association of German Industry, 1933.	72
VI-100	Law for the preparation of organic structure of German economy, of 27 February 1934, RGZ 1934, Part 1, p. 165.	77
VI-6960	Announcement by the management of the Leverkusen I.G. plant signed by defendant Kuehne requesting the personnel to join the May Day rally of the Nazi Party and to prove their will to cooperate.	79
VI-1091	Copy of letter of 19 May 1933 from I. G. Farben to Wahl, I. G. Farben Leverkusen, stating that I. G. Farben would "welcome to have a suitable representation of the National Socialist aims within the IG factories cell organization (SSBO) in the near future."	80
VI-4884	Minutes of meeting of the social welfare committee in Ludwigshafen of 21 June 1933, showing that new regulations concerning the employment of members of the semi-military organizations were discussed and "it was agreed that it should be a matter of course, when engaging new people, to give preference to members of semi-military organizations, if they otherwise filled the requirements."	81
VI-5869	Minutes of meeting of management at Hoechst on 18 September 1933, with defendants Lautenschlaeger and Jaschne present, showing that people were reprimanded on account of the contempt shown towards the German salute.	82
VI-5869	Minutes of Vorstand meeting at Hoechst of 30 October 1933, with defendants Lautenschlaeger and Jaschne present. The directors of the firm of the Hoechst plant accepted the invitation to a public series of lectures by a Jew indoctrination leader on Hitler's "Mein Kampf".	83
VI-5872	Minutes of Vorstand meeting at Hoechst of 27 November 1933, with defendants Lautenschlaeger and Jaschne present, in which the agreement of the employers association concerning the training of SA men was discussed and approved. The business remained members of the health insurance.	84

INDEX TO DOCUMENT BOOK IV

Document Exhibit Number Number	Description	Document Book + Page
NI-5873	Minutes of meeting of Vorstand of Technical Management at Koechst of 5 March 1934, with defendants Lautenschlaeger and Joehne present, showing that an agreement with the para-military organizations was reached concerning the leave of absence and payment of parties or participants in military sports comps.	85
NI-4840	Minutes of meeting of the engineering committee at Frankfurt, Koechst, on 14 November 1934, discussing that the value of the DIW (German Institute for National Socialist Labor Training and Research) training courses lies less in a technical field than in a field of ideology and that this committee recommends the participation by suitable persons.	86
NI-10545	Part I of the Reich Legal Gazette edited in Berlin 1 Dec. 1934	90-91

Reich Association
of
German Industry

Berlin W 35, 29 May 1933.

Berlin W 35
Koenigin-Augusta-Strasse 28

To the
President of the Reich s Bank, Dr. S c h a c h t
B e r l i n W 56.

Dear Dr. Schacht!

The innumerable collections by NSDAP organizations and the Stahlhelm (War Veterans Organization) within German industry have taken on an unorganic and uncontrollable character that is in some cases especially serious and in other cases hardly objectionable. This, however, is not in the interest of either the leadership of the NSDAP or Industry,

On the occasion of a conference with the Reich Chancellor and Fuehrer of the NSDAP I have suggested to concentrate all collections taken up by his party in one great collection which will hit, if possible, all firms in German Industry including agriculture and banking, evenly and in proportion to their number of employees.

Herr Hitler agreed with me and asked me to make the necessary arrangements for such a collection. Accordingly, I have entered negotiations with the leaders of the various branches of industry. It was decided to call the collection "Hitler Spende" (Hitler donation) and to appoint a trusteeship to carry out the necessary actions. Inspired by the will to give my full cooperation to this project which is to represent a token of gratitude to the leader of the nation, I accepted the Chairmanship of the Trusteeship upon unanimous request of the leading associations
(2nd page of original)

I am therefore also addressing my request to you to lend your valuable support to the "Hitler-Spende." I should like to discuss the further details with you. Should you agree to my request, I shall get in touch with you regarding a discussion.

With the expression of my highest esteem,

I am,
Very truly yours,

(3rd page of original)

Handwritten remark:

2nd copy with Mr. Herle

30 May 1933.

Personal.

My dear Mr. President,

handwritten remark: Dr. Schacht.

Pursuant to the short information which I together with Dr. Koettgen had an opportunity of giving you yesterday, it is intended to launch a drive, embracing the entire German economy including agriculture and banking business, with the aim of placing the collected money, to be called "Hitler Donation" at the disposal of the Fuehrer of the NSDAP. It is to replace the collections often made individually by the various organizations of the NSDAP and the "Steel Helmet". It was agreed to appoint a board to take care of this concentrated collection. At the unanimous request of the peak organizations I have accepted the chairmanship of the board, actuated by the wish to devote

(4th page of original)

my whole strength to this drive which is intended to represent a thanksgiving to the leader of the nation.

You were kind enough to promise me that you would get Messrs. Dr. Otto Christian Fischer of the Reichskreditgesellschaft, Berlin, and Dr. Mosler of the Deutsche Bank und Diskontgesellschaft, Berlin, to supply you with all details, in particular to what extent banks of legally authorized public standing can participate in this drive. Dr. Fischer will get in touch with you one of these days.

Assuring you of my sincere and high esteem,

I am,
yours faithfully

Stamp: signed KRUPP - BOHLEN -
H.L.B.CH

(5th page of original)

ADOLF HITLER CONTRIBUTION OF GERMAN ECONOMY

Trustee Committee
Berlin W 62, Burggrafenstrasse 11

Ledger Nr. VIIa/15150

Berlin 2 September 1933.

Complaints of firms have come to the Trustee Committee of the "Adolf HITLER Contribution by German Economy" to the effect that while the ban on collections decreed by the Fuehrer's Deputy Rudolf HESS is complied with by the local offices of the NSDAP. The organizations however, are, in many cases, evading this collection ban by arranging collections of their own, in some cases even in the form of a tax. Evasion of the collection ban in that manner is - also in the view of the Supreme Party Directorate- by no means permissible. In so far as collections through organizations cannot be avoided completely the firms must at least not be deprived of their privilege to refuse participation on the basis of their contribution certificate. Since the firms in many cases are not fully informed in this matter, appropriate instructions are necessary.

Many firms also complain of the fact that, in spite of their participation in the "Adolf HITLER Contribution by German Economy", they are asked to subscribe to numerous other contributions and also to join the "Opferring", "Schutzring" and other similar organizations. It is clearly evident from the collection ban of the Fuehrer's Deputy that it is prohibited to collect funds for party purposes from all enterprises and associations of German Economy which are participating in the "Adolf HITLER Contribution" and can present their contribution certificate and receipts. The collecting offices, however, cannot know from the outset which persons belong to this group of contributors, so that it is unavoidable that collectors appear again and again. It is necessary for those firms who do not consider themselves to be in a position to make additional contributions to rely more than ever upon this contribution certificate.

I urgently request the organizations to refrain from everything that could have a harmful effect on participation in the "Adolf HITLER Contribution by German Economy" and furthermore to continue the collection drive with most intensive canvassing measures.

The Chairman of the Trustee Committee

Signature: Dr. KRUPP von BOHLEN
und HALBACH.

(6th page of original)

August 1933

The "Adolf Hitler Donation of the German Economy" is based on an agreement between the Central Administration of the NSDAP and delegates of the German economy.

Purpose of the donation is :

on the one hand to furnish the Central Administration with the means required for the centralized execution of these tasks which are for the benefit of the SA, SS, Staffs, Hitler Youth, the political organizations etc.

on the other hand to give the enterprises contributing to the donation the assurance, that their work for the reconstruction of the German economy will not be disturbed by unauthorized and unpredictable collections.

I forbid all members, offices and institutions of the Party to collect money from any enterprises and associations of the economy who are participating in the "Adolf Hitler-Donation of the German Economy." The donors will identify themselves with a certificate bearing my signature and the party stamp. The certificate shows the total amount subscribed by the donor for the period between 1 June 1933 and 31 May 1934. The certificate is valid only in conjunction with the receipts covering the actual payments which are due quarterly, viz. on 20 June, 20 September, 20 December 1933 and 20 March 1934.

All individual arrangements, local and districtal, of the party offices and institutions, with the enterprises and associations of the economy eligible for participating in the Donation become nil and void. New arrangements which might cause the firms and associations of the economy to refrain from a participation in the Donation are forbidden. Likewise, interference and measures in connection with the implementation of the donation are forbidden.

All sub-divisions which in pursuance of my decree of 2 June 1933 have reported themselves as receivers of a regular donation from the German economy will be refunded for the full amounts involved from the "Adolf Hitler Donation of the German Economy." Subsequent registration under the decree of 2 June 1933 cannot under any circumstances be considered, as they could not be included when the total of the Adolf Hitler-Donation was being computed.

signed RUDOLF HESS.

(7th page of original)

Berlin, 1 June 1933

ADOLF HITLER CONTRIBUTION OF
GERMAN ECONOMY.

I.

In order to cut out the numerous individual collections of the various offices and formations of the National Socialist Party, a central collection for all branches of German Economy under the name "Adolf HITLER Contribution by German Economy" has been established. A trustee committee which is composed of representatives of the participating economic branches, is in charge of this collection. Dr. KRUPP von BOHLEN and HALBACH has assumed directorship of this Trustee Committee.

The economic branches have pledged themselves to raise within one year, that is from 1 June 1933 till 31 May 1934, a fixed amount in a manner appropriate for them, in each case, and to hand over the collected funds to the Trustee Committee. The Reich Association of German Industry and the Union of German Employers' Organizations will urge the attached associations and firms to support this collection with all the means at their disposal. We expect the energetic cooperation of all our organizations and enterprises and the personal effort of their leaders. It is imperative to take quick and generous action, to perform this task in a simple and economic manner and to avoid all bureaucratic obstacles.

Special agreements already in force are to be included in the general collection.

II.

For the purpose of carrying out this collection in industry an industrial committee under the directorship of Dr. KOLTTINGEN has been formed by the Reich Association of German Industry and the Union of German Employers' Organizations. The management is taken over jointly by the Reich Association of German Industry and the Union of German Employers' Organizations. The joint office is located in Berlin W 62, Burggrafenstrasse 11 (Tel: Barbarossa B5, 9211, after 6PM B 5, 5926).

The following rules will apply to the execution of the program:

1. All affiliated formations will immediately inform their members, if necessary by means of this circular, of this contribution and will urge their participation emphatically, by explaining to them the purpose of the contribution. Special attention is, however, to be given to the fact that such enterprises which do not belong to associations should also be included in the campaign and participate in the contribution.
2. The amount of contribution by the individual enterprises is calculated as follows:
The general annual contribution amounts to 0.05 % of the annual wage- and salary total of the year 1932, but not less than 6 Reichsmark. This minimum scale also applies to enterprises which do not have employees. Higher scales will

be imposed on isolated industrial groups where particularly low wages prevail in order to balance higher turnovers. The individual firms will receive special information in regard to this matter through the circular of the trade associations quoted in par.4.

(8th page of original)

3. It is requested that the payments be made in quarterly instalments, that is by 15 June, 15 September, 15 December 1933, and 15 March 1934. In the interests of simplification of the administration the immediate payment of the entire amount, especially in the case of smaller amounts, is urgently requested.
4. The industrial trades-associations concerned have, at our request -for which we are grateful- placed themselves at our disposal for the technical execution of the collection in order to conduct it simply and economically. The trades associations, for their part, will distribute special circulars to their members which will give all the necessary particulars of the technical procedure. We request that the procedure laid down by the trades associations should be adhered to in order to effect the execution as smoothly as possible and to lighten the task taken over by the trades associations.
5. After receipt of the first payment the trades associations will issue a certificate which bears the name of the contributor and quotes the pledged annual amount of contribution. This certificate however, will only be handed out if the amount of the payment conforms with the regulations stated in Par. 2 and 3. It is, together with the payment receipts, the official certificate of participation in the Contribution.
6. The Party Directorate of the NSDAP will at the commencement of the collection, prohibit all individual collections of party organizations and formations of all kinds (National Socialist Factory Cell Organization, HITLER Youth, SA, SS, NS Student League, Fighting Organizations etc.) from all contributors, pledged under par.5, to the "Adolf HITLER Contribution by German Economy".
7. All inquiries and communications are to be directed to the administration of the industry collection. Copies of this circular are available in any quantity upon request.

For the Reich Association
of German Industry

Signed:

KRUPP von BOHLIN and HALBACH

For the Union of German
Employers' Organizations

Signed:

KOETTGEN.

(9th page of original)

Stamp: Private Secretary Office
In: 25 April 1934

ADOLF HITLER CONTRIBUTION OF GERMAN ECONOMY

Trustee Committee.

Berlin W 35, Tirpitzufer 44
Tel: B 1, Kurfuerst 3814, 3815.

SUBJECT: Ban on collections

Berlin 20 April 1934

The Trustee Committee of the "Adolf HITLER Contribution by German Economy" gathers from numerous enquiries that there is still a great deal of confusion with regard to the ban on collections imposed in connection with the participation in the "Adolf HITLER Subscription by German Economy".

I should like, therefore, to call your attention to the decree attached to this letter relating to the ban on collections issued by the Fuehrer's Deputy Rudolf HESS. This decree expresses the intention of the Supreme Party Directorate to raise the funds necessary for the tasks of the National Socialist Party, its offices, institutions, and formations through centralized collection. As a matter of principle the subscriptions to the "Adolf HITLER Contribution by German Economy" are to be given priority over local collections. Members, offices and institutions of the National Socialist Party are forbidden to make collections from all contributors who are in possession of a certificate issued by the "Adolf HITLER Contribution by German Economy". The contributors will present this certificate as proof to collectors calling on them. In addition all local offices are forbidden to make agreements which could prevent the firms from participating in the "Adolf HITLER Contribution by German Economy".

The Chairman of the Trustee Committee
Signed: Dr. KRUPP von BOHLEN und
HALBACH.

Enclosure.

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

I, JOHN J. BOLL, AGO No. A-444412, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document D-151.

END

-7-

JOHN J. BOLL,
U.S. Civilian,
AGO A-444412.

2E

16 June 1933

Re.: Adolf Hitler Fund (Adolf Hitler Spende).

1.) Meeting at the Trade Association of the Chemical Industry (Berufsgenossenschaft der chemischen Industrie).

In the absence of the Managing Director, Dr. MARTIUS, Herr THEUSS was spoken to. To the question on what the increase of the Adolf Hitler Fund (Adolf Hitler Spende) to 10% for the chemical industry was based, it was explained that even the Trade Association itself had encountered very many difficulties on account of this, as a large number of firms in the chemical industry had submitted protests.

In view of the fact that Herr THEUSS was not acquainted with any further details, it was only arranged with him that he should comply with our request that a single original receipt be issued for the total amount of the receipts to be made out for our individual plants, which are to be regarded as certificates in dealing with local party organizations, and that the number of authenticated receipt copies required by us be made out.

2.) Preliminary discussion with Dr. UNGEWITTER.

Dr. UNGEWITTER as well as Oberregierungsrat Dr. KIRCHNER of the Employers' Association (Arbeitgeber-Verband) who was consulted by telephone, were both surprised about the ruling regarding the increase of the Adolf Hitler Fund imposed on the chemical industry. They had not been approached in this matter in any way. Only the Managing Director of the Trade Association, Dr. MARTIUS, once a long

(Page 2 of original)

time ago, gave a hint to Dr. UNGEWITTER, that the chemical industry should pay a higher rate particularly in respect of those groups whose wage proportion was very low. It was not intimated to Dr. UNGEWITTER on which basis a differentiation between high and low wage proportions should be made; nor did he ascertain any further details upon enquiry at the Reichsverband (Reich Association) until the new circular letter had been sent out.

3.) Meeting at the Reichs-Verband der Deutschen Industrie (Reich Association of German Industry).

Present: Dr. UNGEWITTER
Dr. C. DUISBURG
(Union of Employers' Association) Vereinigung der Arbeitgeber-Verbaende
Dr. ACHENBACH
Oberleutnant von der LINDE
(Union of Employers' Associations)
SCHAUKE (Part of the time)

Dr. ACHENBACH was asked for the reasons which lead to the fixing of the different rates. In this connection it was pointed out to him, - and this was also repeated many times in the course of the discussion - that the I.G. was actually immediately prepared to subscribe to the Adolf Hitler Fund within the framework of the first circular letter of the Reich Association of German Industry and that they, on account of their absolutely positive attitude to the whole matter, were naturally prepared to support this collection. It was only through the fixing of the new increased rate at 10% which had now ensued that there was a certain surprise in I.G. regarding what could be the basis for such a varied rate fixing and it would certainly be against the spirit and the purpose of this contribution if the free

attitude in this matter were to be rendered more difficult by such differentiations. In the course of the conversation, the following was ascertained:

1) The rates were fixed without consultation of the participating Associations as, in view of the necessity to act quickly, no progress would otherwise have been made. This excuse we expressed as unjustified. The

(Page 3 of original)

Industrie Ausschuss (Industrial Committee) of which Dr. KOETTGEN became president in agreement with the two Head Associations, did not meet in full but the matter was essentially deliberated between Dr. KOETTGEN, BRAUWEILER, Dr. ACHENLACH, HOFMANN as liaison man to the NSDAF, and Oberleutnant (Translator's Note: Word crossed out in original) von der LINDE. The Industrial Committee consisted of the following gentlemen:

Dr. KOETTGEN,	Chairman
Engineer PIETZSCH	Chemical Industry
Dr. FOENSGEN	Iron, Steel and Coal
Geh. Bergrat HILBER	Textiles.
Geh. Komm. Rat MITTELSTEN-SCHEID	

2) The difference in the rate was due to the fact that a number of industrial groups with exceptionally high wage proportions could only be induced to consent under the condition that these industrial groups whose wage proportion came to only 3 to 5% were made to participate at double the rate. To the question as to which industrial groups had such a low wage proportion, it was explained that apart from the cigarette industry, this applies amongst others also to the chemical industry.

We pointed out at this point that according to the investigation report, the chemical industry had, quite roughly estimated, a 24% wage proportion, that, however, as soon as one examines the conditions more closely, taking into consideration the total wage proportion in calculating the cost of the finished product from the first stage of production, coal, there is for dye-stuffs alone a wage proportion of 85% (proof of this is in possession of Dr. SCHWARZ, Ludwigshafen). However, even if one did not go so far, the wage proportion, as already mentioned in the investigation report, exceeds 20%. The gentlemen replied that they had acted from entirely different considerations and that they were already convinced of the necessity for a new scale of rates owing to the numerous protests received from firms in the chemical industry.

It was then considered to maintain a rate of 10% in respect of those groups of the chemical industry

(Page 4 of original)

whose wage proportion amounts to less than 15% of the production cost and to fix a rate of 5% in respect of all others.

For I.G., it was stated that they would accordingly also pay a rate of 5% as their wage proportion exceeds 15%; of course, I.G. was always prepared to pay immediately.

3) The gentlemen expressed their willingness - after the discussion with the gentlemen of the Industrial Committee to have a discussion based on this differentiation, with Dr. MARTIUS, of the Trade Association (Berufsgenossenschaft) together with Dr. UNGEWITTER on Monday. In this connection, they

pointed out particularly that they would, of course, not mention the name of our firm but wanted to arrange for an alteration of the rates in the suggested manner, in general, in view of the protests received by the groups of the Chemical Industry.

The gentlemen then tried to persuade us to pay at least the first installment at a rate of 10% which could subsequently be placed to our credit in respect of future payments. I declined to do so and declared that they should first bring the final ruling into effect on the basis of the proposal made by them and that they should inform the firms through the Trade Association. We would then pay immediately.

4) The gentlemen pointed out that of course, certain documentary proof would have to be submitted regarding the wage proportion. However, it was then pointed out that after all one could by no means use a voluntary donation for divulging cost calculations or even turnover figures. The statement by our firm in this connection would have to suffice. It was then suggested that the Trade Association could reserve the right to ask for such documentary proof in doubtful cases.

5) The paragraph contained in the circular letter according to which current arrangements have to be included in the new regulation is to

(Page 5 of original)

be interpreted that any payment obligations still liable for several months, are settled by this big contribution. Amounts already paid are not taken into consideration.

6) The object of the contribution is the support of the SA, in which to a certain extent the Stahlhelm will also participate. The ways and means for carrying this out were to be specially discussed between Herr SELDTE and the Reich Chancellor. Furthermore a certain amount is to be set aside for training purposes. The SA consists at present of 900,000 members, 500,000 of whom are unemployed. The main purpose of this contribution is to alleviate social distress in these circles. In this sense too we consider the contribution to be perfectly justified and absolutely necessary.

7) The urgency of the matter arises from the fact that by next Tuesday, the banks want to make a first installment of 3 million RM available, which sum would then be handed to the Reich Chancellor. In order to guarantee this 3 million RM, the Industrial Committee has approached the larger firms, among others, also us, with the request to execute indemnity bonds for the amount of the 2nd, 3rd and 4th installments, inasmuch as these installments, on the originally fixed dates, were not to be paid to the Trade Association but to the Deutsche Bank und Disconto-Gesellschaft who shall be authorized to grant a credit to the Industrial Committee for the amount of the 2nd, 3rd and 4th installments. For us, it is therefore only a question of pledging ourselves once again to pay the 2nd, 3rd and 4th installments to the Industrial Committee. It is only the place of payment which is changed. The amount of the guaranteed contribution and the payment dates remain the same.

The form will be submitted in the course of the day and may be completed after permission has been received from Geheimrat SCHMITZ.

(Signature) C. DUISBERG

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO. NL-3799
Cont'd

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

I, DOROTHEA L. GALEWSKI, M.P. NO. 34079, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document No. NL-3799.

DOROTHEA L. GALEWSKI
M.P. NO. 34079

END

VERBAND DEUTSCHER EISEN- UND STAHL-INDUSTRIELLER
und
FACHGRUPPE DER EISEN SCHAFFENDEN INDUSTRIE

(Association of German Iron and Steel Industrialists and specialists' Group of the Iron producing Industry)

Telegraphic address: Verdeuteisen
Telephone: B 1 Kurfuerst 9195

Journal No. 6359 V.
1072 Fa.

Ba./Nr.

13 October 1934

Circular Letter C.

To the
Members of the Northern German, etc. Group

Subject: Winter Relief work and National Socialist Public Welfare Organization
(Winterhilfswerk und NS-Volkswohlfahrt)

On 4th inst, the Supervisory Council (Kuratorium) of the Adolf Hitler Fund raised by the German Economy published a proclamation dealing with delinquent of the Adolf Hitler Fund as against the Winterhilfswerk (Winter Relief Work) and the NS-Volkswohlfahrt (National Social Public Welfare Organization). Enclosed, we are transmitting to you a copy of the announcement.

With German salute and Heil Hitler!

The Manager:

(signature) BAARE (acting)

Enclosure.

(Page 2 of original)

C O P Y

Enclosure to the circular letter
6359 V. 1072 Fa. v. 13.10. 1934

Adolf Hitler Fund raised by the German Economy

Supervisory Board

Berlin W 35, 4 October 1934
Tirpitzufer 44

Subject: Winterhilfswerk (Winter Relief Work) and NS-Volkswohlfahrt
(National Socialist Public Welfare Organization)

The beginning of the Winterhilfswerk being imminent, I feel prompted to make the announcement that collections for the Winterhilfswerk do not

fall under the prohibition of collections regarding the "Adolf Hitler Fund raised by the German Economy".

The following arrangement was made with reference to the NS-Volkswohlfahrt.

For plants which are in an unfavorable economic position and which are in possession of the certificate issued by the "Adolf Hitler Fund raised by the German Economy", the Management of the Supervisory Council (Kuratorium) can, upon request, extend the prohibition of collection applying to the "Adolf Hitler Fund raised by German Industry" also to the contribution projects of NSV (membership fees, sponsorships, etc.). In this manner, all further contributions of these firms to the NSV are covered.

For the duration of the Winterhilfe work, no special collections will be made for the NSV.

In the following service offices and institutions are once more listed for which the prohibition of collections regarding the "Adolf Hitler Fund raised by the German Economy", issued by his deputy, by order of the Fuehrer applies:

PO (Party Organization) of the NSDAP
SA
SS
NSKK (National Socialist motor Corps)
HJ (Hitler Youth organization)
Luftsportverband (German Air Sports Club)
Luftschutzbund (Air Raid Protection union)
Arbeitsfront (Labor Front) and NS-Gemeinschaft "Kraft durch Freude" (NS Community "Strength through Joy").
Nationalsozialistische Kriegsoffiziersversorgung (National League for Disabled War Veterans Benefit)
NS-Hago (National Socialist Organization of persons engaged in commerce and trade)
NS-Frauenenschaft (National Socialist Women's Organization)
Nationalsozialistischer Frontkämpferbund (National Socialist War Veterans' Association)
NSV (National Socialist Public Welfare Organization), see above settlement.

The Chairman of the Supervisory Council
signed (typed): Dr. Krupp von Bohlen
und Halbach

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

I, Hertha C. KRUETH, AGO No. X-046355, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages, and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document No. NL-585.

HERTHA C. KRUETH,
U.S. Civilian
AGO No. X-046355

(E N D)

"Adolf-Hitler-Spende der deutschen Wirtschaft"
(Adolf-Hitler Fund of the German Economy)
Board of Trustees

(Translator's Note:
Receipt Stamp:
Private Secretariat
Received: 9 Dec. 1939

Berlin NW 27, Lessingstrasse 1

To:
Dr. Krupp von BOHLEN and HALBACH

Bank Account: Dresdner Bank
Dep. Account 36
Berlin W 50
Hardenbergstrasse 29 A-E
Account: Board of Trustees of the
Adolf-Hitler Fund of the
German Economy

Post Check Account: Berlin 40300
Board of Trustees of the Adolf
Hitler Fund of the German
Economy
Telephone: 399614, 399615

Your Ref.	Your Letter of	Our Ref.	Date.
		He/Re	6 December 1939

Re: Financing.

Dear Dr. KRUPP von BOHLEN und HALBACH!

With reference to our telephone conversation, I am herewith sending you a copy of my letter of today's date to Reichsleiter BORMANN for your information.

(Translator's Note: Stamp
Answered: 11 December 1939

Heil Hitler!

Yours very truly,

(Signature) ACHENBACH

To
Reichsleiter M. BORMANN
At Present
Berlin W 6
Wilhelmstrasse 64

Dr. Ah/He/Re 6 December 1939

Re: Finances

Dear Reichsleiter BORMANN!

I beg to refer to our conversation of 29 ult. which took place in the presence of Dr. KRUPP von BOHLEN und HALBACH. In the meantime the second

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO. NL-2912
Cont'd

installment of the "Adolf-Hitler-Fund" of the German Economy" can be considered as closed. It is possible to see that as far as can be determined, it will be possible to make the contributions planned by Dr. KNUFF von BOHLEN und HALPACH in the amount estimated. Therefore, the remittances of the "Adolf-Hitler-Fund of the German Economy" can be made in the following amounts:

Basic amount	RM 2.5 Mill.
additional amount	RM 1.5 Mill.
minus one-third	<u>RM 0.5 "</u>
remains	<u>RM 1 Mill.</u>
so that a total amount of	<u>RM 3.5 Mill.</u>

can be remitted per month instead of RM 4 Millions as formerly.

I will have the unpaid sums as soon as liquid assets are available for the months of October / November, amounting to RM 1 Million, transferred. A final review of the financing of the "Adolf-Hitler-Fund of the German Economy" will only be possible at the end of March or the beginning of April of the next year.

Heil Hitler!

(Signed) DR. ACHENBACH

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

I, DOROTHEA L. GALEWSKI, M.P. NO. 34079, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document No. NL-2912

DOROTHEA L. GALEWSKI
M.P. NO. 34079

END

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT No. NI-4056
OFFICE OF CHIEF OF COUNSEL FOR WAR CRIMES

Z.A.-Office

October 1944

I.G. Payments for the Adolf Hitler Fund raised by the German

Economy

(Handwritten correction)

1933/34	RM. 924.142.--
1934/35	RM. 693.107.--
1935/36	RM. 578.983.--
1936/37	RM. 671.874.--
1937/38	RM. 753.479.--
1938/39	RM. 849.358.--
1939/40	RM. 1,003.038.--
1940/41	RM. 1,121.135.--
1941/42	RM. 1,208.539.--
1942/43	RM. 1,295.128.--
1943/44	RM. 1,454.044.--
1944/45	RM. 1,525.608.--
	RM. 1,619.028.--

In each case, 3⁰/oo was collected on the total of wages and salaries of the preceding year. In 1933/34, a single contribution was raised of 5⁰/oo of the wages and salaries total. Subsequently this rate was reduced to 3⁰/oo, and one quarter of the amount paid in 1933/34 was credited against the contribution for 1934/35.

In our payments are included:

Ammoniakwerk (Ammonia Plant) Merseburg G.m.b.H.	<u>Leuna Werke</u>
Duna Werke G.m.b.H. (Duna Plant)	<u>Schkopau</u>
"Griesogen" Griesheimer Autogen-Verkaufs-G.m.b.H.	<u>Ffm.-Griesheim</u>
Luranil Baugesellschaft m.b.H.	<u>Ludwigshafen a.Rh.</u>
Muehlhauser Chemische Werke G.m.b.H.	<u>Muehlhausen (Alsaac)</u>
Ostmaerkische Pflanzenschutz G.m.b.H.	<u>Vienna</u>
"Pallas" G.m.b.H. Konzernversicherung	<u>Frankfort (Main)</u>
Serotherapeutisches Institut G.m.b.H. (Serum-therapeutics Institute)	<u>Vienna</u>

All other firms of the Konzern make their contributions themselves

(Page 2 of the original)

(handwritten remark: 27.6)

ADOLF HITLER FUND RAISED BY THE GERMAN ECONOMY

A No. 003552

The firm of
I.G. Farbenindustrie Akt. Ges.
including the Ammoniakwerk Mersburg G.m.b.H.

is participating in the "Adolf Hitler Fund raised by the
German Economy" with an amount of

NINE HUNDRED AND TWENTY-FOUR THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED AND FORTY-
TWO REICHSMARK.

Berlin, June
1933

The raising of money from the holder of
this certificate is forbidden by the
Party Directorate of the NSDAP to all
members, service offices and institutions
of the NSDAP.

(signature) Krueger

Supervisory Council
(Kuratorium)

(2 signatures) illegible

(Official stamp:)

(6 signatures) illegible

Liaison Staff of the NSDAP
-Berlin-

Reich printing office

(Page 3 of the original)

ADOLF HITLER FUND RAISED BY THE GERMAN ECONOMY

Certificate
D No. 023298

The firm of I.G. Farbenindustrie A.G.
Frankfurt (Main)
with all plants and sales offices, including
the Ammoniakwerk Mersburg G.m.b.H.

has participated in the "Adolf Hitler Fund raised by the
German Economy" with an amount of

FIVE HUNDRED SEVENTY-EIGHT THOUSAND AND NINE HUNDRED EIGHTY-
ONE REICHSMARK.

Berlin, June
1934

The raising of money from the holder of
this certificate is forbidden by the Party
Directorate of the NSDAP if the holder of
this certificate can produce the correspond-
ing receipts (see prohibition of collec-
tions).

(signature) Krueger

Supervisory Council
(Kuratorium)

(signature) illegible

(Official stamp)

(8 signatures) illegible

Liaison Staff of the NSDAP
-Berlin-

Reich printing office

(Page 4 of original)

(stamp): : Z.A. Duero No. E.26/7 :

BERUFGENOSSENSCHAFT DER CHEMISCHEN INDUSTRIE
(Employers Professional Liability Insurance Association
for the chemical industry)
(Reichsunfallversicherung)
(National insurance against industrial accidents)

Telephone: B 2 Luetzow 5073, 5074, 5173
Telegraph Address: "Alchimie"
Postal Checking Account: Berlin No. 79546.

Reference Number: 70811 pp.

(Please indicate in your letters to us)
HU./ K.

Berlin W.35,
24 July 1935.
Sigismundstrasse 3.

I.G. Farbenindustrie Aktiengesellschaft
Z.A.- Duero

Gentlemen:

Frankfurt (Main) 20
Grueneburgplatz

Subject: Adolf-Hitler Fund raised by the German Economy.

On behalf of the Supervisory Council (Kuratorium) of
the Adolf Hitler Fund raised by the German Economy and referring to
your letter of 20 June of this year we are expressing our best
thanks for your participation in the drive for the year of 1935/36.
As contribution to the fund in the 3rd year of the drive we have
recorded

RM 671 874.-

and at the same time we are acknowledging the receipt of the first
installment in the amount of RM 167 968.50.

Because posters (Plaketten) are distributed this year
together with the contribution receipts and because these, in turn,
are valid only in conjunction with the contribution receipts, we
were unable to follow our usual practice of sending one contribution
receipt and 80 copies to you. Enclosed we are sending to you 81
contribution receipts and posters which are intended for your central
office and for all plants and branches. We ask that you take care
of distributing them further and are

Heil Hitler!
Berufsgenossenschaft der Chemischen
Industrie
The Management
(signature) illegible

(Two initials illegible)

(Page 5 of original)

(Stamp) Z.A.-Buero 13 July 1936

BERUFGSGENOSSENSCHAFT DER CHEMISCHEN INDUSTRIE
(Employers Professional Liability Insurance Association
for the chemical industry)

(Reichsunfallversicherung)
(National Insurance against Industrial Accidents)

Telephone: B 2 Lutzow 5073, 5074, 5173
Postal Checking Account: Berlin No. 79546
Telegraph Address: "Chemie"

Reference Number: 70611 pp.
(Please indicate, in your letters,)

Berlin, 7.35,
10 July 1936
Sigismundstrasse 3.

I.G. Farbenindustrie Aktiengesellschaft,
Z.A. Buero

Gentlemen:

Frankfurt (Main)
Gruenburgerplatz.

Subject: Adolf-Hitler Fund raised by the German Economy 1936/7.

We have received your letter of 23 June of this year and wish to express on behalf of the Supervisory Council (Kuratorium) of the Adolf Hitler Fund Raised by the German Economy our best thanks for your participation in the fourth year of the drive. For the period of 1 June 1936 until 31 May 1937 we have recorded a contribution of

RM 753.479.-

and at the same time we wish to acknowledge the receipt of the first installment in the amount of

(initial
illegible)

RM 188.369,75.

On the assumption that this year you will need the same number of contribution certificates as last year, we are sending to you enclosed 101 contribution certificates and the gummed posters which pertain to them and which are intended for your central office and for all of your plants and branches. We are, Gentlemen,

Heil Hitler!
Berufsgenossenschaft der chemischen
Industrie
The Management
(signature) illegible

/Enclosures.

(Page 6 of original)

(Stamp) Z.A. Buero 17 July 1937

BERUFGESAMENSCHAFT DER CHEMISCHEN INDUSTRIE
(Employers Professional Liability Insurance Association
for the chemical industry)

Ta. (Reichsunfallversicherung)
(National Insurance against Industrial Accidents)

Telephone: Trunk line Number 22 88 36
Telegraph-Address: "Alchimie"
Postal Checking Account: Berlin No. 795 46.

Reference Number: 70 811 pp:
(Please indicate in your letters)

Berlin, W.35,
15-July 1937-
Sigismundstrasse 3.
(Transl's note) Handwritten, corrected
19 July 1937

I.G. Farbenindustrie Aktiengesellschaft
Z.A. - Office

Gentlemen:

Frankfurt (Main) 20
Grueneburgplatz

Subject: Adolf Hitler Fund raised by the German Economy 1937/38.

We received your letter of 25 June 1937 and in behalf of the Supervisory Council (Kuratorium) of the Adolf Hitler Fund raised by the German Economy we wish to express our best thanks for your participation in the fifth year of the drive. For the period of 1. June 1937 until 31 May 1938 we have recorded

RM 849.358.--

as a contribution and we acknowledge at the same time the receipt of the first installment in the amount of

(initial
illegible)

RM 212.339,50.

As per your request you are receiving 110 contribution certificates and posters for distribution to your plants and branches.

Heil Hitler!
Berufsgenossenschaft der chemischen
Industrie
The Management:
(signature) illegible.

(Page 7 of original)

BERUFGENOSSENSCHAFT DER CHEMISCHEN INDUSTRIE
(Employers Professional Liability Insurance Association
for the chemical industry)

(Reichsunfallversicherung)
(National Insurance against Industrial Accidents)

Telephone: Trunk line Number 22 88 36
Telegraph-Address: "Alchimie"
Postal Checking Account: Berlin No. 795 46.

Reference Number: 70 311 pp.
(Please indicate in your letters)

(Transl's note: Illegible
initial)

Berlin W 35,
4 July 1938
Sigismundstrasse 3

I.G. Farbenindustrie Akt.-Ges.
Z.A. Office

Frankfurt/ Main 20
Grueneburgplatz

Registered Letter!

Gentlemen:

Subject: Adolf Hitler Fund raised by the German Economy 1938/39.

We have received your letter of the 20 inst. and on be-
half Supervisory Council (Kuratorium) of the Adolf Hitler Fund
raised by the German Economy we wish to express our best thanks for
your participation in the 6th year of the drive. As a contribution
for the period of 1 June 1938 until 31 June 1939 we recorded

RM 1 003 038.-

and we acknowledge at the same time the receipt of the first install-
ment in the amount of

RM 250 759,50.

In compliance with your request you are receiving 130
contribution certificates and posters for distribution to your
plants and branches (H Nr. 164 309 - 164 438).

Berufsgenossenschaft der chemischen Industrie

The Management :

(signature)

illegible.

2 initials (illegible)

(Page 8 of original)

(Stamp) Z.A. Office 11 July 1939

BERUFGESSENENSCHAFT DER CHEMISCHEN INDUSTRIE
(Employers Professional Liability Insurance Association
for the chemical industry)

Telephone: Trunk line Number 22 88 36
Telegraph-Address: "Alchimie"
Postal Checking Account: Berlin No. 79546

Reference Number: 70 811

(Please indicate in your letters)

Berlin W.35, 6 July 1939
Sigismundstrasse 3

I.G. Farbenindustrie A.G.

Registered Letter:

Frankfurt/Main 20
Grueneburgplatz

Gentlemen:

Subject: Adolf Hitler Fund raised by the German Economy.

We have received your letter of 22 inst.- Z.A. Bureau- and wish to express on behalf of the Supervisory Council (Kuratorium) of the Adolf Hitler Fund raised by the German Economy our best thanks for your participation in the seventh year of the drive.

As a contribution for the period of 1 June 1939 to 31 May 1940 we have recorded

RM 1 121 135,-

and we acknowledge at the same time the receipt of the first installment in the amount of

RM 280 283,75.

According to your wishes you are receiving herewith 130 contribution certificates and posters for distribution to your plants and branches.

Berufsgenossenschaft der chemischen
Industrie
The Management:
(signature) BOLLE

2 initials illegible.

(Page 2 of original)

(Stamp) Z.A. Duero 10 July 1940

BERUFGESOSSENSCHAFT DER CHEMISCHEN INDUSTRIE
(Employers Professional Liability Insurance Association
for the chemical industry)

(Reichsunfallversicherung)
(National Insurance against Industrial Accidents)

Telephone: Trunk line Number 83 70 11
Telegraph Address: "Chemieruf"
Postal Checking Account: Berlin No. 795 46

Reference Number: 70611 K.
(Please indicate in your letters)

Berlin-Wilmersdorf 1,
8 July 1940
Johannisberger Strasse 38/39

Gr.

Registered letter!

I.G. Farbenindustrie Aktiengesellschaft
Frankfurt/Main 20
Gruenburgerplatz

Gentlemen:

Subject: Adolf Hitler Fund raised by the German Economy.

We have received your letter of the 1. inst. -Z.A. Fuero- and wish to express on behalf of the Supervisory Council of the Adolf Hitler Fund raised by the German Economy our best thanks for your participation in the eighth year of the drive.

As a contribution for the period of 1 June 1940 to 31 May 1941 we have recorded . . .

RM 1,206,539.--

and acknowledge at the same time the receipt of the first installment in the amount of

RM 301.635.--

According to your wishes you are receiving herewith 150 contribution certificates and posters for distribution to your plants and branches.

(Translator's note) Handwritten remark: 150 Posters
150 contribution certificates

Berufsgenossenschaft der chemischen
Industrie
The Management:

(signature) Illegible

(Illegible initial)

I, HERTHA C. KNUTH, AGO X-046355, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document No. NI-4056.

HERTHA C. KNUTH,
U.S. Civilian,
AGO X-046355.

END

-9-

19

R E P O R T

of 92nd meeting of the Working Committee (Arbeits-Ausschuss) on Friday
21 June 1935, 15.00 hours in the Administration Building,
Frankfurt a. Main
- - - - -

PRESENT: Members as in enclosure.

Geheimrat SCHMITZ opened the meeting at 15.20 hours

.....
(Page 1, Paragraph 6, of original):

The Central Committee (Zentralausschuss) approved a few contributions, among them a Carl Duisberg Foundation of the Association of German Chemists (Carl Duisberg Stiftung des Vereins Deutscher Chemiker) for an amount of RM. 20,000.--; further the Adolf Hitler Fund of the German Economy (Adolf Hitler Spende der Deutschen Wirtschaft).

.....
(Page 6 of original)

Enclosure

L I S T

of those participating in the 92nd meeting of the Working Committee (Arbeits-Ausschuss) on Friday, 21 June 1935, at 3 p.m., in the Administration Building, Frankfurt a. Main

From the Aufsichtsrat:

von RATH
HAUSER

from the Verwaltungsrat:

Dr. C. von WEINBERG
Geheimrat Dr. SCHUON
Dr. von SIMSON
Geheimrat Dr. A. von WEINBERG
Dr. KREBSLER
Dr. KALLE

from the Working Committee:

Geheimrat Dr. SCHMITZ, Chairman
Dr. BUNTEFISCH
Dr. GAJEWSKI
Dr. HERMANN
Dr. HOERLEIN
Dr. KRAUCH
Dr. KUHNKE
W. R. MANN
Dr. ter MEER
OTTO
PISTOR
WEBER-ANDREAS
DENCNER

TRANSLATION OF EXTRACTS OF DOCUMENT No NI-
No. NI-4863 (Cont'd)

in addition: HANSER
WEISS

Minutes taken by: DUISBERG

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

I, DOROTHEA L. GALEWSKI, M.P. No. 34079, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document No. NI-4863.

DOROTHEA L. GALEWSKI
M.P. No. 34079

(E N D)

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT No. NI-4865
OFFICE OF CHIEF OF COUNSEL FOR WAR CRIMES

Card index
finished

Received
29 June 1937 145/11

MINUTES

of the 103rd meeting of the working committee
at the Lurhotel Petersburg, Thursday, 24 June
1937, 3 P.M.

(Initial)

The appended list bears the names of all gentlemen present. Geheimrat Schmitz opens the meeting at 3:25.

First of all Dr. von Anierien gives a report on point 2
on the agenda:

Committee on Patents and Legal Division. Report v. Anierien
He describes what the consequences of the supplementary stock law will mean to I.G., next year. At present, provisions for its execution are being worked out. In addition, a supplementary law to the G.N.B.R. law is now in preparation. It is intended to hold discussions on the extension of protection of patents.

Once again the patent divisions of I.G. can report an increase in the number of new applications, registered. Costs are maintained in proportion to the increase.

on the
Point 3/agenda:

Impressions of America. Report v. Schnitzler
Dr. von Schnitzler gives an account of impressions gleaned from his latest trip to America. Economic conditions are favorable from all angles. It seems, however, that leading business men are not favorably disposed towards the President.

Foreign trade relations between Germany and America are confined to a minimum in consequence of the American tariff policy and there are, at present, no prospects for any change.

I.G. relations with Dupont have been further strengthened. In contrast to Dupont, whose field of activity has undergone tremendous expansion, the Allied Chemical can record no progress.

(page 2 of original)

- 4 -

The foreign exchange situation has given rise to difficulties in several European countries.

Subsequently, Geheimrat Schmitz gives an account of the growth, both of the turnover and the staff for the first six months of 1937.

Point 9 on the agenda:

Credits voted by the Technical Committee. Report for Beer
Credits that were discussed and voted for by the Technical Committee amounted to RM 51,842,754.- - of which 42,344,250.- were in amounts in excess of 100,000 marks - and RM 24,399,665.- for the Kunawerk Schkopau - of which 23,063,775.- were in amounts in excess of 100,000 marks.

Point 1 on the agenda:

Central Committee.

Report Schmitz

a) Geheimrat Schmitz reports on the proceedings in the Central Committee.

In Central Germany plans are under way for the re-adjustment of the coal price clearing system (Kohlenpreisverrechnung). A special discussion of this matter with Bitterfeld will take place.

b) Herr Jencker discusses deposit accounts with reference to the new legislation. With regard to the keeping of accounts held by employees abroad, special request is to be submitted. As for all other deposit accounts, it has been decided that payment of interest will be discontinued with effect from 1 July. Geheimrat Schmitz and Professor Selck will take the necessary additional measures.

c) Geheimrat Schmitz thereupon gives an account of a discussion with the press representatives.

d) The Central Committee, in addition, resolved the following:

- 1) The authority of Herr Gustav Krestel, Department Oil, was extended to include the Ammoniakwerk Merseburg, G.m.b.H.
- 2) The following donations were approved:
Adolf Hitler donation RM 849,358.-
Foundation: "People and Reich", in addition to the annual contribution, to be paid but once - RM 5,000.-
Deutsche Herderhochschule Riga RM 5,000.-
Deutsche Schule Kobe Yen 5,000.- = RM 3,500.-

(page 3 of original)

- 6 -

LIST

of names of the gentlemen present at the 103rd
meeting of the working committee on Thursday,
24 June 1937, at 3 P.M.

Aufsichtsrat members:

Geheimrat Dr. Haeuser
Dr. vom Rath
Geheimrat Dr. Arthur von Weinberg
Dr. Carl von Weinberg

Verwaltungsrat members:

Geheimrat Professor Dr. Bosch
Dr. Kalle
Geheimrat Dr. Schuon
Dr. von Simon

Members of Working Committee:

Geheimrat Dr. Schmitz	chairman
Dr. Brueggemann	
Dr. Buetefisch	
Dr. Buhl	
Dencker	
Dr. Gajewski	
Dr. Gaus	
Dr. Hermann	
Dr. Hoerlein	
Dr. Ilgner	
Dr. von Inieriem	
Dr. Kuehne	
Kann	
Dr. ter Meer	
Dr. Oster	
Otto	
Dr. Ristor	
Dr. Scharf	
Dr. Schneider	
Dr. von Schnitzler	
Professor Selck	
Waibel	
Weber-Andreac	
Haeffliger	
Kuehlon	
Dr. Paul Mueller	
Dr. Seidel	

Official recorder of proceedings:

Duisberg

"and"

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT No. NI-4865
CONTINUED

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

I, Ursula Rudmann # 20130, hereby certify that
I am thoroughly conversant with the English and
German languages and that the above is a true
and correct translation of document No. NI-4865.

Muenberg, 23 May 1947

URSULA RUDMANN
20130

AFFIDAVIT

1. I, Hermann Bessler, Chief of Office of Central Committee of I. G. Farbenindustrie Aktiengesellschaft from 1931 to 1945, domiciled at 41 Gutleutstr, Frankfurt/Main, after having been warned that I shall be liable to punishment for making a false statement, herewith state the following under oath of my own free will and without coercion:

2. The contributions of I. G. Farbenindustrie to National Socialist organizations and organizations connected with the National Socialist party, and payments for special purposes listed in pp 1 - 31 of the appendix, are recorded in the following documents, amounts listed having been copied from those documents:

a. Cards of a contribution card index, kept in the office of the Central Committee. On these cards were entered all payments made by I. G. including all factories, branches and some affiliated firms showing in each case amount paid, date and sometimes details of purpose

These entries were based on the carbon copies of payment-orders of the Office of the Central Committee and monthly returns of payments of contributions and membership fees submitted to the Office of the Central Committee by the accounts departments of the factories and sales departments of the I. G. The letters which appear on the cards under the heading "Werk" (plant) refer to the factory making the payment. Key to letters:

(Page 2 of original)

A	Berlin SO 36
B	Frankfurt a.M.
C	Wolfen Filmfabrik
D	Hoechst
E	Leverkusen
F	Ludwigshafen
G	Uerdingen
H	Marseburg
J	Biebrich
K	Griesheim
L	Mainkur
M	Offenbach
N	Wolfen Farbenfabrik
O	Rheinfelden
P	Bitterfeld
Q	Berlin NW 7
R	Auschwitz
S	Heydebreck
T	Schkopau
Z	Office of Central Committee

b. Carbon copies of payment-orders given to the banking department by the Office of the Central Committee for payment of contributions.

3. The contribution cards and carbon copies of payment-orders mentioned under a. and b. were kept at the Office of Central Committee and were transferred at the end of the war to the Records Building of I. G. Farben Control Office at Frankfurt/Main - Griesheim.

4. Following are the enclosures attached to this affidavit:

Enclosures: Contributions of I. G. Farbenindustrie Aktiengesellschaft to:

- (1) Adolf Hitler Fund of German Economy
- (2) NSDAP Political Organization/Political Direction
- (3) NSDAP Adolf Hitler Birthday Fund, Fund for Victims of Industrial Accidents, etc.
- (4) NSDAP SS
- (5) NSDAP SA
- (6) NSDAP Union of German Girls,
Hitler Youth,
Junior Hitler Youth
- (7) NSDAP NS Women's League

(Page 3 of original)

Enclosure: Contributions of I. G. Farbenindustrie Aktiengesellschaft to:

- (8) German Flying Club and NS Flying Corps
- (9) NS Motor Vehicle Corps (Motor - SA)
- (10) NS Union of Teachers
NS Union of German Students
NS Union of Lawyers
NS Union of German Doctors
- (11) NS Union of German Technicians and House of German Technology
- (12) NSV (NS Social Welfare)
- (13) NSKOV (NS War Victims Assistance Fund)
- (14) NS Society for the Promotion of Culture
- (15) Funds "Race and Reich"
"Sauckel Fund"
Fund Bruno Mussolini
- (16) Reich Labor Service (gratitude for labor service and labor service camp)
- (17) NSDAP - NS Factory Cell Organization
German Labor Front
- (18) NS Association Strength through Joy
- (19) Academy of German Law
- (20) German Academy, Munich
- (21) House of German Art
- (22) German Union of Veterans (Steel Helmet)
Light Infantry Corps
- (23) NS Organization for Crafts Commerce and Trades and
NS Institute for the Estate System
- (24) NS Assistance Union for Hesse-Nassau
NSZ - Rheinfrost (Newspaper)
Hermann Goering - House in Saxony
- (25) Preparation for the Reichstag Elections 1938
- (26) Society for Promotion of German Industry
- (27) NSDAP - Abroad
- (28) Union of German Schools Abroad
- (29) National Union of Germans Abroad
- (30) Winter Aid Scheme
- (31) General survey of contributions and payments listed in pp. 1 - 30 of enclosures.

(Page 4 of original)

5. Although practically all payments made by the I. G. Farbenindustrie for the purposes mentioned are to the best of my knowledge contained in this list, there is a possibility that some payments have not been entered, so that the total sum of amounts paid by the I. G. for such purposes may exceed the sums here listed; lacunae are particularly likely in the list of payments for 1944 because, owing to wartime conditions, accounts departments no longer submitted all their returns.

6. Apart from the payments to German organizations abroad listed separately in enclosure 27 - 29, a few smaller sums paid to organizations abroad are contained in the other lists: these, however, are not listed separately but are contained in the totals.

7. The following details deserve mention:

Ad Enclosure 2: All payments to the NSDAP and organizations affiliated thereto are contained in the figures for 1933. From 1934 onward these payments were listed on the cards of the respective recipients.

Ad Enclosure 8: German Flying Club - About 1937 the club changed its name to NS Flying Corps. Payments in subsequent years are listed under that name.

Ad Enclosure 20: The aims are described on the card in accordance with the statutes of the Society as follows:

Scientific investigation of Germandom in all its cultural manifestations and practical assistance of the cultural development of Germandom abroad.

Ad Enclosure 24: Two payments for NS-Rheinfront of RM 1500.-- and RM 7000.-- are listed.

(Page 5 of original)

The first sum of RM 1500.-- was paid as far as I know for advertisements, the second, of RM 7000.-- for books purchased from the publishers of NS Newspaper-Rheinfront.

Ad Enclosure 29: The National Union for Germans Abroad was formerly called Association of Germans Abroad. Its aim is quoted on the card in accordance with the statutes of the association, as follows: Preservation and Encouragement of Germandom abroad.

On the card Frontier Library Service and Education Scheme, registered Union, Berlin, the following is listed as aim: To preserve and cultivate German life and culture (deutsche Art und deutsches Wesen) not only within the boundaries of the Reich, but wherever the German language is spoken.

Ad Enclosure 30: Payments for the Winter Aid Help were made from 1 October of any given year to 30 March of the following year.

I have compared the figures contained in the originals used with the figures listed in enclosures 1 - 31, being pages 6 - 41 of this affidavit, and have convinced myself that they agree.

Enclosure No. 1

Contributions made by the I.G. Farben Industrie A.G.

to

the Adolf Hitler Fund for German Industry

(Adolf Hitler Spende der Deutschen Wirtschaft)

1933	RM 697,071.38
1934	435,095.58
1935	649,301.00
1936	735,011.25
1937	850,694.29
1938	990,839.41
1939	1,122,476.79
1940	915,537.84
1941	1,364,233.40
1942	1,445,797.70
1943	1,927,211.45
1944	1,619,819.00
Total	RM 12,693,089.09

The figures are taken from the .2. . cards marked ...NSDAP.....
 Adolf Hitler Fund for German Industry (Adolf Hitler Spende der Deutschen
 Wirtschaft) contained in the "Contributions" card index in the office of the
 Central Committee (ZA Office) described in more detail in Paragraph 2a of this
 statement (P. 1).

(Page 7 of original)

Enclosure No. 2

Contributions made by the I.G. Farben Industrie A.G.

to

NSDAP

1933

RM 55,994.92

NSDAP Political Organization
 (NSDAP Politisch Organisation)

1934	RM 142,133.34
1935	29,779.37
1936	37,500.57
1937	23,149.59
1938 entered on card <u>Political Direction</u> from June 1938 onwards	53,358.07
1939	110,028.21
1940	78,529.02
1941	25,342.65
1942	8,426.16
1943	6,802.28
1944	<u>10,480.98</u>
Total	RM 581,525.16

The figures are taken from the .14 . cards marked NSDAP and NSDAP...
 Political Organization or Political Direction (NSDAP Politisch Organisation)
 contained in the "Contributions" card index in the office of the Central
 Committee (ZA Office) described in more detail in Paragraph 2a of this state-
 ment (P. 1).

(Page 8 of original)

Enclosure No. 3

Contributions made by the I.G. Farben Industrie A.G.

to

NSDAP Funds

(Adolf Hitler Birthday Fund, Fund for Victims of Industrial
 Accidents and others)

(Geburtstagspende Adolf Hitler Spende "Opfer der Arbeit", u.a.)

1933	RM 44,528.00
1935	375.00
1937	59.70

NSDAP Fuehrer's Birthday Fund

(NSDAP Geburtstagsspende des Fuehrers)

1942	RM	10,000.00
1943		<u>471.45</u>
Total	RM	55,434.15

The figures are taken from the ...2. cards marked...NSDAP.Fund.....
 and NSDAP.Fuehrer's.Birthday.Fund.(NSDAP Geburtstagsspende des Fuehrers)
 contained in the "Contributions" card index in the office of the Central
 Committee (ZA Office) described in more detail in Paragraph 2a of this
 statement (P. 1).

(Page 9 of original)

Enclosure No. 4

Contributions made by the I.G. Farben Industrie A.G.

to

NSDAP, S.S.

1934	RM	61,515.43
1935		55,316.00
1936		64,019.00
1937		76,998.70
1938		82,935.00
1939		85,555.35
1940		24,000.00
1941		30,630.00
1942		23,810.78
1943		6,816.00
1944		<u>500.00</u>
Total	RM	512,096.26

The figures are taken from the 9 cards marked NSDAP, S.S. contained in
 the "Contributions" card index in the office of the Central Committee (ZA
 Office) described in more detail in Paragraph 2a of this statement (P. 1).

(Page 10 of original)

Enclosure No. 5

Contributions made by the I.G. Farben Industrie A.G.

to

NSDAP S.A.

1934	RM	74,224.05
1935		29,446.46
1936		37,314.50
1937		30,862.80
1938		33,237.06
1939		21,706.41
1940		7,806.00
1941		1,518.84
1942		435.00
1943		732.00
1944		700.00

NSDAP, S.A. (Frankfurt on Main)

1941	RM	8,500.00
1942		6,600.00
1943		5,100.00

Total RM 258,183.12

The figures are taken from the 9 cards marked NSDAP, S.A. and NSDAP S.A. (Frankfurt on Main) contained in the "Contributions" card index in the office of the Central Committee (ZA Office) described in more detail in Paragraph 2a of this statement (P.1).

(Page 11 of original)

Enclosure No. 6

Contributions made by the I.G. Farben Industrie A.G.

to

NSDAP, Union of German Girls

(NSDAP, Bund Deutscher Maedchen)

1934	RM	209.00
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TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO.
 NI-9200 Cont'd

1935	RM 550.00
1936	372.00
1937	2,372.00
1938	1,912.00
1939	2,024.00
1940	50.00
1941	222.00
1942	70.00

NSDAP Hitler Youth
(NSDAP Hitlerjugend)

1934	11,463.40
1935	11,036.45
1936	19,894.52
1937	41,039.87
1938	36,952.97
1939	24,725.51
1940	9,109.20
1941	899.80
1942	3,061.50
1943	203.00

NSDAP Junior Hitler Youth
(NSDAP Jungvolk)

1934	733.15
1935	619.00

Carried over RM167,519.37

(Page 12 of original)

Funds: NSDAP Junior Hitler Youth (NSDAP
Jungvolk Continued

Union of German Girls (Bund Deutscher
 Maedchen)

Hitler Youth (Hitlerjugend)

Carried over RM 167,519.37

1936	787.00
1937	35.00
1938	579.00

1939		103.00
1942		<u>2.00</u>
	Total	RM 169,025.37

The figures are taken from the 8 cards marked NSDAP Union of German Girls (Bund Deutscher Maedchen) NSDAP Hitler Youth (Hitlerjugend) and NSDAP Junior Hitler Youth (Jungvolk) contained in the "Contributions" card index in the office of the Central Committee (ZA Office) described in more detail in Paragraph 2a of this statement (P. 1).

(Page 13 of original)

Enclosure No. 7

Contributions made by the I.G. Farben Industrie A.G.

to

The National Socialist Women's League

(NS Frauenschaft)

1934	RM	571.00
1935		299.50
1936		253.00
1937		499.80
1938		2,180.00
1939		5,685.45
1940		1,484.00
1941		1,946.00
1942		1,283.00
1943		2,079.00
1944		<u>965.00</u>
	Total	RM 17,245.75

The figures are taken from the 3 cards marked National Socialist Women's League (NS Frauenschaft) contained in the "Contributions" card index in the office of the Central Committee (ZA Office) described in more detail in Paragraph 2a of this statement. (P. 1).

(Page 14 of original)

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO.
NI-9200 Cont'd

Enclosure No. 8

Contributions made by the I.G. Farben Industrie A.G.

to

The German Flying Club

(Deutscher Luftsportverband)

1933	RM	14,173.00
1934		42,752.45
1935		221,931.60
1936		16,801.30

National Socialist Flying Corps
(NS Fliegerkorps)

1937 (National Socialist Flying Corps from June)		10,609.00
1938		258,526.00
1939		55,203.00
1940		3,355.00
1941		3,328.00
1942		5,060.80
1943		6,691.72
1944		1,257.00

Total RM 639,708.87

The figures are taken from the 8 cards marked German Flying Club (Deutscher Luftsportverband) and National Socialist Flying Corps (NS Fliegerkorps) contained in the "Contributions" card index in the office of the Central Committee (ZA Office) described in more detail in Paragraph 2a of this statement. (P. 1).

(Page 15 of original)

Enclosure No. 9

Contributions made by the I.G. Farben Industrie A.G.

to

the National Socialist Motor Vehicle Corps (Motor S.A.)

(NS Kraftfahrerkorps (Motor S.A.))

1934	RM	8,818.00
1935		10,983.40

1936	19,288.00
1937	9,828.10
1938	8,086.00
1939	5,323.00
1940	3,367.50
1941	2,335.00
1942	1,870.00
1943	1,542.80
1944	<u>131.00</u>
Total	RM 71,572.80

The figures are taken from the 4 cards marked NSDAP National Socialist Motor Vehicle Corps (Motor S.-A.) (NS Kraftfahrerkorps (Motor S.-A.) or NSDAP National Socialist Motor Vehicle Corps contained in the "Contributions" card index in the office of the Central Committee (ZA Office) described in more detail in Paragraph 2a of this statement. (P. 1).

(Page 16 of original)

Enclosure No. 10

Contributions made by I.G. Farben Industrie A.G.

to the

National Socialist Union of Teachers
(NS Lehrerbund)

National Socialist Union of German Students
(NS Deutscher Studentenbund)

National Socialist Union of Lawyers
(NS Rechtswahrerbund)

National Socialist Union of German Doctors
(NS Deutscher Aerztebund)

National Socialist Union of Teachers:

1941	RM	35.00
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National Socialist Union of German Students:

1935	300.00
------	--------

1938	200.00
------	--------

National Socialist Union of Lawyers:

1937	36.00
------	-------

1938	100.00
------	--------

National Socialist Union of German Doctors:

1937	RM	10.00
1938		50.00
1939		15.00
1940		35.00
1941		15.00
1942		10.00
1943		15.00
Total	RM	821.00

The figures are taken from the 4 cards marked "National Socialist Union of Teachers" (NS Lehrerbund), "National Socialist Union of German Students" (NS Deutscher Studentenbund), "National Socialist Union of Lawyers" Berlin (NS Rechtswahrerbund), "National Socialist Union of German Doctors" (NS Aerztebund), contained in the "Contributions" card index in the office of the Central Committee (ZA Office) described in more detail in Paragraph 2a of this statement. (P. 1).

(Page 17 of original)

Enclosure No. 11

Contributions made by I.G. Farben Industrie A.G.

to

the National Socialist Union of German Technicians
 (NS Bund Deutscher Technik)

and

The House of German Technology
 (Haus der Deutschen Technik)

National Socialist Union of German Technicians:

1935	RM	200.00
1936		50.00
1937		41.00
1942		10,271.00
1944		500.00

Haus der Deutschen Technik:

1939		30,000.00
1940		30,000.00

1941	RM	30,000.00
1942		30,000.00
1943		<u>30,000.00</u>
Total	RM	161,062.00

The figures are taken from the cards marked National Socialist Union of German Technicians and House of German Technology Munich contained in the "Contributions" card index in the office of the Central Committee (ZA Office) described in more detail in Paragraph 2a of this statement (P. 1).

(Page 18 of original)

Enclosure No. 12

Contributions made by I.G. Farben Industrie A.G.

to the

National Socialist Welfare and Assistance Organization
 (NS Volkswohlfahrt)

1933	RM	250.00
1934		13,470.30
1935		4,233.35
1936		4,332.50
1937		5,124.50
1938		855,679.46
1939		26,022.00
1940		9,761.75
1941		4,391.75
1942		9,167.00
1943		4,582.50
1944		<u>1,750.00</u>
Total	RM	938,765.11

The figures are taken from the card marked National Socialist Welfare and Assistance Organization contained in the Contributions card index in the office of the Central Committee (ZA Office) described in more detail in Paragraph 2a of this statement. (P. 1).

(Page 19 of original)

Enclosure No. 13

Contributions made by I.G. Farben Industrie A.G.

to the

National Socialist War Victims Assistance Fund
(NS Kriegsoferversorgung)

1934	RM	1,144.00
1935		2,004.00
1936		3,593.00
1937		2,709.00
1938		7,027.65
1939		2,535.64
1940		2,591.00
1941		1,328.00
1942		738.00
1943		550.00
1944		<u>300.00</u>
Total	RM	24,520.29

The figures are taken from the 3 cards marked "National Socialist War Victims Assistance Fund" contained in the "Contributions" card index in the Office of the Central Committee (ZA Office) described in more detail in Paragraph 2a of this statement. (P. 1).

(Page 20 of original)

Enclosure No. 14

Contributions made by I.G. Farben Industrie A.G.

to the

National Socialist Society for the Promotion of Culture
(NS Kulturgemeinde)

1934	RM	90.00
1935		1,975.00
1936		1,805.50
1937		1,815.00
1938		69.00
1939		<u>6.00</u>
Total	RM	5,760.50

The figures are taken from the card marked "National Socialist Society for the Promotion of Culture" contained in the "Contributions" card index in the office of the Central Committee (ZA Office) described in more detail in Paragraph 2a of this statement (P. 1).

(Page 21 of original)

Enclosure No. 15

Contributions made by I.G. Farben Industrie A.G.

to the following Funds:

People and Reich
(Volk und Reich)

Sauckel Fund
(Sauckel-Stiftung)

Bruno Mussolini Fund
(Stiftung Bruno Mussolini)

People and Reich Fund:

1933	RM 5,000.00
1934	5,000.00
1935	5,000.00
1936	5,000.00
1937	10,000.00
1938	5,000.00
1939	5,000.00

Sauckel Fund "Achievements of the Workers":

1937	1,000.00
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Bruno Mussolini Fund:

1942	<u>100,000.00</u>
Total	RM 141,000.00

The figures are taken from the 3 cards marked "People and Reich Fund, Berlin", Sauckel Stiftung "Achievements of the Workers" and "Bruno Mussolini Fund" contained in the "Contributions" card index in the office of the Central Committee (ZA Office) described in more detail in Paragraph 2a of this statement (P. 1).

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO.
NI - 9200 CONT'D.

(Page 22 of original)

Enclosure No. 16

Contributions made by I.G. Farben Industrie A.G.
to the

Reich Labor Service

(Reichsarbeitsdienst)

(Labor Service and Labor Service Camps)

Gratitude for Labor Service:

1934	RM 8,250.00
1935	14,110.00
1936	11,350.00
1937	30.00

Labor Service Camps:

1933	6,479.47
1934	18,872.05
1935	22,506.20
1936	3,594.21
1937	1,530.00
1938	1,010.00
1939	848.00
1940	50.00
1943	<u>300.00</u>

RM 88,929.93

The figures are taken from the 3 cards marked "Gratitude for Labor Service and "Labor Service Camps" contained in the "Contributions" card index in the office of the Central Committee (ZA Office) described in more detail in Paragraph 2a of this statement (P. 1).

(page 23 of original)

Enclosure No. 17

Contributions made by I.G. Farben Industrie A.G.

to the

National Socialist Factory Cell Organization

(Nationalsozialistische Betriebs - Zellen Organisation)

German Labor Front

(Deutsche Arbeitsfront)

National Socialist Factory Cell Organization:

1934	RM	478.00
1935		435.00
1936		1,734.00

Deutsche Arbeitsfront:

1934		3,522.43
1935		5,625.60
1936		19,205.98
1937		17,195.62
1938		20,126.32
1939		10,801.33
1940		1,722.60
1941		5,273.00
1942		3,784.90
1943		2,356.00
1944		326.00

Total RM 92,586.77

The figures are taken from the 7 cards marked "National Socialist Factory Cell Organization" and "German Labor Front" contained in the "Contributions" card index in the office of the Central Committee (ZA Office) described in more detail in Paragraph 2a of this statement (P. 1).

(Page 24 of original)

Enclosure No. 18

Contributions made by I.G. Farben Industrie A.G.

to

Strength Through Joy
 (Kraft durch Freude)

1934	RM	7,350.00
1935		2,337.75
1936		2,122.00
1937		8,953.20
1938		5,444.97
1939		4,439.73
1940		2,770.00

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO.
 FI-9200 Cont'd

1941	RM 1,426.40
1942	1,477.00
1943	120.00
1944	<u>60.00</u>
Total	RM 36,501.05

The figures are taken from the 4 cards marked "Strength Through Joy" contained in the "Contributions" card index in the office of the Central Committee (ZA Office) described in more detail in Paragraph 2a of this statement (P. 1).

(Page 25 of original)

Enclosure No. 19

Contributions made by I.G. Farben Industrie A.G.

to the

Academy of German Law
 (Akademie fuer Deutsches Recht)

1934	RM 31,000.00
1935	100,000.00
1936	100,000.00
1937	100,000.00
1938	100,000.00
1939	100,000.00
1940	100,000.00
1941	100,000.00
1942	<u>75,000.00</u>
Total	RM 806,000.00

The figures are taken from the card marked "Academy of German Law" contained in the "Contributions" card index in the office of the Central Committee (ZA Office) described in more detail in Paragraph 2a of this statement (P. 1).

(Page 26 of original)

Enclosure No. 20

Contributions made by I.G. Farben Industrie A.G.

to the

German Academy, Munich
 (Deutsche Akademie, Muenchen)

1933	RM	5,000.00
1934		8,000.00
1935		14,000.00
1936		15,000.00
1937		30,000.00
1938		15,100.00
1939		100.00
1940		15,130.00
1941		15,124.00
1942		15,124.00
1943		15,124.00
1944		<u>15,200.00</u>
Total	RM	162,902.00

The figures are taken from the card marked "Academy of Scientific Research and for the Preservation of Germandom, German Academy, Munich" contained in the "Contributions" card index in the office of the Central Committee (ZA Office) described in more detail in Paragraph 2a of this statement (P. 1).

(Page 27 of original)

Enclosure No. 21

Contributions made by I.G. Farben Industrie A.G.

to the

House of German Art
 (Haus der Deutschen Kunst)

1939	RM	150,455.00
1940		168,170.00
1941		194,269.00

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO. NI - 9200
CONT'D.

1942

	<u>RM 181,281.00</u>
Total	RM 694,175.00

The figures are taken from the card marked "House of German Art, Munich" contained in the "Contributions" card index in the office of the Central Committee (ZA Office) described in more detail in Paragraph 2a of this statement (P. 1).

(Page 28 of original)

Enclosure No. 22

Contributions made by I.G. Farben Industrie A.G.
to

German Union of Veterans (Steel Helmet)
(Deutscher Frontkämpferbund (Stahlhelm))

and to the

Light Infantry Corps
(Feldjägerkorps)

Steel Helmet:

1935	RM 5,060.00
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Feldjägerkorps:

1934	<u>1,851.53</u>
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Total	RM 6,911.53
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The figures are taken from the 2 cards marked "German Union of Veterans (Steel Helmet) and "NSDAP-Light Infantry Corps" contained in the "Contributions" card index in the office of the Central Committee (ZA Office) described in more detail in Paragraph 2a of this statement (P. 1).

(Page 29 of original)

Enclosure No. 23

Contributions made by I.G. Farben Industrie A.G.
to

National Socialist Organisation for Crafts, Commerce
and Trades (NS Hago)

and to

National Socialist Institute for the Estate System
(Nationalsozialistische Institut fuer Standewesen)

NS Org. for Crafts, Commerce and Trades:

1934	RM 3,270.00
------	-------------

1935	20.00
------	-------

Contributions for National Socialist Estate System:

1933	RM	5,000.00
Total	RM	8,290.00

The figures are taken from the 2 cards marked National Socialist Organization for Crafts, Commerce and Trade and National Socialist Institute for the Estate System, Deusseldorf contained in the "Contributions" card index in the Office of the Central Committee (ZA Office) described in more detail in Paragraph 2a of this statement (P. 1).

(Page 30 of original)

Enclosure No. 24

Contributions made by I.G. Farben Industrie A.G.

to

National Socialist Assistance Union for Hessen-Nassau
(NS Hilfverein Hessen-Nassau)

NS Newspaper Rheinfront
(NSZ - Rheinfront)

Hermann Goering - House in Saxony
(Hermann Goering - Haus in Sachsen)

NS Assistance Union for Hessen-Nassau:

1935	RM	1,000.00
1936		300.00

NSZ Rheinfront:

1935		1,500.00
1936		7,000.00

Hermann Goering - House in Saxony:

1938		10,000.00
Total	RM	19,800.00

The figures are taken from the cards marked NS Assistance Union for Hessen-Nassau, NS Newspaper Rheinfront and Hermann Goering - House in Saxony contained in the "Contributions" card index in the office of the Central Committee (ZA Office) described in more detail in Paragraph 2a of this statement (P. 1).

Enclosure No. 25

Contributions made by I.G. Farben Industrie A.G.

for

Reichstag Election Preparations in 1938
(Vorbereitung der Reichstagswahl 1938)

Total RM 125,000.00

This contribution was made in two installments. One contribution of RM 50,000.00 was remitted to the account of the Reich Treasurer, Reich Directorate of the NSDAP, Munich No. 4444 at the Bayrische Gemeindebank in Munich; the second installment of RM 75,000.00 was remitted to the account of the "Communal Educational Training Union (Gemeinnutziger Schulungsverein) in Hessen-Nassau, registered Union", account No. 5726 at the Nassauische Landesbank, Frankfurt/M Branch. The figures are taken from the carbon copies of money-orders No. A 102499 and A 102504, described in more detail in Paragraph 2b of this statement (page 1), as well as from the carbon copies of the covering letters addressed to the Reich Treasurer of the NSDAP and to the Hessen Gau Directorate of the NSDAP.

(Page 32 of original)

Enclosure No. 26

Contributions made by I.G. Farben Industrie A.G.

to the

Society for the Promotion of German Industry
(Foerderergemeinschaft der Deutschen Industrie)

1942

RM 5,026,250.00

The figures are taken from the card marked Society for the Promotion of German Industry contained in the "Contributions" card index in the office of the Central Committee (ZA Office) described in more detail in Paragraph 2a of this statement (P. 1).

(Page 33 of original)

Enclosure No. 27

Contributions made by I.G. Farben Industrie A.G.

to the

NSDAP Abroad
(NSDAP Ausland)1941

January	Santiago, Contributor's Club	RM	450.00
February	Milan, Flezi Group		65.00
December	Warsaw		1,750.00
November	Ankara, Party Welfare Fund		138.60
April	German News Service, Bogata		17.00
April	" " " "		17.00
May	Santiago, Contributors' Club		54.00
July	Santiago, Contributors' Club		54.00
December	Sofia, for the Eastern Front		182.00
December	Warsaw, Construction Fund		2,500.00
December	Santiago, Contributor's Club		180.00
	Pressburg		73.00
	Lima		67.50

1942

February	Warsaw		5,000.00
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1943

April	to the National Socialist Movement, Brussels		20.00
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Total	RM	10,538.10
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The figures are taken from the card marked "NSDAP Abroad" (NSDAP Ausland) contained in the "Contributions" card index in the office of the Central Committee (ZA Office) described in more detail in Paragraph 2a of this statement (P. 1).

Enclosure No. 28

Contributions made by I.G. Farben Industrie A.G.

to the

Union of German Schools Abroad
(Deutsche Schulvereine im Ausland)

Alexandria	- 1935 - 1939	RM 622.04
Amsterdam	- 1939, 1940, 1942	199.17
Amsterd	- 1936 - 1938, 1940, 1941	600.05
Association of German Schools in Argentina	- 1937, 1940, 1941	1,810.00
Arnheim	- 1943	66.35
Asuncion	- 1934, 1936, 1938, 1939	438.00
Barcelona	- 1933 - 1936, 1941 - 1944	11,548.68
Barranquilla	- 1933 - 1935	641.99
Bogota	- 1933 - 1940	2,525.83
Brussels	- 1937	100.00
Buenos Aires	- 1933 - 1936, 1938, 1939	1,671.20
Cali	- 1935 - 1937, 1939	794.35
Helsinki	- 1936	1,588.58
Kobe	- 1933 - 1941, 1943	15,374.73
La Paz	- 1933, 1935, 1939, 1940	590.35
Montevideo	- 1933 - 1941	872.25
Oslo	- 1942, 1943	570.50
Paris	- 1934	2,495.60
Recife	- 1933 - 1939	395.78
Rotterdam	- 1940	2,654.00
Rio de Janeiro	- 1933 - 1938	1,332.84
Vigo	- 1938, 1942 - 1944	1,400.00
Zaragoza	- 1933 - 1935, 1938, 1942 - 1944	<u>2,906.48</u>
Total		RM 51,398.77

The figures are taken from the 23 cards marked "Union of German Schools".
(Deutscher Schulvereine)

(Page 35 of original)

Continuation: Union of German Schools
(Deutscher Schulvereine)
or Association of German
Schools (Deutscher
Schulverband) Abroad.

or "Association of German Schools" (Deutscher Schulverband) contained in
the "Contributions" card index in the office of the Central Committee (Zd
Office) described in more detail in Paragraph 2a of this statement (P.1).

(Page 36 of original)

Enclosure No. 29
Contributions made by I.G. Farben Industrie A.G.
to the
National Union of Germans Abroad
(Volksbund fuer das Deutschtum im Ausland)

1933	RM 8,275.00
1934	5,876.00
1935	6,410.06
1936	4,707.25
1937	6,531.15
1938	2,506.00
1939	455.00
1940	3,140.00
1941	665.00
1942	80.00
1943	<u>80.00</u>
	RM 38,725.46

Frontier Library Service and Education Scheme Registered Union, Berlin
(Grenzhaushaltsservice und Bildungspflege o.V., Berlin)

1933	RM 5,000.00
1934	10,000.00
1935	10,000.00
1936	10,003.00
1937	10,300.00
1938	13,500.00
1939	10,500.00

1940		RM 10,300.00
1941		10,300.00
1942		20,500.00
1943		20,500.00
1944		<u>20,000.00</u>
	(Page 37 of original)	
	Total	RM 169,628.46

The figures are taken from the 4 cards marked "National Union of Germans Abroad, Berlin W 30" (Volksbund für das Deutschtum im Ausland, Berlin W 30) and "Frontier Library Service and Education Scheme Registered Union, Berlin" (Grenzbuerochendienst und Bildungsstelle e.V., Berlin) contained in the "Contributions" card index in the office of the Central Committee (ZA Office) described in more detail in Paragraph 2a of this statement (P. 1).

(Page 38 of original)

Enclosure No. 30

Contributions made by the I.G. Farben Industrie A.G.

to the

Winter Aid Scheme
(Winterhilfswerk)

1933/34		RM 1,000,000.00
1934/35		970,020.00
1935/36		971,330.00
1936/37		1,315,000.00
1937/38		1,668,200.00
1938/39		1,548,700.00
1939/40		1,528,000.00
1940/41		1,614,450.00
1941/42		1,571,000.00
1942/43	Winter Aid Scheme (WHW)	1,609,354.00
	Street Collection (Strassensammlung)	131,677.50
1943/44	Winter Aid Scheme (WHW)	1,307,125.00
	Street Collection (Strassensammlung)	350.00
	Mines and participation (Gruben u. Beteiligungen)	138,274.38
1944/45		<u>639,475.00</u>
	Total	RM 16,813,555.88

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT No. NI-9200 Cont.

The figures are taken from the carbon copies of the Payment Orders described in more detail in Paragraph 2b of this statement. (P.1).

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT No. NI-9200 Cont.

(Page 39 of original)

Enclosure 31 (First of the three sheets)
General Survey of the Contributions and Payments made by the I.G. Farben
Industrie A.G., listed in Enclosures 1 to 30.

Organization (Enclosure)	1933	1934	1935	1936
Adolf Hitler Fund (Enc.1)	697,071.38	435,095.58	649,301.00	735,011.25
NSDAP Political Direction etc. (Enc.2)	55,994.92	142,133.34	29,779.37	37,500.57
NSDAP Funds (Enc.3)	44,528.00		375.00	
NSDAP S.S. (Enc.4)		61,515.43	55,316.00	64,019.00
NSDAP S.A. (Enc.5)		74,224.05	29,446.46	37,314.50
NSDAP Union of German Girls (Enc.6)		209.00	550.00	374.20
NSDAP Hitler Youth (Enc.6)		11,463.40	11,036.45	19,824.32
NSDAP Junior Hitler Youth (Enc.6)		733.15	619.00	787.00
National Socialist Women's League (Enc.7)		571.00	299.50	253.00
NS Flying Corps (Enc.8)	14,173.00	42,752.45	221,931.60	16,801.30
NS Motor Vehicle Corps (Enc.9)		8,818.00	10,983.40	19,288.00
NS Union of Teachers (Enc.10)				
NS Union of German Students (Enc.10)			300.00	
NS Union of Lawyers (Enc.10)				
NS Union of German Doctors (Enc.10)				
NS Union of German Technicians (Enc.11)			200.00	50.00
NS Welfare and Assistance Organiz. (Enc.12)	250.00	13,470.30	4,233.35	4,332.50
NS War Victims Assistance Fund (Enc.13)		1,144.00	2,004.00	3,593.00
NS Society for the Promotion of Culture (Enc.14)		90.00	1,975.00	1,805.50
Various Funds (Enc.15)	5,000.00	5,000.00	5,000.00	5,000.00
Reich Labor Service (Enc.16)	6,479.47	27,122.05	36,616.20	14,944.21
SA Factory Coll. Org. (Enc.17)		478.00	435.00	1,734.00
German Labor Front (Enc.17)		3,522.00	5,625.60	19,205.98
Strength Through Joy (Enc.18)		7,350.00	2,337.75	2,122.00
Academy of German Law (Enc.19)		31,000.00	100,000.00	100,000.00
German Academy, Munich (Enc.20)	5,000.00	8,000.00	14,000.00	15,000.00
House of German Art (Enc.21)				
Steel Helmet, Light Inf. Corps (Enc.22)		1,851.53	5,060.00	
Org. for Crafts, Commerce and Trades Institute for the Estate system (Enc.23)	5,000.00	3,270.00	20.00	
SA Assistance Union for House (Enc.24)			1,000.00	300.00
SA Newspaper Rheinfront (Enc.24)			1,500.00	7,000.00
Ernst Thälmann House in Saxony (Enc.24)				
Reichstag Election 1938 (Enc.25)				
Sec. for Promotion German Indust. (Enc.26)				
SDAP Abroad (Enc.27)				
Union of German Schools Abroad (Enc.28)	2,980.89	4,985.83	2,925.27	3,315.99
National Union of Germans Abroad (Enc.29)	8,275.00	5,876.00	6,410.06	4,707.25
Frontier Library Service (Enc.29)	5,000.00	10,000.00	10,000.00	10,000.00
Inter Aid Scheme (Enc.30)	1,000,000.00	970,020.00	971,330.00	1,315,000.00
TOTAL	1,849,752.66	1,870,695.53	2,180,610.01	2,439,354.57

54

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT No. NI-9200 Cont.

(Page 40 of original)

Enclosure 31 (Second of three sheets)

General Survey of the Contributions and Payments made by the I.G. Farben
Industrie A.G., listed in Enclosure 1 to 30.

1937	1938	1939	1940	1941	1942
850,694.29'	990,839.41'	1,122,476.79'	915,537.84'	1,304,233.40'	1,445,797.70'
23,149.59'	53,358.07'	110,028.21'	78,529.02'	25,342.65'	8,426.15'
59.70'					10,000.00'
76,998.72'	82,935.20'	85,555.35'	24,000.00'	30,630.00'	23,810.78'
30,862.80'	33,237.06'	21,706.41'	7,806.00'	10,018.84'	7,035.00'
2,372.00'	1,942.00'	2,024.00'	50.00'	222.00'	70.00'
11,039.87'	36,952.97'	24,725.51'	9,109.20'	899.30'	3,061.50'
35.00'	579.00'	103.00'			2.00'
499.80'	2,180.00'	5,685.45'	1,484.00'	1,946.00'	1,283.00'
10,609.00'	258,526.00'	55,203.00'	3,355.00'	3,328.00'	5,080.80'
9,828.10'	8,036.00'	5,323.00'	3,367.50'	2,335.00'	1,870.00'
				35.00'	
	200.00'				
36.00'	100.00'				
10.00'	50.00'	15.00'	35.00'	15.00'	10.00'
41.00'		30,000.00'	30,000.00'	30,000.00'	40,271.00'
5,124.50'	855,679.46'	26,022.00'	9,761.75'	4,391.75'	9,167.00'
2,709.00'	7,027.65'	2,535.64'	2,591.00'	1,328.00'	738.00'
1,815.00'	69.00'	6.00'			
11,000.00'	5,000.00'	5,000.00'			100,000.00'
1,560.00'	1,010.00'	848.00'	50.00'		
17,195.62'	20,126.32'	10,801.33'	1,722.60'	5,273.00'	3,784.90'
8,953.20'	5,444.97'	4,439.73'	2,770.00'	1,426.40'	1,477.00'
100,000.00'	100,000.00'	100,000.00'	100,000.00'	100,000.00'	75,000.00'
30,000.00'	15,100.00'	100.00'	15,130.00'	15,124.00'	15,124.00'
		150,455.00'	168,170.00'	194,269.00'	181,281.00'
	10,000.00'				
	125,000.00'				
					5,026,250.00'
				5,518.10'	5,000.00'
13,721.56'	4,261.06'	2,162.05'	4,450.30'	3,774.20'	4,718.57'
6,531.15'	2,506.00'	455.00'	3,140.00'	665.00'	80.00'
10,300.00'	13,500.00'	10,500.00'	10,300.00'	10,300.00'	20,500.00'
1,663,200.00'	1,548,700.00'	1,548,000.00'	1,614,450.00'	1,571,000.00'	1,741,031.50'
2,923,345.88'	4,182,379.97'	3,304,170.47'	3,005,809.21'	3,322,075.14'	8,730,869.91'

55

(Page 41 of original)

Enclosure 31 (Third of three sheets)

General Survey of the Contributions and Payments made by the I.G. Farben
/ Industrie A.G., listed in Enclosures 1 to 30.

1943	1944	1933..1944	
1,927,211.45	1,619,319.00	12,693,089.09	Adolf Hitler Fund (Enc.1)
6,302.21	10,430.98	501,525.16	NSDAP Political Direction etc (Enc.2)
471.45		55,434.15	NSDAP Funds (Enc.3)
6,716.00	500.00	512,096.26	NSDAP S.S. (Enc.4)
5,332.00	700.00	252,133.12	NSDAP S.L. (Enc.5)
			NSDAP Union of German Girls (Enc.6)
203.00		169,025.37	NSDAP Hitler Youth (Enc.6)
			NSDAP Junior Hitler Youth (Enc.6)
2,079.00	965.00	17,245.75	NS Women's League (Enc.7)
6,691.72	1,257.00	639,708.87	NS Flying Corps (Enc.8)
1,542.80	131.00	71,572.30	NS Motor Vehicle Corps (Enc.9)
			NS Union of Teachers (Enc.10)
			NS Union of German Students (Enc.10)
		821.00	NS Union of Lawyers (Enc.10)
15.00			NS Union of German Doctors (Enc.10)
30,000.00	500.00	161,062.00	NS Union of German Techn. (Enc.11)
4,582.50	1,750.00	933,735.11	NS Welfare and Ass. Org. (Enc.12)
550.00	300.00	24,520.29	NS War Victims Assistance Fund (13)
			Society for the Promotion of Culture (Enc.14)
		5,760.50	NS Various Funds (Enc.15)
		141,000.00	Reich Labor Service (Enc.16)
300.00		38,929.93	NS Factory Cell Org. (Enc.17)
2,356.00	326.00	92,586.77	German Labor Front (Enc.17)
120.00	60.00	36,501.05	Strength Through Joy (Enc.18)
		806,000.00	Academy of German Law (Enc.19)
15,124.00	15,200.00	162,902.00	German Academy, Munich (Enc.20)
		694,175.00	House of German Art (Enc.21)
		6,911.53	Steel Helmet, Light Inf. Corps (22)
			NS Organization for Crafts, Commerce and Trades, Institution for the Estate System (Enc.23)
		8,290.00	NS Assistance Union for House (24)
		19,800.00	NS Newspaper Rheinfront (Enc.24)
			Hermann Goering House in Saxony (24)
		125,000.00	Reichstag Election 1933 (Enc.25)
		5,026,250.00	Soc. for Promotion German Ind. (26)
20.00		10,538.10	NSDAP Abroad (Enc.27)
2,403.05	1,700.00	51,396.77	Union of German Schools Abroad (28)
80.00		30,725.46	Nation Union Germ. Abroad (Enc.29)
20,500.00	20,000.00	150,903.00	Frontier Library Service (Enc.29)
1,446,349.38	639,475.00	16,013,555.28	Winter Aid Scheme (Enc.30)
3,480,049.63	2,313,163.98	39,602,276.96	SUM TOTAL

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT No. NI-9200 Cont.

(Page 42 of original)

I have carefully read through each of the 41 pages of this affidavit and countersigned them with my own hand, have made the necessary corrections in my own handwriting and countersigned them with my initials, and herewith declare under oath that to the best of my knowledge and belief I have stated the absolute truth in this affidavit.

Signature: HERMANN BAESSLER
Hermann Paessler

Sworn to and signed before me this 30th day of July 1947 at Frankfurt/M, Germany, by Hermann BAESSLER, known to me to be the person making the above affidavit.

Signature: FRED OPEL
Fred Opel
AGO No. 4-441688
Office of Chief of Counsel for
War Crimes
U.S. War Department

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

We, Arthur C. MacNamara, ETO 20191, Patricia E.C. Wood, ETO 20139, and Beryl C. Boswick, ETO 20183, hereby certify that we are thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of the original document No. NI-9200.

ARTHUR C. MACNAMARA, ETO 20191
PATRICIA E.C. WOOD, ETO 20139
BERYL C. BOSWICK, ETO 20183.

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT No. NI-4442
OFFICE OF CHIEF OF COUNSEL FOR WAR CRIMES

ADOLF-HITLER-SPENDE DER DEUTSCHEN WIRTSCHAFT
(ADOLF-HITLER FUND OF THE GERMAN ECONOMY)

Berlin, June 1941

Firm

CERTIFICATE

Fa. Dynamit-Aktion-Gesellsch.
vorm. Alfred Nobel & Co
-Social Welfare Department

L No. 622610 *

41 733

T r o i s d o r f

participated in the Adolf-
Hitler-Spende (Adolf-Hitler-
Fund) of the German
economy.

All members and offices of
the Party, its formations and
affiliated organisations are
forbidden to collect from the
owner of this certificate.

The Chairman of the Board
of Trustees (Kuratorium)
(Signature)

The Chief of the
Party Chancery.

(Signature)

Transl.

Note:

Seal:

National
Socialist

German Workers'
Party
Party Chancery

(Transl. Note: Seal:
Board of Trustees (Kuratorium)
of the Adolf-Hitler-Fund of the
German Economy.)

(Translator's note: stamp) 23 August 1941

Dynamit-Aktion-Gesellschaft
vormals Alfred Nobel & Co.
Wirtschafts- und Sozial-Abteilung
(Economic and Social Welfare
Department)

Troisdorf Distr. of Cologne,
14 August 1941

Circular Letter 3011/1941

(Translator's note:
handwritten: File)

To the

Plants,
Chief construction Control Offices (Oberbauleitungen),
Construction Control Offices (Bauleitungen),
Contact Office (Verbindungsstelle) Berlin,

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT No. NI-4442
Cont'd

Central Construction Office,
Office Stegundshof,
Office Breslau,
Office Geesthacht,
Office Munich,
Office Bad Sachsa,
Office Hamburg,
Social Welfare Offices and
Laboratory Cologne-Dellbrueck

of the Dynamit-Aktion-Gesellschaft vormals Alfred Nobel & Co.,
Venditor Kunststoff-Verkaufsgesellschaft m.b.H., Treisdorf,
Berlin;
Vienna,
Rheinisch-Westfälische Sprengstoff-Aktion-Gesellschaft,
Muenster,
Berlin.

Subject: Adolf Hitler Fund of the German Economy.

On the basis of our participation in the Adolf Hitler
Fund of the German Economy, we transmit to you the enclosed
certificate of contribution with plaque which we received
for your plant resp. for your Construction Control Office (Bau-
leitung).

Yours sincerely,
DYNAMIT-AKTION-GESELLSCHAFT;
vormals ALFRED NOBEL & Co.

(Transl. Note: two illegible
signatures.)

Enclosure.

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

I, JOHN J. BOLL, AGO A-444412, hereby certify that I am
thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages;
and that the above is a true and correct translation of
Document No. NI-4442.

JOHN J. BOLL,
U.S. Civilian,
AGO A-444412

END

COPY.

File No. 183 v.3.

25 April 1933.

Dear Mr. Reichs Chancellor!

Referring to the kind letter of the Secretary of State of the Reichs Chancellory, dated the 10th of this month, Ref No. 3646, I respectfully enclose herewith a statement which represents my views concerning the reorganization of the Reichs Association of German Industry and of the trade associations as a whole. I am also adding a synopsis of statements concerning the programme of the REICHS ASSOCIATION of German Industry in previous years.

The standpoint taken by the REICHS ASSOCIATION of German Industry concerning the question of reorganisation of trade associations has been characterised, on the one hand, by the simplification and rationalisation of all the industrial groups. This was aimed at in the widest circles of the REICHS ASSOCIATION and, 1st but not least, by myself. On the other hand, it was characterised by the wish to co-ordinate, in the interest of the whole nation, both economic measures and political necessity, adopting the Fuehrer conception of the new German state. Industrial associations should be formed which are as simple and powerful as possible, closest to present conditions, and retaining the valuable privilege of free industrial administration. For me, this standpoint is a political and economic necessity.

I feel convinced that this task of reorganisation can be realised only through an active economic self-administration based upon the creative energies of each employer and employee, and recognising the principle which combines the National Idea with National Responsibility. This should be done by the closest contact between the Reich Government and its representatives on one side and the REICHS ASSOCIATION on the other. In this respect I am convinced that the

deciding factor leading to the success of the reform is not to be found in the outward form of the organisation itself but in the spirit, in which union between political leadership and economic necessity is established for the benefit of the State and people.

The presiding council of the REICHS ASSOCIATION of German Industry has entrusted me, as its chairman, with the task of reorganisation in a resolution passed at its extraordinary session held on the 6th of this month. The REICHS ASSOCIATION of German Industry, dear Mr. Reichs Chancellor, puts itself at your disposal at the disposal of the Reich Government for all necessary negotiations. At the same time I respectfully request the confidence and assistance of you and of the Reich Government in the task of reorganisation which shall serve to render the trade association a most useful instrument towards the purpose of rebuilding a national economy.

Assuring you, dear Mr. Reichs Chancellor, of my highest esteem, I have the honour to be.

To: Reichs Chancellor
Hitler
Berlin.

Very respectfully yours,
KRUPP BOHLER H.L.A.CH.

Enclosure No. 1 to the letter of Dr. Krupp von Bohlen and Halbach
to Reichschancellor Hitler, dated 25 April 1933.

On April 6 of this year the Presiding Council of REICHS
ASSOCIATION of German Industry empowered me unanimously, as its
Chairman, to establish contact with the REICHSCANCELLOR, the
Government of the REICH and its officials, for the purpose of deter-
mining what measures shall be taken to simplify and remodel the trade
associations.

By this unanimous resolution of the Presiding Council it is
declared that:

- 1) In view of the authority bestowed upon me to appoint re-
presentatives to deal with various problems on hand, I am
solely empowered by the REICHS ASSOCIATION of German Industry
to hold any necessary conferences with the Government of the
REICH and its officials, and
- 2) under the same authority as in para (1) I am solely responsible
on behalf of the REICHS ASSOCIATION of German Industry for all
organisational reforms, especially those concerning personnel;
which may result within the structure of the REICHS ASSOCIATION
of German Industry.

By the resolution of the Presiding Council, the REICHS ASSOCIATION
of German Industry has given me full powers which involve extraordinary
responsibilities.

The following consideration led me to the acceptance of this
extraordinary authority:-

The turn of political events is in line with the wishes which I
myself and the Board of Directors have cherished for a long time. I
am convinced that, under the threat of the impoverishment of our people,
the machinery of government must be simplified to the utmost. For the

same reason I did not fail to recognise a long time ago the necessity of rationalising our economic system.

Convinced that the opportunity of the hour must not be missed to obtain the best for our economic system I am employing the authority bestowed upon me by the Presiding Council to carry out a double task:-

- 1) In the negotiations with the REICHSCANCELLOR and his representatives, I shall make it my goal to co-ordinate, in the field of organisation of industrial associations, the economically reasonable with the politically necessary.
- 2) In reorganising the REICH ASSOCIATION of German Industry I shall be guided by the idea of bringing the new organisation into agreement with the political aims of the REICH Government and at the same time to make it so rational and forceful that it can be an effective instrument of industrial enterprise, according to the relative importance of the industry.

The task of re-organisation of industrial groups would be on too narrow a basis if in doing so I were to think solely of rebuilding the REICH ASSOCIATION of German Industry. I know from my own experience how much individual firms suffer from circumstances of historical development which cause overlappings of industrial groups, frequently resulting in a lack of co-ordination in their formation.

This demands that we must also bring into the sphere of our coming tasks the numerous questions pertaining to the complex occupational formation of our economic system. The foremost aim of our economic system and especially of industry, must therefore be to eliminate organisations which are too complicated. In order to preserve the valuable privileges of free industrial self-management, the resulting

organisations must be made as simple as possible.

After the Presiding Council of the REICHS ASSOCIATION of German Industry bestowed upon me the task of re-organisation in its resolution of April 6 of this year, it also stated that the still existing groups forming the REICHS ASSOCIATION of German Industry were to remain to some extent inactive until the task of re-organisation undertaken by me is accomplished.

I intend to use the period until reorganisation is complete by engaging especially qualified gentlemen as expert advisers for the solution of specific problems. Since the management of the REICHS ASSOCIATION of German Industry needs the guidance of enterprise itself, I intend further to form special committees of experts to study specific questions, as for example, questions of organisation, question of the ethics in economic life, the examination of occupational aspects of trade policy, exchange and credit problems, as well as the field of taxation, etc. The decision of the Presiding Council specifies that I am to preside over all these committees that I am creating. As it is impossible for me to be present at all necessary meetings, I must have the authority to appoint various gentlemen as deputy chairman.

As soon as my negotiations with the REICHS CHANCELLOR and his officials are concluded, and as soon as the proposed committees and the management of the REICHS ASSOCIATION of German Industry have drafted a plan for its reorganisation, I shall summon the leading groups of the REICHS ASSOCIATION of German Industry to a special meeting. It will be the task of the meeting to lay the corner-stone for the new structure of the REICHS ASSOCIATION of German Industry.

rts.

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT D-157

20 November 1945

I, LEO LOEB, civilian, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document D-157.

- 5 -
(LND)

LEO LOEB

64

First Early Edition.

84th year of publication - No. 1051

Vollfs Telegraphisches Bureau

(S.T.B.)

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Berlin, Thursday 4 May 1933

Declaration of the Reich Association of German Industry on the reorganization and simplification of the industrial association system.

Berlin 3 May. The Reich Association of German Industry announces:

Following upon an interview today granted by the Reich Chancellor Hitler to the chairman of the Reich Association of German Industry, Dr. Krupp von Bohlen und Halbach and after the appointment by the Reich Minister of Economy Dr. Hugenberg of Dr. h.c. Otto Wagener and Alfred Woelfers member of the Reichstag as Reich Commissioners for the Reich Association of German Industry and for the remaining economy with the exception of agriculture and furthermore after the nomination by Dr. Wagener of Dr. von Lucke as his deputy for the sphere of the Reich Association, the Reich Association for German Industry publishes the following declaration:

In conformity with the principles of the national government and at the same time in the interests of a uniform and rigorous carrying out - in future excluding all individual action - of the tasks before the Reich Association the principle of absolute leadership will be realized in the following form for the entire organization of the industrial associations:

In accordance with the resolution of the Praesidium on 6 April by which the chairman, Dr. Krupp von Bohlen und Halbach was unanimously authorized to prepare and carry out the measures for the simplification and reorganization of the industrial associations, Herr von Bohlen will use the extraordinary power conferred on him to

(page 1 of original cont'd)

1. bring the existing economic factors in the field of the organization of industrial associations into line with political necessity
2. bring the new organization into agreement with the political aims of the Reich government and to mould it at the same time on such rational and vigorous lines that corresponding to the importance of industry it can be an effective instrument of industrial economy within the framework of national, social and economic reconstruction in every field.

This two-fold task extends not only to the reorganization of the Reich Association of German Industry itself (i.e. in particular the carrying out of all measures concerning organization and personnel necessary for this but it embraces also the whole gamut of questions of the professional division of economy. The prior aim of economy and industry must hereby be to eliminate every superfluous organization while adhering as closely as possible to the existing state of affairs and preserving the precious possession of free self-administration, and mould the organization in as simple and effective a manner as possible. The impoverishment of our nation compels us not only to simplify drastically the state machine but also to eliminate all overlappings in the association system which have arisen more or less by chance as a result of historical development and led to a complex inorganic division.

In carrying out these tasks, which have already been taken up energetically with the co-operation of the Reich Commissioners nominated by the Reich Minister of Economy, the chairman of the Reich association will refer to wishes and lines of thought already cherished and expressed by himself.

(page 2 of original)

Special advisory committees will be appointed to deal with individual current ^{questions} in specialized spheres e.g. the organization and professional division, the ethical basis also indispensable for economic life, the policy of currency and credit, tax policy etc. In recognition of the principle of absolute leadership Herr von Ohlen will himself take the chair at all committees with the proviso that he nominates deputies, and assume responsibility for decisions.
will

Upon conclusion of the further negotiations with the Reich Commissioners and upon completion of the

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT No. NIK-5982
CONTINUED

(page 2 of original cont'd)

final plan for the reorganization of the industrial association system the authoritative bodies will be called to a special meeting. The task of this meeting will be to create a valid basis for the new organization of the Reich Association of German Industry.

The Reich Association clearly realizes that the whole work of reform must be carried out on the one hand on the basis of the creative powers of the individual in the field of enterprise and labor and on the other in recognition of the binding principle of the national idea and national responsibility, and that the decision for its success is not conditioned by the outer form of the organization in itself, but by the spirit in which the synthesis between political leadership and economic necessity is found for the ultimate good of the state and the people.

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT No. NIK-5982

16 May 1947

I, Mary, Flack PERRY, No. E-00524, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages, and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document No. NIK-5982.

Mary, Flack PERRY,
No. E-00524.

ERRATA SHEET

Page 11 of Document D - 317, Title should read:

THOUGHTS ABOUT THE INDUSTRIAL ENTREPRENEUR

Page 11 of Document D - 317, Paragraph 1, 4th sentence
should read:

..... I have already often repeated orally as well as in
writing, and today I also want to re-state to this group that,
according to the terms of the Dictate of VERSAILLES (Diktat),
Krupp had to destroy and demolish considerable quantities of
machinery and equipment of all sorts. It is the unique merit
of the entire German war economy that it did not remain idle
during those years, even though its activity could not be
brought to light for obvious reasons.....

Errata Sheet prepared by:

JOHN J. BOLL
U. S. Civilian
AGO NO. A-444412

END

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO. D-317
OFFICE OF CHIEF OF COUNSEL FOR
WAR CRIMES

ERRATA SHEET

Page 1 of Translation of Document No. D-317

Handwritten date in left margin should read:

14 January 1944.

Errata Sheet Prepared by:

JOHN J. BOLL
U. S. Civilian
AGO No. A-444412

- E N D -

676

TRANSLATION OF EXCERPTS OF DOC. NO D-317
OFFICE OF U.S. CHIEF OF COUNSEL FOR WAR
CRIMES

(TRANSLATOR'S NOTE: Handwritten Note on top of page: This speech was planned to be held at the University of Berlin by Dr. Krupp von Bohlen und Halbach, but was not held.)

(Handwritten Note:)
1 Copy to Dr. Fuss
1 Copy to Dr. Wineschuen
14 January 1933
(signed) Kraft
.....

(Page 11 from line 7 on)

THOUGHTS ABOUT THE INDUSTRIAL ENTERPRISER

(Handwritten Note: Original in personal possession of Mr. K.B.H.)

Therefore, I do not see why this thought still flutters in many a head occasionally - that the production of war materials should be a sinister trade! No; war material is lifesaving for one's own people and whoever works and performs in these spheres can be proud of it; here enterprise as a whole finds its highest justification of existence. This justification - I may inject this here - crystallized especially during that time of the "Interregnum", between 1919 and 1933, when GERMANY was lying down disarmed. I have already often repeated orally as well as in writing, and today I also want to re-state to this group that, according to the terms of the Dictate of VERSAILLES (Diktat), Krupp had to destroy and demolish considerable quantities of the entire German war economy that it did not remain idle during those bad years, even though its activity could not be brought to light for obvious reasons. Through years of secret work, (Stillor Arbeit) scientific and basic ground work was laid, in order to ready again to work for the German Armed Forces at the appointed hour, without loss of time or experience. This required many

(Page 12 of original)

and various things, this demanded also the introduction of specific products suited to maintain the skills of experienced engineers and war workers - this tremendous fund of knowledge and experience; this required further equipping and maintenance of scientific laboratories and research establishments, etc.

Just as once a 100,000 men kept up the tradition of the old glorious Army so there also was - figuratively speaking a 100,000 men army of business men (Der Wirtschaft) who kept up the tradition of war industry. The circumstances caused by the military collapse were even more difficult considering the necessary changes in old war plants to peacetime production, which in itself caused untold difficulties in politically confused times. It was necessary for instance, to expand the KRUPP WERKE into a structure capable of survival and competition, but, at the same moment they also had to be ready as war plants for future times.

Only through this secret activity of German enterprise, together with the experience gained meanwhile through production of peacetime goods was it possible, after 1933, to fall into step with the new tasks arrived at restoring Germany's military power, (only through all that) - could the entirely new and various problems, brought up by the Fuehrer's Four Year Plan for Germany

enterprise, be mastered. It was necessary to exploit new raw materials, to explore and experiment, to invest capital in order to make GERMAN economy independent and strong, in short; to make it war worthy (Kriegstark). On the basis of various remarks of outsiders, who are able to overlook the entire situation

(Page 13 of original)

From a vantage point, I may well say that GERMAN enterprise proved itself here again, by tackling and solving the new problems with that energy, that - I might say: enthusiasm, with which it has always approached historical tasks (Geschichtliche Aufgaben). In this connection I want to bring to attention something else, something which probably has hardly been considered in other circles so far: That is the fact, that the proven success of the Four Year Plan, the creation of new raw materials as substitutes for scarce ones, something which at the beginning showed only the quiet and modest degree of success we had hoped to achieve, (brought about) that not only were the well-known materials fully replaced in the customary field of usage, but that the new raw materials go many times far beyond their conception as substitutes for many uses - I am almost inclined to say: can be moulded fully as one wishes. That applies to artificial rubber, to synthetic gasoline and to various other similar things, and opens new vistas for the future which cannot be envisaged today. After 1933, the GERMAN businessmen did not undertake such historical tasks of greatest range and scope only in organizational, technical and commercial respects. The National Socialist Revolution has hardly ever brought another profession

face to face with, in many ways such now, sometimes fortunately shockingly new situations, as it has the enterpriser. Now he became the FUEHRER of his employees (Gefolgschaft). It

(Page 14 of original)

would, of course, be extremely unjust to claim that even before 1933 the enterprisers did not also have an understanding for this side of their profession leading and caring for people for how could they otherwise have gained economic success in the long run? Particularly that is the pride of so many large enterprises, that they can look back to a rich and old social political tradition, and yet, before 1933, it was made - God knows - many a time quite difficult for the enterpriser to act and show himself as the deeply responsibility-conscious leader of his business. This change since 1933 which occurred with almost elementary suddenness, concerning the conception about the spiritually founded partnership of interests between employer and employee. I am again making use of this old formula intentionally should be attributed to the singular genius of the FUEHRER and to his revolutionary movement, the FUEHRER who won through the power of his personality and his doctrines the whole of the GERMAN people to his expounded ideas of National Socialist ideology. It is clear that through them by appointing the enterpriser as Leader of his employees by law, a much wider and nicer, more promising field of activity than before was assigned to him, full with success especially concerning the human aspect - and I think I may state here, that the GERMAN enterprisers followed the new ways enthusiastically, that they made the great intentions of the FUEHRER their own

TRANSLATION OF EXCERPT OF DOCUMENT NO. D-317
CONT'D

by fair competition and conscious gratitude and became his faithful followers.

.....
(Page 15 of original until line 6)

How else could the tasks between 1933 and 1939 and especially those after 1939 have been overcome? Not by force, but only through good will - more so; only through devotion and enthusiasm could and can tasks of such world historical scope succeed.

.....
(Page 20 of original until line 18)

Into the future, I think, and this you probably felt too, due to my previous statements, the GERMAN enterpriser (Unternehmer) may look with full confidence. He will be even more necessary in the political, economic and social structure of our GREATER GERMAN REICH after the War (Nach dem Kriege). I don't feel called upon to act as a prophet, but yet the grand vision of a NEW EUROPE floats happily before my eyes, and in this great space, which will then overflow with new economic, technical, transportation, commercial and financial problems of all kinds - in this NEW EUROPE one will not only need farmers, frontier-guard-peasants and tradesmen, state and private officials, but in all countries and provinces as well, daring enterprisers ready for decision. And again people will say as before, during my time in BERLIN in 1900: "GERMANS to the Front!" The GERMAN enterpriser will have to be the model for the new type of European enterpriser - just as the GERMAN worker will determine the future type of the European skilled worker.

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

I, ELLA E. UIBERALL, AGO No. D-150096, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document No. D-317.

ELLA E. UIBERALL
U.S. CIVILIAN
AGO NO. D-150096

AFFIDAVIT

I, Dr. Felix EHEMANN, residing at Baddeckenstedt, district Wolfenbuettel, British Zone, at present in Nuremberg, having been duly warned that I shall render myself liable to punishment by making false statements, herewith state the following on oath of my own free will and without coercion:

1) Up to the year 1919, German Industry had no unified representation. There were the Central Association of German Industrialists, the League of Industrialists and also the Society for the Protection of the Interests of the Chemical Industries. The last-named was founded in 1877 and until 1919, when the whole Industry was combined in the Reich Association of German Industry, it independently represented German Industry.

The Reich Association consisted of specialist industrial associations (e.g. the Association of German Engine Factories, the Society for the Protection of the Interests of the Chemical Industries), associations formed according to area or location, corporations, single firms and, in special cases, individuals.

As far as I remember, the Praesidium of the Reich Association was not formed by automatically appointing no-one but the members of the respective Vorstaende of the individual corporate member associations to this board. On the contrary, the Praesidium was elected independently. The I.G. also provided a president of the Reich Association in the person of Geheimrat DUISBERG.

The Reich Association also had at its disposal a number of committees (e.g. for legal problems, foreign trade, etc.), as well as advisory councils.

In general, the relationship between the Reich Association and its members was more or less similar to that normally found between associations and its members: compulsory contributions and the right to vote. The functions of the association and the rights of its members were laid down in its statutes.

With regard to the division of work between the Reich Association and associations who were its members, the following conditions developed as time went on: the Reich Association took over all tasks of general importance, i.e. it negotiated with the Reich Ministry of Economics, the

(page 2 of original)

Foreign Office, and in general it dealt with trade agreements, tariff law amendments, tax laws, etc. The members were informed of the results of these negotiations by means of circular letters. The fundamental principles of these projects were described in these letters, and in cases where trade agreements were to be concluded, these letters also explained the current trade policy towards the other partner of the

(page 2 of original, cont'd)

agreement in question. The Society for the Protection of the Interests of the Chemical Industry represented the chemical industry as a whole.

As a result of its special position in German Economy this industry was held in high esteem. Not only had it achieved quite outstanding results in production during the past few decades, it was also a very important factor of the German export trade as its export earnings exceeded those of all the other branches in industry. It was therefore obvious that the Reich Association of German Industry had to a very great extent to base its work and its plans on the programs of the leaders of the chemical industries.

The Society for the Protection of the Interests of the Chemical Industries was a corporate member of the Reich Association as were also the other specialist associations. No limits were imposed on its functions by the general work done by the Reich Association. It was in direct, and in some instances very close contact with the various ministries. Only in special cases, such as treatment of fundamental tax-legislation questions, did the Society for the Protection of the Interests of the Chemical Industries confine itself to informing the Reich Association of its opinion on the matter, leaving the negotiations to the Reich Association.

In matters which from the technical point of view required special treatment, the method employed was as follows: the Society for the Protection of the Interests of the Chemical Industries, after having first informed and consulted the Reich Association, and after having considered its circular letter on the subject, then instituted its own measures. This was generally done by informing its members in its own circular letters and asking them for their opinions and requests, but not without previously conferring

(page 3 of original)

with the appropriate ministry. The Society for the Protection of the Interests of the Chemical Industry itself evaluated the data supplied by its members.

With regard to relationships between the Society for the Protection of the Interests of the Chemical Industries, it must be stated that those with the Ministry of Economy were very close. Later on, at the time when the International Tariff Scheme of Geneva was being worked out, this also applied to the Ministry of Finance.

Advice and information given by the Reich Association played an important part in the collaboration between the Reich Association and the Society for the Protection of the Interests of the Chemical Industries. On the whole, the role of the Reich Association was generally limited to that of adviser and supplier of information.

The Administrative Department never brought influence to bear on the activities of the Reich Association; this was done through the Vorstand and Praesidium or through direct personal contact.

(page 3 of original, cont'd)

I do remember indications, but not proofs that such influence was exerted, for example, on the part of I.G. It is, however, certain that I.G. in many cases by-passed the Society for the Protection of the Interests of Chemical Industry in its dealings with the Reich Association in the same way in which it by-passed the Society in its dealings with the Ministries.

2) There was no basic change in these relationships after the Reich Association had become the Reich Group for Industry and the Society for the Protection of the Interests of the Chemical Industries had become the Industrial Group for Chemical Industries, that is, from 1933/34 onwards.

In spite of the introduction of compulsory membership and the transference of some of the rights, direct contact remained established between I.G., on the one side, and the Reich Group and Ministries on the other. The I.G. continued to have its opportunities for directly influencing the Reich Group, one of the reasons being the fact that it had its representatives in the various committees and advisory councils. I can unfortunately no longer remember the names and functions of these I.G. representatives.

3) The following can be stated about the position which the I.G. held within the Society for the Protection of the Interests of the Chemical Industries and later within the Industrial Group for Chemical Industries:

(page 4 of original)

Very roughly, it can be formulated as follows: The I.G. played outwardly a greater role in the Society for Protection of the Interests of the Chemical Industry, that is, up to 1933-34, than it did in the Economic Group, i.e. in the period after 1933/34. This may be illustrated by pointing to the fact that no one in the Society for Protection of the Interests of the Chemical Industry had any hesitation and even, on occasion, regarded it as natural to elect a member of the Directorate of the I.G. as leading director of the Society for Protection of the Interests of the Chemical Industry. Accordingly, Geheimrat DUISBERG was president of the Society for Protection of the Interests of the Chemical Industry from about 1925 to 1931 and Geheimrat BOSCH from about 1931 to 1934.

The work of the Society for Protection of the Interests of the Chemical Industry was, even for practical reasons alone, subject to strong influence on the part of the I.G. If, for instance, a commercial treaty was to be brought about, it was always the I.G. which, on account of the extent of its manufacturing programme, had the greatest number of wishes to put forward. At the same time, the justification of these wishes was seldom deniable, because, of course, in most cases, the fulfilment of the commercial-political wishes of the I.G. was of particular benefit to the trade balance, since it implied also large quantities of goods, or goods of special or peculiar value, for the export trade.

(page 4 of original, cont'd)

There were, however, fields of work in which - as frequently occurred when it was a case of satisfying I.G. demands - the benefits, objectively regarded, were doubtful, or even had to be denied: for instance, the cartel negotiations which involved the fixing of internal German quotas, or negotiations over Reich Railway tariffs with the object of cheaper freight rates. In such cases, the Society for the Protection of the Interests of the Chemical Industry was in a difficult position. The Business Management always strove to secure the benefits for the smaller firms, in which, however, they often did not succeed.

The explanation for this difficult position of the Society for the Protection of the Interests of the Chemical Industry is also, at the same time, an explanation of the special role which the I.G. played in the Society for Protection of the Interests of the Chemical Industry: it was the firm which contributed to it by far

(page 5 of original)

the largest number of members. It was on the membership of the I.G. that the fate of the Society for the Protection of the Interests of the Chemical Industry more or less depended.

In estimating the importance of the role played by the I.G. in the Society for Protection of the Interests of the Chemical Industry, it must, however, not be forgotten that this was not the only instrument that the I.G. had at its disposal for the furtherance of its economic-political aims. The great economic importance of the I.G., as well as its actual technical means, enabled it to carry on immediate direct communication with the Government. Government offices themselves even esteemed it of great importance to maintain direct contact with leading persons of the I.G. An example of this is the commercial policy in the Far East, especially in Japan. It pleased both the Government and the Society for Protection of the Interests of the Chemical Industry that the I.G. should advise the German Embassy in Tokio during the negotiations, because there was no one else who could dispose of the knowledge and connections required for the attainment of the greatest possible commercial-political effect.

The reconstruction of the Society for Protection of the Interests of the Chemical Industry into the Economic Group of the Chemical Industry (Wirtschaftsgruppe Chemische Industrie) in 1933/34 in no way altered the powerful position of the I.G.. It is true that the point of view that the I.G. should contribute the largest number of members was dropped, but, on the other hand, the numerous direct connections of the I.G. with high, and even the highest, Reichsrune offices assumed now, under the authoritarian regime, particular importance.

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT No. NI-9086
CONTINUED

(page 5 of original, cont'd).

I have carefully read through the 5 (five) pages of this affidavit and signed it with my own hand, have made the necessary corrections in my own handwriting and countersigned them with my initials and I hereby declare under oath that in this declaration I have told the absolute truth to the best of my knowledge and belief.

Signature: Dr. FELIX EHRMANN

(page 6 of original)

Sworn to and signed before me this 25th day of July 1947 at Nuremberg by Dr. Felix EHRMANN, known to me to be the person making the above affidavit.

Signature: ARTHUR T. COOPER

U.S. Civilian, AGO number D 434534
Interrogator, Office of Chief of
Counsel for War Crimes
U.S. Department.

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

12 August 1947

We, Anne MARTIN, No. 20144, and Arthur MACNAMARA, No. 20191, hereby certify that we are thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages and that the above is a true and correct translation of the document No. NI-9086.

Anne MARTIN
No. 20144

Arthur MACNAMARA
No. 20191

- 5 -
"END"

76

1934 REICHSGESETZBLATT, PART I, PAGE 185

Law for the Preparation of the Organic Structure
of the German Economy of 27 February 1934

(Gesetz zur Vorbereitung des organischen Aufbaues
der deutschen Wirtschaft vom 27. Februar 1934)

The Reich Government has enacted the following law which
is hereby promulgated:

Article 1

The Reich Minister of Economics is empowered for the
preparation of the organic structure of the German economy.

1. To recognize economic associations (Wirtschaftsverbände) as sole representative of their economic branch;
2. To establish, to dissolve, or to merge economic associations;
3. To amend, to supplement bye-laws and contracts (Gesellschaftsverträge) of economic associations; particularly to institute the leadership principle (Führergrundsatz);
4. To appoint and to recall the leaders of economic associations;
5. To affiliate (anzuschliessen) entrepreneurs and enterprises with economic associations.

Economic associations are such associations and federations of associations, which are charged with taking care of economic interests of entrepreneurs and enterprises.

Article 2

The Reich Minister of Economics may issue legal decrees (Rechtsverordnungen) and general administrative orders (Verwaltungsvorschriften) for the execution of this law with the consent (Einvernehmen) of the Reich Minister of the Interior; he may also issue orders (Vorschriften) of supplemental character (Inhalt) with the consent of the Reich Minister of the Interior.

Article 3

Whoever violates deliberately or negligently a regulation which the Reich Minister of Economics has issued on the basis of this law, or executive orders thereto, is punishable with a fine or imprisonment up to one year. The prosecution (Strafverfolgung) is effected only upon application by the Reich Minister of Economics. The application may be repealed.

Article 4

No compensation will be made for a damage which arises from the measure on the basis of this law.

Article 5

Associations of members of the Reich Food Estate with the exception of members according to Article 1, paragraphs 1 to 10, sub b. of the 3rd Decree on the Preliminary Structure of the Reich Food Estate of 16 February 1934 (Reichsgesetzblatt I, page 100) and associations of members of the Reich Chamber of Culture do not come under this law.

Insofar as associations of members of the Reich Food Estate according to Article 1, paragraphs 1 to 10, sub b. of the 3rd Decree on the Preliminary Structure of the Reich Food Estate and associations of Transportation are concerned, the Reich Minister of Economics exercises the authority stated in Articles 1 to 3 with the consent of the competent Minister having jurisdiction (Fachminister); he can delegate the authority to the competent Minister having jurisdiction.

Berlin, 27 February 1934.

The Reich Chancellor

Adolf Hitler

The Reich Minister of Economics

At the same time for
the Reich Minister of Food and
Agriculture

Dr. Schmidt

The Reich Minister for the Interior

Frick

The Reich Minister of Transportation

Baron von Eltz

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

I, Alfred H. Booth U.S. Civilian AGO No. X-046254 hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document No. NI - 100.

ALFRED H. BOOTH
U.S. CIVILIAN
AGO NO. X-046254

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT No. NI - 6960
OFFICE OF CHIEF OF COUNSEL FOR WAR CRIMES

ANNOUNCEMENT :

The Government asks to celebrate 1 May as the holiday of industrial labor. Since the main issue is that on this day all of Germany should stand behind its Government, we are asking all colleagues and co-workers to join the rally on this day and thus to prove our will to co-operate. To show the personnel of our plant as a uniform group, we request that you adhere to the published organizational chart of the N.S.B.O., (Factory Cell Organization) which has been compiled in agreement with the other national agencies of the city of Wiesdorf.

The Management.

(signed): Dr. KUEHNE.

Leverkusen I.G. Werke, 25 April, 1933.

Stamp:

Direktorium der
I.G. Farbenindustrie
Aktiengesellschaft
Leverkusen b/ Koeln a/Rh.

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

20 June 1947

I, ROSENBERG E., Civ.No. 20076 hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages and that the above is a true and correct translation of the document No. NI - 6960.

ROSENBERG E.,
20 076.

19 May 1933

Dr. MAHL,

Leverkusen - I.G. Plant

We refer to our discussion of today. We also would welcome to have a suitable representation of the National-Socialist aims within the N.S. Factory Cell Organization (N.S.B.O.) of our plant in the near future.

Respectfully yours,

I.G. FARBE INDUSTRIE AKTIENGESELLSCHAFT

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

I. G. W. G. RAND, Civ. 143692, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document No. NI-1091.

30 November 1946

G. W. G. RAND
Civ. D-143692

No. 119.

Minutes

of the meeting of the Social Committee held
on 21 June 1933 at Ludwigshafen on Rhine.

The following people were present: Keller as chairman, Bertrams,
Kuhlmann, Gurschmann, Weiss.

.....
(page 3 of original)

.....
5) In several plants the workers' committee has advanced the demand
to be allowed to cooperate usefully when new employees are engaged.
It is established that this demand has no legal foundation and that
it must, therefore, be turned down. On the other hand there is no
reason why workers' committees, as has been done at other plants,
should not submit lists with proposals concerning workmen and clerks
about to be engaged. These would be taken into consideration wherever
it was found practical.

Following upon this, the new regulations concerning the employment
of members of semi-military organizations were discussed, and it was
agreed that it should be a matter of course, when engaging new people,
to give preference to members of semi-military organizations, if they
otherwise fill the requirements.

.....
CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

19 May 1947

I, Victoria ORTON, No. 20129, hereby certify that I am thoroughly
conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above
is a true and correct translation of excerpts of document no. NI-4884.

VICTORIA ORTON
20129

END

81

R E P O R T

of meeting of the Vorstand on 18 September 1933 at Hoechst on Main

PRESENT: Dr. HERMANN
Dr. ROHMER (Translator's Note:
Prof. LAUTENSCHLAGER Tick against Lauten-
Dr. JACOBI schläger and handwrit
Dir. JAEHNE note: Yes)
Dr. KRAEUSELEIN

Dir. SCHMAMBERG (Part of the time)

.....
(Page 3, last paragraph of original)

There was reason for giving warning in individual cases in the plant, against the contempt shown towards the German salute which had been introduced from the lowest ranks up. A notice is to be prepared in order to maintain peaceful working conditions.

.....
(Page 5, Paragraph 5 of original)

In Kammersdorf, a smoke screen test took place, with siliciumstra-chloride and ammonia water, in the presence of Dr. Meder of Hoechst. The smoke of the smoke acid (chlorsulphonic acid and fuming sulphuric acid) proved to be denser and heavier. The tests are to be continued, and corresponding preliminary tests are to be carried out beforehand on suitable sites at Hoechst.

.....
CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

I, DOROTHEA L. GALEWSKI, M.P. No. 34079, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages, and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document No. HI-5868.

DOROTHEA L. GALEWSKI
M.P. - 34079

(E N D)

TRANSLATION OF EXCERPTS FROM DOCUMENT No.
NI-5869
OFFICE OF CHIEF OF COUNSEL FOR WAR CRIMES

(Extracts)

Notes

on the meeting of the Vorstand (Board of Directors) on 30 October 1933,
in Frankfurt/Main.

Messrs.

Present: / Hermann
Lautenschlaeger
Jacobi
Jaehne Initials: Ju
Kraenzlein

.....
(page 2 of original)
.....

Hermann read out the dialogue for a radio-lecture on "the Chemical Industry", which Dr. Struss was requested to give in the near future; Hermann will pass on a few brief remarks on the subject to Dr. Struss.

The directors of the Hoe (Hoechst) works were invited to a public series of lectures by Gauschulungsleiter Professor Werner on the book "Mein Kampf", on Monday evenings at 8 o'clock. The invitation will be accepted.

.....

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

20 May 1947

I, JOHN FOSBERRY, Civ.No.20 179, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages and that the above is a true and correct translation of excerpts from the document No. NI-5869.

JOHN FOSBERRY, Civ.No.20179.

-1-
"END"

TRANSLATION OF EXCERPTS FROM DOCUMENT No. NI-5872
OFFICE OF CHIEF OF COUNSEL FOR WAR CRIMES

Memorandum

on the meeting of the Vorstand on 27 November 1933 in Hoechst/Main

Present: Dr. Hermann
Dr. Rohmer
Prof. Lautenschlager
Dir. Jacobi
Dir. Jachno
Dr. Kraenzlein

Mr. Schwamborn part of the time.

.....

The agreement of the association of employers regarding the training of SA-men is discussed and approved. The trainees remain members of the health insurance.

.....

(page 2 of original)

.....

The visit of Colonel Jacob of the Reich Ministry of Defense is discussed. The latter has expressed his appreciation of our co-operation and intends to thank us in writing. Army equipment for the creation of fog is being sent to Hoechst. The Navy too will take part in the experiments in future. Experiments with silicon tetrachloride will be made in Justerbog before Christmas.

.....

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

17 June 1947

I, A. MARTIN, No. E.00848, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages and that the above is a true and correct translation of excerpts from the document No. NI-5872.

.....
A. MARTIN, No. E.00848.

-1-
"END"

84

No. 5

R E P O R T

on meeting of the Vorstand and Technical Management on
5 March 1934 at Hoechst.

PRESENT: Dr. HERMANN
Prof. LAUTENSCHLAGER
Dr. JACOBI, Gr.,
Dir. JAEHNE
Dr. KRAENZLEIN
Dr. FLATO, (part of the time)
Dr. ROTH, "
Dr. von BRUENING "
Dr. FEHRLE, "
Dr. HILCKEN, "
Dr. LANDERS, "
Dr. PFAFFENDORF, "
Dir. SCHWAMBORN, "
Dr. TAMPE, "

.....
(Page 1, Paragraph 3, of original)

In agreement with the para-military organizations (Wehrverbände)
a ruling has been fixed in written form regarding leave of absence and
payment to participants at military sports camps.
.....

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

I, DOROTHEA L. GALEWSKI, M.P. No 34079, hereby certify that I am
thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the
above is a true and correct translation of Document No. NL-5873.

DOROTHEA L. GALEWSKI
M.P. 34079

(E N D)

TRANSLATION OF EXTRACT FROM DOCUMENT NO. NI-4840
OFFICE OF CHIEF OF COUNSEL FOR WAR CRIMES

I. G. Farbenindustrie Aktiengesellschaft
Technical Commission

Leverkusen. - I.G. Plant.
14 November 1934

(Translator's Note

Stamp:

Tea-Buero (Office of Technical
Committee)
Department A.
Received: 15 Nov. 1934
passed on.....
settled.....)

To
Geheimrat Prof. Dr. Bosch,
for attention of Dr. C. Duisberg, Office of Central Committee, Frankfurt a.M.,
Geheimrat Prof. Dr. Duisberg, Leverkusen,
Geheimrat Dr. von Weinberg, Frankfurt a.M.

To the Members of the Technical Committee:

Director D. Kuehne,	Leverkusen,
Director Dr. ter Meer,	Frankfurt a.M.,
Director Dr. Gaus,	Ludwigshafen,
Director Dr. Krauch,	Ludwigshafen,
Director Dr. O. Seidel,	Ludwigshafen,
Director Prof. Dr. Hoerlein,	Elberfeld,
Director Dr. Pistor,	Bitterfeld,
Director Dr. Gajewski,	Wolfen-Film
Director Dr. Hermann,	Frankfurt-Hoechst.

To the Members of the Teko (Technical Commission):

Director Jaehne,	Frankfurt-Hoechst,
Director Dr. Sauer,	Leunawerke,
Obering, von der Hey,	Bitterfeld,
Obering, Dr. Eymann,	Ludwigshafen
Obering, Ricas,	Wolfen-Film.

Subject: Teko (Technical Commission) Meeting

I am sending you enclosed the report on the meeting of the Technical
Commission (Technische Kommission) which took place on 8 November 1934 in
Frankfurt-Hoechst.

(Signature) Einsler

Distribution List:

As addressees above.....17
Bitterfeld 4
Leunawerke..... 2
Leverkusen..... 3
Ludwigshafen..... 3
Hoechst (Management Dept.)..... 7
Wolfen-Film..... 3
Frankfurt a.M. (Tea-Buero)..... 1
40

(Translator's Note:
Various illegible
initials)

(Page 2 of original)

REPORT

of meeting of the Technical Commission on 8 November 1934 in Frankfurt a.M.--
Hoechst.

Present:

Jachen,	Frankfurt a.M.--Hoechst (Chair),
Sauer,	Leunawerke,
Einsler,	Leverkusen,
von der Bey,	Bitterfeld,
Eymann,	Ludwigshefen,
Riess,	Wolfen-Film

Agenda:

- 1) Report of meeting of the Norko (Normungskommission) (Standardising Commission) on 10 October 1934.
- 2) Report of the meeting of the Waeko (Währungskommission) (Currency Commission) on 16 October 1934.
- 3) Patent matters.
 - a) License agreement with firm Lurgi-Apparatebau Gesellschaft MBH Frankfurt/Main. Re: Electro-filter-installations.
 - b) Patent application IG No. 5969, graded scale for oscillators (?) (Ablesnetz fuer Schwing Maschinen)
 - c) Agreement with Banag-Meguin AG, Berlin (Banag)
 - d) Patent application fire fighting ladder
- 4) Association of Owners of Boilers (Vereinigung der Grosskesselbesitzer)/organization questions "Z.V.--A.V."
- 5) Questions on artisan replacements.
 - a) Dinta tripartite agreement.
 - b) Dinta Work Council meeting (Dinta-Arbeitstagung).
 - c) Hoechst report of the discussion on 24.10.1934. with the Chief Committee for Vocational Training at the Rhein-Main Association for Industry and Commerce (Rhein-Mainische Industrie-und Handelstag).
- 6) Credits.
- 7) Reports.

The Hoechst oscillators (?) (Schwing Maschinen) in Chemo-Technics.
- 8) Miscellaneous.

(Page 3 of original)

.....
Item 5. Questions concerning artisan replacements

a) Dinta-Tripartite Agreement.

As the value of the Dinta training course lies less in the technical field than in the field of ideology, the Teko (Technical Commission) considers the participation in such courses by gentlemen suitable for it as commendable.

(Page 4 of original)

b) Dinta Work Council Meeting of 27/30 October 1934 in Düsseldorf. Leverkusen Report.

Einsler gave a short report on the proceedings of the meeting.

c) Hoechst report on the discussion on 24 October 1934 with the Chief Committee of the Rhine-Main Association for Industry and Commerce (Rhein-Mainische Industrie-und Handelskammer).

In the proposed training course for welders it is recommended that care be taken that it be acknowledged that qualified workers, also have the right to work on machinery which is subject to official inspection (abnahmepflichtige Apparaten). On the other hand, in general work there are to be no restrictions regarding work which welders are permitted to do.

.....
Item 8. Sundry Items.

The Technical Committee considers the introduction of the price for 1,000,000 calories of fuel in the quarterly exchange tables (Austauschtabellen) for power as desirable.

In accordance with report of the Technical Committee (Teko-Niederschrift) dated 25/26 January 1934 (page 6) the members of the offices for examination of materials (Materialprüfungsstellen) informed themselves on the condition of our work. The Technical Commission is contemplating a meeting of these gentlemen at Bitterfeld in the spring of 1935 at the latest.

For exchange of experience as regards technical material, the existing procedure of exchange of experience through the Technical Committee is to be used.

(Page 5 of original)

However, Leverkusen undertakes, for the purpose of obtaining directives, but taking local conditions into consideration, to call the piece work fixing technicians (akkord-ingenieure) together from time to time.

After close of the meeting, the air raid precaution measures so far taken at Hoechst and the corresponding installations, and then the new boiler house, were inspected.

It is contemplated to hold the next meeting in Rottweil.

Leverkusen. I.G. Plant.

12 November 1934

signed Jaehne

(signature) Einsler

.....

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

I, DOROTHEA L. GALEWSKI, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document No. NI-4840.

DOROTHEA L. GALEWSKI,
AGO 34079

END

Copy 6
Doc Bk 4

REICH LEGAL GAZETTE PART I 1934, edited in

Berlin, on 1 December 1934

No. 131.

.....

First decree for the execution of the law for the preparation of the organic construction of German economy. Of 27 November 1934.

On the basis of paragraph 2 of the law for the preparation of the organic construction of German economy of 27 February 1934 (Reich Legal Gazette I, page 185) it is decreed:

S e c t i o n I

Construction of professional economy

Par. 1.

The commercial economy will be combined and divided by subject and district.

The organization and the public-legal representations of professional economy will be organically combined.

.....

S e c t i o n III

Appointment and competence of the leader
of the section

Par. 11

Every section of professional economy will receive a leader who will work without pay.

The leaders of the Reich-sections and the main sections of industry will be appointed and dismissed by the Reich Minister of Economics.

The leaders of the economic sections will be appointed by the Reich Minister of Economics at the suggestion of the leader

(Page 2 of original)

of the Reich Section (the principal section of the industry) and will be dismissed after he has been heard. The leaders of the special groups (Fachgruppen) and special sub-groups (Fach untergruppen) will be appointed by the leader of the Reich Section (the principal section of the industry) and will be dismissed after he has been heard. The leaders of the district section of a Reich-section and the branch offices of such district sections will be appointed and dismissed by the leader of the Reich Section, and the leaders of the district groups will be appointed and dismissed by the leader of the economic section in cooperation with the leader of the economic chamber (Wirtschaftskammer).

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO. NI-10545
Cont'd

The district sub-groups of a district organization which are connected with the chambers of industry and commerce, and branch offices of district groups are subordinated in regard to subject matters to the leader of the district group and in regard to district matters to the chairman of the chamber,

Par. 12

The leader decrees the by-laws of the section. The by-laws must be in accordance with the regulations of this decree.

Par. 13.

With the approval of the leaders of the section on the next higher level the leader of a section appoints deputies and one or more managers, as needed, who conduct current business according to his instructions.

.....

Certificate

I, JOHN J. BOLL, U.S. Civilian, AGO NO. A-444412, hereby certify that the above are true excerpts as indicated of the Reich Legal Gazette (Reichsgesetzblatt) 1934 edition, Part I, No. 131, of 1 December 1934

(Signature) JOHN J. BOLL
(Typed) John J. Boll
U.S. Civilian
AGO NO. A-444412

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

I, JOHN J. BOLL, AGO NO. A-444412, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document No. NI-10545.

JOHN J. BOLL
U.S. Civilian
AGO NO. A-444412

END

MILITARY TRIBUNAL NO.
CASE NO. 6
Prosecution Document Book No. *IV*

Englisch



INDEX TO DOCUMENT BOOK V

Document Number	Exhibit Number	Description	Document Book Page
NI-7123	0	Memorandum of 15 September 1933, concerning discussion in the Reich Air Ministry between officials of the Air Ministry and the Army Ordnance Office at which the difficulties of military rearmaments are discussed. Milch approves enlargements of production at Bitterfeld, approved "a new electron-metal finishing plant", and refers to General Bockelberg "a memo" of the I.G. Farben (Dr. Krauch) concerning the expansion of raw materials bases (with particular reference to oil) and suggested a joint energetic approach to the competent agencies in this matter.	1
NI-7626		Letter WC 170. Report of discussions in the Ministry of Economics dated 7 November 1933, at which officials of the Ministry discussed with Army officials subsidies for important firms. Farben's hydrogenation process specifically mentioned, and production of synthetic rubber.	5
NI-861		Agreement between I.G. Farben (Ammoniak Werk Mersoburg) and Reich Government concerning production of gasoline dated 14 December 1933.	9
NI-319		Carbon copy of letter from I.G. Farben (signed Bosch and Schmitz) to Reich Minister of Economics of 14 December 1933, giving their consent to the agreement between Reich and Ammoniak Werk, Mersoburg. (It should be noted that Bosch and Schmitz, who signed for I.G. Farben, also signed for Ammoniak Werk, Mersoburg.)	15
NI-320		Memorandum of Reich Chancellery of 10 January 1934, stating that the gasoline agreement between the Reich and I.G. Farben was submitted to Hitler and that he took notice thereof.	16



INDEX TO DOCUMENT BOOK V

Document Number	Exhibit Number	Description	Document Book Page
NI-8326		Affidavit of Struss, authenticating notes concerning discussions about Buna plans between Farben officials and Wehrmacht and other Reich authorities, 1933-1938.	17
NI-8327		Speech by Struss on Four Year Plan, delivered 13 May 1938.	27
NI-6194		Report by the High Command of the Armed Forces, Military Economics Staff (OKW/Wehrwirtschaftsstab) dated end of March 1941, showing the indispensability of rubber to the motorization and mechanization of the Armed Forces; showing Germany's lack of natural supplies; and tracing the history of the synthetic rubber program.	56
NI-8317		Affidavit by Struss of 2 June 1947, concerning I.G. Farben's construction of a secret magnesium plant in Aachen for the Luftwaffe in 1933.	74
NI-2747		History of the V/W compiled by Eichwede, stating that "since 1934 conferences and discussions with various military offices and authorities in Berlin became more and more numerous and urgent."	77
NI-4702		Letter by Krauch of 5 September 1935, stating that the Central Committee has created the V/W to provide systematic cooperation within the I.G. Farben for current developments of military economy.	80
NI-8321		Affidavit by Struss on war games and mob preparations.	82
NI-4619		Report by Kuehne of December 1936, on "Military Economic Tactical Planning Exercise" in Leverkusen to take place in January, 1937.	86
NI-5929		Correspondence between Reich Air Ministry and I.G. Farben in October 1933, concerning an article in a French periodical referring to final experiments by I.G. Farben, Oppau, on a poison gas against which no protection was available.	103

INDEX TO DOCUMENT BOOK V.

Document Number	Exhibit Number	Description	Document Book Page
NI-4953		tion Affidavit by Ehrmann of 18 March 1947, on early coope- ration of I.G. Farben in mo- bilization work.	105
NI-1165		Letter from I.G. Farben Stassfurt (signed Conrad) addressed to Prokurist Franz in Bitterfeld, dated 21 Oc- tober 1936, on stand-by plant for electron metal in Stass- furt.	108
NI-5762		Letter from I. G. Farben of 28 August 1935, signed by Pistor to Buhl, I.G. Frankfurt, enclos- ing minutes of conference with Zahn of Army Ordnance Office of 23 August 1935, re-agreement on establishment of diglykol plant at Wolfen; the plan to construct a stand-by plant for stabilizers (to be used only in case of war); and the pro- duction of hexogene by DAG.	110
NI-5761		Strictly confidential memoran- dum signed by Pistor on a Discus- sion with Zahn, Army Ordnance Official, in Berlin on 19 Sep- tember 1935, concerning Diglykol (explosives ingredient).	113
NI-6144		1942 contract between the German Reich and I.G. Farben, where under Farben authorizes the Army Ordnance Office to use "free of charge for an unlimited time.... for purpose of the German Wehrmacht its pro- cess for the manufacture of Hexo- gene which Farben had developed in 1935, on its own initiative."	116
NI-6498		Strictly confidential letter of 13 December 1935, from Dynamit A.G. Nobel in Troisdorf to Direc- tor Kraenzlein of I.G. Farben Hoechst for the Army Ordnance Office con- taining information about the cooperation of I.G. Farben and Dynamit A.G. in the production of explosives.	120

INDEX TO DOCUMENT BOOK V

Document Number	Exhibit Number	Description	Document Book Page
NI-7135		Letter from V/W, Sparto I, of 20 February 1936, signed by Ritter, to the Reich War Ministry (Military Economy Office) concerning the con- struction of a stand-by plant for production of con- centrated nitric acid.	122
NI-5910		Minutes of the meeting of the Technical Management at Frankfurt, 3 August 1936, w/ with Hermann and Jaehne pre- sent. Staib, who was also present, informs the meeting of a new process for the production of Siliciumtetra- chloride smoke screen tests from which I.G. Far- ben is excluded. Von Heider and Staib will approach Ber- lin authorities in order to assure that I.G. Farben will receive sufficient Silicium- tetrachloride.	124
NI-4490		File note of Pistor, deceased Vorstand member, on discussion with Zahn of 13 September 1936. Zahn had conferred on Germa- ny's chlorine situation with Ritter (V/W Sparto), and was apprehensive that there was in- sufficient chlorine for Case A. Pistor and Zahn discussed lo- cation of new calcium sulphuric acid plant and Zahn said still two more plants were needed as emergency or preparedness plants. Diglycol capacity of Ludwigshafen mentioned as suf- ficient for present, since all powders not yet tested. Soon I.G. Farben must increase phos- gene production, etc.	125
NI-4486		Memorandum of 17 December 1936, on a visit of Zahn to I.G. Far- ben Wolfen and Bitterfeld. Zahn indicates that in view of the shortage of glycerine it was ur- gently necessary that the Diglycol plant at Wolfen be put into opera- tion on 1 March 1937.	127
NI-4487		Confidential letter of 17 Decem- ber 1936, from Pistor to Buhl stating that I.G. Farben Bitter- feld had had a visit from Zahn who informed	128

INDEX TO DOCUMENT BOOK V

Document Number	Exhibit Number	Description	Document Book Page
		them that the main agreement regarding Diglycol had been signed. Zahn had indicated that immediately the first Diglycol plant was ready it would be necessary to put it into operation.	
HI-4489		File memorandum of 11 January 1937, of distance conversation between Wittner of I.G. Farben and Zahn of the Army Ordnance Office regarding the plant in Ammendorf which had to be put into operation promptly. The Wolfen plant was discussing from the point of view of completing formalities speedily and putting the plant into operation promptly.	129
HI-4492		Memorandum of 20 January 1937, on a discussion in Berlin between Zahn of the Army Ordnance Office and Buhl, Pistor and Virck of I.G. Farben. Buhl's draft of lease agreement for the plant for production of Diglycol was discussed and the estimates sent to the Army Ordnance Office for increasing the production of the Diglycol plant to 400 tons per month and the phosgene plant to 600 tons per month were being checked.	130
HI-4494		Letter from I.G. Farben Wolfen, signed by Virck, to Buhl, I.G. Farben Frankfurt, of 8 February 1937 enclosing a memorandum regarding a visit to the Army Ordnance Office on 4 February 1937. The above-mentioned memorandum reveals that the products Diglycol, especially, was discussed from the point of view of estimated production capacity at Wolfen and Ludwigshafen and storage facilities.	132
HI-4496		Correspondence dated 16, 17, 18 March 1937 between Boeckler of the Legal Department of I.G. Farben at Ludwigshafen and Buhl, with reference to the agreements prepared by Buhl for the Diglycol plant at Wolfen, originally planned as a mere standby plant but already put in operation. Obligation for keeping strict secrecy is stressed.	135
HI-5763		Letter of 25 March 1937 from Pistor to Buhl revealing that the Wolfen plant was about to go into operation and its production would go to the explosive factories Tassag and Dynamit Nobel. An enclosed letter from the Army High Command to I.G. Farben of 15 March 1937 discloses that office OMH is in agreement with Farben to put the Diglycol plant at Wolfen into operation as quickly as possible.	138
HI-4634		Secret file memorandum of V/1, signed Wagner, on substance for decontamination of weapons, of 25 June 1938. This memorandum reveals that officials of V/1 were invited on 25 June 1938	142

INDEX TO BOOK V

Document Number	Exhibit Number	Description	Document Book Page
		to the Army High Command and spoke there to pharmacists. The production of the substance for the decontamination of weapons in Wolfen according to the discussion at the Army High Command, is to be brought up immediately to the greatest capacity possible at the present time, i.e., 17 tons per month. The increase to 34 tons per month is not to be carried out by 1 September 1938.	
NI-4637		Strictly confidential letter of 14 July 1938 from Zentraleinkauf, Berlin, to Ludwig, Leverkusen, concerning the purchase of additional Toluel for the manufacture of explosives by the standby point.	144
NI-5890		Minutes of the meeting of the Technical Directors in Hoechst, 22 August 1938, present Lautenschlaeger and Kraenzlein, who reported on a visit of von der Linde, Army Ordnance Office, and Wagner of V/1, concerning Acetophenon in which the A.O.O. is very interested. The experiments are to be carried out on a large scale.	146
NI-6497		Letter from Army High Command, Army Ordnance Office, to I.G. Farben of 2 March 1939 concerning a meeting of the High Command of the Wehrmacht with leading personalities of I.G. Farben, who were to receive a short report on the most important work and problems of the Army's Examination Group IX of the High Command.	147
NI-4989		Contract between Reich, represented by the Army High Command and I.G. Farben of September/October 1941 concerning the operation of a "Montan" plant at Dyhernfurth and a poison gas factory.	148
NI-5668		Report of nitrogen conference at Leuna on 22 December 1937 showing increase in nitrogen production in 1937 throughout Four Year Plan.	162
NI-1319		Excerpt from "Von Werk zu Werk", January 1941, setting forth an article by Krauch on Hermann Schnitz and his achievements in German industrial life.	167
NI-6489		Letter of 25 February 1938 from "Bayer" to a foreign representative, on support of the NSDAP by Farben officials abroad.	170

INDEX TO BOOK V.

<u>Document</u> <u>Number</u>	<u>Exhibit</u> <u>Number</u>	<u>Description</u>	<u>Document Book</u> <u>Page</u>
NI-8590		Letter by Leob of 25 November 1937 to Backe reporting on the achievements of the first year for the Four Year Plan, and reciting the contributions of German industry. In the margin opposite the word "industry" appears a red pencil note "I.G. Farben".	171
NI-8594		Report of 21 April 1943 prepared by Eckel for Krauch showing the effect of the overall war effort which the bombing of I.G. Farben plants would have.	178
NI-10002		Chart of the sales and gross profits of I.G. Farbenindustrie A.G. of 11 June 1947 with affidavit by Helmut Deich-Fischer.	181
NI-10014		Affidavit by Helmut Deich-Fischer of 11 June 1947 explaining how Chart NI-10002 was compiled.	182
NI-10003		Chart "Net Profit of I.G. Farbenindustrie A.G." with affidavit by Helmut Deich-Fischer of 11 June 1947.	184
NI-10015		Affidavit by Helmut Deich-Fischer of 11 June 1947 explaining how Chart NI-10003 was compiled.	185

Copy

Discussion in the Reich Air Ministry on 15.9.33

TOP SECRET

<u>Present:</u> Lt. Gen. v. Bockelberg	}	Wa A (Ordnance Office Dept. A)
Lt. Col. Thomas		
Lt. Col. Stud		
State Sec. Milch	}	L.H. (Air Ministry)
Colonel Kever		
Lt. Col. Wimmer		
Major (ret) Wegner		
Captain Jeschonek	}	

1. Procurement Order 33/35 of the L.H. (only fighter aircraft).

Lt. Col. Wimmer presented briefly the Procurement Programme already known to Wa A., and emphasized that the present programme represents the 1st stage of the rearmament of the Luftwaffe. The target of the final rearmament to be aimed at was not yet fixed, but it could be reckoned approximately that this rearmament would in five years reach three times the position of the 1st stage (1.10.35).

For the rest, the L.H. would regard the two yearly periods (1.10.34 and 1.10.35) of the 1st stage as a whole. If therefore the requirements specified for the 1st yearly period were not reached in individual procurement areas, i.e. by 1.10.34, the delivery of the remainder for that year could take place in the 2nd yearly period, i.e. by 1.10.35.

L.H. requested, however, that, as soon as enquiries were concluded, they should be furnished with a statement of the deliveries to be expected up to 1.10.34 and the position in regard to manufacture at this date (Wa B (Armament Office, Dept. B) in conjunction with Wa Wd (Armament Office Economics?)).

With regard to the st.M.G. (Machine Guns) 08/15 for the 1st year, it could be stated that these were already available, whereas for the same M.G. of the 2nd year, M.G. 08/15 would be taken from stocks and would have to be suitably mounted.

State Secretary Milch expressed the desire that the completion of the construction of the M.G. 17, which is later to replace the M.G. 08/15 should be accelerated as much as possible (Wa Prw).

Lt. Gen. v. Bockelberg requested that Wa A be informed as soon as possible as to the intended full programme of the Air Rearmament and also as to the required monthly replenishment figures, as the framework of the preliminary manufacturing preparations would be materially dependent on these. This was promised.

(Ms.: To be filed 2550)

Lt. Gen. v. Bockelberg then expounded the difficulties which existed in the different fields of procurement and the intended remedies.

(Ms.: 26/9 2646)

(page 2 of original)

State Secretary Milch expressed his agreement with the proposals to bring in new firms for the manufacture and especially approved the installation of a new tube rolling mill, of the enlargement of production at Bitterfeld and of a new electron metal finishing plant on the basis of Magnesium-chloride. This applied also to the manufacturing preparations for Thorrite which would become necessary. When it was pointed out the high costs which would be incurred for manufacturing preparations, State Secretary Milch declared that the necessary means would be made available.

With regard to the very high replenishment requirements in electron metal bombs it was pointed out on the part of Wa A that the manufacturing preparations would presumably necessitate the erection of a number of new electron metal works and probably even new electric power plants which could not be maintained by peacetime orders.

L.M. reserved its decision on this point and intended at first, so far as stocks and replenishment possibilities in E.-bombs permit to secure continuance of supply through stock reserves and possibly to provide for an expansion of production only in A-Fall.

State Secretary Milch requested that Wa A should examine whether another metal with a basis of German raw material could not be used instead of electron metal for the incendiary bombs. (Wa Prw).

For the safeguarding of replenishments in Explosives for the C-bombs L.M. declared its agreement with stockpiling of Tri. and Toluiol. For the extension of the Toluiol basis, further steps should be initiated by the L.M. and Ru. Min. (?Reich Ministry of Economics) as soon as possible, in conjunction with the "New Order" for fuel oil economy (Wa Wf -?Armament Economic Office?).

L.M. requested to be kept currently informed of the intended manufacturing preparations and costs incurred.

2. Manufacturing preparations in fields reserved to the L.M.
L.M. has entrusted Dr. Doves (Pruef. & Forschungsgemeinschaft Vereinigte Stahlwerke und Siemenswerke) with the working out of a plan for securing the finishing of certain semi-finished products and semi-finished parts (for instance, aircraft-frame-tubing from steel, crankshafts and so on).

(page 3 of original)

On completion, the plan will be sent to Wa A.

3. Securing of Fuel Oil.
State Secretary Milch handed to Lt. Gen. v. Bockelberg a memorandum of the I.G. (Dr. Krauch) concerning the expansion of the home raw materials basis and suggested a joint energetic approach to the competent agencies in this matter. It would be necessary to appoint a commissar for carrying out the necessary steps.

Lt. Gen. v. Bockelberg promised examination of the memorandum and joint action (Wa Wf).

(page 3 of original cont'd)

4. Decision concerning development and procurement of Aircraft Radio Apparatus.

As a result of detailed representations by the L.H. to the effect that the radio apparatus was less an information apparatus for the Luftwaffe than a navigation instrument, the further development of which in this direction was of vital importance to the Luftwaffe, Lt. Gen. v. Bockelberg expressed his agreement that aircraft wireless apparatus should be developed by the L.H. in closest touch with Wa A.

L.H. expressly promised exchange of results and the closest collaboration (Liaison officer of the In 7). Wa A to continue to be responsible for the procurement of aircraft wireless apparatus, and the Construction Control of the L.H. to take charge of delivery.

(Signed) v. Bockelberg.

Wa A
No. 1248/33 G.K. Wa M

Copy

20 Sept. 33

To the Chief Wa B (Ordnance Office)	}	against personal receipt
Dept. B		
To the Chief Wa Prw		
To the Chief Chief Eng.		
To the Chief Wa M	}	I
To the Chief Wa M II		

The preparations for procurement and manufacturing preparations are to be continued with vigour.

Re No. 1:

After conclusion of the enquiries instituted, will Wa B in conjunction with Wa M report to me as soon as possible concerning the intentions with regard to the effecting of the procurements and

(page 4 of original)

of the manufacturing preparations (together with statement of the costs).

Will Wa Prw report to me as soon as possible regarding the possibility and means of testing another metal instead of electron for incendiary bombs.

Re No. 2:

On receipt of the plan of Dr. Domes, report will be made through Wa M, in conjunction with Wa B and possibly Wa Prw through Wa M.

Re No. 4:

Wa M will arrange for supplementary written confirmation of the agreement arrived at, which has received the full approval of the Minister.

(Signed): v. Bockelberg

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT No. NI-7123
CONTINUED

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

12 July 1947

I, VICTORIA ORTON, No. 20129, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages and that the above is a true and correct translation of the document No. NI-7123.

VICTORIA ORTON, No. 20129.

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT No. NI-7828
OFFICE OF CHIEF OF COUNSEL FOR WAR CRIMES

handwritten: (Draft copy)

Wa H
to Nr. 1750/33 Top Secret No 1 (a)

7 November 1933

3 copies

original

(Stamp) TOP SECRET

File

13 November (initialed)

Result of the Conference at the Reich Ministry

for Economy on 6 November 1933

Present: Reich Minister for Economy SCHLINT)

Ministerialdirektor FUSSE)

Ministerialrat GADLESKI)

Reich Ministry

for Economy

State Secretary HILCH)

Oberstleutnant (Lt. Col) WIEBER)

Hauptmann (Capt.) JESCHONWISK)

Reich Air Ministry

General der Artillerie von BUCKELBERG)

Major MARLIANT)

Reich War Ministry

General von BUCKELBERG reports to the Reich Minister for Economy on the wishes of the Wehrmacht (Armed Forces) in the field of economy.

The first part of his exposition deals with the request to the Reich Minister for Economy to watch the interests of Reich defence, when forming the entire economic policy, by granting consideration to the wishes of the Reich War Ministry and Reich Air Ministry to the greatest extent possible. Examples are given from all fields which are come into consideration.

A number of special wishes in the way of organization and material for the actual A-preparations (preparations for the "A-Fall") is submitted in the second part.

handwritten: File R.V.R - II

(page 2 of original)

The Reich Minister for Economy states that he will, as far as possible, see that war economic aspects are considered; however, after a closer examination of some of the examples quoted, he emphasizes how difficult it is to bring these into line with the aspects of peace time economy which must not be neglected either.

State Secretary HILCH supports the detailed explanations of the Office Chief Wa A (Amtschef Wa A), specially stressing the point, that when decisions are made, war economic aspects must take priority until such time as some sort of adequate basis can be found in middle Germany for dealing with the question of the supplies necessary in the event of a war.

(page 2 of original cont'd)

In conclusion it is agreed that the detailed preliminary estimates for securing supplies by the stockpiling of raw materials and the enlargement of raw material plants and depots, which at present are being worked out by the Army Ordnance Office, should be submitted to the Reich Ministry for Economy in the near future and should serve as bases for further measures.

(illegible) (initials) B.
initials, 8 November (illegible)
initials, 8 November

1. original (draft copy): File, appendix contains detailed information.
2nd Copy: Reich Air Ministry. handwritten note: special letter of
transmittal. From 9 Nov. 33
3rd Copy: Via Lt. Col. III Initialed P.
to Lt. Col. II

R.V.R.-II

(page 3 of original)

Report Notes for the Conference with the
Reich Minister for Economy.

- 1.) Safeguarding of the interests of Reich defence when forming
entire economic policy by giving fullest possible consideration
to the wishes of the Reich War Ministry.

The working plans issued in the spring of this year by the Reich War Minister, as executive organ of the Reich Defence Council, to be taken as basis.

On this basis, special committees created in the Reich Ministry for Economy for cooperation particularly in economic matters.

In spite of this, experience has often shown that there are conflicting interests between the aspects of peace time economy and war economy.

The following are the provinces in which there are special wishes: -

1. To maintain the inner-German production system in particular, by all suitable measures. To this belong:-
a) Customs legislation (protection of German mining of non-ferrous metal ores)
b) Tax legislation: supporting the wishes of the Reich War Ministry at the Reich Ministry of Finance.

(page 3 of original cont'd)

- c) Tariff matters: supporting the wishes of the Reich War Ministry at the Reich Transport Ministry and at the Reich Railroad Company.
(Example: no tariff for central Germany, lubricant imports from Holland to Hamburg)

handwritten:

Appendix to Draft No. 1550/33 Top secret R.V.R. - II

(page 4 of original)

- d) Support of individual, particularly important firms by official orders, etc.
- e) Setting-up of new plants in central Germany. (hydrogenation plant on the basis of the new Mineral Oil Law)
- f) Prevention of the extension of the long distance coal gas supply from the Ruhr area to central Germany.
- g) Encouragement of standardization.
- h) Subsidizing of types which are of importance to the Wehrmacht, particularly for motor vehicles.
- 2.) Preparations for the "A-Fall".
- a) Measures concerning organization.
Increasing the number of offices for specialists in matters of war economy in the sub-departments of the Reich Ministry for Economy.

Early establishment of provincial office of the Reich Ministry for Economy.
- b) Measures concerning materials.
Hard coal: Increase of storage capacity of the Reich Railroad, coal syndicates - (handwritten): gasworks and industrial concerns. simultaneously measures for labor allocation in distressed areas.

Iron ore: Increase of stocks at Central German Steelworks, simultaneously emergency measure for Siegerland mining.

Ferro-alloys: Stockpiling at the Central German Steelworks.

Nitric acid: Construction of a concentration plant has been started - to be assisted further.

(page 5 of original)

Toluol: Establishment of supply depots, increase of production by setting up new gas plants.

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO. NI-7828
CONTINUED

(page 5 of original cont'd)

Rubber: Encouraging synthetic production.

Fuels: Increased stockpiling and the enlargement of tanking plants in inner Germany to be made compulsory.

Electricity: (word inserted in handwriting, space left blank)

Detailed proposals and cost estimates for a program covering the next few years are being worked out.

Considerable financial means are required; can probably only be obtained by strong combined pressure upon the Reich Ministry of Finance.

(initialed) .B.

Initial: A. November
B.

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

4 August 1947

I, VICTORIA COTTON, 20129, herewith certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of document no. NI-7828.

VICTORIA COTTON, 20129

Benzin - Contract.

Der Reichswirtschaftsminister
(Reich Minister of Economics)
I A 17696/33

Der Reichsminister der Finanzen
(Reich Minister of Finances)
F. 6523 - 14 I

Berlin, 14 December 1933

To

Ammoniakwerk Merseburg G.m.b.H.

Leuna.

Gentlemen:

In connection with the contract concluded today between the Reich, represented by the Reichswirtschaftsminister and the Reichsminister der Finanzen on the one hand, and the Ammoniakwerk Merseburg GmbH on the other hand, we confirm that by reason of this contract Ammoniakwerk Merseburg GmbH does not take on the character of a subsidized enterprise in the sense of the Decree of the Reichspräsident for the Priming of Economy, Part IV, Chapter V (Reich Gesetzblatt I (Reich Law Gazette) pages 425,431) dated 4 September 1932.

Der Reichswirtschaftsminister
Signed: G. FEDER (Acting)

Der Reichsminister der Finanzen
Signed: v. KROSIGK

I.G. FARBENINDUSTRIE AKTIENGESellschaft

Berlin NW 7
Unter den Linden 78
14 December 1933

To the

Reichswirtschaftsminister
(Reich Minister of Economics)

Berlin W. 35.

Viktoriastrasse 34.

Sir:

In connection with the contract concluded today between the Reich, represented by the Reichswirtschaftsminister and the Reichsminister

TRANSLATION OF EXTRACT OF DOCUMENT
NO. NI-881
Cont'd

der Finanzen, on one hand, and Ammoniakwerk Merseburg GmbH, on the other hand, this is to confirm to you that this contract meets with out approval and that we accept the stipulations according to articles 3 and 6 as binding upon us.

Yours very truly,

I.G. FARBEINDUSTRIE AKTIENGESELLSCHAFT

Signed: BOSCH Signed: H. SCHMITZ

C o p y .

In connection with the conclusion on 14 December 1933 of the contract between the Reich represented by the Reichswirtschaftsminister (Minister of Economics) and the Reichsminister der Finanzen (Minister of Finances), on the one hand, and Ammoniakwerk Merseburg G.m.b.H., on the other hand, the following

a r b i t r a t i o n c o n t r a c t

is concluded:

To the extent that litigations between the parties refer to provisions of Articles 4, 8 or 9 of the contract or to agreements as yet to be reached relative to Article 8, these litigations shall be decided by an arbitrator under exclusion of the normal legal procedure. In case the two parties should not agree on a certain person the arbitrator is being appointed by the President of the Reichswirtschaftsgericht (National Economic Court) upon the proposal of one of the two parties and after hearing the other party.

Arbitration procedure provides for a counter-plea (Widerklage) or a plea setting-off the original claim (Aufrechnung) only if - according to the arbitration clause - the decision on the counter-claim asserted by the counter-plea, or by the plea setting-off the original claim is within the purview of the competence of the Court of Arbitration.

As regards the decision on the costs, the court of arbitration must decide by the principles of the Code of Civil Procedure (Articles 91 and following, of the Code of Civil Procedure).

This arbitration clause becomes void for the case of litigation in question, if an agreement on the value of the object in dispute and as to the amount of the arbitrator's fees is not reached among the parties themselves and with the arbitrators within three months. This term begins with the date on which one party for the first time submitted to the other party definite proposals on the value of the object in dispute and on the amount of the arbitrator's fees, with the request that the other party make a declaration within 3 months in order to avoid legal procedure according to the first sentence of this paragraph.

The Reichsminister der Finanzen has at the same time given his consent to this Agreement according to Article 1 of the Law of 10 October 1933 (Reich Law Gazette I, Page 722) for the Settlement by Arbitration of Controversies of the Reich and the States (Laender), which come under civil law.

TRANSLATION OF EXTRACT OF DOCUMENT
NO. NI-861
Cont'd

Berlin, 22 January 1934.

Der Reichswirtschaftsminister (Reich Minister of Economics)
Signed: G. FEDER (Acting)

Der Reichsminister der Finanzen (Reich Minister of
by order: Finances)
Signed: Dr. OLSCHNER

Ludwigshafen (Rhein), 17 January 1934

Ammoniakwerk Merseburg
Gesellschaft mit beschränkter Haftung
Signed: v. KNIERIEM Signed: (per) WEISS.

B e t w e e n

the Reich, represented by the Reich Minister of Economics (Reichswirtschaftsminister) and the Reich Minister of Finances (Reichsminister der Finanzen)

a n d

Ammoniakwerk Merseburg G.m.b.H. (Ammoniakwerk) the following c o n t r a c t is concluded:

Article 1.

(1) Ammoniakwerk pledges itself to enlarge the installations for the production of synthetic benzine at Leuna to such an extent that within the period of 1 July 1934 to 31 December 1934 a production of minimum 80,000 tons will be reached and by 31 December 1937, at the latest, a production of 300,000 tons as a minimum, and of 350,000 tons as a maximum, as applied for the year.

(2) Ammoniakwerk pledges itself to keep up this production for the duration of the contract (Articles 2,3) and to take steps for further developing the process which is applied.

(3) The benzine manufactured by Ammoniakwerk must be of a good, marketable quality.

Article 2.

For benzine produced after 1 July 1934 in quantities according to Article 1, the Reich guarantees to Ammoniakwerk for the duration of 10 years, i.e. until 30 June 1944, a price in marks which corresponds to the costs of production (guarantee price, Article 4).

(Page 2 of original)

Article 3.

(1) The Reich pledges itself to take measures for the sale of the quantities of benzine manufactured according to Paragraph 1 during the period of 1 July 1934 to 30 June 1944 to the extent that the sale is not possible by way of Deutsche Gasolin Aktiengesellschaft, Berlin, and within the scope of

TRANSLATION OF EXTRACT OF DOCUMENT
NO. NI-881
Cont'd

contracts in force at the time the contract is being consummated by way of I.G. Farbenindustrie Aktiengesellschaft for Ammoniakwerk on the one hand, and by way of Standard Oil Company New Jersey for its subsidiary, the Deutsch-Amerikanische Petroleum Gesellschaft, Hamburg, and Royal Dutch Shell for its subsidiary Rhenania-Ossag Mineraloelwerke Akt.Ges., Hamburg, on the other hand.

(2) Ammoniakwerk is entitled to sell the quantities of benzine produced - entirely or in part - by way of sales agencies other than the ones mentioned in paragraph 1, provided this does not result in a reduction of the ex-works proceeds for Ammoniakwerk; contracts which provide for a sale under terms less favorable than the terms according to paragraph 1 and 2, sentence 1, are subject to the approval of the Reich Minister of Economics in order to become effective.

(3) The obligation of the Reich according to paragraph 1 exists only if Ammoniakwerk proves that the quantities of benzine as per paragraphs 1 and 2 are not marketable and that it is no fault of its own.

(Page 3 of original)

Article 4.

(1) The guarantee price is understood per 100 kgs ex Ammoniakwerk, placed aboard tank cars. For the first year of the contract the guarantee price according to the meaning of Article 2 amounts to 25 Reichsmarks per 100 kgs.

(2) The guarantee price is to be agreed on annually during the first three years and thereafter every two years, on the basis of a re-examination. In that respect modifications which in the course of the last period of time occurred in the process and in the technical equipment of similar enterprises, should be taken into consideration to the extent that these improvements are available to the plant and that their application by the plant can be demanded by reason of the situation prevailing.

(3) A renewed stipulation of the production costs can be requested by each of the two parties independently of the periods of time mentioned in paragraph 2 if for reasons on which the manufacturer has no influence the production costs rise or go down by more than 5%.

(4) The Reich Minister of Economics is authorized to carry through the re-examination according to paragraph 2 by a public auditor or by another delegate not coming into consideration as competitors. Ammoniakwerk is obligated to give the necessary information and to put the pertinent data at the disposal.

(Page 4 of original)

(5) The production costs must make allowance for reasonable depreciation and the payment of 5% interest on the investment capital.

Article 5.

Every three months the Ammoniakwerk provides proof to the Reich as regards the proceeds, ex plant, derived by it from sales effected by the sales agencies according to Article 3. If after deduction of the mineral oil tax and the alcohol charges, the proceeds are below the guarantee price the Reich refunds the differential; on the other hand, if the proceeds are higher the Ammoniakwerk pays the amount of the differential to the Reich.

TRANSLATION OF EXTRACT OF DOCUMENT
NO. NI-881
Cont'd

Article 6.

I.G. Farbenindustrie Aktiengesellschaft has pledged itself towards the Ammoniakwerk to make use of its contractual rights for examination towards the sales agencies, incidental to the settlement of accounts for the proceeds, and to place the examination report together with the vouchers at the disposal of the Ammoniakwerk.

Article 7.

The Reich Minister of Economics is authorized to make at any time an inspection of such sections of Ammoniakwerk as are connected with the production of benzine and to audit the accounting for the proceeds according to the directions of Article 4, paragraph 4.

The Rechnungshof des Deutschen Reichs (Supreme Auditing Court of the Reich) has authority for examination according to the meaning of the Reichshaushaltsordnung (State Budget Rules) Article 45 c.

(Page 5 of original)

Article 8.

Directives for the establishment of the production costs according to Articles 2 and 4, Paragraphs 2 and 3, and a calculation pattern, as well as instructions on the details of the computation of the proceeds and the accounting on differential amounts (Article 5), are being attached to this contract as an appendix constituting an integral part of this Contract.

Article 9.

If while the contract is in force a legal adjustment affecting the mineral oil company takes place which has bearing on the contract situation, each of the parties is entitled to demand an adaptation of the legal status to such law regulations, with the provision that placing any of the parties at a disadvantage must be avoided.

Article 10.

For litigations arising out of this Contract the Landgericht (District Court) Berlin is the competent court.

Article 11.

Ammoniakwerk pays the fees incidental to this Contract (stamps etc.).

Berlin, 14 December 1933.

The Reich Minister of Economics
Signed: G. FEDER (Acting)

Ammoniakwerk Merseburg
G.m.b.H.

The Reich Minister of Finances
Signed: v. KHOSIOW

Signed: BOSCH Signed: H. SCHMITZ

TRANSLATION OF EXTRACT OF DOCUMENT
NO. NL-881
Cont'd

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

I, HERTHA C. KNUTH, AGO NO. X-046355, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document No. NL-881.

HERTHA C. KNUTH
U.S. Civilian
AGO NO. X-046355

END

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO. XI-319
OFFICE OF CHIEF OF COUNSEL FOR THE CRI

C O P Y

I.G. Farbenindustrie
Aktien-Gesellschaft (Inc.)

Frankfort-on the Main, 14 Dec. 1935
Berlin

To the

Reich Minister of Economic Affairs,

34 Viktoriastrasse

Berlin W 35

In connection with the agreement concluded today between the Reich - represented by the Reich Minister of Economic Affairs and the Reich Finance Minister - on the one hand, and the Ammoniakwerke Hersburg G.m.b.H. (translator's note: ammonia works, Hersburg, limited liability) on the other hand, we confirm to you that this agreement accords with our approval and that we accept the provisions as per paragraphs 3 and 6 as binding for us.

I.G. Farbenindustrie
Aktien-Gesellschaft (Inc.)

(Typed) sig. Bosch

sig. Schmitz

RK 14390

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

I, HERTHA C. KNUTH, AGO No. X-046355, hereby certify that I thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of document No. XI-319.

HERTHA C. KNUTH,
U.S. Civilian,
AGO X-046355

END

15

RE. Rk. 14390. ^{II}

Berlin, 10 January 1934.

1.) N o t i c e

Undersecretary FEDER has expressed the request that the attested copy of the mineral oil agreement concluded between the German Reich and the I.G. Farbenindustrie be submitted to the Reich Chancellor with the request to take notice.

3.) Submitted to

the Under Secretary.

(Translator's Note: Handwritten initial)

- 1) (Translator's note: Stamp:)
The Reich Chancellor has taken notice
- 2) (Translator's Note: Handwritten notation)
Submitted for information

(Translator's Note: Handwritten initials):

L. 13 (Lammers, 13 January)

V. (Translator's note
z.d.A. (disposition: file)

W. (Willuhn)

Bergw. 6

(translator's Note: Handwritten initial:)
W 15/1 (Willuhn)

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

I, HERTHA C. KNUTH, AGO No. X-46355, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document No. W-320.

HERTHA C. KNUTH
U.S. Civilian
AGO No X-46355

(E N D)

16

Document No. NI-8326

A F F I D A V I T

I, Dr. Ernst STRUSS, Director of I. G. Farben, chief of the Office of the Technical Committee of the I.G., Secretary of the Technical Committee of the Vorstand of the I.G., chief of Sparte II of the Vermittlungsstelle W, and since 1943 production chief of the whole German dyestuffs industry within the Economic Group for Chemical Industry, having been warned that I will be liable to punishment for a false statement, hereby declare under oath voluntarily and without coercion:

The reports made in the document marked NI-306 were made by my former employee, Mr. Holmuth ROHDEMANN, in 1945. ROHDEMANN collaborated closely with me in this compilation and I have continually supervised the progress of his work. The content of Document NI-306 and the history of its origin are therefore known to me to the fullest extent, and to the best of my knowledge and belief it corresponds in all details to the whole truth. I have carefully checked document NI-306 which was submitted to me. This document, together with this affidavit, forms a single document and is herewith declared part of this affidavit. In appending my signature to this affidavit I, at the same time, have signed each of the eleven pages of this document NI-306.

I have carefully read through each of the eleven pages of Document NI-306 as well as this page of my affidavit and personally marked them, have made the necessary corrections in my own hand, and marked them with my initials and declare herewith under oath that I have to the best of my knowledge and belief spoken the absolute truth in this declaration.

(signed) Dr. ERNST A. STRUSS
/t/ Dr. Ernst Struss

Sworn and signed before me this 30 day of May 1947 at Frankfurt Main by Dr. Ernst Struss known to me to be the person making the above affidavit.

(signed) OTTO HEILBRUNN
/t/ Dr. Otto Heilbrunn
Civilian, ETO 30140
Office of Chief of Counsel
for War Crimes
U.S. War Department

Discussions about Buna with government offices

Detailed version August 1945 for Mr. Weissbrodt
Extract from original file

1933. In reply to personal query by a representative of the Army
Ordnance Office (Heereswaffenamt) to Dr. Mueller-Cunradi, followed:

15 Letter Ludwigshafen (Mueller-Cunradi) to Heereswaffenamt HWA
Aug. (Army Ordnance Office) Berlin-Charlottenburg.

Information on the work of I.G. Farben in the field of synthetic
rubber 1910 to 1914 and after 1918.

Present situation of work and readiness of I.G. for again taking
up the production of synthetic rubber on a large scale with the
support of the Reich Government and with the collaboration of an
efficient rubber factory (Production of 1000-2000 tires which
are to be tested on vehicles of government authorities).

1934.

6 Expose Leverkusen (Dr. Konrad) to HWA (General Lieso).
Jul.

Information about the work in the field of synthetic rubber.

- I. Methylenerubber (1910-1918)
- II. Butadienerubber (from 1926 on)
- III. Mixed polymerisates.
- IV. Oil and gasoline-proof rubber
- V. Duprene (U.S.A.)
- VI. Present state of work.
- VII. Program of experiments for the near future.

11 Conference report (Dr. Konrad Leverkusen) on meeting in HWA
Jul. (Major Philip, Dr. Hagemann) later on in presence of Dr. Weber
and Dr. Haumann, Conti.

I. Without representative of Conti

Present state of work

- a) Butadieno-Basis (Buna)
- b) " Mixed polymerisates
- c) " - alloyed with softeners.

Mass production of 5,000 tons a year (time for
construction 1 year) can only begin after the tire
experiments. Duprene (license negotiations I.G./Dupont).

(Page 2 of original)

1934 II. Together with representatives of Conti:

A greater production of tires will only be possible after the
conclusion of the tests with the individual experimental tires.
The production of solid rubber tires has to be examined.
Conference about general economic expectations for synthetic
rubber.

- 24 Report on conference (Dr. Konrad, Leverkusen) with the Reich
Jul. Plenipotentiary for Rubber. Herrn Harnosfahr of Hamburg, in
Leverkusen.

Conference about development and state of work in the field of synthetic rubber of I.G.

Extension of the experimental installations from 10 to 25-50 tons of butadiene per month.

Harnosfahr refers to the special urgency of the rubber problem.

Present yearly consumption: about 70,000 tons, of which 60 % is for tires (soon: about 80 %). He emphasizes that the project must not fail on account of the financial question.

General discussion about the difficulties of the process. Superiority of synthetic material over natural rubber, part replacement of the cotton by Vistra. Extension of the production experiments to other purely German rubber factories apart from Conti. Examination of the question of replacing rubber by synthetic materials of I.G. in order to reduce rubber consumption. Conference about Duprene and possible taking-over of this process by I.G. Discussion of the price question for synthetic rubber.

Miscellaneous

Buna : Replacement of the American product by I.G. products.

Trinidad asphalt: Examination of production possibilities by I.G.

Information on German sulphur production.

Regeneration : Extension of the existing regeneration plants with the collaboration of I.G.; improvement of the processes.

Information on the raw rubber requirements of I.G.

- 7 Conference report (Dr. Struss Frankfurt/M.) on Conference in Control
Nov. office for Rubber and Asbestos, held on 31 October with Herrn
Harnosfahr.

Also present : The economic Plenipotentiary of the Fuehrer: Koppler
Army Ordnance Office: Mureck, of Reich Economic
Ministry, the Firm Metzeler, Munich and I.G.

(Page 3 of original)

1934 (Cont'd)

Report about use of Buna in the tire industry. Harnosfahr draws attention to the very special urgency; I.G. to examine construction of a plant for 1000 ton per month. After thorough discussion, I.G.'s suggestion for a plant for 200 ton per month is accepted. Slight price increase for the tires is bearable if durability is also increased.

- 7 Conference report (Dr. Struss Frankfurt/M) on conference in
Nov. Control office for rubber and Asbestos, held on 31 October with
Herrn Harnosfahr.

Discussion on our possible agreement with Dupont, re: Duprene.
Discussion of the plant with a monthly capacity 200 tons, which can go into production in late 1935 at the earliest. The financial question will be finally settled later on.

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT No. NI-8326 and
NI-306 (Cont'd)

Document No. NI-306 (Cont'd)

- 8 Report Dr. Konrad, Leverkusen, about the visit of the Reich
Nov. Plenipotentiary for Rubber, Herrn Hammesfahr, to Leverkusen.

Inspection of the existing installations for the production of synthetic rubber and general non-obligatory discussions on the future development of the field.

- 22 Report Dr. Ebert, Ludwigshafen, on the visit of the Reich
Nov. Plenipotentiary for Rubber, Herr Hammesfahr on 20 Nov. in Ludwigshafen.

General discussion on release of rubber experiment material for other purposes than tires.
Question of financing a large-scale plant.
Easing of the rubber situation through synthetic products of I.G. I.G. to speed up submission of detailed information and suggestions for large-scale plant.

- 1 Conference report (Dr. Struss, Frankfurt/M) on a conference in HWA
Dec. (Army Ordnance Office) on 29 Nov. with State Secretary, Dr. Posse.

General orientation on the situation in the field of synthetic rubber.

- 1 Conference report (Dr. Struss, Frankfurt/M) on a conference in HWA
Dec. on 30 Nov. with General Liesse.

Same discussions as in conference with HWA of 29 November.

- 17 Conference report (Dr. Struss, Frankfurt/M.) on a conference with
Dec. the Plenipotentiary for Economic Problems, of the Fuehrer Koppler, held in Berlin on 10 Dec. in the presence of Herr Hammesfahr.

(Page 4 of original)

1934 (Cont'd)

General discussion of the technical execution of the process for making carbide via Butylene/glykol.
Planning of a large-scale plant, when experiments in Lu (Ludwigshafen) and Le (Leverkusen) have been concluded.
Detailed discussion of the price question for synthetic rubber.

1935

- 7 Report (Dr. Ebert, Ludwigshafen) on the visit of Herr Hammesfahr
Jan. in Ludwigshafen on 5 November.

Discussions on I.G.'s various experiments for the promotion of the synthetic rubber problem.

- 10 Report (Dr. Ludwig, Leverkusen) on the visit of Dr. Hagemann to
Jan. HWA, Leverkusen.

State of the rubber work in Leverkusen.
General Liesse to ask the tire plants to speed up their production in order to get a decision about the fitness for use of synthetic rubber.

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT No. NI-8326 and
NI-306 (Cont'd)

Document No. 306 (Cont'd)

- 20 Conference report on Meeting (Dr. Konrad, Leverkusen) in HWA
Feb. in the morning with Major Philipp and Dr. Hagemann.

Establishment of tire test program. General survey of I.G. work
and experimental expenses in the field of rubber.
Discussions about questions of location for a rubber factory.

In the afternoon: With Dr. Hagemann and Dr. Ing. Kracht, of HWA
as well as representatives of Conti.

Establishment of a further tire test program for production.

- 22 Conference report (Dr. Struss, Frankfurt/M) in HWA of 20 February.
Feb.

Army requests direction in the rubber question. Total peace
requirements of the Army about 150-250 tons per month.

- 22 Conference report (Dr. Struss, Frankfurt/M) on meeting with
Feb. Herr Koppler on 20 February in presence of Herr Hannesfahr, as
well as representatives of HWA, Conti and on the firm Metzeler.

Discussion about the work of the tire manufacturers.
Further conferences about large scale production of synthetic
rubber will be held in early March.

(Page 5 of original)

1935 (Cont'd)

- 18 Conference report (Dr. Struss, Frankfurt/M) on a meeting with
Mar. Herrn Koppler on 14 March.

Dr. ter Meer explains the present state of work. The main point
for the measures to be taken lies with the producing industry,
which regularly has to supply the experimental plants with large
quantities of rubber.
Discussion about the price for synthetic rubber and cost of large
scale plant for producing 2500 tons a year.

- 29 Conference report (Dr. Konrad, Leverkusen) on the visit of
Mar. Dr. Hagemann and Dr. Exner of HWA in Leverkusen.

General discussion on road tests with tires of both natural and
synthetic rubber.

- 2 Conference report (Dr. Konrad, Leverkusen) on a meeting in HWA
May with Dr. Hagemann and Dr. Exner

Discussion about the Armed Forces total requirements for synthetic
rubber.
Start of special test work especially for the Armed Forces.

7. Sept.
13 /Correspondence of the Fuehrer's Plenipotentiary for Economic
Aug. Problems, Koppler, with Dr. ter Meer, re: Conference to be held
in September about the present state as regards synthetic rubber.

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT No. NI-8326 and
NI-306 (Cont'd)

Document No. 306 (Cont'd)

- 20 Conference report (Dr. ter Meer, Frankfurt/M) on a meeting in the
Sep. Reich Chancellery with Herrn. Koppler and Fleiger.

State of rubber production.

The construction of the large-scale plant to be speeded up,
Conference about further procedure in the question of mass
production.

Possible sales guarantee by the Armed Forces at fixed prices.
Discussion about conference with Dupont about licenses for
German patents concerning Monovinylacetylene and Chloroprene.

- 23 Conference report (Dr. Konrad, Leverkusen) on visit of
Oct. Lt. Col. Philipps, Dr. Hagemann, Dr. Exner of HWA, Leverkusen.

Inspection of production and testing installations for synthetic
rubber.

(Page 6 of original)

1935 (Cont'd)

General discussion about disposal of increased future buna
production (requirements of Armed Forces not 150-250 ton per
month as previously stated, but about 50 ton per month).
Discussion of location of the rubber factory.

- 12 Correspondence of the Plenipotentiary of the Fuehrer for Economic
15 questions Koppler and Dr. Struss re: construction of a large-scale
19 plant for manufacture of synthetic rubber. Questions on
Nov. financing. Sales guarantee. Price guarantee. Questions of
location.

- 30 Expose of HWA (Dr. Hagemann) on state of the tests with synthetic
Nov. rubber for use in army material and suggestions for the distrib-
ution of the planned production.

1936

- 21 Letters (Dr. ter Meer, Frankfurt/M) to the Fuehrer's Pleni-
Jan. potentiary for Economic Problems, Koppler, Berlin.

- 4
Feb. Draft for a contract between the Reich Economic Ministry and
I.G. concerning the construction of a plant with a capacity of
200 ton of synthetic rubber per month.

- 13 Conference report (Dr. Dohn-Rothfelsor; Louna) on a meeting in
Feb. the Reich Economic Ministry, Gdh. Rat. Kuogler.

General discussion about the development of the Buna production
up to date with respect to the "Project Schkopau".

Document No. NI-306 (Cont'd)

1936 (Cont'd)

25./27 Feb, Correspondence of the Fuehrer's Plenipotentiary for Economic problems, Keppler, Berlin and Dr. Struss, concerning the draft for a contract and further promotion of the preliminary work.

5 June Conference report (Dr. von Bruening, Berlin) on a meeting in the Reich Economic Ministry with Geh.Rat.Kuegler and other officials.

Report on the latest stand of the production of synthetic rubber.

Utmost speeding up of the further development and avoidance of useless investigations.

17 June Conference report (Dr. Struss, Frankfurt/M) on a conference of the Staff for Raw Materials and Foreign Exchange, under the chairmanship of Dr. Krauch, with officials of Reich War Ministry, HWA and Keppler Bureau.

Conference about possible extension of the Buna Factory Schkopau, which is under construction, from a capacity of 800 to 1000 tons a month.

(Page 7 of original)

1936

16./29 June., 1./2./10 July. Correspondence between Staff for Raw Materials and Foreign Exchange (Lt.Col.Loeb) and I.G., concerning the extension of the Buna Factory Schkopau to a capacity of 1000 tons a month and the possible construction of a second plant for 1000 tons a month.

28 July Conference report (Dr. Hasenclever, Frankfurt/M) on a meeting with Dr. Hagemann of HWA, Berlin, 22 July.

General discussion concerning the second plant for producing 1000 tons of Buna per month.

Report Dr. ter Meer on negotiations with Dupont.

Report Dr. Hagemann about market possibilities for the extended Buna production.

31 July, 4 Aug. Correspondence between the Fuehrer's Plenipotentiary for Economic Problems, Keppler and the Finance Ministry and I.G. Farben concerning the draft of a contract for the Schkopau Buna factory for producing 1000 tons per month.

29 Sept., 2 June, 13 Oct. Correspondence between the Fuehrer's for Plenipotentiary Economic Problems, Keppler and Dr. ter Meer, re.: the extension of the Schkopau Buna plant to 2000 tons per month and the problems connected with this.

13 Oct. File note Dr. Struss on a phone call with Staff for Raw Materials and Foreign Exchange concerning the prospective Buna production 1937-1939.

5 Nov. Letter: Office for German Raw & Synthetic Material (Lt.Col. Loeb) to I.G. concerning the dispatch of the draft contracts for the Schkopau Buna production of 2000 tons per month.

Document No. NI-306 (Cont'd)

1936(Cont'd)

23 Nov. Letter (Dr. Struss, Frankfurt/M) to Office for German Raw
and Synthetic Materials (Dr. Eckell).

Transmission of contract principles for the construction of
a Buna factory.

Financing suggestions.

(Reference conference with Dr. Eckell of 19 Nov., of which
handwritten notes of Dr. Struss are available).

7 Dec. Note Dr. Struss re: telephone call of Dr. Eckell re immediate
construction of a second Buna factory for 1000 tons per month.

7 Dec. File note (Dr. Buhl) about a conference with Dr. Eckell in
Berlin on 4 Dec.

Discussion of the contract principles (without mention of the
financial questions) for the construction of a Buna plant.

(Page 8 of original)

9 Dec. Letter (Dr. ter Meer, Frankfurt/M) to Dr. Eckell, Office for
German Raw & Synthetic Materials, Berlin.

Confirmation of the telephone conversation re various
technical details re the Buna plant Schkopau.
Willingness of I.G. to collaborate in the construction and
management of Buna plant II.

9 Dec. Conference report (Dr. Frentzel, Frankfurt/M) about a meeting
in the Reich Finance Ministry with officials of the Reich
Finance Ministry and the Reich Economic Ministry, under
consultation of Dr. Eckell of Office for Raw Materials.

Detailed conference re: easing of and release from taxation
for the Buna GmbH, Schkopau, which will be established.

17 Dec. Letter (Dr. ter Meer, Frankfurt/M) to Dr. Eckell, Office
for German Raw and Synthetic Materials, Berlin.

Transmission of the draft contracts (directives for the sett-
lement of accounts) omitting the agreements which have to be
made for the financing.

17 Dec. Letter (Dr. ter Meer, Frankfurt/M) to Dr. Eckell, Office for
German Raw and synthetic Materials, Berlin.

Handing over an expose re the financing of Buna plants accord-
ing to the meeting in the Reich Economic Ministry on 16 Dec.
(Handwritten notes of Dr. Struss are available about this
meeting).

22 Dec. Letter (Dr. ter Meer, Frankfurt/M) to Dr. Eckell, Office
for German Raw & Synthetic Materials, Berlin.

Request for detailed information from the Commissioner for
Price Control about the construction costs and the production
price of the types of Buna, to be produced in the 2000-ton-
plant at Schkopau.

Document No. NI-306 (Cont'd)

1936(Cont'd)

31 Dec. Letter (Dr. Ambros, Ludwigshafen) to Dr. Eckell, Office for German Raw and Synthetic Materials, Berlin.

Question of location of Buna plant II.

(Page 9 of original)

1937

5 Jan. Letter: Office for German Raw and Synthetic Materials, Berlin to I.G. (Dr. ter Meer).

Increase of Buna output to 3000 tons per month by January 1948 (2000 in Schkopau and 1000 as the first development phase in Fuerstenberg).

7 Jan. File note (Dr. Konrad, Leverkusen) on a conference in the Office for German Raw & Synthetic Materials of 22.12.36 in the presence of Representatives of the German tire industry.

General discussion about the exclusive utilization of Buna S instead of Buna N for tire production.

14 Jan. File note (Dr. Struss, Frankfurt/!) on a conference in the Office for German Raw & Synthetic Materials, Berlin.

State of Buna plant I and II.

Start of production of the 200 tons per month installation on 1 March and increase up to 2000 tons per month by about the beginning of 1938.

Discussion of the location question for Buna plant II (project Zweckel).

21 Jan. Letter of Reich Finance Minister to I.G. re: release from taxation and easing of taxation for Buna GmbH.

29 Jan. and 6 Feb. Correspondence between Office for German Raw and Synthetic Materials and I.G., re: Buna contract.

12 Feb. Conference report (Dr. Struss, Frankfurt/!) about the meeting in the Office for German Raw and Synthetic Materials of 11 Feb. in the presence of representatives of Conti.

Rejection of the request made by Conti in the name of the entire German rubber industry for I.G. to roll and soften Buna (Vormastizierung).

17 Feb. Expose Dr. ter Meer about basic points for the establishment of the Schkopau works and for the Buna contract (10 copies were sent to the Office for German Raw & Synthetic Materials on 19 Feb.)

23 Feb. and 3.3. Correspondence with Office for German Raw and Synthetic Materials concerning terms of payment of the Reich for the loan for the construction of Buna plant Schkopau.

23 Feb. and 25.2. Letter I.G. to Office for German Raw and Synthetic Materials.

Transmission of the Buna draft contracts and information on the cost of the Buna experiments 1928-1936.

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT No. NI-8326 and
NI-306 (Cont'd)

Document No. NI-306 (Cont'd)

(Page 10 of original)

1937 (Cont'd)

4., 19., 22., 30 March and 14 Apr. Correspondence of Office for
German Raw and Synthetic Materials with I.G., concerning
Buna plant Schkopau.

Inspection of the plant, questions of power supply, raw
materials, housing.

13., 20., 23 April -- 7., 13., 15., 18., 24., 29 May -- 5., 18 June --
5., 7., 9., 16 July -- 10., 16., 20 August -- 20., 25 September --
15., 29 November

Correspondence Office for German Raw and Synthetic Materials-
I.G.

29.4 2 File notes (Dr. Struss, Frankfurt/M) about conference in
Office for German Raw and Synthetic Materials.

10., 17., 25., 26., 31 Aug.

Correspondence: Office for German Raw and Synthetic Materials-
I.G. and various other firms.

Supply of raw material and terms for the construction of Buna
plant Schkopau.

13. and 22 Sept. -- 1, 9, 11 and 21 Dec.

Correspondence Reich Commissioner for Price Establishment,
the Office for German Raw and Synthetic Materials and I.G.

1938.

4 Jan and 10 March. Buna contract with the Reich

24 Jan. Report (Dr. Albers, Frankfurt/M) on a conference with the
Control Office for Rubber in Berlin.

General questions of sale, allocation of Buna, consumption
of I.G. itself, waste material.

(Page 11 of original)

1938.

2 Feb. Price establishment for Buna.

Correspondence Reich Commissioner for Price Establishment,
the Office for German Raw and Synthetic Materials and I.G.

Frankfurt/M.,
11 April 1947.

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

I, DOROTHEA L. GALENSKI, ETO #34079, hereby certify that I am thoroughly
conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above
is a true and correct translation of Documents No. 8326 and NI-306.

DOROTHEA L. GALENSKI,
ETO #34079.

END

DOCUMENT NO. N I - 8327
OFFICE OF CHIEF OF COUNSEL FOR WAR CRIMES

AFFIDAVIT

I, Dr. Ernst STRUSS, Director of I.G. Farben, Chief of TEA Bureau of I.G., Secretary of the Technical Committee of the Vorstand of I.G., Manager of Division II (Sparte II) of the Vermittlungsstelle W, and, since 1943, Production Manager for the entire German dyestuffs industry within the framework of the Economic Group Chemical Industry, after having been warned that I will be liable for punishment for making a false statement, state herewith under oath, of my own free will and without coercion, the following:

On the 13th May 1938 I gave a lecture on "The great task of the chemical industry in the Four Year Plan, particularly fuel, oil, lubricating oil and rubber."

I have been shown and have carefully examined the photostat of an English text, consisting of 16 pages and starting with the words:

"Preface. The German "Four Year Plan" was proclaimed by the "Fuehrer" in September 1936 on the "Reichsparteitag" (Party day) at Nuernberg".

This document is a true and faithful translation of my aforementioned speech. Charts and pictures referred to are missing; otherwise the speech is completely translated.

Said document is attached to this affidavit and made a part thereof by reference. I sign each page of the document at the back concurrently with the execution of this affidavit.

I have carefully read each of the 16 pages of the document and the two pages of this declaration and have signed them personally. I have made the necessary corrections in my own handwriting and initialed them and I declare herewith under oath that I have given the pure truth to the best of my knowledge and conscience.

signed: Dr. Ernst A. Struss

DR. ERNST STRUSS

Sworn to and signed before me this 30 day of May 1947 at Frankfurt/Main by Dr. Ernst Struss known to me to be the person making the above affidavit.

signed: Otto Heilbrunn

DR. OTTO HEILBRUNN

Civilian, ETO 30140
Office of Chief of Counsel
for War Crimes
U.S. War Department

Translation
Kretschmar/Voelkel

P r e f a c e

The German "Four Year Plan" was proclaimed by the "Fuehrer" in September 1936 on the "Reichsparteitag" (Party day) at Nuernberg:

"Within four years Germany must be entirely independent from foreign countries with regard to those products, which possibly can be manufactured in some way or other by German ability, by our own chemistry and mechanical industry and by our own mining-industry!"

Mentioning chemistry first, shows already, that this section will take a very important part in the plan, and in the chemical field it is again the I.G. Farbenindustrie which is highly participating in the "Four years plan" by its extensive scientific experiments and technical progresses. According to the "Fuehrer's" own words Germany shall become independent in these four years from importing foreign raw-materials as far as possible. That does not mean, however, that Germany will withdraw from international commerce and the world market. On the contrary, the "Four years plan" will induce us strongly to increase our exports in order to be able to pay the foreign raw-materials, still needed in the time of development. But still after accomplishment of this "Four years plan", which will be followed by a second

one, we shall need further large quantities of import-goods, the payment of which can only be effected by intensive exports. In order to explain this apparent contradiction, I will give you now quite roughly a brief summary of those goods, imported by Germany in the last year. The whole import, listen, amounts to round $5\frac{1}{2}$ milliards, being balanced by exports amounting to 6 milliards. May I point out, that especially the I.G. took a very important part in it and by that in such a way helps again to accomplish the enormous tasks of the "Four years plan".

I will now once more go through the large amounts of the import-statistics in order to show you the share of chemistry in the different groups and the success to be expected within the scope of the "Four years plan". Later on in addition to that I shall give a detailed explanation with reference to the red underlined items "fuels and greasing-oils and crutchouc".

First the table-luxuries. It is mainly thought of coffee, tobacco and tea. There does not seem to be any great chance of replacing these products by German-ones. I don't think, anyone would like to miss these products in future, and only for that reason will understand, that this item will always take an important part in the import-statistics of Germany, the amount of which we shall have to pay with the proceeds from corresponding export-goods.

A very large sum, namely 1,7 milliards, was spent last year for the import of foodstuffs. This amount con -

tains almost 400 millions for corn and a still higher amount for fats, either as such or as raw-products for the purpose of making fats.

Translation

L o o s e r / T. Schuppener

This deficit in food and especially the bottle neck in the supply with fat cannot be closed in the near future. However, the chemistry is extraordinarily active, to gain a considerable improvement of the position. We help by producing huge quantities of cheap fertilizers, by creating suitable preservatives for green food and finally we place at the disposal insecticides, which help to fight energetically against the large loss in the crop by animal and vegetal parasites. These losses in consequence of these parasites, which the German agriculture suffers, amount at present to several hundred millions of Mark per year. On this subject the I.G. is absolutely leading and all these extensive tasks are always managed in co-operation with the Reichsnährstand.

The chemistry already tackles energetically the bottle neck in the supply with fat. We at first succeeded in producing synthetic products without fat from German raw material, which may replace the soap and facilitate the human nourishment, as the imported raw-fats may used for manufacturing soap and margarine. Secondly we succeeded according to the Fischer-Tropsch process, which will be mentioned below, in producing large quantities paraffin out of German coal and out of these paraffines again fats for soaps and for the human nourishment. These efforts however, have not gone together to such an extent, that they will bring us a considerable relief in the very next years. In the long run the bottle neck in the supply with fat will certainly be closed by the

chemistry.

The next item refers to ores and metals; the greatest item represents the iron ore. The chemistry is less interested in the improvement of the German iron-balance, but as you know, within the scope of the Vierjahresplan (- 4 years plan) serious plans will be dealt. By means of the Hermann Goering Werke, which will be erected in the vicinity of Braunschweig, unused German iron ores, which are available in large quantities, will be utilized. An essential improvement brought the annexion of Austria, which country possesses large quantities of iron-ores of first class quality (2nd plant of the Hermann Goering-Werke at Linz).

The second important item amongst the metals represents the copper. From this material in Germany only small quantities are available and a substitute cannot be created by the chemistry. However, the possibility exists to replace same in a great extent by the lightmetals aluminium and magnesium. Magnesium, the lightest metal largely used to day in its alloyings for the construction of aeroplanes and motorcars, can be produced in unlimited quantities out of pure German materials.

Later on we intend to produce aluminium out of German clay. For the time being as raw material we still require bauxite, which has been imported up to now, but we hope to procure same from the south-east-European territory especially from Hungary; this material takes up only little percent of the cost of the ready aluminium.

Translation

Zuobert / Mungai

The German Aluminium production is at present the biggest in the world, since national socialism came to power it increased from 20 000 metric tons p.a. to about 120 000 metric tons and is at present further on the increase.

As far as ores and metals are concerned chemistry has made still further progress owing to want of time I cannot however go into details. I would only mention that in our works at Wolfen a large plant is being completed, in which sulphuric acid is produced from German Gypsum, whereas formerly the requisite ores, sulphurous pyrites, had to be imported from abroad.

On the domain of Textile raw materials likewise great progress is being made with the aid of chemistry. You see that in the past year we had still to import for 700 million Marks cotton wool and other textile raw materials. Meanwhile the German staple-fibre (Zellwolle) production has reached gigantic figures. Until the end of the year 1938 we shall produce about 180 000 metric tons staple-fibre and 60 000 metric tons artificial silk, which means that end of this year we shall be in a position to cover nearly half of the total requirements in textile raw materials by home production. It is particularly gratifying that I.G. succeeded in the first place to make use of the beechwood which is at disposal in Germany in sufficient quantity. The first giant plant for staple-fibre from German beech-wood came into operation in our film works at Wolfen towards the end

OF L(1937). The placing at disposal of further large quantities of beechwood requires only alterations in the organization because $3/4$ of the cutting of beechwood is at present used as fire-wood. This should be replaced gradually by coal.

Since the enormous figures of the German consumption in textiles which amounts to 600-700 000 metric tons p.a. will not give you a clear view, I will calculate the figures for each individual. Every German citizen therefore consumes in one year about 10 kilo textiles, be it as clothing, linen or curtains, casements, furniture goods and the like. Of these 10 kilos more than 9 kilos had to be imported in 1932 from abroad; in 1939 it will only be about 5 kilo. You see that an enormous progress has been made, principally during the last two years. The item of 700 million in the import statistic will soon drop to half of this amount or even more.

The next big import item of 260 million Mark refers to skins, which are mainly worked up to leather; also in this instance chemistry is of assistance as it produces from German raw material artificial leather, which, before long will stand every comparison with natural leather.

Of wood for various purposes, be it for buildings, for the production of paper likewise an import amounting to 200 million is necessary. In this case too, the I.G. assists to reduce this item, in particular by way of improving common woods, or by replacing wood by plastic materials.

By including Austria, which possesses large forests, a further facilitation will be felt on this domain.

If we now look at our schedule, I would determine that of the import of 4 milliards, which we have just discussed, quite a considerable part can be replaced by production from German raw materials. In the long run at least half of this import requirement will disappear. Even then there still remains calculated under present conditions an import of more than 3 milliards, and then we must not overlook that at present we confine our import to the utmost, so that - provided we can maintain our export at the present level - we can import other goods, which we now miss, in place of the raw materials at present required from abroad.

I M P O R T 1937

(figures in mill. RM)

Table luxuries	RM 300	}	RM 2.000
Foodstuffs	" 1700		
Ores and metals	" 800	}	RM 2.400
textile raw materials	" 700		
skins	" 260		
caoutchouc	" 120		
Fuel and lubricating oils	" 300		
wood	" 200		
Ready goods and miscell			<u>RM 1.800</u>
			<u>RM 5.400</u>

Translation

Rechtenberg / Michel

Extract from the Fuehrer's speech
on the occasion of the "Reichsparteitag" (Reichs-Congress of the party)
1936 - Berliner Tageblatt of Sept.
10th, 1936.

The national-socialist state not being disposed at any rate to introduce birth control, but being on the contrary decided to increase the very natural prolificacy of the nation, we are compelled to reflect carefully on the consequence of that development for the future. It is impossible to increase materially the yield of the soil, and it is scarcely possible to increase considerably exports in the near future.

The new four years plan.

Therefore the national-socialist state and economic authorities have the duty of examining carefully what necessary raw materials, fuels etc. can be produced in Germany by herself.

The "Devisen" thus saved, will then be used in future as a supplement for securing food supply and for buying those materials which cannot at any rate be procured in this country.

Within four years, Germany must be fully independent from

foreign countries in all those materials which can anyhow be procured by German capabilities, by our chemistry and machine industry as well as by our mining.

The new reconstruction of this great German raw material industry will also give work of use for national economy to the human masses available after the end of rearmament. Thereby we hope to be enabled to increase again national production in many lines and that, in the internal cycle of our economy, in order to reserve the sums cashed from our exportation first of all for food supply and for procuring the raw materials we are yet in need of.

Consumption of textile raw material
in Germany.

figures in 1000
metric tons.

Consumption of textile raw
material on the average

6000 metric tons p.a.

of which formerly

about 50 % cotton

and 25 % wool

Production of
natural fibres

Production of
synthetic fibres
and staple fibre.
(Zellwolle)

1 9 3 2

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1939

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240

Translation

Haag/Baldamus

G a s o l i n e .

I will now come to a field in which we shall become independent of foreign countries in a few years. I am speaking of fuels and lubricants, our import demands of which still amounted to RM 300 millions in the last year. Not only this amount demonstrates the importance of this field, it is emphasized by the political significance of the petroleum. A little example of the recent past may explain this.

Italy won the Abyssinian war by modern weapons and by building special high ways. In modern wars the consumption of gasoline for motorised troops, tanks, aeroplanes, is immense. As the troops advanced into the country the military roads became immensely long, as was the case in Abyssinia - all reinforcements, provisions for the fighting troop etc. had to be transported by car - and the consumption of gasoline increased still further. In addition an extensive motor park had to be kept in order to supply the motorised units of the fighting forces and the air-bases built in Inner-Abyssinia. Although provisions had been made beforehand, it was impossible to store these enormous amounts of gasoline needed in the Italian territories on the coast before the war, they had to be filled up continually the same as men, weapons and ammunition. As Italy has no petroleum of her own she was relying on the continual import from abroad.

Nearly all the petroleum in the world is controlled by USA and the countries that are members of the league of Nations, if therefore gasoline had also been included in the sanctions, as proposed by England and France, the war would have come to an end very soon. Italy could win the Abyssinian war and build her empire only because England and France could not carry into effect their intentions.

This example will make it clear to you, that it is quite out of question, that Germany will run the risk of a similar situation and for this reason also the German demand of fuel has to be covered by Germany herself before long. The processes necessary have been developed to such an extent - especially by the I.G. - that the realisation of this gigantic task is possible. Unfortunately as prices are concerned we cannot compete with petroleum, but that does not mean that prices will have to be kept at the present level in the long run.

Table 2 shows you the German fuel demand climbing very much according to the increasing motorisation. At present we need about 5 000 000 tons of fuel and 1/2 million ton of lubricants. This amount is divided into light fuels, gasolines, the consumption of which is estimated at 3 million tons in the present year, thus the greatest part of the total amount of fuel.

The second place is held by the Diesel oils, which in an increasing manner are used for trucks, rapid railway- and aeroplane-motors. Thereafter are ranging the heating oils, which particularly are used for driving ship-motors. In order to give you also in this case a better idea of the quantities it may be said that in Germany 70 kos of fuels are consumed yearly per head of the population whereas in the United States the enormous quantity of 1 ton or 1000 kos are needed yearly by each inhabitant. You will gather therefrom which possibilities of development may still come forward on this line.

At present the requirements of fuels and lubricating oils are generally extracted from naphta.

On photo 1 you will see the unequal distribution of this natural substance. By far the biggest quantity is obtained in America and here again in the United States using by far the largest part of their giant production themselves. The next biggest producer is Russia, then comes Venezuela, Persia, Dutch-Indies and Roumania. As far as is known to-day the occurrence of naphta will last for 20 to 30 years. Also for this reason it will be advisable for us to pass over to the raw material coal, the occurrences of which in Germany will be available still for a thousand years.

On photo 2 you see the raise of naphta in Germany on a much bigger scale. Although one succeeded since 1932 to raise the production from 240 000 t or to about 500 000 t

we can with this German naphta containing only little benzine only cover a very small part of our requirements of fuels, but a considerable part of our requirements of lubricating oil the German naphta being very suitable in this direction.

Photo 3 shows the scheme of hydrogenation of coal. When producing benzine coal is used for three different purposes : once coal itself is converted into benzine or Diesel oil, secondly the hydrogen still necessary for the adding of hydrogen - i.e. the hydrogenation - is also produced out of coal and thirdly large quantities of coal are necessary to obtain the necessary energies, electricity, current and steam.

You will see from the scheme that a number of valuable by-products arise, particularly large quantities of propane, butane, which as fuel gases instead of benzine are used for driving trucks and which are filled in cylinders. This method is being adapted in an increasing manner.

On photo 4 you will see the three benzins processes at present being applies in Germany:

- 1) the I.G. process
- 2) " Fischer process
- 3) " Pott- Broche- process.

p.t.o.

Translation

B u h r o w / T. Schuppener

-5-

On picture 5 you see now the whole working process of the benzine synthesis schematically. The different apparatus you will see later in further transparent positive after original photographics, made in our work Leuna.

The brown coal arrives from the mine in great luggage-vans at the work, automatically is to be filled in bunkers, forwarded in high situated bunkers by elevators and comes from there in great dryers, in which it is equally dried and ground. Here still is to be made an important addition; a so called catalyser is to be mixed up in a dissolved estate, it effects, that the hydrogenation in the coal furnace takes place with greater easiness and speed. In a mixer the coal is to be stirred to a paste with heavy oil, which is taken off from the hydrogenation. The so existed coal mass, imagine nearly like a thin honey, than comes in the paste press and from there under pressure of 200 atm in a pre-heater. Before entering the pre-heater, to the coal mass is to be added the carefully cleaned and on 200 atm. compressed hydrogen.

As already mentioned before this hydrogen is generated out of coal in gigantic apparatus, not drawn in here on account of simplicity. From the pre-heater the coal mass at a temperature of 450° , mixed with the necessary quantity of hydrogen, comes in the coal furnace and there takes place the transformation of the coal to an oil. These coal furnaces are gigantic cannon tribes with a length of 18 mtrs. thus far higher as

a medium house. At this high temperature and high pressures they are exposed to an according strain, as you can imagine. From the coal furnace the oil comes in a refiner, where the ash residue is drawn off and later has to be treated separately. The oil goes in a distilling apparatus, where it is to be separated into heavy oil and middle oil. The heavy oil is to be reconducted in the mixer and serves to grind the coal mass. The middle oil goes in the oil press and again is to be brought on 200 atm. once more diluted with hydrogen and again goes through the pre-heater in the so called benzine furnace. In this furnace with the help of a catalysator fastly built within, is to be executed the further transformation of the middle oil. After a new destillation the product separates itself in middle oil, to be reconducted in the circular course, and in crude benzine which is now to be refined in the last apparatus. As already mentioned, hereby accumulate great quantities of gases which also are employed as fuels or as heating gases.

picture 7: brown-coal - open work

- " 10: high pressure receiver with erecting crane
- " 11: lead press
- " 12: gas compressor
- " 13: catalyser
- " 14 :high pressure furnace in erecting
- " 15: control station of the high pressure furnace

picture 16: hydrogen washing process
" 17: benzine distillation
" 18: treatment of residues
" 19: bottle filling
" 23: Leuna-work.

At least still something about the quality of synthetic benzines. After all treatments in hand, one can produce benzines without difficulty which are of the same value or even better than the natural ones. For aircrafts, especially for long distance raids or to attain highest speeds are to be required a great deal and also that can fulfil the German chemical industry without difficulties.

Translation

Zuebert / Michel

Germany's requirements in million metric tons

(without Austria)

	<u>Fuel</u>	<u>Lubricating Oil</u>
1932	2.-	0.3
1935	3.3	0.4
1938	5.-	0.5
1940	6.3	0.6

Translation
Eysing/ Mungai

C a u t s c h o u c .

Now I come to speak about the natural caoutchouc, for which, as you will have seen, in order to import it, still in the year 1937 120 million Mark were necessary. The works for the manufacturing of the artificial caoutchouc were begun by I.G. before 1914 and during the war led to a considerable fabrication. The manufactured product was not very apt for times, but very good as hardened caoutchouc, and in this form it was used very much in our submarines. After the world war the works were taken up again on a different base and until 1932 have been successful in such a way as a manufacturing on a large scale could be thought of. At present apart from the old plants on the Rhine, already a big factory in the centre of Germany is manufacturing, and according to the first four years plan there will be more factories. In a few years also in this field we will have obtained the complete independence from foreign countries.

Before speaking about the manufacturing of the synthetic caoutchouc I want to demonstrate to you briefly how the obtaining and the consumption of caoutchouc has developed since 1870.

Table 1 : At that time there was only the s-called "Wildkautschuk" (wild caoutchouc) which came from the Brazil and was obtained by the natives by tapping rubber trees which existed in the virgin forests. Until about the year 1900 the obtaining of "wild caoutchouc" rised to 50 000 annua metric

tons. In the meantime clandestinely with many efforts the English had got seedlings out of the Brazil which they cultivated in London in a special establishment and then planted them in their colonies, particularly in the Malayan estates and in Ceylon. Shortly afterwards in the Dutch Indies great plantations were created and thus the plantation caoutchouc came into existence which has been given an enormous rise by the invention of the tires for motor cars since 1910. You see from the table that the "Wildkautschuk" (wild caoutchouc) has become unimportant and that at present more than 1 million metric tons caoutchouc are being obtained annually in the plantations, some pictures of which I can show you afterwards.

In table 2 you see the main places where the plantation caoutchouc is obtained e.g. the Malayan estates which are the British possessions in the north of the important naval and commercial port Singapore. There almost the half of all natural caoutchouc is obtained. The second important territories are the Dutch Indies. In the Isle of Java of the Dutch Indies one third of the world production is obtained. The rest is distributed particularly on Borneo, Sumatra, and Ceylon. You see that the whole plantation caoutchouc either is in the hands of England or of the Netherlands. These countries fix the prices for the product to the whole world and their riches frequently derive from surplus profits they could obtain from their caoutchouc plantations.

In table 3 you see how the consumption of natural caoutchouc is distributed in the different fields of application in the United States of America and Germany. I want to make you more comprehensible the high figures:

Translation
Brudermüller/Balkenhol

At the present time a yearly consumption of 1-1½ kg rubber is to be apportioned to every person of the German population, in the United States which take up more than half of the world production, 4-5 kg

Picture 4-8: Caoutchouc plantations.

After having given you a brief summary as to the development of natural caoutchouc, I should like to pass on to the manufacturing of synthetic caoutchouc. This production will be limited just as little to Germany, as that of synthetic benzene, since also in other countries, especially in the United States, the dependency upon England and Holland is felt rather troublesome.

Whereas with regard to benzene we are producing artificially always the same products, which can also be extracted from petroleum, we succeeded in the other hand with buna in opposing to the natural product a great number of different kinds of synthetic caoutchouc, which in part have other and substantially better properties than natural caoutchouc. The different qualities which we are putting on the market are partly fast to oil and to benzene, and are therefore apt to be used f.i. to benzene tubes and to the bearing of machine parts, consequently in such cases in which natural caoutchouc is of no avail. In the cable industry, too, the synthetic caoutchouc is gaining large and important fields of application. Its outstanding properties are:

better fastness to heat and to oxidizing and a much smaller rubbing off which plays important part with motor-car tyres.

- Picture 11 : process Bung S
- " 13 : Imaginary picture of a bony factory.
 - " 14 : Schkopau
 - " 16 : Aldol distillation
 - " 17 : working platform
 - " 18 : styrol furnace
 - " 19 : Sodium polymerization
 - " 20 : test plant Leverkusen
 - " 21 : emulsion polymerization
 - " 22 : Krümel
 - " 23 : plant Schkopau

I have herewith shown you how bung is being manufactured. In the meantime further technical improvements have been achieved so that many of the pictures which have been shown here, are already out of date. The gigantic plants are, just as for benzene, based upon continuous and mechanical process with a view to employing therein a minimum of persons.

Whereas, with regard to benzene, the manufacturing process is closed after having obtained the finished product, which, of course, must be submitted to an exhaustive examination and control, once caoutchouc is produced the greatest difficulties are yet to come. As I have already pointed out, we do not produce that what nature does, and consequently also the working up of caoutchouc in the manufacturing industry is based on other principles as with natural caoutchouc. Thus our rubber factories, especially the "Continental Gummi-Waren Fabrik", Hannover, had to make every possible efforts in order to master

Translation
Brudermüller/Balkenhol

Also in this line the I.G., co-operates actively; you may infer this from the fact that in Leverkusen we have constructed a gigantic laboratory and test plant for the working up of rubber spending several millions of Marks, and which will start working in these days. We are aware that researches of many years with still be required in order to develop in this new laboratory and in close co-operation with the great rubber works all the tasks resulting from the working up and the applications of synthetic caoutchouc. The price for synthetic caoutchouc is, for the time being, much higher than for plantation caoutchouc. In the long run, however, it will be possible to cut down this difference in prices considerably, and undoubtedly the consequence will be that the customer, irrespective of the somewhat higher price synthetic caoutchouc, will be better off owing to its more advantageous properties than with natural caoutchouc. In foreign countries, too, our products are obtaining customers.

a) export

b) licensing

Working up of caoutchouc:

Picture 24: rolling-mill plant

" 25: mixing apparatus

" 26: calendar

" 27: stretching of sheets

" 28: spraying of tubes

Manufacturing of tyres

Picture 29: cross cut section of tyres

" 30: machinery for manufacturing tyres

Translation
Brudermüller/Balkenhol

The flatly constructed tyre gets its definite shape owing to strong pressure and goes in a iron form into a furnace, in which the so-called vulcanization takes place under high pressure. This is a chemical process, in which the sulphur previously embodied into the rubber combines with the caoutchouc molecule.

Testing and properties of the finished products.

Picture 33: test-department

- " 34: tensile test
- " 37: aging
- " 41: rubbing off
- " 43: tyres worn out
- " 44: apparatus for testing tyres
- " 49: bunc exhibition

TRANSLATION OF EXCERPTS OF DOCUMENT NI-6194
OFFICE OF CHIEF OF COUNSEL FOR WAR CRIMES

High Command of the Armed Forces
(War Economic Armament Office)

SECRET

In four copies
3rd copy

INDIA RUBBER

and

The Supply Situation During
the war

Compiled by: Lt. Colonel Dr. Hodler

Completed: End of March

1941

Page 1 of Original

1

I N T R O D U C T I O N

The raw material
"rubber"

- 1) Rubber is one of the most important raw materials of the entire military and war economy. This applies, due to the motorization and mechanization of the Armed Forces, to a particularly large extent to all three branches of the Armed Forces: the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force. It is therefore understandable that the Economic Armament Department of the High Command of the Armed Forces responsible for the war economy of the Armed Forces since its first beginnings as an economic department of the Army Ordnance Office gave this raw material its particular attention long before rearmament started.

Since natural rubber has to be imported from tropical foreign countries and as Germany, as well as Europe, has no production of its own, Germany was dependent on imports from overseas. Consequently the W-Staff (War Economic Staff) made provision for the building up of large stocks in order to safeguard the supply situation and for furthering the utilization of waste rubber (regeneration). It also sought to improve the supply position by concentrating all efforts on research work on substitutes and the synthetic production of Buna Rubber and by recourse to other substitutes.

Page 2 of Original

Since rubber is of prime importance for the Armed Forces, it was only natural that the task of safeguarding the necessary raw materials for the Armed Forces should remain with the Military Economic Staff (War Economic Armament Office) when on 22 March 1934 the entire control of commodities was transferred to the Reich Ministry of Economics. *)

- *) Reich Law Gazette I Page 212 Dated 22 March 1934
- Reich Law Gazette I Page 565 dated 3 July 1934
- Reich Law Gazette I Page 816 dated 9 Sept. 1934
- Reich Law Gazette I Page 761 dated 28 June 1937
- Reich Law Gazette I Page 142 dated 18 August 1939

Page 3 of Original

Synthetics

Synthetics were bound to assume an important place in the control of rubber by the government when they became suitable as substitute materials and could be used as such. This applies in particular to the synthetic material "Buna", which is also termed artificial rubber, and to the synthetic materials "Oppanol" and "Igelit", which also are particularly well suited as substitute materials for rubber, even if they could not attain the importance of Buna.

Page 4 of Original

In June 1936 the synthetic rubber Buna was added to the list of commodities placed under the Raw Materials Control, and in July 1936 an order came out which made it compulsory to notify any large stocks of old rubber and rubber scrap, and prohibited the destruction of such material.

II.

Pre-War Military Economic Measures

Page 8 of Original

The Synthetic Material
"Buna"

3) a) Already during the World War it was possible to produce in Germany sufficient quantities of synthetic rubber to cover the requirements existing at that time. Owing to political and economic conditions production was stopped after the war and no further attempts were made to improve this article.

Interest in synthetic rubber gradually came to be shown, as the price for natural rubber had increased to such an extent that the production of artificial rubber in Germany seemed to be worth while. In 1926 the experiments were found to be successful, and it was possible to produce synthetic rubber in the form of Buna according to the process in use today. The initial materials are coal and lime, both of which are found in Germany in sufficient quantities. From these Kalziumkarbid was made, a further stage in the process produced acetylene and from this Butadien is derived. The latter is a gas which can be condensed to form a liquid which represents the main component for rubber.

Buna is really no substitute for rubber, but a new material which is in some respects superior to rubber. It has qualities equal to those of natural rubber and in some respects is even superior.

Page 9 of Original

Of the different kinds produced, numerical Buna (Zehlon-Buna) was found to be more resistant than natural rubber to benzine and oil and type S to higher temperatures. In the meantime the product has been further improved, and another type SS is being produced. The bulk of the production consists of Buna S, produced at Schkopau, and Buna SS, produced at Heuls. The latter wears better and is therefore particularly suitable for tires.

The working process on the roller, in particular the vulcanization process, is in principle the same as for natural rubber. The difficulties in manufacturing Buna in the early years were so great that according to information from the industry, 5 to 8 times more machines were necessary. In the meantime it has been found possible to reduce this to 1 1/2 times as many machines.

Difficulties in
Introducing Buna

b) aa) The Armed Forces endeavored already at an early stage to give full support to Buna. At the suggestion which the Economic Department made to the Army Ordnance Office (Wi Ru Amt), a meeting took place on 28 July 1933 at the Armament Testing Office (Wa Prw) with the I.G. Farben as producer and owner of the patents. The I.G. representatives explained the basic principles for the production of Buna and

Page 9 of Original (Cont'd)

stated that they alone were not in a position to get German industry to carry out detailed research on Buna. There were two difficulties in the way of such experiments:

- 1) The processing of Buna means the total transformation of the works, and this in turn means that if the synthetic product is to be properly worked, the industry is confronted with entirely new tasks.

Page 10 of Original

- 2) Since tires made out of Buna have a longer life, the introduction of such tires would result in decreased sales.

The Wa A not only promised its own full support, but also declared itself prepared to get other users, such as the Post Office and State Railways, to order articles made of Buna from the industry and to make experiments.

Measures of
the WT

- bb) WA/W Staff (War Economic Armament Office) constantly endeavored to get the branches of the Armed Forces to use Buna for their equipment. In March 1935 the WA (Wehrmachtamt) proposed to the Wa A (Heereswaffenamt), General Navy Office (Allg.Mar.Amt) and the Reich Air Ministry to use Buna not only for tires but also for articles made of hard rubber (especially accumulator boxes, proofed materials and hosepipes.) On the basis of a conference at the WA on 18 April 1935, the following progress report on research was drawn up: -
- 1) Army:
 - a) Wa Prw. has been entrusted with experiments carried out by the Army.
 - b) Tires: Since the several varieties and compounds have to be tested and driving experiments are necessary in each case, final results cannot be expected under 1 1/2 years.
 - c) Gas Mask Materials: Experiments at the firm of Phoenix were not successful, as they were not carried out in conjunction with I.G. and presumably wrong materials were used at the start.

TRANSLATION OF EXCERPTS FROM DOCUMENT NO. NI-6194
CONTINUED

Page 10 of Original (Cont'd)

New experiments will start shortly.

- d) Rubber Dinghy Materials
(Flossbootstoffe): Experiments have been concluded. It has been found superior to natural rubber especially as far as its keeping qualities are concerned.
 - e) Washers: Experiments are in progress.
 - f) All Rubber Tires for Motorized Guns: Experiments are in progress.
- 2) Navy: Main requirements are for cables, washers and accumulator boxes.

TRANSLATION OF EXCERPTS OF DOCUMENT NO. NI-6194
CONTINUED

Page 11 of Original

- a) Accumulator Boxes: Experiments have been concluded. Orders have already been placed.
- b) Cables and Washers: Experiments are in progress. Experiments with artificial resin (trolit) are also being conducted which seem hopeful.

3) Air Force:

There is not much demand for high quality rubber, especially tank covers, cables, aeroplane tires. Experiments with synthetic rubber have not yet been made.

As a result of this conference the following measures were deemed necessary for promoting the use of synthetic rubber in future and adopted on the suggestion of Economic Staff (W Stb) (Economic Armament Office) (Wi Ruo Amt).

- a) Branches of the Armed Forces, when placing orders for articles on which tests have already been successfully concluded /accumulator boxes, floating bags (Flossaecke)/ should ask the suppliers to use synthetic rubber.
- b) In order to avoid duplication of work and in order that research work in the individual spheres should only be undertaken by one branch of the Armed Forces, it has been decided to speed the tests up as follows:
 - a) Army: Tires, rubberized materials for gas protection, washers, motor suspensions (Motorenaufhaengung), low-tension electric cables.
 - b) Navy: Accumulator boxes, high tension electric cables.
 - c) Air Force: Tank covers.

TRANSLATION OF EXCERPTS OF DOCUMENT NO. W1-6194
CONTINUED

Page 11 of Original (Cont'd)

In January 1936 the WA/W Stb (W1 Ru Amt) *) suggested to the Air Ministry that synthetic rubber should be used for the production of accumulator boxes for the Air Force. This was agreed. On 16 May 1936 the WA/W Stb (W1 Rue Amt) informed the Reich Minister for Air and C-in-C of the Air Force that the Wa A was already using synthetic rubber in the manufacture of gas suits in the proportion of 50 : 50, and also suggested that the Luftwaffe should carry out tests in this direction.

*) D.RKM and Obd W, 36 5 2164 W W1 No. 24/36 dated 7 January 1936.

Page 12 of Original

Growth of Buna
Production

c) In spite of the fact that the Military Economic Staff (Wi Rue Amt) constantly pressed for production to be carried out on a scale and at a speed which would meet the urgent requirements, it was unfortunately not possible to do this. Already on 30 March 1935 the Reich Minister for War *) in a letter to the Plenipotentiary for Economic Affairs, Herr Koppler, stressed the necessity of erecting a larger plant for the production of Buna. On 21 September 1935 Chief W (Oberst Thomas) declared in a discussion with I.G. Farben that the Reich Minister for War would immediately contact Herr Koppler in order to give the guarantee regarding quantities and prices required by I.G. Farben. On 7 October 1936 **) the Chief of the Military Economic Staff (Oberst Thomas) informed Herr Koppler that in view of the new rubber program, which came within the Four Years' Plan, he had no objection to the capacity of the three great plants to be erected being increased to 2,000 tons per month each. Accordingly, a change took place in Autumn 1936 with the announcement of the Plan for the first quarter, in which synthetic rubber formed one of the most important points. According to the opinion of the Economic Armament Office (Raw Materials Department [Wi Ru Amt/Ro]) it may well be assumed that the efforts of the W-Staff, lasting over many years, to solve the raw material problem in general and that of research work on synthetic rubber Buna in particular, have been one of the reasons for formulating the Four Years' Plan and thus accounted for the increase in Buna production. Nevertheless valuable months passed by in which the size of the plant, etc. was discussed. Schkopau, which so far had been built on a small scale, was now extended to such an extent that it was estimated that production would soon reach 2,000 tons per month. In spite of this, it was not until 1939 that the plant started to produce 2,000 tons per month.

Meanwhile a second factory had been planned at Huels, but this did not start production until 1940

*) D.RKM 66 b 2164 W W1 (I) No. 1573/35 dated 30 March 1935

**) Chief W Stb im Wi. 66 b 2164 No. 9418/36 g.IIb dated 7 October 1936.

TRANSLATION OF EXCERPTS OF DOCUMENT NO. NI-6194
CONTINUED

Page 20 of Original

I I I.

Transition to War Economy

First
Measure

- 1.) On the whole the transition to War Economy was effected almost without a hitch in the first stages. Most of the plants had at their disposal a sufficiently large stock of raw materials which, in spite of difficulties caused by the outbreak of the war and the decrease in supplies owing to war traffic, enabled work to continue sufficiently to keep employees and workers employed. The strict organization introduced before the war and the general tendency also at the outbreak of war to maintain the former system of control proved its worth.

Page 22 of Original

I V.

War Economy

A.

From 1 September 1939 to 30 June 1940

Introduction 1) As natural rubber belongs to those raw materials on the import of which Germany is dependent until the artificial rubber Buna can be processed in sufficient quantities, it was especially important that this particular raw material should be carefully managed and planned. For, as already mentioned, not only is rubber one of the essential raw materials of industry, but its importance lies also in the fact that the chief branches of the Armed Forces and their ability to use their weapons is dependent on adequate supplies of rubber. Thus, a shortage of rubber can actually decide the outcome of the war.

TRANSLATION OF EXCERPTS OF DOCUMENT NO. NI-6194
CONTINUED

Page 27 of Original

On 9 February 1940 *) General Field Marshall Goering gave the order to utilize raw material reserves to a greater extent and to work on Buna production to full capacity. As a result of this order the quota was revised. It is true that the stock position was considerably affected by the increase in the quota, but it was hoped that by making use of the last reserves the stocks of natural rubber would last until the beginning of 1941, when supplies of Buna would be available.

*) Ktb. W1 Rue Amt/Stab, Appendix Bd. II, Appendix 41.

Page 36 of Original

C o n c l u s i o n

Supply of Natural
Rubber and Buna

- 1) According to information from the Economic Armament Office (W1 Rue Amt/Ro), from the time when it was first set up as a consulting body for raw materials, or as a group within the Economic Department of the Army Ordnance Office, the Raw Materials Department of the High Command of the Armed Forces occupied itself with the key raw material, rubber, which up to that time had always come from abroad, and later sought to improve the supply position by laying in large stocks, by fostering synthetic production and the utilization of old material (Regeneration) and by recourse to substitute materials. Already in 1932 and 1933 it was instrumental in getting the agencies responsible for its development (Heereswaffenamt, Prw 6), to overcome the formidable obstacles which prevented the production or rather the processing of Buna. The importance of this has always been emphasized by this office. Again and again it approached the Reich Ministry of Economics in order to put German Military Economy on a firm basis as far as rubber is concerned. Since rearmament started it has repeatedly pointed out

TRANSLATION OF EXCERPTS OF DOCUMENT NO. NI-6194
CONTINUED

Page 36 of Original (Cont'd)

in its reports to the leaders (Fuehrung) that unless the raw materials problem is solved, and this applied especially to rubber, it would not be possible to carry on a war for any length of time. There is no doubt that these blunders were one of the reasons for the Four Years' Plan, which then took up synthetic rubber production, which had been tackled on a larger scale.

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

26 May 1947

I, Victoria Orton, Civilian, ETO No. 20129, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with both the German and English languages and that the above is a true and correct translation of excerpts of Document No. NI-6194.

Victoria ORTON
ETO No. 20129

- 18 -

END

..FFID.VIT

I, Dr. Ernst STROOS, Director of I.G. Farben, Chief of the Bureau of I.G., Secretary of the Technical Committee of the Vorstand of I.G., Manager of Division II (Sparte II) of the Vermittlungsstelle, and, since 1943, Production Manager of the entire German dyestuffs industry within the framework of the Economic Group Chemical Industry, after having first been warned that I will be liable for punishment for making a false statement, state herewith under oath, of my own free will and without coercion, the following:

I.G. was the first industrial undertaking to develop the industrial production of magnesium. In 1927 I.G. started its actual production of magnesium in its Bitterfeld plant. The yearly capacity of this plant was 1,500 tons in the beginning and from 1935 onward 4,000 tons.

In 1933 I.G. received from the Luftwaffe the order to build magnesium plant with the capacity of 12,000 tons a year. The Luftwaffe selected the site in Aken. The plant was partly completed in 1934 when production started. The plant and its production was to be kept secret by order of the Luftwaffe.

The negotiations for the construction of the plant by I.G. were carried on between the Luftwaffe and Dr. Fister of Bitterfeld. Subsequently Dr. Fister received from Schmitz a kind of blank approval to carry on with the negotiations. This procedure was not usual at that time. The financial arrangement with the Luftwaffe had already been made before the project was submitted to the T.E.. After negotiations had already been carried on so far, the financial part had been settled and Schmitz's approval had been obtained, the T.E. could not very

well refuse to approve the building of the plant and the final arrangements even if it had wanted to do so.

The total investment for magnesium and aluminium in Aken amounted to about 46,000,000 marks; and for magnesium alone it amounted to about 40,000,000 marks. I.G. furthermore obtained a special concession from the Ministry of Finance authorizing I.G. to provide for an annual 20% depreciation on machinery in the plant. The normal depreciation was 10% and so I.G. obtained a considerable advantage.

Before the plant was actually built, the Luftwaffe carried out a number of tests from the air in order to ascertain how the plant itself, could best be camouflaged. In accordance with the result of these tests in which Bitterfeld's chief engineer, von der Bey, participated, the plans for the plant were repeatedly changed until the Luftwaffe was satisfied that the plant was well hid from the air. Dr. Fister subsequently stated in the T.M. that considerable additional costs had to be incurred by I.G. on account of the camouflage requirements.

The production of the magnesium plant Aken was also kept secret. A large part of the production and to my mind considerably over 10% consisted of tubes with a diameter of approximately 8 c.m., a wall thickness of approximately 1 c.m. and a length of approximately 20 c.m. These tubes were packed into boxes with the inscription "Textilhuelsen", a code name which means "Textile Tubes". In reality these tubes were containers for incendiary bombs.

Also by order of the Luftwaffe, I.G. started planning in 1934 another magnesium factory, for which the Luftwaffe selected Stassfurt as its site. Construction of the plant started in 1935 and it was completed in part in 1938. Here again the arrangements

were entirely made between the Luftwaffe and Dr. Fister and I take it for granted that this plant too, and its products, had to be considered as secret. The production capacity for magnesium was 13,000 tons a year since 1942. The total investment amounted to 50,000,000 marks. The Luftwaffe financed the construction by granting a credit of 44,000,000 marks. Here again the Ministry of Finance agreed to increased depreciation at the rate of 20% yearly.

For Aken as well as Stassfurth, I.G. was permitted to charge to the Luftwaffe an increased amount over the cost price and the normal profit in order to be able to repay the credits out of the accrued extra profits.

I have carefully read each of the 4 pages of this declaration and have signed them personally. I have made the necessary corrections in my own handwriting and initialed them and I declare herewith under oath that I have given the pure truth to the best of my knowledge and conscience.

signed: Dr. Ernst Struss
DR. ERNST STRUSS

Sworn to and signed before me this 2 day of June 1947 at Frankfurt/Main by Dr. ERNST STRUSS known to me to be the person making the above affidavit.

signed: Otto Heilbrunn
DR. OTTO HEILBRUNN
Civilian, LTO 30140
Office of Chief of Counsel
for War Crimes
U.S. War Department

".. CERTIFIED TRUE COPY"

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT No. NI-2747
OFFICE OF U.S. CHIEF OF COUNSEL FOR
WAR CRIMES

N o t e s

on the
Founding, Development, Organization, and Members of
TEA.- HAUPTGRUPPE 2,- and KOMMISSIONEN
of the I. G. Farbenindustry Co.
up to the end of 1943

Volume I : Tea and Hauptgruppe 2.
Volume II : Kommissionen (also Farben Committee (Aus-
schuss) and Business Com-
mittee (Ausschuss))
Volume III : Personal Data.

Prepared
by order of Director Dr. Struss
by
Dr. Heinz EICHWEDE

V o l u m e I:

TEA and HAUPTGRUPPE 2
(Page 2 of original)

VERMITTLUNGSSTELLE W. (Military Liaison Office)

Since 1934 conferences and discussions with various military offices and authorities in Berlin became more and more numerous and urgent. During the conference of the central committee at Ludwigshafen on 2 September 1935, it was decided to create beginning the 1 October 1935, a liaison office W (=Wehrmacht) in Berlin which had to take over and to sustain the connection between the three main divisions (Sparten) of the I.G. and the military authorities. Dr. Krauch indicates in his letter to Dr. ter Meer of 5 September 1935 that main division I (Sparte I) was taken care of by Dr. Ritter and shortly thereafter also by Dr. Eckell. For Main Division 2 (Sparte 2) Dr. von Bruchning, Hoechst, will be sent to the "central office for war-economical and war-political questions" (Zentralstelle für Wehrwirtschaftliche und Wehrpolitische Fragen). By Dr. Gajewski's letter to the plants of Main Division (Sparte 3) of November 1935, Dr. Meyer, Wolfen-Pil is appointed for this division. For reasons of efficiency, the office work of Vermittlungsstelle W, Main Division (Sparte) 3, is to be taken care of at Wolfen Film.

Circular, Frankfurt, 2 January 1936 (ter Meer-Selck) states that under the management of Dr. Morbeck a Department (Abteilung) A for counter-intelligence (espionage, sabotage, betrayal of working secrets (Betriebsgeheimnissen), etc.) located at Leverkusen, is attached to the Vermittlungsstelle. On 1 January 1944, part of the functions of this department A will be taken over by the today new-founded office A of the main counter intelligence commissioner (Hauptabwehrbeauftragten) of the I.G., Dir. Dr. Schneider, Leo or his deputies, Dr. Dyckmann (techn.)

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT No. NI-2747
(Cont'd.)

Dr. von der Heyde or Dr. Ruediger (commercial) resp. The other defensive functions of Vermittlungsstelle W will be taken care of by the Berlin office (counter-intelligence commissioner (Abwehrbeauftragter) Dr. Diekmann, deputy Dr. Gorr.

As per letter of 30 June 1936, Dr. Ritter and Dr. Eckell will be replaced because of being charged with other duties (Dr. Eckell has transferred to Government service) by Dr. Diekmann and Dr. Pfaundler for Main Division (Sparte) I and on 1 December 1936, Dr. von Bruening who will return to the Hoechst plant will be replaced by Dr. Gorr, Hoechst.

A letter of Dr. v. Schnitzler and Dr. Ilgner of 3 February 1938 to the Reich Ministry of Economic Affairs, the Prussian Ministry of Economic Affairs and the Reich Ministry of War expresses the following:

" For the treatment of questions and tasks related to war economy as far as all affairs of the individual I.G. works are concerned, the following offices will be destined: The Vermittlungsstelle W for control of raw material, planning and distribution of production, shipping and stockpiling of raw, intermediary and finished products as well as the service exemption of the necessary personnel, and the office of economic policy (Wirtschaftspolitische Abteilung), Berlin NW 7, for matters in the business sphere, e.g. personnel and requirements estimates within the country and abroad, increase of export, displacing of export, stockpiling of external stores, direction of sales, etc. Provisions have been made that in all matters of war economy close contact will exist between the Vermittlungsstelle W and the Department of Economic Policy (Wirtschaftspolitische Abteilung)"

From 1 October 1935 to 30 April 1937, the Vermittlungsstelle W was located in the administrative building of the Laenderbank, Berlin NW 7, Unter den Linden 78, in three, later on in 5 rooms, since 1 May 1937 in the building of Igerussko, Dorotheenstr. 34, in twelve, later on because of personnel increase and including of the offices of Ingenieur Wolf (extension of Huel and Schopau) and Zeiktra (traffic planning in case of "Mob") in 23 rooms. On 30 November 1939, the office moved to Berlin SW 68, Kochstrasse 73, with 37 rooms. Post office as before: Berlin NW 7.

Managers of the Vermittlungsstelle W have been:

	Main Division (Sparte) 1	Main Division (Sparte) 2	Main Div. (Sparte) 3
From 1 Oct. 1935	Dr. Ritter	Dr. v. Bruening	Dr. Meyer
" 9 May 1936	Dr. Diekmann	"	"
" 1 Apr. 1937	"	Dr. Gorr	"

Officially the gentlemen of Main Division (Sparte) 2 of the Vermittlungsstelle W were placed some time before the war under Tea-Buero Dr. Struss

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO. NI - 2747
(Cont'd.)

State of Personnel

	Chemists			Engineers			Technicians			Commercial			misc.	Fem.	Total
	Main Div.			Main Div.			Main Div.			Main Div.					
	Sparte	Sparte	Sparte	Sparte	Sparte	Sparte	Sparte	Sparte	Sparte	Sparte	Sparte				
	1	2	3	1	2	3	1	2	3	1	2	3			
Oct. 35	2	1	1										1	1	6
31 Dec. 35	2	1	1										2	1	7
31 Dec. 36	2	2	1		1								2	2	10
31 Dec. 37	2	2	1		1					1			5	2	14
31 Dec. 38	2	3	1		1					1			7 *)	3 **)	18
31 Dec. 39	2	5	1								1		12 (2)	12 (1)	33 (3)
31 Dec. 40	3	5	1								1		13 (2)	22 (5)	45 (7)
31 Dec. 41	3	4	1								1		14 (3)	24 (5)	47 (8)
31 Dec. 42	3	5	1				1						14 (4)	25 (6)	47 (10)
31 Dec. 43	3	5	1		1		1						13 (6)	24 (4)	48 (10)

*) - Inducted to military service

***) - Attached to Vermittlungsstelle W. Ladies are employed at Departments Wolf (Huels/Sko.) Dr. Link (Reichs commissioner for dry ice) and I.G. long distance switch board. correspondence attached to office for lodging and care.

Correspondence:

Year	Receipt:				Dispatch:				TOTAL
	I.G.	Author-ities	Other firms	Sub Total	I.G.	Author-ities	Other firms	Sub Total	
1936	3.566	578	184	4.328	3.751	852	83	4.686	9,014
1937	5.395	1.966	160	8.541	5.555	1.420	120	7.095	15,636
1938	8.436	2.359	603	11.398	9.576	2.640	200	12.416	23,814
1939	16.375	3.935	1.531	21.841	13.784	3.827	576	18.187	40,026
1940	26.359	7.279	1.314	34.952	22.961	4.800	750	28.511	63,463
1941	33.768	7.611	1.331	42.710	24.599	5.550	302	30.451	73,161
1942	37.509	10.045	1.452	49.006	32.199	6.260	774	39.233	88,239
1943	33.023	8.214	1.342	42.579	30.047	7.372	265	37.684	80,263

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

I, JOHN J. BOLL, AGO No A-444412, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document No. NI - 2747.

JOHN J. BOLL
U.S. Civilian
AGO No A-444412

I.G. FARBEINDUSTRIE AKTIENGESELLSCHAFT

Nitrogen Direction.

Ludwigshafen on the Rhine,
5 September 1935.

(Transl. Note: Initial "H" (?)
for Huenocke?)

Ammoniakwerk Merseburg G.m.b.H.
Attention Director Dr. Schneider

Leuna - Works

I.G. Farbenindustrie A.G.
Attention Director Dr. Pistor

Pitterfeld

I.G. Farbenindustrie A.G., Division "N"
Attention Director Dr. Petersen

Wolfen, Kreis
Pitterfeld

I.G. Farbenindustrie A.G., Division "N"
Attention Director Dr. Plato

Frankfurt a/M.-Hoechst

I.G. Farbenindustrie A.G.
Attention Dr. Lang

Pitterfeld

I.G. Bergwerke
Attention Mine Director Dr. Scharf

Halle a.S.

Gewerkschaft Auguste Victoria
Attention Assessor Stein,

Huels, Kreis
Rocklinghausen

I.G. Farbenindustrie A.G.
Dept. Badammon, Attention Director Dr. Oster

Berlin NW 7

I.G. Farbenindustrie A.G.
Oil Dept. Dir. Baacke
Attention Dir. Dr. Fischer

Berlin NW 7, U.d.L.

I.G. Farbenindustrie A.G., Division "N"
Attention Dir. Dr. Fahrenhorst

Oppau.

Re: War Economy Central Office of the I.G. for all matters of
military economy and questions of military policy.

The Central Committee has determined to create an Agency (W) in our place of business in Berlin NW 7, Unter den Linden 78, in order to provide systematic co-operation within the I.G. in the current development of military economy, and particularly to assure central treatment of the questions of military economy, military policy and military technic. The work for Sparte I were already been started some time ago by Dr. Ritter.

From now on all correspondence - even about matters still in the balance - with the Reich Ministry of War and its offices, such as the Heereswaffenamt (Army Ordnance Office) etc., the Navy Office and its offices,

(Page 2 of original)

such as the General Naval Office etc., the Reich Air Ministry and its offices, such as Air-Command Office 3, the Experimental Station for Aviation, as well as the air raid protection, offices etc., further

with the appropriate central air raid protection office of the Reich Group Industry, and, for military economic questions, with the Reich Ministry for Economy also, is to be addressed exclusively to the Ermittlungsstelle (liaison agency) and a copy of the correspondence is to be included at all times.

Requests, and/or agreements about personal discussions at these places, or invitations to inspections or similar things, as well as ideas or proposals for military economic or military technical matters, are also to be addressed to this office. Vice versa, all questions concerning the I.G. shall from now on be passed on from these authorities to the liaison agency, from where they will be sent to the competent I.G. offices.

The liaison agency, in agreement with the Sparten leaders, will contact the individual works leaders directly in the near future, and, as far as this has not been done yet, prepare for co-operation with the Wirtschaftsinspektionen (economy inspections) and/or with the district economy officers of the competent spheres, and make investigations about the co-operation of the plants with the central authorities and the local offices in the field of military economy.

The liaison agency is authorized to inspect all relevant matters.

The liaison agency is ready to give any information about and make arrangements in military economic and military policy questions, which are part of its sphere of work and include the following:

Investigations about production,
Plans for production,
Economic mobilization plans,
Plans for the supply of raw material,
Plans for storage,
Questions of transport,
Assuring the supply and/or movement of labor,
Air raid protection-, counter espionage-, sabotage prevention,
Patent questions.

The address of the liaison agency is: I.G. Farbenindustrie A.G.,
Vermittlungsstelle (W), Berlin NW 7, Unter den Linden 78.
Phone: A 2 Flora 0021.

(Page 3 of original)

We request that you inform those of your offices which are concerned confidentially about the contents of this letter.

I.G. Farbenindustrie A.G.

(signed): Krauch (signed): Fahrenhorst.

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION.

I, DOROTHEA L. GALEWSKI, ETO 34079, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document No. NI - 4702.

21 May 1947.

DOROTHEA L. GALEWSKI
ETO. 34079.

AFFIDAVIT

I, Dr. ERNST STRUSS, Director of I.G. Farben, Chief of TEA Bureau of I.G., Secretary of the Technical Committee of the Vorstand of I.G., Manager of Division II (Sparte II) of the Vermittlungsstelle W, and, since 1943, Production Manager of the entire German dyestuffs industry within the framework of the Economic Group Chemical Industry, after having first been warned that I will be liable for punishment for making a false statement, state herewith under oath, of my own free will and without coercion, the following:

Since 1934 conferences and discussions with various military offices and authorities in Berlin became more and more numerous and urgent. In order to create a permanent liaison between I.G. Farben and the military, the Vermittlungsstelle W (Military Liaison Agency) was established on the initiative of Prof. Carl Krauch at the conference of the Central Committee in Ludwigshafen on September 2, 1935. The Vermittlungsstelle W started operations on October 1, 1935.

Prof. Krauch was in charge of the Vermittlungsstelle W.

The heads of Sparte I (Division I) in the Vermittlungsstelle W were Dr. Ritter and later on Dieckman. Members were Dr. Eckel and Mr. Pfaundler.

The head of Division II was Dr. von Bruening until 1936 and from then on Dr. Gorr.

Dr. Hozer was in charge of Division III.

At first the Vermittlungsstelle W occupied itself entirely with war problems. It coordinated the work of the I.G. plants with the general mobilization plan and had

detailed plans worked out for each plant for war production and mobilization. These mobilization plans were to come into effect with the outbreak of war. They were first drafted in the year 1935 and from then on they were set up from year to year. The instructions for preparing these production plans in case of war came from Dr. Ungewitter, head of the Reichsstelle Chemie, who in turn received his orders from the Ministries of War and Economics.

After each plant of the I.G. had prepared its own production plan for war it submitted the plan to Dr. Ungewitter.

Furthermore the Vermittlungsstelle W discussed with the military agencies the experiments in I.G. Farben laboratories for the development and production of weapons. It also handled, through Dr. Wagner, all secret inquiries about orders and research and other work in connection with the armed forces. Dr. Wagner was not allowed to inform even me about his work. The Vermittlungsstelle also devised and enforced drastic security measures for keeping secret such matters as production, patents and research in all matters connected with the military including poison gas production.

Since January 1936 a special department for counter-intelligence service, defense against spying, sabotage and betrayal of working secrets was incorporated into the Vermittlungsstelle W. Finally the Vermittlungsstelle W arranged for and supervised the planned exercises (Plan-Spiele) which were held in order to visualize the effect of bombing on I.G. plants and to afford training to the German Air Force.

These "Plan-Spiele" were inaugurated by Dr. Ritter either on his own initiative or at the direct instruction of Krauch. They were set up the following way: On a map of a particular

plant, an umpire marked the points where bombs of a certain weight were supposed to have been dropped by the attacking air force. The Works Management which operated in an air raid shelter ascertained the imaginary damage done by the bombs and figured out for what length of time parts of the plant had been put out of operation. The management itself also ascertained within which period of time the damage could be repaired.

At the conclusion of each "Plan-Spiel" it was discussed between the I.G. representatives and the military which measure should be taken by I.G. to afford additional protection from the air to the particular plant. It was as a result of one of these discussions that the gasoline production in the I.G. plant Leuna was split up in 5 or 6 different units which could work independently of each other in case one of them was hit by a bomb. As far as I remember I.G. Farben spent an amount of several million marks in order to effect the necessary changes.

Such "Plan-Spiele" were held in Leuna, Ludwigshafen-Oppau and in Leverkusen. They were always held in the presence of a number of high-ranking officers of the Luftwaffe, artillery and infantry and representatives of various authorities.

In 1936 the Office for German Raw and Basic Materials (Amt fuer Deutsche Roh- und Werkstoffe) later on renamed Reichs Office for Economical Development (Reichsamt fuer Wirtschaftsausbau), was formed by the German government. Prof. Krauch who was appointed to this office remained at the same time in charge of the Vermittlungestelle W. He drafted at once the members of Divisions I and subsequently a number of other members of the Vermittlungsstelle into his new office.

After the representatives of the armed forces became acquainted with the technical experts of the different plants they contacted these experts directly without using the services of the Vermittlungsstelle W.

The main activity of the Vermittlungsstelle during the last years of the war was to work in close cooperation with a number of governmental or semi-governmental agencies.

I have carefully read each of the five pages of this declaration and have signed them personally. I have made the necessary corrections in my own handwriting and initialed them and I declare herewith under oath that I have given the pure truth to the best of my knowledge and conscience.

gez.: Dr. Ernst A. Struss

DR. ERNST STRUSS

Sworn to and signed before me this 30 day of Meerz 1947 at Frankfurt/Main by Dr. ERNST STRUSS known to me to be the person making the above statement.

gez.: Otto Heilbrunn

DR. OTTO HEILBRUNN
Civilian, ETO 30140
Office of Chief of Counsel
for War Crimes
U.S. War Department

" A CERTIFIED TRUE COPY "

- 4 -
E N D

PS

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT No. NI - 4619
OFFICE OF CHIEF OF COUNSEL FOR WAR CRIMES

Leverkusen I.G. Work, 22 Dec. 1936

To: Baurat SCHUNK, private

at our works

Confidential !

The war-economy tactical planning exercise has been
definitely fixed for Friday, 15 January 1937.

For this purpose a preparatory exercise has been arranged for

6 January 1937, 1100 hours

at the conference room, Azo Building, to which I herewith
cordially invite the gentlemen participating in it.

Questions on the planning exercise are to be addressed to

Direction Department, "everkusen,

Dr. DORMAIER.

Signature: Dr. KUHNLE.

1 enclosure.

Time-table for the tactical exercise in
industrial planning at Leverkusen.

hour

900 - 910	Reception of the guests in the Administration Building
910 - 940	Address by Dr. KUEHNE (Importance of the chemical industry, particularly of I.G. to Germany, Division of I.G. into spartes, more detailed description of sparte II, special significance of the Group Niederrhein and Leverkusen in wartime. Stressing the interrelation of the various departments and plants. Location and lay-out of the Leverkusen factory).
940 - 1000	Sight-seeing tour in cars through factory, Rhine quay, main roads. View of the factory from the new power station.
1000	Arrival in front of the Azo laboratory building Explanation of the exhibition
1020 - 1040	Introduction into the tactical planning exercise by Dr. v. BRUENING.
1040 - 1140	Tactical planning exercise.
1140 - 1220	Talk by Dr. v. BRUENING winding up the planning exercise.
1220 - 1300	Debate.
1300 - 1320	Final address by Dr. KUEHNE.
1330 - 1530	Lunch in the casino.
1530 - 1700	Inspection of the factory.

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT No. NI - 4619
CONTINUED

Time-table for the tactical exercise in industrial
planning at Leverkusen.

hour:

900 - 910	Reception of the guests in the Administration Building.
910 - 940	Address by Dr. KUEHNE. (Importance of the chemical industry, particularly of I.G. to Germany, Division of I.G. in spartes, more detailed description of Sparte II, mention of Sparte III, special significance of the group Niederrhein and Leverkusen in wartime. Stressing the inter-relation of the various departments and plants. Location and lay-out of the Leverkusen factory).
940 - 1000.	Sight-seeing tour in cars through factory, Rhine quay, main roads. View of the factory from the tower of Pharma building.
1000	Arrival in front of the Azo laboratory building.
1010 - 1020	Introduction into the tactical planning exercise by Mr. v. BRUENING
1020 - 1150	Tactical planning exercise.
1150 - 1210	Talk winding-up the planning exercise Dr. ter MEER or Dr. v. BRUENING.
1210 - 1310	Debate.
1310 - 1330	Final address by Dr. KUEHNE
1400 - 1530	Lunch in the casino.
1530 - 1700	Inspection of the factory.

Confidential

Tactical Exercise in industrial planning.

Period: After the beginning of the war.

Presupposition: The plant is engaged in the manufacture of war material or products of vital importance to roughly about the same degree as at present, but a certain change within the various installations has taken place. The work at the dyestuffs plants and at the Zw plants (intermediate products) belonging to them has been restricted, the plant manufacturing inorganic white colors (Lithopone and Titan) is working only as far as those products are needed for the synthetics industry. The Titan factory is about to be shut down entirely through lack of raw materials.

A meeting of the technical directors is taking place, with the director-in-chief of the works, Dr. KUEHNE, in the chair and the following gentlemen present:

- 1) Chief engineer
- 2) Chief buyer of technical and raw materials
- 3) Chief of Department for transport, dispatch and packing
- 4) Chief of social Department
- 5) Chief of Research Laboratory
- 6) Chief of inorganic plants
- 7) Chief of plants for intermediate products
- 8) Chief of A-factory / Nitrating and Rubber Department
- 9) Chief of Dyestuffs Plants
- 10) Chief of Uerdingen plant.

KUEHNE: Gentlemen, as you know, yesterday's air raid on our works has caused not only extensive material damage and interfered considerably with our manufacturing program, but has also caused a number of casualties. I have asked you to come here for a conference about the measures necessary for the re-establishment of full production capacity at the most essential manufacturing installations, particularly those

(page 2 of original)

working directly on Army supplies. Will you, Dr. EINSLER, be kind enough to let us have a short report on the destructions caused.

Mr. EINSLER: During yesterday's air raid on our works, poison gas, incendiary, and high explosive bombs were dropped. All the small fires started by incendiaries in factory buildings were extinguished by our works fire brigade with the exception of the fire at the garage for private cars near the Leuna patrol station where the wooden shed was burnt down because our fire brigade was, of necessity, engaged at other places within the plant. The poison gas bombs did not cause any destruction worth mentioning. But regrettably we lost 8 men.

(page 2 of original, cont'd)

2 were not able to reach the shelter in time, 4 men of the shift working at the power station were killed when the boiler exploded, and 2 men of the shift working at the P-plant were buried beneath the debris. The 5 heavy high explosive bombs which hit our works have destroyed, as you know, the phenol plant CS, buildings P 33 and P 31 to such a degree that we must expect a considerable decrease in production. Dr. KAESSMANN is, I assume, going to report on this presently. The condition of the East wing of building P 33, in which benzol is being sulphurized, however, is such that complete demolition of the ruins still standing will be necessary. It is impossible to carry on production there.

Further severe damage has been caused to the old power station which was completely out of action for a short time. But it has been ascertained since by a thorough inspection that the damage is not as severe as was thought at first. Completely destroyed are the entire furnace installation and the boilers 11 and 12. Boiler 10 can be repaired, as far as can be judged at present. -

(page 3 of original)

The damage at boiler 9 is more external; there is reason to hope that this boiler can be used again within four days. Boiler 2 being at present under repair, we could operate with 7 boilers if we can solve the question of supplying the necessary coal. We would have boiler 9 as a reserve as early as within four days. I had a talk with the power station chief and think we can supply the boilers manually with coal by carrying the coal in wheelbarrows from the railroad lines at the North side of the boiler house over ramps into the building. We expect the output of the boilers to drop by 10 - 15 %. In effect, we shall then be able to produce approx. 60% of the normal steam output in the old power station. The steam deficiency can partly be made good by using the new power station to its full load capacity. We can secure the remaining small balance by installing steam tractors in building F 29 or by placing 3 railway engines on the Y-block near the main coal store, as we have done once before. Steam connections for this emergency installation in F 29 are available. The pipes for the railway engine emplacement on Y-block can be connected within two days. The deficiency in electric power is to be made good by using the RWE grid (Rheinisch-Westfälische Elektrizitätswerke), so that no difficulties regarding electric power supply will arise.

LUDWIG: It is gratifying to know that we can expect to have the normal steam supply in working order again very soon. Since the circular pipe system in building M 4 was sealed off within a short time, the distilling processes in Cu, liquid fuels, Nitrotoluol plants as well as the rubber manufacturing plant were interrupted for a short time only, the necessary steam from the new power station being brought in from the other end of the pipe system.

(Page 4 of original)

The steam supply system for the Nitrating and Nitrotoluol separator plant in the N-Block, however, is brought to a standstill as a result of the old power station having ceased to function. In the Nitrating plant, we can manage for a few days without steam, but for the Nitrotoluol separator plant the steam supply has to be got working again within the shortest possible time.

EINSLER: Some boilers of the old power station can be expected to provide steam as early as to-morrow. The emergency ramps for the unloading of coal by hand are already under construction. I have put all available carpenters on this job. Mention has also to be made of the destruction caused by the last hit in Kekule-road between the power station and the dyestuffs mill. There is a big crater in the street; the second gas main as well as the steam and water pipes and the power cables have been cut. The ensuing fire from the escaping gas prevented the turning off of the steam at the nearest block valve, and only after the gas cock at the spot marked on map A had been shut off was it possible to close steam valve 1; prior to this, it had been necessary to turn off valves 2 and 3 thereby sealing off the whole block. This naturally resulted in a production break-down in this block. The electricity distributor at the corner of the dyestuffs mill was damaged so badly by the explosion that it had to be switched off. By running an emergency cable from electricity distributor X, the plants in the vicinity, especially the dyestuffs mill, can again be supplied with electric power as from to-night. As to gas supply, the situation is as follows: There are two main pipe lines for supplying gas from a distant works. One of the pipe lines, the so-called old pipe, enters the works near the gas-producing factory, and pressure reduction and distribution takes place there. The other pipe line, now destroyed, runs as a high pressure pipe directly to the inorganic

(page 5 of original)

plant where pressure is reduced and the gas distributed. The main difficulty caused by the destruction of this pipe line is that of supplying the T-block with gas. The main consumers situated here are the sulphate-hydrochloric acid-plant and the A-coal plant. Since cutting down production in the A-coal plant is out of the question, it became necessary yesterday to extinguish 3 sulphate furnaces as a result of too sharp a decrease in pressure. If the pipe line now under construction on the left bank of the Rhine had been completed, the continuation of gas supplies would not have met with any difficulties whatsoever in spite of the present damage. As I have been told just now the present restrictions of gas consumption are not sufficient; we have to decide here and now about the measures to be taken in order to make further supplies of gas available.

(Page 5 of original, cont'd)

THIENEMANN: Since the Titan-factory is working only to a very limited extent, the biggest gas consumers in the works are the Lithopone factory, the sulphate-hydrochloric acid-plant and the A-coal plant. As already has been mentioned restriction of the latter is out of the question. You have already been told that consumption in the sulphate-hydrochloric acid-plant has been reduced as far as possible. The remaining sulphate furnaces have to be kept working because a certain quantity of hydrochloric acid is indispensable for chloro-sulphonic acid, chlorhydrin production and for some other purposes, as you all know. Unfortunately, the usual way of providing sulphate hydrochloric acid by chlorine combustion can not be used since we shall have to face a great shortage of Chlorine anyway. There is no other way out but to extinguish both rotary furnaces in the Lithopone factory; especially the rotary furnace for finished dyes. Furthermore, the Titan factory which in any case has raw materials for only two more months has to be closed down immediately until the gas pipe is in working order again. By this procedure, all other gas consuming plants can

(page 6 of original)

go on working without restriction.

KUEHNE: Gentlemen, thanks to the quick and circumspect work done by the Engineering Department the vitally important plants are in a position to continue production. I should like to know how long it is going to take to repair the gas pipe lines and when we can expect normal gas supply.

EINSLER: Since we have a supply of m of gas pipes of mm diameter as well as valves to replace the two destroyed valves we hope to have the damaged pipe lines repaired within 8 days, so that the supply of gas in the quantities formerly supplied can be resumed after nine days.

KUEHNE: I request the Engineering Department to do everything in their power to restore normal working conditions as quickly as possible. I should now like to ask Dr. KAESSMANN for a detailed report on the destruction caused in the Phenol plant, as we have to do our utmost to bring this plant back to full capacity production as quickly as possible since it is extremely important.

KAESSMANN: The manufacture of Phenol is divided into two parts. The first takes place in the Eastern part of building P.33, the second in the adjoining building P 31. In short, the production process is the following: Benzol is sulphated through being treated with monohydrate of sulphuric acid in cast iron vessels equipped with a mechanical mixing & stirring device. The Benzol-sulphonic acid is poured into sodium chloride, then the excess

(Page 6 of original, cont'd)

sulphuric acid is neutralized with chalk. The sulphuric acid is then filtered off from the gypsum resulting from this process, and the gypsum is washed. This part of the manufacturing process is carried out in building P 33. From here, the benzol salt solution is taken to building P 31 and there it is steamed and later dried on cylindrical dryers. The dry benzol salt is fused with concentrated caustic soda at the high temperature of 340 degrees centigrade. The finished compound is put into water. The phenolate which was formed then goes into solution; the sulphite produced as a by-product separates out.

(page 7 of original)

as a crystalline deposit. After filtering and washing the sulphite, the phenolate solution is acidified, and the crude phenol liberated in this process is purified by distillation.

As already stated, the part of building P 33 in which the sulphating apparatus was situated has been completely destroyed, but in building P 31 only the melting installation has been damaged. Of the 4 melting appliances one has been entirely destroyed; a splinter has pierced the lid of another one and torn off all the pipes. It is hardly possible to say how long it will take to get the necessary replacements and to repair these two sets.

EINSLER: Taking the present strain on machine factories into consideration we must expect a delay of about 8 months in the delivery of new sets. Time needed for installation has to be added. These containers are not in stock.

KAESMANN: If we can transfer the Benzol sulphating process to other plants manufacturing intermediate products it will be possible to continue the production of phenol at about 50 % capacity in the undamaged part of the melting plant, after the clearing up has been done which will not take very long. As far as I could ascertain the shops SS and TS in building N 20 and shop ES in building N 14 would be suited for this purpose. The sulphating appliances for intermediate dyestuff products which are installed there and are not used to full capacity at present, can be put into use for benzol sulphating after cleansing and some minor alterations of the pipe system. It is an advantage that these shops have sufficient installations for the chalk neutralization process. Benzol salt solution can be supplied to the phenol plant in building P 31 by means of a newly laid pipe line which will be finished within 2-3 days. It will take about equally as long before the benzol sulphating process is running again and the first finished product is available.

(page 8 of original)

The total capacity of the above-named plants is greater than demanded. The equipment of plants SS and TS is sufficient to sulphurize 500 tons of benzol per month. Even though the sulphurizing boilers are not equipped with entirely suitable stirring apparatuses, this does, nevertheless, not constitute a disadvantage, since only the reaction time is prolonged somewhat. But the required output will be attained under all circumstances. In addition to this there is available there a roller dryer which could, in case of need, be used with an output corresponding to 150 tons of phenol per month in order to relieve the load on the plant in Bau P 31.

WENK: In the triphenylmethane plant it is also possible to sulphurize about 100 tons of benzol per month in the apparatus in which otherwise the sulphurization of our green dyes takes place, which, to be sure, is now being used only to a limited extent. But the equipment for the calcination would have to be provided first.

KAESSMANN:
The taking over of the fusion process by other plants involves somewhat greater difficulties. The two alkali fusion plants AS II and ANS in the undamaged western part of building P 33 have available principally cast steel autoclaves. This boiler material is conceivably unsuitable for the phenol melt. When subjected to the strong attacks of the concentrated, highly heated soda lye it would quickly deteriorate. In the ANS plant the equipment for gamma acid and I-acid is more suitable. If these products can be produced in Wolfen the phenol melt could be carried out there, even though with a somewhat slighter yield. Whether, to be sure, the total deficiency of 250 tons of phenol per month can be produced, seems doubtful, since the equipment is adjusted to handling solutions, whereas now considerable amounts of dry benzol salt must be introduced. The remaining accessory equipment for carrying out the process up to the phenolate solution is available. A sufficient number of pipe lines are available for the transportation of this solution to

(page 9 of original)

Bau P 31 for further processing. The possibility of WOLFEN taking over the production must therefore be examined immediately.

KUNDE: With reference to the phenol melt we shall probably have to follow the suggestion of

(page 9 of original, cont'd)

Dr. KAESSMANN and make ANS available therefor. Dr. KAESSMANN, will you please get in touch with WOLFEN immediately with reference to their taking over our gamma and I-acid manufacture. With reference to the lost sulphurizing equipment in building P 33 we now have, to be sure, found several possibilities. But I should like to emphasize specifically that the improvised equipment will also produce the accustomed good quality.

KAESSMANN: In Plant TS one can, after cleaning the equipment and rearranging a few pipe lines, already begin with the sulphurizing. The preparation of the equipment will require about 5 days.

KUEHNE: The preparation of Bldg. P 33 West for the refusion must be undertaken immediately. How long, Dr. EINSLER, do you think the reconversion will require?

EINSLER: Presumably 1 1/2 weeks.

O. BAYER: If the envisaged transfer of the fusion of the sulpho acid into plants AS I and AS II in the autoclave should cause too great difficulties, there would still be the possibility of producing - instead of according to plan A, as hitherto - in accordance with the wellknown but somewhat more expensive process via aniline phenol. At the present time considerable amounts of aniline could be readily obtained, since, to be sure, in peace times the I.G. produced up to 1000 tons per month and we obtained up to 200 tons per month from Uerdingen.

LAUX: The obtaining of additional amounts of aniline from Uerdingen causes no difficulties. In the course of a month we furnish about

(page 10 of original)

100 tons for vulcanizing accelerators, 100 tons for dyes and 120 tons are being used at the present time for Centralite, and the demands for Centralite are increasing.

O. BAYER: If, now, one diazotizes aniline with nitrite and sulphuric acid and boils the aqueous solution, there is liberated, according to the formula, 1 phenol, which can be distilled off

(page 10 of original, cont'd)

directly with water vapor. Equipment for diazotizing and boiling is now available in the Azo division as desired. To be sure, this method requires, as is evident from the formula, $2\frac{1}{4}$ mols of nitric acid, 1 mol for the nitration of the benzol and about $1\frac{1}{4}$ mol for the diazotization of the aniline.

WENK: This process could also be carried through offhand in the Azo division. The boiling would be accompanied by difficulties, since here tremendous volumes are processed with the easily decomposing diazo solution. For 10 tons of phenol per day boilers of 120,000 liters useful content are required. Since this amount of boiler space is not available, the boiling would have to be continuous. A considerable amount of time will be necessary in order to prepare the equipment for the production of the total amount of phenol which is required. On the other hand, in the Azo division we can cover the requirements of phenol for salicylic acid with about 3 - 4 tons per day according to the method indicated. To be sure, the required distillation would have to be carried out in the A-factory.

LUDWIG: The equipment is available. We must also mention the production of phenol via the chlorbenzol exchange method. In our case the method can be carried out only intermittently and for this purpose not sufficient pressure boilers are available. But in our experimental plant in the inorganic division perhaps 40 - 50 tons of phenol per month could be produced in the alkaline way via chlorbenzol. For this purpose Dr. THIENEMANN would have to initiate the necessary steps in order to have an additional reserve in case difficulties should arise in connection with the

(page 11 of original)

reconversion in plants ZM and Azo.

KUEHNE: In view of the greater requirements of nitric acid and the longer time required for reconversion, also in view of the possibly increased consumption of aniline for diphenylamine, for diphenyl-arsenic acid chloride (Clark) as a preliminary product for Blue Cross⁺ I consider that Dr. WENK's proposal with reference to a limited production of phenol is correct. The Azo factory will immediately

+ Poison gas? (translator's note).

(page 11 of original, cont'd)

take over the matter of supplying the salicylic acid plant with phenol. The question of transportation must be regulated between Azo, A-factory and ZW-division. The present position makes it necessary that we again operate at full capacity in the very shortest time possible, regardless of the increase in the cost of production, and that we will be in a position to make available the amounts of phenol which are necessary for the picric acid. Perhaps after Dr. KALSSMANN briefly tells us once more the distribution key for phenol, Mr. SCHWENK can give us information concerning the coverage of benzol and nitric acid requirements, and concerning the phenol situation within the I.G.

KALSSMANN:

In peacetime we produced 300 tons of phenol per month, distributed as follows:

- 60 tons for salicylic acid,
- 130 t for synthetic materials (Kunststoffe Troisdorf)
- 50 t for dyes,
- 15 t for tanning materials,
- and 25 t for special pharmaceutical purposes.

Now the output has amounted to 500 tons per month, of which there are used

- 120 tons for salicylic acid and special pharmaceutical purposes,
- 80 tons for synthetic materials,
- 20 tons for tanning materials,
- and 20 tons for dyes.

That corresponds to 240 tons, so that it was possible to use 260 tons for the manufacture of picric acid. Since these 260 tons must continue to be made available without fail and since there will be a shortage of 100 tons this month, even when taking into account that all reconversion programs are carried through, the additional requirements must be reduced from 240 to 140 tons.

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT No. NI-4619
CONTINUED

(page 12 of original)

Upon inquiry at Troisdorf it develops that synthetic materials can be limited only in so far as they serve civilian purposes, so that there one must continue to count on a running demand of 60 tons. I propose that the remaining 80 tons be distributed as follows :

60 tons for salicylic acid and pharmaceutical purposes and 10 tons each for dyes and tanning materials.

Schellenberg: It remains to be determined whether, when carrying out all of the shifts in manufacture which have now been decided on, the internal plant transportation load will not increase to such an extent that the required tank cars for intraplant transportation can no longer be furnished.

Ludwig: By combining the sulphurization in the N-block the question of transportation has been materially facilitated. In addition the A-factory can furnish 6 tank cars for the shipment of the raw phenol. If the transportation is uniformly distributed throughout the day and night it will be possible to overcome the difficulties with the available tank cars.

Schwenk: Because of the conversion one must, in view of the lower yield, as Dr. Kässmann advised, figure on additional benzol requirements of 50 tons per month in connection with the phenol melt. Since, in accordance with the last interview with Ludwigshafen, the purchasing center for benzol and toluol, additional delivery is extremely difficult, we must count on a further limitation of the processing of benzol for dyes. There is as yet no danger of a shortage of nitric acid because of the processing of aniline into phenol, since the allotment for nitrobenzol is sufficient and nitrite is still on hand in large quantities due to the stoppage of the manufacture of dyes. By the intensification of the yield of phenol,

(page 13 of original)

in the waste water and in the hydrogenation plants it was possible thus far to cover the shortage comparatively easily. One must expect that there will be an increase in demand on the part of rayon manufacture in the near future. But we hope, by converting the rayon factories to Cresol, to be in a position here also to take care of a shortage of raw materials.

Thienemann: Unfortunately I must report on still other damage caused by yesterday's air attack. Because of the sudden failure of current in the A-carbon plant,

(page 13 of original cont'd)

which could not be switched in again until after an hour had elapsed, the new A-carbon revolving furnace was unfortunately bent through. This produced a fracture in the large toothed gear when operation was resumed. As you all know, it is extremely difficult to again bring into order a revolving furnace, which has thrown itself. To obtain a corresponding toothed gear will also require a few months. It is therefore necessary that some other revolving furnace be used for the manufacture instead of the furnace which was put out of commission.

Kühne: If it is only a question of a revolving furnace it would be relatively easy to help by taking one of the furnaces in the titanium factory or in the lithopone plant. But how about the volatilization that follows immediately afterwards? For in the A-carbon the evaporated zinc chloride and the hydrochloric acid are recovered in the condensation behind the revolving furnace. If this does not occur then one must calculate on a rapid destruction of the foxes (Füchse) and of the hearth, in addition to the loss of material.

Thienemann: That is correct. In the case of every other

(page 14 of original)

revolving furnace we shall have to figure not only on considerably higher losses of material, particularly of zinc chloride, but also that the fox (Fuchs) and hearth will suffer heavily, and the revolving furnace will suffer because of unsuitable masonry work. But according to my opinion we have no choice; since we must continue to manufacture we shall simply have to choose a revolving furnace which will, as much as possible, continue to hold out until the A-carbon revolving furnace is again restored. The transportation of the furnace material back and forth is also disagreeable. 30 tons of mixture must be handled daily, with a pouring weight of 0.6, i.e., approximately 50 cbm ready formed mixture. These shaped forms must be treated with a certain precaution, since otherwise they gather too much dust, thus causing a loss of yield. It will probably be most suitable to lay temporary rails in the plant and allow the material to run from the transporting belt into dump cars standing alongside. Since a dump car holds about 1 cbm of filling, 50 to 60 dump cars must be provided each day for the transportation of the shaped forms. I assume that this will cause no particular difficulties. The return transportation of the furnace material will, to be sure, be more disagreeable. The hot furnace material will, in the A-carbon, be drawn off into lockable chests which hold 300 kg each. To be sure, these chests can be moved about the plant in a special driving frame. But if we wish to transport the material back from the Lithopone plant, which probably has the furnace that is most

(page 14 of original cont'd)

suitable for our purposes, these closed chests would have to be returned either by automobile or by the suburban railway. Now, we have to figure on 16 to 18 tons of furnace material each day, which amounts to 60 chests. Since we have only about 40 chests available for the furnace the transportation must be carried out very rapidly and the empty chests must be returned immediately again.

Schellenberg : The loading of these chests, which, with a charge of 300 kg and a net weight of 250 therefore weigh 550 kg when

(page 15 of original)

filled, on narrow gage cars and the unloading is practically possible only with one crane each in the lithopone and in the A-carbon plant. I believe that this transportation is, after all, in view of the space conditions which are now already very limited in the A-carbon, not to be recommended. It is probably more suitable to make available for these purposes two electric carts on whose flat platforms the chests can be easily loaded. If two electric carts run back and forth continuously the transportation can be handled easily, without further limitation of the A-carbon plant, which will already be very much confined by the dump cars which are to take care of the transportation of the raw material for the furnace, by the crane and the additional railway freight cars.

Thienemann : I also believe that this solution is suitable. With reference to the furnaces under consideration it should be remarked that the eliminated revolving furnace in the A-carbon is 22 meters long, with a free cross section of 1.20 meters. In the lithopone factory there is available a furnace 28 meters long and 1.30 meters in diameter. All other available furnaces, such as the barium sulphide furnaces and the furnaces of the Titanium association are relatively too large and would require interrupted operation. Since, in addition, as was mentioned, one must calculate on great damages to the furnace in question, I would suggest taking the lithopone furnace, it being the smallest and the least expensive of the furnaces that are available. To be sure, this will temporarily require a complete cessation of the lithopone manufacture, since another furnace of the lithopone factory is not available. But presumably one can get around this by letting the raw dya - pile up and then using the one furnace of the Titanium factory for the heating to red heat, since it, as has already been mentioned, is practically ready to stop completely because of a lack of raw material.

(page 16 of original)

Kuehne:

I believe we can proceed according to this suggestion. I request Dr. EINSLER to see to it that this important repair will also be made with the greatest possible speed.

Einsler:

The coinciding of the repair jobs which have been mentioned will make it difficult to release the corresponding number of locksmiths and construction workmen. As you know, we already have a continuous shortage of workmen. Unfortunately the older foreign workmen assigned to us by the Solingen assignment office are in part not well enough broken in yet to relieve the pressure materially. In part we were completely unable to take charge of people assigned to us, since accommodation was lacking for the time being.

Popp:

If the Titanium Factory is closed completely a large part of the 180 man crew will be released there; the same from Lithopone. We shall need no new housing facilities for these people. Otherwise there are still possibilities of accommodation, at least temporarily and immediately in the domestic science school, which will have to stop entirely its operations, which are at present minimal. There we can set up cots in the large rooms, also in the basement. Meals can also be provided there immediately, since stoves are on hand. It will also be possible to provide for another series of men in the Bachelors' Home by squeezing together. To be sure, the engineer office would have to help in setting up the beds and to make some improvised mattresses.

In my opinion we can use the girls who have been released in the Farbenlager and other places to fill positions in the factory in which men are still doing light work. The plants ought to indicate that immediately to the labor office. The pensioners who are still living here can also provide some help.

(page 17 of original)

In my opinion the question of accommodation is thereby solved.

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT No. NI-4619
CONTINUED

(page 17 of original continued)

Schwank:

The tanker with mining acid due from Hoechst yesterday has not yet arrived today. We have a two days' supply of mixing acid.

Kuehne:

The carrying out of the reconversion program just decided on for the preparation of phenol depends, if one assumes that the question has been decided satisfactorily from the technical angle, essentially on our being provided with the required increased amount of benzol by the Berlin assignment office. In addition there must again be a regular sequence of mixing acid deliveries. It is probably most suitable if the individual gentlemen will once more make an exact compilation for their sections of the present requirements of these products and turn it over to Mr. Schwank today yet. Mr. Schwank can call personally in Berlin tomorrow again in order to determine whether all proposed measures can be carried out as envisaged.

If nobody has anything further to bring up I shall close the meeting and thank you gentlemen for your vigorous support in connection with overcoming the heavy damages which our plant has suffered.

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

5 June 1947

We, ARTHUR C. MACNAMARA, 20127, and HERBERT R. DECK, B 397 944, hereby certify that we are thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of the document No. NI-4619.

ARTHUR C. MACNAMARA
20127

HERBERT R. DECK
B 397 944

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT No. NI-5929
OFFICE OF CHIEF OF COUNSEL FOR WAR CRIMES

THE REICH AIR MINISTER

L S II 4c No. 3758/33

Berlin W 8, 9 October 1933
Behrenstr. 68/70
Tel. a 2 Flora 0047
Telegram address: Reichsluft Berlin

D.P.

To the

Management (Direktion) of I.G. Farbenindustrie A.G.

Frankfurt/Main

In pencil: Milenz (?)

In the last number of the French periodical "Danger from the Air and Chemical Air Warfare" No. 9/10 (July-August) 1933 the following passage can be found on page 154:

Frankfurt/Main, 22 August. - Final experiments are being carried out at the I.G. Farben Laboratories at Oppau on a new gas, the composition of which is being kept secret. It is said that neither a mask nor any other device can afford any protection against this gas. - (Radio).

I would be obliged to have your comment on the above report.


On behalf of

signed: Dr. KNIPFER

Certified
signature
Office Clerk

In pencil:

Dir. Gaus

 your comment

Rubber stamp:

signature: DUISBERG

Reich Air Ministry Office.

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT No. NI-5929
CONTINUED

I.G. FARBENINDUSTRIE AKTIENGESellschaft LUDWIGSHAFEN/RHEIN

Nitrogen-Department

Rubber stamp: Dr. MUELLER-CUNRADT
initialled

To the
Reich Air Ministry

Berlin W 8
Behrenstr. 68-70

LS II 4 c
No. 3758/33

20 October 1933 KL.

In pencil: Dr. MILENZ

We acknowledge receipt of your letter of 9 October 1933 addressed to our firm in Frankfurt. Dr. MUELLER-CUNRADT from our Oppau works will be calling on you next week to give you the required explanation. He will contact you by telephone to find out what time will be convenient to you.

Yours faithfully

I.G. FARBENINDUSTRIE AKTIENGESellschaft

signed: LAPPE signed: KRAUCH

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

22 May 1947

I, Arthur MCMILLAN, Civ.No. 20191, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages and that the above is a true and correct translation of the document No. NI-5929.

Arthur MCMILLAN
Civ.No. 20191

A F F I D A V I T.

I, Dr. Felix ENRICH, residing at Baddockenstett, District of Velfenbuettel in the British Zone of Occupation, having been advised that by making any false statements I will become liable to punishment, hereby voluntarily declare the following under oath and without having been subjected to any duress:

Question of war economy were already taken up by the Nazis shortly after their having assumed power. Any plant that was suitable for war production, was systematically registered i.e. it was decided upon as to what had to be produced in the case of mobilization, which quantities were to be manufactured and which prerequisites had to be accomplished to carry out the production.

In the sector of chemistry this whole work was rendered difficult by the fact that up to a certain moment neither the Reich Agency nor the Economic Group nor the Statistical Reich Office were entitled or in a position to make the necessary inquiries. There was practically no possibility to force the firms in question to furnish information as they were not compelled by law to do so.

Though there was no obligation to give information, nevertheless the I.G. quite readily supplied information concerning its production capacity, actual production and production plans and devised precise Mobilization Plans for each plant.

In 1937 a law was introduced by which the Statistical Reich Office or the Office for War Economy Planning were charged with investigations as to production possibilities, the sale of goods and requirements in raw materials by the various firms. The above mentioned organizations were legally empowered to force the firms to give the desired information. The Reich Office for Chemistry was at first not included in these preparative especially as the personnel of the Reich Office was badly paid and therefore the maintenance of secrecy was endangered.

On the part of the Reich Office for Chemistry Dr. UNGEWITTER, Dr. DIETRICH and later on Dr. HAGERT were charged with the investigations and the preparatory

(Page 2 of the original)

work; on the part of the OKW the former Captain BECHT participated

Firm by firm turned up now to discuss this matter. The plans were discussed with the individual firms. In the course

of these conferences the firms supplied the required information and thus the so-called Mobilization Plan was established which was divided according to products - and within the various production sectors subdivided again as to firms. This Mobilization Plan led to the drawing up of the so-called Mobilization Tasks i.e. to the preparation of an order which in case of mobilization was to be communicated to the individual firms through an agency that had not yet been appointed. Later on it was decided that this agency was to be the Reich Office for Chemistry.

At these conferences the I.G. Farben was represented by all their section heads, especially Dr. WURSTER of Ludwigshafen and BUECHER of Bitterfeld-Wolfen, furthermore AMBROS, later on Ter MEER; from the commercial section WEBER-ANDRESSE, furthermore HUEFLIGER, later on SCHAAF and then von HEIDER.

Though outwardly the Mobilization Plans etc. were accepted by the I.G. without objections, practically they did what they liked and neglected everything that had been planned. There was no authority which was in a position or could risk it to call the I.G. to order.

Even if the people who had to deal with the I.G. were trained in chemistry and possessed far-reaching knowledge, they could never enlighten a man who came directly from an I.G. plant, as to what the factory really could produce - and they were always dependent upon his opinion. There were never any controls carried out at all at the I.G. as they were from the very beginning considered senseless. Whenever the Reich Ministry of Economics and the Reich Office for Chemistry ascertained production figures which did not agree with those of the I.G., the opinion of I.G. always prevailed.

The I.G. even gave information beyond its own province i.e. they provided the Reich Office for Chemistry with figures concerning production capacities and the like of firms which did not belong to them.

The first negotiations of this kind took place already in 1933; they were taken up on a larger scale about 1935 whereby the years until 1939 have to be called the years of preparatory work, while

(Page 3 of the original)

after the outbreak of the war one really cannot talk any longer of mobilization, but of economic war measures.

I Have carefully read each of the 3(three) pages of this affidavit and signed it with my own hand. I made the necessary corrections with my own hand and initialed them with the first letters of my name and I declare herewith upon oath that I have said the pure truth in this declaration to the best of my knowledge and belief.

(Signature) Felix EHRMANN

Sworn to and signed before me this 18th day of March 1947 at Nuremberg by Dr. Felix EHRLICH, known to me to be the person making the above affidavit.

(signature) Paul H. KATSCHER
U.S. Civilian, AGO number D-150641
Office of Chief of Counsel for
War Crimes, U.S. War Department

(initials): F.E.

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

21 April 1947

I, Dr. HORN, Civ. 20004, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document No. NI-4953.

Dr. HORN,
Civ. 20004

I. G. FARBENINDUSTRIE AKTIENGESELLSCHAFT

Telephone	Telegraph address:
Stassfurt	Sulfur
No. 983-84	Stassfurt

Mailing address: I.G. Farbenindustrie
Aktiengesellschaft, Stassfurt

To Procurist FRANZ
BITTNERFELD

Your Reference:	Your letter of:	Our reference:	STASSFURT
		(Cite in answering)	31 October 1936
Subject:		Accounting for installation work	
		Co/14	

Dear Mr. Franz,

If I am coming to you once more with a proposal concerning the Stassfurt matter, this certainly is done for the purpose of clarifying a situation which is uncertain for all Stassfurt gentlemen but mainly in order to spare our firm a possible reproach at a later time.

I talked to Dr. SCHMID on Saturday. He, too, does not know whether the competent authorities were informed in writing that quite a long time is required for the delivery of light metal after operation of the plant has been started. If this really has not yet been done, and unless there are other obstacles I think that a letter placing the responsibility upon a competent higher authority would be in order.

As this involves a plant matter, I have transmitted a copy of the draft to Dr. SCHMID, he shall contact you once again on the subject.

With best wishes,

Devotedly yours

(signed) L. CONTRAD

(Translator's Note:
Insertion -- see above-):
F) similar to the enclosed draft

(Enclosure)

Prime Minister Goering's comments on the Four Year Plan brought the invitation to all Germans to cooperate intensively. This invitation prompts us to express once again our opinion on the following:

You know that by order of the Reich, I.G. has established at Stassfurt a plant for the production of 4,800 tons of Electron metal per year, at the cost of 20 million in round figures. It is also known that the present needs of light metal for Army purposes can be covered without the utilization of this plant so that this production establishment at Stassfurt is idle, constituting a stand-by plant (Bereitschaftswerk). Not all competent officials know, however, that the effectiveness of this operating readiness is being considerably reduced -- if not even made illusory -- because of the fact that after the day on which plant operation has started it takes 8 weeks for

TRANSLATION OF EXTRACTS OF DOCUMENT
No. NL-1165 (Cont'd)

the first metal to be available. Taking this data as a basis, it is being assumed that the innovations tested in the laboratory will immediately function satisfactorily on large scale plant operation and that we have a sufficient number of skilled workers at our disposal immediately. The latter shall probably not be the case so that the interval between the start of operations and the delivery of metal will still be increased by an unknown factor. Furthermore, it is not known how much time the refining industry which further processes the metal will require to produce the finished products.

It is the purpose of this letter to point out once more this fact which if case arises might be of the greatest importance.

.....

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

I, HERTHA C. KNUTH, AGO No. X-046355, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of Extracts of Document No. NL-1165.

HERTHA C. KNUTH
AGO No. X-046355
U.S. Civilian

(E N D)

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT No. NI-5762
OFFICE OF CHIEF OF COUNSEL FOR
WAR CRIMES

I.G.FARBENINDUSTRIE AKTIENGESSELLSCHAFT
Board of Directors

Bitterfeld, 28 August 1935

(rubber stamp:)

Secretariat
Ministerial Councillor
Retired Dr. BUHL
Received 29 August 1935
Answered

Ministerial Councillor Retired Dr. BUHL
I.G.Farbenindustrie Aktiengesellschaft

Frankfurt /M.20.

Dear Dr. BUHL,

Following up my letter of the 26th instant I am
enclosing herewith the minutes of the conference with
Dr. ZAHN on 23 August, for your information.

With German Salute

Yours very faithfully,

(Signature:) Dr. PISTOR

-Enclosure-
Registered letter

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT No. NI-5762
CONTINUED

Conference with Ministerial Councillor Dr. ZAHN in Berlin on
23 August 1935.

Members of the I.G. present: Dr. PISTOR
Dr. MAY
Dr. VIECK.

1.) Diglykol. Dr. ZAHN informs us that the agreement concerning the erection of the plant at Wolfen has been approved in principle. One could now begin to place orders. We would receive a preliminary notice to that effect. Dr. ZAHN approves our point of view, that the Diglykol plant should become the property of the I.G.

As it does not yet appear to be quite clear what grade of purity the Wasag require with respect to Diglykol, Dr. ZAHN will call a meeting with the Wasag, Lu and Wo.

2.) Stabilisators. Dr. ZAHN informs us of a plan to erect a reserve installation for stabilisators of the same size as the one at "Ue" in Central Germany. As it is to be merely a reserve installation to be used in the case of war (in A-Fall), and as one must count on the stabilisators being used within a short time, no installations for distillation should be provided. The plant, which is to be erected at Wo, should be expandable to double its size. He estimates the cost at approximately two million. The requirements in the case of war are estimated at about four times the capacity of "Ue", namely at

approx.	264 tons per month	Ethyl-Phenylurethane
	116 "	" " " Diphenylurethane
	49 "	" " " Centralit I
	15 "	" " " Diphenylamine
further	23 "	" " " unsymmetrical Diphenylurea.

(page 2 of original)

Oils required for the following years should be stored. It is planned to erect plants for the production of Aniline and alkylised Anilines later.

3.) Acetophenon. Dr. MAY explains processes of production which have been considered:

a) Reaction of Acetyl Chloride on Benzol in the presence of Aluminium Chloride (Friedel-Crafts-Synthesis).

The Friedel-Craft process is already being put into technical practice at Lu. For the production of Acetyl Chloride Dr. MAY suggests the Phosgene process used at Knapsack instead of the PCl_5 process, previously envisaged, which presents difficulties with regard to apparatus.

The question of procurement of Acetic Acid has not yet been clarified and is being examined by Dr. ZAHN. Dr. ZAHN will also investigate whether the amount of approximately 50 tons per month Al-Metal, required for the production of $AlCl_3$, in accordance with the Griesheim process, will be released for this purpose.

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT No. HI-5762
CONTINUED

(page 2 of original cont'd)

- b) Condensation of Benzoic Acid with Acetic Acid in the presence of a Manganese-Carbonate catalysator.

This process has not yet been tested in technical practice; so far it has only been used on a small scale (6 kilogram daily). One cannot, without further ado, erect a plant producing 4 tons per day on this basis.

Naphtaline or Toluol are not available for the manufacture of Benzoic Acid. For this reason the laboratories have worked out a process of producing Benzyl Chloride, by combining Benzol with Formaldehyde in a hydrochloric acid current. From the Benzyl Chloride

(page 3 of original)

Benzoic Acid is to be produced by further chlorination and saponification, which will, however, come much more expensive. This stage also has not yet been developed on a technical scale, so that this entire method seems hardly suitable.

Nevertheless, Dr. ZAHN will examine whether Formaldehyde would be released for this purpose. The question of procuring Acetic Acid for this process will have to be settled as well.

4.) Hexogene. Dr. MAY reported on the large consumption of Hexamethyl Entetramine for the manufacture of high explosives in Japan. Hexamethyl-Entetramine produced from Ammonia and Formaldehyde.

Dr. ZAHN informed us that the Dynamit A.G. at Rottweil is working on the production of Hexogene (Trinitro-Hexamethyl-Entetramine).

Wolfen, 26 August 1935.

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

I, Julia KERR, No. 20185, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages, and that the above is a true and correct translation of document No. HI-5762.

Julia KERR
No. 20185.

-3-
"END"

112

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT No NI-5761
OFFICE OF CHIEF OF COUNSEL FOR WAR CRIMES

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL!

Memorandum

Discussion with Ministerialrat Dr. ZAHN in Berlin
on 19 September 1935 concerning Diglycol.

Dr. ZAHN reported that unfortunately the agreement on Diglycol could not be concluded as outlined in Dr. BUEHL's draft, which had been in the hands of the Army Ordnance Office (Heereswaffenamt) for some time. He intends to deal with the matter on the same basis on which he concluded an agreement with AUER i.e. either we sell the ground and the State would erect buildings and installations at its own expense - which in our case would be out of the question - or we make only the ground available and the State would erect the buildings and installations which would remain the property of the State, but that we should be entrusted with the administration and works management. To this I remarked that in that case the State should also bind itself not to use the plant for other purposes than those specified and above all not to use it to compete with us.

Dr. Z. continued that in case the State, after a duration of the agreement of 15 to 20 years, should give notice of its desire to terminate the agreement, the plant would become our property, but in the case of notice being given by us we should have to compensate the State for the value of the plant at the date of termination.

Dr. Z. intended to have an agreement drafted and to submit it to us. However, he accepted a proposal of mine that Dr. BUEHL should see Dr. Z. and submit our proposals for such an agreement, when he was next in Berlin, probably in the week from 23 to 28 September 1935 -. Dr. Z., however, will be in Berlin only on 23, 24 and 25 September. This procedure is more expedient in view of the fact that this agreement should serve as pattern for agreements on other plants, etc.

(page 2 of original)

e.g. for the stabilizer-plant. (Dr. T. R. MEYER with whom I spoke about this matter also emphasized that naturally the State should not be given any power to become our competitor with the help of equipment like the stabilizer-plant which comprises quite a number of products such as aniline and others.)

Dr. Z. also added that the firm in question would have the right to use the equipment for its own purposes and in the case of AUER the agreement provides that a share of the profits derived from the utilisation of such equipment is to be paid to the State, according to the agreement which is to be made in every individual case. In this way the State would participate in the profits.

We are in agreement with Dr. Z. that we, in collaboration with Ludwigshafen on the one hand and the Masag (Festphalisch-Anhaltische Sprengstoff A.G.) on the other, should carry through the research work planned in connection with Diglycol and that only after everything has thus been clarified, should we start building. I suggested that we should confirm this to Dr. Z. as per enclosure and he agreed.

We agreed that meanwhile the negotiations regarding the agreement itself are to be continued and Dr. Z. would also prefer an examination of our rough estimate of costs to be made by the Technical

(page 2 of original cont'd)

Department of the Army Ordnance Office (Heereswaffenamt) in the meantime. He will inform us when the technical experts are available for a discussion of the different items of the estimate.

I then informed Dr. Z. that difficulties are still being experienced in connection with the Omega product, the yield being much lower than previously anticipated, i.e. approximately 56 %, and that consequently, if the product is to be made in the process of manufacture

(page 3 of original)

contemplated, before viz:- acetic acid and phosgene = acetylic chloride, acetylic chloride and benzol containing chloride of aluminium = acetophenone and chlorine (with the Kali-Chemie) = Omega product, and we were to supply the quantity desired by him, we would not be able to manage with the quantity on account of the smaller yield. I told him that I could confidentially inform him as a colleague and not as a ministerial councillor that for this reason we are testing yet another process in which we would use chloric acetic acid as the basic material instead of acetic acid and proceed in the manner described above, thus obtaining the Omega product, directly and in satisfactory quantities. In this case, however, we should have to disregard our former misgivings concerning the production of the Omega product in our plants which to my belief the I.G. would not be willing to undertake. At the moment we were still studying this matter and could then perhaps also supply chloric acetylic chloride.- Dr. Z. asked for the intended place of production of chloric acetic acid and when I named Gersthofen he said he did not believe that E.W.A. (the Army Ordnance Office) would give its consent to this.

(I also discussed this matter with Dr. TIERMEYER who said that he had thought of having the complete manufacturing process performed at Gersthofen but that he is still in doubt as to whether for this small plant the misgivings of the I.G. could be disregarded. In the conference with Dr. TIERMEYER this point could not be settled definitely and it is possible that Dr. TIERMEYER will discuss it himself with Dr. Z. whom he is going to meet within the next few days.)

Note for VOLFM: In any case I would ask that the question be investigated further and that a possible means be found to overcome the extreme difficulties as regards the production site. I believe that Dr. Z. would prefer the production to take place at Wolfen.

(page 4 of original)

Dr. Z. furthermore remarked that he was surprised to hear that the yield should be so poor, since Ludwigshafen had quoted him quite a reasonable price for chloric acetophenone. He would not deny though that at an earlier date RIEDEL had incidentally also informed him that the yield of the Omega products was very low. RIEDEL had, by the way, completed his delivery of 50 tons now, whilst we had delivered only 20-30 tons. The quality of our product had improved, but it was not yet equal to that of RIEDEL.

Furthermore Dr. Z. told me that as my colleague he had to admit that I was right and that the I.G. should rather not undertake the making of the Omega product or any similar kinds.

2nd Copy

Contract

between

the German Reich (Reich Treasury-Army)
represented by the Army High Command,
hereinafter called "OKH",

and

the I.G. Farbenindustrie Aktiengesellschaft,
Frankfurt a. Main, represented by its Vorstand,
hereinafter called "Firm".

Preamble.

In 1935 the Firm, on its own initiative, conducted experiments in its Hoechst laboratories which led to the discovery that hexogen can be obtained by nitration of methylenesulfonacidic salts; consequently, the Firm registered patents under the following numbers :

J 52 746 IV a / XII P Secret
J 57 989 IV b / XII "
J 57 990 IV b / XII "
J 57 010 IV b / XII "
J 57 176 IV a / XII P "

The Firm informed the OKH immediately of the results of this work, and until 1938, in agreement with, and in the interests of, the OKH as well as together with the specialists of the OKH and the Reich Institute of Chemistry (RIC), the Firm, in its Hoechst plant as well as in an experimental plant in Hanau, tested the processes discovered by it for the industrial production of methylenesulfonacidic salts, for the nitration of these salts, as well as for the cultivation of the waste acids of nitration, thereby gaining the requisite experience for the construction of the S-Salt plant now in operation in Hoechst and the corresponding W-Salt plant in the Kruemmel works of the Dynamit A.G., formerly A. Nobel & Co., at Troisdorf.

In the course of this development the Firm incurred expenses amounting to RM 500,648.- This amount was checked and found to be correct on the

(page 2 of original)

25/26.10.1940 through a local audit by the Military Economy and Armaments Office, Auditing Office Army Ia, of the Supreme Command of the Wehrmacht. The OKH will refund this amount, under consideration of the following stipulations :

(page 2 of original, cont'd)

Article 1

The Firm shall authorize the OKH to use, or to let its contractors use, without restrictions and free of charge for an unlimited time, at home or abroad, for purposes of the German Wehrmacht, all results of the development mentioned in the Preamble, including all production blueprints and including all patent rights pertaining to results of the development which were acquired or are still to be acquired by the Firm. This includes the right of duplicating production blueprints and passing them on to other contractors.

Furthermore, the Firm shall inform the OKH of any subsequent improvements in the process and of its experience gained in their application, including any patent rights, and shall pass them on free of charge to the OKH, for use in its own or in third plants for purposes of the German Wehrmacht.

In turn the OKH, when concluding supplementary production contracts, shall enjoin its contractors to pass on to the OKH and to the Firm free of charge and for the duration of the supplementary production, their experiences gained in the application of the process and the improvements obtained, including any patent rights, for the manufacture of S-Salt and W-Salt.

In the industrial application of this development, the OKH shall give preference to the Firm or to one of the Companies belonging to the Konzern of the Firm, provided suitable prices and punctual delivery are ensured and there are no objections for reasons of national defense.

Article 2

The Firm shall be free to use the results of development and the patent rights connected with them (Article 1) at home and abroad for an unlimited time for purposes other than those of the German Wehrmacht, provided they do not affect matters which are to be kept secret in the

(page 3 of original)

interests of national defense. The Firm shall ascertain as to whether an obligation to secrecy exists.

Final decision on this matter rests entirely with the OKH.

(page 3 of original, cont'd)

While the OKH uses S-Salt or W-Salt abroad for purposes of the Wehrmacht, the Firm shall be entitled to suitable reimbursement; the OKH shall in every instance submit estimates for reimbursement to the Firm.

This shall not apply to deliveries to one of its allies during the war.

Article 3

The OKH shall enjoin its contractors to secrecy, as well as engaging them to use all information and experience concerning the process solely for purposes of the German Wehrmacht.

Article 4

Costs of development, which were found to amount to RM 500,648.- shall be borne by the OKH and reimbursed to the Firm at the conclusion of this contract.

Article 5

The Firm shall concede the right of examination, according to Par. 45 c) of the Reich Budget Regulations, to the representatives of the OKH and the Reich Finance Office, for the purpose of supervising the execution of this contract.

Article 6

The Firm shall undertake to preserve the secrecy of this contract and of the correspondence dealing with its drafting and execution, as well as all documents, drafts and files pertaining to it.

The matters to be kept secret may be made known only partially and only to the absolutely required extent to those persons who are needed, directly or indirectly, for the administration and completion of this contract. These persons shall be sworn to secrecy and it shall be pointed out to them that violation of the regulations pertaining to secrecy is punishable according to Articles 88 to 93 a) and 353b) and c), Reich Penal Code, in the versions of 4.4.1934, 2.7.1936, and 16.9.1939.

(page 4 of original)

Article 7

The Berlin District Court shall be competent for any disputes arising from this contract, regardless of the value of the disputed matter.

Immediately upon the beginning of the dispute the parties shall make an application for the exclusion of the public and for swearing all participants in the proceedings to secrecy, according to paragraphs 172, 174 of the law of court procedure. (GVG).

Article 8

The contract is drawn up in triplicate. The OKH shall receive two copies and the Firm one copy.

Berlin, the 1 June 1942
Army High Command
as represented by

Signature : Leob
General of Artillery and
Chief of the Army Ordnance
Office

Frankfurt a.M., 8 May 1942
I.G. F. MEININDUSTRIE AKTIENGESELLSCHAFT

Signature : Signature :
Kraus pp.

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

10 June 1947

I, Arthur MACNAMARA, Civ. No. 20 191, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages and that the above is a true and correct translation of the document No. NI-6144.

Arthur MACNAMARA
Civ. No. 20 191.

- 4 -
"END"

119

Dr. Paul Mueller
No. 4000

MS.: Directorate File T
13 December 1935
Illegible Initials

Treisdorf, 9 December 1935

Strictly confidential.

To: Director Dr. Kraenzlein
Frankfurt/Main - Hoechst

Dear Dr. Kraenzlein,

I thank you very much for your kind letter of 6th inst. I cannot tell you how glad I am to observe the most gratifying results of the closer collaboration in the sphere of high explosives upon which we embarked some time ago. I do not want to miss the opportunity to inform you of a paragraph in a letter from the Commander-in-Chief of the Army, signed "by order" by LtCol. von Horstig which reads:

"Section No. 1 of the Production and Examination Department of Army Ordnance Office congratulates D.A.G. on having been enabled - by close collaboration with I.G. and Wa Prw. (Army Ordnance Office, Production and Examination Departments) - to produce the modern high explosives Trinitrobenzene and Hexogene and to develop them further in the interests of the defense of Germany. -"

show I congratulate you also on the new process for the production of synthetic Glycerine. I await with truly impatient interest the results of the experiments now under way. I could very well believe that the Glycerine mixture in its present form yields a faultless Nitration product with exceptional characteristics. Furthermore, I could imagine that the properties of the Nitration mixture are especially advantageous for certain purposes, e.g. for gunpowder. The question of stability and of the nitration of the individual substances will proceed in mixture is, of course, important. Here, only the results of practical experiments can be decisive.

Stamp:
In: 13 December 1935

(page 2 of original)

I am very glad that the Hexogene Nitration process, so successfully developed by Drs. Wolfram and Schmurr, is to be demonstrated on the 17th inst. and that you, too, will be in Berlin. I should be particularly glad, of course, if we could meet again there and take the opportunity to discuss the other questions which you mention in your letter.

As to cartridge cases, I personally do not think that the idea of manufacturing them on a base of gunpowder will lead to practical results of any importance. The cartridge cases themselves are subjected to extraordinarily rough treatment during transportation. They must therefore have a certain wall thickness which will result in their very incomplete combustion. They will be ejected still burning when the breech is opened after the shot has been fired. In many cases it is necessary to fasten the shells firmly to the cartridge case in order to produce a single-unit

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT No. NI-6493
CONTINUED

(page 2 of original cont'd)

cartridge. In this, the tensile force will be a deciding factor. For my part I do not therefore intend to examine the idea more closely unless clear proposals are made which are capable of dispelling the doubts stated here.

With kind regards

yours very faithfully,
signed: Mueller.

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

26 June 1947

I, BERYL C. BESWICK, No. D 427459, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages and that the above is a true and correct translation of document No. NI6498.

Beryl C. BESWICK, No. D 427459.

TRANSLATION OF EXCERPTS FROM DOCUMENT NO. NI-7135
OFFICE OF CHIEF OF COUNSEL FOR WAR CRIMES

I.G. Farbenindustrie Aktiengesellschaft
Vermittlungsstelle W

Berlin NW 7
Unter den Linden 18
A 2 Flora 0021

CONFIDENTIAL

Reich War Ministry
Military-Economic Office (Wehrwirtschaftsamt)
Berlin W.35

Rv. 3/3 (Handwritten)
received 20/2/ Mu.

Your Ref	Your communication of	Our Ref (to be given in your reply)	Berlin 20 Feb. 36
----------	--------------------------	--	----------------------

Dr. R^W.

Subject: Stand-by plant for Concentrated Nitric Acid.

Your letter of 10 Feb., file number 66 b 2161/IV Wd(II b)
No. 911/36 G.

In answer to your letter of 10 February, we wish to inform you that the VIENENBURG site suggested by you has been thoroughly inspected by our specialists. According to the report, the site seems to be well suited for the intended purpose. In compliance with your request, we have had an estimate made of the process involving concentration by means of sulphuric acid and have drafted the projects for a plant of 15,000 tons per year - 1,250 tons per month and 30,000 tons per year - 2,500 tons per month of nitric acid. We have further drafted a schedule of a supplementary combustion plant, so that the plant can start working directly with primary ammonia. Costs for the VIENENBURG site are estimated at:

Costs in RM			
Type of Plant	Productive capacity of 1. H O 3, concentrated		
	tons per year	30,000	tons per year 15,000
	tons per month	2,500	tons per month 1,250
Combustion and concentration	RM	4,032,000	2,408,000
Concentration only	RM	2,290,000	1,403,000

TRANSLATION OF EXCERPTS FROM DOCUMENT No. NI-7135
CONTINUED

(page 2 of original)

I.G. Farbenindustrie Aktiengesellschaft
Vermittlungsstelle W

Berlin, 20 Feb. 36

Sheet 2

For the sake of regularity we would like to add that this estimate of costs is merely tentative; however, as you can see from the appendix, it has been thoroughly worked out and will be found to contain the approximately correct figures.

Heil Hitler

Vermittlungsstelle W
Sparte I
(signature) RITTER

2 Appendices
Original estimate of costs

3x

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

18 July 1947

I, Samuel S. HORN, AGO-443 113, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages and that the above is a true and correct translation of the document No. NI-7135.

.....
Samuel S. HORN
AGO-443 113

TRANSLATION OF EXTRACT FROM DOCUMENT No. NI-5910
OFFICE OF CHIEF OF COUNSEL FOR WAR CRIMES

(Translator's note:)

Stamp:

Card index;
finished.

R E P O R T

of the meeting of the Technical Management
(Technische Direktionsitzung) At Frankfurt-a.M.-
Hochst on 3 August 1936.

Present:

Hermann
Jachno
Pfaffendorf
Roth
Staib
Hagenboecker
Hilcken
Hirschel

Orthner (part of the time)

.....
(Page 2, para 1, of original)

Staib informs the meeting of a new process for the production of Siliciantetrachloride which is being carried out by Goldschmidt. The tin-chloride accruing from the process of removing the tin from white metal, is converted through silicium into siliciantetrachloride and tin which is extremely pure. The Torpedo-Versuchsanstalt (Torpedo Experimental Station) at Eckernförde is carrying out siliciantetrachloride smoke screen tests in conjunction with the Hanseatische Apparatebau-Gesellschaft (concern with Goldschmidt) from which I.G. is excluded. Von Heider and Staib will approach Berlin authorities in order to attain that I.G., in view of the high experimental costs which have until now accrued, be assured a supply of siliciantetrachloride, whilst the delivery of the machinery can be made through the Hanseatische-Apparatebau-Gesellschaft.

.....
(signature) HIRSCHEL

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

I, DOROTHEA L. GALEWSKI, MP. 34079, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of extract from Document NI-5910.

DOROTHEA L. GALEWSKI,
MP 34079.

END

24

I.G. FARBENINDUSTRIE AKTIENGESELLSCHAFT
Bitterfeld

CONFIDENTIAL !

File Note on a conference with Ministerialrat Dr. ZAHN, on 13 November 193

1. I called on Dr. ZAHN to show him by means of a map of the dye factory WOLFEN the site recently chosen by us for the new production of calcium sulphuric acid and to ask him whether he had any objections to our choice. He had none. Dr. ZAHN only inquired whether the plant for manufacturing phosgene located in the vicinity did not trouble us.

On this occasion I asked Dr. ZAHN whether any interest existed in our establishing a second calcium sulphuric acid plant beside the first. Dr. ZAHN replied that in future the Reich would grant no more funds if factories were erected on strange territory. For that reason a contract such as was for instance made with us for diglycol was out of the question. Furthermore, Dr. ZAHN told me that in his opinion two more plants for the manufacture of calcium sulphuric acid would be needed as emergency plants (Bereitschaftsanlagen), the location of which, however, was not fixed yet.

2. Dr. ZAHN told me that he himself had unfortunately overlooked sending us the arbitration contracts together with the frame contract for diglycol. In the meantime, he had attended to this and asked that we should soon return the arbitration contract to him that he may sign the frame contract and the matter may be settled.

As to the production facilities for diglycol, Dr. ZAHN referred to the fact that at Ludwigshafen up to 350 tons could be produced monthly, a quantity which he thought would not yet be needed at present, because each powder had not been tested for a possible use of diglycol.

(Page 2 of original)

3. Dr. ZAHN is of the opinion that in the near future, we shall have to increase our phosgene production to a capacity of 500 tons and that soon the building of the acetophenone-plant would be ripe for decision, too. In this connection he drew my attention to the fact that we should inform him if we wanted any assistance in the procurement of raw materials (especially iron) particularly non-rationed raw materials for the plants now under construction e.g. stabilizers (applications concerning the supply of rationed raw materials, especially substitute metals, would be submitted to him in any case and would be recommended). He will then give us a permit to the effect that the non-rationed raw materials wanted by us are needed for direct orders of the Armed Forces, a permit which will help speeding up the supply considerably.

4. I told Dr. ZAHN that Dr. WIELENZ had not called on us up to now on account of perchloron and that therefore, we could not submit proposals yet.

5. Dr. ZAHN, as he told me, had had a longer talk with Dr. RITTER before the meeting with me. On the basis of that discussion, Dr. ZAHN asked me whether we used chlorine for our magnesium. He had learned from Dr. RITTER that chlorine was not necessary in a certain process. I replied thereupon I could imagine that that process started from carnallit (Wintershall) whereas we worked with magnesia. Dr. ZAHN's inquiry can be traced back to the fact that they had conferred about the chlorine situation with Dr. RITTER and evidently felt apprehension that there was not sufficient chlorine in the "A-Case" (im A-Falle).

(signed) G. PISTER

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT MonNI-4490
(Cont'd)

Ministerialrat Dr. BUHL
Dr. SCHOEMER/Dr. VIRCK/O.I. MUELLER
Dr. BUEGIN/Director v.d.Bey (for information and return)

Bitterfeld, 14 November 1936

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

I, DOROTHEA L. GALEWSKI, M.P. No. 34079, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document No. NI-4490

DOROTHEA L. GALEWSKI
U.K. Civilian
M.P. No. 34079

(E N D)

F i l e - N o t e

about Ministerialrat Dr. ZAHN's visit to Wo (Wolfen) and Bitt (Bitterfel
on 17 December 1936.

Persons present from Wo (Wolfen): Dr. PISTER (Part of the time)
Dr. SCHÖNER
Chief Engineer MUELLER
Dr. VIRCK.

- 1.) Dr. ZAHN stated that the lack of glycerine made it urgently necessary for the Wolfen diglycol plant to start operations on 1 March, as had been agreed upon with Dr. Wittwer. To this end a lease contract would have to be concluded beforehand, and Dr. BUHL shall be requested to make a draft for it. Dr. PISTER pointed out that the question of starting operations had already been settled in the main agreement.
- 2.) The cover agreement has been signed and will be sent to us within the next few days after having been stamped. The contract for power supply and the sundry sub-agreements will follow.
- 3.) Since there has not yet been any answer to our application of 20 October 1936 to the Main Custom-House Wittenberg about obtaining industrial alcohol, Dr. ZAHN will settle this matter by direct negotiations with the Monopoly Administration (Monopol-Verwaltung).
- 4.) Dr. ZAHN counts upon the 1 October 1937 as deadline for the completion of the stabilisers-plant. The Wo (Wolfen) works will keep to this date.

(Translator's Note:
Pencil note: Initial: B
To Ministerialrat Dr. BUHL)

(Page 2 of original)

It is to be ascertained what amount of aniline and mono-ethyl aniline can be stored in the tanks of the stabiliser plant at Wo (Wolfen). Dr. ZAHN wants to store up a larger supply.

- 5.) Dr. ZAHN inspected the building site.

Wolfen, 19 December 1936.

(Translator's Note:
pencil signature:) Virck

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

I, DOROTHEA L. GALEWSKI, M.P. No. 34079, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document No. NI-4488

DOROTHEA L. GALEWSKI
M.P. 34079

(E N D)

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO. NI - 4487
OFFICE OF CHIEF OF COUNSEL FOR WAR
CRIMES

I. G. Farbenindustrie Aktiengesellschaft
Directorate

Bitterfeld, 17 December 1936

To
Ministerialrat Dr. Buhl,
I.G. Farbenindustrie Aktiengesellschaft,
Frankfurt/M. 20

Secretariat (Rubber Stamp)
Retired Ministerialrat Dr. Buhl
Received: 21 December 1936
Answered:

Dear Dr. Buhl,

To-day we received a visit from Dr. Zahn who informed us that the main Diglycol contract has now been signed and that the stamp will be affixed within the next few days.

The sub-contract for Power, which we had already submitted to the office (Amt) some time ago, is also being signed now.

The other sub-contracts for the individual products will be sent to us shortly. These are only smaller contracts with about 3 articles which mainly contain only the costs of the individual plants.

Dr. Zahn informed us of the necessity for the first Diglycol plant to go into production immediately after completion. For this purpose he suggested that a lease contract be concluded with the Commander in Chief of the Army (Hs.: evidently according to Article 12) and he asked us to prepare such a contract. I replied that the main contract (Hs.: Articles 9, 10, 11) had already provided for the commencement of work, and I ask you, for your part, kindly to examine the question of whether it is more correct to work according to the main contract or to conclude a lease contract. Unfortunately Dr. Zahn was not able to give us a specimen of such a lease contract.

I told Dr. Zahn that I would ask you to see him again when you were in Berlin, in order to discuss the latter matter with him.

With German greeting,
Yours faithfully,
(Signature) I. Griston

(Hs. marginal note: Diglycol is to replace Glycerine, which is scarce (flake powder)).
Initial: B

Hs. No 17

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

2 July 1947

I, BERYL C. BESWICK, D 427459, herewith certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of the document no. NI-4487.

BERYL C. BESWICK
D 427459

END

128

Copy of copy

III Dr. W./U.

Berlin, 11 January 1937

F i l e - N o t e

on a long distance call to Ministerialrat Dr. ZAHN, HWA, on 11 January 1937

1) Re: Ammendorf

Min. Rat Dr. ZAHN has agreed to start Ammendorf at once if Ludwigshafen guarantees to transport to Lu (Ludwigshafen) the produced oxide as far as that cannot be manufactured into thiodiglykol due to lack of storage-room, and to manufacture it into diglykol. A letter to this effect should be written to the H.W.A. once started, Ammendorf should not have to stop anymore.

At present, only about 150 cbm as storage-room are available. The rebuilding of the Gasometer will result in about 1,000 cbm at the beginning of March next, besides which containers for another 2,500t. shall be urgently ordered. I proposed the construction of walled concrete pits for this purpose. Mr. LORINSER is to obtain offers from two firms and forward them to the H.W.A. The completion of the warehouse is to be executed with the utmost speed.

2) Re: Wolfen

Min. Rat Dr. ZAHN is of the opinion that Wolfen cannot start before the taking over of the plant has taken place and the contract with I.G. Farbenindustrie with regard to the transfer, etc. has been concluded. H.W.A. is waiting for proposals of this kind from Wolfen. After the settlement of these formalities the immediate starting up of Wolfen seems to be necessary.

Ø for Dr. Virk

(Page(Page 2 of original)

Dr. ZAHN asked me to discuss the projects Scholven and Gruonau with him after his return from his journey which will last the whole week.

(signed) Dr. Wittwer

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

I, Dorothea L. GALEWSKI, M.P. No. 34079, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document No. NI-4489

DOROTHEA L. GALEWSKI
M.P. 34079

(E N D)

119

F i l e - N o t e

on a conference in Berlin on 20 January 1937.

PRESENT: Ministerialrat Dr. ZAHN of the H.W.A. (Heeres-Waffenamt)

Dr. BUHL)
Dr. PISTOR) of the I.G. FARBEI
Dr. WIRCK)

- 1) The Power and Steam-supply contracts, have been slightly changed in text by the Heeres-Waffenamt, but have otherwise been essentially accepted without any change. Dr. ZAHN will send the contracts to the I.G. for signature in the form now agreed on.
- 2) The lease-contract for the Diglycol production plant, drawn up by Dr. BUHL, was discussed. Dr. ZAHN agreed to the draft with the provision that the contract department of the Heeres-Waffen Amt examine it. Regarding the details of the apparatus, machines, etc. listed in Annex I, the Inventory lists which are yet to be drawn up should be referred to.
- 3) The estimates submitted to the Heeres Waffen Amt regarding the supplementation of the diglycol-plant to an increased production of 400 tons per month and the Phosgene plant to 500 tons per month, are at the Office for Price Control (Preisprüfung).
- 4) There is a lack of storage facilities for diglycol. Dr. AMBROS has been asked by the Heeres-Waffen Amt to ascertain the demand of the Wasag (Westfaelische-Anhaltische Sprengstoff A.G.) and the D.A.G. (Dynamit A.G.) as well as the storage facilities.

(TRANSLATOR'S NOTE:

Pencil Note: Initial B

To Dr. BUHL)

(Page 2 of original)

- 5) Dr. ZAHN agreed that orders for the erection of line storage-facilities in Wolfen should be issued immediately. Written orders to this effect will reach us in the near future.
- 6) Storage of Aniline and Mono-Ethyl-Aniline. Dr. ZAHN asked us to find out whether it would still be possible for the I.G. to supply about 100 tons of Mono-Ethyl-Aniline per month in February and March, for storage in Wolfen.
- 7) Dr. ZAHN expressed the desire that the I.G. might transfer to the Heeres-Waffen Amt a capable, energetic engineer with allround machine-technical and also chemical knowledge. This man's task would be: Centralized agreement, supervision of orders, acting as advisor to the men of the chemical department of the Heeres-Waffen Amt. Tenure of his activity at the Heeres-Waffenamt: 3 - 4 years.

Dr. PISTOR agreed to consider this question, but pointed out the difficulty of finding a suitable person, especially as the I.G. itself has vital tasks to accomplish in the framework of the Four Year Plan.

- 8) Dr. ZAHN informed us on the contents of a letter from the Monopol-verwaltung (Monopoly Administration) according to which they will

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT No NI-4492
(Cont'd)

agree to the Wolfen request for the procurement of undenatured alcohol at cheaper rate under the condition that consumption is normally supervised by the Customs authorities.

Dr. ZAHN will request the Customs authorities to have the storage containers gauged by the Customs Commissioner in charge.

(Page 3 of original)

- 9) In connection with the Acetophenone project, Dr. ZAHN said that on the previous day he had conferred with Dr. von BRUENING about special questions which would have to be cleared up further yet. The manner as well as extent of production No. 3 depend on the result of this clarification.
- 10) In reply to our question, Dr. ZAHN stated that he still had the responsibility for the establishment of Hypo-Chloride and Chloride of Lime plants as before, but that the procurement rested in the hands of Captain BODE.

He urged us to submit to him a final estimate of costs

- 1) regarding procurement and storage of only the most important machinery and apparatus in the framework of the intended increase of Losantine manufacture.
- 2) for the effective extension of the present Losantine manufacture.

Wolfen, 23 January 1937

(Translator's Note: Pencil
initial : V (for Virck))

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

I, DOROTHEA L. GALEWSKI, MP. No. 34079, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document No. NI-4492.

DOROTHEA L. GALEWSKI
U.K. Civilian
M.P. No. 34079

(E N D)

I.G. Farbenindustrie Aktiengesellschaft
Farbenfabrik

Wolfen, Kr. Bitterfeld
8 February 1947

I.G. Farbenindustrie Aktiengesellschaft
Att.: Director Dr. BUEHL

Registered

Frankfurt on Main - 20
Grueneburgplatz

Stamp: Sekretariat
Min.Coun. Dr. BUEHL
recd. 9 February 1947
Answ.:

Dear Dr. BUEHL,

Enclosed I am forwarding to you a memorandum regarding a visit to Berlin on the 4th of this month. Dr. PISTOR would like to discuss the subject of "Dinitroanisol" with you, day after tomorrow, and I should like to give you the following comments on this:

The apparatus on hand in our plant making sulphur black (Schwefelschwarzfabrik) can be used, generally speaking, for the production of Dinitroanisol. This merely calls for a few supplementary items to be set up in the plant nearby which formerly produced sulphur blue (Schwefelblaufabrik). It is the question of apparatus for dressing which need not be attached to the floor or be stationary in a building so that upon request they also can be removed again at any time. For this reason Dr. ZAHN suggested for the estimate the wording as shown in inverted commas.

(Translator's Note: Handwritten: Discussed with Dr. PISTOR on 17/2. (Initial) "B" (for BUEHL)).

Dr. PISTOR would like to discuss with you whether such an addition made in our factory premises as they exist could encounter legal misgivings.

(2nd Page of original)

I.G. Farbenindustrie
Aktiengesellschaft
Farben Fabrik

Wolfen, 8 February 1947

Sheet 2

The costs for this addition would amount to a round sum of RM 100,000.

With German salute
Yours sincerely

(Signature) VIRCK

Enclosure

(3rd Page of original)

Memorandum
on a conference in Berlin
on 4 February 1937

Persons present: of H.W.A. (Translator's Note: H.W.A. - Heereswaffenamt -
Army Ordnance Office) Ministerial Councillor Dr. ZAHN
Dr. BEDIANN
Dr. HANECKE

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO. NI-4494
Cont'd

of I.G. Dr. WITTWER (at the same time noting as Commissioner
Raw Materials)
Dr. VIRCK

Diglycol.

The Diglycol requirement of Vasag and D.A.G. Dynamit A.G. combined amounts to at least 250 moto (Translator's Note: Moto - Monthly tonnage) for the years of 1937/1938. This requirement can be covered by Ludwigshafen and Wolfen plants provided Wolfen will be able to start work on 1 April.

The capacity is expected to be:
for April '38 (Wolfen) 100 moto, Lu (Ludwigshafen) 100 moto
May '38 250 moto Lu 150 moto
from
from June onwards '38 300 moto Lu 200 moto

According to a statement by Major NIESCHLAG the storing of 1000-2000 Jato (Translator's Note: Jato - Yearly tonnage) Diglycol - possibly from production surplus - is by all means desirable. Storage facilities are being provided for 18,000 tons of Diglycol.

In Krussmühl and in Dueneberg storage is already existing, or under construction for 500 tons for each of them.

Dr. ZAHN intends to create facilities for storage of 5000 tons in Wolfen, as well as for 5000 tons in Reinsdorf.

An estimate of 27 January 1937 covering storage for 5000 tons of Diglycol has been submitted to Dr. ZAHN.

(4th Page of original)
(Page 2 of original)

It winds up with RM 840,000.

Dr. ZAHN declared he would not start work in Wolfen until plant ownership has been acquired and the lease contract signed.

Dinitroanisol

Dr. ZAHN's attention was drawn to the fact that no additional apparatus have as yet been provided for the production of (600 Moto) Dinitroanisol under "Mob Case" (Translator's Note: Mob Stands for Mobilization) because so far an order to that effect had not been forthcoming. Dr. ZAHN asked for an "estimate" to be submitted to him "on apparatus and fixtures required to supplement the machine part in the Dinitroanisol plant".

In this instance there is no question of stationary apparatus which are to be installed in the old plant producing sulphur blue (Schwefelblau-fabrik).

Wolfen, 5 February 1937

cc: Dir. Dr. AMEROS
Dir. Dr. PISTON
Dr. WITTWER
Ministerial Councillor Dr. ZAHN
Dir. Dr. BUHL (in handwriting)

Initial V (Translator's Note:
Standing for Virck).

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO. NL-4494
Cont'd

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

I, HERTHA C. KNUTH, AGO NO. X 046355, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document No. NL-4494.

HERTHA C. KNUTH
U. S. Civilian
AGO NO. X 046355

END

(transl's note: In reply to Dr. GOLDSCHMIDT's question we have for the time being suggested to him that the issue could not be suitably dealt with by letter, handwritten initial B)

(Page 2 of original)

I.G.FARBENINDUSTRIE AKTIENGESSELLSCHAFT ON/RHINE

Our Reference	Date	Page
Legal Department	16 March 1937	2

To Ministerialrat Dr. BUHL (ret.), Frankfurt on Main.

giving him the prospect of an verbal explanation at some time. As we shall meet him next week with regard to other matters, I assume he will then again refer to the subject of Wölfen. I therefore would indeed be grateful to you if you would let me know what attitude we should take.

With German salute
I.G.FARBENINDUSTRIE AKTIENGESSELLSCHAFT
Legal Department

(signature) BOECKLER.

(Page 3 of original)

Dr. Fritz BOECKLER
Solicitor

Ludwigshafen/Rhine, 18 March 1937
Friesenheimerstrasse 38
Phone No. 8692 (I.G. Farbenindustrie
Aktiengesellschaft)

Dr. Boe/S

To

Ministerialrat Dr. BUHL
with letter to I.G. Farbenindustrie Aktiengesellschaft
Frankfurt/Main
Gruenburgerplatz

(transl's note:
stamp)

Secretariat
Ministerialrat Dr. Buhl (ret.)
received: 19 March 1937
answered:

Digweed Plant Wölfen

Dear Ministerialrat,

Thank you very much for your letter of 17 March. I see from it that circumstances regarding contracts for the plant at Wölfen are not finally clarified yet. For this reason we shall refuse to answer possible questions by Dr. GOLDSCHMIDT at our next meeting, giving him the prospect of a later conversation on the matter. In case I do not hear anything to the contrary from you, I assume that you will agree with this way of handling the

case.

With my best regards
I am yours truly

(signature) BOECKLER

Confidential!

Personal!

(transl's note: handwritten
initial B)

(page 4 of original)

To
Solicitor Dr. BOECKLER,
I.G.FARBENINDUSTRIE A.G.,
LEGAL DEPARTMENT

17 March 1937

Ludwigshafen/Rhine

Subject: Diglycol-plant/Wolfen

Dear Dr Boeckler,

In reply to your letter of 16 March, I am glad to inform you that the Diglycol-plant at Wolfen was originally planned merely as a stand-by plant in case of war and that for this reason alone we first had no cause whatsoever to contact GOLDSCHMIDT in this matter. Now we have received official orders, however already not to operate the plant, which means that a lease agreement has to be concluded first. I have made a draft for this contract and sent it to the authorities, but I have not had an answer from them yet. Under these circumstances, that is to say, before a lease agreement is signed and the operation of the plants is finally settled by it, any discussion with GOLDSCHMIDT on the matter seems to me a little premature. In addition to this we are bound to strictest secrecy, and would need official approval for a discussion with GOLDSCHMIDT on this matter. There will be the best opportunity for this when the lease agreement is discussed with the authorities.

With kind regards
I am yours truly

(transl.note: signed: DUHL
stamp)

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

I, DOROTHEA L. GALEWSKI, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document No. NI-4486.

DOROTHEA L. GALEWSKI,
MP 34079.

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT No NI-5763
OFFICE OF CHIEF OF COUNSEL FOR WAR CRIMES

I.G. FARBE MINDESTRASSE AKTIENGESELLSCHAFT Bitterfeld, 25 March 1937

Directorate

Secretariat Ministerialrat Dr. BUHL (retire Received 30 March 1937 Answered:

Ministerialrat Dr. BUHL,

Frankfurt /M. 20

Subject: Di-glycolone plant.

Dear Dr. BUHL,

Yesterday we received a visit from Ministerialrat Dr. ZACH, who took over the plant for the production of di-glycolone. We shall receive a confirmation of the transfer in the form of a memorandum, which will serve as document when the MONTAN takes possession of the factory. It is the latter with whom we shall have to conclude our lease contract, and Dr. ZACH asks that you should begin verbal negotiations regarding the lease contract with Ministerialrat Dr. ZWIDLERACK in Berlin.

Notes
B

Dr. ZACH would like it very much if you would visit him when you are in Berlin, so that he can assist you in coming to an early conclusion of the contract.

We shall commence production in the Wolfen factory before the matter of the lease contract is settled, on the strength of Dr. ZACH's letter of 15 March 1937 of which a copy was forwarded to you. Our output is to be sold to the explosive-factories Wasag and Dynamit-Nobel.

We further arranged with Herrn Dr. ZACH that we fix a provisional price for the product together with the auditor of the Reich War Ministry. This price is to be based on the present sales quotation Ludwigshafen, where diglycolone has been manufactured for some considerable time, and the higher amortization for the construction of the new plant is to be taken into consideration. This price is to be revised when the plant has been producing for a certain time.

Regarding fire insurance Dr. ZACH will talk to Dr. ZWIDLERACK; he, too, holds the view, that in the case of

We 17

(page 2 of original)

I.G. FARBE MINDESTRASSE AKTIENGESELLSCHAFT Bitterfeld, 25 March 1937

Directorate

di-glycolone production, which entails fire risks, an insurance is appropriate. Concerning the insurance of the raw materials and the finished product we have already arranged the preliminaries ourselves.

I enclose file note of the talk with Dr. ZACH, which was prepared by Dr. VIERCK.

I wish you a happy Easter and remain with

Deutschen Gruss,
Yours very respectfully
signature illegible

- Enclosures -

(page 3 of original)
File Note.

The visit of Ministerialrat Dr. ZAHN and Ministerialrat Dr. BRUNNEN
of the Army Economic Office on 24 March 1937 in Wolfen.

Present for I.G.: Dr. PISTOR
Dr. SCHROEDER
Dr. DEYER
Obering. MUELLER
Dipl.-Ing. LORISER
Dr. VIERCK

- 1.) The purpose of the visit was the incorporation of the di-glycolone plant. The memorandum on the incorporation will be forwarded to us by Dr. ZAHN.
- 2.) As an exact basis for the calculation of the price for di-glycolone can be obtained only after several months of production, and as on the other hand we must contact Deag (Westphalisch-anhaltische Sprengstoff A.G.) and D.A.G. (Dynamit Aktiengesellschaft), who are going to be the buyers of our product, Dr. ZAHN recommended that an agreement should be arrived at with the Reich War Ministry (Diplom Ingenieur WEDLER) regarding a provisional standard price. This price is later to be adjusted when actual cost price has been calculated. The initial costs for setting the plant going are to be included in the price.
- 3.) Dr. PISTOR pointed out the legal regulations concerning the Organization of German Settlements, which raises the question of the construction of workers' houses. The houses are to be built by the Army High Command as owner of the plant. Dr. ZAHN requested that he should be contacted in this connection.

(page 4 of original)

Ve 17

- 4.) Omega salt. Dr. ZAHN commissioned RIBBEL with the planning of an installation which is to produce 660 tons of Omega salt per month. It is said that the process is one which does not require chloroacetyl chloride but aluminium chloride as raw material.

We confidentially informed Dr. ZAHN of our newly evolved process, in which we achieve the FRIEDEL-CRAFTS synthesis not with $AlCl_3$ but with $FeCl_3$, and pointed out the advantages as regards materials.

The costs of an experimental apparatus are to be assessed and the figures to be forwarded to Dr. ZAHN.

Wolfen, 25 March 1937

signature: VIERCK

To Director Dr. BUEL
" Dr. PISTOR ✓
Ministerialrat Dr. ZAHN

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT No NI-5763
CONTINUED

(page 5 of original)

Copy

High Command of the Army

Berlin W 35, 15 March 1937

Tirpitzufer 72-76

File Reference: 74 a/f
(SXVIII, 2)

Telephone: C 1 Steinplatz 0012

Wa B 9 No. 379 / 37 secret

Secretariat

Ministerialrat (retired)

Received: 20 March 1937

Answered:

To the firm of

I.G. Farbenindustrie A.G.

c/o Herr Director Dr. PISTOR or deputy

B i t t e r f e l d .

Subject: The starting up of the di-glycolene plant Wolfen.

The great shortage in glycerine supplies on the one hand, and the increased demand in the most widely divergent industrial and Wehrmacht spheres on the other hand, make it necessary that an adequate amount of di-glycolene should be available at the right time. The High Command of the Armed Forces therefore agrees that you take all measures to ensure an early start of production in the new di-glycolene plant in Wolfen. It is presumed that the buyers for the entire output will in the first place be the powder and explosive factories (Fasag and D&G) who will place their orders directly with you. The right is reserved for the High Command of the Armed Forces to order additional di-glycolene for special purposes if necessary. 1 April is to be marked down as the latest date for beginning of production. The army-owned di-glycolene plant in Wolfen is leased to you for this purpose by the Munten. The conclusion of a suitable lease contract with that company is reserved. You are requested to communicate directly with Wa B Staff V, Ministerialrat Dr. ZIMMELACK regarding this contract. Will you, at the same time, communicate with the Army Ordinance Office Price Control Bureau, so that from the outset all questions on price formation, increases, introduction of a suitable bookkeeping system, etc. can be clarified according to the overall agreement concluded with you on 24 October to 2 November 1936. It is important that the question of price formation in particular is settled unequivocally from the start.

RM 91,000 (in words: ninety one thousand Reichsmark) have been provided, in accordance with your estimate of 13 June 1936 to cover the initial costs. It has been agreed upon with the Price Control Bureau (Armed Forces) that this amount is to be taken into full account when fixing the price of the finished products.

Please confirm receipt of this in writing.

By proxy
signature

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT No NI-5763
CONTINUED

(page 5a of original)

Secret.

1. This is a state secret in the sense of Article 88 of the Reich
Tax Penal Code.
2. To be forwarded under seal only; if mail channels are used as
"registered letter".
3. To be kept in securely locked deposit as addressee's responsibility.

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

May 23, 1947

I, Annette Wallach, 20101, hereby certify that I am thoroughly
conversant with the German and English languages and that the
above is a true and correct translation of the document No NI-5763.

Annette Wallach
No. 20101

"END"

- 4 -

I.G. Farbenindustrie A.G.
Vermittlungsstelle W
Dr. Vg/W.

25 June 1938

SECRET

1. This is a state secret within the meaning of Article 83 of the Reich Penal Code.
2. To be forwarded only under seal; if sent by post, to be "registered"
3. To be kept on responsibility of addressee under lock and key.

File Memorandum

Subject: Substance for the decontamination of weapons.

We were invited today to OKH, Wa J Rue I, and there spoke to

Mr. Groppler, pharmacist
Mr. Cyran, pharmacist.

In answer to the letter from Department Z, dated 10 June 1938, we were given the following information:

The production of the substance for the decontamination of weapons, in Wolfen, is to be brought up immediately to the greatest capacity possible at the present time, i.e. 17 tons per month. The increase to 34 tons per month is not to be carried out by 1 November 1938 but by 1 September 1938. The necessary iron will be assigned by Wa J Rue 9; the assignment is already under way. Production must at all costs be so organized that by 1 October 1938, 100 tons per month of the finished product are delivered to the Army; if necessary, three shifts must be worked from now onwards, if this is not already the case.

Moreover, production is to be increased from 110 to 120 tons per month, as quickly as possible. A statement is to be made as quickly as possible as to when this increase, i.e. the extension of the plant, is possible. The necessary iron will likewise be assigned from the Army quota.

With regard to the financing, verbal agreement was given to the proposals of Department Z made in the letter mentioned, dated 10 June 1938. No agreements have as yet been reached and no fixed premises made as to the cost of the new apparatus. It was requested that, at all costs, the increase to 120 tons per month be made immediately and with all possible speed.

Wa J Rue I requests an answer to the following questions, by 0900 hrs. on Monday, 27 June 1938 at the latest:

(page 2 of original)

I.G. Farbenindustrie A.G.
Vermittlungsstelle W

25 June 1938

- 1.) What supplies are available in Wolfen at the moment?
- 2.) How much can still be completed by the end of June?
- 3.) Is it possible to manufacture 17 tons per month, in the months July/August?
- 4.) Can production be increased to 34 tons per month as from 1 September 1938?

With regard to packing, it was announced that the produce was to be packed in glass globes with a 25 l content, in wicker baskets, with a glass stopper with a 1 mm bore. The stopper is to be fastened, for safety, with an Igelit-foil.

(stamp) signed Wagner

Distribution:

- Original, Vermittlungsstelle W,
1. Carbon copy to Dr. Marx, Wofa, previously informed by telephone.
2. Carbon copy to Dr. Boesche, Leverkusen
3. Carbon copy to Mr. Flotho, Department Z., previously informed by telephone.

6 x

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

2 June 1947

I, Beryl C. BESWICK, No. D 427459, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages and that the above is a true and correct translation of the document No. NI-4634.

.....
Beryl C. BESWICK, No. D 427459.

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT No. NI-4637
OFFICE OF CHIEF OF COUNSEL FOR WAR CRIMES

I.G. Berlin SO 36
Central Buying Department

SECRET!

(stamp)
Direction Department

16 July 1938

1. This is a state secret within the meaning of Article 88 of the Reich Penal Code.
2. Only to be handed on sealed, if sent by post, to be registered.
3. To be kept at responsibility of addressee, under lock and key.

Strictly confidential!

To
Management Department
for the attention of Dr. Ludwig
Leverkusen

Your reference
B

Your letter of
13 July 1938

Our reference
Central Buying
Department

date
4 July 1938

Subject:

Toluol/ letter from the Buying department Ludwigshafen of the 9th of this month concerning taking over of additional toluol by the A factory.

After we had received your telephonic promise yesterday, according to which an additional taking over of 500 tons of cleansed toluol or pure toluol with about 50 - 60 tons per day would be possible, we immediately make direct contact with the Supreme Command of the Army, which had previously addressed itself to Vermittlungsstelle W. It developed in this connection that the Supreme Command of the Army had been induced to make this inquiry because of our small demands for pure toluol from the Benzol Union for the month of June. Meanwhile, as is known, even increased quantities of pure toluol have been called up for the current month and the month of August in consequence of the demands of the explosives factories which have increased again. The Supreme Command of the Army had known nothing of this at the time of its enquiry at Vermittlungsstelle W. Because of our increased demands for pure toluol, the action of the Supreme Command of the Army has become meaningless. As we learnt there in our telephonic consultation, the increased demands will, in all events, continue for several months.

(signature) illegible

Buying department Ludwigshafen
for the attention of Mr. Schuster

(handwritten)
Bl. -T.O. Office
or(?) Id. 18/7

(handwritten) Initials?

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT No. NI-4637
CONTINUED

(page 2 of original)

To
T.D. Office

I.G. Leverkusen
Department A-factory

Leverkusen

Your reference	Your letter of	Our reference	Date
		Dr. L./Sp	18 July 1938

Subject: Toluol

I request that Vermittlungsstelle W be informed that we can take over immediately 500 tons of either cleansed Toluol or pure toluol, at the rate of 50 - 60 tons per day.

A-factory

(signature) Ludwig

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

7 June 1947

I, HERBERT RODECK, No. B 397499, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages and that the above is a true and correct translation of document No. NI-4637.

.....
HERBERT RODECK, No. B 397499.

- 2 -
"END"

145

TRANSLATION OF EXCERPTS OF DOCUMENT No. NI-589
OFFICE OF CHIEF OF COUNSEL FOR WAR CRIMES

(File dealt with)

Minutes

of the meeting of Technical Directors in Frankfurt/Main-
Hochst on 22 August 1938.

Attended by:

Lautenschlaeger (Initial) L
Jacobi
Kraenzlein
Roth
Pohrle
Hagenboecker
von Bruening
Gebhardt

.....
(page 2 of original)

.....
Kraenzlein reported on the visit of Dr. von der Linde, Economic
Main Office (HWA) and Dr. Wagner, agency W, concerning Acetophenon.
The Economic Main Office is interested in the process; the experiments
are to be carried out on a large scale.

.....
(page 3 of original)

Initial: G.

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

21 May 1947

I, ARTHUR MACMILLERA, Civ. No. 20 191, hereby certify that I am thoroughly
conversant with the English and German languages and that the above is
a true and correct translation of excerpts of the document No. NI-5890.

ARTHUR MACMILLERA
Civ. No. 20 191

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT No. NI-6497
OFFICE OF CHIEF OF COUNSEL FOR WAR CRIMES

HIGH COMMAND OF THE ARMY
Arms Examination Group 9
(Wa Pruef 9)
The Departmental Chief.

Trans.Note:
Stamp:
Office of Dr. KRAENZLEIN
6 March 1939

Berlin NW 87, 2 March 1939
Flotowstrasse 4
Telephone: Local 39 00 13
Long Dist. 39 50 01

To:

Director Dr. G. KRAENZLEIN
I.G. Farbenindustrie-Aktiengesellschaft
H o e c h s t / Main

Dear Herr Director.

On 18 March 1939 (Transl.note: handwritten note: Saturday)
at 10 o'clock, there will be a meeting in my office in Flotow-
strasse 4, which will be attended by several leading personalities
of I.G. Farbenindustrie who are to receive a short report on the
most important work and problems of my department.

I should like to invite you to this meeting and should be glad
to have your acceptance.

Heil Hitler!

Yours faithfully,

(Signature) SCHMIDT

(Trans.Note:)
Handwritten notes:
R. BOEMANN
Yes, through Dr. WAGNER
Vermittlungsstelle W
accept. Could it not be on
Saturday 11th?

Dr. WAGNER - impossible
several illegible initials and words crossed out.
6.3.39.

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

30 June 1947

I, Dorothea L. GALEWSKI, Civ. No. ETO-34 079, hereby certify that
I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages
and that the above is a true and correct translation of the document
No. NI-6497.

Dorothea L. GALEWSKI
Civ.No. ETO-34 079.

- 1 -
"END"

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT No. NI-4989
OFFICE OF CHIEF OF COUNSEL FOR WAR CRIMES

(Stamp)

TOP SECRET :

(Stamp)

- 1) This is a state secret according to the meaning of Article 88 RStGB (Reich Penal Code)
- 2) To be transmitted by hand only or to be sent to the address of an individual only in a double envelope, against a receipt.
- 3) Dispatch, as far as possible, by courier or confidence person, in case of dispatch by mail only with declaration of value, above RM 1001.
- 4) Manifolding of any kind, as well as the making of extracts is prohibited.
- 5) At the responsibility of the receiver, to be kept in a safe, in exceptional cases in a steel filing cabinet having a combination lock.
- 6) Offenses against the above will be liable to severest punishments.

Office Dr. Ambros
Recd. 27 March 1942
No 51 b

SKELETON CONTRACT

between

the German Reich (Central Finance Office of the Wehrmacht),
represented by the Supreme Command of the Army (Oberkommando des Heeres),
in the following briefly called "OKH",

and

I.G. Farbenindustrie Aktiengesellschaft, Frankfurt a.M.,
in the following briefly called "I.G."

On the basis of a building contract which is separately to be agreed upon - a plant for the manufacture of product G - having a capacity of 1000 moto (Translator's Note: Moto - tons per month), fitted to increase capacity to 2,000 moto) is to be erected in a non-stop shift, by order and at the expense of the OKH (order number 9/IX a 240-9018/39) on a site at Dyhernfurth which is owned by the Verwertungsgesellschaft fuer Montanindustrie m.b.H. (Company for the exploitation of the mining industry) Munich, (in the following called "Montan"). The German Reich has appointed the Montan as responsible agency. As to the maintenance and operation of the plant, the OKH and the I.G. agree the following:

Article 1.

- (1) The plant is intended for Wehrmacht purposes; OKH guarantees that the utilization of the plant for other purposes is possible only with the express consent of the I.G.
- (2) The OKH further guarantees that the plant will be operated only by the I.G. or by a company which is 100 % owned by the I.G., assuming that the I.G.

(Page 2 of original)

resp. its subsidiary company meets the obligations of the contract.

- (3) For the maintenance and operation of the plant, the I.G. has made available the Anorgana G.m.b.H. - with location at Ludwigshafen

(Rhein) - which it owns 100 % (in the following briefly called "Anorgana"), and with which the Montan has today signed a lease for the plant.

- (4) The OKH and I.G. herewith give their consent to the contract between Montan and Anorgana, mentioned in Paragraph 3, and they guarantee individually that the provisions of this contract will be abided by to the full extent. The I.G. will especially see to it that the labor staff necessary for the beginning of the operation as well as a suitable plant manager and the necessary working-capital are placed at the disposal.
- (5) The provisions of articles 1 and 2 become void if the contract between Montan and Anorgana, mentioned in Paragraph 3, becomes void as a result of a notice given by the Anorgana, or if, after expiration of the contract as mentioned in paragraph 3, Anorgana refuses to sign a new lease with Montan on the terms of the old lease, or in case the plant is being sold to a third party, according to article 14 of the contract mentioned in Paragraph 3.

Article 2.

- (1) The I.G. pledges itself neither to sell nor to encumber its business shares in the Anorgana for the duration of the contract between Montan and Anorgana as mentioned in Article 1, Paragraph 3.
- (2) The I.G. pledges itself not to amend the statutes of the Anorgana for the duration of the contract between Montan and Anorgana, mentioned in Article 1, Paragraph 3, without the consent of the OKH.
- (3) The I.G. pledges itself to take steps - if requested by the OKH - to the effect that for the duration of the contract between Montan and the Anorgana, as mentioned in Article 1, Paragraph 3, the OKH is represented by three representatives in the Aufsichtsrat of the Anorgana.

(Page 3 of original)

Article 3.

- (1) For the operation of the plant and for the duration of the contract as mentioned in Article 1, Paragraph 3, the I.G. pledges itself to make from time to time available to Anorgana, all present and future patents, processes and experiences which are at its disposal and which are suitable for this plant. The OKH acknowledges - with binding effect also on Montan - that all these patents, processes and experiences are the exclusive property of the I.G. and - unless otherwise agreed in a special contract concluded between Montan and I.G. for the process that without the consent of the I.G., they may not be used in other establishments or transferred to third parties and that in particular the non-protected I.G. processes and experiences must be kept strictly secret as regards third persons: this also applies for the period after the expiration of the agreement between Montan and Anorgana as mentioned in Article 1, Paragraph 3
- (3) The placing at disposal by 26 of processes, experience and patents according to Paragraph 1 will in principle be free of charge. The share in the profit to which Anorgana is entitled as a subsidiary company of the I.G., according to the contract between Montan and Anorgana, as mentioned in Article 1, Paragraph 3, constitutes the compensation.

Article 4.

Both parties pledge themselves to keep the contents of this contract strictly secret as regards outsiders, to take their personnel into the secret only to the extent that it is urgently necessary to pledge it also likewise to permanent discretion, and to take all measures for safeguarding the secrecy.

Article 5.

- (1) For litigations resulting from this contract, and irrespective

(Page 4 of original)

of the value of the disputed object, the District Court (Landgericht) Berlin, is competent.

- (2) Immediately upon the initiation of a lawsuit, both parties must make application for the exclusion of the public and relative to the obligation of all participants in the lawsuit to secrecy, according to Articles 172, 174 GVG (Gerichtsvorfassungsgesetz - Judicature Law) as well as the careful guarding of files.

Article 6.

- (1) Each of the contracting parties will pay half of the costs of the contract.
- (2) The contract has been executed in three copies. Each contracting party as well as the Chairman of the Aufsichtsrat of Montan receive one copy.

Berlin 1 October 1941
Supreme Command of the Army

Ludwigshafen/Rhine, 23 September 1941
I.G. FARBENINDUSTRIE AKTIENGESellschaft

(signed) LEEB

(signed) AMEROS (signature) Illegible

General of the Artillery and
Chief of the Army Ordnance Office.

(one illegible initial)

(Attached letter)

MONTAN
INDUSTRIEWERKE
G.m.b.H.

at present Lippoldsberg, 26 February 1942
Post and railway station (20) Bodenfelde/
Weser

Telephone: Bodenfelde 344/345
Postal check account: Berlin 20959

(Stamp:)

TOP SECRET!

- 1.) This is a state secret according to the meaning of Article 88 RStGB (Reich Penal Code)
- 2.) To be transmitted by hand only or to be sent to the address of an individual only in a double envelope, against a receipt
- 3.) Dispatch, as far as possible, by courier or confidence person; if dispatched by mail, only with declaration of value, about 1001 RM
- 4.) Manifolding of any kind, as well as the making of extracts is prohibited.

- 5.) At the responsibility of the receiver to be kept in a safe; in exceptional cases in a steel filing cabinet having a combination lock.
- 6.) Offences against the above will be liable for severest punishments.

(Translator's Note):
(Handwritten initial) K
(Stamp:) to Dr. DILTHEY

I.G. Farbenindustrie Aktiengesellschaft
Legal Department c/o Dr. Dilthey

Ludwigshafen/Rheine

Your Reference:
Dr.D/Mr.

Your Letter of:
31 October 1944

Our Reference:
05746/IIa2/Schr.

(Stamp:) Legal Department
Received:
12 March 1945 Vm

Re: Supplementary contract pertaining to the skeleton contract Niederwerk
Enclosure:

Enclosed we are returning to you one copy of the supplementary contract pertaining to the skeleton contract for the plant Niederwerk after it has been signed by the Supreme Command of the Army.

Heil Hitler!

Montan Industriewerke GmbH.

(Translator's Note):
(Handwritten) 388
(Illegible initial)

(signature: illegible) (signature: illegible)

(Attached enclosure)

I.G. Lu-Op

(Stamp) SECRET

Safeguarding of
secret letters
and drawings

Department: Legal Department

Number of building	Place where the safe stands:	Name of the keepers of keys	Type of cabinets. Type of lock if special type
1	Room No. 20 1st. upper story (Inside wall)	Dr. Heintseler Schuler	Steel plate reinforced cabinet (burglar and fire proof)
1	Room No. 6 Ground floor (inside wall)	Brunck Gerst	Steel plate reinforced cabinet (burglar and fire proof)

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT No. 11-4989
(Cont'd)

(Attached document)
(Translator's Note: Stamp:) Office of Dr. Ambros
Recd. 27 March 1942
No. 51 a

(Stamp:) TOP SECRET!

- 1.) This is a state secret according to the meaning of Article 88RStGB (Reich Penal Code)
- 2.) To be transmitted by hand only or to be sent to the address of an individual only in double envelope, against a receipt.
- 3.) Dispatch as far as possible by courier or confidence person, if dispatched by mail, only with declaration of value, above 1001 RM.
- 4.) Manifolding of any kind as well as the making of extracts is prohibited.
- 5.) At the responsibility of the receiver to be kept in safe, and in exceptional cases in steel filing cabinet having combination lock.
- 6.) Offences against the above will be liable for severest punishments.

L e a s e - C o n t r a c t

between

Verwertungsgesellschaft fuer Montanindustrie m.b.H. Muehlchan, in the following briefly called "Montan"

and

Anorgana Gesellschaft mit beschränkter Haftung with location at Ludwigshafen a. Rh., in the following briefly called "Anorgana".

By order of the German Reich, represented by the Supreme Command of the Army (in the following briefly called "OKH"), (order number 9/IX a. 240-9018/39) and using funds of the German Reich, I.G. Farbenindustrie Aktiengesellschaft (in the following briefly called "I.G.") establishes in a territory owned by Montan at Dyhernfurt a plant for the manufacture of product G, having a capacity for 1,000 tons (Translator's Note: Tons = tons per month), which can be enlarged for an output of 2,000 tons operated in uninterrupted day and night shifts. The OKH has appointed Montan as responsible agent for this enterprise. On the basis of the following lease-contract, Montan transfers to Anorgana a 100% I.G. owned subsidiary, the maintenance and operation of the plant, it being understood that Anorgana will procure the necessary working capital.

Article 1.

Montan leases to Anorgana the plant mentioned in the preamble. The plant comprises the real estate and the buildings covered by the enclosed situation map (enclosure 1), furthermore the

(Page 2 of attached document)

installations in terms of machines and apparatus according to the inventory lists which are to be drawn up at the earliest possible moment after the completion of the plant when they will be attached to this contract. Objects which are acquired after completion the inventory lists by Anorgana for Montan and which as part of the plant, are to become the property of

Montan, are to be recorded on supplementary lists which are to be attached to the inventory lists and to be kept up to date currently.

Article 2.

- (1) As a trustee of Montan, Anorgana pledges itself to handle the plant with all its accessories (machines and other installments, all supply pipelines and other connections forming a part of it) with the circumspection of a respectable merchant and technician, to keep it at all times in operating condition and, upon the request of OKH and with the means of OKH, to perfection it by modernization or renovation. Anorgana vouchsafes for the careful selection of the personnel entrusted with the administration and operation of the plant.
- (2) Montan has the right to convince itself at any time of the proper condition of the plant and its operating capacity.
- (3) Contracts to safeguard plant values against contingencies must be covered to the extent prescribed by law. Furthermore, Anorgana can take out insurance contracts to the extent required as a protection against damages for which Anorgana is liable according to the law or by reason for this lease. Insurances beyond this can be contracted for only with the consent of Montan.
- (4) Anorgana pledges itself to comply with whatever regulations the trade police may enforce. Changes demanded by the trade police authorities in regard to plant installations or the method of operation are to be submitted to Montan in advance. - Montan pays the cost and taxes arising from this measure.

(Page 3 of attached document)

Article 3.

- (1) While the plant is not operating, Montan has to pay the cost of plant maintenance - including its share of taxes and public assessments as well as insurances if any. Anorgana bills for this its own costs, without profit (including additions for public welfare and other general plant expenditures plus a 2 % addition per annum for the general technical supervision.
- (2) At the beginning of each year Anorgana has to submit for the next budget year (1 April until 31 March of the following year) a non-binding specified - (Translator's Note: aufgeschlüsselt); non-coded tentative estimate on the costs of the current maintenance according to paragraph 1, upon request, this also to include expenditures for modernization and supplementation. This estimate is to cover separately:
 - I. Maintenance of the buildings
 - II. Maintenance of the machines and apparatus with appurtenances.
 - III. Administration costs, broken-down as to personnel expenditures (wages, salaries, social benefit dues) and general costs (including taxes and insurances).
 - IV. Miscellaneous.
- (3) Montan will bring about a decision on the tentative estimate by the beginning of the budget year. Following the approval of the

tentative estimate, right of approval of the final accounting being reserved, Montan is going to provide Anorgana with the means necessary for the maintenance of the plant proportionate to the measure in which Anorgana itself has to make payments or to defray expenses. If Montan refuses to provide the means necessary for the work which Anorgana has declared necessary, the detriments possibly arising from the neglect of such work will be exclusively the responsibility of Montan.

(Page 4 of attached document)

- (4) Beyond the tentative estimate (Paragraph 2), Anorgana can carry out minor repairs up to the single amount of 1,000 Reichsmark without special order. In cases of special urgency, and also without an order, Anorgana has to protect the interests of Montan with the circumspection of a respectable merchant.
- (5) If and as long as the plant is being put into operation and within a three month period of a calendar year is being exploited to more than 40 % of its capacity, Anorgana, as a leaseholder, has to defray the costs of its current maintenance, incorporating such costs in the prices. As long as the plant is being operated but, exploited to less than 40 % of its capacity, within a three-month period, Anorgana has to defray the maintenance costs and calculate the prices accordingly, only proportionate to the exploited capacity, incorporating them in the prices; beyond that the costs will be defrayed by Montan according to paragraph 1.

Article 4.

- (1) The Supreme Command of the Army can at any time place the delivery orders for Wehrmachts purposes with Anorgana. In this case Anorgana is obliged to put the installation to operation and to keep it going. Anorgana pledges itself to furnish the cadre of workers necessary for the operation and to place a suitable plant manager and the funds necessary for plant operation at the disposal.
- (2) Operation of the plant for other than Wehrmacht purposes cannot be requested. Anorgana, on the other hand, can use the plant for other than Wehrmacht purposes, but only with the explicit approval of Montan in advance and on terms to be agreed on for each case. In every case, the orders of the Supreme Command of the Army have priority.
- (3) If Anorgana intends to manufacture in the plant other products than the product designed in the preamble of this lease, it has to so inform

(Page 5 of attached document)

Montan when asking for the approval. In this case, Anorgana must make sure that the converting for the production of the products provided for by the contract for the Supreme Command of the Army is possible within two weeks at the utmost. Anorgana has to defray the costs of converting.

Article 5.

Anorgana pledges itself to operate the plant with the circumspection of a conscientious technician and to make available at the needed time all the patents, processes and experiences suitable for the operation of the plant.

Article 6.

Anorgana will establish separate accounts for the plant in its bookkeeping system and will keep the books for the plant covered by the contract separate from the books for other plants if any. Montan has the right at any time to inspect the books for the plant covered by the contract and to examine all data incidental to manufacture, including the balance sheet of the plant, as well as all operational activities, the same holds true for the delegates of the Army Price Examination Office and the representatives of the Supreme Auditing Court of the German Reich.

Article 7.

- (1) For the duration of the operation of the plant Anorgana has to pay to Montan as rent a stipulated percentage of the profit derived from the plant (Paragraph 2). This share in the profit will be established from year to year by Montan, in cooperation with the Aufsichtsrat of Anorgana, within the 33 1/3 % to 50 % limitation, taking into consideration the orders placed and the exploitation of the plant incidental thereto, on the one hand, and, on the other hand, taking into account the continued technical development so far effected.

(Page 6 of attached document)

- (2) The profit according to the meaning of Paragraph 1 is being established as follows: To begin with the difference between the net proceeds from the products (Article 9) and own costs according to Article 9, Paragraph 1 a) to f) is to be established. From this differential amount, eventual amounts which can be put aside reserve funds, -if any-, and to the extent that same are permissible, according to the following stipulations are to be deducted. From the amount then remaining, the pro-rata corporation tax and the pro-rata export promotion tax are to be deducted (see the calculation example on enclosure 2). The amount thus established is considered the profit according to the meaning of Paragraph 1. Amounts put aside for items closely associated with the purpose (zweckgebundene Positionen) can be incorporated in the accounting as far as this is compatible with sound business management; as an example, amounts can be put aside as "guarantees for the starting of operation disturbances; amounts can also be set aside within a reasonable measure for social tasks and benefits as well as for repairs and claims. In any case, however, Montan - in cooperation with the Aufsichtsrat, is taking a deciding influence on finally stipulating the amounts to be set aside in the closing balance sheet of the respective balance-sheet period. Also in cooperation with the Aufsichtsrat it reserves the right to make use of and dissolve, reserve amounts which after the lapse of a business year - beginning with the deadline date of the last balance sheet - were not directly used by the firm's customer (Auftraggeber) making due provision for the firm's financial independence called for by the "Mob Fall" (Translator's Note: in the case of mobilization), the distribution key being 1 : 1.
- (3) The rent is established at the end of a year for the settlement of accounts (Abrechnungsgate) (1 April until 31 March of the following year) for the year preceding the settlement of accounts. The annual accounting is to be transmitted to Montan within two months after the termination of a year for the settlement of accounts and is to be settled jointly between Anorgana and Montan in cooperation with the Aufsichtsrat

150

(Page 7 of attached document)

of Anorgana within six months after the end of the year, for the year for the settlement of accounts, the rent is to be paid in cash to Montan. During these 6 months, no interest is to be paid by I.G.... Montan may demand during this time appropriate instalments. In case of a belated payment of the rent, Montan may demand a payment of interest which is 2 % higher than the discount of the Reichsbank at that time.

Article 8.

- (1) The Plant depreciation amounts (Paragraph 2) as earned by reason of the price of the products (Article 9) for such portions of the installation as are in operation will be paid in cash by the Anorgana to the Montan, as provided by the meaning of Article 7, Paragraph 3.
- (2) Unless other depreciation rates have been agreed upon for deliveries to public consignors (Auftraggeber), plant depreciation according to the meaning of Paragraph 1 covers:
 - 5 % per annum for factory buildings, railway systems, distribution, installations (pipe lines, lighting circuits, etc.
 - 10 % per annum for engines and apparatus, vehicles moving on tracks, plant and office furnishings,
 - 20 % per annum for short-lived apparatus, street vehicles, plant incidentals,

based in each case on the purchase value and the original value, respectively.

In case the establishment is utilized partially, the amount due per ton of the product is the depreciation total per annum divided by the number of tons which correspond to the annual capacity of this installation when fully utilized.

Article 9.

- (1) As far as the products manufactured in the plant are being delivered for inland Wehrmacht purposes, the sale is to be effected at fixed prices to the extent possible. In particular

(Page 8 of attached document)

the following factors should be considered for the price structure:

- a) Cost of work materials (raw materials and intermediary products).

To the extent that raw materials and intermediary products are being obtained from third parties, the actual cost prices are to be applied (value of goods, freight, packing charges for railway, operation, unloading and maintenance) minus quantity and price discounts, if any. To the extent that primary products and intermediary products are being supplied from plants of I.G., the Anorgana will reimburse for them to I.G. the prices at which I.G. would most reasonably sell, or supply to German customers, applied to an approximately equal quantity and at equal terms.

b) Costs of production

They comprise the wages for production and joint expenditure for production, including a proportionate share in the energy auxiliary and general plants-costs, the taxes and public charges for the plant management and for the establishment: the insurance premiums and special charges, if any.

c) Cost of packing and shipping.

d) Establishment amortizations.

e) Central administration costs and Joint sales expenditures,

amounting to 7 % on the values a) to d), after deduction of primary products and intermediary products possible supplied by I.G. according to a) at the lowest customer prices.

f) Turn-over tax.

g) An addition for profit on the values a) to e), which - providing an orderly plant management, allows for Anorgana

after deduction of rent, corporation tax and export promotion tax and in addition to providing an appropriate payment of interest on the working capital - an appropriate compensation for its industrial contribution also especially, and taking into consideration the inventive and technical achievement utilized in the plant in establishing this compensation the provision of number 56 (2) LSOE. is to be applied.

- (2) As far as the products manufactured in the plant are utilized for purposes other than those mentioned in Paragraph 1, Anorgana will place these products at the disposal of I.G. for selling; in this case, the Anorgana will charge a price to the I.G. which is determined according to the factors mentioned in Paragraph 1, under a) to g).

(Page 9 of attached document)

To the extent that I.G. sells the products manufactured in the plant to third parties and thereby realizes extraordinarily high profits, the Anorgana will bill to I.G. a price which is proportionately higher.

- (3) If the production of the plant covered by the contract is being supplied to other Montan plants, rented by Anorgana or I.G., or to an I.G. establishment, for further processing and for the use of the Wehrmacht, the Anorgana will bill for it a price which is established according to the factors of Paragraph 1, a) to g); for these products no further profit addition may be charged for further processing.

(Article 10.

- (1) Both parties pledge themselves to keep the contents of this contract and its putting into effect secret, as well as the correspondence, exchanged relative to putting the contract into effect, and the file documents pertaining to it, and to inform to an extent not more than absolutely necessary only such persons as must be called upon, directly or indirectly, for the working on and the carrying through of the contract. Anorgana will see to it that the persons named will be pledged to strictest secrecy and that they will be warned that an

offense against this pledge is liable for prosecution according to Articles 88 and following RStGB (Reich Penal Code).

- (2) The obligation arising for the parties to the contract from Paragraph 1 continues to be in effect also after the expiration of this contract.
- (3) Anorgana pledges itself to inform Montan at once should callers be announced on behalf of agencies or service offices outside the service district of the supply system. Upon consultation with the other competent offices, Montan will give the permission for entering the establishment.

(Page 10 of attached document)

Article 11.

- (1) Montan will exempt Anorgana of all obligations and burdens which possibly could arise for Anorgana by reason of this contract, except for stipulations of this contract which provide that Anorgana is bound to fulfill these obligations or finally to defray these expenses.
- (2) For the duration of this contract and by reason of the plant, Anorgana is the agency responsible for taxes according to the meaning of the tax laws.

Article 12.

- (1) The rights and obligations arising out of this contract can be transferred with the consent of the other contracting party only.
- (2) The stipulations of this agreement are binding also for the legal successors of the parties.

Article 13.

For the duration of this contract, Montan pledges itself not to sell without I.G.'s consent the installation or parts of it to private interested parties or for utilization for purposes other than those of the German Armed Forces, without I.G.'s consent; the parties agree that a sale within these limits does not justify a change or cancellation of this agreement.

Article 14.

- (1) This contract becomes effective upon the completion of the plant and is finally concluded for 20 years. The day of the completion of the plant will be fixed in writing between Montan and Anorgana. The contract will be automatically extended for 5 additional years unless one of the parties gives notice of withdrawal by registered letter effective as of the end of a contract period providing for one year notice. The notice of withdrawal was given in time if the letter which gives the notice was mailed before expiration of the deadline.

(Page 11 of attached document)

- (2) If, after the termination of this contract, Montan or its legal successor wishes to sell the installation in its entirety or parts thereof to a third party, the installation or the parts of the installation shall be offered for sale to I.G. first; only after I.G. has declined the acquisition, can a sale to a third party be effected, the latter only on terms which are not more favorable than the terms of the offer to the I.G.

Article 15.

- (1) For litigations arising out of this agreement, the Landgericht, (District Court) Berlin, is competent, without regard to the value of the disputed object.
- (2) Immediately upon the beginning of a lawsuit the parties have to make application for the exclusion of the public and for pledge to secrecy of the contending parties according to Articles 172, 174 GVG (Translator's Note: GVG = Gerichtsverfassungsgesetz = Law concerning the constitution of the courts) and to careful guarding of the files.

Article 16.

Each of the contracting parties defrays half of the costs arising from this contract.

Article 17.

This contract is executed in triplicate. Each party and the chairman of the Aufsichtsrat of Montan receive one copy.

Berlin, 1 October 1941

Ludwigshafen a.Rh., 23 September 1941

Verwertungsgesellschaft fuer
Montanindustrie G.m.b.H.

Anorgana Gesellschaft mit
beschränkter Haftung

(2 signatures): Illegible

(signed) AMEROS 91 signature) Illegible

(Page 1 of attached document II)

TOP SECRET

The German Reich (Armed Forces Fiscal Office)
represented by the Supreme Command of the Army
in the following briefly called "OKH"
and

I.G. Farbenindustrie Aktiengesellschaft, Frankfurt/Main
in the following briefly called "I.G."

in broadening the main contract for the plant Niederwerk, signed by the parties on 23 September/1 October 1941, conclude the following:

SUPPLEMENTARY CONTRACT

The main agreement of 23 September/1 October 1941 regulated the legal relationship of the parties with regard to the plant of Niederwerk for the production of 1,000 tons of product G. Incidental to the projected implementation and enlargement of this plant, and following the main order No. 9/IXa-240-9018/39 of 15 September 1941, I.G. has received in the meantime from the OKH the following orders for the construction and installation of additional plants on the factory site of Montan as Niederwerk.

- 1.) First supplement. It concerns the construction of a plant for the monthly production of 100 tons Bi IV 99 (T 300) and was placed with I.G. under No. 156/43 Top secret Wa J Rus (Mun 3 II) on 4 March 1943 under order No. 9/IXa-240-9018/39.
- 2.) Second supplement. It concerns the construction of plants for the monthly production of 20 tons of T 150 and 30 tons per month of T 155

and was placed with I.G. under No. 1162/43 Top Secret Wa J Rue (Mun 3 zbV) on 1 July 1943, with an implementation No. 1139/43 Top secret Wa J Rue (Mun 3 zbV) on 28 July 1943, under order No. 9/IXa-240-9018/39.

- 3.) Third Supplement. It concerns the construction of an experimental station for the monthly production of 100 tons of Sarin I and was placed with I.G. under No. 212/44 Top secret Wa J Rue (Mun 3 zbV) on 27 January 1944, with an implementation No. 1318/44 Top secret Wa J Rue (Mun 3 zbV) dated 20 June 1944, placed under order No. 9/IXa-240-9018/39.

(Page 2 of attached document II)

- 4.) Fourth supplement. It concerns the enlargement of the Hiedorwerk plant to assure the production of the preliminary products for Tabun, Sarin I and as far as expedient for Hiedorwerk, also for Sarin II (Soewerk) and was placed with I.G. under No. 1320/44 Top secret Wa J Rue (Mun 3 zbV) on 20 June 1944, under order No. 9/IXa-240-9018/39.
- 5.) Fifth supplement. It concerns the carrying out of the "special program of air raid protection measures" at the Hiedorwerk plant and was placed with I.G. under No. 1317/44 Top Secret Wa J Rue (Mun 3 zbV) on 17 June 1944, under order No. 9/IXa-240-9018/39.
- 6.) Implementation to the original main order dated 15 September 1941. It broadens the order of 15 September 1941 and was placed with I.G. under No. 1319/44 Top secret Wa J Rue (Mun 3 zbV), dated 20 June 1944, under order No. 9/IXa-240-9018/39.

The parties agree that for the installations with all accessories covered by the above mentioned figures 1 to 6, and for all other supplementary constructions which within the scope of the program jointly established with OKH, have been erected since signing the main contract, the same stipulations will be valid as have been established for the main plant at Hiedorwerk. The validity of the main agreement referred to is extended therefore to the additional installations and installations parts, in which connection it is considered understood that the broadening of the contract is to become retroactively effective as of the moment when the preliminary decisions was made and the orders for the construction and equipment incidental to the erection of these installations were placed.

If and to the extent that in connection with the future enlargement of the plant at Hiedorwerk new parts of the installation are to be established, it is understood and agreed that without explicit broadening of the main contract, the stipulations of the main contract will be valid also for these additional parts of the installations as soon as by reason of a special order of the OKH (preliminary decision, war order and the like), it is certain that I.G. is to take charge of the establishment of the plant.

Berlin, 8 February 1945

Ludwigshafen a.Rh., 2 November 1944

Supreme Command of the Army

I.G. Farbenindustrie Aktiengesellschaft

By order

(signed) LEEB

(signed) ALBRECHT (1 signature illegible)

General of the Artillery and

Chief of the Army Ordnance Office.

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

I, HERTHA C. KNUTH, AGO No. X-46355, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document No. HL-4989.

HERTHA C. KNUTH
AGO No. X-046,355
U.S. Civilian

(E N D)

??
..... Nr. 1715
..... Dipl. Ing. GEBHARDT? Branch I21/2/38
.....??.....

CONFIDENTIAL

R E P O R T

on the Conference on Nitrogen at Leuna on 22. December 1937

	<u>page</u>
1) Report on sales and market for commercial Nitrogen	3 - 6
2) Report on sales and market for nitrogen for fertilizers	7 - 11
3) Agricultural situation at the end of 1937 and prospects Nitrogen Sales	12 - 38
4) Position of projects for foreign countries	39 - 54
5) Programme for production and development of production	55 - 56

(page 2 of original)

The following gentlemen participated:

from Berlin : Benn, Fahr, Fischer, Flad, Hanser,
Kretschmann, Oster, Roetger.

from Bitterfeld : Buergin, Lang

from Frankfurt : Dencker, ter Meer, Struss

from Halle : Scharf, Steffenhagen,

from Hoechst : Jaehne, Staib

from Koeln : Bachmann

from Leuna : Buete-fisch, v. Felbert, Henning, Lang-
heinrich, Sauer, Schneider, v. Staden, W
Waelder, Willfroth, Wyszomirski,
Strombeck

from Leverkusen : *****

from Ludwigshafen: Ambros, Boeckler, Duden, Pier, Simon,
Stroebeles, Wurster

from Oppau : Balz, Fahrenhorst, Goldberg, Grimm,
Kircher, Krauch, Lappe, Ad. Mueller,
Mueller-Cunradi, Schliephake,

from Ploesteritz : Ritter,

from Wolfen : Petersen

(page 3 of original)

- 1) Scale and market conditions for commercial Nitrogen. Hanser
I.G.'s activity in the field of Nitrogen products for commercial purposes amounted to approximately 84 000 tons Nitrogen in the year 1937. This quantity is made up as follows:

	<u>Tons Nitrogen</u>
Share of I.G. in Syndicate sales	40 000
Requirements of associated works	17 000
Own requirements of the I.G.	<u>27 000</u>
total:	<u>84 000 Tons Nitrogen</u>

As compared with the year 1936 activity has increased by about 25 000 tons Nitrogen or 44%. 2/3rds of the increase is accounted for by the home market and 1/3rd by the foreign market. The increase in home consumption is made up of 10 000 tons Nitrogen for nitric acid and 7 000 tons Nitrogen for liquid ammonia; the increased quantity of the latter product mostly went to Dormagen for the production of artificial silk. The most important product in commercial nitrogen still continues to be nitric acid, and of the total sale of 84 000 tons Nitrogen in 1937 this accounted for 36 000 tons Nitrogen or 43%. These 36 000 tons Nitrogen are spread in fairly equal parts over the I.G. share in Syndicate Sales, the requirements of the associated works and I.G.'s own requirements.

With regard to home prices, we have not reduced the price of commercial nitrogen in line with the reduction price for fertilizer. recently. The question came again to the fore owing to the order to reduce prices of trade mark articles by at least 10%. We have informed the competent offices that we have no trade mark articles, and the only product which might come under this heading, namely carbonate of ammonia, is not a trade mark article.

(page 4 of original)

Therefore we have made practically no price reduction at home in the course of the year.

On representation by the Reich Ministry of Food and the Office of Raw Materials, we only consented to reduce the price of urea for feeding purposes from 75 Pfg per kilo nitrogen, delivered free, to 60 Pfg per kilo nitrogen, ex factory. Of a quantity of 2,500 tons urea proposed for tests, we have delivered up to now 500 tons urea at this price. In November there was a temporary shortage of nitric acid caused by large orders from the factories producing explosives. Consequently the Reich Ministry of Economics and the Army Ordnance Branch considered it necessary to intervene and to prescribe a plan of distribution. However, direct control was not exercised, as there is already an organization for distribution in the form of the Syndicate. Some of the orders for nitric acid for November were cancelled for various reasons; it has been established that various consumers ordered larger quantities than they really needed on account of the alleged shortage. At all events in December 1937 there are sufficient goods to meet requirements, and there will be during the next few months.

If there was a shortage of nitric acid here or there, it was in most cases due not to shortage, of goods, but to a lack of tank cars. As we have always foreseen this difficulty, we had decided to build a second tanker, and this has already been running for several months.

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

I, Victoria ORTON, Civ. No. 20129, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German language and that the above is a true and correct translation of the document No. NI-5668.

Victoria ORTON
Civ. No. 20129

Title Page

"Von Werl. zu Werk"
(Around the Plants)

(I.G. Trade Mark) Monthly Publication of the Works Combine of
I.G. Farbenindustrie Aktiengesellschaft.

January 1941

Ludwigshafen Edition

32nd year

(Page 2 of original)

Hermann SCHMITZ on his 60th birthday
by Carl KRAUCH

.....

Today Germany, under the leadership of Adolf HITLER, is once again
fighting for

(Page 3 of original)

her right to live in a Europe from which plutocracy of the English
stamp must be finally eradicated. For the second time the whole
world is aflame. When the people were called upon to vote for the
last time on 10 April 1938 the newspapers published the following
words of Geheimrat SCHMITZ, who, by the Fuehrer's trust in him was
- at the creation of the first National-Socialistic parliament -
appointed a member of the German Reichstag: "Never before have
historic developments followed each other in such short order and
with such decisive import for the German nation as now. Never
before has each and every German been aware, as he is today, of
what has been at stake heretofore and what will be at stake in the
future. The magnitude of the task set for the German manual worker
and of the epoch which our Fuehrer has opened up to the German
nation." These are the clearly spoken words of the man, who gives
first consideration to the importance of interrelationship.

In 1933, after the laying of the foundation-stone of the Haus
der Deutschen Kunst in Munich (see picture) Geheimrat SCHMITZ,
accompanied by affirming nods from the Fuehrer, expressed among
others the following words in the course of a welcome speech:

"May the erection of the Haus der Deutschen Kunst be a good
omen for the reconstruction of the German economy." This re-
construction has taken place in the meantime. It was the world
war and its consequences that brought our Geheimrat to us, because
of the fact that as a result of the Versailles Treaty, especially
those foreign industrial enterprises had been sequestered, of
which he was amongst other things, Generaldirektor Hermann SCHMITZ,
born on 1 January 1881 in Essen on the Ruhr, was a reserve
lieutenant of the 61st active infantry regiment when that war

broke out. After having been wounded seriously 3 times as company commander, he returned from the front in October 1914. He was awarded the Iron Cross, first and second class. On account of his being particularly well-informed on industrial and economic questions, he was then assigned to the War Raw Materials Section of the Ministry of War and then, following that, he was given a special assignment as a Beirat (Advisory Councillor) in the Reich Treasury Office.

In the course of the hard struggle for survival, in which German industry found itself during the so-called peace negotiations of Versailles, Carl BOSCH and Hermann SCHMITZ met for the first time. After this, Carl BOSCH, from tasks they both had, quickly realized that in Hermann SCHMITZ he had found the man he needed for the "Badische" and for the general interests of the large chemical industries, which later on became I.G. Farben; a man on whom he could rely, who was not only a merchant but especially an industrial organizer of the caliber required to solve the problems which arose in industrial reconstruction after the collapse. As an organizer, he proved his mettle by organizing the financial structure of the I.G. Farben A.G. in its present form. The creation of the "Anilin-collar" in Ludwigshafen a.Rh., which just preceded the Rentenmark, calls to mind one of the milestones on the road to this final achievement. Volumes could be written on the ups and downs encountered in reestablishing the international relations of the I.G. Farben and the final successful conclusion under the direction of Hermann SCHMITZ. Thus only a brief indication can be given of the extent of the tasks which SCHMITZ had to administer in his new field of activity.

(Page 4 of original)

As had already been the case during the World War I due to the solving of the nitrogen problem, the I.G. Farben plant and its products again were one of the economic main-stays of the whole German economy in the post-war years, above all in the years after the political change, regardless of whether the products in question helped to safeguard German autonomy more and more in the field of foodstuffs and arms or whether they were export products which brought very important foreign exchange to the Reich, which had to make itself secure against all probabilities. Thus the managing economic head of this enterprise also had the task of coordinating the activity of this enterprise with the aims and policies of the state.

Hermann SCHMITZ was particularly well-fitted for this task. His absolute calm, his well-balanced and humane personality, his confident manner of conducting affairs at international congresses already described above, his great sense of duty, his ideals from the point of view of the merchant and the economist together with his pleasant and extremely impressive personality mark him as the kind of economic leader particularly needed now-a-days, namely a leader who conceives the functions of a private enterprise to be only a part of and subordinate to the national economy. As a member of the Reichstag since 1933 and as a leader in the war economy, he served his fatherland to the utmost. This is apparent from the fact that he was awarded the War Service Cross on 22 August 1940.

TRANSLATION OF EXCERPTS FROM
DOCUMENT NO. NI-1319
Cont'd

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

I, JOHN J. BOLL, AGO NO. A-444412, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document No. NI-1319.

JOHN J. BOLL
U. S. Civilian
AGO NO. A-444412

END

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT No. NI-6489
OFFICE OF CHIEF OF COUNSEL FOR
WAR CRIMES

Confidential

25 February 1938

Dear Herr HOMANN,

We have already formerly had occasion to write to the Heads of our offices abroad about the support they should give to the State and the Party within their sphere of activities on behalf of our firm. We would not wish to let the beginning of this year go by either without repeating our request that you as well as all your collaborators should again and again make all endeavors to support not only the Government agencies, but also official Party agencies in their work abroad. This does not only mean, that each individual should develop a positive mental attitude towards the present regime, but he should also as far as possible become a member of the Party organisations and contribute to the best of his ability to Party welfare institutions.

We consider it as a matter of course, that apart from each individual being prepared to render service, our foreign offices should also place themselves fully at the disposal of the German cause. This entails the avoidance of placing orders with anti-German firms or of using anti-German newspapers or periodicals for advertising purposes. On the other hand we attach great importance to supporting those organs which have always shown themselves particularly pro-German by the insertion of advertisements.

We expressly call your attention to the fact, that we have no special reason for addressing today's letter to you, but that we wanted to explain once more in general, which attitude towards the State we expect from our representatives who hold leading positions abroad.

"Bayer"

I.G. Farbenindustrie Aktiengesellschaft

(signed:) MAHN KENTZEL

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

I, Julia KERR, No. 20185, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages, and that the above is a true and correct translation of document No. NI-6489.

Julia KERR
No. 20 185.

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT No. NI-8590
OFFICE OF CHIEF OF COUNSEL FOR
WAR CRIMES

MINISTER PRESIDENT GENERAL GOERING
Commissioner for the Four
Year Plan

The Chief of the Office
for German Raw and Synthetic Materials

(handwritten:) No. 1458/37 top secret
(g.R.)

(handwritten:) WC-15 St I-2046/37

Berlin, 25 November 1937
Behrenstrasse 68-70
Telephone: A 2 Flora 0048

(stamp:)

TOP SECRET

(handwritten:)

40
to be filed
Vo 9 Dec.

Dear Mr. Under Secretary of State,

Enclosed herewith please find copy of the report on
"The results of the work done during the first year of the
Four Year Plan", dated 30 October 1937, for the information
of Minister President General GOERING.

1 Enclosure

Heil Hitler !

(signature)

Colonel of the General Staff

(handwritten notes:)

Ministerial Director (name illegible)	}	was submitted to Ministerial Director M. (initialed:) W. 3 December
Ministerial Councillor DITRICH		for notice Noted D. 5 December
Ministerial Director WALTER		Noted W. 3 December

(initialed:) B 2 December

(rubber stamp:)

Section Nutrition
Received: 9 December 1937
Journal No.: top secret
(g.R.) 52/37
To be submitted for
resubmission:
Filed away: 10 December
Initial

(page 2 of original)

MINISTER PRESIDENT GENERAL GOERING
Commissioner for the Four Year Plan

The Chief of the Office
for German Raw and Synthetic Materials

U-2 P.M.

Berlin, 30 October 1937
Behrenstrasse 68-70
Telephone: A 2 Flora 0048
(handwritten) WC - 15

(stamp:)

TOP SECRET

Results of work done during the first year of
the Four Year Plan.

At the close of the first year of the Four Year Plan
I submit the following report on the work done during this year
and what further development may be predicted.

(page 2 of original cont'd)

1. Tasks assigned.

- a) The order given to this office in the form of a directive was to see to it, under its own responsibility, that Germany was freed in the shortest possible time from the necessity of importing those raw materials in the field of industry which we can obtain, produce or replace with other equivalent materials inside Germany.
- b) The translation of this directive into practical details concerning the assignment of tasks and their execution was left to this office.
- c) As an added factor, such an acute shortage of raw materials, especially iron, made itself felt in the course of the year that at times the rate of progress dropped to less than half of what would otherwise have been possible and provided for.

2. Origin of the Overall Plan .

To Minister President General
GOERING

- a) Ascertaining requirements for peace and war. The difficulty here is determining the increase of peacetime requirements in advance and the impossibility of obtaining definite mobilization figures from the Reich Ministry of War and the Commissioner General.

(page 3 of original)

- (pencil note)
I.G. Farben! b) Ascertainment of immediately practicable ways to meet this demand fully or in part without resorting to imports. In this connection, closest possible cooperation with the Reich and party offices concerned and in particular with the industrial economy which cannot be dispensed with in carrying this out.
- c) This brought about the over-all plans of 15 October 1936, 10 January 1937, and 27 May 1937 which were conservatively drawn up and constantly developed further (compare paragraph 7. e)).

3. Execution of the over-all plan by sections and chief consultants (Hauptreferate).

Final results are available up to the end of September 1937. The balance of 1937 can be estimated with sufficient accuracy to render possible a comparison with the preliminary estimate of the over-all plan for 1937. Enclosure shows this comparison in the various special fields.

4. Total result.

(handwritten notes:)
But increased ! ?/
Demand !

Quite wrong!
instead of RM 100 million 16 million
at the most.

On the whole, the measures put into practice by this office in 1937 resulted in savings on imports and additional proceeds from export to the amount of RM 367 million as against 1936. The preliminary estimate of RM 464 million (over-all plan of 27 May 1937) is being exceeded, as it includes approximately RM 100 million (proceeding from drying installations, etc., according to directions given by the Reich Food Estate) which, although the preparatory work has been done, will not take full effect until 1938, and have not been counted in the over-all plan for 1938.

The fact that this result was achieved despite the shortage of raw materials mentioned in paragraph 1.c) is due in part to higher yields from constantly improved processes, and moreover shows the caution which was followed in making the estimates for the over-all plan. Considerably more could have been achieved, had more raw material been allocated. The consequences of the shortages will be considerably more serious for 1938.

(page 4 of original)

The total crude steel consumption of the installations controlled by this office in 1937 had an import value of RM 27.2 million, and an export value of RM 152 million obtained through direct iron exports. The correlation between the plants and installations under the Four Year Plan and direct iron exports referred to by this office whenever the opportunity presented itself.

For other raw materials no total annual figures are available for 1937. Collectively, they are certainly lower than the corresponding iron figures.

5. Financing.

480 projects were completed amounting to RM 1,150 million, of which 200 million came from Reich and budgetary funds. Still in progress are 33 projects amounting to RM 510 million. Total: RM 1,660 million. The difference as against the RM 2,870 million allowed by the over-all plan is due to the fact that many projects do not need to be financed by this office.

Financing presents no difficulties.

6. Propaganda, Press.

This office conducted an indispensable campaign - which grew in intensity as the task developed - for the purpose of enlightening the general public about the measures taken in the field of industry. Lectures at meetings held by the Party, the economy and scientific professional associations, articles in the press, especially in the monthly magazine "Der Vierjahresplan", sponsoring of all important exhibitions which have any bearing on the various special fields concerned, and preparation of three special travelling exhibitions.

The attitude of the press is thoroughly cooperative; articles and notices dealing with the activities of the office are steadily increasing.

Even the foreign press is showing the greatest interest.
(page 5 of original)

7. Measures for further development.

- a) Working out the inventive activities which have been most strongly stimulated by the suggestions of the General. Total number received during the last 12 months about 16,000, of which about one half was completely worthless, about 7% practical as such; 500 to 600 suggestions which have actually been tried out.
- b) Systematic commencement of research by assigning tasks directly to governmental and private research offices; the ones particularly efficient and worthwhile to be singled out as "Institutes of the Four Year Plan". The fear that the influence of this office might be disturbed by the establishment of the Reich Research Council (Reichsforschungsrates) has so far not materialized.
- c) Elaboration of the widely dispersed statistical and scientific materials on raw material-flow-charts and rawmaterial balances for all fields in any way important. In this way - for the first time - a clear survey will be made of the fundamentals of the economy from the point of view of rawmaterial, and the possibility created of a systematic guidance in peace and war adapted to any circumstances. This makes it possible to solve the Plenipotentiary General's most important task.

(page 5 of original cont'd)

- d) Final summaries of the more important special fields, reports concerning this to the economy and authorities for use as a guide to the Four Year Plan, publication in a periodical issued by this office.
- e) Constant development of the over-all plan. The next edition planned for the beginning of 1938 will deal with all fields going out from the point of view of theoretically complete self-sufficiency (comp. conference note of 6 August 1937, number 3.c)).

(page 6 of original)

8. Review of the situation.

(handwritten:)
Praise to the
Fuehrer

apparently ?
could have been
predicted !

- a) The course of the first year has proven that the basic ideas of the Four Year Plan are feasible for the industrial economy and therefore justified.
- b) In so far as the actual increase in production of hitherto imported raw materials does not show up fully in the foreign trade balance, it is apparently (handwritten:)) a case of an increase in consumption. The recognition of this can only lead to a further acceleration of the expansion program, which is thoroughly possible if enough material is allocated.
- c) Taking a long view of the matter the intensified reconstruction of the industrial economy will not be limited by questions of finances or materials, much less by the lack of goodwill on the part of industry or the absence of fitting solutions. It is only the available manpower in Germany, which sets us an insurmountable limit, which perhaps will soon be reached. (Comp. conference note of 6 August 1937 No. 3.b)). The office is devoting particular attention to this question.
- d) The constitutional position of this office within the Reich authorities is still extremely unclear. In spite of that the most important prerequisite for the fulfillment of our task, full control over the economy, has been created. Outwardly this can be seen for instance, from the fact that to date 1300 factories, plants, or factory enlargements were carried out or taken care of by this office in connection with the plan, that the number of daily visits lies between 250 and 300. The present situation with all its defects serves the cause better than would any organizational change, which would tear apart these connections which have been so laboriously created.

(handwritten:)
Premonition!

(page 7 of original)

- e) The main reason for being able to carry out our task is the concentration of all matters concerning the industrial economy in one office which can take in at a glance the manifold connections and bring them into harmony with one another. Any exclusion of subordinate matters does not help this office, but results in additional, unpleasant work, since the concentration has to be brought about somehow as far as the actual work is concerned.

(handwritten:)
PLEIGER!

It is not the desire to unite ^{as} many departments as possible within the office, but my earnest concern at not being able to carry out the task assigned to me which causes me to make the urgent request to refrain from any further division of the responsibility of industry for the Four Year Plan.

(page 7 of original cont'd)

(handwritten:)
Hungry for power !!!

On the contrary, the proper solution seems to me to be the expansion into the Reich Raw Materials Office for direction in peace and in preparation for the tasks of waging a war.

- f) The road taken since the announcement of the Four Year Plan for the industrial economy will lead to our goal. There is no reason for changing the direction of our march.

Signature
Colonel of the General Staff.

(page 8 of original)

Enclosure to the letter of the Chief of Office for German Raw and Synthetic Materials of 30 October 37
(stamp:)

Top Secret

Results of Carrying out Over-all Planning in Individual Fields in 1937

Special Field	Savings in imports in Mill RM as proposed in the over-all plan	Value of the prod. increase in 1937 as compared with 1936 in Mill. RM	Remarks
a) Textiles	128,8	129,4	Achieved in full.
b) Base metals	20,7	18,1	Delays within the field as a whole; essentially fulfilled.
c) Iron and steel x)	46,7	9,6	Entirely inadequate. Besides difficulties with the material itself the reason lies in months of organizational confusion. It is to be hoped that the production plan of the Reichswerke "Hermann Goering" will gradually fill the gap in comparison with the amount called for in the over-all plan.
d) Fatless detergents	-	-	---
e) Tannine	0,3	-	The plants did not start operation until the end of 1937 or the beginning of 1938 because of insufficient material allocation.
f) Soot	1,0	-	as in e)
g) Sausage skins	6,5	2,6	Lack of acceptance by wholesalers and consumers because further possibility of foreign sources incorporated in trade agreements.
h) Rubber, reclaimed	11,3	11,5	Affected to a particularly large extent by the scarcity of iron for the construction of buna installations, made up for by increase of reclaimed rubber
i) Paste	-	4,0	Reconversion could be carried out faster than was originally planned; completion of the installations was hastened in consideration of the ban on rye paste.

(page 8 of original cont'd)

Special Field	Savings in imports in Mill.RM as proposed in the over-all plan	Value of the prod.increase in 1937 as compared with 1936 in Mill. RM	Remarks
k) Casein	5,4	2,0	Belated completion of the installation because of lack of iron, which had a particularly strong effect in connection with the seasonal fluctuations in the dairy economy.
l) Mineral oils	24,8	39,7	Increase in German domestic oil production through drilling program has made good progress. In spite of delay in construction the quantitative result of synthetic production has become more favorable because of increased exploitation.
m) Chemistry on wood basis x)	32,5	5,6	To the 5,6 mill.RM are to be added 32,2 mill.RM, which are cited separately as export surplus under column t) (Total value of the production increase 37,8 mill.RM).
n) Wood			
o) Foodstuffs	165,5	85,8	Conditions were created for import savings through dehydration plants, etc. cited by the Reich Food Estate; result of about 100 mill.RM expected in 1938.
p) Waterways, harbor construction	-	-	-
q) Shipbuilding program	0,2	0,7	-
r) Barter materials	-	-	The savings in imports which have undoubtedly been obtained have not yet been calculated.
s) Machine tools, machine parts xx)	-	20,9	The number has been ascertained through exact investigation in cooperation with the Economic Group for Machine Construction. It is chiefly accounted for because the increased demand of industry could be met by extending capacity without having to increase the imports which otherwise would have become necessary.
t) Chemistry (wood) Increased proceeds from exports xx)	-	32,2	Increased exports of paper and cardboard having become possible through better conservation of commercial timber in the forests. Shift to German types of wood, especially use of firewood in the paper and cellulose industry. Increased use of scrap paper in the interest of wood conservation.
u) Machine tools, mach. parts, excess in proceeds from export xx)	-	5,2	Increase of exports through extension of capacities.
Total	463,7	367,3	

x) including additional program
xx) not yet proposed in over-all plan of 27 May 1937; measures were instigated by this office.

176

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT No. NI-8590
CONTINUED

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

I, John B. ROBINSON, No. X-046 350 hereby certify
that I am thoroughly conversant with the English
and German languages, and that the above is a true
and correct translation of document No. NI-8590.

John B. ROBINSON
No. X-046 350.

I T Ki/gr (Trans Note):
(Stamp:
Top Secret)

Berlin, 21 April 1943

6 copies
1st copy

Notes for Report

"Danger from the Air for the Plenipotentiary-General Chemistry Plants"

The air attack on Krupp has proved what destruction can be caused on first rank armament plants when adequate forces are used. If the same means are used in air attacks on a large-scale chemical plant the effect will still be greater because of the accumulation of inflammable and explosive material within a small space, and further because of the particularly extensive mechanization, the inter-relationship and mutual dependence of all production processes, moreover in view of the greater requirements in time and material in case the plant has to be shifted. Hence it follows that the effects of a mass attack from the air on a large-scale chemical plant have to be reduced by all possible means.

There are two ways:

a) Passive air defense.

In all chemistry plants essential for war production a most severe check of the means for limiting the effects of explosions, fire and poison gas must once more be carried out. Removal of all combustible building sections, wooden ceilings above the machinery halls etc., of barracks within the compound of the factories. In order to avoid loss of time that could never be made good in connection with this work, the GB (Plenipotentiary) for Building should be informed within 24 hours of the building volume and manpower for all work for improving air raid protection which has been recognized as necessary by the Plenipotentiary-General Chemistry in cooperation with the efficiency experts of the Plenipotentiaries for Building.

(Precautionary protection against disasters) (Trans Note):

Handwritten Note: Dury
Plants!

b) Active air defense.

Above that, the strengthening of the active air defense for a limited number of large-scale chemical plants which are of decisive importance for warfare as a whole and which could not be shifted either immediately or in case of emergency has to be demanded.

In this connection the immediate installation of smoke screen equipment, permanent fighter screen during day and night within the approach area, balloon barrages and reinforcement especially of regular heavy anti-aircraft artillery for defense against high-altitude bombing attacks.

(page 2 of original)

The following chemical plants are of great importance to the war (Figures stated in accordance with the production situation in the middle or by the end of 1942):

(page 2 of original cont'd)

1. Leuna: The total loss of the plant would mean losing:
15 to 20% of the aviation gasoline production
12% of the lubricants production for aircraft engines
40% of the ammonium nitrogen production
27% of the methanol production
62% of the mersel production
- decisive reduction of the production of explosives, thus
the abandonment of programs which are at present considered
to be of war-deciding importance, furthermore by the short-
age of nitrogen fertilizer an unbearable reduction of agri-
cultural production, a decisive curtailment of the mineral
oil program, especially of high-grade aviation gasoline and
of the supply of detergents.

2. Ludwigshafen-Opbau:

The total loss is of similar significance to fertilizer
production (36% of the ammonia production) as Leuna. In
addition to that a considerable curtailment of the fuming
acid, Buna and fatty acids (37%) production and a number of
other extremely important products as for instance Kaurit glue,
Oppanol, high grade motor fuels, etc.

The total breakdown of both plants (1. and 2.) means a
considerable encroachment on the German food situation and
will not fail to have serious effects on many other fields
(explosives, synthetics).

(page 3 of original)

3. and 4. The breakdown of Buna at Buels and Schkopau means practically
the end of the motorization of Wehrmacht and economy.
5. The total breakdown of Poelitz means a considerable curtail-
ment of aviation gasoline production (20%).
6. Gelsenberg same as Poelitz (20%).
7. 8. and 9. Bremen-Oslebshausen, Hamburg-Großbrook and Hamburg.
Total breakdown means decisive curtailment of aviation
lubricants production (60%).
10. 11. Deag. Rositz, Welheim: Total breakdown means decisive
damage to fuel oil production for the Navy.
12. Wesseling: Total breakdown means considerable damage to
aviation gasoline and Diesel fuel production.
13. Schölvén: Total breakdown means a considerable curtailment
(15%) of aviation gasoline production.
14. Oberhausen-Holtén: Total breakdown means a considerable
curtailment of lubricants production.
15. Hochst: Total breakdown means substantial impairment of
powder and explosives production as well as danger to
the smoke-screen program.

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT No. NI-8594
CONTINUED

(page 3 of original cont'd)

16. Leverkusen: Total breakdown means a heavy inroad ^{to} in the supply of pharmaceuticals, endangering the manufacture of Buna (accelerators) and its development. Endangering the production of leather (synthetic tannins) and encroachment on the fuming acid production.

(page 4 of original)

17. Urdingen: Total breakdown means a considerable reduction of the preliminary products for the powder and explosives manufacture (stabilizers, aniline, chlorine).
18. Brabag-Hagdeburg: Total breakdown means a considerable impairment of the submarine Diesel fuel.
19. Brabag-Zeitz: Total breakdown means loss of a considerable portion of the paraffin supply for synthetic fatty acid (at present 35%) and of synthetic aviation lubricants, besides motor fuel production.
20. Brabag-Bechlen: Total breakdown means considerable loss in aviation gasoline production (12%).
21. Horn, Lishurg: Total breakdown means considerable damage to the capacities for processing raw oil (20%) and to aviation motor oil (15%).

By order:
(Signature) Oeckl

6 copies:
1st copy: Prof. Krauch
2nd copy: Dr. Ritter/Dr. Ad. Mueller
3rd copy: Lieutenant Colonel Kirschner
4th copy: Dr. Oeckl
5th copy: v. Kriegstein
6th copy: Reserve.

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

10 July 1947

I, DOROTHEA L. GALEWSKI, SPO No. 34079, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages and that the above is a true and correct translation of the document No. NI-8594.

DOROTHEA L. GALEWSKI, SPO No. 34079.

8) SALES AND GROSS PROFIT ON SALES OF I.G. FARBENINDUSTRIE A.G.

(Verkaufe und Bruttogewinn aus Verkäufen der I.G. Farbenindustrie A.G.)

	1932	1933	1934	1935	1936	1937	1938	1939	1940	1941	1942	1943	1944
I. Sales of I.G. Farbenindustrie A.G. (Verkaufe der I.G. Farbenindustrie A.G.)	RM 875,827,147	RM 894,275,104	RM 982,990,246	RM 1,002,700,943	RM 1,206,822,066	RM 1,515,420,348	RM 1,647,236,807	RM 1,990,794,484	RM 2,158,000,334	RM 2,539,316,969	RM 2,801,002,078	RM 3,115,535,666	RM 2,965,204,115
II. Gross profit on sales of I.G. Farbenindustrie A.G. (Bruttogewinn aus Verkäufen der I.G. Farbenindustrie A.G.)	RM 71,475,244	RM 122,000,814	RM 125,936,703	RM 153,434,340	RM 250,805,000	RM 295,707,000	RM 276,226,000	RM 376,675,000	RM 374,046,000	RM 477,316,000	RM 571,659,000	RM 549,404,000	RM 322,315,582

AFFIDAVIT

I, Helmut DEICHFISCHER, Frankfurt (Main), Pariserplatz 9, after having first been sworn that I will be liable for perjury for making a false statement, state herewith under oath, of my own free will and without coercion, the following:

By virtue of the offices held by me in I.G. and in the I.G. Control Office I am fully acquainted with "Sales and gross profit on sales of I.G. Farbenindustrie A.G."

I have been shown and have carefully examined this chart consisting of 1 page and captioned: "Sales and gross profit on sales of I.G. Farbenindustrie A.G.". This chart is to my best knowledge and belief a true and faithful representation of the topic.

I declare herewith under oath that I have given the pure truth to the best of my knowledge and conscience.

Helmut Deichfischer
HELMUT DEICHFISCHER

Sworn to and signed before me this 11. day of June 1947 at Frankfurt on the Main by Helmut DEICHFISCHER, known to be the person making the above affidavit.

Otto Heilmann

DR. OTTO HEILMANN
Civilian, ETO 20740
Office of Chief of Counsel
for War Crimes
U.S. War Department

AFFIDAVIT

I, Holmut DEICHFISCHER, Frankfurt on the Main, Parlamentsplatz 9, employee of the I.G. Central Finance Administration in Berlin since 1936, Deputy Department Chief of the Accounting Department from 1938 to 1940, Chief in this Department from 1940 to 1945, and since then in charge of the Section, "Balance Sheets" in the I.G. Control Office in Frankfurt, after having first been warned that I will be liable for punishment for making a false statement, state herewith under oath, of my own free will and without coercion, the following:

The figures in the chart captioned "Sales and Gross Profit on Sales of I.G. Farbenindustrie A.G.", known as Document III-10002 have been arrived by me in the following way:

I. Sales of I.G. Farbenindustrie A.G.:

These figures were obtained under my supervision from the Turnover Statistics of I.G. Farben for all the Sales Combines.

They are available in the Central Bookkeeping Department in the I.G. Control Office in Frankfurt on the Main.

II. Gross Profits on Sales of I.G. Farbenindustrie A.G.:

These figures were taken under my supervision from the balance sheet reports (Abschlussunterlagen) of I.G. for the individual years. These figures are available at the Central Bookkeeping Department in the I.G. Control Office in Frankfurt on the Main.

I have carefully read each of the two pages of this declaration and have signed them personally. I have made the necessary corrections in my own handwriting and initialed them and I declare herewith under oath that I have given the pure truth to the best of my know-

ledge and conscience.

gez. Helmut Deichfischer

HELMUT DEICHFISCHER

Sworn to and signed before me this 11 day of June 1947
at Frankfurt/Main by Helmut DEICHFISCHER known to me to
be the person making the above affidavit.

gez. Otto Heilbrunn

DR. OTTO HEILBRUNN
CIVILIAN, EPO 30140
Office of Chief of Counsel
for War Crimes
U.S. War Department

C) NET PROFIT OF I.G. FARBENINDUSTRIE A.G.

(Reingewinn der I.G. Farbenindustrie A.G.)

	1932	1933	1934	1935	1936	1937	1938	1939	1940	1941	1942	1943	1944	
	RM	RM	RM	RM	RM	RM	RM	RM	RM	RM	RM	RM	RM	
I. Net profit of I.G. Farbenindustrie A.G. (before appropriation of profit for reserves etc.) (Reingewinn der I.G. Farbenindustrie A.G. (vor der Verwendung des Gewinns für Reserven etc.))	47,013,427	73,502,461	86,276,071	70,598,517	140,166,474	189,081,499	171,305,441	229,969,734	296,257,375	316,251,116	266,901,793	300,493,935	148,771,707	
II. Net profit as per balance sheet of I.G. Farbenindustrie A.G. (Bilanzgewinn der I.G. Farbenindustrie A.G.)	47,013,427	49,143,347	50,981,071	51,438,841	55,434,374	48,053,329	55,780,000	56,071,070	58,756,000	71,080,000	77,263,750	81,700,000	85,007,644	

AFFIDAVIT.

I, Helmut DEIOFISCHER, Frankfurt (Main), Parzenplatz 3, after having first been warned that I will be liable for punishment for making a false statement, state herewith under oath, of my own free will and without coercion, the following:

By virtue of the offices held by me in I.G. and in the I.G. Control Office I am fully acquainted with "Net profit of I.G. Farbenindustrie A.G.".

I have been shown and have carefully examined this chart consisting of 1 page and captioned: "Net profit of I.G. Farbenindustrie A.G.". This chart is to my best knowledge and belief a true and faithful representation of the facts.

I declare herewith under oath that I have given the pure truth to the best of my knowledge and conscience.

Helmut Deiofischer
HELMUT DEIOFISCHER

Sworn to and signed before me this ... day of June 1947 at Frankfurt on the Rhine by Helmut DEIOFISCHER, known to be the person making the above affidavit.

Otto Heilbrunn
DR. OTTO HEILBRUNN
Civilian, ETO 30140
Office of Chief of Counsel
for War Crimes
U.S. War Department

OFFICE OF CHIEF OF COUNSEL FOR
WAR CRIMES

AFFIDAVIT

I, Helmut DEICHFISCHER, Frankfurt on the Main, Parlaments-Platz 9, employee of the I.G. Central Finance Administration in Berlin since 1936, Deputy Department Chief of the Accounting Department from 1938 to 1940, Chief in this Department from 1940 to 1945, and since then in charge of the Section, "Balance Sheets" in the I.G. Control Office in Frankfurt, after having first been warned that I will be liable for punishment for making a false statement, state herewith under oath, of my own free will and without coercion, the following:

The figures in the chart captioned "Net Profit of I.G. Farbenindustrie A.G." and known as Document NI-10003 have been taken under my supervision from the balance sheet reports (Abschlussunterlagen) of I.G. for the individual years. These figures are available at the Central Bookkeeping Department at the I.G. Control Office in Frankfurt on the Main.

I have carefully read the one page of this declaration and have signed it personally. I have made the necessary corrections in my own handwriting and initialed them and I declare herewith under oath, that I have given the full truth to the best of my knowledge and conscience.

signed: Helmut Deichfischer
HELMUT DEICHFISCHER

185

CONTINUED

DOCUMENT NO. NI-10015

Sworn to and signed before me this 11 day of June 1947
at Frankfurt/Main by Helmut DEICHFISCHER known to me to be
the person making the above affidavit.

signed: Otto Heilbrunn
Dr. OTTO HEILBRUNN
Civilian ETO, 30140
Office of Chief of Counsel
for War Crimes
U.S. War Department

MILITARY TRIBUNAL NO. 1
CASE NO. 1
Prosecution Document Book No. 1

English



I N D E X
T O
D O C U M E N T B O O K # 6

COUNT ~~100~~. FARBEN SYNCHRONIZED ALL OF ITS ACTIVITIES WITH
THE MILITARY PLANNING OF THE GERMAN HIGH COMMAND

Document No.	Exhibit No.	Description of Document	Page in:	
			Document Book	Tran- script
1. NI-5861	*	Hermann, a deceased Vorstand member, reports to Hoechst-Vorstand meeting of his visit to Reichswehr Ministry concerning smoke screen materials, 30 January 1933.	pg.# 1	
2. NI-5862	*	Minutes of Hoechst-Vorstand meeting note tests for smoke producing agents are being carried out on a small scale, 6 February 1933.	" 2	
3. NI-5868	*	Minutes of Hoechst-Vorstand meeting reports that smoke screen tests had taken place and that more would take place at Farben's Hoechst plant, 18 September 1933	" 3	
4. NI-8326 NI-306		Affidavit of Struss, authenticating Document NI-306, below.	" 4 12 B	
	*	Notes concerning discussions about Buna plans between Farben officials and Wehrmacht and other Reich authorities, 1933-1938.		
5. NI-5910	*	Minutes of Technical Management Meeting at Frankfurt in 1936 showing that Farben's experimental smoke screen tests were costly to Farben, 3 August 1936.	" 13	
6. NI-4490		File note by Fistor, a deceased Vorstand member, in 1936 states that Dr. Zahn, Army Ordnance Office, had informed Dr. Ritter of Farben's Vermittlungstelle W that he was apprehensive there would be insufficient chlorine in "A-case", etc., 13 November 1936	" 14	



INDEX TO DOCUMENT BOOK # 1, Page 2.

Document No.	Exhibit No.	Description of Document	Page in:	
			Document Book	Trans- cript
7. NI-4718	4.	Letter from General Milch, State Secretary in Reich Air Ministry to Krauch, suggesting Farben appoint a liaison officer to C-office of Reich Air Ministry, 23 July 1935; and reply of Krauch suggesting Farben's Dr. Ritter for this position, 29 July 1935.	pg.# 16	
8. NI-4702	4.	Krauch letter to Sparte I and other Farben agencies announcing the creation of a Military Economy Central Office of I.G. and describing its general competence, 5 September 1935.	" 21	
9. NI-4627	4.	For Leer letter to four main plant combines and to leaders of Farben's Sales Combines announcing the creation of a Central Office of Farben for Military Economy and Military Policies and appointing Dr. Bruening as representative of Sparte II in this office, 28 September 1935.	" 23	
10. NI-9261		Eichwede affidavit identifying and authenticating NI-2747, below.	" 24	
11. NI-2747		Eichwede's history of the Vermittlungstelle A, noting, among other things, that the defendant Gajewski appointed Dr. Mayer as representative of Sparte III in the Vermittlungstelle W, undated.	" 25	
12. NI-2638		Affidavit of Struss identifying NI-2638, and stating that the defendant Krauch signed it.	" 28..d	
13. NI-2638		Letter of Vermittlungsstelle W on the development of its work, noting that in case of war Farben will be treated as one big plant; that D.G. works with V/W on raw materials and planning work; that the aim is to develop mobilization plans for all plants; etc., 31 December 1935.	" 29	

INDEX TO DOCUMENT BOOK # 1, Page 3.

Document No.	Exhibit No.	Description of Document	Page in	
			Document Book	Trans- script
14. NI-7611		Affidavit by Gorr, representative of Sparte II in V/W, on the origin and tasks of V/W, 3 June 1947.	pg #	32
15. NI-8923		Affidavit of Wagner, staff member of V/W, on organization and tasks of V/W, 11 June 1947.	"	33
16. NI-8321		Affidavit of Struss on origin and functions of V/W, noting that the defendant Krauch was "in charge", 30 May 1947.	"	41
<u>PARAGRAPH 20</u> <u>(Security and Secrecy)</u>				
17. IB-2276		Statement by Dr. Robert Ley, Reich Organization Leader of the NSDAP, that "During the years 1933 to 1939 everything had been done in secrecy that seemed necessary", etc., from Ley's Book "The German Labor Front", 1943, p.55.	"	45
18. LC-223		Letter of Dieckmann, chief representative of Sparte I in V/W, to Military Economy Staff of Reich War Ministry, enclosing two Farben directives on security and counter-intelligence, dated 8 July 1937. First enclosed directive is on keeping secret the processes, patents and experiences of the chemical industry, issued by V/W on 4 December 1936, and circulated to all Farben plants, laboratories, etc. Second enclosed directive deals with counter-Intelligence measures, dated 12 March 1937.	"	46
19. NI-4979		Announcement signed by Krauch concerning the establishment of Section A within V/W under Herr Merbeck, noting that Counter-Intelligence (Abwehr) agents have been appointed in I.G. plants; that Merbeck is Farben's chief Counter-Intelligence agent; that Section A is at the disposal of all I.G. agencies on counter-intelligence and security matters, 2 January 1936.	"	49 57a-b-c

INDEX TO DOCUMENT BOOK # 1. Page 4.

Document No.	Exhibit No.	Description of Document	Page in:	
			Document Book	Trans- script
20. NI-4678		Statement by the defendant Kuehne and two other leaders of Farben's Leverkusen plant that they will abide by secrecy and security regulations, February 1936.	pg.# 52	
21. NI-8466	3.	Announcement by Section A, V/W, attaching a directive of the Reich Economic Chamber, noting that the stringent limitations upon the publication of statistical data with important economic and military interest. Announcement notes contents of the regulations coincide with the methods already adopted throughout I.G. Farben, 18 August 1936.	" 53 53a 53b	
22. NI-4679	4.	Letter of V/W to Farben's work combines and other agencies requesting information on behalf of the Army Ordnance Office as to what plants and sales departments have received security regulations for firms executing the Wehrmacht's orders etc., 10 March 1937.	" 54	
23. NI-703	5.	Letter to Schmitz indicating he, as a member of the Aufsichtsrat of a Celluloid factory, was required by the Reich Air Ministry to execute a pledge of secrecy, 9 March 1937.	" 62	
24. NI-1164	6.	Three confidential announcements by the defendant Kuehne of Farben's Leverkusen plant, concerning (1) limitation of employment of foreigners; (2) visits of foreigners; (3) safe-guarding secrecy when answering questionnaires, 21 February 1936.	" 64	
25. NI-4985		Secret circular from Section A, V/W, on restrictions applying to "war essential" Farben plants, 29 April 1937.	" 68	
26. NI-8467		Announcement by Section A, V/W, concerning the pledge to secrecy required by the Reich authorities of all persons concerned with security matters in industry, 16 July 1936.	" 75	

INDEX TO DOCUMENT BOOK # 1, Page 5.

Document No.	Exhibit No.	Description of Document	page in:	
			Document Book	transcript
27. NI-6192	X.	Plodge of secrecy by Krauch concerning military economic matters, 22 October 1937.	Fig. # 77	
28. NI-1153	X.	Letter of Section A, V/W, to Secretariat of Farben's Bitterfeld Plant giving detailed instructions on the handling of secret communications, registry, marking of envelopes, etc., 2 November 1936.	" 79	
29. NI-4903	X.	Letter of Farben's chief counter-intelligence agent, Herr Werbeck, to Farben's plants describing how security regulations have been explained in various ways, and noting that in case of doubt, Section A, V/W should be allowed to pass on the matter, 4 June 1947. Attaches a letter of the defendant Kuchro to officials of Farben's Leverkusen plant concerning security regulations dated 21 February 1936.	" 84	
30. NI-1137	X.	Letter from Farben's "SO-36" Office to Farben's Legal department, concerning handling of confidential correspondence with foreign representatives, 6 November 1937. Attached is a file memorandum of Farben's "SO-36" Office detailing the handling of confidential business matters in correspondence with European representatives, 5 November 1937.	" 90	
31. NI-4977	X.	Secret directive of Section A, V/W, on the handling and destruction of secret documents and other security matters, 22 February 1938.	" 94	
32. NI-6382	X.	Minutes of the Technical direction of the Rhin Valley Technical Direction, noting that the appointment of foreigners is to be avoided at all costs, 28 November 1938.	" 104	
33. NI-5686	X.	File memorandum of Dr. Wagner, staff member of V/W, concerning special security measures on secret correspondence involving chemical warfare agents, which includes provision for code books, etc., 11 January 1939.	" 105	

INDEX TO DOCUMENT BOOK 1, Page 6.

Document No.	Exhibit No.	Description of Document	Page in:	
			Document Book	Trans- script
34. NI-4981	✱	Letter of Section A, V/W to Farben's nitrogen agency in Berlin on counter-intelligence, secrecy declaration by sub-contractors, limitations on employment of Jews, etc., 6 May 1939.	pg.# 108	
35. NI-6147	✱	Letter of Section A, V/W, to Farben's Nitrogen Department in Berlin referring to limitations on publicity of plants operating under the Four Year Plan, 5 June 1939.	" 113	
36. NI-4978	✱	Letter of Section A, V/W, to Farben's Nitrogen agency in Berlin, outlining new official directive that in "Case-A" (outbreak of war), all identification papers of the staff are to be modified by the Farben agency in a specified way, 26 June 1939.	" 115	
37. NI-2889	✱	Counter-Intelligence directive edited by the Gestapo on activities of plant security officers taken from files of Gendorf plant, 1939.	" 116	
38. NI-6656	✱	Affidavit by the defendant von der Heyde that he acted as a counter-intelligence agent within Farben's MW-7 organization in the middle of 1938 until 1940/41, 1 May 1947.	" 121	
39. NI-5694	✱	Notes on a meeting of Farben's Patent Commission, 4 May 1939: The defendant von Linerich requests V/W to make a report on Farben practice in connection with inventions found out in tasks done for Wehrmacht.	" 125	

TRANSLATION OF EXCERPT FROM DOCUMENT
No. NI-5861
OFFICE OF CHIEF OF COUNSEL FOR WAR CRIMES

(page 1 of original)

Minutes of the Meeting of the Vorstand at
Hochst a/M., on 30 January 1933.

Present: Hermann ter Meer
 Rohmer
 Lautenschlager
 Jacobi
 Jachne
 Kraenzlein

(page 2 of original) (Second Paragraph)

HERMANN reports on his visit to the Reichswehr Ministry etc.
concerning smoke screen materials (Nebelstoffe).

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

20 May 1947

I, E. HINCHLIFFE Civ. No. M.P. 026034, hereby certify that
I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German lan-
guages and that the above is a true and correct translation
of excerpt from document No. NI-5861.

E. HINCHLIFFE
Civ. No. M.P. 026034

TRANSLATION OF EXCERPTS OF DOCUMENT No. NI-5862
OFFICE OF CHIEF OF COUNSEL FOR WAR CRIMES

Minutes (initial) L

of the meeting of the Vorstand on 6 February, in
Hochst/Main.

Attended by:

Hermann,
Rehmer,
Lautenschlaeger,
Jachno,
Kraenzlein.

.....

(Paragraph 6)

The support offered in the letter Bi. with reference to development of apparatus and tests for smoke producing agents is to be declined with thanks as it should at present suffice to carry out the tests at Hoc. on a small scale.

.....

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

21 May 1947

I, ARTHUR MACMILLARA, Civ. No. 20 191, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages and that the above is a true and correct translation of excerpts of the document No. NI-5862.

ARTHUR MACMILLARA
Civ. No. 20 191.

R E P O R T

of meeting of the Vorstand on 18 September 1933 at Hoechst on Main

PRESENT:	Dr. HERMANN	
	Dr. ROHDER	(Translator's Note:
	Prof. LAUTENSCHLAGER	Tick against Lauten-
	Dr. JACOBI	schläger and handwrit
	Dir. JASHE	note: TGS)
	Dr. KRAUSELEIN	
	Dir. SCHWABORN (Part of the time)	

.....
(Page 3, last paragraph of original)

There was reason for giving warning in individual cases in the plant, against the contempt shown towards the German salute which had been introduced from the lowest ranks up. A notice is to be prepared in order to maintain peaceful working conditions.

.....
(Page 5, Paragraph 5 of original)

In Kunkersdorf, a smoke screen test took place, with siliciumstra-chloride and ammonia water, in the presence of Dr. Meder of Hoechst. The smoke of the smoke acid (chlorsulphonic acid and fuming sulphuric acid) proved to be denser and heavier. The tests are to be continued, and corresponding preliminary tests are to be carried out beforehand on suitable sites at Hoechst.

.....
CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
.....

I, DOROTHEA L. GALEWSKI, M.P. No. 34079, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages, and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document No. NI-5868.

DOROTHEA L. GALEWSKI
M.P. - 34079

(E N D)

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT No. NI-8326
OFFICE OF CHIEF OF COUNSEL FOR WAR CRIMES

AFFIDAVIT

I, Dr. Ernst Struss, Director of I.G. Farben, chief of the Office of the Technical Committee of the I.G., Secretary of the Technical Committee of the Vorstand of the I.G., chief of Sparte II of the Vermittlungsstelle W, and since 1943 production chief of the whole German dyestuffs industry within the Economic Group for Chemical Industry, having been warned that I will be liable to punishment for a false statement, hereby declare under oath voluntarily and without coercion:

The reports made in the document marked NI-306 were made by my former employee Mr. Helmuth Rohdemann in 1945. Rohdemann collaborated closely with me in this compilation and I have continually supervised the progress of his work. The content of document NI-306 and the history of its origin are therefore known to me to the fullest extent, and to the best of my knowledge and belief it corresponds in all details to the whole truth. I have carefully checked document NI-306 which was submitted to me. This document, together with this affidavit, forms a single document and is herewith declared part of this affidavit. In appending my signature to this affidavit I at the same time have signed each of the 9 pages of this document NI-306.

I have carefully read through each of the 9 pages of document NI-306 as well as this page of my affidavit and personally marked them, have made the necessary corrections in my own hand and marked them with my initials and declare herewith under oath that I have to the best of my knowledge and belief spoken the absolute truth in this declaration.

Signature: Dr. Ernst Struss

Sworn and signed before me this 30 day of May 1947 at Frankfurt/Main by Dr. Ernst Struss known to me to be the person making the above affidavit.

Signature: Dr. Otto Heilbrunn
Civilian, ETO 30140
Office of Chief of Counsel
for War Crimes
U.S. War Department

(page 2 of original)

1933

15 August Letter from Ludwigshafen (Mueller-Cunradi) to the Army Ordnance Office Berlin-Charlottenburg
Information on I.G. work in the field of synthetic rubber from 1910 - 1914 and after 1918.
The position of the work at the moment and I.G.'s preparedness for resumption of the same on a large scale through government subsidy and collaboration with an efficient rubber factory (Manufacture of 1000-2000 tires, which are to be tested on vehicles used by Government Authorities).

1934

6 July Expose by Leverkusen (Dr. Konrad) to the Army Ordnance Office (General Liese)
Information on work in the field of synthetic rubber.
I. Methylene rubber (1910 - 1918)
II. Butadiene rubber (from 1926)
III. Mixed polymer products

(page 2 of original cont'd)

- IV. Oil and gasoline proof rubber
- V. Duprene (America)
- VI. Present position of the work
- VII. Research program for the future.

- 11 July Report on a discussion (Dr. Konrad, Leverkusen) on the meeting of the Army Ordnance Office (Major Philipp, Dr. Hagemann). Later in the presence of Dr. Weber and Dr. Naumann, Conti.
- I. Without Conti representatives
Present stage of the work on
- a) Butadiene base (Buna)
 - b) Butadiene mixed polymer products
 - c) Butadiene mixed polymer products with the addition of softeners.
- Large scale manufacture of 5000 tons per year (over a period of one year) can be started only after the conclusion of the tire experiments.
Duprene (License negotiations I.G./Dupont).
- II. With Conti representatives.
Manufacture of a greater quantity of tires possible only after the conclusion of the experiments with single tires. Review of the manufacture of all-rubber tires.
Discussion on the general economic prospects for synthetic rubber.
- 24 July Report on the discussion (Dr. Konrad, Leverkusen) on the meeting with the Reich Commissioner for Rubber, Mr. E. Hammesfahr, Hamburg in Leverkusen.
- Discussion of the development of and the stage reached in work on synthetic rubber in I.G.
Increasing the capacity of the experimental plant from 10 to 25-30 tons of Butadiene per month.
Hammesfahr pointed out the extreme urgency of the rubber problem. Present yearly consumption about 70,000 tons, of which 60% for tires (shortly to be increased to about 80 %). He stressed that the project should not fall through because of the question of finance.

(page 3 of original)

General discussion of difficulties of the process, superiority of synthetic material over natural rubber, partial substitution of Vistra for cotton. Extending of manufacturing experiments to other purely German rubber factories apart from Conti. Examination of the problem of substituting rubber by I.G. synthetic compounds to decrease rubber consumption. Discussion on the subject of Duprene and the possible taking over of this process by I.G.

Discussion of the question of cost of synthetic rubber.

Miscellaneous

Carbon Black.

Substitution of the I.G. product Trinidadasphalt for the American product. Examination of the possibilities of production by I.G.

Particulars of German Sulphur production.

Regeneration. Enlargement of the existing regeneration factories with the assistance of I.G.; improvement of the process.

Particulars of I.G.'s raw rubber requirements.

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT No. NI- 8326
CONTINUED

(page 3 of original cont'd)

- 7 November Report on a discussion (Dr. Struss Frankfurt on the Main) on the meeting of the Control Office for Rubber and Asbestos on 30 October with Mr. Hammesfahr.
Also present: The Fuehrer's Economic Commissioner: Keppler,
Army Ordnance Office: Mureck,
Representative of the Reich Ministry of Economics,
Representative of the firm of Metzeler, Munich and of I.G.
Report on the processing of Buna in the tire industry. Hammesfahr calls attention to the particular urgency of the matter; I.G. should look into the question of setting up a factory producing 1000 tons per month. After thorough discussion the I.G. proposal for a factory producing 200 tons per month was accepted.
Slight increase in the price of tires could be borne for the sake of greater durability.
- 7 November Report on a discussion (Dr. Struss Frankfurt on Main) on the * of the Control Office for Rubber and Asbestos on 31 October with Mr. Hammesfahr.
*meeting
Discussion on possible agreements with Dupont concerning Duprene.
Discussion on the factory which is to produce 200 tons per month, and which can go into production at earliest at the end of 1935. A final decision on questions of finance should be arrived at later.
- 8 November Report by Dr. Konrad Leverkusen on the visit of the Reich Commissioner for Rubber, Mr. Hammesfahr, to Leverkusen.
Inspection of the existing manufacturing installations for the production of synthetic rubber and general non-binding statement on future development in this sphere.
- 22 November Report by Dr. Ebert, Ludwigshafen, on the visit of the Reich Commissioner for Rubber, Mr. Hammesfahr, to Leverkusen on 20 November.
General discussion on the release of rubber experimental material for purposes other than tire manufacture.
Questions of finance for the large-scale plant.
Relieving the rubber market through I.G. plastic materials.
I.G. to accelerate the submission of detailed data and suggestions for a large-scale plant.

(page 4 of original)

- 1 December Report on a discussion (Dr. Struss, Frankfurt on Main) on a meeting in the Reich Ministry of Economics with State Secretary Dr. Posse on 29 November.
General information on the situation in the field of synthetic rubber.
- 1 December Report on a discussion (Dr. Struss, Frankfurt on Main) on a meeting in the Army Ordnance Office with General Lieso on 30 November.
Same statements as at the above mentioned meeting of the Reich Ministry of Economics on 29 November.

(page 4 of original cont'd)

- 17 December Report on a discussion (Dr. Struss, Frankfurt on Main) on a meeting with the Fuehrer's Commissioner for Economic Questions, Keppler, in Berlin on 10 December in the presence of Mr. Hammesfahr.
- General statements on the technical method used at present to process carbide via Butylene glycol. Planning of the large scale plant when experiments are concluded in Ludwigshafen and Leverkusen.
- Detailed discussion of the question of cost of synthetic rubber.
- 1935
- 7 January Report (Dr. Ebert, Ludwigshafen) on the visit of Mr. Hammesfahr, Ludwigshafen on 5 January.
- Discussion on the various experiments carried out by I.G. for the solving of the synthetic rubber problem.
- 10 January Report (Dr. Ludwig, Leverkusen) on the visit of Dr. Hagemann to the Army Ordnance Office in Leverkusen.
- Progress of work on rubber in Leverkusen.
- General Lieke to urge the acceleration of work on tires in the tire factories, in order to form an opinion on the usefulness of synthetic rubber.
- 20 February Report on a discussion (Dr. Konrad, Leverkusen) in the Army Ordnance Office, with Major Philipp and Dr. Hagemann in the morning.
- Drawing-up of an experimental programme for tires. Review of I.G. work and cost of experiments in the field of rubber.
- Discussion on the question of a site for a rubber factory with Dr. Hagemann and Dr. of Engineering Kracht of the Army Ordnance Office and Conti representatives, in the afternoon.
- Planning of a further programme for the production of tires.
- 22 February Report on a discussion (Dr. Struss, Frankfurt on Main) in the Army Ordnance Office on 20 February.
- Wehrmacht demands chief say on questions of synthetic rubber.
- Total peace requirements of the Army about 150 - 250 tons per month.
- 22 February Report on a discussion (Dr. Struss, Frankfurt on Main) with Mr. Keppler on 20 February in the presence of Mr. Hammesfahr and with representatives of the Army Ordnance Office, of Conti and the firm of Lotzeler.
- Statement on the work of the tire manufacturers.
- Further discussions on large scale production of synthetic rubber should take place at the beginning of March.

(page 5 of original)

1935 (continued)

- 18.3. Conference Report (Dr. Struss, Frankfurt on Main) on a meeting at Herr Koppler's office on 14 March.
Dr. ter Meer described the present position of the work. The measures which are to be taken will at present have mainly to deal with the processing industry which has regularly to demand considerable supplies of synthetic rubber for experimental production.
Discussion of the price to be asked for synthetic rubber and costs of a large scale production plant for 2500 tons a year.
- 29.3. Conference Report (Dr. Konrad, Leverkusen) on the visit paid to Leverkusen by Dr. Hagemann and Dr. Exner of the Army Ordnance Office.
General discussion of the test-runs with natural and synthetic rubber tires.
- 2.5. Conference Report (Dr. Konrad, Leverkusen) on a meeting with Dr. Hagemann and Dr. Exner at the Army Ordnance Office.
Discussion of the total synthetic rubber requirements of the Wehrmacht.
Starting of special research work exclusively for the Wehrmacht.
- 13.8., 7.9. Correspondence between the Fuehrer's Plenipotentiary for Economic Questions, Mr. Koppler, and Dr. ter Meer, concerning a meeting to be held in September, which will deal with the present situation in the field of synthetic rubber.
- 20.9. Conference Report (Dr. ter Meer, Frankfurt on Main) concerning a meeting with Herr Koppler and Herr Pleiger at the Reich Chancellery.
Report on the rubber position.
It is necessary to speed up construction of the large scale production plant.
Discussion of further procedure to be adopted in the problem of large scale production. Possibility of a Wehrmacht contract at fixed prices.
Discussion of negotiations with Dupont relating to license for German patents on monovinyl acetylene and chloropren.
- 23.10. Conference Report (Dr. Konrad, Leverkusen) on the visit to Leverkusen by Lieutenant Colonel Philipps, Dr. Hagemann and Dr. Exner of the Army Ordnance Office.
Survey of the production and test equipment for synthetic rubber.

(page 6 of original)

- General discussion on the disposal of the future, increased Buna output. (Wehrmacht requirements not as previously stated 150 to 250 tons, but about 50 tons per month).
Discussion of the site to be chosen for the rubber factory.
- 30.11. Exposé by the Army Ordnance Office (Dr. Hagemann) on the state of the experiments with synthetic rubber in relation to its suitability for use with Army equipment, and proposals for disposing of the intended output.

(page 6 of original cont'd)

- 1936
21.1., Letters (Dr. ter Meer, Frankfurt on Main) to the Fuehrer's Plenipotentiary for Economic Questions, Herr Keppler, Berlin.
4.2. Draft of a contract to be concluded between the Reich Ministry of Economics and I.G. for the construction of a plant producing 200 tons of synthetic rubber per month.
- 13.2. Conference Report (Dr. Dehn-Rothfeller, Leuna) on a meeting with Geheimrat Kuogler at the Reich Ministry of Economics. General discussion about the progress of work in the sphere of Buna up to this date, with reference to the "Schkopau Project".
- 25./27.2. Correspondence of the Fuehrer's Plenipotentiary for Economic Questions, Herr Keppler, Berlin and Dr. Struss concerning the contract-draft and further speeding up of the preliminary work.
- 5.6. Conference Report (Dr. v. Bruening, Berlin) on a meeting with Geheimrat Kuogler and other officials of the Reich Ministry of Economics. Report on the latest position of synthetic rubber production. Further development should be accelerated as much as possible, at the same time avoiding investment errors.
- 17.6. Conference Report (Dr. Struss, Frankfurt on Main) on a meeting with the Raw Materials and Foreign Exchange Staff under the chairmanship of Dr. Krauch with representatives of the Reich War Ministry, Army Ordnance Office and Keppler's Office. Discussion of the possibility of increasing the proposed output of the Schkopau Buna Factory which is at the moment in the course of construction, from 200 to 1000 tons per month.
- 16./29.6., Correspondence between the Raw Material and Foreign Exchange
1./2./10. Staff (Lieutenant Colonel Loeb) and I.G., concerning the enlargement of the Buna Factory Schkopau to 1000 tons per month and the possibility of constructing another factory to produce 1000 tons per month.
7.
- 28.7. Conference Report (Dr. Hasenclever, Frankfurt on Main) on a meeting with Dr. Hagemann of the Army Ordnance Office in Berlin on 22 July. General discussion about a second plant for production of 1000 tons of Buna per month. Report by Dr. ter Meer on negotiations with Dupont. Statements by Dr. Hagemann concerning sales possibilities of the increased Buna output.

(page 7 of original)

- 31.7., Correspondence between the Fuehrer's Plenipotentiary for Economic
4.8. Questions, Herr Keppler, the Reich and Prussian Ministry of Finance and I.G., dealing with the drafting of a contract for a Buna plant at Schkopau to produce 1000 tons per month.
- 29.9., Correspondence between the Fuehrer's Plenipotentiary for Economic
2./6./13. Questions, Herr Keppler, and Dr. ter Meer, reference extension of
10. the Buna plant at Schkopau to 2000 tons per month, and questions relating to this scheme.

(page 7 of original cont'd)

- 13.10. File Notes by Dr. Struss concerning a telephone conversation with the Raw Material and Foreign Exchange Staff with regard to the anticipated Buna production from 1937 to 1939.
- 5.11. Letter from the Office for German Raw Materials and Plastics (Lieutenant Colonel Loeb) to I.G., reference dispatch of contract drafts for the Buna factory at Schkopau which is to produce 2000 tons per month.
- 23.11. Letter (Dr. Struss, Frankfurt on Main) to the Office for German Raw Materials and Plastics (Dr. Eckoll).
Transmission of the basic contractual clauses for the construction of a Buna factory.
Proposals for financing it.
(Reference was made to the conference with Dr. Eckoll on 19 Nov., for which Dr. Struss's hand-written notes are on file).
- 7.12. Notes by Dr. Struss in reference to the telephone call by Dr. Eckoll about the immediate construction of a second Buna factory to produce 1000 tons per month.
- 7.12. File Notes (Dr. Buhl) on a meeting with Dr. Eckoll in Berlin on 4 Dec..
Discussion of the contract basis (without touching on financial questions) for the construction of a Buna plant.
- 9.12. Letter (Dr. ter Meer, Frankfurt on Main) addressed to Dr. Eckoll, Office for German Raw Materials and Plastics, Berlin.
Confirmation of telephone conversation about various technical details to do with the Buna plant at Schkopau.
Readiness on the part of I.G. to lend its support in the execution of construction and the management of Buna plant No. II.
- 9.12. Conference Report (Dr. Prentzel, Frankfurt on Main) on a meeting in the Reich Finance Ministry with representatives of the RFI, RII (Reich Ministry of Economics), Dr. Eckoll from the Office for Raw Materials taking part.
Detailed discussion of tax reductions or exemptions from taxes for the Buna G.m.b.H. which is to be newly established at Schkopau.

(page 8 of original)

- 17.12. Letter (Dr. ter Meer, Frankfurt on Main) addressed to Dr. Eckoll of the Office for German Raw Materials and Plastics in Berlin.
Forwarding of contract drafts (instructions for settling accounts) not including arrangements on financing which have yet to be agreed on.
- 17.12. Letter (Dr. ter Meer, Frankfurt on Main) addressed to Dr. Eckoll of the Office for German Raw Materials and Plastics in Berlin.
Forwarding an exposé dealing with the financing of Buna factories as arranged at the conference in the Reich Ministry of Economics on 16 Dec..
(Short hand-written notes on this meeting by Dr. Struss are on file.)

(page 8 of original cont'd)

- 22.12. Letter (Dr. ter Meer, Frankfurt on Main) addressed to Dr. Ecköll of the Office for German Raw Materials and Plastics in Berlin. The Price Control Commissioner asks for detailed figures on the cost of the plant and the cost prices of the Buna brands which are to be produced in the 2000-ton-plant at Schkopau.
- 31.12. Letter (Dr. Labros, Ludwigshafen) addressed to Dr. Ecköll of the Office for German Raw Materials and Plastics in Berlin. Question as to the site for Buna Plant No. II.

(page 9 of original)

1937

5.1.

Letter from the Office for German Raw Materials and Plastics (Colonel Loeb) to I.G. (Dr. ter Meer).

Raising the output capacity of the Buna factories to 3000 tons per month by January 1938 (2000 tons in Schkopau and 1000 tons at Puerstenberg as the first step).

7.1.

File Notes (Dr. Konrad, Leverkusen) on a conference at the Office for German Raw Materials and Plastics on 22 Dec. 1936 in the presence of representatives of the German tire industry. General discussion on the exclusive use of Buna S instead of Buna N for the manufacture of tires.

14.1.

File Notes (Dr. Struss, Frankfurt on Main) on a conference at the Office for German Raw Materials and Plastics. Progress of the Buna plants I and II. The plant which is to produce 200 tons per month will start operations on 1 March and will be stepped up to 2000 tons a month at about the beginning of 1938. Discussion of the site for Buna Plant No. II (project Zweckel).

21.1.

Letter from the Reich Finance Minister to I.G. dealing with exemptions from taxes and tax reductions for the Buna G.m.b.H.

29.1.

and

6.2.

Correspondence between the Office for German Raw Materials and Plastics and I.G., reference Buna Contract.

12.2.

Conference Report (Dr. Struss, Frankfurt on Main) on the meeting at the Office for German Raw Materials and Plastics on 11 Feb. in the presence of representatives of Continental.

Rejection of the demand, advanced by Continental on behalf of the entire German rubber industry, that I.G. produce Buna in a pre-masticated state.

17.2.

Exposé by Dr. ter Meer on "Fundamental Arguments for the Establishment of the Schkopau Plant, and the Buna Contract". (10 Copies forwarded to the Office for German Raw Materials and Plastics on 19 Feb.).

23.2. and

3.3.

Correspondence with the Office for German Raw Materials and Plastics concerning the dates of loan payments by the Reich for the construction of the Buna plant at Schkopau.

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT No. NI-8326
CONTINUED

(page 9 of original cont'd)

- 23.2. and Letter by I.G. to the Office for German Raw Materials and
25.2. Plastics.
Forwarding Buna contract drafts and statement of Buna research
expenses from 1928 to 1936.

(page 10 of original)

- 4./19./ Correspondence between the Office for German Raw Materials
22./30.3. and Plastics and I.G., dealing with the Buna plants at Schkopau.
and 14.4. Inspection of the plant, problem of power supply, delivery
of raw materials, accommodation problems.
- 13./20./23. April, 7./13./15./16./14./29. May, 5./18. June, 5./7./9./16. July,
10./16./20. August, 20./25. September, 15./29. November:
Correspondence between the Office for German Raw Materials and
Plastics and I.G.
- 29.4. 2 File Notes (Dr. Strass, Frankfurt on Main) on a conference
at the Office for German Raw Materials and Plastics.
- 10./17./ Correspondence between the Office for German Raw Materials
25./26./ and Plastics, I.G. and various firms.
31. August Procurement of material and fixing of dates for completing the
Buna plant at Schkopau.
13. and Correspondence between the Reich Price Commissioner, the
22. Sept., Office for German Raw Materials and Plastics and I.G.
1./2./
11. and
21. Dec.
- 1938
2.2. Establishment of Buna prices.
- 24.1. Conference Report (Dr. Albers, Frankfurt on Main) on a meeting
with the Rubber Control Office in Berlin.
General sales questions, allocation of Buna, I.G.'s own con-
sumption, waste material.

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

6 July 1947

We, VICTORIA ORTON, No. 20129 and ARTHUR MCNEILLY, Civ. No. 20191 hereby
certify that we are thoroughly conversant with the English and German
languages and that the above is a true and correct translation of the
document No. NI-8326.

VICTORIA ORTON, No. 20129
ARTHUR MCNEILLY, Civ. No. 20191.

-9-
"END"

Document No. NI-8326

A F F I D A V I T

I, Dr. Ernst STRUSS, Director of I. G. Farben, chief of the Office of the Technical Committee of the I.G., Secretary of the Technical Committee of the Vorstand of the I.G., chief of Sparte II of the Vermittlungsstelle W, and since 1943 production chief of the whole German dyestuffs industry within the Economic Group for Chemical Industry, having been warned that I will be liable to punishment for a false statement, hereby declare under oath voluntarily and without coercion:

The reports made in the document marked NI-306 were made by my former employee, Mr. Holmuth ROHMANN, in 1945. ROHMANN collaborated closely with me in this compilation and I have continually supervised the progress of his work. The content of Document NI-306 and the history of its origin are therefore known to me to the fullest extent, and to the best of my knowledge and belief it corresponds in all details to the whole truth. I have carefully checked document NI-306 which was submitted to me. This document, together with this affidavit, forms a single document and is herewith declared part of this affidavit. In appending my signature to this affidavit I, at the same time, have signed each of the eleven pages of this document NI-306.

I have carefully read through each of the eleven pages of Document NI-306 as well as this page of my affidavit and personally marked them, have made the necessary corrections in my own hand, and marked them with my initials and declare herewith under oath that I have to the best of my knowledge and belief spoken the absolute truth in this declaration.

(signed) Dr. ERNST A. STRUSS
/t/ Dr. Ernst Struss

Sworn and signed before me this 30 day of May 1947 at Frankfurt Main by Dr. Ernst Struss known to me to be the person making the above affidavit.

(signed) OTTO HEILBRUNN
/t/ Dr. Otto Heilbrunn
Civilian, ETO 30140
Office of Chief of Counsel
for War Crimes
U.S. War Department

Discussions about Buna with government offices

Detailed version August 1945 for Mr. Weissbrodt
Extract from original file

1933. In reply to personal query by a representative of the Army Ordnance Office (Heereswaffenamt) to Dr. Mueller-Gunradi, followed:

15 Letter Ludwigshafen (Mueller-Gunradi) to Heereswaffenamt HWA
Aug. (Army Ordnance Office) Berlin-Charlottenburg.

Information on the work of I.G. Farben in the field of synthetic rubber 1910 to 1914 and after 1918.
Present situation of work and readiness of I.G. for again taking up the production of synthetic rubber on a large scale with the support of the Reich Government and with the collaboration of an efficient rubber factory (Production of 1000-2000 tires which are to be tested on vehicles of government authorities).

1934

6 Expose Leverkusen (Dr. Konrad) to HWA (General Liese).
Jul.

Information about the work in the field of synthetic rubber.
I. Methylenrubber (1910-1918)
II. Butadienrubber (from 1926 on)
III. Mixed polymerisates.
IV. Oil and gasoline-proof rubber
V. Duprene (U.S.A.)
VI. Present state of work.
VII. Program of experiments for the near future.

11 Conference report (Dr. Konrad Leverkusen) on meeting in HWA
Jul. (Major Philip, Dr. Hagenmann) later on in presence of Dr. Weber
and Dr. Naumann, Conti.

I. Without representative of Conti

Present state of work
a) Butadieno-Basis (Duna)
b) " Mixed polymerisates
c) " - alloyed with softeners.
Mass production of 5,000 tons a year (time for construction 1 year) can only begin after the tire experiments. Duprene (license negotiations I.G./Dupont).

(Page 2 of original)

1934 II. Together with representatives of Conti:

A greater production of tires will only be possible after the conclusion of the tests with the individual experimental tires. The production of solid rubber tires has to be examined. Conference about general economic expectations for synthetic rubber.

- 24 Report on conference (Dr. Konrad, Leverkusen) with the Reich
Jul. Plenipotentiary for Rubber. Herrn Hammesfahr of Hamburg, in
Leverkusen.

Conference about development and state of work in the field of synthetic rubber of I.G.
Extension of the experimental installations from 10 to 25-50 tons of butadiene per month.
Hammesfahr refers to the special urgency of the rubber problem. Present yearly consumption: about 70,000 tons, of which 60 % is for tires (soon: about 80 %). He emphasizes that the project must not fail on account of the financial question.

General discussion about the difficulties of the process. Superiority of synthetic material over natural rubber, part replacement of the cotton by Vistra. Extension of the production experiments to other purely German rubber factories apart from Conti. Examination of the question of replacing rubber by synthetic materials of I.G. in order to reduce rubber consumption. Conference about Duprene and possible taking-over of this process by I.G. Discussion of the price question for synthetic rubber.

Miscellaneous

Buna: Replacement of the American product by I.G. products.
Trinidad asphalt: Examination of production possibilities by I.G.
Information on German sulphur production.
Regeneration: Extension of the existing regeneration plants with the collaboration of I.G.; improvement of the processes.
Information on the raw rubber requirements of I.G.

- 7 Conference report (Dr. Struss Frankfurt/M.) on Conference in Control
Nov. office for Rubber and Asbestos, held on 31 October with Herrn
Hammesfahr.

Also present: The economic Plenipotentiary of the Fuehrer: Koppler
Army Ordnance Office: Kurock, of Reich Economic
Ministry, the Firm Metzeler, Munich and I.G.

(Page 3 of original)

1934 (Cont'd.)

Report about use of Buna in the tire industry. Hammesfahr draws attention to the very special urgency; I.G. to examine construction of a plant for 1000 ton per month. After thorough discussion, I.G.'s suggestion for a plant for 200 ton per month is accepted. Slight price increase for the tires is bearable if durability is also increased.

- 7 Conference report (Dr. Struss Frankfurt/M) on conference in
Nov. Control office for rubber and Asbestos, held on 31 October with
Herrn Hammesfahr.

Discussion on our possible agreement with Dupont, re: Duprene.
Discussion of the plant with a monthly capacity 200 tons, which can go into production in late 1935 at the earliest. The financial question will be finally settled later on.

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT No. NI-8326 and
NI-306 (Cont'd)

Document No. NI-306 (Cont'd)

- 8 Report Dr. Konrad, Leverkusen, about the visit of the Reich
Nov. Plenipotentiary for Rubber, Herr Hannesfahr, to Leverkusen.

Inspection of the existing installations for the production of
synthetic rubber and general non-obligatory discussions on the
future development of the field.

- 22 Report Dr. Ebert, Ludwigshafen, on the visit of the Reich
Nov. Plenipotentiary for Rubber, Herr Hannesfahr on 20 Nov. in
Ludwigshafen.

General discussion on release of rubber experiment material for
other purposes than tires.
Question of financing a large-scale plant.
Easing of the rubber situation through synthetic products of I.G.
I.G. to speed up submission of detailed information and suggestions
for large-scale plant.

- 1 Conference report (Dr. Struss, Frankfurt/M) on a conference in HMA
Dec. (Army Ordnance Office) on 29 Nov. with State Secretary, Dr. Passo.

General orientation on the situation in the field of synthetic
rubber.

- 1 Conference report (Dr. Struss, Frankfurt/M) on a conference in HMA
Dec. on 30 Nov. with General Liese.

Same discussions as in conference with HMA of 29 November.

- 17 Conference report (Dr. Struss, Frankfurt/M.) on a conference with
Dec. the Plenipotentiary for Economic Problems, of the Fuehrer Koppler,
held in Berlin on 10 Dec. in the presence of Herr Hannesfahr.

(Page 4 of original)

1934 (Cont'd)

General discussion of the technical execution of the process for
making carbide via Butylene/glykol.
Planning of a large-scale plant, when experiments in Lu (Ludwig-
shafen) and Le (Leverkusen) have been concluded.
Detailed discussion of the price question for synthetic rubber.

1935

- 7 Report (Dr. Ebert, Ludwigshafen) on the visit of Herr Hannesfahr
Jan. in Ludwigshafen on 5 November.

Discussions on I.G.'s various experiments for the promotion of the
synthetic rubber problem.

- 10 Report (Dr. Ludwig, Leverkusen) on the visit of Dr. Hagemann to
Jan. HMA, Leverkusen.

State of the rubber work in Leverkusen.
General Liese to ask the tire plants to speed up their production
in order to get a decision about the fitness for use of synthetic
rubber.

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT No. NI-8326 and
NI-306 (Cont'd)

Document No. 306 (Cont'd)

- 20 Conference report on Meeting (Dr. Konrad, Leverkusen) in HWA
Feb. in the morning with Major Philipp and Dr. Hagemann.

Establishment of tire test program. General survey of I.G. work
and experimental expenses in the field of rubber.
Discussions about questions of location for a rubber factory.

In the afternoon: With Dr. Hagemann and Dr. Ing. Kracht, of HWA
as well as representatives of Conti.

Establishment of a further tire test program for production.

- 22 Conference report (Dr. Struss, Frankfurt/M) in HWA of 20 February.
Feb.

Army requests direction in the rubber question. Total peace
requirements of the Army about 150-250 tons per month.

- 22 Conference report (Dr. Struss, Frankfurt/M) on meeting with
Feb. Herr Koppler on 20 February in presence of Herr Hammesfahr, as
well as representatives of HWA, Conti and on the firm Metzeler.

Discussion about the work of the tire manufacturers.
Further conferences about large scale production of synthetic
rubber will be held in early March.

(Page 5 of original)

1935 (Cont'd)

- 18 Conference report (Dr. Struss, Frankfurt/M) on a meeting with
Mar. Herrn Koppler on 14 March.

Dr. ter Meer explains the present state of work. The main point
for the measures to be taken lies with the producing industry,
which regularly has to supply the experimental plants with large
quantities of rubber.

Discussion about the price for synthetic rubber and cost of large
scale plant for producing 2500 tons a year.

- 29 Conference report (Dr. Konrad, Leverkusen) on the visit of
Mar. Dr. Hagemann and Dr. Exner of HWA in Leverkusen.

General discussion on road tests with tires of both natural and
synthetic rubber.

- 2 Conference report (Dr. Konrad, Leverkusen) on a meeting in HWA
May with Dr. Hagemann and Dr. Exner

Discussion about the Armed Forces total requirements for synthetic
rubber.

Start of special test work especially for the Armed Forces.

7. Sept.
13 /Correspondence of the Fuehrer's Plenipotentiary for Economic
Aug. Problems, Koppler, with Dr. ter Meer, re: Conference to be held
in September about the present state as regards synthetic rubber.

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT No. NI-8326 and
NI-306 (Cont'd)

Document No. 306 (Cont'd)

- 20 Conference report (Dr. ter Meer, Frankfurt/M) on a meeting in the
Sep. Reich Chancellery with Herrn. Koppler and Fleiger.

State of rubber production.

The construction of the large-scale plant to be speeded up,
Conference about further procedure in the question of mass
production.

Possible sales guarantee by the Armed Forces at fixed prices.

Discussion about conference with Dupont about licenses for
German patents concerning Monovinylacetylene and Chloroprene.

- 23 Conference report (Dr. Konrad, Leverkusen) on visit of
Oct. Lt. Col. Philipps, Dr. Hagemann, Dr. Exner of HWA, Leverkusen.

Inspection of production and testing installations for synthetic
rubber.

(Page 6 of original)

1935 (Cont'd)

General discussion about disposal of increased future buna
production (requirements of Armed Forces not 150-250 ton per
month as previously stated, but about 50 ton per month).
Discussion of location of the rubber factory.

- 12 Correspondence of the Plenipotentiary of the Fuehrer for Economic
15 questions Koppler and Dr. Struss re: construction of a large-scale
19 plant for manufacture of synthetic rubber. Questions on
Nov. financing. Sales guarantee. Price guarantee. Questions of
location.

- 30 Expose of HWA (Dr. Hagemann) on state of the tests with synthetic
Nov. rubber for use in army material and suggestions for the distrib-
ution of the planned production.

1936

- 21 Letters (Dr. ter Meer, Frankfurt/M) to the Fuehrer's Pleni-
Jan. potentiary for Economic Problems, Koppler, Berlin.

- 4
Feb. Draft for a contract between the Reich Economic Ministry and
I.G. concerning the construction of a plant with a capacity of
200 ton of synthetic rubber per month.

- 13 Conference report (Dr. Dohn-Rothfelsor; Leuna) on a meeting in
Feb. the Reich Economic Ministry, Gdh. Rat. Kuogler.

General discussion about the development of the Buna production
up to date with respect to the "Project Schkopau".

Document No. NI-306 (Cont'd)

1936 (Cont'd)

25./27 Feb, Correspondence of the Fuehrer's Plenipotentiary for Economic problems, Keppler, Berlin and Dr. Struss, concerning the draft for a contract and further promotion of the preliminary work.

5 June Conference report (Dr. von Bruening, Berlin) on a meeting in the Reich Economic Ministry with Geh.Rat.Kuebler and other officials.

Report on the latest stand of the production of synthetic rubber.
Utmost speeding up of the further development and avoidance of useless investigations.

17 June Conference report (Dr. Struss, Frankfurt/1) on a conference of the Staff for Raw Materials and Foreign Exchange, under the chairmanship of Dr. Krauch, with officials of Reich War Ministry, HWA and Keppler Bureau.

Conference about possible extension of the Buna Factory Schkopau, which is under construction, from a capacity of 800 to 1000 tons a month.

(Page 7 of original)

1936

16./29 June., 1./2./10 July. Correspondence between Staff for Raw Materials and Foreign Exchange (Lt.Col.Loeb) and I.G., concerning the extension of the Buna Factory Schkopau to a capacity of 1000 tons a month and the possible construction of a second plant for 1000 tons a month.

28 July Conference report (Dr. Hasenclever, Frankfurt/1) on a meeting with Dr. Hagemann of HWA, Berlin, 22 July.

General discussion concerning the second plant for producing 1000 tons of Buna per month.
Report Dr. ter Meer on negotiations with Dupont.
Report Dr. Hagemann about market possibilities for the extended Buna production.

31 July, 4 Aug. Correspondence between the Fuehrer's Plenipotentiary for Economic Problems, Keppler and the Finance Ministry and I.G. Farben concerning the draft of a contract for the Schkopau Buna factory for producing 1000 tons per month.

29 Sept., 2 June, 13 Oct. Correspondence between the Fuehrer's for Plenipotentiary Economic Problems, Keppler and Dr. ter Meer, re.: the extension of the Schkopau Buna plant to 2000 tons per month and the problems connected with this.

13 Oct. File note Dr. Struss on a phone call with Staff for Raw Materials and Foreign Exchange concerning the prospective Buna production 1937-1939.

5 Nov. Letter: Office for German Raw & Synthetic Material (Lt.Col. Loeb) to I.G. concerning the dispatch of the draft contracts for the Schkopau Buna production of 2000 tons per month.

Document No. NI-306 (Cont'd)

1936(Cont'd)

23 Nov. Letter (Dr. Struss, Frankfurt/M) to Office for German Raw
and Synthetic Materials (Dr. Eckell).

Transmission of contract principles for the construction of
a Buna factory.

Financing suggestions.

(Reference conference with Dr. Eckell of 19 Nov., of which
handwritten notes of Dr. Struss are available).

7 Dec. Note Dr. Struss re: telephone call of Dr. Eckell re immediate
construction of a second Buna factory for 1000 tons per month.

7 Dec. File note (Dr. Buhl) about a conference with Dr. Eckell in
Berlin on 4 Dec.

Discussion of the contract principles (without mention of the
financial questions) for the construction of a Buna plant.

(Page 8 of original)

9 Dec. Letter (Dr. ter Meer, Frankfurt/M) to Dr. Eckell, Office for
German Raw & Synthetic Materials, Berlin.

Confirmation of the telephone conversation re various
technical details re the Buna plant Schkopau.

Willingness of I.G. to collaborate in the construction and
management of Buna plant II.

9 Dec. Conference report (Dr. Prentzel, Frankfurt/M) about a meeting
in the Reich Finance Ministry with officials of the Reich
Finance Ministry and the Reich Economic Ministry, under
consultation of Dr. Eckell of Office for Raw Materials.

Detailed conference re: easing of and release from taxation
for the Buna GmbH, Schkopau, which will be established.

17 Dec. Letter (Dr. ter Meer, Frankfurt/M) to Dr. Eckell, Office
for German Raw and Synthetic Materials, Berlin.

Transmission of the draft contracts (directives for the sett-
lement of accounts) omitting the agreements which have to be
made for the financing.

17 Dec. Letter (Dr. ter Meer, Frankfurt/M) to Dr. Eckell, Office for
German Raw and synthetic Materials, Berlin.

Handing over an expose re the financing of Buna plants accord-
ing to the meeting in the Reich Economic Ministry on 16 Dec.
(Handwritten notes of Dr. Struss are available about this
meeting).

22 Dec. Letter (Dr. ter Meer, Frankfurt/M) to Dr. Eckell, Office
for German Raw & Synthetic Materials, Berlin.

Request for detailed information from the Commissioner for
Price Control about the construction costs and the production
price of the types of Buna, to be produced in the 2000-ton-
plant at Schkopau.

Document No. NI-306 (Cont'd)

1936(Cont'd)

31 Dec. Letter (Dr. Ambros, Ludwigshafen) to Dr. Eckell, Office for German Raw and Synthetic Materials, Berlin.

Question of location of Buna plant II.

(Page 9 of original)

1937

5 Jan. Letter: Office for German Raw and Synthetic Materials, Berlin to I.G. (Dr. ter Meer).

Increase of Buna output to 3000 tons per month by January 1948 (2000 in Schkopau and 1000 as the first development phase in Fuerstenberg).

7 Jan. File note (Dr. Konrad, Leverkusen) on a conference in the Office for German Raw & Synthetic Materials of 22.12.36 in the presence of Representatives of the German tire industry.

General discussion about the exclusive utilization of Buna S instead of Buna N for tire production.

14 Jan. File note (Dr. Struss, Frankfurt/1) on a conference in the Office for German Raw & Synthetic Materials, Berlin.

State of Buna plant I and II.

Start of production of the 200 tons per month installation on 1 March and increase up to 2000 tons per month by about the beginning of 1938.

Discussion of the location question for Buna plant II (project Zweckel).

21 Jan. Letter of Reich Finance Minister to I.G. re: release from taxation and easing of taxation for Buna GmbH.

29 Jan. and 6 Feb. Correspondence between Office for German Raw and Synthetic Materials and I.G., re: Buna contract.

12 Feb. Conference report (Dr. Struss, Frankfurt/1) about the meeting in the Office for German Raw and Synthetic Materials of 11 Feb. in the presence of representatives of Conti.

Rejection of the request made by Conti in the name of the entire German rubber industry for I.G. to roll and soften Buna (Vormastizierung).

17 Feb. Expose Dr. ter Meer about basic points for the establishment of the Schkopau works and for the Buna contract (10 copies were sent to the Office for German Raw & Synthetic Materials on 19 Feb.)

23 Feb. and 3.3. Correspondence with Office for German Raw and Synthetic Materials concerning terms of payment of the Reich for the loan for the construction of Buna plant Schkopau.

23 Feb. and 25.2. Letter I.G. to Office for German Raw and Synthetic Materials.

Transmission of the Buna draft contracts and information on the cost of the Buna experiments 1928-1936.

Document No. NI-306 (Cont'd)

(Page 10 of original)

1937 (Cont'd)

4., 19., 22., 30 March and 14 Apr. Correspondence of Office for German Raw and Synthetic Materials with I.G., concerning Buna plant Schkopau.

Inspection of the plant, questions of power supply, raw materials, housing.

13., 20., 23 April -- 7., 13., 15., 18., 24., 29 May -- 5., 18 June -- 5., 7., 9., 16 July -- 10., 16., 20 August -- 20., 25 September -- 15., 29 November

Correspondence Office for German Raw and Synthetic Materials-I.G.

29.4 2 File notes (Dr. Struss, Frankfurt/II) about conference in Office for German Raw and Synthetic Materials.

10., 17., 25., 26., 31 Aug. Correspondence; Office for German Raw and Synthetic Materials-I.G. and various other firms.

Supply of raw material and terms for the construction of Buna plant Schkopau.

13. and 22 Sept. -- 1, 9, 11 and 21 Dec. Correspondence Reich Commissioner for Price Establishment, the Office for German Raw and Synthetic Materials and I.G.

1938.

4 Jan and 10 March. Buna contract with the Reich

24 Jan. Report (Dr. Albers, Frankfurt/II) on a conference with the Control Office for Rubber in Berlin.

General questions of sale, allocation of Buna, consumption of I.G. itself, waste material.

(Page 11 of original)

1938.

2 Feb. Price establishment for Buna.

Correspondence Reich Commissioner for Price Establishment, the Office for German Raw and Synthetic Materials and I.G.

Frankfurt/II.,
11 April 1947.

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

I, DOROTHEA L. GALENSKI, ETO #34079, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of Documents No. 8326 and NI-306.

DOROTHEA L. GALENSKI,
ETO #34079.

END

(Translator's note:)

Stamp:

Card index:
finished.

R E P O R T

of the meeting of the Technical Management
(Technische Direkti. nussitzung) at Frankfurt-a.M.--
Hochst on 3 August 1936.

Present:

Hermann
Jachae
Pfaffendorf
Roth
Staib
Hagenboecker
Hilcken
Hirschel

Orthner (part of the time)

.....
(Page 2, para 1, of original)

Staib informs the meeting of a new process for the production of Siliciantetrachloride which is being carried out by Goldschmidt. The tin-chloride accruing from the process of removing the tin from white metal, is converted through silicon into siliciantetrachloride and tin which is extremely pure. The Torpedo-Versuchsanstalt (Torpedo Experimental Station) at Eckernförde is carrying out siliciantetrachloride smoke screen tests in conjunction with the Hansertische Apparatbau-Gesellschaft (concern with Goldschmidt) from which I.G. is excluded. Von Heider and Staib will approach Berlin authorities in order to attain that I.G., in view of the high experimental costs which have until now accrued, be assured a supply of siliciantetrachloride, whilst the delivery of the machinery can be made through the Hansertische-Apparatbau-Gesellschaft.

.....
(signature) HIRSCHEL

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

I, DOROTHEA L. GILLESKI, MP 34079, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of extract from Document NI-5910.

DOROTHEA L. GILLESKI,
MP 34079.

END

13

General

CONFIDENTIAL

1. The following information is being furnished to you for your information only.

2. It is requested that you do not disseminate this information to other personnel who do not have a valid "need-to-know" basis for the information. This information is being furnished to you for your information only.

3. The following information is being furnished to you for your information only. It is requested that you do not disseminate this information to other personnel who do not have a valid "need-to-know" basis for the information. This information is being furnished to you for your information only.

4. The following information is being furnished to you for your information only. It is requested that you do not disseminate this information to other personnel who do not have a valid "need-to-know" basis for the information. This information is being furnished to you for your information only.

5. The following information is being furnished to you for your information only. It is requested that you do not disseminate this information to other personnel who do not have a valid "need-to-know" basis for the information. This information is being furnished to you for your information only.

Special Instructions

6. The following information is being furnished to you for your information only. It is requested that you do not disseminate this information to other personnel who do not have a valid "need-to-know" basis for the information. This information is being furnished to you for your information only.

7. The following information is being furnished to you for your information only. It is requested that you do not disseminate this information to other personnel who do not have a valid "need-to-know" basis for the information. This information is being furnished to you for your information only.

8. The following information is being furnished to you for your information only. It is requested that you do not disseminate this information to other personnel who do not have a valid "need-to-know" basis for the information. This information is being furnished to you for your information only.

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100-100000-100000

100-100000-100000

THE SECRETARY OF THE
NAVY
WASHINGTON, D. C.

NAVY DEPARTMENT
WASHINGTON, D. C.

NAVY DEPARTMENT
WASHINGTON, D. C.

NAVY DEPARTMENT
WASHINGTON, D. C.

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NAVY DEPARTMENT
WASHINGTON, D. C.

THE OFFICE OF COORDINATING
Gentle

Million Marks for 1.5 Million tons. For the 1935-36 season it is estimated that about 200 Million Marks would have to be invested in factories to produce hydrogen from coke and in existing power houses, which would have to be converted into power stations. Of course, these figures are only estimates and are subject to change. It is, however, certain that the number of workers employed should be reduced as far as possible. It will be necessary to reduce the production of machines from its basic material program, while a not inconsiderable number would work in the machine and steel industries. But if there are these workers who, through the production process, would be directly again be led back into employment, according to careful estimates, this number amounts to at least 75% of those directly employed.

As for the hydrogenation is concerned, we have worked for quite some time on the production of suitable aviation gasoline. We can now state that, according to the conditions of technical methods, it would easily be possible to produce aviation gasoline as well as lubricants suitable for airplanes, by German production. At this time, the further is making extensive tests with our gasoline.

(Page 3 of original)

To State Secretary HILCH, Air Ministry, Berlin

14 September 1933

I hope to have given you basic data for an expansion of the German motor fuel economy in this exposition. If there are any points arising out of this matter which require additional elucidation, I should be glad to furnish you with further verbal information.

Yours very respectfully

(Signature) Hermann C. KRAUSE

(Page 4 of original)

20 July 1933

(Secretary's Note)

Stamp

Folter

Underwritten Miscellaneous

"

"A.L.H." (A.L.H. Air

Ministry)

To: State Secretary H. HILCH,

Berlin V

Reference 25.70

(Secretary's Note: Illustrative Initial)

Dear State Secretary:

Please accept my thanks for your kind letter of the 11th of this month. I received it somewhat belatedly, since I was away from home for a few days during my vacation, and therefore it was not possible for me to reply to you before today.

I am very glad that you and the members of your staff are pleased with what we were able to show you in Garmisch-Partenkirchen. It is only a pity that the time at your disposal was so short. I am very happy that you have the opportunity to discuss all questions pertaining to German aviation. I believe

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO. 116 VI
Cont'd

that this is the best method to further our work to date it appears. Apart from this, I think that we may derive various benefits from the personal acquaintance made between the gentlemen of your enterprise and our men who work in these particular fields here.

I noticed with interest from your letter that you have had the opportunity of discussing the questions dealt with in Opus with General GORDON as well, and that he intends to invite us for a personal conference in the near future. For the appreciation of our work of

(Page 4 of original)

which this bears witness, I would like to thank you most sincerely already today, dear State Secretary. I anticipate your further communications as to when the proposed visit is to take place.

I subjected the data concerning the invention of Mr. HACHONIE which you sent me to a preliminary examination. The claims of the inventor seem fantastic, and I have for the moment strong doubts as to their accuracy, particularly on account of the fashion in which this invention is being advertised in France, vividly reminding me of some cases of invention offered us from France, which upon closer examination proved to be frauds. In fact, the protracted efforts of Mr. HACHONIE to induce the various authorities to accept his inventions have actually been described in France as the "HACHONIE Syndrome". I am now about to have the data more closely studied and am also having investigations made as to how far the inventor has become known in scientific literature, and I then shall take the liberty of submitting to you a proposal for further action in this matter.

At present we can put at your disposal as instructional and training material for the Luftwaffe, the charts listed in the enclosed index. Although these charts are mainly meant for the automobile section, the same as that shown on it essentially applies also to the aeroplane. Will you kindly let us know how many copies of these charts you require, and to which offices we are to send them.

I suggest the provisional appointment of our Dr. RITTEL as liaison officer to your Office.

I remain, with many kind regards and Best Wishes,

Respectfully yours,

(Signed) G. KROGER

(Page 5 of original)

DER STAATSEKZELAR
Herr LUTTWALD
(State Secretary for Aviation)

Berlin, W 1
Charlottenstr. 7/70
1.11.41 A 2 Floor 0047

22 July 1941

TO: Director Dr. G. KROGER
I.G. Farbenindustrie
Ludwigshafen/Elbe

Dear Dr. KROGER:

To begin with, I would like to thank you specially for the friendly reception you gave us in Opus. All participants were deeply impressed by the

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO. 11-171
Cont'd

informative talks and demonstrations given them there. I myself have immediately informed General GOERING, who is also particularly interested in questions of this nature. As soon as he has finished his summer vacation, he plans to ask you to come for a leisurely visit to Berlin in the Reichsheil, in order that he too can discuss with you the long-range viewpoints. In his capacity as Reich Game Warden he is specially interested in the lumber problem.

(Translator's Note: Handwritten Marginal Note: Extract of letter to Dr. SCHMIDT (Para. 2 of Original)).

Enclosed I am sending you documents about a French non-combustible fuel, about which I had already heard quite a lot many years ago. The experiments, however, apparently were a failure in France, some claim for technical reasons, while others assert it was due to consideration for the mineral oil companies. It is impossible to determine which version is true.

The inventor MAKHOMINE wants to approach Germany by way of the Adjutant to Minister GOERING. Before we do anything in this matter I would like to transmit the material to you, and to leave any further action up to your judgement, which appears to me the best way on account of your expert knowledge.

(Translator's Note: Handwritten: 3 enclosures. Note is Dr. EMBECKER: Rapport. A la chambre des Deputes - (Report presented to Chamber of Deputies). In addition to this notes according to this printed matter, Headline: Motor Fuel C H. With excerpt of 11 November to Dr. C.H. 25 July.)

(Page 7 of original)

I repeat again my two requests which I expressed at our visit:

- 1.) Assignment of a liaison officer to our G-office.
- 2.) Provision of educational and training material for the Luftwaffe, with respect to the various projects of the I.G., and of course, only to the extent as it is suitable for training purposes for officers and selected personnel.

In case you find an opportunity, please extend also my greetings to the other gentlemen. I remain, with many kind regards and Heil Hitler,

Dear yours,

(Signed) E. MILON

I.G. LUDWIGSHAFEN
Technical Department

(Translator's Note: Handwritten: OK)

TO: Dr. C. SCHMIDT
SUBJECT: Educational Charts,

We can put at your disposal the following charts:

1. Manufacture of Gasoline
2. Manufacture of Liquefied Gasoline

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO. NL-4710
Cont'd

3. Carburetor breakdowns
4. Glysantin (Anti freeze) Educational Chart and also Driving Manual.

(Signature) WILKE

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

I, DOMOTHEA L. GALEWSKI, N.I. NO. 34075, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document No. NL-4710.

DOMOTHEA L. GALEWSKI
N.I. NO. 34075

I.G. FARBEINDUSTRIE AKTIENGESellschaft

Nitrogen Direction.

Ludwigshafen on the Rhine.
5 September 1935.

(Transl. Note: Initial "H" (?)
for Huonocke?)

Ammoniakwerk Merseburg G.m.b.H.
Attention Director Dr. Schneider

Leuna - Works

I.G. Farbenindustrie A.G.
Attention Director Dr. Pistor

Pitterfeld

I.G. Farbenindustrie A.G., Division "N"
Attention Director Dr. Petersen

Wolfen, Kreis
Pitterfeld

I.G. Farbenindustrie A.G., Division "N"
Attention Director Dr. Plato

Frankfurt a/M.-Hoechst

I.G. Farbenindustrie A.G.
Attention Dr. Lang

Pitterfeld

I.G. Bergwerke
Attention Mine Director Dr. Scharf

Halle a.S.

Gewerkschaft Auguste Victoria
Attention Assessor Stein,

Huels, Kreis
Rocklinghausen

I.G. Farbenindustrie A.G.
Dept. Badammon, Attention Director Dr. Oster

Berlin NW 7

I.G. Farbenindustrie A.G.
Oil Dept. Dir. Baacke
Attention Dir. Dr. Fischer

Berlin NW 7, U.d.L.

I.G. Farbenindustrie A.G., Division "N"
Attention Dir. Dr. Fahrenhorst

Oppau.

Re: War Economy Central Office of the I.G. for all matters of
military economy and questions of military policy.

The Central Committee has determined to create an Agency (W) in our place of business in Berlin NW 7, Unter den Linden 78, in order to provide systematic co-operation within the I.G. in the current development of military economy, and particularly to assure central treatment of the questions of military economy, military policy and military technique. The work for Sparte I were already been started some time ago by Dr. Ritter.

From now on all correspondence - even about matters still in the balance - with the Reich Ministry of War and its offices, such as the Heereswaffenamt (Army Ordnance Office) etc., the Navy Office and its offices,

(Page 2 of original)

such as the General Naval Office etc., the Reich Air Ministry and its offices, such as Air-Command Office 3, the Experimental Station for Aviation, as well as the air raid protection, offices etc., further

with the appropriate central air raid protection office of the Reich Group Industry, and, for military economic questions, with the Reich Ministry for Economy also, is to be addressed exclusively to the Ermittlungsstelle (liaison agency) and a copy of the correspondence is to be included at all times.

Requests, and/or agreements about personal discussions at these places, or invitations to inspections or similar things, as well as ideas or proposals for military economic or military technical matters, are also to be addressed to this office. Vice versa, all questions concerning the I.G. shall from now on be passed on from these authorities to the liaison agency, from where they will be sent to the competent I.G. offices.

The liaison agency, in agreement with the Sparten leaders, will contact the individual works leaders directly in the near future, and, as far as this has not been done yet, prepare for co-operation with the Wirtschaftsinpektionen (economy inspections) and/or with the district economy officers of the competent spheres, and make investigations about the co-operation of the plants with the central authorities and the local offices in the field of military economy.

The liaison agency is authorized to inspect all relevant matters.

The liaison agency is ready to give any information about and make arrangements in military economic and military policy questions, which are part of its sphere of work and include the following:

- Investigations about production,
- Plans for production,
- Economic mobilization plans,
- Plans for the supply of raw material,
- Plans for storage,
- Questions of transport,
- Assuring the supply and/or movement of labor,
- Air raid protection-, counter espionage-, sabotage prevention,
- Patent questions.

The address of the liaison agency is: I.G. Farbenindustrie A.G.,
Vermittlungsstelle (W), Berlin NW 7, Unter den Linden 78.
Phone: A 2 Flora 0021.

(Page 3 of original)

We request that you inform those of your offices which are concerned confidentially about the contents of this letter.

I.G. Farbenindustrie A.G.

(signed): Krauch (signed): Fahrenhorst.

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION.

I, DOROTHEA L. GALEWSKI, WFO 34079, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document No. NI - 4702.

21 May 1947.

DOROTHEA L. GALEWSKI
WFO. 34079.

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT No. NI-4627
OFFICE OF CHIEF OF COUNSEL FOR WAR CRIMES

I.G. Farbenindustrie Aktiengesellschaft
Office of the Technical Committee

Frankfurt (Main) 20
26 Sept. 1935

Management Department
Leverkusen
28 Sept. 1935

Confidential

Plant.. Combine Oberrhein:	Herr Dir. Dr. W. Gaus, Ludwigshafen
Plant: Combine Mittelrhein:	Herr Dir. Dr. L. Hermann, Hoechst
	Herr Dr. C. Jacobi, Mannheim
Plants Combine Niederrhein:	Herr Dr. H. Kuehne, Leverkusen
	Herr Prof. Dr. Hoerlein, Elberfeld
	Herr Dir. Dr. J. Laux, Uerdingen
Plants Combine Mittelddeutschland:	Herr Dir. Dr. G. Pistor, Bitterfeld
Herr Director Dr. Gg. v. Schnitzler,	Frankfurt/Main
Herr Director E. Weber-Andreas,	Frankfurt/Main
Herr Director W.R. Mann,	Leverkusen

Subject: Central Office for all Questions concerning Military
Economy and Military Policies.

At its last meeting at our Berlin Business address, Unter den Linden, the Central Committee decided to create a Vermittlungsstelle (Liaison Office) to centralize the work dealing with all questions of military economy, military policy and of a military technical nature in connection with the planned development of the Military Economy (Wehrwirtschaft).

Herr Dr. Ritter, who has been working in Berlin for some time and has gotten in touch with all the military authorities concerned, has been appointed as head of Sparte I.

Herr Dr. G. v. Bruening will take over these tasks for Sparte II and will arrive in Berlin in the very near future. You will be notified by the Office of the Technical Committee as to the date when the Vermittlungsstelle will commence working. Details of its sphere of activity will be discussed at the next Sparte meeting to be held on 16 October.

Please communicate the contents of this letter confidentially to all offices concerned.

(Signature) Dr. ter Meer

Zw Amt
Received 7 Oct.

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

19 June 1947

I, VICTORIA ORTON, No. 20129, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages and that the above is a true and correct translation of the document No. NI-4627.

.....
VICTORIA ORTON, No. 20129.

-1-
"END"

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT No. NI-9261
OFFICE OF CHIEF OF COUNSEL FOR WAR CRIMES

AFFIDAVIT

I, Dr. Hans EICHLEDE, having been warned that I render myself liable to punishment for any false statement, hereby declare under oath, voluntarily and without coercion, as follows: -

The document NI-2747 (Vermittlungsstelle II) presented to me is the photocopy of an extract from the notes concerning the structure and the technical organization of the I. G., which I made in the years 1942 to 1944, on the instructions of Dr. STRUSS, Technical Committee (TEK-Buero) as co-worker of the I. G.

The notes made under NI-2747 were compiled by me on the basis of the files available in the Technical Committee (TEK-Buero), especially memoranda and correspondence and, as far as I remember, occasional personal communications from Dr. STRUSS.

I have carefully read the oath and signed with my own hand this one page of the Affidavit, have made the necessary corrections in my own handwriting and countersigned them with my initials and declare hereby under oath that I have told the absolute truth in this declaration to the best of my knowledge and belief.

Signature: Dr. HEINZ EICHLEDE

Sworn to and signed before me this 30th day of July 1947 at Nuremberg by Dr. Heinz EICHLEDE, known to me to be the person making the above affidavit.

Signature: Arthur T. COOPER
U. S. Civilian JG number D 434534
Interrogator, Office of Chief of
Counsel for War Crimes
U. S. War Department

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

8 August 1947

I, ANNE HURTIN, 00848, herewith certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of the document NI-9261.

ANNE HURTIN, 00848

END

24

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO. 100-277
OFFICE OF U.S. CHIEF OF COUNSEL FOR
WAR CRIMES

N o t e s

on the

Founding, Development, Organization, and Members of

TEA.- HAUPTGRUPPE 2,- and KOMMISSIONEN

of the I. G. Farbenindustry Co.

up to the end of 1943

- Volume I : Tea and Hauptgruppe 2.
Volume II : Kommissionen (also Farben Committee (Aus-
schuss) and Business Com-
mittee (Ausschuss))
Volume III : Personal Data.

Prepared
by order of Director Dr. Struss
by
Dr. Heinz EICHWEDE

V o l u m e I:

TEA and HAUPTGRUPPE 2

(Page 2 of original)

VERMITTLUNGSSTELLE W. (Military Liaison Office)

Since 1934 conferences and discussions with various military offices and authorities in Berlin became more and more numerous and urgent. During the conference of the central committee at Ludwigshafen on 2 September 1935, it was decided to create beginning the 1 October 1935, a liaison office W (=Wehrmacht) in Berlin which had to take over and to sustain the connection between the three main divisions (Sparten) of the I.G. and the military authorities. Dr. Krauch indicates in his letter to Dr. ter Meer of 5 September 1935 that main division I (Sparte I) was taken care of by Dr. Ritter and shortly thereafter also by Dr. Eckell. For Main Division 2 (Sparte 2) Dr. von Bruening, Hoechst, will be sent to the "central office for war-economical and war-political questions" (Zentralstelle für Wehrwirtschaftliche und Wehrpolitische Fragen). By Dr. Gajewski's letter to the plants of Main Division (Sparte 3) of November 1935, Dr. Meyer, Wolfen-Pil is appointed for this division. For reasons of efficiency, the office work of Vermittlungsstelle W, Main Division (Sparte) 3, is to be taken care of at Wolfen Film.

Circular, Frankfurt, 2 January 1936 (ter Meer-Selck) states that under the management of Dr. Morbeck a Department (Abteilung) A for counter-intelligence (espionage, sabotage, betrayal of working secrets (Betriebsgeheimnissen), etc.) located at Leverkusen, is attached to the Vermittlungsstelle. On 1 January 1944, part of the functions of this department A will be taken over by the today new-founded office A of the main counter intelligence commissioner (Hauptabwehrbeauftragten) of the I.G., Dir. Dr. Schneider, Leo or his deputies, Dr. Dyckmann (techn.)

Dr. von der Heyde or Dr. Ruediger (commercial) resp. The other defensive functions of Vermittlungsstelle W will be taken care of by the Berlin office (counter-intelligence commissioner (Abwehrbeauftragter) Dr. Diekmann, deputy Dr. Gorr.

As per letter of 30 June 1936, Dr. Ritter and Dr. Eckell will be replaced because of being charged with other duties (Dr. Eckell has transferred to Government service) by Dr. Diekmann and Dr. Pfandner for Main Division (Sparte) I and on 1 December 1936, Dr. von Bruening who will return to the Hoechst plant will be replaced by Dr. Gorr, Hoechst.

A letter of Dr. v. Schnitzler and Dr. Ilgner of 3 February 1938 to the Reich Ministry of Economic Affairs, the Prussian Ministry of Economic Affairs and the Reich Ministry of War expresses the following:

"For the treatment of questions and tasks related to war economy as far as all affairs of the individual I.G. works are concerned, the following offices will be destined: The Vermittlungsstelle W for control of raw material, planning and distribution of production, shipping and stockpiling of raw, intermediary and finished products as well as the service exemption of the necessary personnel, and the office of economic policy (Wirtschaftspolitische Abteilung), Berlin NW 7, for matters in the business sphere, e.g. personnel and requirements estimates within the country and abroad, increase of export, displacing of export, stockpiling of external stores, direction of sales, etc. Provisions have been made that in all matters of war economy close contact will exist between the Vermittlungsstelle W and the Department of Economic Policy (Wirtschaftspolitische Abteilung)"

From 1 October 1935 to 30 April 1937, the Vermittlungsstelle W was located in the administrative building of the Laenderbank, Berlin NW 7, Unter den Linden 78, in three, later on in 5 rooms, since 1 May 1937 in the building of Igerussko, Dorotheenstr. 34, in twelve, later on because of personnel increase and including of the offices of Oberingenieur Wolf (extension of Huels and Schopau) and Zeikra (traffic planning in case of "Mob") in 23 rooms. On 30 November 1939, the office moved to Berlin SW 68, Kochstrasse 73, with 37 rooms. Post office as before: Berlin NW 7.

Managers of the Vermittlungsstelle W have been:

	Main Division (Sparte) 1	Main Division (Sparte) 2	Main Div. (Sparte) 3
From 1 Oct. 1935	Dr. Ritter	Dr. v. Bruening	Dr. Meyer
" 9 May 1936	Dr. Diekmann	"	"
" 1 Apr. 1937	"	Dr. Gorr	"

Officially the gentlemen of Main Division (Sparte) 2 of the Vermittlungsstelle W were placed some time before the war under Tea-Buero Dr. Struss

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO. NI - 2747
(Cont'd)

State of Personnel

	Chemists			Engineers			Technicians			Commercial			Masc.	Fem.	Total
	Main Div.			Main Div.			Main Div.			Main Div.					
	Sparte			Sparte			Sparte			Sparte					
	1	2	3	1	2	3	1	2	3	1	2	3			
Oct. 35	2	1	1										1	1	6
31 Dec. 35	2	1	1										2	1	7
31 Dec. 36	2	2	1		1								2	2	10
31 Dec. 37	2	2	1		1					1			5	2	14
31 Dec. 38	2	3	1		1					1			7 *	3 **	18
31 Dec. 39	2	5	1								1		12 (2)	12 (1)	33 (3)
31 Dec. 40	3	5	1								1		13 (2)	22 (5)	45 (7)
31 Dec. 41	3	4	1								1		14 (3)	24 (5)	47 (8)
31 Dec. 42	3	5	1				1						14 (4)	25 (6)	47 (10)
31 Dec. 43	3	5	1		1		1						13 (6)	24 (4)	48 (10)

* - Inducted to military service

** - Attached to Vermittlungsstelle W. Ladies are employed at Departments Wolf (Huels/Sko.) Dr. Link (Reichs commissioner for dry ice) and I.G. long distance switch board - correspondence attached to office for lodging and care.

Correspondence:

Year	Receipt:				Dispatch:				TOTAL
	I.G.	Author-ities	Other firms	Sub Total	I.G.	Author-ities	Other firms	Sub Total	
1936	3.566	578	184	4.328	3.751	852	83	4.686	9,014
1937	5.395	1.966	160	8.541	5.555	1,420	120	7,095	15,636
1938	8.436	2.359	603	11.398	9.576	2,640	200	12,416	23,814
1939	16.375	3.935	1,531	21.841	13.784	3,827	576	18,187	40,028
1940	26.359	7.279	1,314	34.952	22.961	4,800	750	28,511	63,463
1941	33.768	7.611	1,331	42.710	24.599	5,550	302	30,451	73,161
1942	37.509	10.045	1,532	49,086	32.199	6,260	774	39,233	88,239
1943	33.023	8.217	1,512	42,579	30.047	7,372	265	37,684	80,263

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

I, JOHN J. BOLL, AGO No A-444412, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document No. NI - 2747.

JOHN J. BOLL
U.S. Civilian
AGO No A-444412

DOCUMENT NO. W I - 2638
OFFICE OF CHIEF OF COUNSEL FOR WAR CRIMES

AFFIDAVIT

I, Ernst STRUSS, Director of the Office of the Technical Committee of I.G. Farben, Secretary of the Technical Committee of the Vorstand of I.G. Farben, Chief of the Vermittlungsstelle W, Berlin, Sparte II and Production manager of the entire German Dye-stuff industry within the framework of the Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft Chemical Industry since 1943, after having been informed that I shall be liable to punishment if I make a false declaration, herewith state under oath, on my own free will and without coercion, the following:

The attached document entitled "Development of the Work of Vermittlungsstelle W", I-2638, dated "Berlin 31 December 1943" is a document coming from the files of I.G. Farben Industrie AG. and was drawn up by Dr. RITTER in collaboration with Professor KRAUCH. This document could only have been signed by Professor KRAUCH, as Dr. RITTER had no authority to sign.

I have carefully read and personally signed this one page of the affidavit. I have made the necessary corrections in my own handwriting and initialled them and declare herewith under oath, that I have stated the whole truth to the best of my knowledge and belief.

signed: Dr. ERNST A. STRUSS
Dr. Ernst A. Struss

Sworn to and signed before me this 22nd day of
July 1947 at by Dr. Ernst A. Struss,
known to me to be the person making the above
affidavit.

signed: William A. Acton

AGO No. D-417491
OFFICE OF CHIEF OF COUNSEL FOR WAR CRIMES
U.S. War Department

28a'

(TRANSLATOR'S NOTE: These excerpts are taken from the Kilgore Report, Part X, Chapter III, Exhibit 6, Page 1348)

(Translator's Note:
Handwritten initials: "F.A." and
"H.S.")

CONFIDENTIAL

I.G. Farbenindustrie Aktiengesellschaft
Liaison office W (Vermittlungsstelle W)

Berlin 31 December 1935

Development of the Work of the Liaison Office W (Vermittlungsstelle W)

With the creation of the Army, the German industry got the task to bring its plants and its organization in line with the building up of the defenses of the country, which means to reorganize its existing plants and offices from the point of view of the armament.

The newly founded Vermittlungsstelle W has as its task the simplifying and connecting up of those works inside of the I.G. The aim of this work is the building up of a tight organization for the armament in the I.G. which could be inserted without difficulty in the existing organization of the I.G. and the individual plants.

In the case of war, I.G. will be treated by the authorities concerned with armament questions as one big plant which in its task for the armament, as far as it is possible to do so from the technical point of view, will regulate itself without any organizational influence from outside.¹⁾

In close collaboration with the Minister of War, it was provided that the work of the I.G. should conform with the general development and in accordance with the rules given by the authorities with respect to its requirements.

In the Vermittlungsstelle W the work for armament of all the plants of the three divisions (Sparten) are joined. An agreement has been made with DAG (Dynamit Nobel) to the extent that DAG works together with the Vermittlungsstelle W only on supplies for raw material and planning works. Whereas questions dealing with the developmental work were not made by the Vermittlungsstelle W.

To the field of the work of the Vermittlungsstelle W belongs, besides the organizational set-up and long-range planning, the continuous collaboration with regard to the armament and technical questions with the authorities of the Reich and with the plants of the I.G.

A. Long-Range Planning

1.- Planning works for armament.

(a) Central office of the I.G. (Zentrale I.G. Stelle) (Division of Production) (Produktionsverteilung) - To secure in case of war, execution of production in the plants of the I.G., one must prepare an I.G. office, making use of the organizations of the different divisions and the existing

¹⁾ The work in this direction was in principle agreed upon with the Ministry of War (Reichskriegsministerium) (Wehrwirtschaftsamt) and from this office with the Ministry of Economy.

institutions which would act as connecting link of the government offices. The most suitable form for this organization should be found by practicing different schemes. Such a scheme, which should demonstrate the work of this contemplated office was in preparation for Division I (Sparte I) in the nitrogen field.

(b) Individual works of the I.G. (for the purpose of securing Production - To secure from the beginning the collation of all the armament and technical questions in the different works already during the time of the development a staff (Fuehrungstab) was appointed in each plant of the three divisions (Sparten). The same was provided for the commercial offices and the centralized administrations, although the most suitable form for these organizations will only be found after outbreak of war and by the experience gained in the war. This staff was set up in the different works in close connection with the existing organization of the plants. The manager of the plant should be in principle the man who is alone responsible for all the armament questions and questions connected therewith. The managers of the plants are to a great extent thoroughly familiar with the armament developments and working schemes were lined out as far as this was possible in the present state of development.

To prepare the members of the staff for the different decisions which must be taken in case of war it is necessary to exercise by means of technical planning games ("betriebstechnische Planspiele") in the plants. In these games all the possible disturbances and their effects on production of the works and further the respective measures which would have to be taken to secure the most important productions, should be taken into consideration.

These preparations can be made use of even in normal times, especially in cases of a catastrophe. The air-raid prevention organization recently formed should be taken into the new set-up for the prevention of catastrophe in the plants.

These measures adopted for the armament should lead to a uniform organization under the leadership of the plant manager in each of the I.G. works which connects all the armament and technical questions including protection against catastrophe and air raids and which can be used in normal times whenever any disturbances may occur in the plants.

3.- Working out of plans of mobilization.

The aim is to make up the plans for mobilization for all plants in close connection with the authorities concerned with the armament. These plans are worked out under the presumption that I.G. takes the necessary measures in its plants to execute their "Mob-orders". In cases concerned with the demand of raw material or finished products from outside the works and in questions of labor and transportation, each of the plants of the I.G. works just like every other industrial plant, with the organization offices of the government in their respective spots.

Attempts were made to find out the prospective particulars for the production of the different I.G. works in the case of war. Only in very few cases which dealt with especially important products for the war, one could get a certain picture of the necessary requirements. It will take a long time for the development work until one could see really clear as to the actual requirements in the case of war.

A scheme for mobilization for war (technical part) based on present recognitions, was set up, just as well as a scheme for the I.G. works (chemical industry). We can expect that the authorities will give, at a

later date only an indication for the execution of that part of the scheme which has purely the character of a timetable, the presumable structure of which was already taken into consideration.

B. Continuous accomplishment of the work.

The continuous developmental work in the field of armament and technical questions connected therewith is fixed and agreed upon (in further collaboration with the Vermittlungsstelle W.). Contact is made with most of the experts of the I.G. works and the governmental departments.

1) Developmental Work. - A big range of cases was already settled or is worked on.

2) Contract, licenses, and exchange of experiences. - On request of Dr. Krauch and Dr. von Knieriem, the Ministry of War created an office which deals for all the different parts of the army with the above questions. A few questions have already been taken up and cleared with this office.

3) Patent Questions and Secrecy - Induced by Dr. von Knieriem, the I.G. will take up all the questions concerned with patents in the armament field through the medium of Vermittlungsstelle W. The Vermittlungsstelle W has and will settle continuously those patent questions.

4) Visitations with government offices, inquiry in plants. - It was agreed with the plants that the Vermittlungsstelle W will be informed on announced visits or inquiries by government offices in order to be able to take part and evaluate the discussions. Some visits were initiated and evaluated.

5) Preventive measures against espionage and sabotage. - On recommendation of Professor Salck a "Department A" was created in the Vermittlungsstelle W which is at the disposition of all the I.G. offices for the different preventive measures and questions of the security service in the plants (manager: Kerbeck of Leverkusen). It was agreed with the Ministry of War that contrary to the general rules, exchange of experiences and assistance in these preventive measures inside the I.G. through the Vermittlungsstelle W can take place. A uniform evaluation and treatment if something comes up, is guaranteed herewith, and the plants which have nobody in charge of preventive measures, have the possibility of making use of the experiences made in the different plants of I. . for their own work and to settle the questions coming up in a proper way.

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

I, JOHN J. BOLL, AGO No. A-444412, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document No NI - 2638.

JOHN J. BOLL
U.S. Civilian
AGO No A-444412

AFFIDAVIT.

I, Dr. Guenther Gerr, chemist of the I. G. Farbenindustrie AG from 1926 until 1945, Prekursor of the I. G. Farbenindustrie AG since 1940 and member of the Vermittlungsstelle V since December 1936 and their manager for Sparte 2 since April 1937, present address Berlin-Charlottenburg, Preussen Allee 28, after having been warned that I shall be liable to punishment for making a false statement, herewith declare the following under oath of my own free will and without coercion:

1. In 1926 I entered the I.G. Farbenindustrie AG, Ludwigshafen-Oppeau plant as biochemist. I worked there until 1931, when I was transferred to Hoechst. In December 1936 I was transferred from Hoechst to the Vermittlungsstelle V in Berlin, where I finally took over the management of the matters of Sparte 2, after Dr. von Bruening had left.

2. On the basis of a conversation with my superior at that time, Dr. von Bruening, whom I succeeded in 1937, and on the basis of other, generally known facts, I can say the following about the fundamental idea which led to the founding of the Vermittlungsstelle V:

The general political and economic development in Germany showed that the economic policy in Germany would be influenced more and more by military economic ideas. In view of the fact that the I.G. Farben AG, although juridically a centrally controlled organization, on the other hand deliberately kept up the independence of the individual works, it seemed necessary to prevent the authorities in charge from contacting the individual works directly to an extent contrary to the interests of the I. G. For this

(page 2 of original)

reason the Vorstand of the I. G. thought it expedient to create an office which the central office in Berlin could consult on all technical questions, and which would be able to furnish the desired information. This was also to prevent the authorities, especially the Wehrmacht offices, from interfering too much with the internal structure of the I. G.

3. The tasks of the Vermittlungsstelle V were not exclusively liaison with the Wehrmacht offices, but also with the other central offices in Berlin which were engaged in economic technical questions. This holds true, above all, for liaison between the I. G. and the official agencies for the so-called Four Year Plan, as well as for the liaison between the I. G. and the Reich offices (Reichsstellen), especially Reich Office for Chemistry.

4. The Vermittlungsstelle V was organized according to the 3 production Sparten of the I. G. Since the last pre-war years the management of Sparte 1 within the Vermittlungsstelle V was in the hands of Dr. Diekmann, while I was in charge of Sparte 2 and Dr. Meyer of Sparte 3. All three of us had the same rights, each one of us had his own superior, i.e. the respective chief of the Sparte; Dr. Christian Schneider of Sparte 1, Dr. Fritz von Meer of Sparte 2 and Dr. Gajewski of Sparte 3.

(page 2 of original cont'd)

There was no close liaison between the three gentlemen of the Vorstand mentioned above and the Vermittlungsstelle W; in cases of doubt the representatives of the Vermittlungsstelle W usually contacted managers of the individual Sparten offices, i.e. Dr. Goldberg (Sparte 1), Dr. Struss (Sparte 2). The office of Sparte 3 was being taken care of by Dr. Moyer in addition to his work at the Vermittlungsstelle W. As far as I know Dr. Moyer discussed the matters concerning the Vermittlungsstelle W with Dr. Gajewski's deputy, Dr. Kleino, Wolfen-Film.

(page 3 of original)

The offices of the Vermittlungsstelle did not make any current reports to the Vorstand or to the office of the Technical Committee. I myself or Dr. Wagner as my deputy did, however, attend the so-called Monday meetings once every month at the office of the Technical Committee in Frankfurt/Main. During these Monday meetings, which were under the direction of Dr. Struss, questions - especially of a technical nature - were discussed. Besides the technicians from the office of the Technical Committee itself and the undersigned, members of the directorate departments of the large plants and occasionally experts in special fields attended the meetings. I myself sometimes reported on more important matters from the sphere of work within the Vermittlungsstelle W, particularly on changes in the organization of the authorities, the procurement of raw and building materials, questions pertaining to keeping matters in the field of patents secret etc.

5. The Vermittlungsstelle had the following tasks:

- a. to furnish the authorities mentioned above with information on all technical matters or questions of direct interest to the plants, in as far as it was possible to furnish such information from Berlin itself.
- b. to forward all inquiries by the authorities to the individual experts of the I. G. if information could not be given directly by the Vermittlungsstelle W.
- c. to centralize the developmental work which the authorities expected the I. G. to carry out. This was to prevent similar problems being dealt with by various offices within the I. G. without these offices realizing it, and therefore creating duplication of work.
- d. liaison in the collaboration between the I. G. and the Wehrmacht. It was only natural for the Wehrmacht to use the large research stations of the I. G. for working on a number of problems which were of special interest to the Wehrmacht. Consequently various military technical questions

(page 4 of original)

were dealt with by the research departments of the I. G. Since the competent experts of the I. G. often worked in close collaboration with the experts of the Wehrmacht developmental offices, this generally resulted in mutual stimulations. It is not easy to determine from which office the first suggestions originated. Without doubt the experts of the I. G. were often able, as a result of their greater chemical knowledge, to make suggestions to the Wehrmacht offices, which furthered the problems of the Wehrmacht which were of general interest. I suppose, now and then one or the other chemist of the I. G. has occasionally taken up a military technical problem on his own initiative which was then brought to the attention of the Wehrmacht.

This collaboration goes back to the time before I entered the Vermittlungsstelle W. We in the Vermittlungsstelle W were necessarily informed about these matters, mostly, however, only superficially. (Translator's note: the following lines were originally in the document, but afterwards deleted. "The negotiations on developmental work were often conducted via the Vermittlungsstelle W. We only learned afterwards that such negotiations had taken place").

e. Dr. Wagner dealt with incoming Wehrmacht orders, which also included orders for preliminary products of explosives and chemical warfare agents. (We did not manufacture explosives, that was done by the Dynamit AG). General orders date from the time of the founding of the Vermittlungsstelle W. (Translator's note: the following lines were originally in the document but afterwards deleted. "Orders for explosives and poison gases in small quantities date approx. from 1935/1936 - as is known to me since I entered the firm - when they were ordered as small samples, approx. a few kilograms".)

f. the centralized management of raw material allocations to the I. G., that is, on the one hand raw materials which were needed for manufacture itself, on the other hand, raw materials necessary for the expansion of the works' plants (building iron, wood, cement etc.). In this respect the activity of the Vermittlungsstelle W was of a purely general nature, as the documents pertaining to the raw materials requirements had to be worked out by the plants

(page 5 of original)

and were only forwarded via the Vermittlungsstelle W to the authorities concerned. The quotas for building materials were - as far as expansions within the Four Year Plan were concerned - laid down in most cases by the Reich Office for Economic Development (Reichsamt fuer Wirtschaftsausbau) or the office of the General Plenipotentiary for Chemistry respectively and, in as far as expansions were concerned which were of direct interest to the Wehrmacht (powder, explosives, chemical warfare agents etc.) were in most cases given by the competent Wehrmacht offices. The raw materials for the manufacture had to be applied for at the authorized Reich offices (Reichsstellen).

The centralized control of all patent questions of the I. G., in as far as patent applications had to be checked as to whether they had to be kept secret in accordance with official instructions. Which applications had to be submitted to the Wehrmacht offices to check whether they had to be kept secret, was decided by the patents departments of the individual plants. To ensure that even applications of which the military technical or military economic importance could

(page 5 of original cont'd)

not be recognized immediately, were submitted to the authorities, the Vermittlungsstelle W was eventually given a list of the formulation of requirements; it was only occasionally necessary to ask the plants to submit patent specifications which had not originally been suggested by the patent departments for checking as to whether or not they had to be kept secret. The Vermittlungsstelle W also occasionally negotiated, with regard to granting licenses to employ production processes to foreign interested parties, with the military economic staff and the Reich Air Ministry.

g. Centralized management of the so-called mobilization plans. After the authorities had ordered that the most important industrial enterprises prepare themselves, by compiling so-called mobilization plans, for a change-over of production, mobilization plans were also compiled for the plants of the I. G. Also with regard to these plans the individual plants of the I. G. were not supposed to negotiate independently with the authorities in Berlin. By calling in the Vermittlungsstelle W it was to be guaranteed that with regard to the mobilization plans uniform action would be taken by the individual I. G. plants. Consequently the blanks which were needed for the compilation of the mobilization plans were developed in conferences between the

(page 6 of original)

competent authorities (High Command of the Army, Reich Ministry of Economics, Reich Office (Reichsstelle) Chemistry and the Vermittlungsstelle W) and were forwarded - with uniform directives - to the plants to be dealt with by them. With regard to the mobilization plans it was also endeavored to maintain the internal plans, the technical and economic connexions between the individual I. G. plants, as much as possible, and to prevent the authorities from having too much insight and influence in the internal conditions of the I. G.

h. Uniform organization and handling of all precautions to be taken against possible air raids. As already stated with reference to the plants mentioned above, here, too, it was endeavored by the Vermittlungsstelle W to guarantee the uniformity of procedure in the individual works. In the middle of the Thirties so-called tactical exercises were conducted in individual plants for this purpose, at the suggestion of the authorities. During these tactical exercises at the "conference table" certain damage in the plants caused by air raids were chosen as starting point and the operational management was advised to make suggestions concerning a change-over of the production procedure with the aim of having the smallest possible loss in production and which would show a quick result.

i. Since 1943 the statistics concerning the movement of workers of all I. G. plants were kept for Krauch's office at the Vermittlungsstelle W. (Translator's note: the following lines were originally in the document, but afterwards deleted. "The Vermittlungsstelle W was the only department within the I. G. Konzern in which individual gentlemen, who did not hold a special position or a special title within the I. G. could give a binding signature in general correspondence".)

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT No. NI-7611
CONTINUED

(page 6 of original cont'd)

K. Centralized control of all measures for the prevention of espionage, sabotage etc. These matters were at first dealt with by an office at Leverkusen, which had formerly dealt exclusively with questions concerning the prevention of general civilian works espionage, the prevention of operational secrets being revealed to civilian interested parties and the following up of thefts (Eigentumsdelikte) within the I. G. This office was instructed to work on all measures ordered by the authorities for the prevention of

(page 7 of original)

enemy espionage, sabotage etc. in the central place and was regarded as a sub-department of the Vermittlungsstelle W in as far as it had to deal with this task.

At the end of 1939, after the Abwehr Office of the Supreme Command of the Wehrmacht had criticized the efficiency of this central Abwehr office within the Vermittlungsstelle W, the Vorstand of the I. G. decided, at the suggestion of the competent Wehrmacht offices, to set up an independent office of centralized work in regard to Abwehr, the so-called office A, under the management of Dr. Schneider, member of the Board Vorstand, which was to be competent not only for the plants taken care of by the Vermittlungsstelle W, but also for all commercial works.

I have carefully read each of the 7 (seven) pages of this affidavit and countersigned it with my own hand, have made the necessary correction in my own handwriting and initialled them, and I herewith declare under oath that I have stated the full truth in this affidavit to the best of my knowledge and belief.

(signature: Dr. Guenther Gerr
Dr. Guenther Gerr

Sworn to and signed before me this 3rd day of June 1947 at CCWC, Berlin, by Dr. Guenther Gerr, known to me to be the person making the above affidavit.

(signature: Peter H. MILLER
Peter H. MILLER
U. S. Civilian AG D 145 338
Office of Chief of Counsel
for War Crimes
U. S. War Department

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

7 August 1947
I, BRIGITTE TURK, ETC 35130, herewith certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of document No. NI-7611.

AFFIDAVIT

I, Dr. Hans WAGNER, born 9 July 1903 in Frankfurt/Main, chemist at I.G. Farbenindustrie A.G. from 1928 - 1945, member of "Vermittlungsstelle W", Berlin NW 7, at present resident in Stierstadt am Taunus, Untergasse 10, after having been warned that I render myself liable to punishment for any false statement, hereby declare under oath, voluntarily and without compulsion, as follows: -

1. In the year 1928, I entered the Hoechst Works as research chemist and remained there until the middle of February, 1938, when I was transferred to the "Vermittlungsstelle W" in Berlin. My personal records, however, at the request of Dr. TER MEER, were from that time on kept in Frankfurt. In "Vermittlungsstelle W", I took over the work concerning patent questions, principally for Sparte II and partly for Sparte I and III; also the development work and the supplies to the Wehrmacht within the province of Sparte II.

2. The administration of the "Vermittlungsstelle W" was conducted on a very special basis and consisted in a triple division of the management. The following table shows the structure of the "Vermittlungsstelle W": -

(page 2 of original)

Structure of "Vermittlungsstelle W"

Sparte	I	II	III
Member concerned in			
Verstand)	Dr. SCHNEIDER	Dr. ter MEER	Dr. GAWENSKI
Central Committee)			
Technical Committee)			
Chief of the Sparte Office	Dr. GOLDBERG	Dr. STRUSS	Dr. MEYER
Responsible official			
in "Vermittlungsstelle W"	Dr. DIERMANN	Dr. GORR	Dr. MEYER
Co-worker in			
"Vermittlungsstelle W"	Dr. PFUNDLER	Dr. WAGNER	_____
	Dr. DOELL	Dr. HANSEN	_____
	for the procurement of iron, steel, wood, cement and man-power for all 3 Sparten jointly:		
	Diplomingenieur NOLZE,		
	Dr. UNGER		

(page 2 of original cont'd)

Position as on 1 March 1945.

As it was not always possible for the gentlemen in "Vermittlungsstelle W" responsible for the 3 Sparten to discuss all questions with their respective superior Vorstand member, these discussions were mostly conducted with the chief of the Sparte office concerned, who, on his part, would discuss the most important points with the Vorstand member concerned. The division of work within the "Vermittlungsstelle W" during the years 1938-1945 was approximately as follows: -

Sparte I:

The management was in the hands of Dr. DIEMANN, the I.G. Procurist, who was also Abwehrbeauftragter (Security Officer) of the "Vermittlungsstelle W", deputy Central Security Officer for the entire I.G., and, since about 1942, honorary assistant in the office of Professor KRAUCH. Working together with him were Dr. PFAUNDLER, whose jurisdiction was principally for works air raid protection questions of all the Sparten and for measures for safeguarding the I.G. plants against air raid damage, and Dr. DOLL, who worked chiefly on production and

(page 3 of original)

supply questions of Sparte I.

Sparte II:

The management of Sparte II was in the hands of I.G. Procurist Dr. GORR, who at the same time was Deputy Security Officer of "Vermittlungsstelle W" and at times directed the Falkenhagen Works, also called "Seewerk" ("Lake works"). I worked under Dr. GORR as his deputy. My duties were, in the first place, the work on patent questions for Sparte II; besides that, I also worked generally on the patent questions of Sparte III and, since 1942, also those of Sparte I. Furthermore, I had to deal with the development work of Sparte I in connection with the Wehrmacht, as well as with the supplies to the Wehrmacht within the province of this Sparte. During the war, a man was detailed to Berlin to assist me who concerned himself mainly with synthetics. This work was carried out by the following men in turn: Dr. von ROESSEL, from Ludwigshafen, Dipl. Ing. KNEIP, from Uerdingen, Dr. HAGER from Hoechst and Dr. KOCH from Hoechst. Furthermore, Dr. LEISTER, of the Farbenfabrik Wolfen, was seconded to me from 1943 - 1945 specially for the work on dye problems.

The preparation of the allocation of raw materials and chemicals, as well as the conduct of negotiations with the Reich Office Chemistry (Reichsstelle Chemie) and the other Reich Offices in contract with the work of I.G., were carried out during the war by several men in turn: only one of whom worked in Berlin at any time. Before the war, the preparation of the Mob. Plan with the Reich Offices (Reichsstellen) concerned was also part of the

(page 3 of original cont'd)

duties of this working group. The names of the men employed on this were: Dipl. Ing. NEUMANN, from Uerdingen, up to the end of 1938, Dr. KAYSER, from Bitterfeld, up to 1941, Dr. HERMANN, from Hoechst, up to 1943 and Dr. HANSEN, from Leverkusen, up to the end of the war.

Sparte III:

The work of Sparte III for the "Vermittlungsstelle W" was carried out by Dr. MEYER of the Filmfabrik Wolfen, who had his office in Wolfen and in general only came to Berlin once a week.

(page 4 of original)

He was the chief in Wolfen of the so-called Economic Audit (Wirtschaftlichkeitsprüfung), which had the same functions as the Sparten Office III. This arrangement was as far as I know made because Dr. GAJEWSKI did not desire too strong an intervention on the part of the Vermittlungsstelle in the problems of his Sparte.

Up to 1943, Dipl. Kaufmann STRAESSLE was concerned with the procurement of iron, steel, wood and cement for all 3 Sparten together. From that time on, this work was carried out by Dipl. Ing. WOLZE and Dr. UNRUH, who both belonged to the Ludwigshafen Works; besides that, these gentlemen were also responsible for the procurement of man-power, or the keeping of statistics on the movement of man-power in the works.

Staff matters concerning the office personnel were handled by an office manager, who was a business man, and who also kept the day-book on incoming secret documents.

In effect, the three above-named gentlemen, who were Vorstand members, were, each in his own field, responsible for the acts, whether of commission or of omission, of "Vermittlungsstelle W".

3. With regard to Sparte II, it is to be remarked that Dr. TIERMLER concerned himself very little with the "Vermittlungsstelle W" and left the direction of "Vermittlungsstelle W" so far as it concerned Sparte II entirely in the hands of Dr. STRUSS who was the secretary of the Technical Committee.

4. The "Vermittlungsstelle W" was the only department in the I.G. Farben-Konzern where any individual having no special position or special title within the I.G. would sign general correspondence.

(page 4 of original cont'd)

5. Dr. STRUSS reported to the Technical Committee and, when necessary, Dr. TER MEER to the Vorstand, concerning the duties of Sparte II handled by the "Vermittlungsstelle W". As far as I know Dr. GOLDBERG gave the reports on Sparte I to the Technical Committee. Reports were mostly only made when some Vorstand member of the

(page 5 of original)

I.G. Farben had expressed his dissatisfaction with the Vermittlungsstelle; for example, if he considered that we had not handled his problems with sufficient energy.

6. In no case were written reports concerning the activities of "Vermittlungsstelle W" given, because we were prohibited by the Wehrmacht through the Abwehr (Counter-Intelligence) from making written reports, as secret problems were touched upon. Even the Counter-Intelligence Department of the Wehrmacht received no written reports.

We in Sparte II reported verbally to Dr. STRUSS about every 6 weeks. This was done mostly by Dr. GORR, or, in his absence, by myself. The opportunity was afforded by the so-called "Monday discussions" which were held in Frankfurt and which were unofficially called the "little TEA" (Technical Committee) by us. In these meetings we only reported when we were especially requested to do so by Dr. STRUSS, otherwise we informed him personally regarding our activities.

7. The object of these Monday-Discussions was to give the members of the Directorate-Departments of the works an insight into the matters which were discussed by the Vorstand and the Technical Committee so as to guarantee a uniform attitude in the various works. In my opinion, the same problems and lectures which were presented to the Technical Committee were repeated in the Monday-Discussions.

Questions concerning credits, allocations of man-power etc., that is, questions which affected the whole of I.G. and which had particularly to do with the internal affairs of I.G., were dealt with there. Secret matters were also discussed in these "little TEA-meetings", but only to a small extent, and the various men were then requested to refrain from reporting on them in their departments and works. As far as I know, the "little TEA" must have dated back to the year 1935 and its meetings were mostly held in Frankfurt a. Main, Grueneburg. The list of participants during my time was as follows:-

Dr. STRUSS, who acted as chairman, Dr. LOEHR of the Office of the Technical Committee, Dr. GIESLER, of the Office of the

(page 6 of original)

Technical Committee, Herr KOENIG, of the Office of the Technical Committee, Herr KROLIKOWSKI, of the Grueneburg Office, Dr. HIRSCHEL, of the Hoechst Directorate-Department, who was later replaced by Dr. LANGE of the Hoechst Directorate Department, Dr. von NAGEL of Ludwigshafen, Dr. FAGGE from the Farbenfabrik WOLFEN, Dr. WARNECKE of Leverkusen and Dr. WINGLER of Leverkusen, Dr. VORLAENDER of Bitterfeld, and Dr. GORR or myself from the "Vermittlungsstelle W", Berlin NW 7.

The abovenamed gentlemen were invited by name to these meetings by Dr. STRUSS, as he only wished to include a small circle. The leading gentlemen within the I.G. were aware that these meetings were held and that questions of all kinds were discussed, such as, for instance, questions regarding building material allocations to the works, the position concerning chemist personnel etc., besides technical questions.

On the occasion of the clearing of the credit grants Dr. STRUSS also reported on the figures of available man-power in these Monday-Discussions just as in TEA and in my opinion exactly the same tables and illustrations were used in these Monday-Discussions as had been used by the Technical Committee. There was also a lecture by Dr. FISFELD on the I.G. Works Auschwitz in these discussions.

8. I knew of the "Vermittlungsstelle W" and its activities since its beginning, as I had already been working on a commission from the Wehrmacht to the I.G.-Farben A.G. since August 1933 - namely on the production of artificial fog. The process for the production of artificial fog was made a secret Reich patent. The possibility of registering such secret patents in the Reich Patent Office had existed since the first World War, but after the end of the first World War was no longer used and was only resumed in the years 1933 to 1935, under HITLER's regime.

9. The duties of the "Vermittlungsstelle W" can best be divided into 3 categories, namely: -

1). Matters which were negotiated exclusively between official agencies and the "Vermittlungsstelle W".

(page 7 of original)

2). Matters which were only sometimes dealt with by the "Vermittlungsstelle W", as various members of I.G. preferred to take them up themselves with the agencies concerned.

3.) Matters which leading personalities of the I.G. themselves negotiated directly with the Reich agencies interested, and about which we only got to hear accidentally from the Reich agencies.

Category 1 included the following tasks:

(page 7 of original cont'd)

Submission of Patent applications to the Wehrmacht agencies for the purpose of checking the need for secrecy.

The procurement of approval of the Wehrmacht for the granting of licences abroad for products in which the Wehrmacht was interested.

Negotiations with the Reich Group Industry under the key word "Industrie Verschleppung" (Removal of industrial potential from Germany).

Receipt of orders from the Wehrmacht for supply of current products from the manufacturing program of the I.G. Transmission of the tender and of the accounts for such deliveries to the Wehrmacht. This also includes orders for the stockpiling of products.

Offers of the I.G. to the Wehrmacht for new products or processes developed by it.

Inquiries from the Wehrmacht regarding the possibility of development or production of products or implements desired by them for special purposes.

Working out of MOB-plans as required by the Wehrmacht and the Reich Office Chemistry.

Allocation of chemical raw materials and manufactured products.

Procurement of building materials such as iron, steel, wood and cement, required for new building projects and works extensions.

Keeping of labour statistics for the KRAUCH Office and applications for man-power at this agency.

General liaison agency of the I.G. with all the highest Reich authorities in Berlin.

Negotiation with the Supreme Command of the Wehrmacht for the exemption from military service (U.k.-Stellung) of chemists and scientists indispensable for the I.G., in so far as the individual works had not been able to secure this exemption

(page 8 of original)

for them from their local Armament Detachment (Ruestungskommando).

(page 8 of original cont'd)

Category 2:

This included in general the task of arranging the necessary appointments with the Wehrmacht agencies for any one who wished to submit to them new problems or solutions to problems. For reasons of special secrecy, we then usually had no further information on the progress of the matter.

The "Vermittlungsstelle W" was not even always informed of the work within the I.G. which formed the centre of interest of the Vorstand and the scientific laboratories, the gentlemen concerned preferring mostly to report to the Reich or Wehrmacht agencies themselves.

Category 3:

In the first place this category included the experiments which were part of the project of Professor HOFMEIER, Dr. SCHRAEDER and Dr. AMROS, and about which we only learned anything by chance. It further included the experiments made by Professor LAUTENSCHLAGER together with Professor ROSTOCK for the production of Penicillin in the Hoechst Works. Reports regarding these experiments were also not sent to us, but were despatched directly to the I.G. members concerned.

10. I think it is correct to say of the year 1939 that 30 - 40% of all problems with which the "Vermittlungsstelle W" was occupied and which it discussed with the Wehrmacht originated with the I.G. and only 10 - 20% arose as a result of the direct requests of the Wehrmacht; the remainder consisted of purely civilian problems.

I have carefully read each of the 8 (eight) pages of this Affidavit and countersigned them in my own handwriting and have made

(page 9 of original)

the necessary corrections in my own handwriting and countersigned them with my initials and hereby declare under oath that in this statement I have told the absolute truth according to the best of my knowledge and belief.

(Signature) Dr. Hans WAGNER
(Signature)

Sworn to and signed before me this 11th day of June 1947 at Nuremberg by Dr. Hans WAGNER, known to me to be the person making the above affidavit.

(Signature) Peter H. MILLER
Peter H. MILLER
U.S. Civilian AGO D 145338
Office of Chief of Council
for War Crimes
U.S. War Department.

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT No. NI-8923
CONTINUED

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

11 July 1947

I, Dorothea L. GALEWSKI, ETO 34079, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages and that the above is a true and correct translation of the original document No. NI-8923.

Dorothea L. GALEWSKI
ETO 34079.

AFFIDAVIT

I, Dr. ERNST STRUSS, Director of I.G. Farben, Chief of TEA Bureau of I.G., Secretary of the Technical Committee of the Vorstand of I.G., Manager of Division II (Sparte II) of the Vermittlungsstelle W, and, since 1943, Production Manager of the entire German dyestuffs industry within the framework of the Economic Group Chemical Industry, after having first been warned that I will be liable for punishment for making a false statement, state herewith under oath, of my own free will and without coercion, the following:

Since 1934 conferences and discussions with various military offices and authorities in Berlin became more and more numerous and urgent. In order to create a permanent liaison between I.G. Farben and the military, the Vermittlungsstelle W (Military Liaison Agency) was established on the initiative of Prof. Carl Krauch at the conference of the Central Committee in Ludwigshafen on September 2, 1935. The Vermittlungsstelle W started operations on October 1, 1935.

Prof. Krauch was in charge of the Vermittlungsstelle W.

The heads of Sparte I (Division I) in the Vermittlungsstelle W were Dr. Ritter and later on Dieckman. Members were Dr. Eckel and Mr. Pfaundler.

The head of Division II was Dr. von Bruening until 1936 and from then on Dr. Gorr.

Dr. Hozer was in charge of Division III.

At first the Vermittlungsstelle W occupied itself entirely with war problems. It coordinated the work of the I.G. plants with the general mobilization plan and had

detailed plans worked out for each plant for war production and mobilization. These mobilization plans were to come into effect with the outbreak of war. They were first drafted in the year 1935 and from then on they were set up from year to year. The instructions for preparing these production plans in case of war came from Dr. Ungewitter, head of the Reichsstelle Chemie, who in turn received his orders from the Ministries of War and Economics.

After each plant of the I.G. had prepared its own production plan for war it submitted the plan to Dr. Ungewitter.

Furthermore the Vermittlungsstelle W discussed with the military agencies the experiments in I.G. Farben laboratories for the development and production of weapons. It also handled, through Dr. Wagner, all secret inquiries about orders and research and other work in connection with the armed forces. Dr. Wagner was not allowed to inform even me about his work. The Vermittlungsstelle also devised and enforced drastic security measures for keeping secret such matters as production, patents and research in all matters connected with the military including poison gas production.

Since January 1936 a special department for counter-intelligence service, defense against spying, sabotage and betrayal of working secrets was incorporated into the Vermittlungsstelle W. Finally the Vermittlungsstelle W arranged for and supervised the planned exercises (Plan-Spiele) which were held in order to visualize the effect of bombing on I.G. plants and to afford training to the German Air Force.

These "Plan-Spiele" were inaugurated by Dr. Ritter either on his own initiative or at the direct instruction of Krauch. They were set up the following way: On a map of a particular

plant, an umpire marked the points where bombs of a certain weight were supposed to have been dropped by the attacking air force. The Works Management which operated in an air raid shelter ascertained the imaginary damage done by the bombs and figured out for what length of time parts of the plant had been put out of operation. The management itself also ascertained within which period of time the damage could be repaired.

At the conclusion of each "Plan-Spiel" it was discussed between the I.G. representatives and the military which measure should be taken by I.G. to afford additional protection from the air to the particular plant. It was as a result of one of these discussions that the gasoline production in the I.G. plant Leuna was split up in 5 or 6 different units which could work independently of each other in case one of them was hit by a bomb. As far as I remember I.G. Farben spent an amount of several million marks in order to effect the necessary changes.

Such "Plan-Spiele" were held in Leuna, Ludwigshafen-Oppau and in Leverkusen. They were always held in the presence of a number of high-ranking officers of the Luftwaffe, artillery and infantry and representatives of various authorities.

In 1936 the Office for German Raw and Basic Materials (Amt fuer Deutsche Roh- und Werkstoffe) later on renamed Reichs Office for Economical Development (Reichsamt fuer Wirtschaftsausbau), was formed by the German government. Prof. Krauch who was appointed to this office remained at the same time in charge of the Vermittlungsstelle W. He drafted at once the members of Divisions I and subsequently a number of other members of the Vermittlungsstelle into his new office.

After the representatives of the armed forces became acquainted with the technical experts of the different plants they contacted these experts directly without using the services of the Vermittlungsstelle W.

The main activity of the Vermittlungsstelle during the last years of the war was to work in close cooperation with a number of governmental or semi-governmental agencies.

I have carefully read each of the five pages of this declaration and have signed them personally. I have made the necessary corrections in my own handwriting and initialed them and I declare herewith under oath that I have given the pure truth to the best of my knowledge and conscience.

gez.: Dr. Ernst A. Struss

DR. ERNST STRUSS

Sworn to and signed before me this 30 day of Maerz 1947 at Frankfurt/Main by Dr. ERNST STRUSS known to me to be the person making the above statement.

gez.: Otto Heilbrunn

DR. OTTO HEILBRUNN
Civilian, ETO 30140
Office of Chief of Counsel
for War Crimes
U.S. War Department

" A CERTIFIED TRUE COPY "

- 4 -

E N D

OFFICE OF U S CHIEF OF COUNSEL
TRANSLATION OF DOC. NO. 2276-PS

From p. 55 of "Die deutsche Arbeitsfront. Wesen - Ziel - Wege", issued by the Scientific Labor Institute of the German Labor Front. Published by the Publishing House of the German Labor Front, 1943.

During the years from 1933 to 1939 everything necessary had been done in secrecy (in aller Stille) that seemed necessary to the conservation of the nation in the anticipated clash with an envious surrounding world. As always when taking precautionary defensive measures on a newly-won field, it was not possible here either to plan in a way that would be satisfactory. It was necessary to check what was on hand, and build with that the most essential and the momentarily most useful. It could not be obviated that the result, measured with the yardstick of what had been planned for the future, would appear modest and perhaps even inadequate.

It has not always been simple for those charged with practical social work to satisfactorily master the juxtaposition of old, scantily mended institutions and new ones. But certainly it was even more difficult for the biggest part of the people to see how the effort supported by it was, year after year, applied to tasks which initially necessitated renunciation after renunciation. After all it seemed like a small matter to apply the energies released by the National Socialist revolution to the improvement of social conditions desired for so long. Instead the leadership chosen by the people and over again confirmed by it, channeled all its strength into armaments (Wehrhaftigkeit). And - won the consent especially of those sections of the people who had had to suffer most from social conditions prevailing up to then.

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO. 2276-PS

23 October 1945.

I, FRED NIEBERGALL, 2nd Lt., Inf., O-133 55 67, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the German and English languages; and that the above is a correct and true translation of Document No. 2276-PS.

FRED NIEBERGALL,
2nd Lt., Inf.,
O-133 55 67.

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT No. EC-223
OFFICE OF CHIEF OF COUNSEL FOR WAR CRIMES

I.G. Farbenindustrie A.G.
Vermittlungsstelle W

Berlin NW 7
Unter den Linden 82
A 2 Floor 0021

Reich War Ministry
Wehrwirtschaftsstab (Military Economics Staff)
Attention Dr. Strommenger
B e r l i n 1 3 5
Tirpitzufer 72/76

(Transl's note: Receipt
stamp:)

: WStB :
: 9 July 1937 :
: No. 1065/379 Encl. 2 :

Berlin, 8 July 1937.

Our Ref: (Quote in reply) Dr. Di./Sch/

Re: Conference on Motor Fuel and Lubricants.

Enclosed please find:

- 1) Directions for maintaining the secrecy of processes, patents and "know-how" of the chemical industry, dated 4 Dec. 1936.
- 2) Instructions concerning intelligence in I.G. Farbenindustrie A.G. dated 12 March 1937.

Both these enclosures were at the time sent to all I.G. Offices concerned, i.e. works-management, department- or laboratory chiefs, legal departments, patent departments etc.; all these departments have been advised to adhere to these instructions. The instructions themselves have been discussed and accepted at various times by the Military Economics Staff of the Reich War Ministry, Reg. Brurat LEHMANN, as well as by the intelligence Dept. of the Reich War Ministry, Col. HENCKE.

It is recommended that both these enclosures serve as a basis for the conference with the Military Economics Staff of the Reich War Ministry concerning fuel and lubricant questions that you intend to hold on 13 July 1937.

Heil Hitler!
Vermittlungsstelle W

(signature) DICKMANN

2 enclosures.

REGISTERED.

(Transl's note: Handwritten note:

- 1) 3 d.A. Lob 24 a
maintenance of secrecy
intelligence etc.)

(Page 2 of original)

I.G. Farbenindustrie A.G.
Vermittlungsstelle W.

Confidential

4 December 1936

Instructions for maintenance of secrecy for processes, patents
and "Know-How" of the Chemical Industry.

The increasing importance of military economy has caused the Government to issue new and stricter directives about keeping secret important military economic matters. (See enclosed 3 pages of penal regulations).

Up to date, it has been impossible to get official directives which specify the products, processes and installations to be kept secret in the field of the chemical industry. Up to now, the responsibility for the right procedure has been exclusively that of the industry, which in case of doubt had to consult the Reich War Ministry.

From the experience acquired by the Vermittlungsstelle W of I.G. Farben during the last year in their contact with various authorities, the following approximate directions for the internal sphere of I.G. can be given:

In principle, the authorities (Reich War Ministry) order that such processes, patents and "know-how" which concern the production and use of materials of war-and armament -importance, should be kept secret. This specification also includes such products as are furnished by industry as finished goods immediately to the army, such as implements or war, explosives, war gases, special motor fuels and lubricants, as well as such materials as are important raw-materials and preliminary products for the production of the above-mentioned finished goods.

The keeping secret of new methods in the above mentioned fields is necessary in any case, if either completely new, up to now unknown materials are produced, or if already-known products can be manufactured in considerably improved quality. Furthermore, a new method could be subject to secrecy if through it the self-sufficient military economic power of a possible enemy in case of war were considerably improved; i.e. if an existing lack of raw material for the production of a war-important product in the country concerned is removed by the new methods.

(transl's note: stamp and hand-
written note: Encl. to No. 1065/27
Rv.)

(Page 3 of original)

In all such cases, the procedure is to be kept secret and, it has to be decided together with the authorities whether and to what extent the process can be released for open production. The obligation for secrecy applies for patent applications which in case of secrecy cannot be made as well as for processes which

can no longer be patented, and for "know-how" about specific methods of already known processes. The obligation for secrecy also includes unfinished processes, where it cannot yet be foreseen whether in their further development the above characteristic will appear.

The decision as to whether secrecy is necessary or not will be a matter for the authorities via the Vermittlungsstelle W. It has been proved unsuitable to contact directly the various Army Ordnance Offices which are interested in the procedure concerned, but in such cases the Military Economics Staff of the Reich War Ministry should be consulted. This office is competent for all sections of the Wehrmacht and consults the various Ordnance Offices of the Army, Air Force and Navy, which are always only competent in their own fields on request.

The decisions of the Military Economics Staff also take into consideration the interests of National defence as well as the economic interests of the industry. If a new process or a new product is declared as secret, it does not prevent us from applying for open treatment again later on if we justify it.

Procedures, which:

Do not contain any new material of war-importance, do not contain any improvement of the quality of any war important material do not change considerably the basis of raw material in war-important material

but which concern only a more economical production of war materials, are in general not subject to secrecy.

(Page 4 of original)

This concerns especially the preliminary resp. the intermediate products for war materials.

It can however also become necessary for purely economic improvements to be declared secret as regards foreign countries, if these methods cause a considerable saving of labor and through the release of a certain amount of workers (i.e. several thousands) the military economic power of a country is increased.

Signed: DICKMANN.

Re: Intelligence.

Confidential.

The increasing cooperation of various I.G.-offices with parts of the Wehrmacht and with other state organizations makes it necessary with a view to the intensified regulations of the law about treason, to refer to the following points:

I. Secret patents (Par. 8 of the patent law of 5 June 1936.)

By notification from the Wehrmacht that a patent application is subject to secrecy, this patent registration and the compositions, files belonging to it etc. become a State secret

according to Par. 38 Str. 6B (of the penal code); the secrecy of which patents is "in the interest of the National Defence" and which are to be protected as regards intelligence.

Therefore the works intelligence agent is to be informed by an official of the patent office responsible for this of such processes which are of the subject to secrecy; in this, the inventor and other persons having knowledge the secret are to be registered by name.

The intelligence agent has to see to it that everybody concerned is sworn to secrecy and that the documents and other reference material concerning the process are kept securely.

In general, it is however not sufficient to wait for instructions from the Wehrmacht, as the time from the beginning of the work to the application to the Reich Patent Office and the declaration of secrecy by the Reich War Ministry may be very long. As a precaution the maintenance of secrecy should not only be confined to keeping as a plant secret but more extensively, as a state secret in the sense of para. 62 of the Penal Code,

(Page 5 of original)

with regard to all such work as may be considered for patent application. This should be observed as soon as it is possible to judge, either from past experience or as probable, that the Wehrmacht may possibly issue notification for maintenance of secrecy - this should already be applied to all the preliminary work (experiments, negotiations, reports and other reference material etc) so that later on no justified reproach of negligence can be made. Accordingly, these security measures have also to be taken with regard to inventions and compositions which are not to lead to a patent registration or which are not patentable.

As the fields of work covered by this cannot be specified in general, it will be a matter for the plant officials to find them out in joint conferences with the scientific laboratory, the plant managers in question, patent department and with the intelligence agent. In cases of doubt, our "Vermittlungstelle" is available for giving information.

If the Wehrmacht contrary to expectation declares Para 1 an application which I.G. had not considered to be required to be kept secret, the security measures must be taken later on.

Should the notification by the Wehrmacht according to Para 1 not be made, the special obligation for maintenance of secrecy again becomes unnecessary.

II. Experimental and development-work for the Wehrmacht.

All persons working together with Wehrmacht offices on the development of new materials and processes which are of importance to national defence, have to be informed in every case about the secret character of their work. In this matter there can also be a question of some state secrets, the maintenance of secrecy of which is necessary in the interest of national defence (Para 33 Penal Code) The fact alone that there is collaboration with Wehrmacht offices and the fact that work is being done in a specific

field, can be such a state secret.

On various occasions it has been proved that officers of the Wehrmacht consider it a matter of course that I.G. officials dealing with the matters concerned are sworn to secrecy; although our chemists and engineers

(Page 6 of original)

had no real idea about the necessity for maintaining secrecy about the information they received and about their legal obligation for secrecy.

III. Planning work.

Of late, the planning work of I.G. offices for the Wehrmacht and for the Reich Economics Ministry (economic mobilization) as well as for the Office for German Raw and Synthetic Materials (Four Year Plan) has taken on greater proportions. This planning work also often brings with it information, which demands the same secret handling as direct Wehrmacht questions; here too, the persons of the various works who negotiate in or cooperate the matter concerned have to be informed as regards intelligence about the confidential character of the information they received.

IV. Security Measures.

In the three previously mentioned fields processes subject to secrecy are concerned of which the intelligence agents must absolutely be informed. In works with special intelligence agents, the intelligence measures have to be taken by them, whereas for the other I.G. works and I.G. offices, this will be a matter for the intelligence agent of "Vermittlungsstelle W", Department A, to deal with separately, in agreement with the various works.

Apart from other intelligence measures, general instruction of I.G. members who are active on inventions or in work spheres described under 1-3, will be advisable. This instruction must include the present regulations of the law, especially Para. 88, Penal code on State secrets (as opposed to the general office - and plant secret), criminal negligence and the law for the amendment of the Penal Code of 2 July 1936, re Para 353 b and 353 c of the Penal Code concerning persons to whom the pledge applies particularly.

(Page 7 of original)

These instructions can be given by the intelligence agent or by his deputy in the form of short repeated lectures and instructions.

These precautions are not only necessary for efficient protection against espionage and treason but also, according to our own experiences, for the protection of the I.G. members concerned against eventual legal prosecution for negligence.

12 March 1937.

I, DOROTHEA L. GALENSKI, MP 34079, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document EC-223.

END

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT No. NI-4979
OFFICE OF CHIEF OF COUNSEL FOR WAR CRIMES

Confidential

I.G. FARBENINDUSTRIE AKTIENGESELLSCHAFT

Frankfurt/Main
2 January 1936

Herrn Director	Dr. Schneider	Louna-Werke
"	" " " " " " " " " " " "	Wolfen N-Department
"	Dr. Staib	Frankfurt-Hoechst N-Department
"	Dr. Laug	Bitterfeld
"	Berkwerksdr. Dr. Scharf	Halle
"	Assessor Stein	
"	Gew. August Viktoria	Huels, Krs. Rocklinghausen
"	Dir. Dr. Oster; Abt. Badammen,	Berlin NW.7
"	" " Hanser, " " " " " "	" " "
"	" " Baacke " " " " " "	" " "
"	" " Dr. Fischer	" " "
"	" " Dr. Fahrenhorst	Oppau
"	" " Dr. Bachmann	Knapsack

Herrn Director	Dr. Gaus	Ludwigshafen (Betriebsgem. Oberrhein)
"	" " " " " " " " " " " "	Hoechst) (Betriebsgem. Griesheim) Mittelrhein)
"	Dr. L. Hermann	Leverkusen)
"	Dr. C. Jacobi	Elberfeld) (Betriebsgem. Uerdingen) Niederrhein)
"	Dr. H. Kuehne	Bitterfeld
"	Professor Dr. Hoerlein	(Betriebsgem. Mitteld.)
"	Director Dr. Laux	Frankfurt/M.
"	" " " " " " " " " " " "	" "
"	Dr. Pister	Leverkusen
"	" " " " " " " " " " " "	
"	Dr. v. Schnitzler	
"	" " " " " " " " " " " "	
"	Heber-Andreac	
"	W.R. Mann	

Herrn Director	Otto	Berlin
"	Dr. Esselmann	Wolfen
"	" " " " " " " " " " " "	Wolfen
"	" " " " " " " " " " " "	Wolfen
"	Dr. Osterburg	Rottweil
"	" " " " " " " " " " " "	Rottweil
"	Eble	Bobingen
"	" " " " " " " " " " " "	Premnitz
"	Kaempfe	Lichtenberg
"	Zetzsche	Dormagen
"	Huber	Dormagen
"	" " " " " " " " " " " "	Muenchen.
"	Harz	Bilenburg
"	Hofmann	
"	Linge	
"	Gausten	

Herrn Director	Dr. v. Knieriem	Ludwigshafen
"	" " " " " " " " " " " "	Frankfurt/M.
"	" " " " " " " " " " " "	Leverkusen
"	" " " " " " " " " " " "	Berlin SO. 36

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(Page 2 of the original)

Subject: "Vermittlungsstelle W" (Information Center W).

- 1) In addition to the circulars concerning the creation of the "Vermittlungsstelle W" in Berlin, we inform you that we have annexed to this office a Section A for counter intelligence matters (against espionage and sabotage). Mr. MERBECK is put in charge of this section.
- 2) Special counter intelligence agents (Abwb.) have been appointed in certain I.G. plants. The counter intelligence agents together with the competent local authorities and counter intelligence agencies handle under their own responsibility counter intelligence cases arising in their respective plants.
Owing to a directive that these counter intelligence agents are to keep secret from other I.G. agencies all counter intelligence matters, it has been agreed upon with the Reich War Ministry, in order to support and further this counter intelligence work, that, within the I.G., the plant counter intelligence agents may exchange information and experiences with the head and counter intelligence agent of Section A in a manner stated hereafter.
According to this, the plant counter intelligence agents are to report to Section A on all espionage and sabotage matters, in order to support the handling of the case on the basis of material assembled at the central registry (Leverkusen). This report will be withheld only if, in exceptional cases, the local military counter intelligence office, on its own initiative, decides otherwise.
The counter intelligence agencies have been informed of this regulation by the Reich War Ministry.
- 3) In I.G. plants or other I.G. agencies which do not have a counter intelligence agent, any espionage or sabotage cases will be handled in accordance with a special regulation which will be agreed upon by the Head of Section A together with these I.G. plants and agencies.

(Page 3 of the original)

In any case, these I.G. plants and I.G. agencies will report immediately to Section A, as in Art. 2).

- 4) In view of the future war economy development, Section A is at the disposal of all I.G. plants and I.G. agencies for any information in counter intelligence and security matters and will take care, if necessary, that information be exchanged.
The head of Section A is the counter intelligence agent for general counter intelligence matters of the I.G. and for such matters as do not concern individual I.G. works, or I.G. works and I.G. agencies for which no counter intelligence agents have been appointed, and for special cases.
- 5) Correspondence with Section A.
 - a) The general mail will be addressed to:

I.G.Farbenindustrie Aktiengesellschaft
Vermittlungsstelle W
Berlin NW 7, Unter den Linden 78,
(inside envelope: Section A, Mr. Morbeck or his deputy)

- b) In urgent cases which may need immediate handling based on the counter intelligence records (in Leverkusen), including all cases of espionage and sabotage suspects, the mail will be addressed to:

I.G.Farbenindustrie Aktiengesellschaft
Vermittlungsstelle W
Leverkusen - I.G.Werk
(inside envelope: Section A, Mr. Morbeck or his deputy)

- c) The following mailing regulation issued by official authorities applies to counter intelligence matters:
All documents must be marked "confidential" (that is, if addressed to the authority the same meaning as "secret"). They are only to be sent "registered" in double envelopes.

(Page 4 of the original)

The outer envelope must bear only: "Registered" Vermittlungsstelle W...., and not "secret", "confidential", "personal", etc.

The inner envelope which is to be pasted to the inner back side of the outer envelope, will be addressed:
"Section A, Mr. Morbeck or his deputy".

The inner address is to be written with an ink-pencil if possible. If letters are of particular importance, receipt will be acknowledged to the dispatcher by simple letter.

- 6) The I.G. Security Central Office in Leverkusen will continue to operate in accordance with the general directive of 13/4/1935 of the Reich Ministry of Justice "Directives for criminal procedures", that is for illicit shifting etc., (formerly unauthorized export), falsification of goods and betrayal of business and factory secrets, which are to be prosecuted in accordance with Art.17, 18 and 20 U.W.G., and any other incidents so far handled together with this central agency.

I.G.FARBENINDUSTRIE AKTIENGESELLSCHAFT.
(signatures)

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

I, Dr. HORN, Civ.20004, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document No.NI-4979.

Dr. HORN,
Civ. 20004.

END

Confidential

I.G. Farben A.G.
Vermittlungsstelle W
Berlin NW 7
Unter den Linden 78
A 2 Flora 0021

Berlin NW 7
Unter den Linden 78

Subject: Works Leverkusen

Statement.

On 29 October 1935 the undersigned were made acquainted with the details of the military economic organization in course of formation and the questions and tasks connected therewith.

The undersigned declare to the Vermittlungsstelle W

that they are aware of the need for secrecy and of the confidential nature of the questions under discussion,

and that the measures termed as confidential will only be passed on by them to people designated for this purpose and that they

will treat as secret all matters which are considered secret in accordance with Articles 98 et seqq. (Treason) of the Reich Law Gazette, part I, No. 47, page 341 of the Reich Penal Code, and that they

will ensure their safe keeping.

Leverkusen, February 1936

Director Dr. Kuehne

signature Dr. Hans Kuehne

Director Dr. Stange

signature Dr. Stange

Dr. Thionemann

signature Dr. Thionemann

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

2 June 1947

I, Arthur MACNAMARA, Civ. No. 20 191, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages and that the above is a true and correct translation of the document No. NI-4678.

.....
Arthur MACNAMARA, Civ. No. 20 191

WED

12

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT No. HI-8466
OFFICE OF CHIEF OF COUNSEL FOR
WAR CRIMES

I.G. Farbenindustrie Aktiengesellschaft
Vermittlungsstelle W, Department A

Berlin-NW. - 7, - Unter den Linden 78 -
(subsequently crossed out)
Leverkusen - I.G. Plant,
18 August 1936.

Our reference: III/2a III/5b

Registered Letter - Confidential.
(Receipt form enclosed)

To

Subject: Restriction of statistical publications.

Various I.G. plants have been informed confidentially by the District Economic Chambers (Bezirkswirtschaftskammern) of a note from the Reichsgruppe Industrie, dated 30 June 1936 - Journal No. 172 - and from the Reich Economic Chamber (Reichswirtschaftskammer) dated 25 May 1936 - No. 90/36. This note deals with a Decree of the Minister of Economics for the Reich and for Prussia, dated 15 May 1936 - AK 2 A/3624/36 -a- (secret).

A copy of the note from the Reich Economic Chamber dated 25 May 1936 No. 90/36, is attached.

The contents of this decree coincide in general with the methods which have already been adopted throughout I.G.

In the last paragraph of the above decree it is requested that in cases of doubt all publication

(page 2 of original)

be refrained from or that the matters intended for publication be submitted for examination to a "referent" who will be assigned to every District Economic Chamber.

Such a submission does not refer to the I.G. Plants and the I.G. Offices, since, according to the circular of the I.G. Farbenindustrie Aktiengesellschaft, Frankfurt/Main, dated 2 January 1936, concerning establishment of Department A, and according to agreements with the Reich War Ministry on which that circular is based, Department A of the Vermittlungsstelle W is to be consulted in such matters, as has indeed been the practice hitherto.

In connection with this, reference is made to a note dated 17 June 1936 - III/2a - III/5b - concerning security and propaganda. This note is attached for issue to those I.G. Plants and Offices which have not received it so far.

N.D.:

Circular dated 17 June 1936 III/2a III/5b

is attached.

has-already-been-submitted. (subsequently crossed out.)

(page 3 of original)

C O P Y

of the letter from the Reich Chamber of Economics dated
25 May 1936, No. 90/36

At the request of the Minister of Economics for the Reich and for Prussia we herewith inform you confidentially of the decree of the Minister of Economics for the Reich and for Prussia:

initial

" The regulations concerning high treason according to the Law modifying the provisions of the criminal law, and of criminal proceedings, dated 24 April 1934 (Reich Law Gazette I, page 341 and the following pages) contain in paragraphs 90d and 90e very severe and extensive orders concerning high treason by negligence. According to this, high treason by negligence has already been committed, when important economic and military interests of the German Reich have been endangered by the publication of statistical data in description, numerical or graphic form or by information given for the purpose of such publication.

In the interest of your members, therefore, I would ask you to see to it that in the publication of data concerning

- 1.) stocks and warehouses,
- 2.) purchase and consumption of raw and semi-finished materials,
- 3.) production capacities, unused production capacities, and employment figures,
- 4.) localisation of industries or of branches of industries,
- 5.) plans of the positions of plants, surveys and drawings,

nothing is included which is, or could be, detrimental to war economic or military interests of the German Reich. This applies especially to the publication of isolated facts concerning the subjects mentioned under 1-5:

The giving of information to publishers and to scientific bodies comes within the meaning of the term "publication".

The publication and issue of statistical data, made at the request or with the approval of official or Party authorities or agencies, as well as the completion of official or Party questionnaires are not affected hereby. The same applies to the

(page 4 of original)

compulsory publication of the annual balance sheets of the Aktiengesellschaften and Kommanditgesellschaften auf Aktien.

The publication of photographs, which have been taken on ground level (including a raised position) and making them available for publication, are subject to the same restriction as the publishing of the data mentioned under 1-5. This applies especially to photographs which

- a) give a survey of the entire plant or independent parts thereof, of a firm or its branches,
- b) show isolated buildings, machines, or technical installations, unique, or comparatively rare in Germany, or represent as far as the installations of this particular plant are concerned, something out of the ordinary.

Generally speaking, however, no objections will be raised to the photographing of the following objects:

- 1.) office and administrative buildings,
- 2.) views of individual parts of the plant, taken from the outside, provided neighbouring plants and the surrounding site are not included on the picture,
- 3.) indoor photos, as far as they do not come under b),
- 4.) photos taken at the working-place, and of the work of the individual worker,
- 5.) photos of products of the plants, of their buyer and the place of their employment within the Reich is omitted. This includes advertisements by the building firms of plants of all kinds which they have built,
- 6.) social service installations.

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT No. NI-8466
CONTINUED

(page 4 of original cont'd)

The taking and publishing of aerial photographs remains, independently from the above regulations, subject to the approval of the Reich Air Ministry.

In doubtful cases publication is to be desisted from entirely, or is to be submitted for approval to the special "Referent" whom the Reich Economic Chamber will appoint to each District Economic Chamber."

4 and initial
(in handwriting)

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

I, Annette JACOBSON, No. 20146, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages, and that the above is a true and correct translation of document No. NI-8466.

Annette JACOBSON
No. 20146.

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT No. NI-4679
OFFICE OF CHIEF OF COUNSEL FOR WAR CRIMES

Registered 1

I.G. FARBENINDUSTRIE AKTIENGESellschaft
Vermittlungsstelle W
(Military Liaison Office)

initial D.B.

Stamp :

Dir. Secretariat
" Bayer " received
13 March 1937
9 - 10

Berlin NW 7 10 March 1937
Unter den Linden 82

I.G. Farbenindustrie Aktiengesellschaft

<u>Works Combine of Upper Rhine</u>	attention of Dir. Dr. Gaus, Ludwigshafen
Works of Sparte I :	Oppau, Ammoniakwerk Herschburg G.M.B.H. incl. Niedersachswerfen
Works of Sparte II :	Ludwigshafen incl. Karlsruhe and Goldbach.
<u>Works Combine of Middle Rhine</u>	attention of Dir. Dr. Hermann, Hoechst
Works of Sparte I :	Hoechst, Knapsack.
Works of Sparte II :	Hoechst, Offenbach, Gersthöfen, Mainkur, Marburg, Knapsack.
<u>Works Combine of Lower Rhine</u>	attention of Dir. Dr. Kuehne, Leverkusen
Works of Sparte II :	Leverkusen, Dormagen, Uerdingen, Wuppertal-Elberfeld, Duisburger Kupferhütte, (Copper Foundry), Duisbg. Metallchemie Hermann.
<u>Works Combine of Central Germany</u>	attention of Dir. Dr. Pistor, Bitterfeld
Works of Sparte I :	Wolfen, Bitterfeld, Doberitz-Ost (East) and Nord, Bayer-Stickstoffwerke (Bavarian Nitrogen Works) Piesteritz.
Works of Sparte II :	Bitterfeld, Wolfen-Farben, Doberitz-West, Aken, Stassfurt, Teutschenthal, Rheinfelden.
Work Autogen and I.G. Sauerstoffwerke (Oxygen Works)	attention of Dir. Jaehne, Hoechst
Vermittlungsstelle W, Sparte III,	attention of Dr. Meyer, Wofi. for the Works and Sales Dept. of Sparte III

(page 1 of original, cont'd)

Dept. Backstrom Sparto I attention of Dir.Dr.Oster,
Berlin NY 7

Dept. Entestick Sparte I attention of Dir. Hanser,
 Berlin NW 7

Dept. CIL Sparte I attention of Dir.Dr.Fischer,
Berlin NW 7

Dept. Sales Combine Dyes Sparte II attention of Dir.Dr.v.Schnitzler,
Frankfort/M.

Dept. Sales Combine Chemicals Sparte II attention of Dir. Weber-Andreas,
Frankfort/M.

Dept. Sales Combine Pharmaceu- Sparto II attention of Dir. W.R. Mann,
ticals
Leverkusen

Vermittlungsstelle W, Dept. A attention of Nerbeck, Lovorkausen .

for information to:

Prof. Solck,
Dir. Dr. Krauch
Dir. Dr. ter Meer
Dir. Dr. Gajewski

(page 2 of original)

Confidential

I.G. Farbenindustrie Aktiengesellschaft
Vermittlungsstelle W

Page 2
10 March 1937
Dr. v.B./Pf.

Re: Secrecy Regulations for firms executing Wehrmacht orders.

Subsequent to research work carried out by I.G. together with various departments of the Wehrmacht and as a result of the execution of Wehrmacht orders, several I.G. Works and sales departments were furnished with the " Secrecy Regulations for firms executing Wehrmacht Orders". At the same time these offices received a Pledge Declaration in which so-called " Confidential Agents " (Vertrauensleute) had to be named for future negotiations with the authorities.

On the request of the Army Ordnance Office, where the issue of the Secrecy Regulations will now be concentrated, a report is to be made of those agencies that have been bound by pledge up to the present. We, therefore, ask all Works and Sales Departments which have received the Secrecy Regulations to submit the following particulars:

- 1) Number and date of issue with which these Secrecy Regulations are marked.
- 2) Works or Sales Departments which hold a copy.
- 3) The authority from which the copy was received.
- 4) Names of the members of I.G. who have been quoted as Confidential Agents in the Pledge Declarations and their deputies.

All returns are requested.

VERMITTLUNGSTELLE W

(signature) Bruening

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT No. NI-4679
CONTINUED

(page 3 of original)

Secret ! initial Hi

I.G. Frankfurt
Statistics Accounting Chemicals

1. This is a State secret within the meaning of Article 88 of the Reich Penal Code.
2. To be forwarded under sealed cover; to be registered if sent by post.
3. To be kept under lock and key at the responsibility of the addressee.

To

Mr. Scharnhorst
Pharmaceutical Sales

Registered

Mr. Belz
Department K
Leverhausen.

Your reference	Your letter of	Our reference	Date
-	-	Ko/Bl.	22 March 1939

initial (?)

Re: Price Control at Leverhausen on 16 March 1939.

Offers of Pharmaceutical Products to OMS.

Enclosed we are forwarding you an internal file note which we have compiled on our conference with you on 16 March 1939. Should you have any objections to the text, please inform us.

STATISTICS

Accounting Chemicals

(signatures) Koch.

Enclosure: 1

(page 4 of original)

I.G. Farbenindustrie Aktiengesellschaft
Tele-office

Frankfurt (Main) 20
26 Sept. 1935

Handwritten : File
Initial : H

Confidential 1

Works Combine Upper Rhine :	Dr. W. Gaus, director, Ludwigshafen
" " Middle Rhine :	Dr. L. Hermann, director, Hoechst
" " Lower Rhine :	Dr. C. Jacobi, director, Marburg
	Dr. H. Kuchno, director, Leverkusen
	Prof. Dr. H. Hoerlein, Elberfeld
	Dr. J. Laux, director, Uerdingen
" " Central Germany :	Dr. G. Pistor, director, Bitterfeld

Dr. G. v. Schnitzler, director,
E. Weber-Andreas, director
W. R. Mann, director

Frankfurt on Main
" " "
Leverkusen

Re: Central office for all war economic and war political problems.

The Central Committee decided at its last meeting in our business premises in Berlin, Unter den Linden, to establish a Vermittlungsstelle (liaison office) which in the planned organization of War economics to act as the central office for dealing with all war economic, war political and war technical problems.

Dr. Ritter, who has already been working in Berlin for some time and has established contact with all the appropriate military authorities has been nominated for Sparte 1.

Dr. G. v. Bruening will take charge of this task for Sparte 2 and will arrive in Berlin in the very near future. The TEA Office will inform you of the date when the Vermittlungsstelle will start to operate. Details of the sphere of activity will be discussed in our next Sparte Meeting on 16 October.

Please advise, confidentially, all agencies concerned of the contents of this letter.

(signature) Dr. Fr. ter Meer

(page 5 of original)

Handwritten: Dept. A.

" Bayer "
Central Department K

Leverkusen 17 March 1939
Be./S.

Supreme Command of the Wehrmacht

Initial : S

W. Army Price Control, Berlin-Charlottenburg.

Initial : Kl.

Hardenbergstr. 9

Price and Calculation Questions concerning Deliveries

to the Wehrmacht

Conference of 16 March 1939 at Leverkusen.

Present :

Beurat Wedler	}	Price Control	
v.d. Linde		Office	temporarily
Koch		Zebu. (Central Bureau) of	
		Frankfurt on Main	
Koziol		Leverkusen	temporarily
Belz		"	
Scharnhorst		"	temporarily

On the occasion of a price control in our factory at Leverkusen, Beurat Wedler, who has already been carrying out such price controls for some years at Frankfurt on Main, wished to inform himself also of our accounts-calculations for deliveries to Wehrmacht agencies.

Initially a list compiled by our department "A" concerning "Prices for Wehrmacht Agencies", edition of September 1938, was submitted with the request that, where necessary, prices might be rectified to conform to the latest standards. The question as to how these prices were arrived at was replied to, reference being made to prices for various products which were, in part, much lower than the usual.

(page 6 of original)

wholesale prices, stating that these prices were fixed in free agreement with the agencies concerned taking into account the market situation, competition etc.

Thereupon Baurat W. turned the discussion to the calculations presented by us for our deliveries of Igar, Endoagar, Neosalvarsan, and Rivanol, which are intended for veterinary purposes. The amounts included in our calculations for factory overheads (under which we have also booked general expenses) as well as the business expenses (summary of the expenses in our profit calculation relating to the Sales Combine) were objected to on account of their being allegedly extraordinarily high.

In the first place we put forward the basic argument in our reply that in the pharmaceutical business much higher expenses are incurred than in the chemical business, which is more familiar to Baurat W. through his examinations in Frankfurt on Main, as the pharmaceutical business was a rather difficult field consisting almost exclusively of detail work. For instance, exactly as in the film industry, the packing must be regarded as a part of the merchandise, for without appropriate packages, which contain precise doses, must be sterilized and have to protect the product against light and air, they are rendered useless. He might best convince himself of these difficult circumstances by walking, for example, through our stores of pharmaceuticals. Furthermore, attention was drawn to the expenses which we have taken upon ourselves in the public interest, by the far-reaching obligations entered into by us for the exchange of sera and pharmaceutical products. Furthermore, attention was drawn to the emergency stores that had been established in Germany and to the increased stocks which, in the interests of prompt delivery to the Army, we have to store as agreed upon with our offices. Moreover, we have also established additional production plants such as the Serum Institute in East Prussia and recently also in Vienna, which on account of their parallelism, naturally, cause considerably more expenses.

(page 7 of original)

* Hand-
written
note.

By virtue of what has been said above, Baurat W. considered it in order for our many small sales, for instance to the Military Area Pharmacist (Wehrkreisapotheker), to be effected, as sales over the counter, so-to-speak, at approximately normal prices. It is also desired to save us the large amount of work which is entailed by making out a detailed calculation for these small transactions. In the course of our conversation an amount of perhaps RM 5000.- was quoted as limit. However, for larger transactions Baurat W. refers in this connection to the invitation for tenders No. XVI/33 Dept. II NO.23 issued by the Veterinary Depot in Berlin, in which, among other things, Neosalvarsan was quoted at a value of

* Handwritten note: Baurat Wedler
did not agree with this amount.

(page 7 of original, cont'd)

approximately RM 500.000 special calculations ought to be made, as they were assuming that our cost prices also would be favourably influenced by such purchases.

By a practical example (Agar calculation) Baurat W wished to make sure whether material, wages and factory expenses would be calculated in accordance with the prescribed regulations. He was told that all factory calculations of I.G. were figured out on uniform principles in accordance with the directives of the Central Bookkeeping Department of Frankfurt on Main i.e. in the same manner as was known to him from his various examinations at Frankfurt on Main.

Meanwhile the time for Baurat W.'s departure had arrived. He declared further that when the opportunity occurred the discussion on the amount of expenses in our calculations and also the profits ought to be continued in order to come to a decision.

Handwritten
Note :
We approx. 15% of
sales-price. Wedler
wants to calculate
profit on actual cost
price only.

This Price Control Agency has made an agreement with Frankfurt that only an additional charge of 17% on material, wages and factory expenses to cover all expenses of the Sales Combine including the general expenses, may be imposed. Apart from that a profit of approximately only 10% was approved.

" Rayer "

Central Department K.

Signature: Bels

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

5 June 1947

I, John FOGHERY, Civ. No. 20 179, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages and that the above is a true and correct translation of the document No. HI-4679.

John FOGHERY,
Civ. No. 20 179

Dr. A. Fausten
DEUTSCHE CELLULOID FABRIK
(German Celluloid Factory)
Direktion (Directorate)

(Translator's Note: Stamp:) 9 March 1937
Eilenburg, 8 March 1937

REGISTERED

(Translator's Note: Handwritten:) Answ. 30 March 1937

To the Secretariat of Geheimrat Dr. SCHMITZ
I.G. Farbenindustrie A.G.
Unter den Linden 78
BERLIN NW 7

Gentlemen:

With reference to our letter of 22 February to Geheimrat Dr. SCHMITZ and your communications of 24 and 27 February 1937, we are again submitting to you herewith a declaration on the obligation towards secrecy as applying to firms, together with directives, for execution by signature of Geheimrat SCHMITZ. It is my hope that you may be able to return the material to us at an early date.

With German salutation

(signed) FAUSTEN

(3 enclosures)

Dr. A. FAUSTEN
DEUTSCHE CELLULOID FABRIK
(German Celluloid Factory)
Direktion (Directorate)

(Translator's Note: Stamp:) 24 February 1937

EILENBURG, 22 February 1937

Geheimrat Dr. H. SCHMITZ
I.G. Farbenindustrie A.G.
BERLIN NW 7
Unter den Linden 78

Registered!
Confidential!

My dear Herr Geheimrat:

The Reich Air Ministry demands the execution through signature of our Aufsichtsrat chairman of the two forms, hereto attached, on

"Declaration by firms on obligation towards secrecy"

I also attach the secrecy regulations to be observed by firms in connection with the filling of Wehrmacht orders to which reference is made in the declaration on the obligation.

Your prompt action and return of all of the material will be very much appreciated.

With German Salutation

(signed) FAUSTEN

3 enclosures

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

I, HERTHA C. KNUTH, AGO No. X-46355, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document No. HI-703.

HERTHA C. KNUTH
AGO No. X-46355
U.S. Civilian

(E N D)

Leverkusen - I.G. Plant, 21 February 1936

Confidential!

Subject: Employment of Foreigners.

In behalf of Abwehr the competent authorities have issued regulations for armament plants which generally are not being applied to I.G. plants but which are to be taken into consideration in their meaning when war-essential plants are concerned.

- 1.) If, in exceptional cases, the employment of foreigners (including stateless persons, Danzigers and Memellanders, also former members of the Foreign Legion, Germans returning from foreign states (Rueckwanderer)) is being planned the Security Service be informed in time so that, if necessary, an additional screening of the person can take place before-hand and surveillance of the person after employment the latter being expressly demanded by the competent authorities.
- 2.) In Russia there exist espionage schools of economy whose students are later to be placed in German industry as apprentices of Estonian, Finnish or Latvian nationality.
- 3.) If foreigners are to be employed as unsalaried volunteers in the volunteers' dyeing works or otherwise, they should be named in time to the Security Service so that a screening according to Point 1 can also take place.

Care should be taken that such volunteers would not obtain knowledge of plants and processes of manufacture which need to be kept secret.

The Directorate:

(Signature) Dr. KUEHNE

Distribution

Directorate Department
"Bayer" Directorate Secretariat
Personnel Department, General
Personnel Department, Pharma
Social Security Department
Colorists' Department
Security Service

Leverkusen-I.G.Plant, 21 February 1936

Confidential!

Subject: Visits of Foreigners.

Pursuant to today's letter regarding business calls and visits to plants the following is brought to your attention:

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO. NI-1164
OFFICE OF CHIEF OF COUNSEL FOR WAR
CRIMES

As an Abwehr requirement competent authorities have issued special regulations for armament establishments which, in general, do not find application to I.G. plants but the meaning of which should be taken into consideration as far as inspection of plants, or parts of plants, are concerned which are war-essential.

1.) Visits of foreigners:

- a) Visits by foreigners who wish to see parts of the armament manufacture must always be approved by the Wehrmacht agency giving the order.
- b) Visits by foreigners who do not wish to see a part of the armament manufacture but only equipment of trade-known type call for approval by the Wehrmacht agency giving the order only if the visitors should remain in the plant for some time; - for apprenticeship, for instance, - when they possibly might find occasion to obtain knowledge of secret manufacturing processes, or if for other reasons the danger should exist that they might obtain insight into secret facts; for instance, a possibility to observe the expansion of plants serving armament purposes, or the transportation of Wehrmacht equipment within the plant.
- c) Visits by foreign officers, Armed Forces officials and employees, or other members of foreign Armed Forces are in each case subject to the approval of the Wehrmacht agency giving the order. These applicants should be referred to diplomatic channels.

2.) For visits by Russians the following regulations apply:

Visits by Russians who do not wish to see parts of the armament manufacture but only equipment of trade-known type and who will remain for no longer than a few hours in the plant are exempt from approval. Their personal data, however, should be ascertained in each case, to permit a check.

3. As regards prospective visits as covered by number 1 and 2. To the extent that by reason of general regulations

(Page 2 of original)

Security Service does not yet receive information on business calls and plant inspections an advice must be given to Security Service in due time so that in the individual case a check can be made as to whether and which specific measures are to be taken.

The Directorate (Direktorium)

(Signature) Dr. KUEHNE

(Translator's Note: Initial: M)

Distribution:
Directorate Department
Secretariat, General
Directorate Secretariat, "Bayer"
Foreigners' Office
Social Security Department (Sozial-Abteilung)
Security Service

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO. NL-1164
Cont'd

Leverkusen-I.G.Plant, 21 February 1936

Confidential!

Subject: Safeguarding of secrecy when filling out questionnaires of economic organizations, etc. - Publication of statistical material etc.

As an Abwehr requirement competent authorities have issued the following regulations for armament establishments which, in general, do not find application to I.G. plants but the meaning of which should be taken into consideration as far as war-essential plants are concerned:

- 1.) Questionnaires of economic associations, Party and Labor Front agencies for armament plants.

When executing questionnaires of the above named and similar agencies the secrecy imposed on the plants is to be strictly preserved. Questions liable to permit conclusions as to the manufacture of war materials by the plant are not to be answered.

As regards information to be supplied by armaments plants with secret manufactures on questionnaires of the German Labor Front as well as the Reichsbetriebsgemeinschaft Chemie there exists a preliminary regulation to the effect that for the time being questionnaires should not be executed. Negotiations in this respect are still pending.

- 2.) Announcements in the daily press, in annual reports, information sheets, etc., shall not contain data the publication of which is not desirable in the interest of the defense of the country. This includes especially communications which permit conclusions as to the maximum capacity, in theory or practice, of individual plants or parts of plants, and data on the size of real estate comprising buildings or vacant plots. Experience has taught that the intelligence service abroad systematically exploits such communications to the advantage of its own purposes.

(Page 2 of original)

- 3.) For armament plants the regulation exists that there are no objections against the confidential communication of the total number of workers and of the turnover to government agencies, such as Regierung-Präsident, Landrat, Labor Offices etc. There are also no objections against giving the break-down of the workers in to classes. It is to be pointed out to the receiving agencies, however, that the figures are for official use only.

This regulation, too, is to be applied to the I.G. plants in proper adaptation; publications as to the number of workers etc., therefore, are not to be made.

- 4.) It is being recommended to clarify possible doubts, if necessary, in consultation with the Security Service.

The Directorate:
(Signature) Dr. KUEHNE

(Translator's Note: Initial: M)

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO. NI-1164
Cont'd

Distribution:

Directorate Department
Engineers' Administration
Main Bookkeeping
Social Security Department (Sozial-abteilung)
Secretariat, General
Directorate Secretariat, "Bayer"
Security Service
Fire Fighting Department

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

I, HERTHA C. KNUTH, AGO NO. X-046355, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document No. NI-1164.

HERTHA C. KNUTH
U. S. Civilian
AGO NO. X-046355

END

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT No. III-4985
OFFICE OF CHIEF OF COUNSEL FOR WAR CRIMES

I.G. Farbenindustrie Aktiengesellschaft
Vermittlungsstelle W, Abteilung A

(Trans. Note:

Our Reference: III/2a/6a/5b

Berlin-NW.7, Unter den Linden-82)
(corrected to.)
Leverkusen, I.G. Werk
29 April 1937.

Stamp:

Secret

1. This is a state secret according to the meaning of Art. 88 of the RStGB. (Reich Penal Code)
2. Forwarding only sealed and registered if forwarded by mail.
3. To be kept in a safe place at the responsibility of the addressee.

Secret/Registered
(against receipt)

To

Director Rudolf Hanser
or his deputy Prokurist Grimm
Departm. Batestik
Berlin - NW 7

Sir:

Re: Announcement of or authorization for visits to the plant.
-see our letter of 21/7/36 - III/2a/5b

As a result of a revision of the secrecy regulations for firms which carry out Wehrmacht orders, -issued in October 1936, - it has become necessary to modify rulings for plant visits in a manner set forth below, as approved by the competent offices of the Reich War Ministry, our circular III/2a/5b, of 21/7/1936 thereby becoming desolate.

I.I.G. plants which have to carry out Wehrmacht orders:

In this respect the above mentioned secrecy regulations applicable to firms will apply which were received by all plants concerned and by all Abwb (Transl/Note: Abwehrbeauftragte: Abwehr agents) of I.G.

Art. 16 and enclosure G of these regulations will set the standard. They list the persons who may enter the plant without special authorizations.

(Page 2 of original)

Exceptions, -that is authorizations for inspections by other persons - may be requested in opportune time from the Wehrmacht branch of ultimate competence (federführenden), through Vermittlungsstelle W: -see figure VI, 2.-

The same regulation as to exceptions applies to foreign private individuals.

Members of foreign armies are to be referred to diplomatic channels - see figure VI, 3.-

II. I.G. plants which do not handle Wehrmacht orders in
sense covered by the secrecy regulation to firms.

For these the authorization by an ultimately competent Wehrmacht branch does not come under consideration, as a rule.

In this respect the following will apply:

The authorization from the Reich War Ministry is necessary for visits and inspections by:

1.) Foreigners who wish to see secret installations and productions of essential importance to waging war.

2.) Foreigners who do not wish to see secret installations and productions of essential importance to waging war, but only commercially known productions and parts of installations of the general type, but who remain for more extended period of time e.g. to undergo training in the plant when a chance might arise for them to obtain knowledge about secret productions or if for other reasons there should exist the danger that facts come to their attention which should remain a secret, even were it nothing more but the possibility of observance of the expansion of a work for armament purposes, or the transporting of Wehrmacht equipment within the plant.

(Page 3 of the original)

3.) Members of foreign Armies.

are to be directed to diplomatic channels, as under I.

Concerning applications for authorization see Art. Figure VI,3-.

III. Exempt from authorization in regard to all I.G. plants
are:

1.) General visits by indigenous persons or Foreigners (for instance, customers), who do not wish to inspect any parts of establishments and productions which are secret and essential to the war, but only ordinary commercial productions and parts of general installations, the regular precautionary measures being taken and provided that the visit remains restricted to that.

2.) Employment of foreigners as apprentices drawing no pay, for instance in experimental dye-works to the extent that they will have no opportunity to become acquainted with secret war essential productions. It is necessary, however, that these unpaid apprentices be checked on and be watched by the local security service, especially in their associating with other members of the plant. Recent espionage incidents call for particular caution along that line.

3.) To the extent that in regard to 1 and 2 - the visitors are not members of foreign armies.

The latter are to be directed to diplomatic channels, same as under I.

IV. In addition, the following special regulation applies to Russian visitors:

Visits by Russians who do not wish to see any part of armament production and of war essential secret productions, but only ordinary commercial production and who do not remain in the plant for more than a few hours, are

(Page 4 of the original)

not per se subject to authorization. Their personal data are to be established every time, to permit investigation, and they are to be reported to the Reich War Ministry through Vermittlungsstelle W.

V. The Political Economy Department, Berlin-NW 7, Unter den Linden 82

requests information on visits by indigenous persons and foreigners in which

the Foreign Office, the Reich Ministry of Economics, the Propaganda Ministry, and the Publicity Council of German Economy

might be interested. This includes, among others, foreign commissions, eminent political personalities and important industrialists of foreign countries, foreigners who travel for reasons of study, but not to the ordinary business visits by foreign customers.

VI. Flow of business.

- 1.) In order to establish a final ruling as to which parts of installations and productions of the individual I.G. plants are to be considered war essential and secret in the light of those visitors and inspection regulations, and in order to achieve greatest possible uniformity within the I.G., all I.G. plants are being requested to inform Vermittlungsstelle W, Berlin as soon as possible which, according to their opinion, are the installations and/or productions which would come into question.
- 2.) Making use of the attached sample of the proposed form and in order to avoid unnecessary inquiries Vermittlungsstelle W, Berlin, copy to Vermittlungsstelle W, department A, Leverkusen-should be informed in opportune time regarding
 - a) all visits subject to authorization requirement, figures I and II,
 - b) Russian visitors, figure IV.

(Page 5 of the original)

Lately, the Abwehr Department has requested that when reporting visits by foreigners, the complete personal data on the visitor be given, if possible, namely first and last name, date and place of birth, profession, residence, as the reports otherwise are of no value to the card index department of Abwehr.

When sending the application, responsibility should be assumed as far as possible for the correctness of the personal data given; otherwise it must be stated why this cannot be done and why the request for authorization is being made nevertheless.

To the extent that the political Economy Department of Berlin-NW 7, is interested in these visits according to figure V, it will be informed after the authorization has been granted or an investigation made by Vermittlungsstelle W.

- 3.) When members of foreign armies as per figures I, II and III are being directed to diplomatic channels, it is requested that information be sent simultaneously to Vermittlungsstelle W in Berlin - with copy to section A in Leverkusen - including a statement as to whether and - if the case arises - what is I.G.'s interest in the authorization of such a visit from the viewpoint of business so that this may be taken into consideration for the decision by the Wehrmacht.
- 4.) Visits by foreigners for which according to figure V no authorization is required and in which the Political Economy Department is interested, are to be reported directly to that section.

VII. The above mentioned arrangement applies to all I.G. plants,

(Page 6 of the original)

those which are particularly protected by a local Abwb., (Transl. Note: Abwehrbeauftragter: Abwehr agents) as well as plants which are taken care of by the Abwehr activity of Vermittlungsstelle W, section A.

Its purpose is the protection of state secrets. This concept is a very far reaching one, especially in our industry. It often is identical with the concept of "plant secret". The latter therefore, call for the most far reaching protection as regards all visitors since the foreign information service which ranges on the same level with industry and economy espionage - seeks to secure by all possible means news which it considers useful and since this danger has proved to be particularly great in our industry.

Therefore, even in the case of routine visits and inspections by customers the application of all preventive measures is necessary so that they might not give cause to abuse for the benefit of industry and economy espionage purposes. Greatest reserve commands itself for business conversations as well as for private conversations.

It is being recommended that persons who conduct visits regularly or occasionally execute a pledge in writing according to the enclosed sample - form F -, so that they will be aware of their responsibility.

With German salutation

(signature) MERBECK.

(7th page of original)

D r a f t

Factory:

.....193..

S e c r e t

Vermittlungsstelle W, Department A

1 x Berlin NW 7, Unter den Linden 82
1 x Leverkusen - I.G. Werk.

Subject: Authorization to visit plants.

We herewith make application for authorization for a visit, as stated below, on

for plant :

1.) Family name and
given names:

from:

Born: x) on:

Profession: (Civilian or military)

Nationality:

Representing firm (or organization) etc.

2.) as above

3.) as above

etc.

Purpose of visit and probable duration of visit.
Explanation as to why IG is interested in such authorization being granted, etc.:

.....
.....
.....

x) information to give as many details as may be possible.

(8th page of original)

Form F

P l o d g e d e c l a r a t i o n

for persons who conduct visitors during plant inspections .

By my signature I recognize the following as being a part
of my obligation in work and service:

I. I pledge myself

- 1.) to abide strictly by instructions given relative to conducting visitors in plant inspections, especially to restrict conducting only to such portions of the plant for which restrictions have been explicitly lifted and which were set aside for said purpose,
- 2.) during such conducted inspections to restrict explanations and comments to the works' parts which are being inspected but to refrain from giving information on business and plant secrets of I.G. or on state secrets.
- 3.) to make sure that visitors do not have upon themselves photographic apparatus and are not taking photographs or make notes which are not permitted,
- 4.) to report at once to the works' management and to the security service of the plant (Werksicherheitsdienst) any observations which during such conducting of visitors gives cause for suspicion as to espionage or industry espionage. Into this class may also come questions asked by visitors which exceed the scope of the inspection purpose.

II. It has been explained to me that in case of infraction of these regulations I invite the risk of becoming liable for punishment according to the meaning of the law against unfair competition, as formulated under date of 9 March 1932 (Reich Law Gazette 1932, Part I, page 122) and, possibly, also according to Articles 68 and following of the Reich Penal Code, Section Treason (against the country), according to the version of the law dated 24 April 1934 (Reich Law Gazette 1934, Part I).

III. I am aware of the fact that the pledge to secrecy enjoined on me is in keeping with an order promulgated by the Reich Government for the safeguarding of the defense of the country and, respectively, a prohibition according to the meaning of Article 92b of the Reich Penal Code.

The above mentioned laws have been brought to my
knowledge - in part in the form of an abstract.

....., the193..

(signature)
(typewritten repetition of
name)
Department:

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

I, HERTHA C. KNUTH, AGO X046355, hereby certify that I am
thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages;
and that the above is a true and correct translation of
Document No. NI-4985.

HERTHA C. KNUTH,
U.S. Civilian,
AGO X046355.

END

-7-

74

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT No. NI-8467
OFFICE OF CHIEF OF COUNSEL FOR
WAR CRIMES

I.G. Farbenindustrie Aktiengesellschaft
Vermittlungsstelle W, Abteilung A

Our reference: III/2a III/5b

~~Berlin NW.7, Unter den Linden 78~~
(subsequently crossed out)
Leverkusen-I.G. Werk,
16 July 1936.

To

Registered.
Confidential.

Subject: Pledge to Secrecy.

The competent Reich authorities request that all those concerned with security matters in industry or those who are otherwise occupied on work which brings them into contact with such matters or matters which it is otherwise considered should be kept secret in the interest of security, should be pledged to secrecy in writing and informed of the penalties applicable in case of non-observance.

Meanwhile, violation of this pledge to secrecy has been made a penal offence by the Law, dated 2 July 1936, modifying the Penal Code.

Enclosed are herewith:

- 1.) Formula for secrecy pledge concerning security matters (2 copies).
- 2.) Copy of "Law against unfair competition dated 9 March 1933" and "Extract from articles 88 and following of the Reich Penal Code, Section High Treason as contained in the Law of 24 April 1934"

handwritten:
607.

(page 2 of original)

- 3.) Copy of the Law modifying the Penal Code of 2 July 1936.
- 4.) Formula for Secrecy Pledge - Form B - , 2 copies.

The secrecy declarations under 1.) should be completed by you and your deputy, one copy to be kept in your files, the other copy to be returned to us.

Form B of the secrecy pledge is to be completed by those persons who are going to be in contact with these matters, working either in your office or in your plant. You are asked to see to it that this is done. One copy is to be returned to us after completion by the persons concerned, the second copy is to be filed with you.

It is, at present, not necessary to furnish these individuals with copies of the above-mentioned provisions of the Penal Law (number 2 and 3), but it is desired, that they be expressly announced, and each person acknowledge in writing that he has been made acquainted with their contents.

It is a prerequisite that the trust-worthiness of these individuals is established beyond a doubt, if this is not the case they are to be screened again by the State Police. This can be arranged from here. Your reply to this will be appreciated.

The provisions of the new articles 353b and 353c of the Penal Code - compare copy of Law dated 2 July 1936, modifying the Penal Code can be applied to the confidential reports from this office (documents

(page 3 of original)

and other information).

Particular importance is, therefore, to be attached to the safe keeping of such information and the maintenance of secrecy concerning it. For this reason, it is requested that these papers be kept separately from other records in special files, clearly marked "Confidential" on the outside, and these are to be stored in strong safes, which should be either armor-plated or have some other, equivalent protection.

Kindly acknowledge in writing receipt of this letter with enclosures.

We expect to hear from you regarding any queries you may have.

signed: MERBECK

6 enclosures.

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

9 July 1947

I, ANNETTE JACOBSON, No. 20146, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages and that the above is a true and correct translation of document No. NI-8467.

ANNETTE JACOBSON
No. 20146

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT No. NI-6192
OFFICE OF CHIEF OF COUNSEL FOR WAR CRIMES

Branch Office of the Reich and Prussian Ministry of Economics, Wiesbaden

Correspondence should be addressed to:
The Branch Office
of the Reich and Prussian Ministry
of Economics.
Attention: Herr Ober-Reg. Rat Johannes
or Deputy at the
Wiesbaden Office
Hindenburgallee 59

Long Distance Telephone No. Wiesbaden 20047

Pledge of Secrecy of Persons Entrusted
With Confidential Tasks

Ludwigshafen a. Rh. 22 Oct. 1937
(Place) (Date)

Dr. Carl Krauch full member of Vorstand of I.G. Farben
(First and last Name) (Profession)
domiciled at Heidelberg, in Lindenried No. 23
declares herewith:
I was today appointed by the Security Officer of I.G. Farben as confidential agent (Vertrauensperson) of the Plant I.G. Farben Aktiengesellschaft
Ludwigshafen-Oppau Works, (Name)
Ludwigshafen a. Rh.
(address of plant)
I have been fully informed that:

1. All military economic plans discussed, or yet to be discussed, are to be kept secret;
2. all material concerning these plans is to be safely locked away and made inaccessible to unauthorized persons;
3. I shall be personally responsible for seeing that other employees at this plant, regardless of their position, are only informed of the military economic purpose of these plans if it is absolutely necessary for operational reasons, and that I shall have to obtain a signed statement from each of these co-workers pledging himself to secrecy;
4. obligation to secrecy applies also to outsiders unless they identify themselves as:

(page 2 of original)

- a) members of the Wehrmacht office, giving the order,
- b) members of the Military Economic Staff (Wehrwirtschaftsstab) of the Reich Ministry of War (including its departments), of the Military Economic Inspection Office XII (Wehrwirtschafts-Inspektion XII) (including its Military Economic Offices),
- c) members of the Abwehr Department of the Reich Ministry of War and of Abwehr Office XII Army Corps,
- d) members of the branch office of the Reich and Prussian Ministry of Economics,
- e) members of the branch office of the Reich and Prussian Ministry of Labor,

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT No. NI-6192
CONTINUED

f) Chairmen and Vice-chairmen of the Labor Offices as well as their special delegates.

(Persons mentioned in a to f possess special passes.)

I have been informed that violation of these regulations renders me liable to punishment according to the law against unfair competition, text of 9.3.32 (Reich Law Gazette 1932, part I, page 122), and if applicable, according to par. 88 ff. Reich Penal Code, section: Treason, according to the text of the law of 24.4.1934 (Reich Law Gazette 1934, par I) as well as par. 139, 143a, 353b and 353c of the law of 2 July 1936 modifying the Penal Code.

5. I realize that the obligation to secrecy laid upon me is an order and a prohibition within the meaning of par. 92b of the Reich Penal Code promulgated by the Reich Government for safeguarding national defense.

I have been given excerpts of the above-mentioned laws in order to acquaint myself with them.

6. I realize that the obligation to secrecy will continue to exist even after the termination of my activity as confidential agent.

7. I undertake to inform the chief of the Branch Office of the Reich and Prussian Ministry of Economics, Wiesbaden, immediately upon my leaving the plant.

8. I am fully aware of the extent and the import of the obligation incurred through attaching my signature hereto.

9. I have received a duplicate of this obligation to secrecy.

Read out, seen and signed

(signature) Dr. Carl Krauch
(first and last name of confidential agent)

(signature) Hanns Wagner
(Office, Name and Rank of person exacting the obligation)

(Handwritten) Security Officer of I.G. Farbenindustrie A.G., Ludwigshafen-Opau

1 Enclosure (Excerpt of Law)

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

20 June 1947

I, VICTORIA ORTON, No. 20129 hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages and that the above is a true and correct translation of the document No. NI 6192.

.....
VICTORIA ORTON, No. 20129.

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT No. NI-1153
OFFICE OF CHIEF OF COUNSEL FOR WAR CRIMES

I.G. Farbenindustrie Aktiengesellschaft
Vermittlungsstelle W, Department A

Our reference: III/2a III/5b

F 9/2
Berlin-NW.7,
Unter den Linden 78
Leverkusen - I.G. Werk,
2 November 1936.

Registered/Confidential
(Receipt enclosed)

To:

Prof. Dr. CURSCHMANN
or Deputy-Director von der BEY
- Office of the Directorate Secretariat -

Plant: Bitterfeld
17
for: Bitterfeld

Re: Security (Abwehr)

- "Written Communications and dispatch by mail -

1) The Commander in Chief of the Air-Force has sent the following letter to Vermittlungsstelle W:

"As verbally arranged, all I. G. communications destined for my Ministry, containing confidential material dealing with the cooperation in " ... matters", are for security reasons to be mailed "registered" or as "letters containing valuables". This security-measure loses its effectiveness if envelopes of I.G. are marked "confidential", as well as being mailed "registered". pp.

I want to stress the point that any further negligent handling of confidential communications will be considered a violation of security regulations."

This reprimand from the air-ministry, frequently repeated in the meantime, can be taken equally well as coming from the ministries of the other branches of the Armed Forces.

Vermittlungsstelle W, Berlin and Leverkusen are also repeatedly receiving letters from other I. G. agencies, incorrectly marked on the outer envelopes, "strictly confidential", "confidential", "personal"

(page 2 of original)

etc. Moreover several "confidential" letters, correctly marked as such, were dispatched by regular mail, in some instances even in envelopes not specially sealed, which fact enabled people, not authorized to receive them, to become acquainted with their contents.

(page 2 of original, cont'd)

The attached information leaflet contains directives to be observed in order to avoid serious consequences.

More detailed instructions regarding "Letters containing valuables" mentioned in the leaflet are contained, together with other things, in

"Secrecy obligations of Firms"

"Edited by the War Ministry, Army Ordnance Office"

"issued on 1st December, 1935".

"Farben" plants and I. G. agencies concerned are provided with this particular directive, strict observation of which is hereby recommended.

A new edition of the "Secrecy obligations of firms" is expected to appear shortly.

2) Experience to date has shown that as a general rule it is advisable to dispatch communications destined for department A directly to Leverkusen, which is in possession of all documents and files and deals with the actual handling of these matters.

3) To facilitate dispatch by mail address-labels have been prepared for the outer and inner envelopes for

Vermittlungsstelle W, "General" and "Department A", Berlin (sample 1)

Vermittlungsstelle W, Department A, Leverkusen-I.G.-Werk (sample 2).

(page 3 of original)

If it is desired in some instances to avoid using the outer address "Vermittlungsstelle W, Leverkusen-I.G. Werk", in order to render guesses as to the contents of the letter more difficult, the address

"I.G. Farbenindustrie Aktiengesellschaft
Sicherheitsdienst - I.G. Zentrale
Leverkusen - I.G. Werk"

may be used on the outer envelope, as both addresses are equally significant as far as the opening of the letter is concerned. (Sample 3)

3 sheets each of samples 1 - 3 are enclosed; more may be had on request.

4) For communications to be dispatched from here, addressee labels have been prepared in the same way - compare label used for this letter - The word "Registered" is stamped on the envelope in such a way as to extend over the printed address-label and the envelope itself. The same procedure is recommended.

(page 3 of original, cont'd)

It is requested that all "Farben" agencies, departments, works and persons, who may have to handle confidential communications within the sphere entrusted to you, be instructed concerning the above directives and be given a copy of this leaflet.

(5 copies are enclosed, more may be had on request).

Signature

(page 4 of original)

Confidential !

Information leaflet

regarding the marking and mailing of confidential communications between government agencies, plants and agencies within the I.G.

- Issued on 2nd November 1936. -

A) Marking of communications:

All communications, which are to be kept secret, and which pertain to military-economic matters, i.e. which deal with matters such as fuel and other supplies, work-installations, production, personnel administration, espionage, sabotage, counter-intelligence (Abwehr), air-raid protection, patents etc, should be marked "confidential" on the communication itself. This means the same as the mark "secret" used on official communications, but prohibited for private enterprises. The location of carbon copies and reproductions should be controlled. They should be kept on a safe place.

B) Dispatch by mail and marking of envelopes:

- 1) Two envelopes. Confidential communications should be mailed "Registered" in two opaque envelopes, (in some special instances as "letter containing valuables" - see No. B 7)
- 2) The outer envelope should only bear the receiver's address and be marked "Registered". Any other mark such as "personal", "Confidential", "secret", "strictly confidential" etc. is prohibited.

(page 5 of original)

3) The inner envelope.

- a) The back of the envelope should be stuck to the inside of the outer envelope in such a way that it can only be opened by damaging the outer envelope.
- b) As far as possible the address should be written in copying pencil. If any unauthorized person attempted to open the outer envelope by applying moisture, the ink would run and immediately show that it had been opened by an unauthorized person.

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT No. NI-1153
CONTINUED

(page 5 of original, cont'd)

- c) Unlike the outer address, the envelope may bear personal addresses and marks previously agreed upon, such as "confidential", "personal" etc.

4) Regular and pneumatic mail-dispatch.

The dispatch of a confidential communication as ordinary letter by regular or pneumatic mail is prohibited.

5) Dispatch of mail within a plant or a building.

In exceptional cases where a confidential communication to be delivered within the same building, two envelopes are not required. It should be treated in the same way as a registered letter and be delivered only against receipt or passed from hand to hand by means of a voucher.

6) Outgoing foreign mail.

The same rules apply to outgoing foreign mail containing confidential material.

- 7) Letters containing valuables (declared value RM. 1.100.-) This method should be used, unless dispatch by courier etc. was ordered, especially in cases where documents (Beschaffungsunterlagen) are sent bearing the top secret stamp with the caution.

(page 6 of original)

For matters outside the scope of these regulations special directives have been drawn up, and dispatched to the agencies concerned.

8) Confirmation of receipt.

Wherever possible a printed receipt slip should be enclosed with very important communications (see sample slip). Immediately after receipt this slip should be returned to sender by ordinary mail. In addition to the rubber-stamp of the receiving agency, the receipt should be signed by the person who opened the letter.

- 9) In cases of doubt regarding the handling of the letter, stricter regulations should be applied.

C) Penalty:

Persons violating these regulations are liable to prosecution, even in cases of negligence only, in accordance with paragr. 353 b and 353 c St.G.B. (Penal Code) and will be severely punished by imprisonment and fines.

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT No. NI-1153
CONTINUED

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

26 May 1947

I, Victoria OBTOM, No.20129, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages and that the above is a true and correct translation of the document No. NI-1153.

Victoria OBTOM
No. 20129

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT No. NI-4983
OFFICE OF CHIEF OF COUNSEL FOR
WAR CRIMES

I.G. FARBENINDUSTRIE AKTIENGESSELLSCHAFT
Intermediary Office W, Department A

Leverkusen-I.G. Plant

To
Director HANSER
or Deputy Prokurist GRDM
Department Batestick

Secret!
Registered!

Berlin - NW.7

Your reference number	Your letter of	Our reference number	Date
		III/5b	4 June 1937

Subject: Counter Intelligence/Circular.

Following up our letter of 3 June 1937 we send you in addition the attached circulars of 17 June 1936 in regard to Counter Intelligence and Propaganda, with enclosure of 21 February 1936 regarding Security Service. The circular of 17 June 1936 regarding Counter Intelligence and Propaganda is to be taken as a rider to the circular sent you on 18 August 1936 regarding the Restriction of Statistical Publications.

Secret Register
7 June 1937

With German Salute !
By order Signature

(page 2 of original)

I.G. Farbenindustrie Aktiengesellschaft
Intermediary Office W, Department A

Leverkusen-I.G. Plant,
17 June 1936.

Our reference number: III/2a III/5b

Registered!
Confidential!

(rubber stamp:) S E C R E T !

Subject: Counter Intelligence and Propaganda.

As suggested by an I.G. Office, the chief counter intelligence regulations concerning propaganda have been summarised as follows.

I.) The regulations issued to the industry etc. in general regarding the countering of espionage and industrial espionage, air-raid protection, sabotage, high treason and other betrayals of business secrets and industrial secrets have to be also observed by the "Propaganda".

The enclosed circular Leverkusen of 21 February 1936 regarding Security Service, number 1-8, gives the rules which must be observed in general in the interest of counter intelligence. They also apply in their proper sense to the Propaganda Departments.

II.) Among others the following additional regulations apply to propaganda:

1.) Aerial Photos:

According to the Law pertaining to Aerial Photographs of 15 December 1933, Reich Gazette No. 143 of 19 December 1933 -Part I- and the additional regulations enacted thereto, photos taken from an airship (aerial photos) as well as drawings and sketches produced therefrom can be put into public circulation only by permission of the authorities; that

(page 3 of original)

is to say: permission of the Reich Air Ministry is required for publication.

This also applies to older pictures produced before the enactment of this law, and furthermore to cuttings from aerial photos.

Permission for publication is not to be expected if this would be against the interests of the country's defense, whether in connection with air-raids or with the prevention of sabotage and espionage.

Aerial photos of important industrial plants or sections of plants will therefore as a rule not be released for publication.

2.) Photographs from Points of Vantage:

Though these do not come under the Aerial Photo Act, they should be treated similarly to aerial photos as far as publication is concerned. Such photos can reveal state secrets according to paragraph 88 of the Reich Criminal Code, as well as industrial secrets according to paragraph 17 and the following paragraphs of the UWG (Law regarding Unfair Competition), so that their publication is not admissible.

Prior to a possible publication, an examination in this respect is required in each case.

3.) Plans of Plants:

Publication of plans of important industrial works or installations is prohibited, since these may also reveal secrets of state according to paragraph 88 of the Reich Criminal Code, either in connection with air-raids or with danger of sabotage and espionage.

4.) Photos of Plant Sections, or Buildings, or Interiors of Work Shops:

Here an examination is also necessary to ascertain whether secrets of state according to paragraph 88 of the Reich Criminal Code, or industrial secrets according to paragraph 17 and the following paragraphs of the UWG (Law concerning Unfair Competition) are being revealed thereby.

(page 4 of original)

so that a publication would be inadmissible.

5.) Photos of Power Stations etc.:

Here the following regulation issued by the Reich War Ministry applies:

"The production and publication of films and photos of plants and works (water, gas and electric power), that are vital to the war effort, without permission of the Reich War Ministry is prohibited; for aerial photos the special permission of the Reich Air Ministry must be obtained."

If a special importance is attached to the publication of such photos of Plant Sections, for instance of interiors of workshops, a special examination and possible permission is necessary.

6.) City Plans, Official Maps, and Maps on Sale to the Public:

Here the regulation issued by the Reich War Ministry applies, that military buildings, important armament plants must no longer be represented in every detail on maps of a scale of 1:50000 and larger, and that they must not be printed out specially by explanatory notes (as for instance Gas Works, Electric Power Station, Water Works, Chemical Factories, Blast Furnaces, Wireless Stations, Military Barracks, Powder Store Houses, Ammunition Sheds, etc.).

(page 4 of original cont'd)

7.) Publications concerning Manufacture and Statistical Material:

When publishing details of manufacture and manufacturing processes it should always be examined whether hereby secrets of state according to paragraph 88 of the Reich Criminal Code or other industrial secrets according to paragraph 17 and the following paragraphs of the Law concerning unfair competition can be betrayed. With regard to the latter it must be taken into consideration that,

(page 5 of original)

in accordance with the administration of justice and the demands of the fight against industrial espionage, even the fact that an in itself well-known manufacturing process is being used in a certain plant, can be an industrial secret.

As a rule, publications giving information on what different products are being manufactured in one plant, must be omitted.

Publications in the daily papers, annual reports, prospectuses, etc. should not contain any statements whose publication is against the interests of the country's defense. This includes, among others, reports from which deductions can be made as to the potential or actual maximum production capacity of individual plants or plant sections, statements as to the size of real estate, built up or not built up, number of personnel, etc.

III.) In order to ensure, as far as possible, a uniformity of judgement within the I.G., we recommend, as has hitherto already been done in practice throughout, that in cases where an examination is required according to No. II/1-7, the Intermediary Office W, Department A should be give an opportunity to state their view and possibly to procure the official permission.

The examination as to whether it is a question of industrial secrets according to paragraph 17 and the following paragraphs of the Law concerning unfair competition, should be carried out by the competent plant in the first instance.

signed: MERBECK

(page 6 of original)

Leverkusen-I.G.Factory, 21 February 1936.

To the
Heads of Departments, Factory-managers and Chiefs
of office
L e v e r k u s e n .

Re: Security Service.

For the protection against industrial espionage and sabotage, betrayal of business and factory secrets as well as other offenses and acts detrimental to the plant and its employees and thereby to the German economy, it is necessary to point out to the following facts:

1.) In case of suspected offenses against the law, irregularities, or other acts detrimental to the plant, no independent investigations should be started by the departments and plants in order not to impair subsequent actions by the Security Service. Instead, the Security Service has to be notified without delay. This applies not only to thefts, loss of files, documents, drawings or anything similar, but also to the appearance of suspicious persons, incidents out of the ordinary, etc.

In case of serious accidents and extraordinary break-downs at the plant, the Security Service is to be notified in the same way.

(page 7 of original)

2.) More attention than in the past should be paid to the proper locking of wardrobes and lockers by the employees. This aims, among other things, to the safeguarding of the employees' property and as well as of that of the factory.

After working hours, especially over week-ends and ^{on} holidays, filing cabinets, desks, etc. should be properly locked and no files, business-papers, etc. should be left lying about in the offices.

Over the week-end and on holidays, documents etc. should be secured with particular care and kept in safe places, so that they cannot be removed unnoticed and replaced again on the next work-day.

Non-observance of these regulations may considerably interfere with the investigations to be carried out, which would be contrary to the interests of the factory and its employees. Besides, it may, under certain circumstances, be punishable.

3.) Notes concerning production processes, factory plans, photo-copies, statements about tests and negotiations, generally all documents and matters which require secrecy, should be kept in safety-lockers only, if possible in iron-safes, with locks in good working conditions, and should neither be left lying about during working-hours without supervision nor exposed to handling by unauthorized persons.

The keys of such lockers should only be left in the hands of specially chosen persons who will be held responsible, and are to be kept outside working-hours in a safe place.

Secret dossiers, documents, etc. should generally not be

(page 8 of original)

taken home, but should be kept at the proper place inside the factory.

If for business reasons, such objects should be needed at home or on journeys for a certain time, their safekeeping has to be assured, they should for instance not be left lying around at home, in the train or at the hotel without due care and supervision.

Non-observance of these regulations may, under certain circumstances, represent a serious offense against the Penal Code, and bring about legal punishment.

No mimeographs, photocopies, copies and printed copies in excess of what is strictly required are to be made of such documents, plans, etc. and a record is to be kept of the whereabouts of the different copies.

Document of this type which are to be destroyed, including typewriter carbon-paper, must not be put into the waste-paper-basket, but are to be burned under supervision.

Shorthand-pads and writing-pads are especially dangerous, if they are not kept safely. Secret shorthand-notes should not be kept on general shorthand-note-pads etc. but should be destroyed as soon as possible.

Factory-plans and telephone-directories are also to be guarded against unauthorized persons.

Small factory plans and loose ones on flimsy paper, are to be avoided if possible as they may disappear more readily. There is less risk with large-scale factory plans on stiff cardboard.

Should factory-plans or factory-telephone-directories be missing, the Security Service is to be notified immediately.

(page 8a of original)

Whenever waste-paper and other waste-material is sold, a previous check in the sense mentioned above has to be made so that secret material may be sorted out and destroyed separately.

4.) As a safety measure against factory espionage, every worker is, according to paragraph 11, part 3, bound not to disclose any particulars about factory installations, business activities and processing methods as well as to refrain from taking down unauthorized notes.

(page 8a of original cont'd)

Sabotage and dissemination of material apt to spread disaffection are closely related to industrial espionage.

Any possible opportunity should be used by departments and plants to instruct their employees with regard to these important facts and duties, and to request them to report at once any suspicion arising to their superiors or direct to the Security Service, so that the matter may be investigated.

Failure to give such information may also represent a serious offense and entail legal prosecution.

5.) Just as documents, drawings and other secret business papers are to be guarded carefully within the factory premises, so it must be seen to it that no unauthorized or unnecessary publications or informations concerning these matters can reach other places outside. This refers, among other secret material, to plans and pictures of the factory, information about the staff, factory-reports and figures concerning the factory, statistical material,

(page 9 of original)

questionnaires from other quarters, articles in trade journals, prospectuses, etc.

For any publication or information of this kind the permission of the Board of Directors has to be obtained in agreement with the Security Service.

Special care is advisable in dealing with inquiries from information-bureaus and/or similar agencies.

6.) Correspondence in matters of a secret nature is to be restricted to a minimum as far as possible and is to be replaced by personal discussion.

In cases of this kind, outgoing mail has to be registered, communications within the factory goes from hand to hand against receipt, the use of the carrier-tube system being prohibited.

Special care is to be taken with communications by wire and by telephone. Matters of a secret nature should not be discussed on the telephone or only so that unauthorized persons will not gain access to this information.

7.) Attention is to be paid to the fact, that no unauthorized persons are staying at the factories and offices within and outside working-hours. If such people are found there, the Security Service should be informed immediately by telephone, for investigation. It is not enough to turn such persons away.

Furthermore it is desirable, that the observance of the regulations laid down for visitors to the factory are carefully watched by the factory staff and that visitors do not move around freely during factory-inspections without authorized guides or visit restricted plants. In such cases too

(page 10 of original)

the Security Service is to be notified immediately by telephone, to make it possible to establish the necessary facts in time.

If business visitors are conducted to the departments and plants for conferences, etc., they will have to be shown back to the door-keeper so that they will not be left to themselves in the administration-building or about the plant.

8.) The factory managements have also to see, that no pictures are taken in the factory premises by unauthorized persons, that no cameras are brought into the plant by staff members or visitors.

In cases of contraventions against this, the Security Service is to be notified immediately by telephone.

Should photographs have to be made of the premises or buildings or within the plants, the Security Service must previously be given the opportunity to state their point of view. The decision rests with the Board of Directors.

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT No. NI-4983
CONTINUED

(page 10 of original cont'd)

9.) In order to have, on week-ends and holidays, a check at the gate on the persons who are authorized to pass the door-keeper, the lists of people working on Sundays and legal holidays which till now had been made out on the preceding day by 1700 hours on Form H No. 9847050, will in the last column be supplemented by stating, which particular door-keeper will be passed by the person in question. In future these lists will be sent direct to the Security Service (instead, as to the Fire-brigade, as before).

(page 11 of original)

Members of the staff on a monthly pay-basis entering the plant outside normal working-hours and on weekends and holidays for business reasons, will notify the door-keeper when entering and leaving.

The report on the night-watch now handed in to the Fire-Department (Form 1109 Din.A 5) will in future be sent also direct to the Security Service.

The Forms will be altered accordingly when new prints are made.

10.) The Security Service will assist the departments and plants in the execution of the above mentioned necessary measures by inspections, especially outside normal working-hours; the departments and plants are requested, to assist the Security Service to the best of their ability in its activities.

The Board of Directors.

(Signature:) Dr. KUEHNE.

(Initial:)

M.

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

We, Julia KERR, No. 20185, and Robert HOFFMANN, No. 1876, hereby certify that we are thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages, and that the above is a true and correct translation of document No. NI-4983.

Julia KERR
No. 20185.

Robert HOFFMANN
No. 1876.

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO. NI-1137
OFFICE OF CHIEF OF COUNSEL FOR WAR
CRIMES

I. G. BERLIN SO 36

(Stamp:) Received: 8 Nov. 1937

To the Legal (Translator's Note; Handwritten:)
Department, Farben Attention of Dr. Kuopper
I.G. Farbenindustrie A.G.
FRANKFURT on MAIN, 20

Your File Ref Your letter of: Our Reference: Dry
v.R./H. 22 Oct. 1937 Legal Department 6 Nov. 1937

Subject:

Handling of confidential correspondence with foreign
representatives.

We wish to thank you for the file Note of 28 May 1934 sent to us with your above mentioned letter and to advise you that we have decided to discontinue the form heretofore used for M.G.-Letters (Translator's Note: Mappe Geheim Briefe (Folder Secret letters), and to cover confidential business matters in the correspondence with our representatives as outlined in the memorandum referred to above.

The individual agencies will gradually be orally informed, during visits which our local officials will pay to them or while foreign executives are present in Berlin.

For your information we are sending to you enclosed a copy of a file memorandum on the proposed future handling of such business matters.

Legal Department

(Translator's Note: (signed) D. BRISSMANN
Handwritten notation:)
To be brought to the attention of
Herr. Pwb. Winkl after his return

1 enclosure
Ø Photo-Europe

Berlin, 5 November 1937

File Memorandum

Subject: Handling of confidential business incidents in
correspondence with European representatives.

Effective immediately, the previous method of using M.G.-letters (Translator's Note: Mappe Geheim Briefe (Folder Secret Letters) will be discontinued. Consequently, M.G.-letters are being eliminated from our correspondence with agencies as well as in the reversed-sense.

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT No. NI-1137
CONT'D

Confidential matters will in the future be dealt with on plain white paper, with the date (without indication of location) in the top right hand corner and a consecutive number in the left hand corner. This number will enable the receiver to check on the receipt of all confidential letters without break. The address and signature of the firm will be eliminated.

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO. NI-1137
CONT'D

The letters will be marked merely with the signature of the respective Chief of the Leader, or the Block Leader, on the original and one carbon copy which will remain here (in more important cases the signature will be that of the department head). The Block leader will collect the confidential letters in an unbroken sequence of numbers and keep them in a special folder.

Mailing to foreign officials will be handled by Berlin, together with the ordinary daily business mail to agencies (in collective envelope) - but in special white envelopes which are plain and do not state the sending. The envelope thus merely shows the address of the receiver.

When mail from Berlin is being opened by agencies these special envelopes are to be remitted to the addressee at once. As a rule, the letter will open Berlin mail himself. Should the confidential communication deal with matters which call for further action when, possibly, they will have to be made available to other employees in the agency, the receiver will be held to express the contents of the letter in a file note of approach form in the language of the respective country, and he must pass it on to the respective referees as coming from him. Thereupon the confidential letter from Berlin must be immediately destroyed by the receiver. Even in cases when confidential communications discuss matters which are merely to be brought to the attention of the addressee, or of the foreign business management, it is indispensable that the respective letter be destroyed after it has been read. There is no objection to the receiver's making brief notes on the matter personally and in suitable form. This must be done in a manner, however, that it does not imply an initiative on the part of the parent establishment, or a connection with same. In other words confidential business letters from Berlin must not be kept in the agency's office or in the addressee's home.

Likewise, in the future confidential communications from agencies to us can no longer be dealt with by the foreign officials in combination with the official correspondence but must be covered by private letters to the Block leaders, on white plain paper. Copies should be made only when special reasons call for it; to be kept - as long as they will be needed - in the residence of the sender. Right hand top corner: the date (without indication of location); upper left hand corner the consecutive number; no address and no signature of the firm but only the signature of the sender. To be mailed together with regular business mail to Berlin but in a white special envelope without indication of sender, stating merely the address of the receiver (Block leader).

The individual agencies are not to be informed in writing of this modification but they are to be informed orally from case to case, incident to visits abroad; or incidental to the visit of one of the foreign executives in Berlin.

(330) FBINDEL

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO. NI-1137
Cont'D

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

I, HERTHA C. KNUTH, AGO No. X-46355, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document No. NI-1137.

HERTHA C. KNUTH
U.S. Civilian
AGO No. X-46.355

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT No. HI-4977
OFFICE OF CHIEF OF COUNSEL FOR WAR CRIMES

I.G. FARBENINDUSTRIE AKTIENGESellschaft
Vermittlungsstelle W, Abteilung A

Leverkusen-I.G. Werk:
22 February 1938

(Translator's Note: Letterhead originally
read: Berlin NW 7, Unter den Linden, 28)

Our Reference: III/1a/2a/5b

SECRET/Registered

(Stamp:) Gr. 24 Feb. 1938

(Stamp:) Hanser, 14 March 1938

(Stamp:) SECRET!

1. This is a state secret in accordance with Art. 38 of the RStGB. (Reich Penal Code)
2. Forwarding only sealed, registered if forwarded by mail.
3. To be kept in a safe place at the responsibility of the addressee

Director Prof. HANSER
or Deputy Prosecutor Grimm
Dept. Batestick,
BERLIN - NW 7

Re: Keeping and/or destroying of obsolete secret documents held by firms.

With reference to our circular of 15 July 1936 - III/2a/5b - with which excerpt from the official directive (Dienstweisung) for Abwehr Beauftragte (agents) was forwarded, we again refer to the instruction concerning keeping and/or destroying of obsolete secret documents held by firms, and at the same time are submitting herewith a copy of the instructions issued relative thereto, for your information.

In addition to these instructions, Art. 44,2, and 302,2, of the HGB (commercial code), and Art. 74 of the GmbH (limited liability company) Law must also be observed - a fact to which particular reference was made recently, a copy of which is also being forwarded for your convenience.

With German salutation

(signature) FAUDEL

(Translator's Note: Pencil notation:) Should we not get a written pledge from Herr Beyer too (as well as Loockle)?

initial (illegible)

(second page of original)

I.G. FARBENINDUSTRIE AKTIENGESellschaft:
Vermittlungsstelle W, Abteilung A

Leverkusen, I.G. Werk:
15 July 1936

(Translator's Note:) Letterhead originally
read: Berlin-NW 7, Unter den Linden 28)

Our Reference: III/2a III/5b

Registered/Confidential:

To

Re: a) Secrecy Pledge
b) Directive for Abwehrbeauftragte (Abwehr agents)

The competent Reich authority has requested that all persons in the industry who handle Abwehr matters or who by reason of their activity otherwise obtain knowledge of this - or of other matters which in the interest of Abwehr should be kept secret - be made to execute a written pledge for secrecy, reference being made to the relevant penal regulations.

Meanwhile, the law of 2/7/1936 amending the criminal code invokes liability for punishment for the violation of such secrecy pledge.

The following is being forwarded herewith:

- 1.) Excerpt from the official directive for Abwehrbeauftragte
- 2.) Copy-print of "Memorandum for Abwehr in the case of espionage and treason"
- 3.) Form for the pledge declaration, in duplicate, for confidential Abwehr agents.
- 4.) Copy-print of "Law against illicit competition, dated 9 March 1932" and "Excerpt from Art. 88 ff of the RStGB (Reich Penal Code) paragraph on High Treason, version of the law of 24 April 1934".
- 5.) Copy of the law of 2 July 1936, amending the criminal code.
- 6.) Pledge declaration, form B, in duplicate.

It is being requested that the pledge declaration as per 3) be executed by you and your deputy, filing one copy with your records.

(Third page of original)

and returning the second copy to us.

The pledge declaration according to form B is to be executed by persons who, in your office or in the plant, will handle these matters. It is being requested that you take care of this also and that, after execution by the persons concerned, one copy be returned to us, while the second copy will remain with your files. Handing of a copy of the above mentioned penal regulations as per figures 4 and 5 to those persons can be dispensed with at this time; it is a requirement, however, that the latter be informed of them specifically, and that they supply a written acknowledgement. It is understood that the reliability of those persons is entirely beyond doubt, otherwise a subsequent investigation by the State Police would be in order, for which we can arrange. Your comments on this will be welcome.

Concerning the excerpt from the official directive for Abwehrbeauftragte, of 20 August 1935, it is explicitly pointed out that this excerpt is to be handled as "strictly confidential" and is to be kept in a safe only. The excerpts bear consecutive numbers; the enclosed excerpt bears No. 53.

The official directive for Abwh (Abwehrbeauftragter) is valid in general for armament establishments; in its meaning, however, it is to be applied in war essential plants also. If there is no special local Abwh, the Abwehr-V.-Man (Translator's Note: "V" stands for Vertrauensmann = confidential agent) will act in his place.

As stated in the Frankfurt circular letter of 2 January 1936, concerning the creation of Vermittlungsstelle W, Section A, figure 4, your plant will be under our care and supervision for matters pertaining to Abwehr.

It is requested, therefore, that if suspicion arises relative to espionage and sabotage, including the loss of secret documents, and except for cases where any delay might be dangerous and where immediate action by the police is indispensable - refer to excerpt from the official directive figure IV Bb - this office be advised initially so that help and advice becomes possible. If the police is called upon directly, a report to us is requested at the same time.

(Fourth Page of original)

You will shortly receive separate advice as to whether and to what extent an investigation is necessary of workers who are to be employed, or reports to competent police authorities in the case of dismissals through double cards (refer to directive for Abwehr Beauftragte in armament establishments, dated 20 August 1935, IV b 3, Sections 1, 4, 5).

The provisions of new Art. 353 b and 353 c of the criminal code - compare copy of the law of 2 July 1936 amending the criminal code - may be applied to the confidential information forwarded from our office (documents and other information).

Special importance must therefore be attached to the careful guarding and preservation of secrecy of such information. For this reason, this being requested that all of these documents be kept separately from other files, in special folders which also on the outside are marked "confidential", placed in safes or other, iron plate clad cabinets equally secure.

Please acknowledge the receipt of this letter and of the enclosures.

Let us know if you have any questions.

(signed) MEERBECK

8 Enclosures.

(Fifth Page of Document)

(Stamp) SECRET

To be kept only in safe

(Translator's Note:

Across the above stamp: (typed) TOP SECRET)

E x c e r p t

from the official directive Abwehr - Beauftragte (Abwehr Agents) in armament establishments 20/8/35

(The statements made in the following on Abwehr Beauftragte (Abwb) - Abwehr Agents - in armament establishments applied also to the confidential security agents (Abw.V.) Abwehr confidential agents (Abw. V.: Abwehr Vertrauensmann) in war essential establishments.)

I. The Abwehrbeauftragte (Abwb)

1. The extraordinarily active foreign military intelligence service calls for the most thoroughgoing consolidation of all forces fighting against espionage, treason, and sabotage, in order to establish a battlefield under uniform command.

II. Abwehr's position in establishments generally speaking

1. Every establishment handling secret Wehrmacht orders -- directly or indirectly -- is upon request held to make available to the military Abwehr organization, members of the establishment suitable as Abwehr agents. The Abwehr agent at the same time acts as specialist with the management of the establishment for enforcement of the secrecy pledge for which the management of the establishment remains responsible.

Therefore, a constant close cooperation between the Abwb and the Betriebsfuhrer is necessary.

For the accomplishment of his duties, the Abwb must at all times be enabled to have access to any premises used in connection with execution of Wehrmacht orders, and he must be informed in such adequate time of the introduction of secret items into production that he may take preparatory protective measures. The Abwb. has to examine the secrecy pledge declaration signed by the management of the establishment.

(Sixth Page of original)

3. Unless a deviating order is issued in individual cases, the fact of the appointment as an Abwb. of the Reich War Ministry is to be kept secret from the personnel; which persons in the establishment are to be informed will be determined together with the management.

The personnel may, however, be informed of the name of the Abwb. as the person acting in behalf of the management of the establishment in all cases of espionage, treason and sabotage. The personnel is to be instructed to report all such cases to him or to an office otherwise distinctly specified.

III. op

IV. Duties of the Abwb.

A. General duties

1. It is the duty of the Abwb to check that instructions issued by the Wehrmacht concerning secrecy (Memorandum pertaining to Abwehr: espionage, and treason, and special instructions) and the secrecy pledge declarations of his establishment are being observed strictly. Negligence in seemingly unimportant matters may make treason, espionage, and sabotage easy.

Above all there is the practical work in the establishment; written communications are to be limited as much as possible. Doubts which might arise are to be explained in an oral discussion if possible.

2. The Abwb. must -- on the basis of the instructions given him by the Abwehr office and the briefing by the Betriebsfuhrer (see III¹) -- have a clear concept of what is to be protected as a state secret and how to go about it.

Wherever a state secret seems to be in danger, the Abwb. must interfere and protect the interest of the Abwehr.

The whole establishment is to be examined accordingly in order to detect any points of danger and to submit proposals for necessary security measures to the Betriebsfuhrer.

(7th Page of original)

These measures are to be carried out and checked currently, in agreement with the management.

3 to 4 pp.

5. The duties of the Abwehr incidental to the discharge of the task assigned to him became apparent especially in the following cases:

Careful protection measures of all kinds against treason, espionage, and sabotage, visits to the establishments, employment of foreigners.

To be watchful of the correct attitude in the case of treason, espionage, and sabotage, and assuring cooperation with the Abwehr offices and the state police offices.

Correct attitude in the case of the loss of secret documents.

Depending upon the size of his works the Abwb. must establish for himself associates and a circle of confidential agents in order to accomplish his duties.

6. Individuals belonging to the works security or supervisory service (including door-keepers, watchmen) for whom it will prove expedient to be under the orders of Abwb. are to be trained and educated along Abwehr lines.

B. The Abwehr service according to plan

a) Secret protection carefully mapped out

1. SAFEGUARDING of locality and PROTECTING OF THE PREMISES of plant installations against robbery, sabotage, and breaking in by strange people from the outside.

Fencing-in of the plant grounds; possibility for detaining access means for keeping them under lock and key, special protection or blocking off of premises which are endangered, or premises provided for secret production.

Guarding of plant installations, checking on guard service. Protecting of the scrap - metal and dress depot, etc.

2. HANDLING OF SECRET WRITTEN COMMUNICATIONS.

Deposition in safes, question regarding keys; handling of the mail folders.

Making available and forwarding of secret documents, drawings; use and safekeeping of workshop drawings.

(Eighth Page of original)

Handling of drafts not currently used, blue prints, carbon copies, used carbon paper, misprints, supervising when destroying same.

Supervision in tracing and drawing installations.

Taking home of secret documentations, etc; prohibition to make copies of secret documents.

Proper use of camouflage designations according to order.

Security measures regarding doors to rooms where documents are being held which must be kept particularly secret.

Checking on all instructions along this line, also after office hours and during rest periods.

3. THE EMPLOYEE AS A REPOSITORY FOR SECRETS (GEHEIMNISSTRAGER)

Checking on the individuals to be employed.

Pledge and briefing of persons serving as repositories for secrets.

Surveillance of persons serving as repositories for secrets, if occasion arises, in cooperation with confidential agents.

Well founded request for surveillance of employees who are to be dismissed if a suspicion for espionage or a possibility for treason at a later date, appear justified.

Notification of competent state police office through double card index sheet according to prescribed models if employees are not being hired because of unreliability or are being dismissed for that reason.

Teaching all members of the establishment how to keep secrets (see memorandum, section V) and how to carry on the common fight against espionage, treason, and sabotage.

Lecturing repeatedly to the personnel, from time to time, and on special occasions, (correct action, breaking away from loose talk, caution during conversations.)

Posting of appropriate warnings against espionage in the works; drastic presentation in pictures in alternating sequence and in different places.

(Ninth Page of document)

Instruction to personnel on reporting cases involving suspicion of espionage, treason, and sabotage, as well as turning in of inflammatory publications.

4. INTERCOMMUNICATION (VERKEHR) SURVEILLANCE.

Surveillance of all workers (employees, laborers and apprentices) when entering and leaving; instructions to the door-keepers; spot test type of bodily search.

Surveillance of intercommunications within works' confines.

Passes and identifications tokens for members of the establishments or for persons occupied in the establishment officially.

Supervising members of other establishments working in this particular plant, of messes, etc.

Regulating admission of members of the Wehrmacht visiting the plant on official business.

Regulating admission of officials and of semi-official persons, as well as of outsiders not belonging to the works (merchants, purveyors).

Checking of vehicles.

Plant inspections by indigenous persons and foreigners, such as: business friends, foreign representatives, representatives of the Labor Front, air raid protection, professional corporations, Reich and Lander insurance institutions, industrial inspection boards, fire insurance companies, etc. works inspections by domestic and foreign commissions, officials, etc. who announced their coming.

Precautions when issuing permanent passes - time limitation and stamps indicating checks, as expiration dates.

Prohibition to take photographs.

5. pp.

6. CONTROL, preventing state secrets from being jeopardized by statistics and by requests for information (in matters of insurance, information to banks, inquiries from information bureaus, auditing of books, etc.

Handling of new fire insurance contracts or indemnity requests.

(10th Page of original)

Secrecy for AIR RAID PROTECTION MEASURES - to the extent necessary - in cooperation with the official handling the works' air raid protection.

b.) Action to be taken in case of a suspicion for treason, espionage or sabotage

In each instance of espionage, treason, or sabotage, or in the case of such suspicion, the Abwehr must interfere at once.

He has to see that nobody works on the case in disregard of him. Every member of the establishment must know to whom he has to report such observations.

In every such instance the competent office of the secret state police (political police) must be notified immediately.

If there exists any danger and if immediate action by the executive body of the police seems imperative - for instance in case of suspicion of escape, danger of black-out -, the Abwh. must contact the competent state police office directly. In this connection, it must be borne in mind that, in general, only state police authorities (not municipal police or Gendarmes) are able to handle espionage cases expertly. Police authorities other than the state police should be called upon only in case

of emergency. (see Memorandum, Section VI and VII). As soon as the state police takes action, the directing of investigations passes into its hands completely within the scope of the instructions received by him; the Abwh. will have to assist fully in carrying these investigations through.

In connection with all measures, it must be remembered that it is not sufficient to arrest one individual agent, but high quality circumstantial evidence must also be secured, accomplices must be apprehended, the connections must at least be recognized.

Therefore: there must be no hasty or premature arrests, no conspicuous measures.

The independent handling of espionage cases, and the like by the Abwh. alone or by the security service of the establishment - without recourse to the state police - is prohibited.

(Eleventh Page of Document)

c.) Action to be taken in case of loss of secret documents.

The loss of secret documents - even a temporary loss - always carries with itself a suspicion of espionage or treason. One must make sure that such cases of loss are immediately being reported to the Abwh. even if there is a possibility that the document may be found again. Therefore, cases of loss must be immediately reported to the Abwehr office and followed up energetically under the direction of the Abwehr office - if necessary, according to directives from the state police.

Any loss of time involves danger for a possibility to solve the case.

The Abwh. must obtain permission from the plant direction to check secret documents at appropriate intervals as to their completeness in number and their safekeeping; at the prescribed place

V. The Abw. must bear in mind that he is an important link in the general German Abwehr-front. He will be able to accomplish his task only if he is devoting himself to it sufficiently trained, using all his abilities and, if necessary, risking his whole personality in the interest of the German people.

(Twelfth page of original)

Re: Safekeeping of secret documents.

Certain persons are to take the specific responsibility for the safekeeping of secret documents.

For details of regulations see

Enclosure C

Secret documents must be protected against robbery, unauthorized use or study, and separate from other documents be kept in safes or iron clad cabinets. The iron-clad cabinets are to be placed in rooms having security locks, their being properly locked must be checked on also after office hours by special watchmen.

During working hours secret documents must not lie around unguarded.

At the conclusion of work, all secret documents -- as an example, workshop drawings too, are to be taken to the places provided for their safekeeping.

Workshops in which there is secret equipment, are to be locked carefully and to be guarded in an increased measure.

Guard personnel is to be given particular briefing with regard to their task.

The party with whom the order is placed must keep records showing what secret documents, drawings, etc. have been handed over and where they are. Appropriate checks to establish their being available completely must be made frequently.

The Reich War Ministry may check on the carrying out of the above mentioned regulations at any time.

Re: Returning or destruction of documents, etc. which are no longer needed.

All written material including copies and duplicates of same and those which are torn or stained, or, therefore, individual fragments of drawings which had been made or cut in pieces for workshops or subcontractors must, after execution of the order, be returned to the agency which placed the order, at the latest when rendering final bills. Receipts will be returned to the consignee (Auftragnehmer). He is not permitted to destroy original data. The agency placing the order may grant exceptions to these regulations.

For detailed instructions see

Enclosure B

When burning other written data of a confidential nature, and particulars prepared by the consignee, care must be taken to see that this is being carried out thoroughly and that scraps of paper do not reach the outside by way of the chimney or remain in the ashes untouched by combustion. When using a paper breaking machine, the process must be carried to a point where it becomes impossible to put the individual fragments of paper back together again. A notation on such destructions is to be recorded (dokumentiert) by the firm. Two witnesses must certify to the act of the destruction.

(Thirteenth Page of original)

Article 44,2 HGB (Commercial Code)

The same applies to business letters received and to copies of business letters sent out, as well as to inventories and balance sheets.

Article 303,2 of the HGB

The books and papers of the company are to be deposited for ten years at a safe place designated by the tribunal at the locality where the company has its headquarters.

Article 74 GmbH Law (Law governing limited liability companies)

After termination of the liquidation, the books and papers of the company are to be turned over to one of the company partners or to a third person for safekeeping. In the absence of a provision in the

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT No. HI-4977
(Cont'd)

company statutes or a resolution by the company partners, the company partner or the third person will be designated by the tribunal (Art. 7, par.1)

pp.

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

I, MERTHA C. KRUH, ACC No. E-046356, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the Russian and German languages, and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document No. HI-4977.

MERTHA C. KRUH
ACC No. E-046356
U. S. Civilian

(B H D)

Minutes

of the Technical Mainrau Management meeting at
Frankfurt/Main - Hoechst on 28 November 1938

The following gentlemen were present:

LAUTENSCHLAGER
JACOBI
JAEFFE
KRAENZLEIN
ROTH
FEHRLE
HAGENBOECKER
HILCKEN
HIRSCHEL
LANGE

(page 2 of original)

LAUTENSCHLAGER discusses the minutes of Management meetings
of other Works: (Dr. BRILL has been entrusted with the
direction of the exchange of knowledge in the field of
physics in place of Prof. GRIMM Dr. KAYSER-Bitterfeld is
going to the Vermittlungsstelle W in place of NEUMANN - the
appointment of foreigners must be avoided at all costs)
(marginal note in handwriting: SCHRAUBER?)

(page 5 of original)

(signed) HIRSCHEL

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

23 June 1947

I, Victoria ORTON, No. 20 129, hereby certify that I am
thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages
and that the above is a true and correct translation of
Excerpt of document No. NI-6382

Victoria ORTON
No. 20 129

"END"

I.G. Farbenindustrie A.G.
Vermittlungsstelle W

11 January 1939
Dr. Wg./Ra.

Secret!

1. This is a state secret within the meaning of article 88 of the Reich Penal Code.
2. To be transmitted only under seal and if mailed, by "Registered" post.
3. To be kept on the responsibility of addressee under lock and key.

File Memorandum.

Re: Chemical warfare agents (K-Stoffe)
Procedure as to secret correspondence.

Conference at the Vermittlungsstelle W on 11 January 1939.

Those present were: Dr. Boeckler,	}	I.G. Ludwigshafen
Justizrat Dr. Wagner		
Dr. Wittwer		
Dr. Gorr	}	I.G. Vermittlungsstelle W.
Dr. Wagner		

A statement should be made as to how the transmission of top secret matters can be largely eliminated, or how it can be brought about that the necessary number of copies may be produced in such cases without infringing the law against the taking of excerpts or the making of copies. In many cases it is necessary to pass on to several persons a letter received from OKH. In order to avoid delays, each individual should receive his own copy. It is also desirable the person in question be able to keep this copy so that he can consult it at any time during later conferences.

Following a proposal discussed by the undersigned a few days ago with Regierungsrat Dr. Janssen of the OKH, Pruef 9, it is agreed to create a new code combination from time to time and to produce the necessary number of copies of the code book. Letters which are received as top secret matter by the Vermittlungsstelle W

(page 2 of original)

and which cannot be broken down into ordinary secret letters will be sent, in the original, to Ludwigshafen.

(page 2 of original, cont'd)

Ludwigshafen will then incorporate the contents of these letters in a new letter which will be distributed to all experts as well as to Vermittlungsstelle W and which will open with roughly the following words:

" We learn today from OKH, Testing Center the following:
(the citation of the letter follows)"

These letters which are to be written as and when required are to show the exact distribution. In addition, the individual copies are to be numbered so that it can always be determined who has received such a letter.

For the procedure within the Ludwigshafen Works it has been ordered by Director Dr. Ambros in the meantime that all original secret letters concerning his department are to be kept in his (Dr. Ambros') Secretariat only, insofar as letters dealing mainly with chemical matters are concerned. If the contents are of a preponderantly legal nature, Dr. Boeckler is to keep them. By means of these new measures a centralization of correspondence is guaranteed.

After Department of the Directorate T at Ludwigshafen has moved into the buildings Ludwigshafen I, secret matters will in future be dealt with by the analytical chemists in question only in the offices which are available for this purpose in the buildings Ludwigshafen I. Top secret matters will be transmitted in specially provided brief-cases with letter or figure combination-locks. The combination is known only to the initiated experts and will be changed from time to time.

The Vermittlungsstelle W will also try, wherever possible, to transform inquiries received as top secret matters, into ordinary secret letters, by means of appropriate changes in the contents, or by the omission of superfluous references.

(page 3 of original)

In this manner a further simplification of the correspondence can be achieved.

signed Wagner

♠ Justizrat Dr. Wagner, Ludwigshafen
♠ Dr. Boeckler, Legal Department, Ludwigshafen
♠ Dr. Wittwor, Ludwigshafen

5 x

Registered

TRANSLATION OF

DOCUMENT No. 5686

CONTINUED

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

28 May 1947

I, Deryl C. BESWICK, No. D 427459, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages and that the above is a true and correct translation of the document No. NI-5686.

Deryl C. BESWICK, No. D 427459

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT No. NI-4981
OFFICE OF CHIEF OF COUNSEL FOR
WAR CRIMES

I.G. Farbenindustrie Aktiengesellschaft
Intermediary Office W, Department A

Leverkusen - I.G. plant
6 May 1939.

Our Ref No.: III/1a/2a/5b

S e c r e t / Registered !

(rubber stamp:)

SECRET!

1. This is a State Secret according to Paragraph 88 of the Reich Penal Code.
2. Only to be passed on sealed and by registered mail.
3. Receiver responsible for keeping it locked up in a safe place.

To

Director Rudolf HANSEN

(rubber stamp)

or Deputy Confidential Clerk GRIMM
Department Batestick

HANSEN
11 May 1939

B e r l i n - NW 7

(rubber stamp:)

Secret 11 May 1939

Subject: Counter Intelligence.

1.) Binding declaration by sub-contractors.

With reference to our circular letter of 11 January 1939 - III/2a/5b - we inform you that, according to regulation issued in the meantime, the enclosed printed form

"Pledge of Sub-contractors in Connection with
Secret Commissions (Sub-contracts)."

must be used.

The enclosures mentioned in this form

"Binding Declaration by Members of the Staff"

and

"Extract from the Regulations"

are familiar.

Sub-contractors' Pledge Forms, as also the enclosures, can be obtained from us, if required.

We specifically point out once more, however, that the forms should only be handed out in cases of sub-contracts requiring the protection of secrecy. In cases of sub-contracts that are not secret these protective measures should not be applied.

2.) Employment of Jews.

An official agency has advised us of the following regulation which we herewith bring to your notice:

"The Supreme Command of the Armed Forces has decreed that the employment of Jews in the departments of protected works is prohibited on principle.

This decree also applies to the protected "k.-+ 1." works. (Works of vital importance and essential to the war effort.)

To be regarded as Jews according to this decree are the Jews of German nationality (Paragraph 5 of the first regulation of the law relating to German Citizens of 14 November 1935 - Reich Legal Gazette I; page 2333).

Jews of foreign nationality and Jews without nationality will be treated as foreigners and will therefore naturally be rejected as well. (page 2 of original)

Enclosed we transmit for your information the copy of a decree of 20 December 1938 issued by the president of the Reich Institution for Allocation of Labour and Unemployment Insurance."

Should any plants intend to provide employment on the lines suggested, would they please get in touch with us beforehand.

3.) Making contact with Foreigners through the Armament Industry

It had been established that export firms have tried, more or less skillfully, and in every possible way, to get in touch with foreigners travelling to or staying in Germany, either personally or

(page 2 of original cont'd)

through go-betweens at private or official occasions.

In doing this they had the often not unjustified hope of establishing a first connection with the country in question.

Such contacts have had the result that firms have made agreements for foreigners, especially members of foreign armies, to visit the plants, without having beforehand obtained the permission of the Wehrmacht branch by whom they had been commissioned.

This form of making contacts places the authorities in an awkward position, if subsequently the permission to visit must be refused for reasons of military policy or secrecy.

Once more we draw the firms' attention to the fact that they must obtain the approval of the competent office before making contacts with foreigners with a view to their inspecting works or sections of works of vital importance which are essential for war purposes, concerning which secrecy must be observed, or which are especially vulnerable as regards sabotage. Moreover it is advisable to inform the representatives in foreign countries (German or foreign) to that effect.

Heil Hitler !
Signature: FAUM ?

(page 3 of original)

Firm heading

Place, date

To the

firm

for the attention of Herr

Subject: Pledge of sub-contractors in connection with secret commissions (Sub-contracts).

According to instructions received by me/us from the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces I am/we are obliged, before commissioning you, to draw the attention of your firm to the regulations concerning Treason (paragraph 88 and following paragraphs of Reich Penal Code) and Betrayal of secrets (paragraph 353b and c Reich Penal Code). For the same reason I/we must pledge your firm to secrecy, and to an observance of the relevant regulations, especially those below, and must request you to make the following declaration:

- 1.) All members of the staff-as well as members of the Aufsichtsrat and of the Vorstand- who, by reason of their collaboration have gained knowledge of such essential items of the sub-contracts, as are not customary in trade, have had their attention drawn to the regulations concerning treason (paragraph 88 and following paragraphs of the Reich Penal Code, and paragraph 353 b and c Reich Penal Code). After receiving the said instruction these persons have been, or will be, pledged in accordance with the attached declaration.
- 2.) Only reliable persons of German nationality, who have been, or will be, examined by the State Police, will be entrusted with the execution of the order.
- 3.) All unauthorized persons, including members of the staff who are not concerned with the order, are forbidden to inspect the work-rooms, in which the above-mentioned order is being executed, or where parts of the secret sub-contract are being stored. On the other hand, officers, and officials in pursuance of their duty are allowed to visit all the manufacturing installations.
- 4.) The manufacturing of the secret parts of the sub-contracts will be carried out apart from the other work, in special work rooms, as far as this is practicable (with the exception of unessential parts of the articles concerned, and such as are customary in trade

(page 4 of original)

- 5.) The order will not be passed on, except for unessential parts, customary in trade, from which no deductions can be made as to secret production for the Armed Forces, and which give no clue to the commission as a whole.
- 6.) We shall see to it that all records of the commission, such as contracts, descriptions, photos, photo stats, terms of delivery, models, designs, sketches, instructions, etc. are kept in a safe place, especially after working hours - ordinary wooden cupboards and desks do not suffice. Adequate safeguarding measures have been taken, or will be taken immediately, at the plant installations, where the order is being executed, or where articles forming part of the order are being stored. Independent duplication of secret records, - designs and others, - are prohibited. Manufactured articles that prove useless are to be destroyed, or stored in such a way that they cannot get into the wrong hands.
- 7.) Secret material, such as documents, for instance, designs, samples, are to be sent "registered" or as an "insured parcel", amount of insurance RM 300.-. Top secret matters will be sent as parcels insured for more than RM 1001.-. They will be dispatched packed in two layers of non-transparent paper and addressed to the consignee personally.
- 8.) I/we pledge myself/ourselves to inform the Counter Intelligence Office in my/our competent military district immediately and in the quickest possible way if any cases of treason, espionage, sabotage or even of suspicion thereof occur, as well as in cases of loss of secret material.
- 9.) For all other information the competent War Economy Inspectorate, or War Economy Office, will be available.
- 10.) I/we know that the above regulations represent orders or prohibitions issued by the Government for the purpose of safeguarding the defense of the country in accordance with paragraph 92 b of the Reich Penal Code. It has been specifically pointed out to me/us, that any act contrary to the pledge will be punished in accordance with the relevant regulations relating to treason, as far as no other regulations of penal law apply.

Enclosures:

Binding declaration by members of the staff
Extract from the regulations.

(page 5 of original)

Subject: Pledge of secrecy.

I/we acknowledge receipt of your letter of
and herewith declare that I/we took all necessary steps
in accordance with your letter and will faithfully observe
these regulations.

(handwritten:)

208

11

(page 6 of original)

Copy of a copy.

The President
of the
Reich Institution for Allocation
of Labour and Unemployment Insurance.

Berlin-Charlottenburg 2
Hardenbergstrasse 12,
20 December 1938.

Ref.No. II 5431/59

To

- a) the Presidents of the Regional Labour Offices
- b) the President of the Reich Institution for Allocation of Labour and Unemployment Insurance, Branch Office Austria, Vienna
- c) the Nurnberg Branch Office of the Regional Labour Office Bavaria, Nurnberg
- d) the Special Commissioner of the Reich Institution for Allocation of Labour and Unemployment Insurance in the German Sudeten territories, Reichenberg.

Subject: Employment of Jews.

Reference: My circular decrees of 19 October 1938.
- II 5431/36 -

According to reports submitted to me the number of unemployed Jews has increased considerably. It is not the interest of the State to fail to utilize the working power of Jews fit for employment, and possibly to support these from public funds without any compensation. Efforts should be made to put to work all unemployed Jews fit for employment as quickly as possible, and in this way to effect, if possible, the release of German labour for urgent projects of importance to State policy. The Jews will be employed in plants, departments of plants, on construction and improvement work, segregated from the staff. I would ask you therefore, to use your endeavours in order to induce public and private enterprises in your district to provide such employment.

page 7
of
original

The employer may be assured that the fact that he is employing Jews will have no disadvantageous results for either himself or his business. To be regarded as Jews according to this decree are the Jews of German nationality and Jews without nationality (paragraph 5 of the first regulation of the law relating to German Citizens of 14 November 1935, Reich Legal Gazette I, page 1333), who are fit for work. Regarding the question of public enterprises, providing suitable work for Jews, as well, I have got in touch with the highest Reich Authorities concerned. At the same time I have asked the Reich Minister for Economics and the Reich Food Minister to point out specifically to the owners of private enterprises the necessity for employing Jews as soon as possible and of providing suitable work for them.

This decree is issued with the explicit approval of the Commissioner for the Four Year Plan, President of the Cabinet Council, Field Marshal General Goering. I have asked the Deputy of the Fuehrer to inform the Party offices, including subsidiary and affiliated organisations, in accordance with this decree.

I would ask you to let me have current reports on the measures you have taken and the experiences you have made by the 15th of every month, the first report being due on 15 January 1939.

gez. Dr.SYRUP.

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

I, Julia KERR, No.20185, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages, and that the above is a true and correct translation of document No.NI-4981.

Julia KERR
No. 20185.

"END"

///

I.G. Farbenindustrie Aktiengesellschaft
Vermittlungsstelle, Section A

Our reference:

III/Ia/2a/12c/5b

Berlin NW 7, Unter den Linden 82
Leverhulsen-I.G. Werk
5th of June, 1939

Rubber-Stamp: Gr.-7 June 1939
Rubber-Stamp: Hanser 7 June 1939

Rubber-Stamp:

1. This is a state-secret within the meaning of article 88 of the Reich Penal Code.
2. To be forwarded in a sealed envelope only, to be registered if sent by mail.
3. To be kept at responsibility of addressee under lock.

Director Aud. HANSER
or his deputy Prokurist G. III,
(Nitrogen Statistics Dept.) Section Batestick,
Berlin NW 7

Subject: Publicity on works run under the auspices of
Four Years' Plan.

We have been requested by the competent authorities to point out again to all our plants and offices that at a meeting of the General Council for Economic Affairs on the 15th of May of this year Field Marshal GOERING pointed out with the greatest possible emphasis, that security regulations regarding publicity on works operated under the Four Year Plan must be more rigidly observed. Recently reports have allegedly once again been published in the German press, which enabled foreign countries to calculate without any difficulties the production capacity of important plants operated under the Four Years Plan. One editor, we are told, has actually been reprimanded for publishing such a report.

Since these security regulations apply i.e. to Buna, Hydrogenation- and Cellulose plants, i.e. especially to plants producing important German industrial materials, it seems necessary to prohibit the publication of statistical reports on these plants, which would provide data for the calculation of production capacity, nor to permit any information to be made public on the number of employees, the number of construction workers employed, on new buildings or plants, or on the figures of total production etc.

over

(page 2 of original)

We should like to take this opportunity of pointing out once again the advisability of referring all communications with the Press re publicity on matters other than those of purely local import having no possible bearing on the subjects mentioned above, to the Berlin News Agency (Nachrichtenstelle Berlin), who are conversant at all times with the relevant, official regulations. Cases have, in our experience occurred time and again, of statistic material, subject to security regulations, being published in the guise of "Local News".

Heil Hitler!

Signature FAUBEL

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

4 June 1947

I, Leonhard LAWRENCE, Civ. No. 20 138, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages and that the above is a true and correct translation of the document No. PI-6147.

Leonhard LAWRENCE
Civ. No. 20 138.

- 2 -
END

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO. NI-4978
OFFICE OF CHIEF OF COUNSEL FOR WAR
CRIMES

I.G. Farbenindustrie Aktiengesellschaft
Vermittlungsstelle W, Section A.

Our Reference: III/1a/2a/5b

(Translator's Note: Berlin NW 7
Unter den Linden 82 corrected to
read) Leverkusen, I.G. Werke
26 June 1939

Stamp:
Secret!

1. This is a State Secret in accordance
with Art. 88 of the RStGB (Reich Penal
Code).

2. Forwarding only sealed and
registered if forwarded by mail.

3. To be kept at the responsibility of
the addressee in a safe place.

To
Director Rud. HANSER or his
Deputy, Prokurist GRIMM

Stamp: Gr. 26 June 1939

Berlin NW 7
Dorotheenstr. 54

Re: Security/Change of Identification Papers in Case "A". (Translator's Note:
Case "A" is code word for "in case of War".)

We received the following directive from official authorities:

"In case of mobilization all identification papers are to be
modified by pasting on a stamp of conspicuous color or by applying
a stud, or by taking any similar and plainly clear measure. The
material therefore must be obtained in peacetime and held in readi-
ness. There must be every assurance that the enforcement of the
control of traffic which of necessity must be more severe takes place
at the very instant when the mobilization task of the plant starts."

To assure the execution of this directive for the alteration of the
identification papers and - depending upon their make (whether or not they
have a "decelith protection") - it is advisable to have a supply of stamps and
riveting instruments in stock so that the application of the distinguishing
mark demanded can proceed with greatest speed.

Heil Hitler!

(Signature)

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

I, HERTHA C. KNUTH, AGO NO. X 046355, hereby certify that I am thoroughly
conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a
true and correct translation of Document No. NI - 4978.

HERTHA C. KNUTH
U. S. Civilian
AGO NO. X 046355.

END

10372 *

DIRECTIVES
for the Political Security Activity
of the Security Officer (Abwehrbeauftragter) (Abwb)
Published by the Office of the Geheime Staatspolizei
(Translator's Note: Gestapo)
--- 1939 ---

This is a secret matter in the sense of § 88 of the
R St G B. (Translator's Note: Reichsstrafgesetzbuch,
the Reich Penal Code) (Version of 24.4.34). Misuse
will be punished according to law, as far as other
penal regulations do not come into question.

(Page 2 of original)

CONTENTS

Tasks of the Security Officer (Abwehrbeauftragter).....	p. 4
Right of Direction and Superintendence of the Geheime Staatspolizei. (Translator's Note: Gestapo).....	p. 6
Relations with the Geheime Staats- polizei.....	p. 7
Appointment and recall of the Security Officer (Abwehrbeauftragter).....	p. 8

(Page 3 of original)

THE SECURITY OFFICER (Abwehrbeauftragter) (Abwb) is
appointed and engaged by either the Reich Leader of the SS (Reichs-
fuhrer-SS) and Head of the German Police in the Reich Ministry of
the Interior (Reichsministerium des Innern) or by the Supreme
Command of the Armed Forces (Oberkommando der Wehrmacht), or by an
office charged by either of these two authorities and is assigned
to and engaged by a plant which needs special protection.

If a Security Officer, who has already been appointed by one
authority, will be acknowledged by another authority, according to
the agreements reached, he has to act for both authorities.

The tasks and duties of the Security Officer in regard to his
activity as Deputy of the Geheime Staatspolizei (Translator's Note:
Gestapo), result from the following Directives, issued by the Reich
Leader of the SS and Chief of the German Police at the Reich Min-
istry of the Interior (Geheimes Staatspolizeiamt).

(Page 4 of original)

I. TASKS OF THE SECURITY OFFICER

Task of the Geheime
Staatspolizei:

1. The Geheime Staatspolizei has the task to investigate and to combat all moves that are dangerous to the State, to collect and to utilize the result of the investigations, to inform the Government, and to keep the other authorities up-to-date as to findings which are important for them and to provide them with suggestions.

General Tasks of the
Security Officer
(Abwehrbeauftragter):

2. From this assignment (Translator's Note: Aufgabestellung) results the task of the Security Officer, who has to become active as an auxiliary organ of the Geheime Staatspolizei.
He is obliged,
a) to communicate at once to the Geheime Staatspolizei all observations and findings regarding moves within his firm or sphere of activity that are dangerous to the State,
b) to be active as reporting station (Meldestelle) of the management, for all current affairs of treason and sabotage,
c) to follow the instructions of the Geheime Staatspolizei, as to defence and combat of all exertions hostile to the State.

Task of the Security
Officer (Abwehrbeauf-
tragter) in detail:

3. Especially any activity of a person is dangerous to the State which is opposed to the building up of the National Socialist Reich as far as this activity is bent on causing a disturbance of the employed persons (political and strike agitation, horror propaganda etc.), or on the preparation of

(Page 5 of original)

execution of treason and sabotage of any kind, or to the concentration and organization of individuals hostile to the State.

Preventive activity
of the Security
Officer.

4. A cardinal point of Counter-Intelligence is the preventive activity of the Security Officer. Therefore, part of his job is the speedy recognition of asocial and unlawful conditions and occurrences among the employed persons which could be easily utilized by individuals hostile to the State for breaches of the public peace, agitation, and for actions of treason and sabotage. He has to pay special attention to all former and present enemies of the State, of all political convictions, to all persons at the plant who are previously charged with moral turpitude and criminal offense, and who represent, especially in times of strain, a permanent source of danger for the smooth accomplishment of the economic program.

Competence for
Immediate Measures:

5. Principally, the Security Officer has not to carry out independent investigations. He and the Werkschutz are especially forbidden to treat cases of espionage independently, without contacting the Staatspolizei (Leit) Stelle ((District) Gestapo Offices). After contact with the Geheime Staatspolizei, the direction of every investigation and the execution of inquiries is in the hands of that Staatspolizei (Leit) Stelle ((District) Gestapo Office) which is competent for the respective firm. Only in case of imminent danger, the Security Officer, as an auxiliary organ of the Geheime Staatspolizei, has to take those measures, which are necessary for the removal

(Page 6 of original)

of the danger. The Security Officer is, however, in every case responsible for immediately informing the Geheime Staatspolizei.

Only in the greatest emergency will other police authorities (criminal police, uniformed police cops, gendarmerie) (Translator's Note: Kriminalpolizei, Schutzpolizei, Gendarmerie) be contacted in addition to the competent Staatspolizei (Leit) Stelle. ((District) Gestapo Offices).

Obligation of
Secrecy:

6. Absolute secrecy has to be maintained by the Security Officer about all factual and personal communications of the Geheime Staatspolizei, except when, in individual cases such communications are especially released for transmittal. This obligation of secrecy continues to exist after discharge from the office.

Obligation to take
part in Labor Meetings
(Arbeitstagen):

7. The Security Officer is obliged, to obey the invitations of the Chief of the Security Police (Sicherheitspolizei) and of the SD, to take part in fundamental Labor Meetings (Arbeitstagen). If he is unable to attend, he has to report this in time.

II. RIGHT OF DIRECTION AND SUPERINTENDENCE
(Weisungs- und Aufsichtsrecht)
OF THE GEHEIME STAATSPOLIZEI.

Right of Direction
of the Geheime
Staatspolizei:

1. The Geheime Staatspolizei has a right of direction in all political affairs which are connected with the tasks of the Security Officer.

(Page 7 of original)

Right of Super-
intendence (Aufsichts-
recht) of the Geheime
Staatspolizei:

2. Furthermore, the Geheime Staatspolizei has the right of superintendence over all Counter-Intelligence measures which are, or were, taken in the course of these tasks.

3. In cases of doubt, the Chief of the Sicherheitspolizei (Translator's Note: Security Police) and the SD (Translator's Note: Sicherheitsdienst, Security Service) will decide.

III. RELATIONS WITH THE GEHEIME STAATSPOLIZEI

Local Competency
of the Security
Officer:

1. The Security Officer is annexed to (angegliedert) that Staatspolizei(Leit)stelle (Translator's Note: (District) Gestapo Office) within whose district his firm or sphere of activity is located.
If, on account of the physical location of the firm, two or more Staatspolizei(Leit)Stellen (Translator's Note: (District) Gestapo Offices) are competent, that Staatspolizei(Leit)stelle will be considered competent, within whose district the Security Officer has his office.
In cases of doubt the Chief of the Security Police (Sicherheitspolizei) and SD (Translator's Note: Sicherheitsdienst, Security Service) will decide.

Communication with
the Geheime Staats-
polizei:

2. The Security Officer has to maintain immediate communication with the Chief of the competent (District) Gestapo Office (Staatspolizei(Leit)stelle), resp. with his Deputy.
Within the frame of local and factual competency, the Leader of the Staatspolizei(Leit)stelle, resp. his Deputy, is obliged to allot to the Security Officer at all times the support of the State Police (Staatspolizeilich).

Forms of Official
Contact:

3. The Official Contact takes place verbally or in writing. Important communications must be acknowledged in writing.

(Page 8 of original)

Treatment of Secret
Written Communica-
tions:

4. As far as communications are marked as requiring maintenance of secrecy or are to be considered as that, they will be handled according to the Directives of the "Secrecy Regulations for Firms Manufacturing Items for the Wehrmacht" (Geheimhaltungsbestimmungen fuer Firmen bei Ausfuehrung von Wehrmachtsauftraegen), published by the OKW in 1939 resp. according to the "Instruction Regarding Treatment of Secret Exchange of Documents", (Anweisung ueber Behandlung des geneimen Schriftverkehrs), published by the Reich Ministry of Economics (Reichswirtschaftsministerium) in agreement with the OKW.

IV. APPOINTMENT AND RECALL OF THE SECURITY OFFICER

Appointment of the
Security Officer:

1. Within the sphere of the Reich Leader of the SS and Chief of the German Police at the Rmd. I. the appointment of the Security Officer and his Deputy is made in writing by the Chief of the Security Police (Sicherheitspolizei) and the SD.

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO. NL-2883
Cont'd

The appointment may be refused only in case of present cogent reasons.

Recall of the
Security Police:

2. Within the sphere of the Reich Leader of the SS and Chief of the German Police at the R.Md. I, the recall of the Security Officer is likewise done in writing by the Chief of the Security Police (Sicherheitspolizei) and SD (Translator's Note: Sicherheitsdienst, Security Service).

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

I, JOHN J. BOLL, AGO NO. A 44412, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document No. NL-2883.

JOHN J. BOLL
U. S. Civilian
AGO NO. A 44412

END

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT No. NI-6658
OFFICE OF CHIEF OF COUNSEL FOR WAR CRIMES

A F F I D A V I T

I, Dr. Erich v. d. HEYDE, having been cautioned that I render myself liable to punishment for false testimony, make the following statement under oath, voluntarily and not subject to duress:

Supplementary to paragraphs 5 and 6 of my statement of 1 May 1947, I wish to state as follows:

I can no longer remember the details of the reports to Counter-Intelligence I, mentioned by me in the two paragraphs in question. I do remember, however, that they were of a generally economic character, i.e., they described conditions in the respective country -- now and then, very likely, with a view to the political situation. Most of the time, they dealt with problems of currency and finance, questions referring to foreign trade between foreign countries, and problems of marketing I.G. products -- occasionally in connection with production in the countries concerned. Reports which were received through the Economics Department (VOI - Volkswirtschaftliche Abteilung) also contained foreign trade statistics etc..

I have carefully read the foregoing affidavit and countersigned it with my own hand, have made and initialled the necessary corrections in my own hand, and herewith swear that this statement contains the full truth, to my best knowledge and belief.

(signature:) Dr. Erich von der HEYDE
signature

Sworn to and signed before me this 2nd day of May 1947, at Nuernberg, Germany, by Dr. Erich v.d. HEYDE, known to me to be the person making the above affidavit.

(signature:) Otto VERBER
Otto VERBER
U.S. Civilian AGO-No. A 444 385
Office of Chief of Counsel for
War Crimes
U.S. War Department

(page 2 of original)

A F F I D A V I T .

I, Dr. Erich v.d. HEYDE, having been cautioned that I render myself liable to punishment for false testimony, make the following statement under oath, voluntarily and not subject to duress:

1. I was born 1 May 1900 in Hongkong, came to Germany in 1906, attended school in Bremen till 1915 and in Weimar from 1915 to the spring of 1918, and then served in the Armed Forces from May 1918 to the end of the war. I studied and practised agriculture at the Technische Hochschule (Technical University) in Munich, from 1919 to 1924. From 1925 to 1926 I was employed by the Bayerische Hagelversicherung. From 1926 to 1936 I worked in the agricultural department of I.G.-Farbenindustrie Ludwigshafen, from 1936 to 5 September 1940 I acted as consultant for nitrogen and agricultural economy with Wipo Berlin, later on I held war essential jobs in addition and acted as Counter-Intelligence agent since middle of 1938. On 5 September 1940 I was called into the Armed Forces and, till the end of the war, I worked in the Armed Forces Replacement Inspectorate (Wehrersatzinspektion), the Armament Inspectorate (Ruestungsinspektion), the Armament Detachment (Ruestungskommando) and in the Military Economy Department (Wehrwirtschaftsabteilung) of the Military Economy and Armament Office (Wehrwirtschafts- und Ruestungsamt). As from 5 September 1940 up to the second quarter of 1941, I occasionally worked for I.G., including work in the newly established Office A. (Buero A.)

2. Since 1934 I was member of the Reitersturm 7 (Cavalry company) of the General SS. My membership in this Reitersturm lasted until end of 1936. The last rank I held was that of Hauptscharfuhrer. I automatically continued to be a member of the General SS, and when I was appointed Counter-Intelligence agent of I.G. plant Berlin N.W. 7, in the middle of 1938, I was transferred to the Reich Main Security Office (Reichssicherheitshauptamt). At the time of my transfer, I held the rank of Hauptscharfuhrer. About the end of 1938 I was promoted to the rank of Untersturmfuehrer, 1 year later to that of Obersturmfuehrer, and in the middle of 1940 I was promoted to Hauptsturmfuehrer. These promotions came to me during my service as Counter-Intelligence agent of plant Berlin N.W. 7. From 1 May 1937 onwards I was a member of the NSDAP.

(page 3 of original)

3. I know that Counter-Intelligence agents in general as well as the Chief Counter-Intelligence Agent of I.G. were registered with the Reich Main Security Office. Their appointment was confirmed both by Counter-Intelligence as well as by the Reich Main Security Office. At the request of the Counter-Intelligence officer concerned, the names of prospective Counter-Intelligence agents were proposed by the Betriebsfuhrer and, if acceptable, the appointments were made by the afore-mentioned government offices. The agents were responsible both to the above government offices as well as to the Betriebsfuhrer. In my own case, my appointment was proposed by Dr. Max ILGNER, and it was my duty to keep him informed on important matters. This was particularly so with Dr. ILGNER, who always gave me the impression of being a most autocratic type of Betriebsfuhrer.

(page 3 of original cont'd.)

4. In the course of 1938 and owing to the various political crises, the possibility of war and general mobilization became increasingly imminent, and I was requested by my department chief, Dr. GATTINEAU, to attend to the so-called M-problem (M-Frage), i.e., to the war essential jobs in plant N.H.7. In the middle of 1938, the same considerations led to my being proposed by Dr. ILGNER for the post as Counter-Intelligence agent for I.G. Berlin N.H.7., to be charged with Counter-Intelligence functions, and my appointment was subsequently confirmed. These steps were taken for the reasons mentioned above, and were due to the obvious imminence of the outbreak of hostilities.

5. My function as Counter-Intelligence agent consisted in carrying out security measures against espionage and violations of secrecy, falling within the competence of Counter-Intelligence III. In addition, reports from foreign countries, the contents of which were of general interest and not of a purely business character, were to be passed on to Counter-Intelligence I.

6. A short time afterwards, I was requested by my department chief Dr. GATTINEAU to contact Major BLOCH. As a result, an arrangement was made shortly afterwards for reports to be passed on in the manner described in paragraph 5. Reports handled by I.G. Berlin N.H.7

(page 4 of original)

generally passed from the office of the Commercial Committee to the office of Dr. ILGNER; from there, they were generally passed on to me for distribution. I took over the connection with Major BLOCH from my department chief Dr. Heinrich GATTINEAU. I was also requested by Major BLOCH to notify him of the presence of any of our foreign sales agents in Berlin. In such instances I used to telephone Major BLOCH, and he decided whether he wished to see the person concerned. If he did, the respective sales agent had a meeting with Major BLOCH. I cannot remember the names of the gentlemen who met Major BLOCH in this manner, but I definitely know that this was the usual procedure.

7. At the time I was charged with the handling of Counter-Intelligence problems, Dr. ILGNER notified I.G. N.H.7 of my duties as described above, and requested the members of I.G. Berlin N.H.7 to give me their full co-operation in the execution of these tasks.

8. Office A. (Buero A.) was established about the middle of 1940, shortly after Dr. Christian SCHNEIDER had been appointed Chief Counter-Intelligence Agent, and was set up in order to co-ordinate the activities of Counter-Intelligence agents in commercial matters. I was appointed chief of this office. I discussed all questions of common interest with Dr. DIECKMANN, the chief functionary for Counter-Intelligence problems of a technical nature, who was in charge of the Vermittlungsstelle (I.G. Farben's Military Liaison Office). As far as I know, the Counter-Intelligence agents for technical subjects had already been appointed at a much earlier date than in plant N.H.7. In all instances where sales combine and production plant were located together, the Counter-Intelligence agent, as far as I remember, was responsible for both the commercial and technical aspects of problems.

(page 4 of original-cont'd.)

Contact with Counter-Intelligence I was established either through Office A (Bureau A) which received foreign reports from the different commercial organizations for the purpose of distribution, or directly through the local Counter-Intelligence agent to the local Counter-Intelligence officer, the latter procedure being the more frequent. Only in the rarest of cases did Office A receive reports from the sales combines. The majority of reports received originated with plant N.W.7, and the contents of these reports were primarily

(page 5 of original)

of a general nature. I.G. Berlin N.W. 7 was particularly well equipped to furnish reports of this type, because the office of the Commercial Committee received, for example, reports from I.G. Verbindungsmänner (liaison officers) and the Economic Division, thanks to its contacts, was kept supplied with subject matter of generally economic character. The commercial executives evinced a certain dislike towards this, as they feared such tasks might prove detrimental to the commercial activity of I.G. agents abroad.

9. From time to time, I sent reports to Dr. Christian SCHWEIDER, Chief Counter-Intelligence Agent, and he, to my knowledge, reported on all these interrelated problems to the Vorstand meetings and was responsible to the Vorstand.

10. Although I was never released from my function of Counter-Intelligence agent of I.G. Berlin N.W. 7, Dr. RUEDIGER actually took over after I was drafted into the Armed Forces. While serving in the army, I was given opportunity to carry on to a certain extent, as my military unit used to release me for this purpose from time to time, say for approximately 1 - 2 hours a week.

I have carefully read each of the four pages of this affidavit and countersigned it with my own hand, have made and initialled the necessary corrections in my handwriting, and declare herewith under oath that my statement is absolutely true, to the best of my knowledge and belief.

(signature:) Dr. Erich v.d. HEYDE

Sworn to and signed before me this 1st day of May 1947, at Nuernberg, Germany, by Erich v.d. HEYDE, known to me to be the person making the above affidavit.

(Signature:) - Otto VERBER

Otto VERBER

U.S. Civilian - AGO # A - 444 385
Office of Chief of Counsel for War Crimes
U.S. War Department.

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

12 June 1947

I, ANNETTE WALLECH, No. 20101, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages and that the above is a true and correct translation of the document No. NI-6658.

ANNETTE WALLECH
No. 20101

- 4 -
" END "

124

(18th page of original)

(page 1 of original)

Confidential.

Appendix to the Notes on the 43rd Conference of the Patent
Commission; held on Thursday, 4 May 1939, at Berlin NW 7.

Wehrmacht Contracts

Goedies

making the report, stated that lately in working out
tasks for the Wehrmacht, the question has often arisen
as to how it would be possible for I.G. to be
reimbursed for its inventions discovered during the
preparation and solution of such tasks.

v. Knieriem

added, that it usually came about in this way, that
the Wehrmacht had to solve a certain problem and asked
I.G. whether it wanted to help. Generally, nothing is
said about technical details or payment for I.G.'s
contribution. After the work has been concluded, the
question arises as to the payment I.G. wants for it
and what the Wehrmacht is prepared to pay. If patents
result from the work, they are registered by I.G.
The patents are handled in the usual manner and belong
to I.G., which pays the patent fees. Upon formal
transfer to the Reich, the latter merely acts as
trustee. In all other respects, the situation remains
unchanged. The question arises, however, as to how to
compensate I.G. for its inventions. Incidentally, the
relation between the Wehrmacht, as principal and I.G.,
as executor, is similar to the relation between the
laboratory chief and the inventing chemist within
I.G.

(19th page of original)

(page 2 of original)

Spieess

reported about a case, where a well-known material
was developed in Hoechst for certain military purposes
to the stage where it was ready for production, and
was turned over to Troisdorf for production. The patents
of the inventions made in the course of the work were
taken from I.G. and transferred to the Reich as Trustee.
In the settlement of the costs which I.G. incurred,
reimbursement for research work, as well as a profit,
was included but payment for the invention itself was
not taken into consideration by any office. This was
due to the fact that the Patent Department had not
been informed of the negotiations in time.

(19th page of original, cont'd)

(page 2 of original, cont'd)

Rodics

pointed out that it constitutes a special case, if officials or other members of the Wehrmacht participate personally in the solution of a task.

Brauns

mentioned a case, where members of the Army Ordnance Office contributed inventions to the solution of a problem. The patents in question had also been taken from I.G. and the Army Ordnance Office officials or employees concerned were acknowledged as co-inventors. The result of this acknowledgment will be felt when the royalties are given out. Undoubtedly, the Reich will demand a share of the receipts from royalties with which to pay the inventors working for it.

He mentioned another case, where I.G. had developed a

(20th page of original)

(Page 3 of original)

certain, militarily important product and where it was discovered that the army had previously registered the same product. On that occasion the army transferred the older patent registration to I.G.

v. Knierich

stated that, when, at the request of a Wehrmacht Branch, I.G. proceeds with work in any field whatever and the inventions discovered in the course of that work do not lead to deliveries, the question arises as to how the costs incurred by I.G. can be raised. This question has arisen in a number of cases. Ministerialrat Dr. Buhl and Dr. Boeckler are working on the legal aspect of the matter. In one case, the Reich ordered a certain factory and induced I.G. to construct the factory on Reich property and with Reich funds. This plant is also operated by I.G. for account of the Reich. Future inventions, as well as the initial process, are made available by I.G. Payment is regulated by agreement. Reimbursement is modest, it will not make I.G. rich but will pay the I.G. expenses. Ministerialrat Dr. Buhl and Dr. Boeckler have expressed the opinion that a general regulation of these questions should not be attempted.

Dielsmann

reported that at present a large number of processing contracts from the Wehrmacht are being handled by I.G. In his opinion, we can only pursue the same course of action as before.

(21st page of original)

(page 4 of original)

For instance, the Wehrmacht Office states what it demands of the material it requires. As a rule, it is the task of I.G. to find out how to fulfil these requirements. In the question of payment we have always been not with great fairness up to now. The Luftwaffe, in particular, has always been ready to pay several times the usual price, even without asking for proof, in recognition of the fact that it mostly concerned costly production of relatively small experimental quantities. In this connection no exact vouchers of costs have ever been demanded.

Co-operation with the Luftwaffe is excellent and, in his opinion, should not be upset by an attempt at a general regulation. Moreover, the Luftwaffe has never demanded recognition of its officials and employees as co-inventors, although it is the Luftwaffe which gives the most exact data when placing orders. The Army occasionally used different methods in regard to payment. It requested I.G. to find out in advance the probable costs of experiments and to conduct these experiments at this cost; afterwards, the Army made its decision. However, these were cases, where large deliveries could not be expected.

v. Knieriem

felt that we should be glad that co-operation

(22nd page of original)

(page 5 of original)

is so smooth. The conduct of the Luftwaffe is that of a decent private firm. If large deliveries follow the experiments, nothing should be charged for the experiments, if deliveries do not result, the experiments must be paid for. He inquired whether the Luftwaffe's policy could not be discussed with the other Wehrmacht Branches without running the danger of obtaining the opposite of the desired effect and making the Luftwaffe more exacting.

Dielsmann

advised against it, but he did recommend that a preliminary estimate of costs be made and that we should then offer to carry out these experiments at the costs named.

v. Knieriem

the
pointed out that products on which a Wehrmacht Branch co-operated in any way, must on no account be passed on to foreign countries without special permission.

(22nd page of original, cont'd)

(page 5 of original, cont'd)

Rodios

felt that the generous policy of the Luftwaffe is an exception. In future, all Wehrmacht Branches will be sure to check more exactly and we must prepare ourselves for this eventuality. When this happens, the question will be, whether I.G. is to work at a fixed rate, so to speak, or would do better to take its chance as the entrepreneur. It must be borne in mind that in completing such orders at a fixed rate, the invention, which represents the solution of the problem, is transferred to the Wehrmacht, which makes it difficult to obtain future compensation for the invention.

(1st page of original)

(page 23 of original)

v. Knieriem

opposed having I.G. work on these contracts at a fixed rate.

Rodics

concurred, declaring it to be his view, also. Until now, however, the situation was not clarified in advance, rather, the technical solution was worked out first and costs were settled, but no consideration was given to the payment of inventive work.

v. Knieriem

(Handwritten)
yes

felt that I.G. should make developments at its own expense, claim the resultant patents for itself and demand royalties from the Wehrmacht. In exceptional cases, another procedure can be followed if the experiments require unusual efforts.

Brauns

stated that Wolfen handles Wehrmacht requests in the same way as requests by other customers. He pointed out further, that, according to a circular letter, the Luftwaffe claims half of the royalties if it has paid for the experiments.

Spies

said that the Hoechst plant included research work when settling orders which led to the development of commercial products. In this connection it had been omitted to include compensation for inventions however, because there was no space for that on the questionnaire. The I.G. Accounting Office, however, after having it pointed out to them by the Patent Department, stated that it would also be possible to take this item into consideration. Another settlement is to be made and it would present no

(2nd page of original)

(page 24 of original)

difficulties to include in it compensation for inventions.

Rodics

stated, that I.G. not only wants compensation for inventions but, above all, an adequate compensation for its research work. The 10% addition allotted for this purpose is inadequate. If I.G. has a profit for inventions, it must have more than 10%. This has not been so up to now.

Dickmann

pointed out, that I.G. has many orders for stand-by plants on which there is no profit.

v. Knieriem

was of the opinion that a general regulation could not be made in view of the multiplicity of orders, on the one hand, and of the multiplicity of the offices of the Reich and I.G. involved, on the other. Rather, in each case, the I.G. office concerned should negotiate with the competent Wehrmacht office.

(2nd page of original, cont'd)

(page 24 of original, cont'd)

The underlying principle must be this, that I.G. bears the costs of development, receives the patents without restrictions and receives appropriate compensation for its inventive work which is to be included in the price of the products to be delivered by it. In this connection, he referred to the resolution of the Chemicals Committee made on 13 April 1939. Experiments, whenever they do not result in deliveries, should be paid for and the results ought to belong to us.

(3rd page of original)

(page 25 of original)

Rodios

commented that in those cases, where I.G. contributes inventive work it must get a sizable profit. Since everything has been exactly fixed in the prescribed scheme of settlement, something could only be achieved by insisting on a compensation for inventions, a thing which has not been taken into consideration up to now.

v. Knieriem

requested Vermittlungsstelle W, to which everything is sent, to find out the practice of I.G. up to now.

Rodios

pointed out that it was very awkward that individual offices concerned exaggerate the need for secrecy, which leads to the situation where one I.G. office does not know what the other one working next to it is doing. Secrecy must go no further than is necessary to safeguard the state secret as such.

Holdermann

brought up the question of how to inform the Patent Department of the need for keeping these inventions secret. By itself the Patent Department is not in a position to judge whether a patent application was preceded by a discussion or by an order of a Wehrmacht office.

Hediger

stated that Wolfen-Film inquires with every patent application whether there is any need for keeping secrecy.

Brauns

reported that Wolfen-Farben too, always inquires whether Wehrmacht orders for development have led to the inventions.

Holdermann
Rodios and
Spieck

agreed that the Patent Departments are not

(4th page of original)

(page 26 of original)

convinced that they are adequately informed of the need for keeping inventions secret.

v. Knieriem

suggested that Vermittlungsstelle W inform the Patent Department of the fields in which there is co-operation with the Wehrmacht. The Patent Departments then should submit to Vermittlungsstelle W all patent applications pertaining to these fields. This procedure seemed to him to be better than the other one, in which the individual inventors inform the Patent Departments of the need for keeping secrecy, since the inventors themselves may not be informed of the fact that secrecy is required, or perhaps do not even know that it is based on a Wehrmacht contract.

Dr. Wagner

interposed that such a compilation was difficult for Sparte II. Since something is continually being added or dropped, it would be impossible to make a list of the fields in which secrecy is required.

At v. Knieriem's suggestion it was

resolved

to request Vermittlungsstelle W to inform the Patent Departments regularly of all fields in which work is done in co-operation with Wehrmacht-offices and further, that all applications from these fields made to the Patent Departments be submitted to Vermittlungsstelle W.

(5th page of document)

(page 27 of original)

Dielsmann

suggested that the plant contracts be included in the compilations desired by the Patent Departments.

v. Knieriem

contemplated discussion of the matter at the next meeting of the Legal Committee and charged Justizrat Wagner with the preparation for this, particularly with a view to instructing the firms affiliated with I.G., so that they will act in accordance with the same principles.

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

17 July 1947

I, Samuel S. HORN, AGO 443113, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages and that the above is a true and correct translation of the document No. NI-5694.

Samuel S. HORN
AGO 443113

MILITARY TRIBUNAL NO. 2
Case No. 11
Prosecution Document Book No. 7

English



INDEX

TO

DOCUMENT BOOK 2

COUNT I-B. FARBER SYNCHRONIZED ALL OF ITS ACTIVITIES WITH
THE MILITARY PLANNING OF THE GERMAN HIGH COMMAND

Document No.	Exhibit No.	Description of Document	Page in:	
			Document Book	Trans- cript
NI-4569		Secret letter from V/W to the defendant von Knieriem, 6 June 1939: encloses a V/W report on development and research work of Farben done on Wehrmacht orders or in conjunction with Wehrmacht offices.	1	2-4
NI-6193		Contract between the Reich, represented by the Reich Air Minister, and Farben, 7 May 1935: Farben transfers its application for a patent to the Reich Air Ministry for registry as a secret patent.	6	
NI-1082		Another contract, as above, covering secret patent for incendiary substances, 3 October 1936.	8	
NI-8922		Affidavit by Dr. Wagner, staff officer of V/W, on number and nature of secret patents, etc. 11 June 1947.	10	

PARAGRAPH 22

(Air Raid Protection, War Games and Mobilization Plans)

NI-2451		Minutes of meeting of more than 150 plant leaders of Farben's Leverkusen plant, 21 April 1933: After the defendant Knoke expresses joy over the new Nazi government, one Schumck reports on progress in air raid protection, etc.	14	
NI-2455		Minutes of TEKO meeting of 30 May 1933. Defendant Knoke reports on progress of air raid protection. TEKO recommends conference of air raid chiefs of individual plants.	19	
NI-5973		Minutes of conference of Farben plant leaders from all Works Comlines, 6 July 1933: Decision made that Farben's Hoechst plant shall be a clearing office for all air raid protection questions within Farben.	21	
NI-5827		Minutes of TEA Meeting, 16 July 1933: The defendant Knoke reports that first air raid protection measures desired by authorities have been effected in Farben plants at Farben expense.	23	



INDEX TO DOCUMENT BOOK 2

Document No.	Exhibit No.	Description of Document	Page in Document Book Transcript
NI-4838		Minutes of TEKO meeting, 14 September 1933: RM. 190,000 set aside by Farben plants for air raid protection noted as appearing too costly.	23
NI-8462		Minutes of meeting of senior engineers at Farben's Leverkusen plant, 3 November 1933: preparations for a blackout drill in November 1933.	26
NI-5871		Minutes of Hoechst-Vorstand meeting, 13 November 1933: Discussion of future lectures and a conference on air raid protection	28
NI-5884		Minutes of meeting of Hoechst-Vorstand, 20 November 1933: Discussion of procurement of air raid warning apparatus, gas masks, etc.	29
NI-4841		Minutes of TEKO meeting, 20/21 September 1934: Air raid precautions requested by authorities are so stringent that they must be discussed with Central Offices in Berlin.	30
NI-4451		Note of the defendant Jackson for a proposed meeting of Sparte II on September 1934: Stating that burden of proposed air raid protection measures constitute a serious burden on the plant and its operations.	32
NI-6298		Minutes of Technical Direction at Farben's Ludwigshafen plant, 12 April 1938: Report made on extensive air raid protection measures, training of 2000 employees, and completion of 45% of required air raid shelters, etc.	33
NI-6297		Minutes of Technical Direction at Farben's Ludwigshafen plant, 27 September 1938: Report that 50% of air raid shelters were completed at RM 150 per man; that blackout installations were practically complete.	35
NI-7780		Affidavit of Dr. Wagner, staff member of V/M. 15 July 1947: On extracts from minutes of meetings of TEKO and other Farben agencies dealing with air raid protection during period 1934/1939.	37
NI-5861		<u>WAR GAMES</u> Minutes of meeting of Technical Board of	

INDEX TO DOCUMENT BOOK 2

Document Exhibit No. No.	s/ Description of Document	Page in: Document Tran- Book: script
	Directors at Farben's Hoechst plant, 9 March 1936: Notes that a "Map exercise" at Farben's Leuna plant appears to have indicated that Leuna can be well protected.	38
NI-5888	Minutes of meeting of the Hoechst-Ver- stand and Technical Direction, 8 June 1936: Report made on the "Plenspiele" (map exercise) at Ludwigshafen which was attended by military inspectors.	39
NI-4624	Letter from V/W to the defendant Kuehne, 3 November 1936: The "Plenspiele" at Leverkusen have been postponed so that Col. Thomas, chief of the Military Economy Staff of the Reich War Ministry, and his staff could attend.	40
NI-4619	Letter of the defendant Kuehne to Schunck, 22 December 1936: Announces that the military-economic "Plenspiel" has been set for 15 January 1937 and that a preparatory exercise will take place on 6 January 1937. Transcript of proposed discussion of measures to be adopted because of "war damage" attached.	41
NI-4628-	Letter of V/W to the management of Leverkusen (receipt registered by the defendant Kuehne), 27 January 1937: Requests copy of minutes taken during conference on tactical exercises held at Leverkusen and the designa- tion of departments of Farben's Leverkusen plant which will run in "A-case".	58
EC-174 (to be re- vised)	Excerpts from speech of General Thomas to to the German General staff on "war games" (Kriegspiel), May-June 1937: War games are calculated to assist solving economic problems of war; exhorts secrecy on military- economic measures, etc.	59
NI-6377	Minutes of Technical Management of Farben's Hoechst plant, 19 September 1938: On 26 September 1938 a military-economic exercise (wehrwirtschaftliche Übung) will taken place at the Hoechst plant.	61
NI-6378	Minutes of Technical Management of Farben's Hoechst plant, 3 October 1938: Reported that two supply lines particularly vulnerable to air attack should be spread out.	62
NI-8926	Affidavit of Wagner, staff member of V/W, on war games and map exercises, 10 June 1947.	64

TRANSLATION OF EXCERPTS FROM DOCUMENT No. NI-4669
OFFICE OF CHIEF OF COUNSEL FOR WAR CRIMES

I.G. Farbenindustrie Aktiengesellschaft
Vermittlungsstelle W

Berlin NW 7
Unter den Linden 82
Local calls 12 0021
Long Distance 12 6401

To:
Director Dr. von Knieriem
I.G. Farbenindustrie A.G.
Ludwigshafen / Rh.

Secret!

1. This is a secret matter within the meaning of Article 83 of the Reich Penal Code.
2. To be transmitted only under cover; if sent by post, to be registered.
3. To be kept, at the responsibility of the addressee, under lock and key.

Rubber stamp

Office of Secretary of Dr. Buhl
Received: 9 June 1939
Answered:

Your Ref: Your Communi-
cation of:

Our Ref: (To be given in your
reply): Dr. Di./Sch

Berlin,
8 June 1939

Subject: Development and research work of I.G. done on Wehrmacht orders
or in conjunction with Wehrmacht Offices.

In compliance with your request made at the meeting of the Patent Commission on 4 May 1939, we are enclosing a presentation of the development and experimental work of I.G. done on Wehrmacht orders or in conjunction with Wehrmacht Offices.

As agreed, we have attempted to give merely a presentation of the methods until now practiced in the above sectors, without suggesting uniform directives for the multiplicity of dissimilar cases as well as the varying procedures of the individual Wehrmacht offices placing orders, or the I.G. offices executing the orders.

Besides the legal and patent-law aspects, we have, for the sake of better understanding, given a short description of the origin and execution of the orders for work on development and in this connection have briefly touched on the construction and putting into operation of Reich-owned shadow factories.

Assuming you are in agreement, we have forwarded the above presentation to the I.G. offices named in the enclosed distribution list for their information. We enclose additional copies for your own use in case you desire to pass on the information to other offices, such as the managements of the large I.G. plants.

Rubber stamp: Registered!

VERMITTLUNGSSTELLE W
(Signature) Dickmann Corr

Appendix

I.G. Farbenindustrie Aktiengesellschaft

Vorstand: Hermann Schnitz, Vorsitz

Vorsitz des Aufsichtsrats:

Fritz Gajowski, Heinrich Heerlein, August v. Knieriem, Carl Krauch, Fritz Moor, Christian Schneider, Georg v. Schnitzler, Otto Ambros, Max Brueggemann, Ernst Baerlein, Heinrich Baetofisch, Bernhard Buhl, Paul Haefliger, Max H. G. ner, Constantin Jacob, Friedrich Joehne, Hans Kuchne, Karl Lautenschlaeger, Wilhelm R. Mann, Heinrich Oster, Wilhelm Otto, Otto Scharf, Hermann Schol, Hans Walther, Eduard Weber-Andreas, Karl Wurster.

/Carl Bosch/

(page 2 of original)

Distribution List

I.G. Farbenindustrie Aktiengesellschaft

Dir. Dr. von Knieriem,	Ludwigshafen
Legal Department,	Ludwigshafen
Legal Department,	Leverkusen
Legal Department,	Frankfurt (Main)
Legal Department,	Herselburg
Patent Department,	Ludwigshafen
Patent Department,	Hoechst
Patent Department,	Leverkusen
Patent Department,	Wolfen - Filmfabrik
Patent Department,	Bitterfeld/Wolfen - Farbenfabrik

Management Office of Sparte I, Oppau

Office of the Technical Committee, Frankfurt (Main)

Vermittlungsstelle W, Sparte III, Wolfen - Filmfabrik

Dir. Dr. Krauch, Berlin - W 9

Dir. Dr. ter Meer, Frankfurt (Main)

Dir. Dr. Gajowski, Wolfen - Filmfabrik

Dir. Kraus, Frankfurt (Main)

.....
(page 15 of original)

Copy.

I.G. Frankfurt / Statistics
Chemicals Accounting Office.

27 May 1938
Ko/H.

File Number 5

Subject: Discussion of 24 May 1938.

<u>Present:</u>	Dr. Dickmann,	Vermittlungsstelle W, Berlin
	Dr. Feiler;	I.G. Oppau
	Dir. Kraus,	I.G. Frankfurt (Main)
	Koch	I.G. Frankfurt (Main)

The following matters were discussed:

1. Computation of experimental orders carried out by I.G. in the OKW's own plants and upon orders from the latter.

The expenses of the factories incurred by these experimental orders are to be ascertained on the basis of directives issued by I.G. To fix the sum to be refunded by the OKW after the total expenses have been computed, a 2% tax and 6% export duty is to be added to the final sum to be refunded to us by the OKW. * turnover

2. Computation of experimental orders carried out by I.G. in its own plants upon orders from the OKW.

Expenses incurred by these orders will also be determined on the basis of I.G. computation of costs, but in addition, to cover the use of I.G. machinery the computation should include the usual I.G. amortization rates and 5% interest on the original value of the installations in the plant, at the same time taking into account the length of time the machinery is used. Over and above the expenses arrived at on the basis of the computation principles, the following should be added to the final amount to be charged to the OKW:

(page 16 of original)

- 1) 2% for turnover tax
- 2) 6% for export duty.

3. Computation of experimental lots used in carrying out experimental orders under 1. and 2.

Expenses for such experimental lots, to be charged to the OKW, should also be computed on I.G. principles, in which connection amortization of the original value is to be included for the direct, as well as the indirect installations. The works cost price should include 17% to cover the trading costs. A 10% profit is to be added to the cost price, including

(page 16 of original cont'd)

the trading costs, and at the same time, the 2% turnover tax on the sales price should be included. Any shipping charges incurred or possible freight charges incurred by I.G. should also be included in the price, depending on the price.

In the course of the conversation the patent law aspect of the inventions and the scientific knowledge which will be gained during the joint work of I.G. and Wehrmacht was briefly touched on.

Signed: Kraus

Signed: Koch

(page 17 of original)

I.G. Farbenindustrie Aktiengesellschaft, Vermittlungsstelle W

I.G. Farbenindustrie Aktiengesellschaft

Secret!

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2. To be transmitted only under cover; if sent by post, to be registered.
3. To be kept, at the responsibility of the addressee, under lock and key.

Dir. Dr. von Knieriem,	Ludwigshafen	Rubber Stamp
Legal Department,	Ludwigshafen	Illegible
Legal Department,	Leverkusen	Rec.: 27 June 1939
Legal Department,	Frankfurt (Main)	Answered:
Legal Department,	Hersburg	
Patent Department,	Ludwigshafen	
Patent Department,	Hochst	
Patent Department,	Leverkusen	
Patent Department,	Wolfen - Filmfabrik	
Patent Department,	Wolfen - Farbenfabrik, Bitterfeld	
Management Office of Sparte I, Oppau		
Office of Technical Committee, Frankfurt (Main)		
Vermittlungsstelle W, Sparte III	Wolfen - Filmfabrik	
Dir. Dr. Krauch,	Berlin - W 9	
Dir. Dr. ter Meer,	Frankfurt (Main)	
Dir. Dr. Gajowski,	Wolfen - Filmfabrik,	
Dir. Kraus,	Frankfurt (Main)	

Dr. Di/Sch.

Berlin-W 7, 24 June 39
Unter den Linden 82

Subject: Development and experiments carried out by I.G. on Wehrmacht orders, or in conjunction with Wehrmacht offices.

In order to avoid any misunderstandings, we wish to call attention to the fact that the file note of 27 May 1939 by I.G.-Frankfurt (Main), which constituted an appendix to our compilation of 8 June 1939 on joint development work of I.G. and the Wehrmacht, refers only to the chemical

TRANSLATION OF EXCERPTS FROM DOCUMENT No. NI-4669
CONTINUED

(page 17 of original cont'd)

business and development work connected with it.

VERMITTLUNGSSTELLE W

(Signature) Dickmann Gorr

Registered!

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

23 July 1947

I, SAMUEL S. HORN, AGO 443113, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages and that the above is a true and correct translation of excerpts from the document No. NI-4669.

SAMUEL S. HORN, AGO 443113.

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT No. NI-4669
OFFICE OF CHIEF OF COUNSEL FOR
WAR CRIMES

I.G. Farbenindustrie A.G.
Liaison Office W.

2 June 1939

Developmental and research work of the I.G.
ordered by the Wehrmacht or in conjunction with various Wehrmacht
departments.

-
- I. Origin of the orders to carry out developmental work.
Present extent of the joint research work and distribution among the various Wehrmacht departments.
 - II. Accomplishment of the joint developmental work of Wehrmacht and I.G. departments.
 - III. Assessment and refund of research-expenses.
Work done and samples supplied for guidance of customers, major work done in I.G.-owned and Wehrmacht-owned research installations, Apportionment of expenses on finished products and so-called developmental prices. I.G. directives from Frankfurt dated 27 May 1938.
 - IV. Patent rights arising from joint developmental work.
Need for secrecy in regard to new discoveries. Loss sustained through failure to utilize patent rights.
 - V. Reich-owned installations and/or shadow factories and developmental work.

(Rubber stamp:)

SECRET !

I. Origin of the orders to carry out developmental work.

In the past few years, developmental and experimental work in the I.G. plants, carried out at the order of the Wehrmacht or in conjunction with Wehrmacht departments, has assumed increasingly larger proportions. This is traceable on the one hand to the fact that the Wehrmacht is being confronted by an ever-increasing number of problems of a technical or chemical nature, which the engineers and analytical chemists of the Wehrmacht departments cannot tackle with the equipment at their disposal in their own research stations, and on the other hand, to the fact that the Wehrmacht has become, directly or indirectly, a wholesale customer and buyer of I.G. products on an ever-increasing scale, and that a considerable number of problems has arisen from this supplier-buyer relationship between Wehrmacht and I.G.

While 3 or 4 years ago only isolated sections within the I.G. were engaged on work concerning Wehrmacht problems, at present there is experimental work in progress in almost all major I.G. plants, which is being carried on either directly at the order of the Wehrmacht or in which the Wehrmacht is taking an active part either due to the particular nature of the problems in question or through providing experts to participate in the work,

(page 1 of original cont'd)

Apart from a few isolated cases in which certain leading personalities of the I.G. were approached directly, the various Wehrmacht departments, in particular the developing and testing stations, almost always communicate their orders and enquiries, in so far as they are of a chemico-technical nature, to the Liaison Office W in Berlin. The Liaison Office W then passes the enquiry, in so far as it cannot be answered on the spot, to those departments or plants of the I.G. which appear to be best suited for dealing with the respective Wehrmacht problems or are already working on these, or similar subjects.

The fact that the Wehrmacht is a wholesale buyer of I.G. products accounts for the large quantity of the experimental and developmental work which has been placed with the I.G.

(page 2 of original)

2 June 1939

Quite a number of problems were dealt with independently by I.G. departments and it was not until later when the experiments had yielded certain results that Wehrmacht departments were interested in these problems.

Above all and in many cases on their own initiative, the I.G. concentrated on and drew the Wehrmacht's attention to problems which promised to be of importance to private enterprise, i.e. a subsequent wholesale market for articles, production of which could be initiated whenever necessary, or production processes which were likely to be taken over by the Wehrmacht. There are comparatively few cases in which the Wehrmacht on their own initiative, i.e., independent from previously supplied I.G. products and suggestions, approached the I.G. with a particular problem to be solved by experimental work. Summing up the present state of the experimental work done by I.G. departments on behalf of the Wehrmacht it may be said that there are approximately 80-100 analytical chemists and engineers engaged in scientific and technical experiments (partly secondary work) on 50-60 Wehrmacht problems; about half of all problems are posed in connection with the delivery of I.G. products, about 30-40% of the problems reached the Wehrmacht after having originated with the I.G., and only about 10-20% of the problems were presented by the Wehrmacht directly to the I.G. in more or less definite form. At least the same number of academically trained research workers with an even larger staff of associates are active in the Planning and Designing Departments as well as in the Constructional Departments of the I.G. for the experimental installations and plants of the Wehrmacht, not including the number of I.G. scientists actively engaged in the Four Years Plan and in the preparation for the mobilization.

II. Accomplishment of the joint developmental work.

Problems of a chemico-technical nature which the Wehrmacht installations propound to the I.G. and which the Liaison Office W cannot solve directly from its own experience are being dealt with in a variety of ways according to the particular nature of the problems involved. In many cases, the required information or expert's reports can be supplied at once by the I.G. plants or other competent I.G. departments without any experimental work proper being required, or else it may be possible to supply developed material as samples for the Wehrmacht installations to solve the problems by themselves in their own research and development stations. In many cases, small scale laboratory experiments involving a minimum of expenses will be sufficient to solve expeditiously the problem in a few days, employing only one analytic chemist and one laboratory assistant.

(page 2 of original cont'd)

In many cases, however, it takes weeks or months or even years of experimenting; a large staff of scientifically and technically trained experts has to be employed; large sets of laboratory appliances and even whole production units have to be made available for tackling and solving the problem. In the case of such major tasks, cooperation between the Wehrmacht and I.G. departments involved is mostly effected by holding conferences and inspections at regular intervals, say every month, and by applying and testing the objects of developmental work, for instance, new substances or special products or implements, in the Luftwaffe test stations or on the training ground and rifle ranges of the army, until they are finally adopted for general use or else rejected.

Although the cooperation of the Wehrmacht, in particular of the development stations of the Wehrmacht branches in this experimental work cannot be dispensed with if reliable results are to be obtained, and even though the analytical chemists and engineers of the Wehrmacht are frequently very active in their cooperation, it can hardly be denied that so far as creative developmental work and inventive achievement are concerned the emphasis will always be on the performance of the I.G. research workers.

(page 3 of original)

2 June 1939

III. Computation and refund of research-expenses.

The methods by which the Wehrmacht refunds the expenses incurred in experimental work and development-orders to the I.G. vary considerably.

It was repeatedly emphasized by the High Command of the Wehrmacht that the I.G. has to operate on the principles of private enterprise and is therefore entitled to make a certain, if limited profit on top of the net prime costs, not only out of the delivery of products but also out of other services, for instance construction of Wehrmacht installations and the carrying out of development-orders. Within the Wehrmacht branches themselves there appear to exist no uniform directives for dealing with such development-orders. In a general way it may be said that the work done in conjunction with the Reich Air Ministry and its test stations at Rechlin, Adlershof, Goettingen, etc., has so far been treated more generously than the work which was carried out jointly with development stations of the Army, in particular with the Army Ordnance Office, and the Navy.

Minor enquiries from Wehrmacht branches requiring only a small amount of laboratory work were in a majority of cases not charge to the Wehrmacht, unless these jobs did exceed a certain volume of expenses, for instance several hundreds of RM. Similarly, small quantities of specimens and samples of I.G. products to be tested in Wehrmacht test station for certain new purposes were mostly supplied free of charge by the I.G., particularly when there was a chance of a regular sale resulting later on from the supply of such samples. Thus, in supplying small quantities of samples and doing small-scale laboratory work free of charge we are carrying out the usual policy of servicing customers.

Furthermore, the I.G. could not demand of the Wehrmacht a refund of expenses incurred in carrying out experiments which the I.G. started on the initiative of their own analytic chemists and engineers, and in which they did not interest the Wehrmacht until at a later time, unless the Wehrmacht showed real interest in the experiments and was prepared to place development orders. For the rest, the I.G. had to bear the

(page 3 of original cont'd)

contractor's risk with respect to experiments of this kind.

The Reich Air Ministry placed the majority of its development-work in the fuel (aviation gasoline) and lubricants sector. In these two sectors the I.G. had become wholesale supplier of products to the Reich Air Ministry. The many problems arising from the progressive development of the Luftwaffe, particularly in the sphere of motor design and, consequently, of fuel and lubricants, have brought about a very close cooperation between the development stations of the Reich Air Ministry and those of the I.G., above all at Oppeln, Merseburg and Ludwigshafen, as far as the development of new special kinds of gasoline and special lubricating oils for aircraft motors is concerned. So far, the expenses incurred in these experiments, in so far as they are outside the range of experiments for the normal progressive development of I.G. processes and products, could be met by means of what is called "development prices" which the Reich Air Ministry was prepared to pay in each case when receiving and testing the newly developed materials. In most cases, only those analytical chemists and engineers of the technical installations of the Reich Air Ministry who worked directly with us in a technical capacity took part officially in fixing these development prices which often were a multiple of the prices quoted for a similar article turned out regularly in mass production, without obligation to give an itemized account of the expenses which the I.G. had incurred in carrying out the experimental work. Such material quoted at development prices was frequently turned out by the dozen, ranging from several tons to tank car-loads, varying both the manufacturing processes and the quality and composition of the substances in every possible direction.

(page 4 of original)

The technical chemical problems of the Army are almost exclusively worked out by the Army Ordnance Office and its various departments for development and testing. This also frequently involves the discovery and development of new materials and products which the Wehrmacht is regularly supplied with later on, thus permitting the costs of development to be charged to Wehrmacht expenses. But in many cases they deal with processes and manufactures which are expressly intended to be kept in reserve, that is, the processes or products are developed to the point where they are ready for production and manufacture, but they will be produced and actually employed only in case of war.

If the army branch of the Armed Forces puts a problem before I.G. and it is obvious from the first that the problem is not to be solved within a short time and at small expense, the Liaison Office W (Economy) together with the I.G. department which is to carry out the research work, will in most cases make an estimate of the expenses for the experiments, and submit it to the branch of the Armed Forces which is presenting the problem. Then the Army can decide whether the solution of the problem appears important enough to assume the expenses and issue the order for its development, or else reject it.

(page 4 of original cont'd)

Since on many occasions the preliminary estimate of research costs proved useful for the smooth development of experimental orders, in one case, for which nearly all branches of the Armed Forces had expressed an interest, and issued experimental orders, an attempt was already made during a conference on 24 May 1938 at Frankfurt with Director KRAUSS to draw up uniform instructions within the I.G. covering experimental orders for which a cost estimate is to be submitted to the branch of the Armed Forces presenting the problem (see enclosure, file-note by Ffm of 27 May 1938).

In a good many I.G. factories there are experimental plants which were erected for carrying out research orders of the Armed Forces and which have been paid for either totally or in part with State funds. In cases where such experimental plants represent fairly large investments, for example, more than RM 100,000.— I.G. frequently binds itself to keep such plants in good repair, even beyond the actual duration of the experiments, or takes over part of the plants at their current value or even at scrap-value, after the completion of the experiments.

In case larger experimental plants for Army purposes were financed by I.G., they try, if possible, to write off the expenses for such plants within a short time by delivering the experimental products with suitable price increases, as already mentioned in connection with the orders of the Reich Air Minister.

It has also repeatedly happened that experimental orders were given to I.G. without having determined in advance the cost of carrying out such experiments. Then the expenses incurred were figured up afterwards and a claim for repayment submitted to the Armed Forces. In most cases the Wehrmacht department concerned has unhesitatingly approved and repaid the experimental costs quoted by I.G.; in a few cases, however, the Wehrmacht departments have objected to the experimental costs subsequently estimated by I.G., so that it later has become necessary to itemize the costs exactly, give reasons for the same, undertake negotiations about them, and, in part, even make deductions from the original amounts of the claim.

The Navy branch of the Armed Forces and its experimental departments have in general adopted the practice of the Army with regard to issuing, carrying out, and figuring experimental and development orders, which up to now have not been so numerous. A case of the Leverkusen plant, where a new smoke screening device was originally developed on the initiative of the factory chemists themselves and then later taken over by the Navy and placed in general use, represents a special case, in as much as this device is manufactured and supplied by a third firm, and when fixing the price of this device and offering it for sale

(page 5 of original)

2 June 1939

they had forgotten to figure a royalty into the price of this device which might have covered I.G.'s expenses for the experiments, and possibly also a suitable profit from Navy orders. When I.G. subsequently put in a claim for the costs of the experiments the Navy Department recognized only part of the costs (RM 11,400.— out of RM 40,000.—) as subject to reimbursement. Negotiations are still pending for the granting of a patent royalty.

(page 5 of original cont'd)

IV. Patent Rights Arising from Joint Experimental Work.

From the joint experimental and development work between I.G. and offices of the Armed Forces there have also resulted patentable inventions and new discoveries, and patent rights which are also applicable to other fields, but which often have to be handled with secrecy for reasons of national defense. Of the approximately 500 patents which were submitted to offices of the Armed Forces during the last 2 - 3 years for examination as to secrecy, more than half were connected with fields in which joint experimental and development work is being carried out between I.G. and offices of the Armed Forces. In all these applications I.G. appears as the applicant and assumes all the rights and obligations connected with the applications. If an application leads to a patent, this will be handed over to the Reich as trustee, in case secrecy is required, while the patent rights continue to remain exclusively with I.G.

The representatives of the Armed Forces have, as already mentioned, an almost negligible share in the registered inventions. Up to now departments of the Armed Forces have participated in an inventive capacity in only a very few of the several hundred new applications and only 2 members of the Armed Forces (in 4 cases) have claimed recognition as co-inventors. Although perhaps in some other cases the Armed Forces might be considered as a co-inventor, in that, for example, by the way they present their problems they acquire a position similar to that of the factory or laboratory directors in our plants, in contrast to the chemist who is actually working in an inventive capacity, nevertheless no department of the Armed Forces has even claimed an equal share in an invention.

Neither have we ever been requested as yet to pay compensation for the contribution made to an invention by a State office when patentable protected rights resulted from cooperation between I.G. and the Armed Forces. Only in discussions of price questions have the representatives of the Armed Forces occasionally mentioned that any cooperation by the Reich in preparing the inventions and protected rights to be patented, should be taken into consideration when fixing the prices for I.G. products which are supplied to the Armed Forces, in case royalty fees should be figured in with these prices. Likewise, there has never been any question of the authorities sharing in the profits, when third parties were supplied with I.G. products, which had been jointly developed by I.G. and departments of the Armed Forces.

The Supreme Command of the Army, Military Economic Staff, has frequently pointed out in discussions with respect to the necessity of keeping patent applications of I.G. secret - whether or not these patents resulted from the joint experimental work of the I.G. with the Army officers or from I.G.'s own initiative - that the Army is prepared to indemnify and underwrite any damages arising from this enforced secrecy or arising from the fact that these patents cannot be exploited. We were invited to consult with the Economic Staff as soon as such damage may occur in such a form and to such an extent as can be proved and estimated. On our repeated inquiries at the special I.G. offices, however, we were told every time that it was impossible to prove that I.G. had incurred any definite or at all appreciable damage through the practice of secrecy hitherto employed.

(page 5 of original cont'd)

V. State-owned Production Plants, or "Shadow Factories" and Development Works.

I.G. has constructed, or helped to construct, quite a few

(page 6 of original)

2 June 1939

fairly large production plants for the Armed Forces, which after completion were either put into operation for current orders of the Armed Forces, or else are only guarded and kept in good repair in peacetime as so-called "shadow factories" without current production, so that production can be started immediately in case of emergency. Such production plants have been erected by I.G. upon the order of the High Command of the Armed Forces or its dummy enterprises, such as the Economic Research G.m.b.H. (Wifo), as well as by order of the Reich Air Ministry and the Army Ordnance Office. Since sometimes these plants represent investments of many million marks a formal agreement was nearly always made between the office of the Armed Forces which gave the order and I.G., both for the construction, as well as for maintenance or putting it into operation.

In case processes are employed in Wehrmacht plants, which were discovered through I.G.'s experimental and manufacturing work, in part at the expenditure of considerable means, in several cases the office of the Armed Forces granted a sort of additional royalty fee to I.G. apart from the normal reimbursement of expenses, including a limited profit. If the plants have a purely reserve character, that is, will start production only in case of emergency, and for the time being it is not possible to apply the royalty to the manufactured products, the government authorities granted such a royalty only, if what the I.G. had learned affected not only the production costs but also the expenses for the establishment of the plant, so that the government authorities had thereby already saved a considerable amount of money through the reduction in the cost of constructing the production plant. By way of example, 2 nitric acid plants of the Wifo (Economic Research G.m.b.H.) which have been put into operation pay a regular royalty (corresponding to their present production figure of about 100 000 RM per year), while in the case of 2 other similar shadow plants only a part of the savings effected in the costs of construction, RM 135,000,—, that is, RM 75,000.— was separately repaid.

In case new discoveries and practical knowledge are obtained through the operation of State-owned plants by I.G. which possibly may also lead to patent rights, it was considered as self-evident up to now, although never laid down in writing, that these patent rights are also vested in I.G. as plant manager of the State plant. The Government authorities have only declared on repeated occasions that the State-owned plants also ought to get the benefit of such new discoveries and practical factory knowledge, that is, it is expected that I.G. will keep these State-owned plants up to date and in good repair, which are operated by them or under their sponsorship as reserve plants, according to the latest state of technical progress (in return for a suitable reimbursement of expenses).

Just as in the entire question of handling experimental orders issued by offices of the Armed Forces the Liaison Office W (Economy) paid primary attention to the fact that to a constantly increasing extent the Armed Forces are large-scale customers and buyers of

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT No. NI-4669
CONTINUED

(page 6 of original cont'd)

I.G. products, so likewise in the construction of production plants and shadow factories for the Armed Forces, I.G. saw its chief interest to lie in maintaining control over the production capacity of such plants and any influence they might exert on their respective markets, that is, to take over the factory management of the State plants itself in case they should be put into operation.

Enclosure.

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

We, Robert HOFFMANN, No.1876, and John B.ROBINSON, No.X 046350, hereby certify that we are thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages, and that the above is a true and correct translation of document No. NI-4669.

Robert HOFFMANN
No.1876.

John B.ROBINSON
No. X 046350.

TRANSLATION OF EXCERPT FROM DOCUMENT No. NI-6193
OFFICE OF CHIEF OF COUNSEL FOR WAR CRIMES

(page 2 of original)

Rubberstamp

R 28

I.G. Farbenindustrie
Aktiengesellschaft

Entered for the control in the
controlbook under Serial No. 98

Duty Stamp

Cooy

Rubberstamp:
Frankfurt (Main)

for copy RM 1,50 cancelled
for original RM 1,50 used

Hoechst/Main, 13 June 1935
initialled ?

C o n t r a c t

The following contract is concluded between the German Reich, represented by the Reich Air Minister (hereinafter referred to as RLM) on the one hand

and the I.G. Farbenindustrie Aktiengesellschaft (hereinafter referred to as I.G.) on the other hand.

1.

I.G. transfers the application for the patent J.45 291 IVa/1203 concerning the "Process for the manufacture of aluminiummethylchloride" to RLM for the purpose of registering it as a secret patent.

2.

The costs for the transfer and maintenance of the patent rights through payment of the annual duties will be borne by I.G. until such time as the Reich uses the patent.

3.

Both parties agree that an appropriate payment as laid down in # 5 of the patent law will only be made in the event of the object of the invention being used by the Reich. The amount of the appropriate compensation will be determined by means of special negotiations, in the event of utilization, by RLM; the latter will also decide what can be considered as utilization within the meaning of the contract and whether such exists.

TRANSLATION OF EXCERPT FROM DOCUMENT No. NI-6193
CONTINUED

(page 3 of original)

4.

The I.G. is entitled to allow the patent to lapse at any time by non-payment of the annual duties.

5.

The I.G. is entitled to manufacture the object of the invention for purposes other than those of defense of the country, the I.G., however, must ensure that neither the manufacturing process nor the formulae will come to the knowledge of third parties. In this respect I.G. will take the necessary and customary care to safeguard their secret processes in consideration of the regulations in regard to high treason (Law of 24 April 1934).

6.

The costs for the stamp duty will be born as laid down by law.

Berlin, 6 May 1935.

The Reich Air Minister
I.A. (by order)
KRUCHHOFF ?

Rubberstamp
The Reich Air Minister.

Frankfurt/Main, 7 March 1935

I.G. FARBENINDUSTRIE AKTIENGESELL-
SCHAFT
Signatures: HERMANN HUEBNER

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

24 May 1947

I, John FOSBERRY, Civ. No. 20179, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages and that the above is a true and correct translation of excerpt from document No. NI-6193.

John FOSBERRY
Civ.No. 20179

(seal) Farbenindustrie
Aktien-Gesellschaft (Inc.)
German Reich: stamp for
fee of Mk.3.-

Mk.3.- in words: three
Reichsmark
document fee; cancelled
Frankfurt-on the Main
19 October 1936
(signature) illegible

Between the German Reich, represented by
the Reich Minister for Aviation,

-in the following briefly referred to as RM
(Reich Minister for Aviation)

and

the I.G. Farbenindustrie Aktien-Gesellschaft in Frankfurt
on the Main

-in the following briefly termed I.G.-

on the one hand

the following agreement is hereby concluded:

1.) I.G. transfers the patent application
I 45 523 IVb/78 d of 1 June 1934 on "Incondiary composition
of incendiary substances with a thermite base" to the RM
for registration of same as a secret patent. The RM
administers the patent as a trade secret.

2.) The expenses for the transfer of the patent
will be borne by I.G.

3.) It is incumbent upon I.G. to take the neces-
sary steps to preserve the patent through payment
of the annual fees to the Reich Patent Office when they
fall due. The RM will be informed about the payment. I.G.
has the right to drop the patent at any time, through
discontinuation of the payment of annual fees.

4.) Upon the request of I.G. the RM states its
opinion as to whether it is considered necessary to continue
keeping the patent secret. Should the opinion expressed be
to the effect that secrecy is no longer required the

(page 2 of the original)

RM will have the patent transferred to I.G. at the expense
of I.G.

5.) Both parties agree that from the patent on
upon the patent will be used by the Reich, or by order of
the Reich, the provisions of paragraph 8 of the patent law
of 5 May 1936 will apply.

6.) Local regulations will apply for the obliga-
tion to carry the cost of fees.

The Reich Minister for Aviation
Commander in Chief of the Luftwaffe
(in place)
I.L. (by order)

(signature) Schwenck

(Seal) Reich Ministry
of Aviation

Technical
Department

I.G.FARBEN-INDUSTRIE AG, FRANKFURT AM MAIN

(translat r/s note: handwritten)

(signature) Weber (translat r/s
note: handwritten)

ppc Schmidt
(authorized to sign)

Berlin, 29 September 1936

Frankfurt on the Main, 3 October 1936

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

I, FRANK C. KNUTH, AGO No. X-046355, hereby certify that I am
thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages;
and that the above is a true and correct translation of document
No. XX-1002.

FRANK C. KNUTH,
U.S. Civilian,
X-046355.

END

Affidavit.

I, Dr. Hans Wagner, born on 9 July 1903 at Frankfurt on Main, chemist of I. G. Farbenindustrie A. G. from 1928 to 1945, member of Vermittlungsstelle W, Berlin NW 7, at present living at Stierstadt am Taunus, Untergasse 10, having been duly warned that I shall render myself liable to punishment by making false statements, herewith declare the following on oath, voluntarily and without coercion:

1) In 1928 I entered the Hoechst works as laboratory chemist and remained there until the middle of February 1938 when I was transferred to Berlin to Vermittlungsstelle W. On Dr. ter Meer's request, however, my personal dossier was kept, from that time onwards, in Frankfurt. In Vermittlungsstelle W, I undertook the handling of patents, primarily for Sparte II and to a certain extent for Sparten I and III, and, in addition, development work and deliveries to the Wehrmacht within the province of Sparte II.

2) All questions concerning patents were dealt with by Vermittlungsstelle W together with the Reich authorities concerned, with the exception of developments in the field of poison gas proceeding under the direction of Professor Heerlein, Dr. Schrader and Dr. Ambros. All these matters were treated as Top Secret. These developments in the field of poison gas must have been started approximately as early as 1937, for when I joined the Vermittlungsstelle W in 1938 and became consultant for patents, 15 to 20 of these strictly secret patents had already been registered. On this occasion I was told that these patents were no concern of mine; only after protracted efforts did I succeed in discovering the patent numbers, but not details of the product patented. In the course of time their number increased to approximately 40 to 50.

(Page 2 of original)

3) Besides the patents of Sparte II, of which I had complete charge, I had, from the very beginning, to undertake the handling of the patents of Sparte III at Vermittlungsstelle V, because Dr. Meyer, the representative of Sparte III in Vermittlungsstelle U, was usually at Wulfen and came to Berlin only once a week. About 1942 I also took charge of Sparte I patent questions, as Dr. Diekmann, who had so far looked after this Sparte himself, no longer had time to do so on account of his honorary work in Krauch's office.

4) It was also the task of Vermittlungsstelle Wt to obtain the necessary permits from the authorities for the granting to foreign countries of licenses authorizing the use of I. G. processes. The actual supervision of these matters was the responsibility of the Patents Department of the particular plant in which the patent for which a license is to be granted, originated. Many negotiations with the Air Ministry, CKH and CKW were necessary in this connexion. For the most part, the licenses were granted to the interested party abroad, with the exception of those licenses which concerned, for instance, the poison gas "Lust" (mustard gas) process or light metals for aircraft construction.

(page 2 of original cont'd)

5) Moreover, Vermittlungsstelle W was engaged, even before my time, in handling these applications which I. G. had to make to the Reich Group Chemistry in connexion with the taking of a decision, from the point of view of industrial displacement, in the release of processes for overseas use. In these cases the procedure was as follows: Vermittlungsstelle W received from the Office of the Technical Committee (TEA) in Frankfurt the technical records. From these it was apparent for which part of a process or for which process a license authorising overseas use was to be granted.

(page 3 of original)

These technical documents were then discussed with the consultant of Reich Group Industry. I cannot remember, during the period of my activity, a case in which an application for a license was rejected. Matters which were discussed with the Reich Group Industry concerned exclusively products in which the Wehrmacht had no interest.

6) Negotiations were also conducted between Vermittlungsstelle W and Reich authorities in connexion with the export of chemical products abroad. That is to say, from 1935 or 1936 onwards, the Wehrmacht, particularly the Army Ordnance Office, demanded that any offer to any foreign country of a chemical product, which they considered important, be first submitted to them for approval. The list of these important products was compiled about 1935 by AGK (Ausfuhr-Gemeinschaft Kriegsgoragete, Export Association for War Equipment). Besides the products mentioned in this list, the Army Ordnance Office was also interested in other products for the export of which a permit had to be obtained also. In the course of time, I. G. succeeded in reducing to a minimum the list of these products for which a permit was required. Shortly before the outbreak of war in 1939, all export of these products was prohibited. As a result of collaboration between the Army Ordnance Office and Vermittlungsstelle W, a new list of products for which a permit was to be obtained or which might be exported without permit was drawn up about November 1939. At the instigation of I. G. Farben a large number of products were successfully freed from such restrictions.

In these negotiations, the Army Ordnance Office was represented by General Mauger, Lieutenant Colonel von Zastrow and Colonel Hederich. I represented Vermittlungsstelle W.

(page 4 of original)

In connexion with overseas sales, Vermittlungsstelle W had to cooperate with WPA (Wirtschaftspolitische Abteilung), and finally a common procedure was worked out, in accordance with which Vermittlungsstelle W obtained the consent of the Army Ordnance Office, while ~~WPA~~ ^{simultaneously} obtained the consent of the Ministry of Economics.

7) On 1 August 1939 came the order from the Army Ordnance Office that all permits granted for the overseas delivery of products which appeared in the lists of AGK (Ausfuhr-Gemeinschaft Kriegsgoragete, Export Association for War Equipment), and of the Army Ordnance Office, were to be cancelled immediately and considered invalid.

(page 4 of original cont'd)

Deliveries of orders still outstanding were no longer to be made. This order went to Vermittlungsstelle W and I presume that a similar order was issued to WIFC. We informed the people of the Sales Department "Chemicals" in Frankfurt viz. Messr. von Heider and Burgwardt and left it to them to give the Vorstand as much information on the subject as they thought necessary. Technical personnel were informed of it at the very utmost only in the course of conversation.

This order affected not only our deliveries to Poland but all our foreign customers. From this time onwards, a special permit, which had to be obtained in each individual case, was necessary for all overseas deliveries. On our request this regulation was, as already stated, relaxed at the end of 1939.

8) Loans for the construction or expansion of plants were approved by the Technical Committee (TEA) and Vorstand. Applications for such loans went from the plant to the Office of the Technical Committee (TEA). As to the procurement of the necessary iron and building materials the procedure was as follows:

(page 5 of original)

The Engineering Department of the factory in which the new plant was to be constructed or the expansion carried out, submitted its requirements of these materials to Vermittlungsstelle W. Vermittlungsstelle W in turn contacted the Reich authorities responsible for the allocation of the materials required, as for instance in the cases of Wulfen, Ludwigshafen and Leverkusen. As far as purely Wehrmacht orders were concerned, the authorities concerned were the Offices for Raw Materials of the branches of the Wehrmacht placing the orders. For all other orders, negotiations were conducted with Krauch's Office, which had to grant the permit. All such negotiations were conducted by Dipl. Engineer Nalze.

9) Furthermore, from the beginning of the war onwards, one of the tasks of Vermittlungsstelle W was the discussion with the Wehrmacht and the Reich Office Chemistry of the rationing of various products, such as, for instance, ethylene, Oxal, Buna, ethylene lubricants, Glycerin and similar products. Dr. Wurster, for example, discussed with Mr. Schaeff of the Section "S" the question of sulphuric acid.

In these discussions on the rationing of products each Sparte acted on its own behalf.

In the case of ethylene, these discussions with the Wehrmacht took place at three monthly intervals, but after the outbreak of war, they were held each month.

I have carefully read each of the 5 (five) pages of this affidavit and signed it with my own hand; I have made the necessary corrections in my own handwriting and have countersigned them with my initials and I herewith declare

(page 6 of original)

on oath that in this affidavit I have stated the full truth to the best of my knowledge and belief.

Signaturer: Dr. Hans Wagner
signature

(page 6 of original cont'd)

Sworn to and signed before me this 11th day of June 1947 at Nuremberg
by Dr. Hans Wagner, known to me to be the person making the above
affidavit.

Signature: Peter H. Miller
U. S. Civilian AGO D 145338
Office of Chief of Counsel
for War Crimes
U. S. War Department

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT No. NI-8922

9 July 1947

I, BERYL C. BERNICK, 427459, herewith certify that I am thoroughly
conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above
is a true and correct translation of the document no. NI-8922.

BERYL C. BERNICK
427459

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT No. NI-8481
OFFICE OF CHIEF OF COUNSEL FOR WAR CRIMES

Report
of a conference of Betriebsführer (Plant Leaders) on 21 April
1933 at Leverkusen.

Under the chairmanship of KUEHNE, the following were present:
STANGS, HILPERT and 149 Betriebsführer.

First, KUEHNE expressed his pleasure at the fact that we again have a government which puts duty and work foremost, wants to avoid interference in private enterprise and wants to bring manual and white collar workers closer together. He asked everyone to work in this spirit for the welfare of Germany and of the firm.

KUEHNE further reviewed the course of business, starting from statistics of the foreign trade of the most important countries. He noted that Germany's export in general did not decrease more in proportion to her size than the export of other countries, (Decline in Germany's export as against 1931 = 40%).

Within I.G., the situation became worse from quarter to quarter last year, until now, when it has improved a little. However, the apprehensions expressed at the last meeting about the state of these improvements have partly come true. On the other hand, particularly the nitro-m situation has improved. There is no certainty, however, as to the presumable development of sales. Therefore, KUEHNE once again recommends caution in employing new workers. The sale of chemicals has also taken a favorable turn in the first three months of the year.

KUEHNE further reported that plant contributions to wages and salaries have decreased to 22.5%. After social assessments, which the firm cannot influence in any way, workers' baths and recreation rooms are again the second item. Central supervision by SCHUNCK has shown good results, for the contributions required for this item has been reduced from 3.89% in 1931 to 2.57%. Living quarters also make up a considerable portion of general expenses. In future, therefore, billet repairs are to be carried out at a slower rate and KUEHNE requested understanding for this measure.

With the aid of several graphs, TLETT showed the dependence of steam and electricity prices on the power load, in general, and in particular, the relation of the steam and electricity requirements to each other in the Leverkusen power plant and, by way of comparison, in several other I.G.-plants.

(page 1 of original, cont'd)

Pointing out that generation of electricity is thrice as costly by condensation as by counter-pressure, KUEHNE impressed on the plant managers the necessity for distributing requirements of power and heat throughout the day as evenly as possible.

SCHUMACK pointed out that, having issued gas masks to a large part of our employees and trained them for protection against gas attacks, we must also start training for the protection of our plant against air raids, for alarm, classification of employees as active or passive squads etc. The Reich Association of German Industry some time ago emphasized once again that, for the time being, the industries which are left independent may not be required to incur expenses for work which falls within the framework of civil work for protection against air raid under the supervision of the Reich Commissioner for Protection. On the other hand, this privileged position makes it obligatory that all work which

(page 2 of original)

can be executed without incurring expenses be carried out as soon as possible. In conferences, government representatives have already stressed the fact that industry would be forced by means of official orders to undertake expensive work if it were seen that the firms, whose protection against air raids must be prepared, (the Leverkusen plant is one of these) have not decided, at least, to carry out the tasks which do not involve expenditure, i.e. the so-called first measures. The offices for confidential matters (Vertreuerstellen) - ours is the Langenverein (Long-Name Association) in Düsseldorf - are to investigate whether the works air raid precaution chief has started work on the first measures. First measures are:

- 1.) Appointment of a management member who is to supervise all work concerning air raid precautions. Baurat HILPERT has been designated for this.
- 2.) Appointment of a works air raid precaution chief. Baurat SCHUMACK has been designated for this.
- 3.) Establishment of a works air raid precaution program by the works air raid precaution chief.

(page 2 of original, cont'd)

This works air raid precaution program includes:

Communication between the plant alarm post and the public air-raid warning service, the latter to be organized by the authorities. Enemy planes must be reported to the authorities, and from there to the plant alarm post, sufficiently early to allow for carrying out preparatory measures before the arrival of planes.

The following key words are to be used:

For preliminary warning	air raid danger,
for main warning	air raid alarm and end of
	air raid alarm respectively,
for all-clear	end of air raid danger.

The following steps are to be taken at the key word "air raid danger":

- Notify certain plant officials,
- hold the reinforced fire-brigade in readiness,
- men the first-aid stations,
- hold all motor vehicles in readiness,
- notify the workers assigned to work squads,
- take precautionary measures for the sudden cutting-off of
- steam, electricity, gas, etc.;
- prepare for the interruption of difficult production
- processes;
- prepare for black-out if after dark;
- open the shelters for the employees.

The signal for "air raid alarm" or "end of air raid alarm" will be sounded by means of an acoustic alarm to be audible in all places of work. When the signal is sounded all personnel, except in plants which cannot interrupt production, is to go to the shelters intended for it in each plant. The personnel belonging to the so-called "active employees" which cannot stop working, must have gas-protection equipment and have been instructed in its use. The personnel assigned to "work squads", which is also equipped for gas protection, is to proceed to the shelter designated for each squad. Upon "end of air raid alarm", the decontamination squad will start their activities first, after it will follow the repair and demolition squads and only afterwards, the "passive employees" will leave the shelter and return to their place of work, led by works air raid precaution officials or foremen.

(page 2 of original, cont'd)

In the near future (a special request will be made for this) a list will have to be made of active employees, i.e., all personnel which cannot leave its place of work, furthermore, all personnel assigned to the fire-brigade, works protective squad first-aid service, decontamination squads, repair and demolition

(page 3 of original)

squads. No one between 18 and 35 should be used, if possible. If that is unavoidable, those persons are to be indicated. The authorities want these lists in order to avoid assignment of these people to squads of the local air raid protection service during the formation of the civilian air raid protection service.

The Betriebsfuehrer were requested to consider even now which activity of their plants cannot be stopped, how many people and which ones must remain in the plant during the alarm and what shelters (mainly cellars) might be suitable for their "passive" employees.

In the near future, the leaders of the work squads (fire-brigade, works protective squad, medical service, squads for decontamination, demolition and repair) will be designated and will have to organize their squads. The manner of the works alarm system will also be made known soon. No work which causes expense, such as equipment of employees, obtaining building materials etc., construction of buildings (shelters) etc., will be carried out as yet.

Instruction for protection against gas attacks can, and if only in order to prevent accident, must be started now in the model practice rooms of the fire-brigades with the numerous protective apparatus against gas attacks which are available at the plants and the fire-brigades. It is necessary for Betriebsfuehrer, plant engineers and foremen to take part in these instructions also. Applications must be submitted to the fire-brigade.

In concluding the report, KUEHNLE declared that only such steps are to be taken which might anyway be forced on the plant. Above all, everyone is to remain calm and not to exaggerate the matter.

(page 3 of original, cont'd)

HILPERT pointed out that Hoechst is having officials schooled in Frankfurt for protection against air raids, which is not necessary for Leverkusen, however.

In conclusion POPP reported about the number of employees as follows:

September 1932	6798
End of March 1933	7306
at present	7350

Working hours have been shortened for all but 4.3%.

From a peak figure of 93,000 on 1 May 1929, the total number of I.G. workers fell to 47,000 on 1 October 1932 and rose again to about 54,000 by 1 April 1933. The number of salaried employees has remained pretty constant, around 16,000.

Advance payments, which had fallen to RM 64,000.- again increased to RM 88,000.- before Easter. POPP further reported that the works council (Betriebsrat) had resigned, since the National Socialists have withdrawn their delegates and some of the Communist delegates are under arrest. The new elections have been postponed until September 1933. A provisional works council will presumably be appointed temporarily by the government in Duesseldorf; for the time being, however, the situation is not quite clear.

End of the meeting 16.00 hours.

The Chairman:
Signed: KUEHN

The Reporter:
Signed: HEUSER

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

1 July 1947

I, Dorothy L. GALEWSKI, Civ. No. BTO-34079, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages and that the above is a true and correct translation of document No. III-8461.

Dorothy L. GALEWSKI
Civ. No. BTO-34079

8465

TRANSLATION OF EXCERPT OF DOCUMENT No. NI-8465
OFFICE OF CHIEF OF COUNSEL FOR WAR CRIMES

I.G. Hoechst
Engineering Committee.

Toko

Our reference date page
Office of Chief Engineer 2 June 1933

Geheimrat Prof. Dr. BOSCH, attention of Dr. C. DUISBERG
Office of Central Committee, Frankfurt/M.

Geheimrat Prof. Dr. DUISBERG Leverkusen
Geheimrat Dr. von WEINBERG Frankfurt/M.

To the members of the Technical Committee

Director Dr. KUEHNE	Leverkusen
Director Dr. ter MEER	Frankfurt/M.
Director Dr. G. IUS	Ludwigshafen
Director Dr. KRAUCH	Ludwigshafen
Director Dr. O. SEIDEL	Ludwigshafen
Director Dr. HOERLEIN	Elberfeld
Director Dr. PISTOR	Bitterfeld
Director Dr. G. J. ESKI	Wolfen Film
Director Dr. HERLMANN	Ffm. Hoechst

To the members of Toko

Director KUNKE	Bitterfeld
Director HILPERT	Leverkusen
Director Dr. SAUER	Leuna Works
Senior Engineer Dr. EYLMANN	Ludwigshafen
Director DOERR	Wolfen Film

Reference: TOKO meeting

Enclosed find minutes of the meeting of the Engineering Committee which was held at the Leuna Works on 30 May 1933.

Signed J. ESKIE

<u>Distribution Plan:</u>	
according to addresses given	17
Bitterfeld (KUNKE)	4
Leuna Works	2
Leverkusen (I.G. general)	3
Ludwigshafen (EYLMANN)	3
Wolfen-Film (DOERR)	3
Hoechst (Management Department)	7
	<u>39</u>

(Rupper Stamp)
Technical Management Office Leverkusen
7 July 1933

(page 1 of original, cont'd)

Minutes

of meeting of the Engineering Committee
on 30 May 1933 at the Leuna Works

Present:

Director JAEHNE
Director KUHNKE
Director HILPERT
Senior Engineer Dr. EYMANN
Director Dr. SAUER

Hoechst (presiding)
Bitterfeld
Leverkusen
Ludwigshafen
Leuna Works

also:

Senior Engineer Dr. EINSLER
Senior Engineer HISSBACH

Leverkusen
Wolfen (representing
Director DOWER)

Agenda:

6.) Miscellaneous.

(page 3 of original)

Point 6. Miscellaneous.

Air Raid Protection

JAEHNE reports on the present position as regards air raid precautions in the individual Works Combines (Betriebsgemeinschaften). The Toko recommends a joint discussion of the air raid chiefs of the individual works in order to lay down the guiding principles for carrying out air raid precautions inside the I.G.

(page 4 of original)

signed JAEHNE

Frankfurt/Main-Hoechst, 2 June 1933

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

23 Jun 1964

I, Victoria ORTON, No. 20 129, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages and that the above is a true and correct translation of Excerpt of document No. NI-8465.

Victoria ORTON
No. 20 129

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT No. MI-6973
OFFICE OF CHIEF OF COUNSEL FOR WAR CRIMES

1

Leverkusen, 11 July 1933.

To (Trans.Note):
(Handwritten:) Director MANN. (initial:) M (for Mann)

Please find enclosed copy of the minutes of a meeting,
subject: Industrial Air Raid Precautions in the I.G. plants.

(signature:) SCHUNCK.

(page 2 of original)

COPY

Hoechst/Main, 6 July 1933.

MINUTES

of the meeting on industrial air raid precautions
in Hoechst on 6 July 1933.

Present:	von der Eoy	Central Germany
	Ries	Photo Synthetics
	Fuchs	" "
	Schunck	Lower Rhine
	Pfaundler	Upper Rhine
	Ritter	" "
	Deinhardt	Leuna
	Poehn	Central Rhine
	Knorth	" "
	v. Gallois	" "

It appears from the organizational reports of the plants issued by the various men in charge of air raid precaution that the directives issued by the Reich Association for Industrial Air Raid Precaution have been complied with in all I.G. plants, in as far as this was possible without expense. The following directives by the highest authorities should be considered relevant in regard to further measures:

1.) Reich Air Ministry:

"There are no areas in the Reich which could regard themselves as particularly important or endangered. The main principle is the maintenance of production according to military requirements."

2.) Army Ordnance Office:

This office holds the same point of view, only more so, and recognizes that the demand for active air raid protection is justified, if production of the plants has to be maintained in the interest of national defense.

(page 2 of original, cont'd)

3.) Reichswehr:

"Any discussion of the necessity for air raid precaution is high treason" (Landesverrat).

(page 3 of original)

In view of the fact that in case of war I.G. will have to guarantee a possibly even increased production, these statements of the highest authority indicate the necessity for I.G. to start carrying out industrial air raid precaution measures energetically. The people present cannot escape the conviction that in future the government will consider war-industry workers as active soldiers in case of war.

For the uniform execution of the measures it is recommended:

Hoechst to act as clearing-office for all questions regarding industrial air raid precautions within I.G.

Accordingly all questions to be dealt with are to be directed via Hoechst; also all negotiations - of other than local character - with the authorities.

Meetings of the men in charge of air raid precautions to take place. Time and place to be determined by the clearing-office, according to necessity. The man in charge of air raid precautions in Hoechst should arrange monthly circulars if possible. Urgent questions are to be dealt with immediately.

The measures already taken in the plants or yet to be taken are to be discussed individually.

The immediate execution of the following measures, which will incur expenses, is being applied for:

- 1.) Extension of the air raid warning and reporting service.
- 2.) Procurement of implements for the training and equipment of the actively-aiding squads.
- 3.) Procurement of items for fire defense and first aid, also gas-masks for the staff to be actively employed.
- 4.) Training and equipment of more first-aiders.

Furthermore, expenses will be incurred in future for the possible equipment of the working staff as well as for the installation of gas- and splinter-proof shelters for the staff.

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT No. NI-6973
CONTINUED

(page 4 of original)

The measures for the air raid protection of the plants will now be extended to include all members of the staff beyond the small circle of the men in charge of air raid precautions and the security service.

An inspection of the disaster and air raid precaution installations in Hoechst followed the meeting.

(signed) von der BEY.

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

9 July 1947.

I, Dorothea L. GALEWSKI, ETO-34 079, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages and that the above is a true and correct translation of the document No. NI-6973.

Dorothea L. GALEWSKI
ETO-34 079.

(Stamp:)
Office of Chief Engineer
No. 2381
In: 20 July 1933
To be dealt with by Mr. ...
Answered.....

Minutes
of the meeting of the Technical Committee on Tuesday, 18 July 1933
0930 hours in Frankfurt/a/Main.

Those present were the gentlemen listed in Appendix 1).

III. Report on questions concerning air raid precautions.

(Page 4 of original)

III.) Report on questions concerning air raid precautions, Jaehn

The first organized industrial air raid precaution measures desired by the authorities have been taken in the I. G. works. Further development of the warning and reporting service and the acquisition of some equipment for the training and outfitting of certain squads is now necessary. The costs incurred are to be charged to general expenses. The director of air raid precautions will be made answerable for this. The amount necessary is estimated at between 70,000 and 80,000 RM.

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

5 June 1947

I, Beryl BESWICK, AGO No. D-427-459, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages and that the above is a true and correct translation of excerpts from document No. NI-5837.

BERYL BESWICK
AGO No. D-427-459

TRANSLATION OF EXCERPT FROM DOCUMENT No. NI-4838
OFFICE OF CHIEF OF COUNSEL FOR WAR CRIMES

I.G. Farbenindustrie Aktiengesellschaft
Technical Committee

Leverkusen-I.G. Works
18 September 1933

Rubber stamp:
Office of the Technical Committee
Section A
Received: 30 September 1933
forwarded:-----
dealt with:-----

Privy Councillor Prof. Dr. BOSCH
Attention of Dr. C. DUISBERG, Z.A.-Office,

Frankfurt/Main

Privy Councillor Prof. Dr. DUISBERG

Leverkusen

Privy Councillor Dr. von WEINBERG

Frankfurt/Main

To the Members of the Technical Committee:

Director Dr. KUEHNE	Leverkusen
Director Dr. ter MEER	Frankfurt/Main
Director Dr. GAUS	Ludwigshafen
Director Dr. KRAUCH	Ludwigshafen
Director Dr. O. SEIDEL	Ludwigshafen
Director Prof. Dr. HOERLEIN	Elberfeld
Director Dr. PISTOR	Bitterfeld
Director Dr. GAJEWSKI	Wolfen-Film
Director Dr. HERMANN	Frankfurt/Main-Hoechst

To the Members of the Engineering Committee:

Director JAEHNE	Frankfurt/Main-Hoechst
Director Dr. SAUER	Leuna-Works
Chief Engineer von der BEY	Bitterfeld
Chief Engineer Dr. EYMANN	Ludwigshafen
Chief Engineer RIESS	Wolfen-Film

Subject: Engineering Committee Meeting.

Enclosed please find minutes of the Engineering Committee meeting which took place on 14 September 1933 at Rheinfelden.

(signed) JAEHNE

(signature) EINSLER

Distribution:

According to addressees.....	17
Bitterfeld.....	4
Leuna Works.....	2
Leverkusen (I.G. general).....	3
Ludwigshafen.....	3
Hoechst (Management).....	4
Wolfen-Film.....	3
	39

Dir. Dr.	Initial
" " ter MEER	
" STRUSS	
KOENIG	initialled
" GIESLER	initialled
" LOEHR	initialled
" MOELLER	

For information. Return to
Office of Technical Committee.

TRANSLATION OF EXCERPT FROM DOC.No. HI-4838
CONTINUED

(page 1 of original)

Minutes

of the meeting of the Engineering Committee
on 14 September 1933 at Rheinfelden.

Present:

Director	JAEHNE	Frankfurt/Main - Hoechst (Chairman)	
Director	Dr.SAUER	Leuna Werke	
Chief engineer	von der BEY	Bitterfeld	
"	"	Dr.EINSLER	Leverkusen
"	"	Dr.EYMANN	Ludwigshafen
"	"	RIESS	Wolfen-Film

and

Prof.Dr.HENCKY

Leverkusen.

Agenda:

.....

10) Industrial Air Raid Protection.

.....

(page 3 of original)

.....

10) Industrial Air raid protection.

The total of RM 190.000 provided for by the works for air raid protection appear to be too high; when the result of the last central meeting in Berlin is available, the amount to be spent will be finally determined.

.....

(page 4 of original)

.....

(signed) JAEHNE

(signature) EINSLER

Leverkusen-I.G. Werke, 18 September 1933.

TRANSLATION OF EXCERPT FROM DOC.No. NI-4838
CONTINUED

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

29 May 1947

I, Arthur MACNAMARA, Civ. No. 20 191, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages and that the above is a true and correct translation of excerpt of document No. NI-4838.

Arthur MACNAMARA
Civ.No.20 191.

TRANSLATION OF EXCERPT OF DOCUMENT No. NI-8462
OFFICE OF CHIEF OF COUNSEL FOR WAR CRIMES

Confidential

Technical Management Office Serial No. 929

3 November 1933

Minutes

of the Senior Engineers' meeting on Wednesday
3 November 1933

Present: Einsler, Dien, Haager, Hartmann, Hencky, Hoffmann, Koessmann,
Manegold, Hiemann, Reimann, Block, Ruesch, Schwank, Soel,
Tietz, Voigt.

.....

Mr Raid Protection.

For the blackout drill on 17 November next the principle is established that for the present the blackout is to be carried out without incurring expense and in the simplest possible manner. The factory engineers should get in touch with the plants without delay with a view to determining those measures which are absolutely necessary. The light in the yard, as well as in the fire alarm stations will be switched off from the power station. Those outside lights which are not connected with the general grid system should be turned off in the plants themselves. The lights should be dimmed in the simplest manner by using blue bulbs or coloured paper shades. When discussing the question of hand lamps to be made available for blackout drill, mention must be made of the most suitable kind of hand lamp. Department K will examine the question of hand lamps generally and report on it in due course.

.....

(page 2 of original)

.....

The secretary:

signed: SEEL.

The Chairman:

signed: EINSLER

TRANSLATION OF EXCERPT OF DOCUMENT No. NI-8462
CONTINUED

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

23 June 1947

I, Victoria ORTON, Civ. No. 20129, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages and that the above is a true and correct translation of the excerpt of document No. NI-8462.

Victoria ORTON
Civ. No. 20129.

TRANSLATION OF EXCERPT FROM DOCUMENT No. NI-5871
OFFICE OF CHIEF OF COUNSEL FOR WAR CRIMES

(Page 1 of original)

M i n u t e s

of the Meeting of the Vorstand on 13 November 1933 at Hoechst/Main.

Attended by: Director Dr. Hermann
Professor Lautenschlaeger Initial J
Director Jacobi
Director Jachne
Director Kraenzlein
Director Schwenborn present part of the time.

(Page 3 of original)

In the Hoechst Works Pechm and Bauerlein are in charge of Air
Raid Protection matters. Pechm will give a lecture before the
Board on this subject, to which several gentlemen from Hs. and
Offenbach will be invited. After the meeting on Air Raid
Protections in Berlin, from 4. - 7 December 1933, Bauerlein
will give a lecture before the Graduates' Circle (Akademiker-
Kreis).

Signature HERMANN.

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

29 May 1947

I, Arthur MACHAMARA, Civ. No. 20 191, hereby certify that I am
thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages and
that the above is a true and correct translation of excerpt
from document No. NI-5871.

ARTHUR MACHAMARA
Civ. No. 20 191

TRANSLATION OF EXCERPT FROM DOCUMENT No. NI-5884
OFFICE OF CHIEF OF COUNSEL FOR WAR CRIMES

(page 1 of original)

Minutes of the Meeting of the Vorstand held in Hoechst
a/M. on 20 November 1933.

The following gentlemen were present: Dr. Hermann
Dr. Rohrer
✓ Prof. Lautenschlaeger
Dr. Jacobi
Dir. Jaehne
Dr. Kraenzlein

(page 3 of original)

With regard to the training of apprentices discussions have taken place with Arnold (Dinta) and the I.G.. It is recognized that the manager of workshop for apprentices, the master and the foremen have to be convinced followers of the present Government, whereby their professional qualifications must not be disregarded.

(page 4 of original)

The plant in Gr. will get a grant of RM 1900.-- for procuring air raid precaution apparatus, the more so as half of it will be refunded by the State. It concerns the extension of the warning signal system, procurement of gas-masks and unimportant items.

(page 5 of original) (last line)

The submitted estimates of costs are approved.

(Signature): KRAENZLEIN

(rest illegible)

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

20 May 1947

I, E. HINCHLIFFE, Civ. No. M.P. 026034, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages and that the above is a true and correct translation of excerpt from document No. NI-5884.

E. HINCHLIFFE,
Civ. No. M.P. 026034

I.G. Farbenindustrie Aktiengesellschaft
Engineering Committee

Leverkusen-I.G. Werk
25 September 1934

Rubber stamp:
Office of Technical Committee
Section 1
Received: 26 September 1934
forwarded:
dealt with:

Privy Counsellor Prof. Dr. Bosch
Attention Dr. C. Duisberg, Z.N.N.-Office Frankfurt/Main

Privy Counsellor Prof. Dr. Duisberg Leverkusen

Privy Counsellor Dr. von Weinberg Frankfurt/Main

To the Members of the Technical Committee:

Director Dr. Kuchne,	Leverkusen
Director Dr. ter Meer,	Frankfurt/Main
Director Dr. Gaus,	Ludwigshafen
Director Dr. Krauch,	Ludwigshafen
Director Dr. O. Seidel	Ludwigshafen
Director Prof. Dr. Heerlein,	Elberfeld
Director Dr. Pistor,	Bitterfeld
Director Dr. Gajowski,	Wolfen-Film
Director Dr. Hermann,	Frankfurt-Hoechst.

To the Members of the Engineering Committee:

Director Jachne,	Frankfurt-Hoechst
Director Dr. Seuer,	Leunawerke
Obering. von der Bey,	Bitterfeld
Obering. Dr. Eymann,	Ludwigshafen
Obering. Riess,	Wolfen-Film.

Subject: Meeting of the Engineering Committee.

Enclosed please find minutes of the meeting of the Engineering Committee which was held on 20/21 September 1934 in Duisburg.

(signature) Einsler

List of Distribution

According to addresses	17	
Bitterfeld	4	
Leunawerke	2	
Leverkusen	3	
Ludwigshafen	3	Director Dr. Initials
Hoechst (Management)	7	Ter Meer
Wolfen-Film	3	Struss
Frankfurt/Main (Office of Technical Committee)	1	Koenig
		Giesler
		Moeller
	40	

For your information and return
Office of Technical Committee

32

EXCERPTS FROM
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT No. NI-4841
CONTINUED

(page 2 of original)

.....

Minutes

of the meeting of the Engineering Committee on 20/21 September 1934
in Duisburg.

Present:

Mr. Jachno	Frankfurt/Main-Hoechst (Chairman)
Mr. Sauer	Leunawerke
Mr. Einsler	Leverkusen
Mr. von der Bey	Bitterfeld
Mr. Eymann	Ludwigshafen
Mr. Riess	Wolfen-Pilma,

also present for No.9:

Mr. Braumüller,	Duisburg
Mr. Wolf,	Duisburg
Mr. Koch,	Duisburg

.....

(page 4 of original)

.....

12) Air raid Precautions. (Works Air Raid Drill.)

The air raid precautions which it has been requested be taken at the I.G. Werke are so vital for the plant and the factory that they will have to be discussed with the Central Offices of the Reich.

.....

(page 5 of original)

.....

Leverkusen - I.G. Werk, 22 September 1934

(signed) Jachno

(signature) Einsler.

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

28 May 1947

I, VICTOR L. ORTON, No. 20129, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages and that the above is a true and correct translation of excerpts from document No. NI-4841.

.....
VICTOR L. ORTON, No. 20129.

Ffm.-Hoechst, 27 September 1934

Subject: Special Meeting of the Main Group II (Hauptgruppe II)
on 28 September 1934.

Item 2.) Air-raid protection questions.

JAEHNE reports on the measures so far taken and the arrangements made, as well as the costs incidental thereto.

The recently proposed measures which exceed the previous demands constitute such a burden on the plant and its operation that from the viewpoint of good management of the plants, their application appears doubtful.

A clarification of these questions by the Reichsstand der deutschen Industrie (Reich Guild of German industry) is considered necessary.

(Translator's Note: Pencilled initial) Jn.

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

I, HERTHA C. KNUTH, AGO No. X-46355, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document No. NI-4451.

HERTHA C. KNUTH
AGO No X-46355
U. S. Civilian

(E N D)

12

Dr. B/Kr. 10 April 38 1

7. Meeting of the Technical Directors held at Ludwigshafen
on the 12th of April, 1938.

Persons present: Ambros, Brockler, Brendel, Eymann, Goldberg,
Grimm, Haldemann, Hilsch, Koller, Krieger,
Mansfeld, Mohner, Mohndinkel, Mueller-Schrodi,
Pfannmueller, Pflaumer, Pfeleiderer, Reithel,
Reppel, Sante, Sauer, Winter

and Buelow, Fr. Mueller, v. Rosenberg, Wagner.

Not present: Baumann, Fahrenhorst, Kosseler, v. Knierim,
Krauch, Lappe, Pior, Schenemann, Steinmig, Strobel
Weiss/Bayer, Weiss/Welfer, Wurster.

Agenda:

1. Fritz Mueller: Air raid protection
2. Brendel: Contract with I.C.I.
3. Pfannmueller: Report on recent meetings of the
Inorganics Committee.
4. Ambros: Report on various meetings held
during March.

1.) Fritz Mueller: Air raid protection.

With the aid of maps and charts H. gave a general description of the organization and aims of the air raid protection system in the plants, and discussed the conditions in Lu/p (Ludwigshafen/Cppau) in particular. So far approximately 2000 employees had completed training courses at the Plant PAD School (Passive Air Defence), each from Lu and Cp. The training is conducted in accordance with a plan carefully worked out by Plant PAD Leaders. Up to date about 45 % of the air raid shelters required have been completed in Lu and Cppau. Construction of further air raid shelter is either in progress or planned.

(page 2 of original)

The speaker gave an interesting account of black out and camouflage problems as well as of the 'air raid' and 'all clear' signal system, with particular regard to the special conditions prevailing in Lu and Cppau.

The subsequent discussion indicated that a lively interest in taken in problems of air raid protection.

Ambros requested the speaker to report his lecture to a meeting of Betriebsfuhrer of Lu/Cp.

(page 3 of original)

signed: Buelow

TRANSLATION OF EXCERPTS OF DOCUMENT No. NI-6298
CONTINUED

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

5 June 1947

I, LEONARD LAWRENCE, 20138, herewith certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of excerpts of document no. NI-6298.

LEONARD LAWRENCE
20138

TRANSLATION OF EXCERPTS OF DOCUMENT No. NI-5297
OFFICE OF CHIEF OF COUNSEL FOR WAR CRIMES

handwritten: Dir. Dr. ter Meer/Frankfurt

I. G. FARBEINDUSTRIE AKTIENGESELLSCHAFT
Technical Directors.

Ludwigshafen/Rhein
27 September 1938. Dr. Bw/3.
Lu 260

12th Meeting of the Technical Director held at Ludwigshafen
on 27 September 38.

Persons present:	Ambros	Klett	Pflaumer
	Baumann	Krieger	Fior
	Bruckler	Lippe	Knauth
	Buolw	Kensfeld	Rappe
	Eymann	Martin (at 1)	Sant
	Goldberg	Mehner	Steinmig
	Holvort	Mchwinkel	Strabold
	Hildermann	Fr. Mueller (at 1)	Wagner
	Hilzsch	Mueller-Gunrath	Wurster
	Kessler	Pfannmueller	

Not present:	Brendel	Krauch	Stauss
	Grimm	Sauer	Weiss/Bauer
	Keller	Schwenemann	Weiss/Wolfers
	v. Knieriem		

Agenda:

1. General problems of air raid protection.
2. Supply of raw materials for the plant.
3. The credit situation and its effect on the plant.
4. Miscellaneous.

1. General problems of air raid protection. Fr. Mueller reported on present state of air raid protection in the Lu and Op plants. (Ludwigshafen and Oppau.) The construction of air raid shelters is making satisfactory progress. Air raid shelters for 50 % of the employees approximately have been completed, further shelters are being built or planned. The average costs are RM 150.- per head; at Ludwigshafen in 1937 RM 134000 were expended on Air Raid Protection under the heading of "General Works Expenses (Sub Heading: Planning)" and RM 153,000 under the heading of "Projects" (at Oppau the sum is RM 81 500).

In plants operating in 24 hours schedule measures to protect emergency squads from splinters are still inadequate.

TRANSLATION OF EXCERPTS OF DOCUMENT NO. NI-6297
CONTINUED

(page 2 of original)

I. G. Ludwigshafen
Directorate

day sheet
27 Sep 38 2

The protection of housing settlements for white collar and manual workers is not the responsibility of the works air raid protection organization but of the Reichsbund for air raid protection (Reichsluftschutzbund); measures so far taken there seem unsatisfactory in every respect.

The air raid alarm for employees is given by phone, but a gradual change over to small sirens in each plant is being effected.

Blackout installations in the plants are practically complete, the blackout fittings of offices and laboratories are still being put up.

The subsequent discussion offered opportunity for the elucidation of points which had remained obscure.

Then Martin discoursed with the aid of a map on the different sectors into which the plant had been divided up for air raid protection.

Krieger discussed the problem of transportation of employees to and from the place of work.

(page 3 of original)

signed: Duol:w.

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

5 June 1947

I, LEONARD LAWRENCE, 20138, herewith certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of excerpts of document no. NI-6297.

LEONARD LAWRENCE
20138

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT No. NI-7768
OFFICE OF CHIEF OF COUNSEL FOR WAR CRIMES

AFFIDAVIT

I, Dr. Hans WAGNER, born on 9 July 1903 at Frankfurt on Main, chemist, employed by I.G. Farben Industrie AG from 1928 - 1945, member of Vermittlungsstelle W, Berlin NW 7, at present living at Stierstadt/Taunus, Untergasse 10, having been duly advised that I should render myself liable to punishment by making false statements, herewith depose the following on oath, voluntarily and without coercion:

1. I entered the Hoechst Works as chemist in 1928 and remained there until the middle of February 1938 when I was transferred to Vermittlungsstelle W, Berlin. At the request of Dr. TER MEER, my personal dossier was kept at Frankfurt from that time onwards. In Vermittlungsstelle W, I took over the handling of questions relating to patents, mainly for Sparte II, and in part for Sparten I and III; in addition, I took over the handling of development work completed and work connected with deliveries to the Wehrmacht within the sphere of Sparte II. These continued to be my province of work until the end of war in April 1945.

2. In collaboration with Dr. Moriz KANDEL, a representative of the Office of U.S. Chief of Counsel for War Crimes, I have examined the following I.G. Farben documents which are available in the Palace of Justice, Nuremberg, some in the original and some as certified photostat copies.

In the following I quote all extracts from these documents connected with air raid precautions in I.G. In each case, I give precise details of the document concerned and also the names of those persons present, who now appear as defendants in Case No. VI before the American Military Tribunal.

A. Minutes of the Meeting of the Engineering Committee (Teko)
held on 25/26 January 1934 at Hoechst:

Friedrich JAEHNE was present among others.

"Item 13). Miscellaneous.

..... Expenditure could be made for the development of the air raid warning service, for literature and equipment to be used for the purpose of exercises and training".

Signature: WAGNER

(page 2 of original)

B. Minutes of the Meeting of the Engineering Committee (Teko)
held on 8 November 1934 at Frankfurt on Main, Hoechst.

Friedrich JAEHNE was present among others.

"Item 8) Miscellaneous.

..... Following the meeting, the air raid precaution measures

(page 2 of original, cont'd)

so far taken and the installations erected in connexion therewith, and afterwards the new boiler house were inspected."

C. Minutes of the Meeting of the Vorstand and the Technical Directors held on 19 March 1934 at Hoechst.

Karl LAUTENSCHLAGER and Friedrich JAEHNE were present among others:

" Dr. BAUERLEIN - Police Advisor and Chief of Training of the official Air Raid Precautions Sector, Hoechst - had taken part in two courses in Berlin and would report on their results at the next possible opportunity."

D. Minutes of the Meetings of the Vorstand and the Technical Directors held in Frankfurt on Main/Hoechst on 6 August and 3 September 1934.

Karl LAUTENSCHLAGER and Friedrich JAEHNE were present among others.

" An air raid precautions exercise would take place on 3 October. Attention would be drawn to the subsidiary dangers attaching to air raids. Dr. von BRUENING was to get into contact with the section chiefs with reference to the central control of precautionary measures to be taken in connexion with secondary dangers (benzene fires, escapes of chlorine etc.)"

E. Minutes of the Meeting of the Technical Directors held at Frankfurt on Main/Hoechst on 21 December 1936.

Friedrich JAEHNE was present, among others.

" The estimates of costs submitted were approved, with the following reservations:

Item 39:

Air Raid Precautions RM 15,000.-

would be postponed."

F. Minutes of the Meeting of the Technical Directors held at Frankfurt/Hoechst on 31 May 1937.

Friedrich JAEHNE and Karl LAUTENSCHLAGER were present among others.

Signature: WAGNER

(page 3 of original)

" The estimates of costs which had been presented were discussed and approval recommended, with the following reservations:

(page 3 of original, cont'd)

Item 79:

Air Raid Precautions

RM 42,200.-

Consultation with Dr. FOMER."

G. Minutes of the Conference of Chief Engineers held on 10 December 1936. (At Leverkusen)

" Air Raid Precautions.

SINSLER gave a brief report on the success of the last air raid precautions exercise, which had brought us a special word of commendation from the Authorities, and expressed his thanks to SCHUNK and the others who were connected with the exercise. The interest in the results registered by the staff of the plant was so great that it seemed advisable to give a report on the subject at the next Betriebsfuhrer Conference."

H. Minutes of the Meeting of the Technical Committee (TEA) held on Tuesday 2 October 1934 at 9.30 a.m. at Frankfurt on Main.

Fritz THOMAS, Fritz GAJEWSKI and Hans KUEHNLE were present among others. In addition, Hermann SCHMITZ, Heinrich OSTER, Wilhelm MAER, August von KNIERIM and Heinrich GATTINEAU were present for part of the time.

" 6. Air Raid Precautions.

JAEHNE reported on the air raid precaution measures which would probably have to be taken in I.G. works in the near future. Further treatment of these questions with the competent authorities should, wherever possible, be effected from Hoechst."

3. On the grounds of facts and events which came to my knowledge in the course of my seventeen years of service with I.G., I can make the following statements.

A. The Engineering Committee of I.G. Farbenindustrie (Toko), the chairman of which was Director JAEHNE and the offices of which were at the Hoechst works, represented an assembly of the chief engineers of the

Signature: WAGNER

(page 4 of original)

plants of the I.G. works combine, and handled, to the best of my knowledge, only technical questions connected with engineering. As far as I remember, the headquarters of the Engineering Committee were at Leverkusen until approximately 1934/35 and were only moved to Hoechst, when Director JAEHNE transferred to Hoechst.

(page 4 of original, cont'd)

In 1934, the members of the Engineering Committee were the following:

Director JAHNKE, Frankfurt/Hochst
Director Dr. SAUER, Leuna
Director Dr. von HEY, Bitterfeld
Director Dr. EYMANN, Ludwigshafen
Director RIESS, Wolfen-Pilm.

These gentlemen sometimes represented a whole works combine. For example, Mr. von der HEY attended on behalf of the Bitterfeld, Wolfen-Parben, Alton, Stassfurt and Rheinfelden works and Mr. RIESS represented all the works of Sparte III, i.e. Rottweil, Bobingen, Berlin-Lichtenberg and Eilenburg among others, in addition to Wolfen-Pilm.

As far as I remember, the tasks of the Engineering Committee included the handling of all engineering questions of technical nature arising within I.G. Not only the standardization of apparatus and equipment and technical construction material were discussed from the technical point of view, but also the efficacy of processes utilized within the plants and questions of electricity supply and utilization. In addition, the purely technical aspect of estimates of costs which had been submitted, the training of skilled workers and questions arising in connexion with patents were dealt with from the point of view of the engineer. The estimates of costs which were dealt with and approved by the Engineering Committee in its own right were, to the best of my knowledge, predominantly concerned with technical and engineering matters and air raid precaution projects, and not questions connected with the chemical plant. In individual cases it may have happened that chief engineers or even works engineers made more precise statements on their sphere of activity. The resolutions of the Engineering Committee were made known to all members of the Technical Committee (TEA) by means of the regular dispatching of minutes of the meetings of the Engineering Committee.

Signature: WAGNER

(page 5 of original)

B. The Technical Committee of I.G. (TEA) was formed in 1934 and consisted of 9 members of the Vorstand, namely:

Dr. TER MEER, Dr. KUEHNE, Dr. GAUS, Professor HOERLEIN,
Dr. KRAUCH, Dr. SEIDEL, Dr. PISTOR, Dr. HERMANN, Dr. GAJEWSKI.

It was the responsibility of the Technical Committee to supervise all happenings of a technical nature within I.G. This included primarily the control from the purely chemical point of view of all events occurring within the works in the course of production. In addition, the Technical Committee had the right to give the last and final decision within I.G. on questions relating to the building of new works,

(page 5 of original, cont'd)

the erection of production plants and the commencement of new lines of production. In this connexion, the Technical Committee was also the authority which was responsible for advancing the loans necessary for all these projects. As far as I know, questions relating to the procurement of man-power for the works (chemists, engineers and workmen) were discussed by the Technical Committee. In addition, questions concerning the sale of I.G. products in more or less regular departments were also discussed, to my knowledge. To my knowledge too, the minutes of the meetings of the Departmental Committees of the I.G. were regularly sent to the Office of the Technical Committee.

C. Meetings of the Technical Directors took place at regular intervals (generally weekly) in all I.G. works. These meetings frequently extended beyond the bounds of a single works and combined the chiefs of all the works belonging to one works combine. The word "technical" in this context comprehends not only technical questions within the sphere of engineering, but primarily technical questions arising out of production, thus chemical questions. The assembly of the Technical Directors met, with very few exceptions, under the chairmanship of Works Manager. Those taking part in the meetings were all departmental chiefs of the works concerned, and in addition, the chief engineers and the chief of the Social Welfare or Personnel Department. The aim of the meetings of the Technical Directors was to inform all officials holding responsible positions in the works of events taking place within the works, thus ensuring uniform treatment in all departments of all important questions arising within the works. Among other matters, all

Signature: WAGNER

(page 6 of the original)

applications for money to be sent to the Technical Committee from the works concerned were considered before being dispatched, by an assembly of the Technical Directors. It is probable that in those cases in which the works manager was also a member of the Vorstand or even of the Technical Committee, reports were given on important questions arising during meetings of the Vorstand or Technical Committee.

D. Conferences of Chief Engineers were conferences which took place within a restricted circle within the works itself. Those participating in them were primarily the chief engineers of all departments of the works. In addition they were attended by the department chiefs and plant chemists of those departments or plants in which particularly important construction projects or alterations were being undertaken at the time of the meeting. The applications for funds to be submitted by the works to the Technical Committee were likewise dealt with at conferences of chief engineers. In as far as projects of relatively limited scope were in question, they could, to the best of my belief, be settled at conferences of chief engineers without submission to the Technical Committee. All others applications for funds went direct to the Technical Committee, whose responsibility it then was to approve them. The production capacity of the supplier

(page 6 of original, cont'd)

firms of I.G. in the field of machinery and technical equipment and the supply of the works with electricity were also discussed at the conferences of Technical Directors.

4. I know from personal experience that the signature appearing at the foot of the minutes of a meeting, at the right hand side of the page is the signature of the recorder. Thus the minutes of meetings of the Technical Committee quoted above are signed by Mr. EINSLER who, to the best of my belief was also Secretary of the Technical Committee.

The minutes of the meetings of the Technical Committee were, in my opinion, written up by Dr. Ernst STRAUSS, who was chief of the Office of the Technical Committee and also recorder of the meetings of the Technical Directors.

As far as the minutes of the meetings of the Technical Directors quoted above are concerned, I can say that the younger members of the Department of the Technical Directorate generally participated in the meetings as secretaries of the works manager then in office and generally wrote up the minutes. These minutes were generally signed, however, by the works manager.

(page 7 of the original)

in person, as responsible official. Thus, Dr. HIRSCHEL was private secretary to Dr. HERZMAN, works manager of the Hoechst Works, and to Dr. von BRUENING before him. The minutes of the meeting of 19 March 1934 are signed by Dr. von BRUENING, while the minutes of the meeting of 6 August, 24 September 1934, 21 December 1936 and 31 May 1937 are signed by Dr. HIRSCHEL. I know the handwriting of the above-named persons from previous occasions.

I have read carefully the 7 (seven) pages of this statement and signed them with my own hand, I have made the necessary corrections in my own handwriting and countersigned them with my own hand and I herewith declare on oath that I have, in this affidavit, stated the absolute truth to the best of my knowledge and belief.

Signature: Dr. Hans WAGNER
Dr. Hans WAGNER

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT No. NI-7768
CONTINUED

(page 7 of original, cont'd)

Sworn to and signed before me this 15th day of July 1947 at the
Palace of Justice, Nurnberg, Germany, by Dr. Hans WAGNER, known
to me to be the person making the above affidavit.

Signature: Dr. Moriz KANIEL
Dr. Moriz KANIEL
U.S. Civilian, AGO 445442
Office of Chief of Counsel
for War Crimes,
U.S. War Department.

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

30 July 1947

I, Beryl C. BESWICK, No. D 427459, hereby certify that I am thoroughly
conversant with the English and German languages and that the
above is a true and correct translation of the document No. NI-7768.

Beryl C. BESWICK
No. D 427459

TRANSLATION OF EXCERPTS FROM DOC. No. NI-5881
OFFICE OF CHIEF OF COUNSEL FOR WAR CRIMES

(Rubber stamp):

Files MINUTES
dealt with. of the Meeting of the Technical Directors in
Frankfurt/Main-Hoechst on 9 March 1936.

Those present were: Messrs.
Hermann
Lautenschlaeger
Jacobi (part of the time)
Jaehne " " " "
Kraenzlein " " " "
Roth
Pfaffendorf
Fehrle
Hagenboecker
Hilcken
Landers
Tampke
Speidel

.....
(page 2 of original)

JAEHNE informs us that the building for the manufacture of solvents will probably go into production on 1 December. It is necessary that the final decision as to the height of the building to be used for distillation be made as soon as possible.
.....

(page 4 of original)

.....
An exercise at Leuna has shown the apparent efficacy of the Works defense system.
.....

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

I, Beryl BESWICK, Civ. AGO D-427459, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages and that the above is a true and correct translation of excerpts of the document No. NI-5881. 29 May 1947.

Beryl BESWICK
Civ. AGO D-427 459.

(Translator's Note: Stamp:
Carl Index processed.)

MINUTES
of Meeting of the Vorstand and Technical Direction
in Frankfurt/M.-Hochst on 8 June 1936.

Present: HERMANN
LAUTENSCHLAGER
JACOBI
JAEHNE
KRAENZLEIN
PFAFFENDORF
ROTH
FERLE
HAGENBOECKER
HILCKEN
LANDERS
STAIB
TAMPKE:

.....
.....

The Espionage Decree was discussed again and the regulations are to
be adhered to as is most practicable.

.....

(Page 3 of original)

.....

STAIB made a brief report about the visit of the Military Inspectors
(Wehrinspektoren) to Ludwigshafen and the planned exercise (Planspiel) which
took place on this occasion.

.....

(Page 4 of original)

.....

(Translator's Note: Initial: H)

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

I, DOROTHEA L. GALEWSKI, M.P. NO. 34079, hereby certify that I am thoroughly
conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a
true and correct translation of Document No. NI-5888

DOROTHEA L. GALEWSKI
M.P. NO. 34079

END

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TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT No. HI - 4619
OFFICE OF CHIEF OF COUNSEL FOR WAR CRIMES

Leverkusen I.G. Work, 22 Dec. 1936

To: Baurat SCHUNK, private

at our works

Confidential !

The war-economy tactical planning exercise has been
definitely fixed for Friday, 15 January 1937.

For this purpose a preparatory exercise has been arranged for

6 January 1937, 1100 hours

at the conference room, Azo Building, to which I herewith
cordially invite the gentlemen participating in it.

Questions on the planning exercise are to be addressed to

Direction Department, Leverkusen,

Dr. DOEMAIER.

Signature: Dr. KUEHNLE.

1 enclosure.

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Time-table for the tactical exercise in
industrial planning at Leverkusen.

hour

900 - 910	Reception of the guests in the Administration Building
910 - 940	Address by Dr. KUHNKE (Importance of the chemical industry, particularly of I.G. to Germany, Division of I.G. into spartes, more detailed description of sparte II, special significance of the Group Niederrhein and Leverkusen in wartime. Stressing the interrelation of the various departments and plants. Location and lay-out of the Leverkusen factory).
940 - 1000	Sight-seeing tour in cars through factory, Rhine quay, main roads. View of the factory from the new power station.
1000	Arrival in front of the Azo laboratory building Explanation of the exhibition
1020 - 1040	Introduction into the tactical planning exercise by Dr. v. BRUENING.
1040 - 1140	Tactical planning exercise.
1140 - 1220	Talk by Dr. v. BRUENING winding up the planning exercise.
1220 - 1300	Debate.
1300 - 1320	Final address by Dr. KUHNKE.
1330 - 1530	Lunch in the casino.
1530 - 1700	Inspection of the factory.

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT No. NI - 4619
CONTINUED

Time-table for the tactical exercise in industrial
planning at Leverkusen.

hour:

900 - 910	Reception of the guests in the Administration Building.
910 - 940	Address by Dr. KUEHNE. (Importance of the chemical industry, particularly of I.G. to Germany, Division of I.G. in spartes, more detailed description of Sparte II, mention of Sparte III, special significance of the group Niederrhein and Leverkusen in wartime. Stressing the inter-relation of the various departments and plants. Location and lay-out of the Leverkusen factory).
940 - 1000.	Sight-seeing tour in cars through factory, Rhine quay, main roads. View of the factory from the tower of Pharma building.
1000	Arrival in front of the Azo laboratory building.
1010 - 1020	Introduction into the tactical planning exercise by Mr. v. BRUEWING
1020 - 1150	Tactical planning exercise.
1150 - 1210	Talk winding-up the planning exercise Dr. ter MEER or Dr. v. BRUEWING.
1210 - 1310	Debate.
1310 - 1330	Final address by Dr. KUEHNE
1400 - 1530	Lunch in the casino.
1530 - 1700	Inspection of the factory.

Confidential

Tactical Exercise in industrial planning.

Period: After the beginning of the war.

Presupposition: The plant is engaged in the manufacture of war material or products of vital importance to roughly about the same degree as at present, but a certain change within the various installations has taken place. The work at the dyestuffs plants and at the Zw plants (intermediate products) belonging to them has been restricted, the plant manufacturing inorganic white colors (Lithopone and Titan) is working only as far as these products are needed for the synthetics industry. The Titan factory is about to be shut down entirely through lack of raw materials.

A meeting of the technical directors is taking place, with the director-in-chief of the works, Dr. KUEHNE, in the chair and the following gentlemen present:

- 1) Chief engineer
- 2) Chief buyer of technical and raw materials
- 3) Chief of Department for transport, dispatch and packing
- 4) Chief of social Department
- 5) Chief of Research Laboratory
- 6) Chief of inorganic plants
- 7) Chief of plants for intermediate products
- 8) Chief of A-factory / Nitrating and Rubber Department
- 9) Chief of Dyestuffs Plants
- 10) Chief of Uerdingen plant.

KUEHNE: Gentlemen, as you know, yesterday's air raid on our works has caused not only extensive material damage and interfered considerably with our manufacturing program, but has also caused a number of casualties. I have asked you to come here for a conference about the measures necessary for the re-establishment of full production capacity at the most essential manufacturing installations, particularly those

(page 2 of original)

working directly on Army supplies. Will you, Dr. EINSLER, be kind enough to let us have a short report on the destructions caused.

Mr. EINSLER: During yesterday's air raid on our works, poison gas, incendiary, and high explosive bombs were dropped. All the small fires started by incendiaries in factory buildings were extinguished by our works fire brigade with the exception of the fire at the garage for private cars near the Leuna petrol station where the wooden shed was burnt down because our fire brigade was, of necessity, engaged at other places within the plant. The poison gas bombs did not cause any destruction worth mentioning. But regrettably we lost 8 men.

(page 2 of original, cont'd)

2 were not able to reach the shelters in time, 4 men of the shift working at the power station were killed when the boiler exploded, and 2 men of the shift working at the P-plant were buried beneath the debris. The 5 heavy high explosive bombs which hit our works have destroyed, as you know, the phenol plant OS, buildings P 33 and P 31 to such a degree that we must expect a considerable decrease in production. Dr. KAESSMANN is, I assume, going to report on this presently. The condition of the East wing of building P 33, in which benzol is being sulphurized, however, is such that complete demolition of the ruins still standing will be necessary. It is impossible to carry on production there.

Further severe damage has been caused to the old power station which was completely out of action for a short time. But it has been ascertained since by a thorough inspection that the damage is not as severe as was thought at first. Completely destroyed are the entire furnace installation and the boilers 11 and 12. Boiler 10 can be repaired, as far as can be judged at present. -

(page 3 of original)

The damage at boiler 9 is more external; there is reason to hope that this boiler can be used again within four days. Boiler 8 being at present under repair, we could operate with 7 boilers if we can solve the question of supplying the necessary coal. We would have boiler 9 as a reserve as early as within four days. I had a talk with the power station chief and think we can supply the boilers manually with coal by carrying the coal in wheelbarrows from the railroad lines at the North side of the boiler house over ramps into the building. We expect the output of the boilers to drop by 10 - 15 %. In effect, we shall then be able to produce approx. 80 % of the normal steam output in the old power station. The steam deficiency can partly be made good by using the new power station to its full load capacity. We can secure the remaining small balance by installing steam tractors in building F 29 or by placing 3 railway engines on the Y-block near the main coal store, as we have done once before. Steam connections for this emergency installation in F 29 are available. The pipes for the railway engine emplacement on Y-block can be connected within two days. The deficiency in electric power is to be made good by using the RWE grid (Rheinisch-Westfaelische Elektrizitaetswerke), so that no difficulties regarding electric power supply will arise.

LUDWIG: It is gratifying to know that we can expect to have the normal steam supply in working order again very soon. Since the circular pipe system in building W 4 was sealed off within a short time, the distilling processes in Cu, liquid fuels, Nitrotoluol plants as well as the rubber manufacturing plant were interrupted for a short time only, the necessary steam from the new power station being brought in from the other end of the pipe system.

(Page 4 of original)

The steam supply system for the Nitrating and Nitrotoluol separator plant in the H-Block, however, is brought to a standstill as a result of the old power station having ceased to function. In the Nitrating plant, we can manage for a few days without steam, but for the Nitrotoluol separator plant the steam supply has to be got working again within the shortest possible time.

EINSLER: Some boilers of the old power station can be expected to provide steam as early as to-morrow. The emergency ramps for the unloading of coal by hand are already under construction. I have put all available carpenters on this job. Mention has also to be made of the destruction caused by the last hit in Kekula-road between the power station and the dyestuffs mill. There is a big crater in the street; the second gas main as well as the steam and water pipes and the power cables have been cut. The ensuing fire from the escaping gas prevented the turning off of the steam at the nearest block valve, and only after the gas cock at the spot marked on map A had been shut off was it possible to close steam valve 1; prior to this, it had been necessary to turn off valves 2 and 3 thereby sealing off the whole block. This naturally resulted in a production break-down in this block. The electricity distributor at the corner of the dyestuffs mill was damaged so badly by the explosion that it had to be switched off. By running an emergency cable from electricity distributor X, the plants in the vicinity, especially the dyestuffs mill, can again be supplied with electric power as from to-night. As to gas supply, the situation is as follows: There are two main pipe lines for supplying gas from a distant works. One of the pipe lines, the so-called old pipe, enters the works near the gas-producing factory, and pressure reduction and distribution takes place there. The other pipe line, now destroyed, runs as a high pressure pipe directly to the inorganic

(page 5 of original)

plant where pressure is reduced and the gas distributed. The main difficulty caused by the destruction of this pipe line is that of supplying the T-block with gas. The main consumers situated here are the sulphate-hydrochloric acid-plant and the A-coal plant. Since cutting down production in the A-coal plant is out of the question, it became necessary yesterday to extinguish 3 sulphate furnaces as a result of too sharp a decrease in pressure. If the pipe line now under construction on the left bank of the Rhine had been completed, the continuation of gas supplies would not have met with any difficulties whatsoever in spite of the present damage. As I have been told just now the present restrictions of gas consumption are not sufficient; we have to decide here and now about the measures to be taken in order to make further supplies of gas available.

(Page 5 of original, cont'd)

THIENEMANN: Since the Titan-factory is working only to a very limited extent, the biggest gas consumers in the works are the Lithopone factory, the sulphate-hydrochloric acid-plant and the A-coal plant. As already has been mentioned restriction of the latter is out of the question. You have already been told that consumption in the sulphate-hydrochloric acid-plant has been reduced as far as possible. The remaining sulphate furnaces have to be kept working because a certain quantity of hydrochloric acid is indispensable for chloro-sulphonic acid, chlorhydrin production and for some other purposes, as you all know. Unfortunately, the usual way of providing sulphate hydrochloric acid by chlorine combustion can not be used since we shall have to face a great shortage of Chlorine anyway. There is no other way out but to extinguish both rotary furnaces in the Lithopone factory; especially the rotary furnace for finished dyes. Furthermore, the Titan factory which in any case has raw materials for only two more months has to be closed down immediately until the gas pipe is in working order again. By this procedure, all other gas consuming plants can

(page 6 of original)

go on working without restriction.

KUEHNE: Gentlemen, thanks to the quick and circumspect work done by the Engineering Department the vitally important plants are in a position to continue production. I should like to know how long it is going to take to repair the gas pipe lines and when we can expect normal gas supply.

EINSLER: Since we have a supply of m of gas pipes of mm diameter as well as valves to replace the two destroyed valves we hope to have the damaged pipe lines repaired within 8 days, so that the supply of gas in the quantities formerly supplied can be resumed after nine days.

KUEHNE: I request the Engineering Department to do everything in their power to restore normal working conditions as quickly as possible. I should now like to ask Dr. KAESMANN for a detailed report on the destruction caused in the Phenol plant, as we have to do our utmost to bring this plant back to full capacity production as quickly as possible since it is extremely important.

KAESMANN: The manufacture of Phenol is divided into two parts. The first takes place in the Eastern part of building P.33, the second in the adjoining building P 31. In short, the production process is the following: Benzol is sulphated through being treated with monohydrate of sulphuric acid in cast iron vessels equipped with a mechanical mixing & stirring device. The Benzol-sulphonic acid is poured into sodium chloride, then the excess

(Page 6 of original, cont'd)

sulphuric acid is neutralized with chalk. The sulphuric acid is then filtered off from the gypsum resulting from this process, and the gypsum is washed. This part of the manufacturing process is carried out in building P 33. From here, the benzol salt solution is taken to building P 31 and there it is steamed and later dried on cylindrical dryers. The dry benzol salt is fused with concentrated caustic soda at the high temperature of 340 degrees centigrade. The finished compound is put into water. The phenolate which was formed then goes into solution; the sulphite produced as a by-product separates out

(page 7 of original)

as a crystalline deposit. After filtering and washing the sulphite, the phenolate solution is acidified, and the crude phenol liberated in this process is purified by distillation.

As already stated, the part of building P 33 in which the sulphating apparatus was situated has been completely destroyed, but in building P 31 only the melting installation has been damaged. Of the 4 melting appliances one has been entirely destroyed; a splinter has pierced the lid of another one and torn off all the pipes. It is hardly possible to say how long it will take to get the necessary replacements and to repair these two sets.

EINSLER: Taking the present strain on machine factories into consideration we must expect a delay of about 8 months in the delivery of new sets. Time needed for installation has to be added. These containers are not in stock.

KAESSEMAN: If we can transfer the Benzol sulphating process to other plants manufacturing intermediate products it will be possible to continue the production of phenol at about 50 % capacity in the undamaged part of the melting plant, after the clearing up has been done which will not take very long. As far as I could ascertain the shops GS and TS in building N 20 and shop ES in building N 14 would be suited for this purpose. The sulphating appliances for intermediate dyestuff products which are installed there and are not used to full capacity at present, can be put into use for benzol sulphating after cleansing and some minor alterations of the pipe system. It is an advantage that these shops have sufficient installations for the chalk neutralization process. Benzol salt solution can be supplied to the phenol plant in building P 31 by means of a newly laid pipe line which will be finished within 2-3 days. It will take about equally as long before the benzol sulphating process is running again and the first finished product is available.

(page 8 of original)

The total capacity of the above-named plants is greater than demanded. The equipment of plants SS and TS is sufficient to sulphurize 500 tons of benzol per month. Even though the sulphurizing boilers are not equipped with entirely suitable stirring apparatuses, this does, nevertheless, not constitute a disadvantage, since only the reaction time is prolonged somewhat. But the required output will be attained under all circumstances. In addition to this there is available there a roller dryer which could, in case of need, be used with an output corresponding to 150 tons of phenol per month in order to relieve the load on the plant in Bau P 31.

WENKE: In the triphenylmethane plant it is also possible to sulphurize about 100 tons of benzol per month in the apparatus in which otherwise the sulphurization of our green dyes takes place, which, to be sure, is now being used only to a limited extent. But the equipment for the calcination would have to be provided first.

KAESMANN:

The taking over of the fusion process by other plants involves somewhat greater difficulties. The two alkali fusion plants AS II and AS III in the undamaged eastern part of building P 33 have available principally cast steel autoclaves. This boiler material is conceivably unsuitable for the phenol melt. When subjected to the strong attacks of the concentrated, highly heated soda lye it would quickly deteriorate. In the AS plant the equipment for gamma acid and I-acid is more suitable. If these products can be produced in Wolfen the phenol melt could be carried out there, even though with a somewhat slighter yield. Whether, to be sure, the total deficiency of 250 tons of phenol per month can be produced, seems doubtful, since the equipment is adjusted to handling solutions, whereas now considerable amounts of dry benzol salt must be introduced. The remaining accessory equipment for carrying out the process up to the phenolate solution is available. A sufficient number of pipe lines are available for the transportation of this solution to

(page 9 of original)

Bau P 31 for further processing. The possibility of WOLFEN taking over the production must therefore be examined immediately.

MUTHE: With reference to the phenol melt we shall probably have to follow the suggestion of

(page 9 of original, cont'd)

Dr. KAESSMANN and make AWS available therefor.
Dr. KAESSMANN, will you please get in touch with WOLFEN immediately with reference to their taking over our gamma and I-acid manufacture. With reference to the lost sulphurizing equipment in building P 33 we now have, to be sure, found several possibilities. But I should like to emphasize specifically that the improvised equipment will also produce the accustomed good quality.

KAESSMANN: In Plant TS one can, after cleaning the equipment and rearranging a few pipe lines, already begin with the sulphurizing. The preparation of the equipment will require about 5 days.

KUEHNE: The preparation of B.L.G. P 33 test for the refusion must be undertaken immediately. How long, Dr. EINSLER, do you think the reconversion will require?

EINSLER: Presumably 1½ weeks.

O. BAYER: If the envisaged transfer of the fusion of the sulpho acid into plants AS I and AS II in the autoclave should cause too great difficulties, there would still be the possibility of producing - instead of according to plan A, as hitherto - in accordance with the wellknown but somewhat more expensive process via aniline phenol. At the present time considerable amounts of aniline could be readily obtained, since, to be sure, in peace times the I.G. produced up to 1000 tons per month and we obtained up to 200 tons per month from Uerdingen.

LAUX: The obtaining of additional amounts of aniline from Uerdingen causes no difficulties. In the course of a month we furnish about

(page 10 of original)

100 tons for vulcanizing accelerators, 100 tons for dyes and 120 tons are being used at the present time for Centralite, and the demands for Centralite are increasing.

O. BAYER: If, now, one diazotizes aniline with nitrite and sulphuric acid and boils the aqueous solution, there is liberated, according to the formula, 1 phenol, which can be distilled off

(page 10 of original, cont'd)

directly with water vapor. Equipment for diazotizing and boiling is now available in the Azo Division as desired. To be sure, this method requires, as is evident from the formula, $2\frac{1}{4}$ mols of nitric acid, 1 mol for the nitration of the benzol and about $1\frac{1}{4}$ mol for the diazotization of the aniline.

MENK: This process could also be carried through offhand in the Azo Division. The boiling would be accompanied by difficulties, since here tremendous volumes are processed with the easily decomposing diazo solution. For 10 tons of phenol per day boilers of 120,000 liters useful content are required. Since this amount of boiler space is not available, the boiling would have to be continuous. A considerable amount of time will be necessary in order to prepare the equipment for the production of the total amount of phenol which is required. On the other hand, in the Azo Division we can cover the requirements of phenol for salicylic acid with about 3 - 4 tons per day according to the method indicated. To be sure, the required distillation would have to be carried out in the A-factory.

LUDWIG: The equipment is available. We must also mention the production of phenol via the chlorbenzol exchange method. In our case the method can be carried out only intermittently and for this purpose not sufficient pressure boilers are available. But in our experimental plant in the inorganic division perhaps 40 - 50 tons of phenol per month could be produced in the alkaline way via chlorbenzol. For this purpose Dr. THIENEMANN would have to initiate the necessary steps in order to have an additional reserve in case difficulties should arise in connection with the

(page 11 of original)

reconversion in plants 3/ and Azo.

KUEHNE: In view of the greater requirements of nitric acid and the longer time required for reconversion, also in view of the possibly increased consumption of aniline for diphenylamine, for diphenyl-arsenic acid chloride (Clark) as a preliminary product for Blue Cross⁺ I consider that Dr. MENK's proposal with reference to a limited production of phenol is correct. The Azo factory will immediately

+ Poison gas? (translator's note).

(page 11 of original, cont'd)

take over the matter of supplying the salicylic acid plant with phenol. The question of transportation must be regulated between Izo, A-factory and ZW-division. The present position makes it necessary that we again operate at full capacity in the very shortest time possible, regardless of the increase in the cost of production, and that we will be in a position to make available the amounts of phenol which are necessary for the picric acid. Perhaps after Dr. KAESSMANN briefly tells us once more the distribution key for phenol, Mr. SCHUBERT can give us information concerning the coverage of benzol and nitric acid requirements, and concerning the phenol situation within the I.G.

KAESSMANN:

In peacetime we produced 300 tons of phenol per month, distributed as follows:

- 80 tons for salicylic acid,
- 130 t for synthetic materials (Kunststoff, Troisdorf)
- 50 t for dyes,
- 15 t for tanning materials,
- and 25 t for special pharmaceutical purposes.

Now the output has amounted to 500 tons per month, of which there are used

- 120 tons for salicylic acid and special pharmaceutical purposes,
- 80 tons for synthetic materials,
- 20 tons for tanning materials,
- and 20 tons for dyes.

That corresponds to 240 tons, so that it was possible to use 260 tons for the manufacture of picric acid. Since these 260 tons must continue to be made available without fail and since there will be a shortage of 100 tons this month, even when taking into account that all reconversion programs are carried through, the additional requirements must be reduced from 240 to 140 tons.

(page 12 of original)

Upon inquiry at Troisdorf it develops that synthetic materials can be limited only in so far as they serve civilian purposes, so that there one must continue to count on a running demand of 60 tons. I propose that the remaining 80 tons be distributed as follows :

60 tons for salicylic acid and pharmaceutical purposes and 10 tons each for dyes and tanning materials.

Schellenberg: It remains to be determined whether, when carrying out all of the shifts in manufacture which have now been decided on, the internal plant transportation load will not increase to such an extent that the required tank cars for intraplant transportation can no longer be furnished.

Ludwig: By combining the sulphurization in the M-block the question of transportation has been materially facilitated. In addition the A-factory can furnish 6 tank cars for the shipment of the raw phenol. If the transportation is uniformly distributed throughout the day and night it will be possible to overcome the difficulties with the available tank cars.

Schwank: Because of the conversion one must, in view of the lower yield, as Dr. Kassmann advised, figure on additional benzol requirements of 50 tons per month in connection with the phenol melt. Since, in accordance with the last interview with Ludwigshafen, the purchasing center for benzol and toluol, additional delivery is extremely difficult, we must count on a further limitation of the processing of benzol for dyes. There is as yet no danger of a shortage of nitric acid because of the processing of aniline into phenol, since the allotment for nitrobenzol is sufficient and nitrate is still on hand in large quantities due to the stoppage of the manufacture of dyes. By the intensification of the yield of phenol,

(page 13 of original)

in the waste water and in the hydrogenation plants it was possible thus far to cover the shortage comparatively easily. One must expect that there will be an increased demand on the part of rayon manufacture in the near future. But we hope, by converting the rayon factories to Cresol, to be in a position here also to take care of a shortage of raw materials.

Thienemann: Unfortunately I must report on still other damage caused by yesterday's air attack. Because of the sudden failure of current in the A-carbon plant,

(page 13 of original cont'd)

which could not be switched in again until after an hour had elapsed, the new A-carbon revolving furnace was unfortunately bent through. This produced a fracture in the large toothed gear when operation was resumed. As you all know, it is extremely difficult to again bring into order a revolving furnace, which has thrown itself. To obtain a corresponding toothed gear will also require a few months. It is therefore necessary that some other revolving furnace be used for the manufacture instead of the furnace which was put out of commission.

Kühne: If it is only a question of a revolving furnace it would be relatively easy to help by taking one of the furnaces in the titanium factory or in the lithopone plant. But how about the volatilization that follows immediately afterwards? For in the A-carbon the evaporated zinc chloride and the hydrochloric acid are recovered in the condensation behind the revolving furnace. If this does not occur then one must calculate on a rapid destruction of the foxes (Füchse) and of the hearth, in addition to the loss of material.

Thienemann: That is correct. In the case of every other

(page 14 of original)

revolving furnace we shall have to figure not only on considerably higher losses of material, particularly of zinc chloride, but also that the fox (Fuchs) and hearth will suffer heavily, and the revolving furnace will suffer because of unsuitable masonry work. But according to my opinion we have no choice; since we must continue to manufacture we shall simply have to choose a revolving furnace which will, as much as possible, continue to hold out until the A-carbon revolving furnace is again restored. The transportation of the furnace material back and forth is also disagreeable. 30 tons of mixture must be handled daily, with a pouring weight of 0.6, i.e., approximately 50 cbm ready formed mixture. These shaped forms must be treated with a certain precaution, since otherwise they gather too much dust, thus causing a loss of yield. It will probably be most suitable to lay temporary rails in the plant and allow the material to run from the transporting belt into dump cars standing alongside. Since a dump car holds about 1 cbm of filling, 50 to 60 dump cars must be provided each day for the transportation of the shaped forms. I assume that this will cause no particular difficulties. The return transportation of the furnace material will, to be sure, be more disagreeable. The hot furnace material will, in the A-carbon, be drawn off into lockable chests which hold 300 kg each. To be sure, these chests can be moved about the plant in a special driving frame. But if we wish to transport the material back from the Lithopone plant, which probably has the furnace that is most

(page 14 of original cont'd)

suitable for our purposes, these closed chests would have to be returned either by automobile or by the suburban railway. Now, we have to figure on 16 to 18 tons of furnace material each day, which amounts to 60 chests. Since we have only about 40 chests available for the furnace the transportation must be carried out very rapidly and the empty chests must be returned immediately again.

Schellenberg : The loading of these chests, which, with a charge of 300 kg and a net weight of 250 therefore weigh 550 kg when

(page 15 of original)

filled, on narrow gage cars and the unloading is practically possible only with one crane each in the lithopone and in the A-carbon plant. I believe that this transportation is, after all, in view of the space conditions which are now already very limited in the A-carbon, not to be recommended. It is probably more suitable to make available for these purposes two electric carts on whose flat platforms the chests can be easily loaded. If two electric carts run back and forth continuously the transportation can be handled easily, without further limitation of the A-carbon plant, which will already be very much confined by the dump cars which are to take care of the transportation of the raw material for the furnace, by the crane and the additional railway freight cars.

Thienemann : I also believe that this solution is suitable. With reference to the furnaces under consideration it should be remarked that the eliminated revolving furnace in the A-carbon is 22 meters long, with a free cross section of 1.20 meters. In the lithopone factory there is available a furnace 28 meters long and 1.30 meters in diameter. All other available furnaces, such as the barium sulphide furnaces and the furnaces of the Titanium Association are relatively too large and would require interrupted operation. Since, in addition, as was mentioned, one must calculate on great damages to the furnace in question, I would suggest taking the lithopone furnace, it being the smallest and the least expensive of the furnaces that are available. To be sure, this will temporarily require a complete cessation of the lithopone manufacture, since another furnace of the lithopone factory is not available. But presumably one can get around this by letting the raw dye pile up and then using the one furnace of the Titanium factory for the heating to red heat, since it, as has already been mentioned, is practically ready to stop completely because of a lack of raw material.

(page 16 of original)

Kuehne:

I believe we can proceed according to this suggestion. I request Dr. EINSLER to see to it that this important repair will also be made with the greatest possible speed.

Einsler:

The coinciding of the repair jobs which have been mentioned will make it difficult to release the corresponding number of locksmiths and construction workmen. As you know, we already have a continuous shortage of workmen. Unfortunately the older foreign workmen assigned to us by the Solingen assignment office are in part not well enough broken in yet to relieve the pressure materially. In part we were completely unable to take charge of people assigned to us, since accommodation was lacking for the time being.

Popp:

If the Titanium Factory is closed completely a large part of the 180 man crew will be released there; the same from Lithopone. We shall need no new housing facilities for these people. Otherwise there are still possibilities of accommodation, at least temporarily and immediately in the domestic science school, which will have to stop entirely its operations, which are at present minimal. There we can set up cots in the large rooms, also in the basement. Beds can also be provided there immediately, since stoves are on hand. It will also be possible to provide for another series of men in the Bachelors' Home by squeezing together. To be sure, the engineer office would have to help in setting up the beds and to make some improvised mattresses.

In my opinion we can use the girls who have been released in the Farbenlager and other places to fill positions in the factory in which men are still doing light work. The plants ought to indicate that immediately to the labor office. The pensioners who are still living here can also provide some help.

(page 17 of original)

In my opinion the question of accommodation is thereby solved.

(page 17 of original continued)

Schwank:

The tanker with mixing acid due from Hoechst yesterday has not yet arrived today. We have a two days' supply of mixing acid.

Kuehne:

The carrying out of the reconversion program just decided on for the preparation of phenol depends, if one assumes that the question has been decided satisfactorily from the technical angle, essentially on our being provided with the required increased amount of benzol by the Berlin assignment office. In addition there must again be a regular sequence of mixing acid deliveries. It is probably most suitable if the individual gentlemen will once more make an exact compilation for their sections of the present requirements of these products and turn it over to Mr. Schwank today yet. Mr. Schwank can call personally in Berlin tomorrow again in order to determine whether all proposed measures can be carried out as envisaged.

If nobody has anything further to bring up I shall close the meeting and thank you gentlemen for your vigorous support in connection with overcoming the heavy damages which our plant has suffered.

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

5 June 1947

We, ARTHUR G. MACMILLAN, 20127, and HERBERT R. DECK, B 397 944, hereby certify that we are thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of the document No. NI-4619.

ARTHUR G. MACMILLAN
20127

HERBERT R. DECK
B 397 944

Confidential

I.G. Farbenindustrie Aktiengesellschaft
Vermittlungsstelle W

Berlin NW 7
Unter den Linden 82
A 2 Flora 0021

I.G. Farbenindustrie Aktiengesellschaft
Management Department
Attention: Dr. Dobanier
Leverkusen/I.G.-Werk

Stamp:
Management Department
Leverkusen
29 Jan. 1937

Your reference: Your letter of: Our reference: Berlin, the
(to be stated 27th January
when answering) 1937
Dr. v. E. / Pf.

Subject:

We should be grateful to receive a copy of the stenographic notes taken during the discussion of the tactical exercises on the 15.1. We request you also to send us the drawings still in your possession.

In connection with the tactical exercises we had already discussed with you the formulation of plans for Leverkusen being commenced. In preparation for this, we should very much like to receive a list in which the individual departments of Leverkusen are quoted and clearly designated. This list should differentiate between the following three sections:

- 1) Plants which must be on a full production basis in the A-Fall.
- 2) Plants (Intermediates and final processing) which will only operate on a limited scale.
- 3) Plants of which it can be seen even now, that they will not run during the war.

We should very much appreciate your help in obtaining this list and we shall, in the near future, get in touch with you about further developments.

Vermittlungsstelle W
Sparte II

signature: Bruening

signed: Kuchno
Registered!

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

6 June 1947

I, John FOSBERRY, Civ. No. 20 179, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages and that the above is a true and correct translation of the document No. NI-4628.

John FOSBERRY
Civ. No. 20 179

- 1 -
"END"

58

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT No. EC-174
OFFICE OF CHIEF OF COUNSEL FOR WAR CRIMES

Military Economic Tour of the General Staff
to Godesberg from 25 May - 2 June.

I have the pleasure and honor to welcome you here in Godesberg to the 1937 military economic tour of the General Staff. The first tour of this kind took place last year and was limited to a small circle. I particularly welcome the fact, that not only members of the military economic organizations are taking part in this tour, but that this time we also see among us representatives of the three branches of the Wehrmacht, a large number of members of the staff of the Plenipotentiary General and several gentlemen who have joined us under their mobilization instructions. President SCHACHT's announcement that he will personally attend the final meeting on Saturday has given me especial pleasure.

This year's economic tour of the General Staff has for the first time been arranged in a manner which it had for a long time been my aim to achieve. Former tours of military-economic organizations - the well-known economic tours - actually only served for the inspection of industrial plants and for making the acquaintance of their leading personalities. Last year we already advanced a step farther by discussing the

(page 2 of original)

mobilization of concerns, in addition to inspecting industrial plants, and by bringing forward for discussion in another plant the solution of the difficult labor problem.

In the autumn of last year, the first attempt was made in Dresden to institute a military economic manoeuvre on the smallest scale. The experiences gained from this were utilized on the present occasion. This year's economic tour of the General Staff is intended to serve two important purposes. Firstly, on the basis of assumed war conditions, it should test the cooperation within the military-economic organization, the coordination of the Military Economic Staff (Wehrwirtschaftsstab) with the branches of the Wehrmacht and the cooperation between the Military Economic Staff and the Plenipotentiary General (G.B.); the second main purpose of the exercise is the internal mobilization of the plant.

Only recently I have had many talks with soldiers and representatives of the economic life about the style and the carrying out of economic tours of the General Staff.

(page 3 of original)

The opinion I heard from these gentlemen was mostly as follows:
"Such economic tours by the General Staff must be very interesting, how it is actually done is a riddle to me, and I am not able to form any ideas about it."

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT No. EC-174
CONTINUED

(page 3 of original, cont'd)

Such military-economic manoeuvres are also unexplored territory for us and constitute nothing more than an experiment. We, too, want to learn from this year's manoeuvre in order gradually to be able to approach the great skill which the General Staff has acquired in its tactical and strategical exercise tours. We are aware that the manoeuvre is a risky undertaking and that it will be very open to criticism. We will ourselves, however, be the most critical, in order to find the most suitable method of arranging and conducting such manoeuvres.

Before we begin with the actual manoeuvre, I should like to say a few introductory words on its conditions and execution. The circle taking part in this manoeuvre is relatively large, and it was therefore not possible to base the manoeuvre on conditions corresponding to the real German plan of operation. We had to construct conditions which

(page 4 of original)

would, on the one hand, furnish a reasonable and practicable basis for our manoeuvre, and, on the other hand, would be so formed as fully to serve its purpose in the economic field. Therefore, please do not regard this manoeuvre from the tactical and strategical standpoint with too critical an eye, but bear in mind that the military-economic aspects are the main reasons for this tour, that these are the problems still facing us and which have to be brought closer to a solution.

Nevertheless, I should like to use this opportunity to point out to you that all documents handed out to you are strictly secret and that you must exercise the greatest care for their safe keeping, and that all lectures or other orientations are subject to the strictest secrecy.

Now for another point. A manoeuvre, as arranged for the first time, cannot solve all the numerous problems which exist, but can only bring them closer to a solution. I shall therefore not

(page 5 of original)

permit debates on questions of principle or of competence, but will have notes made of the differences arising, in order later to bring them up for settlement in Berlin. We have adopted various suppositions in the situation - particularly on the Red side - in the organizational field which do not correspond to actual German conditions and which require thorough tests before suggestions can be made to the Command of the Wehrmacht (Wehrmachtsfuehrung) for their adoption. Please do not debate on these questions either, for, as already stated, we all wish to gather experiences from such a manoeuvre and to become acquainted with the advantages and disadvantages of the one or the other organization. You can, however, only learn these by practical example in the course of the manoeuvre. The manoeuvre :

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT No. EC-174
CONTINUED

(page 5 of original, cont'd)

should serve particularly to show those present here how in total war the behaviour of the individual soldier is influenced by economic factors and how, conversely, economy is completely dependent on operational events. Therefore in war time there are not two opposite poles: one Army, and one Economy! The important thing is that both cooperate intelligently, and we shall endeavor during these days to find methods which guarantee this cooperation.

(page 6 of original)

The period of time we have allotted for this manoeuvre is very short and consequently, we can in most respects only touch on the problems arising, and deal more closely only with few of the aspects presented. I would therefore request that all lectures and discussions be brief in order to keep within the time limit allowed. I will direct the manoeuvre myself only in part, and will leave part of the direction to Lt. Colonel Huenerman and Major Beutler. This I do in order to observe a certain distance from the events. Only in this way, freed from the details of directing the manoeuvre, will it be possible for me to overlook the whole and in particular the theory of the planning, and to draw conclusions for the future from the experiences gained.

Finally, I trust that the days we shall spend together will also bring us closer together in comradeship, for personal acquaintance and personal discussion are the best way for mutual cooperation.

(part 2)

(page 1 of original)

Before entering into discussion on the military-economic manoeuvre, I especially desire to express to you, my dear President Dr. SCHACHT, all our thanks for having taken the trouble, despite your great pre-occupations, to attend today's final meeting in person. We see in it a confirmation of the great interest you have always shown in our military-economic work, and your presence here is renewed proof of your willingness to facilitate the difficult military-economic preparation for soldiers and to strengthen the harmonious cooperation with your offices.

May I likewise express our heartfelt thanks to General KEITEL for his presence, which demonstrates to us that the Chief of the Wehrmacht Office fully appreciates the significance of the military-economic work and warmly supports it not only here, but also in Berlin.

The military-economic manoeuvre, which has taken place here during the past three days, is the first undertaking of its kind. In preparing this manoeuvre, we were fully aware that such an enterprise was a risky undertaking

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT No. EC-174
CONTINUED

(page 2 of original)

in view of the fact that all precedents and experiences were lacking. We were, however, also aware that it was high time to carry out such manoeuvres, because the large number of problems which occupy us in the military-economic field, can not be solved round the conference table, but only in practical application under conditions specially arranged. Therefore, I stressed at the beginning of the manoeuvre that it was important for all of us first of all to learn from it. Our object was to gain experience for the theoretical planning of such manoeuvres and to acquire the necessary knowledge for arranging them, in order to bring out effectively the military-economic problems with which we were occupied.

Furthermore, it was clear to us that such manoeuvres could only touch on the problems, but could never solve them nor could it settle any questions of competency or result in any decisions, but the point was to identify the problems and then in further cooperation with the branches of the Wehrmacht and with the other Ministries, to bring them closer to a solution.

(page 3 of original)

The entire project is an experiment which will be subject to our own criticism as much as to yours, but I welcome the fact that, despite the urgent work in Berlin, the experiment has been made from which we shall learn for the forthcoming years.

The purpose of this manoeuvre was twofold. In the first place, it should clearly show to all participants how in total warfare the behaviour of the individual soldier is influenced by economic factors and how, conversely, the economy is entirely dependent on operational events. It was intended to show that the soldier and the producer should cooperate intelligently in order to fulfil the tasks set to us in total war.

The second purpose was to ascertain whether the present organization of the Military Economy within the War Ministry and the Plenipotentiary General (G.B.) was capable of guaranteeing the necessary cooperation.

I hope I have succeeded in securing in both points an advance on the opinions hitherto held.

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT No. EC-174
CONTINUED

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

16 July 1947

I, Anne MARTIN, No. 20144, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages and that the above is a true and correct translation of the document No. EC-174.

Anne MARTIN
No. 20144

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT No. NI-6377
OFFICE OF CHIEF OF COUNSEL FOR WAR CRIMES

Minutes

of the Technical Management Conference in Frankfurt am Main

- Hoescht on 19 September 1938.

present: LAUTENSCHLAGER

JAEHNE

PEAFFENDORF

HAGENBOECKER

HILCKEN

Registered in

Card Index

LAUTENSCHLAGER gives an account of the last I.G. meetings:
Plant Leaders' Conference and discussions of the Enterprise Advisory
Council (Unternehmensbeirat) of 14 September, Technical Committee
(TEA) meeting on 15 September and Vorstand meeting of 16 September.

Dr. HABERLAND has been appointed in Uerdingen as successor to the
deceased Dr. LAUX.

On 26 September a military economy practice is scheduled to take place.
The directives, as far as they will have come to hand, will be made
known.

From experience gained at the last blackout practice the necessity
of increased lighting and other changes in the separate plants is
discussed.

Once more it should be driven home to employees and workers that
accidents at work are increasing; foremen will be instructed afresh.

The report of the Patents Department concerning the activity of
the Patent Office in the past year is briefly dealt with.

HAGENBOECKER gives an account of the orders received at Offenbach
regarding despatch and production. The manufacture of the various
Naphtol AS Dyes so far compares unfavourably with last year.

HAGENBOECKER reports on the last meeting of the Azo Dyes Committee
(AKO - Azofarbenkommission).

PEAFFENDORF gives a survey of the dye business and reports on the
work relating to the new Wollstra Dyestuffs.

HILCKEN gives an account of the Zetko (Organic Intermediates Committee)
meeting. The considerable drop in the F 24 production has again been
overcome by fresh orders for Variamine-blue base and diazomidol
acid.

(page 2 of original) .

The manufacture of methylene-chloride is being considerably increased
by the introduction of the safety film (Sicherheitsfilm) which is
probably to start at the beginning of next year.

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT No. NI-6377
CONTINUED

(page 2 of original)
cont'd

Estimates are studied and the directives given in the Technical Committee (TEA) meeting for new investments and estimates for repairs are made known.

Signature: Dr. LAUTENSCHLAGER.

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

24 June 1947

I, Victoria ORTON, Civ.No. 20 129, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the German and English languages and that the above is a true and correct translation of the document No. NI-6377.

Victoria ORTON
Civ.No. 20 129.

6278

TRANSLATION OF EXCERPT OF DOCUMENT No. NI-6.
OFFICE OF CHIEF OF COUNSEL FOR WAR CRIMES

M i n u t e s

of the Technical Management Meeting in
Frankfort on Main - Hoechst on 3 October 1938

present: Lautenschlaeger
Jacobi
Jaehne
v. Bruening
Hagenboecker
Kraenzlein
Pfaffendorf
Roth.

Recorded
in the
Card Index

That part of the factory behind the water works which is particularly vulnerable to air attack owing to the fact that both supply lines pass within a few meters of one another should be spread out over a larger area.

(Page 2 of original)

Plans for the reconversion of the present Water Works are being drafted. Apart from that, still further wells are to be sunk, which are to supply water also to the projected swimming-pool.

(Page 3 of original)

Pending credits are discussed:

Item 43: Air Raid Precautions at Mainkur- Jacobi
will explain these again.

TRANSLATION OF EXCERPT OF DOCUMENT No. I
CONTINUED

(Page 4 of original)

v. Bruening: The request of the High Command of the Army for starting production in the Sodium Plant at Gersthofen was met by the counter-proposal of the Scheideanstalt to store sodium.

(Page 5 of original)

Jacobi gives a confidential report on an enquiry from HWA (Army Ordnance Office) concerning the filling of shells in the Meingau.

signature: LAUTERBACHER.

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

23 June 1947

I, Victoria ARTON, Civ. No. 20 129, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages and that the above is a true and correct translation of document No. NI-6378.

VICTORIA ARTON
Civ. No. 20 129

- 2 -
"END"

AFFIDAVIT

I, Dr. Hans WAGNER, born in Frankfurt/Main on 9 July 1903, chemist of I.G. Farbenindustrie A.G. from 1928 - 1945, member of Vermittlungsstelle W, Berlin NW 7, at present residing in Stierstadt am Taunus, Untergasse 10, having been cautioned that I render myself liable to punishment for false testimony, herewith declare under oath, voluntarily and without coercion:

1. In 1928 I entered the Hoechst plant as laboratory chemist and remained there till the middle of February 1938, at which time I was transferred to Vermittlungsstelle W in Berlin. However, at the request of Dr. Ter Meer, my personal records were kept in Frankfurt from then on. In Vermittlungsstelle W I took over the work on patent questions particularly for Sparte II and partly also for Sparte I and III, furthermore the development work and the shipments for the Armed Forces, within the province of Sparte II.
2. The so-called war games and table exercises were introduced by Dr. Ritter and Professor Krauch, chiefly for the purpose of seeing how I.G.'s net of communications functioned within the framework of the already existing air raid precaution measures. It is possible that the awareness on the part of various members of I.G. of a future armed conflict may have contributed somewhat to the arrangement of these exercises.
3. I know that the air raid precaution measures were taken by order of the government; this did not however apply to the table exercises; however I do not know the extent to which Herr Krauch received proposals from Goering behind closed doors for the arrangement of such exercises. I do know that the first exercise took place in 1935

(page 2 of original)

in agreement with the High Command of the Armed Forces; in Berlin I still saw charts and photographs about it. Dr. Pfandner of Vermittlungsstelle W told me these charts and photographs were made in order to report to the gentlemen of the High Command of the Armed Forces (OKW) in form of a lecture on the arrangement and result of the table exercise.

(page 2 of original, cont'd)

I have carefully read each of the 2 (two) pages of this affidavit and countersigned them in my own handwriting, have made the necessary corrections in my own handwriting and initialled them, and herewith declare under oath that this statement contains the full truth to the best of my knowledge and belief.

(Signature) Dr. Hans Wagner

(Signature)

Sworn to and signed before me this 10th day of June 1947 at Nuremberg by Dr. Hans Wagner, known to me to be the person making the above affidavit.

(Signature) Peter H. Miller

Peter H. MILLER

U.S. Civilian AGO D 145338
Office of Chief of Counsel
for War Crimes
U.S. War Department.

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

10 July 1947

I, Dorothea L. GALENSKI, ETO 34079, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages and that the above is a true and correct translation of the document No. NI-6926.

Dorothea L. GALENSKI
ETO 34079

English

MILITARY TRIBUNAL NO.
Case No. 11
Prosecution Document Book No. *2*



I N D E X
TO
D O C U M E N T B O O K *VIII*

COUNT ~~II~~ FARBEN SYNCHRONIZED ALL OF ITS ACTIVITIES WITH
THE MILITARY PLANNING OF THE GERMAN HIGH COMMAND

Document No.	Exhibit No.	Description of Document	Page in: Document Tran- Book script
1.	NI-8637	Interrogation of the defendant Buete- fisch, 16 April 1947: In the Leuna "Planspiel" in 1935 or 1936, a squa- dron of air craft flew over the plant, work stopped, and a conference was held on effectiveness of protective measures with General Milch and other Luftwaffe generals.	pg. # 1 <i>A-H</i>
<u>MOBILIZATION PLANS</u>			
2.	NI-5880	Minutes of meeting of the Hoechst-Vor- stand and Technical Directors, 24 Fe- bruary 1936: The defendant Lautenschlae- ger submits a list of those products to be produced at Farben's Gersthofen plant in the event of war.	" 10
3.	NI-7475	Letter of Farben's Fischer to Dr. Hage- mann of the Army Ordnance Office, 21 October 1936: Sufficient Glysantin will be available for the Wehrmacht in "A- case" (outbreak of war).	" 11
4.	NI-8609	Minutes of a conference of Farben specialists in questions of personnel, production, raw materials, and trans- portation, 12 March 1937: Mobilization plans for the whole of Farben must be completed by 1 July 1937; various elements for mobilization plans discussed.	" 12
5.	NI-4631	Letter from V/W to Farben's Leverkusen plant proposing a meeting at Leverkusen of Farben leaders with representatives of seven Reich agencies concerned with mobilization questions, 16 March 1937.	" 15
6.	NI-8608	Secret information letter of V/W addressed to all works combines, DAG and several other Farben agencies on the "Industrial Mobilization Tasks of the I.G. Plants", 23 March 1937: V/W engaged in working out mobilization schedules for individual Farben plants; general problems will be worked out directly between Ministry of Economics and V/W; local problems between individual plants and branch offices of Economics Ministry.	" 17



Document No.	Exhibit No.	Description of Document	Page in: Document Transcription Book script
7.	NI-8607	Letter from Farben's Elberfeld plant to Farben's Hoechst plant on mobilization plans 27 April 1937: After consultation with the defendant Hoerlein, decided that a conference on mobilization plans must be deferred since the Alberfeld plant has not yet finished ascertaining its capacity for "army important" materials required in case of war.	pg.# 19
8.	NI-4632	Letter of V/W to 24 Farben leaders, including representatives of all important plants on "Mobilization Plan Tasks", 8 September 1937: Mobilization tasks can be divided into materials and manpower problems and that Ministry of Economics has requested organizational schemes for both present production, including capacity and proposals for production in case of mobilization.	" 21
9.	NI-8777	Confidential file note on a meeting at Frankfurt of Farben mobilization leaders from Leverkusen, Ludwigshafen, and Hoechst plants, 30 November 1937: Decided that certain production should be transferred but that this is not to affect discussion of mobilization plans already under discussion.	" 25
10.	NI-8776	Secret letter of V/W on "Planning of Sales Departments to meet Mobilization Requirements", 7 December 1937: The defendants Krauch and Gajewski have opposed efforts of the defendant Gattineau to establish an independent mobilization office for Farben's sales organization for products of Sparte I and Sparte III.	" 27
11.	NI-9051	Affidavit by Dr. Noack on the defendant Gattineau's efforts to establish a separate mobilization agency in the commercial field, July 1947.	" 30

Document No.	Exhibit No.	Description of Document	Page in Document Tran- Book script
12.	NI-8883	Minutes of meeting at Reich War Ministry on Mobilization Tasks of Farben's Knapsack plant in case of war, 14 december 1937: established production figures for both "Case-A", a total war, and "Case-B", a onefront war.	pg.# 31
13.	NI-8503	Notice of Ueberwachungsstelle Chemie on Mobilization task of Farben's Knapsack plant, undated, but identical in production quotas with those in NI-8883, above.	" 33
14.	NI-8881	Minutes of conference in Berlin between various military and other Reich representatives and Farben representatives on mobilization tasks of Knapsack plant, 25 January 1938: Farben objects to limitation of production quotas for certain products in case of war etc.	" 36
15.	NI-8504	Minutes of meeting of military and other Reich authorities, 23 October 1939: Reich War Ministry has decided to give mobilization tasks to plants in "red zone" also.	" 38
16.	NI-8885	V/W submits to Reich War Ministry data on production and capacity of Piesteritz plant so War Ministry can fix the production schedule, 23 December 1937.	" 40
17.	NI-8886	Minutes of conference in Berlin between various military and other Reich representatives and Farben representatives on mobilization tasks of Farben's Piesteritz plant, 11 January 1938: production quotas established for case of war.	" 43
18.	NI-8890	Minutes of conference in Berlin between various military and other Reich representatives and Farben representatives on mobilization tasks of Farben's Griesheim plant, 17 January 1938: production quotas established for case of war.	" 45
19.	NI-8780	Letter of V/W to Farben's Hoechst plant on operational schedules for the case of war, 26 January 1938: Hoechst plant leaders to be prepared for counter-proposals, if any, for a second conference on Hoechst production schedule.	" 47

Document Exhibit			Page in:
No.	No.	Description of Document	Document Tran- Book script
20 .	NI-7426	Letter from Dr. Zahn, Army Ordnance Office, to the defendant Ambros, 5 March 1938: shows agreement had been reached on production quotas for two poison gases and for Diglykol for years 1940-1944.	pg.# 48
21 .	NI-8879	File memo on conference at Hoechst at which Military Economy Office submits three contracts for delivery of products during war, 8 March 1938.	" 49
22 .	NI-8878	Secret letter from Farben's Hoechst plant to Military Economy Office, Frankfurt, 12 March 1938: Hoechst plant is able to enter into two of the contracts mentioned in NI-8878, above, but that Griesheim plant requires more time to ascertain its production capacity.	" 51
23 .	NI-8774	Secret letter of V/W to Farben's Hoechst plant, 12 March 1938: With competition of production schedules for mobilization tasks, next step is to ascertain raw material requirements, etc.	" 52
24 .	NI-8773	Secret letter of V/W to Farben's Hoechst plant on "Planning" 8 April 1938: Ueberwachungstelle Chemie urging acceleration in working out raw materials requirements to fulfill mobilization schedules; encloses secret instructions for filling out required forms, etc.	" 55
25 .	NI-6398	Secret letter of Legal Department of Farben's Leverkusen plant to about twenty persons, concerned Mobilization of the Leuna plant, including local military and other Reich leaders, 10 May 1938: Addresses invited to a conference since the tasks of securing personnel in case of war is generally concluded.	" 60
26 .	NI-8775	Secret letter of V/W to Farben's Hoechst plant on "planning", 11 June 1938: Proposed revision of production schedules by Farben; also noted that demands upon Ludwigshafen and Oppau must be transferred to other plants.	" 64

Document Exhibit		Page in	
No.	No.	Description of Document	Document Tran- Book script
27.NI-7427		Secret letter from Army Ordnance Office to the defendant Ambros, 25 June 1938: After conferences with the defendant Ambros and other Farben leaders, OKH confirms necessity for building five stand by plants for mobilization plus the necessary storage and power facilities.	pg.# 66
28.NI-7428		Letter of defendant Krauch to Farben's Ludwigshafen plant, 26 August 1938: Farben has received order from Army Ordnance Office to build a Dyglykol plant and to make research on "Direct Lost", etc.	" 67 - A-B
29.NI-8601		Secret mimeographed circular letter of V/W on further mobilization planning, 6 September 1938: After raw materials requirements are completed for plants, operational schedules are issued in a mobilization plan to which, in future, 8 enclosures will be added for listing raw material, fuel, transport, power, etc. requirements; Supreme Command of Armed Forces urges utmost speed in completion of plans, etc.	" 68
30 NI-8889		Secret letter from Hoechst plant to three Farben plants, 9 September 1938: gives details on mobilization orders, war delivery contracts, and war delivery-sub-contracts.	" 70
31.NI-7287		Secret letter of V/W to Farben's Hoechst plant enclosing Mobilization task for Hoechst plant, etc. 10 September 1938.	" 83
32.NI-4630		Secret letter of Sparte III Section of V/W to Farben's Leverkusen plant, 17 September 1938: encloses war delivery contract for photographic paper.	" 87
33.NI-8600		Secret file memo of Hirschel of Farben's Hoechst plant with Neumann of V/W, 14 September 1938: "The plants must consider what dyes are to be produced for the mobilization project", etc.	" 93
34.NI-7213		Secret letter from Dr. Struss of Farben's TEA Buero to several large Farben plants, 20 September 1938: During the first days of mobilization articles can be shipped only with orders of competent military-economy inspectorate, etc.	" 95

Document Exhibit			Page in:
No.	No.	Description of Document	Document Trans- Book script
35	.NI-7214	Secret letter of V/W t Farben's pg# 98 Hoechst plant, 24 September 1938: All plants essential to war effort should enter on special form the average amount of transport required in case of mobilization, etc.	
36	..NI-8877	Secret letter from Sales Combine " 103 Chemicals to technical management of Farben's Hoechst and Ludwigs- hafen plants, 28 September 1938: requests completion of war production schedules for sub- contractors, etc.	
37	.NI-4986	Secret note on conversation with " 107 Dr. Pfaundler of V/W, 20 Septem- ber 1938: deals with handling of sub-contractors order placement chart and position strips, etc.	
38	.NI-8599	Secret file note of leaders of " 109 Farben's Main Valley plants with representatives of Military- Economic Department, Kassel, on 4 November 1938: Question of trans- portation problems during first 14 days of mobilization discussed; also questions of deferment of workers etc.	
39	.NI-8891	Minutes of conference between " 114 military and other Reich representatives and representati- ves of Farben concerning Farben's Knapsack plant, 14 November 1938: Farben is apprehensive that it cannot meet all demands upon Knapsack plant in case of war; Farben inquires of authorities whether it must fill out certain forms since Knapsack plant is already running in peace as it will be run in case of mobilization, etc.	
40	EC-97	Minutes of conference between " 117 military and other Reich represen- tatives of Farben concerning use of Ludwigshafen plant in case of mobilization, 6 December 1938: Suggested that Ludwigshafen plant, located near Germany's Western boundry, should only be given mobilization tasks for the "Ost- fall" (war in the East only).etc.	

Document No.	Exhibit No.	Description of Document	Page in: Document Tran-Book script
41	.NI-7121	Secret letter from Reich Ministry of Economics to V/W, 5 July 1939: No further extensions to Farben's Ludwigshafen/Oppau plants to be made unless plans have been laid before Economics Ministry in time to make objections for reasons of military economy, etc.	pg.# 122
42	.NI-7125	Secret letter of V/W to Reich Ministry of Economics, 5 July 1939: Farben makes a survey of most important products produced at Ludwigshafen/Oppau plants, etc.	" 126 A-E
43 A.	.NI-7124	Secret letter of V/W to Reich Ministry of Economics, 7 July 1939: Farben makes a further survey of products produced at Ludwigshafen/Oppau plants and suggests further discussion of problem of relocation with Economics Ministry.	" 132
43 B	-NI-5196	Affidavit of the defendant von Schnitzler on the "Tense Situation" in the summer of 1939, 18 March 1947: Ungewitter, business manager of Economic Group Chemical Industry and chief of the Uberwachungstelle Chemie, informed the defendant von Schnitzler that Hitler was determined to invade Poland and that war important production of Ludwigshafen/Oppau should be transferred from Western frontier.	" 139
43 C.	.NI-8320	Affidavit of Dr. Struss on concentration of war important Farben plants in central Germany, 29 May 1947.	" 166 164
43 D	.NI-5764	File note of TEA, 30 June 1943: Dr. Struss reports that transfer of war important production to central Germany had been accomplished before war.	" 168 166
44	NI-7284	Secret letter from Farben's Griesheim plant to Farben's Hoechst plant, 13 February 1939: Announces changes in mobilization tasks for Griesheim plant for certain products on basis of discussion with Dr. Zahn of Army Ordnance Office.	" 169 167

Document Exhibit
No. No.

Description of Document

Page in:
Document Tran-
Book script

45.NI-4620

Secret letter of V/W to Far-
ben's Leverkusen plant,
25 February 1939: Suggests
conference of mobilization ma-
nagers of major Farben plants on
status of mobilization task
and to bring mobilization work
within Farben to a common
basis, etc.

pg. # ~~170~~ 170

Interrogation of Dr. Heinrich Buefelfisch
on 16 April 1947, from
9.45 until 11.15
Interrogator: Dr. Otto Heilbrunn

German Court Reporter: Hjal. Underlich

C.: Are you aware that today also your statements are under oath?

A.: Yes.

C.: We need some information from you beyond the usual affidavit.
You have already made a deposition to that effect in your question-
naire. Please dictate: Your curriculum vitae, as briefly as pos-
sible.

(Dictation of curriculum vitae follows, together with
list of offices held. Deposited in affidavit of 18.4.47)

C.: Today we will talk about "MOB". Who in your field of work was
responsible for OB questions?

A.: Mobilization plans? Our opinion on this was not asked, it was
not our competence. It was the task of the Economic Group as such
to collect production figures and these were passed on to the Mi-
nistry of Economics.

C.: No, I mean in the Works.

A.: We had nothing to do with the Works. Only the Betriebsfuehrer
could have dealt with that. When you say MOB question, I do not
know how to answer this. If a question was put to the Works,
then the manager had to supply the answer. We did not have an of-
fice dealing with "OB". But I wish to elucidate one point: The
question of protection, so-called protective measures which had to
be taken in case of war. That did concern the Works. In case the
Works were attacked, the tasks were split up. Mr. Deinhardt was
responsible for taking protective measures.

C.: Did you hold practices at Leuna?

A.: Yes, that's what I meant, Mr. Deinhardt was responsible for that.

C.: When was the first practice?

A.: The Luftwaffe turned up with several generals, "ilich among them.
I do not remember the year, it must have been in 1935 or 1936.
A practice was arranged. It was given out: "An air fleet is at-
tacking Leuna". What do you do to protect yourselves?

C.: Round a conference table or in the open air?

(page 1 of original, cont'd)

- A.: A squadron flew over, a telephone message was received, and work was stopped. This was followed by a discussion as to whether the correct measures had been taken.
- Q.: First the squadron approached, then it was sighted and a message sent out?
- A.: No, it was done on a larger scale. The air raid alarm post signaled the approach and the idea was to see ...
- Q.: Who received the message?

(page 2 of original)

- A.: A telephone call was received from the alarm post. He sighted the squadron. The point was whether the order to stop work could be carried out without confusion before the arrival of the squadron.
- Q.: What do you mean by "stop"?
- A.: The whole of the Louis Works from gas production to the completed production hung together like a honeycomb. Every plant was linked with the other. If work was seriously interrupted in one plant, then it might have thrown the whole Works out of gear. That is why the whole Works was sealed off. The various plants were sealed off by shutting the sliding-doors and supply pipes, so that the damage could be localized.
- Q.: Was that really done during air-raid practices?
- A.: It was only done on paper.
- Q.: Did production go on? How was the signal given?
- A.: The message was: "Squadron approaching". They noted the time. The anti-aircraft commandant had to say whether he recognized them in time; he shot. The raider then signaled, either "I got away" or "I have been hit".
- Q.: Were they shot at?
- A.: No, it was only practice. They did it in order to make use of the experience in case it came to the real thing.
- Q.: Was there any low altitude flying and diving?
- A.: Yes.
- Q.: Did the raiders drop anything?
- A.: No.

(page 2 of original, cont'd)

Q.: Did they fire duds ?

A.: No, I really don't know whether a 2cm gun was used for the defence - it is quite possible.

Q.: An anti-aircraft gun ?

A.: I don't remember exactly.

Q.: The raiders didn't drop any dud bombs ?

A.: No, that would have meant a certain danger for the Works.
If a load had been dropped on the pipe-line, it might have been unpleasant.

Q.: And what happened afterwards ?

A.: There the practice itself ended. We were then told what we should have done; whether the signal was given too late or too early.
Mr. Dainhart then made use of the experience gained.

Q.: Were you as a Works criticized by the Luftwaffe ?

A.: No, I would not know, I did not hear the criticism of the experiences gained. All we said was that if the raiders should succeed in diving down as low as that, then it would be a very serious thing for us.

(Initial-
led:)

(page 3 of original)

Bu. Q.: Was Colonel Thomas present at these practices ?

A.: I cannot say it for certain, I remember General Milch. There were a few Luftwaffe generals. It is possible that Thomas was there. I saw him.

Q.: At these practices ?

A.: No.

Q.: How often did these practices take place ?

A.: I only witnessed one such practice. However, now and then we were ordered to practice on a certain day. Every now and again we had to give the order to cease work.

Q.: Do you remember the approximate date ?

A.: It is difficult to say. After this large scale practice, Dainhardt every now and then held such a practice on his own account. I have forgotten.

(page 3 of original, cont'd)

Q.: That part did the Vermittlungsstelle W play in all this ?

Bu. A.: The Vermittlungsstelle W, as far as I am informed, had been established to determine the question of treason in connection with the giving away of military secrets to foreign countries. It was announced that a Vermittlungsstelle W had been established. That was set up by Krauch and Knieriem. Mr. Dickmann had an office in Berlin and worked on patent questions.

Q.: Is that all you know about this Office ?

A.: I had nothing to do with this Office.

Q.: If the Wehrmacht required some information from you, did it approach this Office ?

Bu. A.: If Mr. Thomas wanted to know anything, he called for me. It was the same with the Luftwaffe; the Luftwaffe had a liaison through Mr. Muedlich.

Bu. Q.: What do you know about Dr. Reitingen ?

A.: He was Ilgner's man. Dr. Reitingen was the man who dealt with statistics. He compiled lists and wrote reports.

Bu. Q.: Did Reitingen work together with the Luftwaffe ?

A.: I don't know.

Q.: To what extent were you in touch with Ilgner ?

A.: He was member of the Vorstand.

Q.: Name some concrete cases.

A.: South Eastern Committee (Suedostausschuss), he belonged to various companies.

Q.: What do you know about his espionage activities, Schellenberg ?

A.: I don't know anything about that.

(page 4 of original)

Q.: Let us come back to "MOB". The Buna part is only one side of it. Who was responsible for MOB questions in the field of synthetic motor fuel ?

A.: Krauch was, in fact.

Q.: No, in the Works ?

(page 4 of original, cont'd)

A.: That would have been myself.

Q.: Were you ever asked about it?

A.: No.

Q.: Dr. Bockelisch, it's no use talking like that.

A.: Who was to ask me?

Q.: You can imagine that I do not ask without knowing why.

A.: No one issued production plans.

Q.: What did you call them?

A.: Production plans.

Q.: Did you call them plans for the MOB case?

A.: That is possible.

Q.: Who was responsible for these questions in the field of synthetic motor fuel for MOB?

A.: I was responsible.

Q.: What was the purpose of the "MOB" plans?

A.: To state production figures in case Germany should be involved in a war. Every one responsible for production had to state: "what can you do, if ..."

Q.: Why were the MOB requirements constantly increased?

A.: In order to make certain of an increased resistance power.

Q.: Because war felt was approaching?

A.: In the case of fuel it was not obvious. Fuel consumption in Germany was enormous. Deliveries of synthetic fuel from our own production were very small. They were increased under the "self-sufficiency" plan. When it was asked, "what is required for MOB", the answer can only be: "everything".

Q.: Were you present at meetings in which Krauch spoke about war?

A.: No.

Q.: Did you speak to Krauch in connection with the production of synthetic gasoline?

(page 4 of original, cont'd)

A.: He asked what the total production of aviation gasoline amounted to.

Q.: Did Krauch drop any hints that considerable quantities would be required at a certain date?

A.: No, I know nothing of that.

(page 5 of original)

Q.: Someone from his Staff?

A.: No, I wouldn't know.

Q.: Did Ungewitter make such intimations?

A.: That was Economic Group Chemical Industry.

Q.: Erdmann?

A.: I don't know him.

Q.: Anybody else?

A.: I wouldn't know. It must have been Thomas who said that we were ready to fight at any time. Herr Muecklich urgently insisted he wanted fuels with high anti-knock qualities.

Q.: What quantities?

A.: Quantities named were very big, practically unobtainable from us. Iso-Octane (Iso-Oktan), for example.

Q.: Was any date given by which certain quantities must be available? Think of 1938.

En. A.: Concerning Iso-Octane, there was the controversy in the Reich Air Ministry as to whether Iso-Octane or Aromatics was a suitable fuel and, owing to these discussions, the technical development of Iso-Octane fell behind, so that when war broke out, there were only a few thousand tons available; there was thus no date set for us.

Q.: Did you supply the WIFO?

A.: Aviation gasoline for the Wehrmacht.

Q.: Did they hold stocks?

A.: Yes, they had stocks.

Q.: How big were they?

(page 5 of original, cont'd)

A.: That is beyond my knowledge. It was delivered to the WIFO direct
Bu. from the works in tank-cars. Whether the stocks there consisted
Bu. of 10,000 or 20,000 tons, I am not able to say.

C.: Did you have storage depots in the I.G. ?

A.: We only had depots in Leuna, only depots for the manufactured stocks
and some rented or leased alternative depots. The Standard Shell
and Gasolin saw to the disposal.

- Here there was a pause of some minutes -

C.: What would you describe as the aim of National Socialist economic
policy ?

A.: I should say: It is planned economy under State control.

Q.: To what end ?

A.: To the end of subordinating everything to the requirements of the
State, that is to say, no free economic activity, but economy to be
dependent on policy. Policy has priority.

Q.: In what did the policy consist ?

(page 6 of original)

A.: It consisted, so far as it was at first understood, in the strengthen-
ing of the nation, on the assumption that a nation is independent
within its own living space.

C.: What for ?

A.: In order to become a stronger and more established State.

C.: Further ?

A.: As it now appears, this national strengthening led to expansion, in
certain circumstances with violence. Without doubt, however, it
was not communicated to the people in that form. That was how they
were led astray.

Q.: You know Goering's famous saying: "Guns ...

A.: "Guns are more necessary than butter". Certainly, it must be owned
that a State is only strong in itself if it is secured against its
neighbours, that is to say, when it can conduct its policy without
fear of attack, without the intervention of a third party. That
was in all probability the opinion of the leaders.

Q.: Would you say that the aim was so to strengthen the Wehrmacht as to
be able to win an unlimited living space ?

(page 6 of original, cont'd)

A.: I should not have assumed that; I should have thought that it was to strengthen it so that the living space already possessed could be defended.

Q.: And then?

A.: That is the aim which I held to be reasonable.

Q.: And when did you realize that that was not the official aim?

A.: I must say I was surprised; I always said it was going too far and showed how little the other side - the leadership of the national-socialist movement - knew about it and how they under-estimated the power of the others.

Q.: When did it first become clear to you that the aim of the national-socialist economic and military policy was an absolute self-sufficiency in Germany?

A.: It dawned on me during the years 1936/37, when they spoke always about "self-sufficiency", whereas we said that this, as such, was an obstruction in the way of every kind of development, that free exchange was the only...

Q.: Then did it become clear to you that the military policy was an aggressive policy?

A.: I was surprised, when steps began to be taken to realize this aim.

Q.: When?

A.: With the invasion of Poland.

Q.: Not 1938?

A.: I regarded Austria as a political step.

Q.: Czechoslovakia?

A.: I said when that this was an act that looked like sheer violence that it was scarcely a policy of security and that it looked like the lust for power. Even though it was said it was a political action, taken in order to bring about a good understanding with Czechoslovakia.

(page 7 of original)

Q.: Did you realize that Czechoslovakia would only be the first chapter?

A.: My opinion was and still is that they used bluff, and I said: "Now he will leave it alone".

(page 7 of original, cont'd)

Q.: Then it began with Poland.

A.: When the abrupt invasion of Poland took place, it was as if scales had fallen from my eyes.

Q.: I mean the preparation.

A.: These matters were presented to us powerfully through the press, where Hitler said, "I only want the path to the Corridor".

Q.: Was it not clear to you that it was not a question of the Corridor, but of Poland? The atrocities that were featured in the press had nothing to do with the Corridor.

A.: With regard to the atrocities, I thought it did not seem quite to fit in.

Q.: Then you received the telegram on the 28 August 1939 from the "Vermittlungsstelle"?

A.: It was then clear to us that there would apparently be a resort to arms.

Q.: Measures that concern the direction of an army are events that cast their shadows before?

A.: Not absolutely. Fischer rang me up and said it would not come to war it would all be arranged.

Q.: Can the mobilization of economy for total war be countermanded?

A.: I must say, we did not have any very great change, we merely continued to manufacture gasoline.

Q.: I am talking of the IG.

A.: As regards the IG as a whole, I am of the same opinion, there was no armaments preparation.

Q.: It was a complete regrouping.

A.: There existed a program to close down Ludwigshafen.

Q.: What do you know about that?

A.: I only know that Ludwigshafen received a telegram.

Q.: When?

A.: On 1st or 2nd September 1939 - the works were to be closed down.

(page 7 of original, cont'd)

Q.: From whom?

A.: From Ungewitter.

Q.: What did you think of that - they want the Polish Corridor and close down Ludwigshafen?

A.: In order to get labor immediately. I think the declarations of war from France and England came simultaneously with this matter. The telegram may also have come on 3.9.39.

Q.: If it came on 3.9., then it was a matter of course.

A.: I do not know exactly

(page 8 of original)

Q.: What do you know of the telegram?

A.: It was discussed.

Q.: Where?

A.: In Leuna; I think Schneider told me that Ludwigshafen had received the order to close down.

Q.: You must recollect whether it was before the outbreak of war with France and England.

Ex. A.: Ludwigshafen was not my works, I cannot say the exact day.

Q.: Can it have been after 3.9.?

A.: It can have been, but if I have to swear to it, I cannot do so. This information must certainly be in the possession of the gentlemen of Ludwigshafen.

Q.: I want to know from you when you got to hear about the telegram.

A.: It was during the days of the greatest tension, I cannot say exactly

Q.: If you heard of it on 3.9., then it would have been to some extent a matter-of-course procedure, which would not necessarily have stuck in your memory -.

A.: Yes, I also consider that logical, but in spite of that, as I was not the Betriebsfuehrer at Ludwigshafen I am not able to say.

Q.: This is not a question affecting you personally and I would ask you to make a special effort. When did you get to know about the telegram?

(page 8 of original, cont'd)

A.: First came the Mobilization order on the 28 August; at that time I did not know anything about Ludwigshafen. Some days later, I heard about it, but whether before or after the 3.9. --

Q.: The 3 September was a Sunday; were you in your office?

A.: In Lüne, in any case. We were of course at the Works every Sunday morning. It is also not the case that they would have informed us of it immediately; we learned of it afterwards, that is why I am not able to say.

Q.: On 28 August, your local Military District Commander informed you that the Mobilization Project was impending and at the same time it was stated that the Mobilization production was to begin. What agency was it that issued the order - the President of the Province (Regierungs-Präsident) or the Military District Plenipotentiary (Wehrkreis-Beauftragte)?

A.: It may have been the President of the Province who issued it.

Q.: What did he issue to you - a telegram?

Bu. A.: That I am not able to say, it went direct to Schneider. In any case, it was announced on 23.8 or 29.8.

Q.: Who was present?

A.: The Departmental Managers, so far as I know.

Q.: How many were there?

A.: Perhaps altogether 20 gentlemen.

(page 9 of original)

Q.: What did Schneider say?

A.: "The Mobilization project is in force, and you must direct the production in your works and the output of work-people in accordance with it."

Q.: Did he give any sort of personal explanations?

A.: He did not make any speech.

C.: No speech --

A.: He said that everybody must quietly perform his duty, that it was now war and that he expected from everyone that he would stay at his post.

(page 9 of original, cont'd)

Q.: On the 28.8. you were under the impression that this only meant war with Poland?

A.: Yes, but I must say that, in view of the reports on the 29. of the Re-insurance Treaty of Beck (the General of Poland), I said that it was questionable whether England and France would permit it.

Q.: What happened on the 29.8.?

A.: Was there not in the press an offer of mediation by England to compose the matter? That happened in the meantime when Hitler said "I will not allow myself to be dictated to".

Q.: Did you expect war with England on the 29.?

A.: I must say that when Hitler said that and knocked away the ground from under the political negotiations, I said: this means war, how can a man give so abrupt an answer!

Q.: When did the Ludwigshafen telegram arrive then?

A.: That remark was made, I think, on the last day of August, and then I heard, if I am to take the matter chronologically, that Ludwigshafen was to be closed. It is possible that I heard this on the 1. or 2. September, 1939.

Q.: You said on 29, or 30.8.

A.: I don't think so.

Q.: I wish to know, whether before or after 3.9.

Q.: Were any further meetings held in Leuna on the 29. and following days owing to the outbreak of war?

A.: Certainly separate meetings in the departments.

Q.: The departmental managers with their subordinates?

A.: The departmental managers called their plant managers (Betriebsleiter) together and transmitted to them the words of Schneider.

Q.: How many plant leaders (Betriebsfuhrer) were there?

A.: 50 or 60.

Q.: 20 departmental managers and 50 or 60 plant leaders (Betriebsfuhrer) These were informed in their departments on 28. August 1939 that war had broken out?

A.: Yes.

(page 10 of original)

Q.: What did the Betriebsfuhrer do, on their part ?

A.: They called together the work chiefs, the head foremen (Obermeister) and foremen (Meister) and will certainly have communicated to them what Schneider had said, whereupon they would have had at once to examine their lists to find out who would be drafted - there were red, yellow and green slips - who had to report without awaiting orders; this all had to be settled. After that, detailed work would begin.

Q.: Is it correct to say that on 28 August 1939 all employees of the Leuna plant realized that "this means war" ?

A.: I would say on 29 August. It would not all have been possible to settle up everything so quickly, we had shifts of 8 hours each.

Q.: When war broke out, would still another order have been issued to Leuna by the Wehrmacht or by the President of the Province (Regierungspraesident) ?

A.: At any rate, the one ordering all protective measures to be taken all arrangements to be made, in case Leuna should be attacked.

Q.: That was on 3.9.

A.: When war broke out, on 1.9., it was already war.

Q.: No further orders concerning production were issued after the 28.8.

A.: That changed, when it was said ...

Q.: Of a fundamental nature

A.: No. That only came later, when new productions were started.

Q.: Were you aware of the fact on 28 August 1939 that the aim of National Socialist economic policy was the industrial preparation of Germany for a war of aggression ?

A.: Yes.

Q.: Do you think the Wehrmacht could have conducted the war without synthetic gasoline ?

A.: No, it could not have done so without nitrogen, without gasoline, without Buna. That I consider is impossible.

Q.: Do I understand your answer to mean that the war could not have been conducted without IG-production ?

A.: Yes, that is clear, but you single out IG - there were other products that could not have been done without, either.

(page 10 of original, cont'd)

Q.: What was Hitler's motive when he took the gasoline industry under his special protection?

A.: In my opinion, it was in the first place purely the desire for self-sufficiency, to be to a large degree independent of foreign fuels and to abolish unemployment.

Q.: What was Bosch's motive, when in 1932 he approached Hitler through you and Gattineau?

(page 11 of original)

A.: Bosch's motive was to keep what seemed to him a highly promising development in the field of high pressure synthesis from being smashed.

Q.: Why did he choose Hitler as an indirect partner in the negotiation?

A.: In my opinion, Hitler was not his negotiating partner, but Bosch had to fight the cross of many parties, who strongly opposed the development of synthetic fuel. He said: "They want to kill something which I consider for the general good".

Q.: Did Bosch commission you to go to Hitler?

A.: Gattineau must have telephoned him that I would probably be in the position to give technical information. I was to go there at Bosch's request.

Q.: What did Hitler promise at the time?

A.: He said only: "I shall see to it that such articles do not appear in my press any more".

Q.: Did he say: I expect IG to behave decently toward the Party?

A.: No. Not a word about that. There was never any talk about politics at all, which I considered very fair.

Q.: At the time, he needed money badly.

A.: Yes. That may be, but there was not a word about it.

Q.: And Hess?

A.: Not one word.

Q.: Did Gattineau give any hints?

A.: After Hitler said: "That is my conception of it", I was asked about the technical aspects of coal hydrogenation. I gave the explanation and that was all.

(page 11 of original, cont'd)

Q.: What did you talk about with Hess ?

A.: He told me of his flight over Garmisch, the exertions it took and so on.

Q.: The matter in question was not discussed with Hess ?

A.: No.

(page 12 of original)

Q.: Did you communicate this to Bosch ?

A.: Yes, verbally. I said that I had given the technical aspects of the matter and that Hitler had said, that he would see to it that no more such attacks appeared in his press. For the rest, he said that he considered the development sound and if gasoline could be made from coal it should be pursued.

Q.: What did Bosch say ?

A.: "Then the man is more sensible than I thought".

Q.: Did Bosch say that one ought to show one's gratitude ?

A.: No.

Q.: In connection with this discussion was anything done to show a more friendly attitude toward the party by IG ?

A.: Not as far as I know. That would have been Bosch's concern.

Q.: How large were the investments in the field of synthetic fuel up to that time ? Altogether ?

A.: Expenditures must have amounted to approximately 300 Millions.

Q.: Does it not seem probable to you that if a politician makes a statement which will bring in 300 Millions, one does something in return ?

A.: In my opinion Bosch never looked at it from that point of view.

Q.: What did Hitler promise ?

A.: He merely promised to stop the articles attacking the synthetic gasoline production, because "if gasoline is already being produced in Germany, the manufacturers ought to receive their costs for it"; by costs he meant payment at current prices.

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT No. HI-8637
CONTINUED

(page 12 of original, cont'd)

Q.: He not only said that the attacks would be stopped but he also said that he needed gasoline? That meant therefore that the economic policy of National Socialism would give financial support to industry for synthetic gasoline production?

A.: You can say the same for quite a number of products.

(page 13 of original)

Q.: How did you interpret Hitler's statement that he considered synthetic gasoline production in Germany economically desirable?

A.: That it is right to produce from German raw materials anything that could possibly be produced, provided it is economically practicable. From the financial point of view, considering the foreign exchange situation existing in the Reich ---

Q.: What caused Hitler to abandon his hostile attitude toward IG which he expressed in the first edition of "Mein Kampf"?

A.: In my opinion, he realized that an economy cannot be run without the rational work of the industrial combines, that it does not do to put everything under state control.

Q.: Because of your lecture?

A.: Because of my lecture? - He probably realized it in general, not because of my lecture.

Q.: Did he demand any production promise from IG?

A.: No.

END

I have carefully read each of the 13 pages of this affidavit and signed it, have made the necessary corrections in my own handwriting and have initialed them and declare under oath that I have told the truth in this interrogation to the best of my knowledge and belief.

(Signature) Heinrich BUETEFISCH
Dr. HEINRICH BUETEFISCH

(Signature) Otto HEILBRUNN
Dr. OTTO HEILBRUNN
Interrogator

(Signature) Elly WUNDERLICH
ELLY WUNDERLICH
German Court-Reporter

Nuernberg, 30 April 1947

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT No. NI-8637
CONTINUED

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

1 July 1947

We, Victoria ORTON, No. 20129, and Anne MARTIN, No. 20144, hereby certify that we are thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages and that the above is a true and correct translation of the document No. NI-8637.

Victoria ORTON
No. 20 129

Anne MARTIN
No. 20 144

(Place) Nurnberg, Germany

(Date) 21 August 1947

CERTIFICATE

I, Rolf C Schnyder, of the Evidence

Division of the Office of Chief of Counsel for war Crimes,

hereby certify that the attached document, consisting of

5 photostated pages and entitled

NI-5880 Protocol of Meeting of the "Hoechst-

Vorstand" and Technical Management

dated Feb 1936, is a true copy of a document which

was delivered to me in my above capacity, in the usual course

of official business, as (the original of a document found

in German archives, records and files captured by military

forces under the command of the Supreme Commander, Allied

Expeditionary Forces.

To the best of my knowledge, information and

belief, the original document is held at:

OCCWC Document Room

s/ Rolf C Schnyder

The Document is not available in English

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT No. NI-7475
OFFICE OF CHIEF OF COUNSEL FOR WAR CRIMES

21 October 1936

Initialed: Bo.

Subject: Glycerine.

Dear Dr. HAGEMANN:

The other day you mentioned in the course of conversation that in your opinion glycerine could not be counted upon in the A-Fall as an anti-freezer/diater-fluid and that it would therefore be expedient to look for a substitute right away. In this connection I should like to tell you that glycerine requirements are absolutely safeguarded today. You presumably know that our new ethylene processing plant at Zwiesel is already under construction and will be put into operation at the beginning of next year. If we count upon trebling the glycerine sales which would amount to approx. 3000 tons, sufficient to run 1 million cars, we could meet this demand immediately with the quantity of ethylene which will be at our disposal from next year on. In the meantime we shall even now watch for new ethylene resources. Even if these 3000 tons of glycerine in A-Fall would have to be produced for the moment from ethylene-spirit, we require for that purpose only approx. 60 000 hl of spirit, a quantity which we could easily make available from our plant in Central Germany.

Heil Hitler!

Yours

(signed) FISCHER.

Regierungsrat Dr. HAGEMANN
Army Ordnance Office
Berlin-Charlottenburg 2,
Friedrichstr. 57

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

6 August 1947

I, Brigitte TURK, Civ. No. 35 130, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages and that the above is a true and correct translation of the original document No. NI-7475.

.....
Brigitte TURK
Civ. No. 35 130.

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT No. NY - 8609
OFFICE OF CHIEF OF COUNSEL FOR WAR CRIMES

Conference of 12.3.37.

930

Present: Dipl. Ing. Neumann, Vermittlungestelle W
Dr. Hall, Ludwigshafen
Dir. Kurtz (auxiliary materials)
Dir. Schwanborn, (personnel problems)
Fohn, " "
Heuser, " "
Mosor, (in charge of production)
Strewinski, " "
Rosenberger, (transportation problems)
Dr. Hirschel
Baechle

In general, the following was agreed upon: Plans for the whole of I.G. to be completed by 1 July.
Nitrogen will be included in Hoechst's production (Distribution through sparte I office).
Concerning Knapsack, Dr. Hermann is requested to decide whether Hoechst or Leverkusen is to start operating.

The authorities count on export in case of war (A-Fall); this must particularly be kept in mind with regard to dye stuffs. The various products to be entered separately only if they are manufactured in bulk (heavy chemicals etc.), those manufactured in smaller quantities to be entered in groups. Only quantities actually leaving the works to be shown; production for further processing to be left out. Deliveries subject to seasonal fluctuation (insecticides) will be added to the fourth quarter of 1936, which is the basis.

On the basis of the return forms before the meeting, the following program was then decided on for the collection of the records urgently required:

Return form 1.) list of products.

Mosor suggested that the Grunenburg statistic office should be consulted in connection with the collection of documents on outgoing goods (customers, districts) as they had the relevant statistics. Herr Plaines of the Farben statistics office was asked to join the meeting.

Result: According to estimates, columns a-d should be completed in 2 weeks.

Vermittlungestelle W will negotiate with the Raw Materials Office etc. on the basis of these figures. Operation schedule for the Hoechst plant will then be determined. Work on remaining questions of the various sheets would not be started until then.

Return sheet 2.) Products (detailed)

Subdivided according to the 13 departments of the dye stuffs division; the following to be shown with regard to Germany expressed in terms of goods/weight; in last quarter of 1936 classified by supplier factories and, separately, by receiving areas;

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT No. NI - 8609
CONTINUED

(Page 2 of original)

I.G. deliveries, whole-sale customers, other customers grouped to, other. Shipment in the last quarter of 1936 will be the basis for abroad. Herr Kleines undertakes to procure from the chemicals statistics office (Herr Koch) the documentary material for chemicals, solvents. Leverkusen (Herr Wagner) to be responsible for pharmaceuticals, production figures will be submitted by Hoechst itself. Herr Neumann undertakes to request the documents through Herr Dr. Heerlein. Result: Herr Kleines promises to have the documentary material ready within 3 weeks.

Return sheet 3): Raw Materials
actual requirement in the last quarter of 1936 to be basis throughout.

Return sheet 4): Auxiliary Materials.
Requirements for last quarter of 1936 correct to the nearest higher integer. Requirements for new constructions, which were particularly high in 1936, to be considered as "margin of safety" and included. This will be counter-balanced by increased depreciation and a certain increase of requirements in case of war. The list of Ludwigshafen used by Herr Kurtz to be used as a uniform basis for I.G. figures. Attention should be paid to subdivisions in the case of certain materials, as well as to separate headings in connection with raw material problems (for instance filter cloths, to be sub-divided into those of wool, cotton etc.). As a general rule, everything passing through the depots is to be recorded, including coal, except coal for power supplies. Provision should be made for the participation, in future government contracts, of the purchasing commission.
Result: Time of completion: 2 months.

Return sheet 5.) Transportation.
Requirements for large goods can be given without difficulty, whereas requirements for small goods which are concerned in the majority of cases, cause a lot of work and are bound to contain inaccuracies, by their nature (awkward goods, bulky packages, mainly of pharmaceutical products, freight cars containing mixed goods for a large variety of countries due to reloading difficulties ("Umschlag") at frontier stations. Herr Rosenberger will collect data for the last quarter of 1936. Goods now transported in trucks, will presumably continue to be transported in trucks in case of war. Barges expressed in terms of 1,000 t-barges according to number of trips.
Result: Transportation - Survey in 4 Weeks.

There followed a discussion of personnel problems. Attempts were being made to have extended to the Maingau the "3 month's grace until 1. July" granted to Louisa/Bitterfeld. At Herr Poehn's suggestion, Major Klein of the Frankfurt a/M Office of Military Economy (Wehrwirtschaftsstelle), who

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT No. NI - 8609
CONTINUED

(Page 3 of original)

is to represent our interests and to recommend them to higher authority was asked to come over from Frankfurt to join the conference. Major Klein appeared soon and it was explained to him by Herr Neumann what had been achieved for Central Germany. The same course of action was, he said, indicated for the Mainau, namely to submit nominal rolls of all employees of the plants to the authorities concerned, thus enabling the latter to see at a glance which persons were I.G. employees and to serve induction papers, not on individual persons but on I.G. The necessity for such measures would be demonstrated at the meeting organized by I.G. for the purpose, with the authorities at Hoechst. Major Klein agreed to this and the 24 March was decided on as the date for the discussion. The authorities concerned are to be invited immediately.

Agenda of meeting: Introductory words of welcome by Dr. Hermann; talk by Dr. Hirschel on the importance of Hoechst as supplier of important preliminary products for armament plants. Exposition by Herr Neumann of war planning in general, to be followed by personnel problems with the request for 3-months' grace.

Herr Neumann further gave a detailed account of the negotiations with the authorities for the Leuna or Leverkusen District. Concerning Leverkusen, a Captain Eckelz had promised to recall any induction orders already issued. It was generally considered that 20 % of the people would be affected by these orders. The 10-hour working day would also release some workers. There was however no hope that persons under 27, war veterans and service ranks would be released. In Hoechst these junior age groups of workers amounted to 750 men - about 12 %; with the addition of the employees, the 20 % would probably be reached. About 220 induction papers had been issued at Hoechst up to date. The wording of the certificates of employment was then discussed and amended.

End of conference: 1400 hours.

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

17 July 1947

I, Leonard LAWRENCE, Civ. No. 20 138, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages and that the above is a true and correct translation of the document No. NI - 8609.

Leonard LAWRENCE
Civ. No. 20 138

CONFIDENTIAL

I.G. Farbenindustrie A.G.
Vermittlungsstelle W

Berlin NW 7
Unter den Linden 7 - 82
A 2 Flora 00 21

(stamp) Department of the
Directorate
Leverkusen
19 March 1937

I.G. Farbenindustrie A.G.
Department of the Directorate
for the attention of Dr. Warnecke
Leverkusen/ I.G.- Works

Your reference

Your letter of

Our reference
(to be quoted
in replying)

Berlin
18 March 1937

N./Pf.

Subject: Planning of Leverkusen

After the visit to the District Command Opladen, the participants in the conference had the impression that there was, at the moment, no necessity for the meeting arranged for all the representatives of the authorities interested in the planning.

After a more detailed investigation of the situation, we now consider it right to call the conference planned. We are confirmed in our opinion by a confidential communication, which says that in the near future, new formations will be set up from the 1893-1900 age-groups. Other events as well may lessen the significance of the promise made by Captain van Erkelens, whether it be that changes occur in the personnel of the Military Replacements Inspectorate or the District Command, ^{or} that instructions are issued by the Military Replacements Inspectorate, which make it impossible for Captain van Erkelens to keep his promise.

We therefore propose to arrange a meeting as originally planned - for Friday 2 April. It would be appropriate for you to send out the invitations, which should be worded similarly to the corresponding Hoochst invitation which is attached. The following Leverkusen authorities are to be considered in issuing the invitations:

- 1) The appropriate Military Replacements Inspectorate
- 2) The appropriate District Command
- 3) The appropriate Military Economy Inspectorate
- 4) The appropriate Military Economy Office

Initial

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT No. NI- 4631
CONTINUED

(page 2 of original)

I.G. FARBEINDUSTRIE AKTIENGESELLSCHAFT
Vermittlungsstelle W
To Dr. Warnecke, Leverkusen

Berlin 18 March 1937

- 5) The appropriate Branch Office of the Reich
Ministry of Economics
- 6) The appropriate Branch Office of the Reich
Ministry of Labor
- 7) At the wish of Mr. Schunk, a representative of the
Air Raid Protection Service.

The following points are provided for in the program:

1. Welcome by Director Dr. Kuehne or deputy
2. Lecture by Dr. Debnier or Dr. Warnecke:
The importance of Leverkusen as an armaments plant
and as a stage I production plant for other
armaments factories.
3. Lecture by Neumann qualified engineer:
Position with regard to planning in the I.G.-works.

We presume that before sending off the invitations, you will ascertain, by telephone, from the various authorities who are to be invited, whether 2 April can still stand as the date. As soon as a decision has been reached on this point, we should like to be informed of it so that we can then invite Dr. Lenz of the Reich Ministry of Economics and Oberregierungsrat Nolte of the Reich Ministry of Labor, to take part.

VERMITTLUNGSSTELLE W

signature: Bruening

Enclosure!

3 x (stamp) Registered!

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

2 June 1947

I, Deryl C. HESNICK, No. D 42 74 59, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages and that the above is a true and correct translation of the document No. NI-4631.

.....
Deryl C. HESNICK, No. D 427459.

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT No. NI - 8608
OFFICE OF CHIEF OF COUNSEL FOR WAR CRIMES

Secret

I.G. FARBEINDUSTRIE AKTIENGESellschaft

Vermittlungsstelle W

date: 3 April

Received
24 March 1937 69/1
Berlin NW 7,
Unter den Linden 82
23 March 1937

I.G. Farbenindustrie Aktiengesellschaft

Works Combine Upper Rhine Attention: Dir. Dr. Gans, Ludwigshafen

" " Central Rhine " Dir. Dr. Hermann, Hoechst
" " Lower Rhine " Dir. Dr. Kuchno, Leverkusen

" " Central Germany " Dir. Dr. Pistor, Bielefeld

Mines Management " Dir. Lonnartz, Halle

Work Automation and " Dir. Jachno, Hoechst
I.G. Oxygen Plant " Dir. Dr. Propach, Troisdorf

Dynamit A.G. formerly A. Nobel & Co. " Dir. Dr. Propach, Troisdorf

For information:

Vermittlungsstelle W, Sparte III " Dr. Moyer, Wofl
" " Department A Merbeck, Leverkusen

Subject: Industrial Mobilization Tasks of the I.G. Plants

As you may know, Vermittlungsstelle W is engaged at present in working out mobilization schedules for the individual I.G. plants. Since the I.G. plants are in the main so-called "Plants Essential to the War Effort", (K- and L-plants) not "Permanent Plants", (R-plants) it is the Reich Ministry of Economics which is responsible for their industrial mobilization, not the Reich War Ministry. As a result, general problems regarding mobilization schedules will be handled by the Reich Ministry of Economics in direct co-operation with Vermittlungsstelle W, while problems of purely local importance affecting individual plants will be dealt with by the Reich Ministry of Economic Affairs through their branch offices attached to the various "Oberpraesidien" (=government authority for province).

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT No. NI - 8608
CONTINUED

(Page 2 of original)

In order to enable the branch offices to carry out mobilization preparations together with the various plants it is necessary that each I.G. plant designate a so-called confidential agent (Vertrauensmann) and a deputy of this agent for the appropriate task. We have been requested by the Reich Ministry of Economic Affairs to suggest candidates; the minister will then pledge them to secrecy.

Some plants appointed "confidential agents for questions of military economy" some time ago. Many of these persons would, however, probably be unsuited for this type of work, as the branch offices of the Reich Ministry of Economic Affairs would prefer to collaborate with men who can afford the time to carry out personally the extensive investigations involved. In view of the nature of these investigations it would on the other hand seem to be expedient to suggest for appointment as confidential agent and his deputy men who, on account of their position have a comprehensive knowledge of production problems in their plants.

We have promised the Reich Ministry of Economic Affairs to submit in the near future, the returns of the various I.G. plants, on the enclosed proforma. Will you please complete the enclosed forms, insofar as they concern plants of your works combine and return them to us in duplicate. Names of men suggested for appointment as confidential agents and deputies to be entered in columns h and i respectively. Should one or the other branch office of the Reich Ministry of Economic Affairs have designated confidential agents and deputies for some factory already, the names of the gentlemen concerned should be entered in the lists and clearly marked accordingly.

We should like to add that on 7 April of this year, there a meeting of all the chiefs of the Ministry's Branch Offices will be held at the Reich Ministry of Economic Affairs; we should therefore be obliged if completed forms could be sent in by 5 April so that we could submit them to the Reich Ministry of Economic Affairs before the above meeting of the chiefs of the Branch Offices.

Vermittlungsstelle 7
(signature) Gass

Appendices:
3 copies I.G. plants
3 " affiliated "

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

16 July 1947

I, Leonard LAWRENCE, Civ. No. 20 139, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages and that the above is a true and correct translation of the document No. NI - 8608.

Leonard LAWRENCE
Civ. No. 20 139

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT No. NI - 8607
OFFICE OF CHIEF OF COUNSEL FOR WAR CRIMES

Registered strictly confidential!

I.G. FARBE-INDUSTRIE AKTIENGESSELLSCHAFT

Elberfeld Plant

Secret!

Wire Code:
Farbfabrik
Elberfeld

1. This is a secret within the meaning of Par. 88 of the Reich Penal Code.
2. To be handed on only under cover, to be "registered" if sent by post.
3. To be kept at responsibility of addressee under lock and key.

Herr

Dr. von Bruening
Directorate Department T
IG FARBE-INDUSTRIE AKTIENGESSELLSCHAFT

Frankfurt/Main - Hoechst

Your reference your commu- our reference Wuppertal-El-
nication of (to be quoted verbatim
when replying) 27 April 37
Dr. Ltr./Stj.

Subject Mobilization Plans.

Dear Dr. von Bruening!

In answer to your letter Dr.v.Br./K1. dated 22 inst. I have to inform you, after consultation with Professor Hoerlein, that we shall have to postpone the scheduled conference since, at present, we are still engaged in ascertaining our production capacity of those essential products which we shall presumably be called upon to deliver in case of war.

Also, I want to contact the Leverkusen commercial department to find out whether it will send a representative to this conference. I have no objections to Hoechst as place of the conference. Please wait until next week for the exact date. By then, I hope to be able to give you an exact date.

With German salute,

Yours truly,

(signature) Dr. Lutter

Enclosed: 1 copy

Through: Vermittlungsstelle W, Berlin NW 7
Messrs. Professor Lautenschlaeger and
Dr. Fohrle.

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT No. NI - 8607
CONTINUED

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

16 July 1947

I, Leonard LAWRENCE, Civ. No. 20 138, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages and that the above is a true and correct translation of the document No. NI - 8607.

Leonard LAWRENCE
Civ. No. 20 138

- 2 -
"END"

I.G. FARBENINDUSTRIE AKTIENGESELLSCHAFT
Vermittlungsstelle W

Secret!

This is a state secret
within the meaning of
Article 88 of the
Reich Penal Code.
Only to be handed over under
cover, if sent by post, " registered".
To be kept, at responsibility of
addressee, in a safe.

Berlin, 8 September 1937.
N./Mr.

(Stamp)
Management Department
Leverkusen
9 September 1937

I.G. Farben A.G., attention	Director von der Bey,	Bitterfeld	for the works	Bitterfeld-Ges.
				Bitterfeld-Her-
				Wolfen-Farben
do	Dr. Schneider, Doeberitz	" "	" "	Doeberitz-West
do	Director Professor Dr.	Hoerlein, Elberfeld	" "	Wuppertal-Elber-
				feld
do	Dr. Weber, Gersthofen	" "	" "	Gersthofen
do	Director Dr. Kohnor,	Ludwigshafen	" "	Ludwigshafen
do	Chief Engineer H. Klingen-	berg, Ludwigshafen	" "	Goldbach (barrel
				wood factory)
do	Dr. Engelbertz, Griesheim	" "	" "	Griesheim
				Chemical
				Factory
do	Dr. Holler, Griesheim	" "	" "	Griesheim
				Autogen,
				Griesheim machine
				factory
do	Director Dr. Staib, Hoechst	" "	" "	Hoechst
do	Director Dr. Laux, Uerdingen	" "	" "	Uerdingen,
				Horren (Metall-
				chemie, Horren
				GmbH.
do	Dr. Warnecke, Leverkusen	" "	" "	Leverkusen
do	Dr. Krauss, Fo.	" "	" "	Mainkur
do	Dr. Demnitz, Marbach	" "	" "	Marbach
do	Dipl. Engineer Koch,	Offenbach	" "	Offenbach
do	Dr. Liebich, Rheinfelden	" "	" "	Rheinfelden

(page 1 of original, cont'd)

I.G. Farben A.G., attention Dr. Wulff, Schkopau	for the works Schkopau
do Dr. Reubke, Teutschenthal	" " " Teutschenthal
do Steinrig, Ludwigshafen	" " " Zweckel
A.G. fuer Stickstoffduenger attention Dr. Hegels, Cologne	" " " Knapsack
Bayrische Stickstoffwerke AG attention Dr. Ritter, Piesteritz	" " " Piesteritz
Deutsch-Koloniale Gerb-u. Farbstoff- GmbH, attention Director Dr. Fr. Mueller	" " " Karlsruhe
Aluminiumwerk GmbH, Bitterfeld, attention Director Dr. Schall	
Duisburger Kupferhuetten, Duisburg-Hochfeld, attention Director Dr. Engineer Hermann Wolf	
Attention of: Director Dr. Bertrams, Frankfurt/Main Director Jachne, Hoechst Dr. Meyer, Wofl., (Wolfen Film Plant ?) Mr. Mathy, Leuna	

Registered :

(page 2 of original)

Re. Mobilization planning tasks (Mob-Planungsarbeiten)

The majority of the works named in the distribution list has been instructed by us in the course of the months June and July as to the nature and aim of Mobilization tasks to be carried out. It became evident that the entire Mobilization task can be divided into two main parts:

- A) Supplying the works with the materials necessary for fulfilling the Mobilization task (including supplying with transportation to and from)
- B) Guaranteeing the personnel necessary for carrying out of the Mobilization task.

The tasks under main part B) have been explained in our circulars dated 13 July, 16 July and 20 August. The conferences which have been fixed for the next weeks will help in making known new points of view which have come up in the meantime and to clarify matters.

(page 2 of original)

The tasks coming under main part A), since so far no Mobilization task was known, could only cover the collection of data available on the subject in its present stage, and the drawing up of a proposed production plan in the event of mobilization. We have now been informed by the Ministry of Economics that we should begin to draw up organizational schemes and we have been asked to submit our current production plans as well as our production plan proposals for all works in the event of mobilization.

The current production plans will in the meantime have been completed by all works; part of the works (Bitterfeld, Goldbach, Hoechst, Leverkusen, Ludwigshafen, Wolfen-Farben) have already forwarded theirs to the Vermittlungsstelle. The production plans must state the following about each product:

- 1.) Names
- 2.) Capacity of works
- 3.) Normal peace-time production
- 4.) Breakdown of normal peace-time production into

(page 3 of original)

- a) works' own consumption
- b) consumption of other I.G. works
- c) consumption at home excluding I.G. consumption
- d) consumption abroad.

We request the works to send us their production plans as soon as possible, as far as this has not already been done.

The proposals for a production plan in the event of mobilization, have to be worked out in agreement with the works management. They are to be understood as non-binding statements of opinion by the works, for which, in view of the nature of the matter, no responsibility can or should be assumed. In all cases in which a change in production from the present normal production in the event of mobilization is not very likely, the present normal production is to be set down in the proposal.

We ask you to further the work sufficiently so that the contents and form of the proposals can be fixed at the next meetings.

VERMITTLUNGSSTELLE W

signature: Herrmann

TRANSLATION OF EXHIBIT No. NI-4632
CONTINUED

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

2 June 1947

I, Arthur MACMILLAN, Civ. No. 20191, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages and that the above is a true and correct translation of the document No. NI-4632.

.....
Arthur MACMILLAN, Civ. No. 20191

I.G. Farbenindustrie Aktiengesellschaft

(Rubber Stamp)

Received 1 December 1937

(Rubber Stamp)

REGISTERED

Frankfurt(Main), 30 November 1937

Secret!

CONFIDENTIAL

1. This is a secret matter within the meaning of Article 88 of the Reich Penal Code.
2. To be transmitted only under cover; if sent by post, to be registered.
3. To be kept, at the responsibility of the addressee, under lock and key.

File Note.

At the suggestion of Leverkusen a conference on mobilization plans took place in Frankfurt(Main) on 30 November 1937.

Present:	Dr. Warnocko,	Leverkusen
	Dr. Dolanier	"
	Dr. Hohl	Ludwigshafen
	Dr. v. Bruchning	Hochst
	Dr. Hirschel	"
	Dipl. Ing. Neumann	Vermittlungsstelle W, Berlin
	Dr. Eichwede	Technical Committee Office, Frankfurt(Main)

The starting point for today's meeting was the question whether the discussion of mobilization plans now being resumed at Berlin was influenced by the suggestions reported by Dr. ter Meer in the Dyestuffs Committee of 23 November 1937.

Irrespective of the result of the Dyestuffs Committee meeting mobilization plans policy has to remain unaltered. The Office of the Technical Committee (Dr. Struss) to raise at the discussion of the Leverkusen plan on 13 December in Berlin the fundamental question as to whether plans should be built up from below or whether planning can be directed into the right channels from the very beginning by the stipulation, on the part of the authorities, of a few basic target figures. The suggestion of Dr. ter Meer, to transfer the industry somewhere else, to be tried out meanwhile; the result not to influence the present discussion.

It was agreed to take as terms of reference for dyestuffs the production figures of 1936, i.e. to express actual production, deliveries and sales in tons (of goods actually sold) (Handelsgewicht); production capacities not being shown. The Vermittlungsstelle W undertook to inform Dr. Ungewitter of the change of these figures.

(page 1 of original, cont'd)

The information, required by the Vermittlungsstelle W, on the uses of various products or groups of products, to be submitted, pending a future ruling, in form of estimated percentages for products exceeding 10 tons per month only.

(page 2 of original)

In the case of dye-stuffs and pharmaceuticals no need for data on uses. Estimates to be made at the works; should they be unable to do so in the case of individual products data to be supplemented by the Office of the Technical Committee.

Owing to pressure caused by manpower problems, Leverkusen made a number of estimates about dye-stuff production, which fall considerably short of the 1936 production. A few discussions which have taken place in the meantime have disclosed that these figures seem to be too low, they are therefore to be increased in the present version. The present production figures of the new version (13 December 1937) have no immediate connection with the original safeguarding of labor.

The affiliated plants of the works combine to be informed of the measures to be taken as a result of today's meeting.

(signature) Dr. Eichwede

Office of Technical Committee.

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

16 July 1947

I, Leonard LAWRENCE, No. 20 138, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages and that the above is a true and correct translation of the document No. NI-8777.

Leonard LAWRENCE
No. 20 138

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT No. NI-8776
OFFICE OF CHIEF OF COUNSEL FOR WAR CRIMES

I.G. Farbenindustrie Aktiengesellschaft
Vermittlungsstelle W

Berlin NW 7
Unter den Linden 82
120021

Stamp:

*only

I.G. Farbenindustrie A.G.
Directorate, Department T
for the attention of Dr. von Bruening
Frankfurt/Main - Hoechst

1. This is a state secret within the meaning of Article 88 of the Reich Penal Code.
2. To be forwarded under seal, if sent by post, to be "registered".
3. To be kept, at responsibility of addressee, under lock and key.

Your reference: your letter of: our reference Berlin,
(to be quoted when 7 December 1937
replying)
Dr. Di/Sch.

Subject: Planning of the Sales Departments to meet Mobilization Requirements.

Shortly before starting on his official journey, Dr. Gorr informed me yesterday of your wish expressed over the phone, for a written exposition of the development of the matter mentioned above, and also for a statement on Vermittlungsstelle W.'s attitude. As is already known, in embarking upon our industrial mobilization program, at first only the production plants of I.G. and those departments which are immediately connected with them, such as the Transportation-Department, Accounts-Department, Construction-Department, Social Welfare-Department etc., were subjected to a thorough preparation for the emergency. The preparation consisted mainly of the guaranteeing of the raw material supply and of transportation- and man-power-requirements. The various Sales-Departments and Distribution-Organizations of our Konzern, on the other hand, were included much less in this preliminary work for industrial mobilization. In contrast to the more comprehensive preliminary work of our production plants, the industrial mobilization of our Distribution-Departments may, in the main, be restricted to the guaranteeing of the personnel necessary in an emergency. And it was precisely here that the mobilization plans of all the larger plants had shown, that, if 20 - 30 % of the staff were released for active military service, we could probably maintain full production with the remaining staff, by means of longer working hours etc. Since on the one hand it can be expected that, because of the age groups to which most of the employees of our Distribution-Departments belong,

(page 2 of original)

as compared with those of the Production-Departments, there will be a smaller call-up of employees for active military service, and since on the other hand, the general shortage of goods which is to be expected in our Sales Departments in the event of war, may eliminate certain work, such as sales-propaganda and the like, mobilization preparations in the field of distribution did not seem so urgent.

(page 2 of original cont'd)

*we Of course we also intended to include the organizations for the sale of our products in the industrial mobilization, after having completed the reorganization of the Production-Departments. Time and again, for instance, have contacted the appropriate authorities of the Reich War Ministry, the Reich Ministry of Economics etc. and asked them which goods would not be controlled in the event of war (Ernstfall), i.e. to which goods normal supply, demand and price-conditions can be expected to apply, and for which groups of goods a control system, in the form of allocation of quotas, will have to be planned immediately. The answer to this question is, in our opinion, of decisive importance for the structure of a Distribution Organization which will serve a useful purpose in the event of mobilization. Unfortunately it had so far been impossible to obtain from the authorities an answer which was in any way satisfactory. Here, too, the production plants are of primary interest for mobilization.

For instance, Dr. Fischer, Gasoline Control, bases his mobilization preparation for the distribution of fuel, lubricants etc. on the assumption of complete government control. Dr. Oster, Nitrogen Syndicate, prefers not to commit himself yet as far as his field of work is concerned.

The fact that we can carry out the mobilization preparations for the ensuring of I.G.-Export trade, in the event of war (in Ernstfall) only in the closest cooperation with the expert authorities of I.G. in Frankfurt/Main and Berlin N. 7 seems just as natural to us as the close cooperation with our worksmen and department-chiefs in the field of production.

We were, of course, surprised to learn from the authorities - Oberregierungsrat Pohlmann of the Reich Ministry of Economics and Regierungsrat Hinsch of the Branch-Office - that according to an arrangement made by Dr. Gattineau, two independent central offices are now responsible for the industrial mobilization of I.G.,

(page 3 of original)

namely the Vermittlungsstelle W for the production and Drs. Gattineau and Noack for the commercial side. In pursuance of this arrangement Berlin N. 7 had been immediately declared essential to the war effort, in order to make it possible to submit the applications for exemption from military service necessary for this I.G. office. In a discussion with us, Dr. Gattineau imposed limits on his authority on commercial interests in mobilization matters as follows: He does not intend to include within his scope the Purchasing Departments and other commercial departments of the works, but only the large Sales Departments of the I.G. Those, however, will be included even if they are directly connected with the works, as in the case of Pharma-Leverkusen and Agfa-Berlin, and their mobilization preparations have already been undertaken there.

After a short exposition of the facts mentioned above, Director Dr. Krauch instructed the undersigned that within the sphere of the Sparte I, Vermittlungsstelle W should also be responsible and in charge of negotiations for the industrial mobilization of the distribution organization; the establishment of a new independent mobilization office, for which Dr. Gattineau has striven, should not apply to the distribution of the products

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT No. NI-8776
CONTINUED

(page 3 of original cont'd)

of Main Group I. Dr. Krauch emphasized the fact that his decision was only to hold good for Sparte I. He could not and would not make any decision for the other Sparten.

Dr. Meyer, Wolfen-Film, informed us that Dir. Dr. Gajowski and Dir. Dr. Kleino are also opposed to the establishment of a new independent mobilization office to deal with sales matters and reject this new arrangement as far as Sparte III is concerned.

Even if too much importance cannot be attributed to this whole matter and the main task essential for successful mobilization of the Sales- and Export Departments of the I.G. is a close cooperation between all authorities concerned, from a practical point of view, the concentration in one place of all work connected with military economy

(page 4 of original)

and of all mobilization preparations of the I.G. is to be recommended. The maintenance of uniformity serves not only to enhance the prestige of the I.G. in the eyes of the authorities, but to facilitate practical, methodical cooperation.

We have no need to emphasize the fact that, in the systematic regulation of the work involved in the mobilization of the distribution organizations of the I.G., for which we strive, full use will be made of the experience and knowledge of overseas trade possessed by our Political Economic Department and that Drs. Gattineau and Moack can conduct their negotiations on the subject with the authorities just as independently as can our works managements in the field of production.

VERMITTLUNGSSTELLE W

(Signature) Dickmann

Copies to: Director Dr. Krauch, Berlin W 8
Secretariat of Sparte I, Oppau
Dr. Meyer, Wolfen-Film.

7 x

Registered

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

14 July 1947

I, BERYL C. BESICK, No. D 427459, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages and that the above is a true and correct translation of the document No. NI-8776.

BERYL C. BESICK, No. D 427459.

AFFIDAVIT

I, Dr. Helmut NOACK, Wiesbaden-Bierstadtterhehe, Richard Wagnerstrasse 3, at present in Muenberg, having been warned that I shall render myself liable to punishment by making a false statement, herewith declare on oath of my own free will and without coercion.

At the time when I entered the service of the I. G. Farbenindustrie Berlin NW 7 on 1 May 1937 the Liaison Office "W" (Verbindungsstelle "W") was in existence. If I remember rightly, it was inaugurated in 1935 for the technical sector of I.G., shared the offices of NW 7, but was responsible to Sparte 1 - 3 (KRAUCH, TERTNER, GAJLSKI) as regards the execution of its tasks. The OKW (Military Economy Staff), Reich Ministry of Economics (Department for Chemistry and Mineral Oil) and the Economic Group for Chemistry made use of it in the inception and execution of military economic tasks, which the Liaison Office "W" (Verbindungsstelle W), accepted and carried out, either alone or, as was usually the case, in cooperation with the I.G.'s works. Military economic tasks and those connected with mobilization were dealt with in the ministries, in so far as these were set by the OKW (Office for the Defense of the Realm, Military Economy Staff). In the course of the year all the Reich Ministries were entrusted with the following tasks:

- 1.) Reich Ministry for the Interior:
amongst other things, with the organization of an authoritative body for mobilization, air raid precautions.

(page 2 of original)

- 2.) Reich Ministry of Economics:
 - a) Production questions,
 - b) Stock-piling of important raw materials (coal, fuels, ores, etc.)
 - c) Re-location of plants,
 - d) Establishment of production schedules, mobilization operational schedules
 - e) Increase of present production capacity.
 - f) Classification of plants under armament plants, plants for vital war and domestic production, other plants.

In 1935 comprehensive production statistics for industrial economy were introduced by the Reich Office of Statistics. The results of this extremely detailed enquiry should, besides being utilized for peace-time economic planning, form the basis of military economic work in the sphere of industrial production.

(page 2 of original cont'd)

- g) Questions of foreign trade and of trade and foreign exchange policy.
- 3) Reich Ministry of Food:
Questions of management, supplies etc.
- 4) Reich Ministry of Labor:
Safeguarding of supplies of German and foreign workers for industry, crafts, agriculture etc.
- 5) Reich Ministry of Finance:
Money and finance policy in cooperation with the Reich Bank, which was the particular authority for questions of currency and foreign exchange.
- 6) Reich Ministry of Commerce:
Questions of preparedness of vehicles.

(page 3 of original)

For the sake of coordination, tasks 1-6 laid down for the ministries - they overlap and are mutually dependent - were merged, and entrusted to Praesident SCHACHT (Plenipotentiary General for War Industry, Plenipotentiary General for Industry) who appointed for the task WILHELM, Ministerial Director for the Foreign Exchange Dept. of the Reich Ministry of Economics, who retained his previous sphere of tasks. In executing the tasks, the Reich Ministry of Economics made use of the newly installed "Department of Statistics", of the State Governments (Laenderregierungen) and Oberpraesidien, and also employed the Economic Groups for Industrial Economy and the Reich offices which had existed since 1934 for the distribution and treatment of various raw materials (iron, chemicals, cotton, wool, silk, synthetic fibres, metals, rubber, leather, mineral oil etc.).

On these matters - which in part were known of and took place openly - I informed Dr. GATTILIAU, after taking up my position in 1940 as leader of the Liaison Office for trade policy to the Reich Ministry of Economics and the Foreign Office. As far as I could observe at the time, in contrast to the steadily advancing work of the technical sector of I.G., economic tasks with regard to mobilization in the realm of the commercial sector had not up to then been started. This seemed to me serious; for if the organization of home and foreign markets were to be maintained in the A-Fall, the necessary personnel would have to be released from war service. Dr. GATTILIAU seized the opportunity. It led to the treatment of the matter in the Commercial Committee, to discussions with the OKW and Reich Ministry of Economics (General TH. ... , Staatssekretaer RUSS, von SCHUTTLER, JUNG).

(page 4 of original)

and finally to my appointment for the introduction of work on the release of personnel in the commercial sector. I discussed the question of the safeguarding of production capacity for the maintenance of the export trade during mobilization in conversation with Dr. GATTNER. My suggestions had no result at all.

It cannot be denied that in the situation existing at the time Dr. GATTNER saw in the treatment of military economic tasks the possibility of strengthening his influence and his position in NW 7, which would favorably affect his progress. Unquestionably he also intended to subordinate the Liaison Office W (Verbindungsstelle W) - extended by reason of the tasks of the commercial sphere in mobilization matters - to Berlin NW 7. As Dr. GATTNER for his part informed me, this wish miscarried because of its rejection by the Sparte chiefs, (KALLICH, GAJDANEK). I suppose that it was material and personal considerations and reflections which caused Dr. GATTNER to suggest to Herr von BRUNING the participation of the IFA employees, Dr. EICHNER and Dr. MACH, in the military economic conference at Hoechst in 1937. I can no longer say, but it is quite possible. As Dr. EICHNER has been named in this connection, it can be assumed that military economic questions in the sphere of pharmaceutical production were involved, as he was the expert for the "Pharma" sales combines in IFA. Considering the condition of military economic work by the State, the following questions may have been the subject of the discussion in Hoechst:

Whether I took part in this conference in the summer of 1939,

(page 5 of original)

- a) Release of workers when mobilization begins;
- b) Guarantee of facilities for producing pharmaceutical products for civil and Wehrmacht requirements - from this the operational schedules for mobilization developed at a later date;
- c) Supply of raw and auxiliary materials for production (coal; chemical basic materials, which had been quantitatively of little importance.)
- d) Guarantee of vehicle supply if necessary

As long as President SCHACHT was the minister responsible, his attitude was unmistakable: namely he intended to give his support to all matters connected with the Wehrmacht and with armament only in so far as they could be brought into harmony with his political and economic views. The "New Plan" would balance supply and demand - of industrial goods - the trade agreement system was to make it possible for Germany to fulfil its international financial obligations, armament was to be kept within economically defensible limitations, the scope of which depended on an active balance of trade. SCHACHT approached all tasks connected with mobilization matters, armament etc., only with hesitation, and thus gained the name "cunctator". This attitude also communicated itself

(page 5 of original cont'd)

to his colleagues. SCHACHT permitted this sort of work only in so far as it remained within sensible limits and was essential to a defensive war in Europe. During my employment in the Reich Ministry of Economics, I came to consider that, of the situations presented to the RK, the most disastrous were:

(page 6 of original)

European conflict with France, Czechoslovakia, Poland, with England as an unfriendly neutral and the oversea routes held open.

As international publications (e. g. FULMER) reveal, the General Staffs of all the powers were occupied with similar defensive and safe-guarding measures in case of total mobilization.

As long as SCHACHT was guiding and directing these matters, they were, in my opinion, in harmony with the needs of the State, and could be considered by all offices and bodies occupied with mobilization work as limited to Party and Wehrmacht use.

SCHACHT's ever more difficult position was considerably weakened (1936) by the introduction of the "Four Year Plan" and its organization (G. GUNIG, Oberst LIEB, KEPLER). It led to the systematic crippling and undermining of the Reich Ministry of Economics. An essential basis of his work and the methods used in it was the large estimate of raw materials held and required, which had to be supplied by all the ministries participating under the direction of the "Four Year Plan" offices from the summer of 1936 onwards. The purpose was to obtain a picture of the demand (civil and Wehrmacht (armaments) demand) on the one hand, and of the possibilities of fulfilling this demand (stocks which were or might become available, mobilization of final reserves (the resources of a country's economy are not calculable!) substitute materials, the extraction and supply of raw materials in Germany independently of price estimates or any other consideration (e.g. "Salzgitter" ores) and the most thorough exploitation of syn-

(page 7 of original)

thetic production) on the other hand. Since 1937 the economic policy, which became to an ever-increasing extent a military economic policy, was entirely determined by the experience gained from assessment of stocks in hand and requirements. It was carried out by the above-named people, (Party members or military personnel), whereby leading industrialists were employed to a major extent beyond the previous limits. SCHACHT's influence and that of his colleagues disappeared still further, and with it the restraint imposed by him on a foolish, indeed an absurd military economic armaments policy. The liquidation of SCHACHT's policy which began in 1936/37 came, outwardly also, to its conclusion at the beginning of 1938, through the reorganization of the Reich Ministry of Economics. The supporters of SCHACHT's economic conceptions were replaced by the logical representatives of the Four Year Plan policy, whose mental capacity often stood in inverse ratio to their consistency in the pursuit of National

(page 7 of original cont'd)

Socialist aims and ideals (e.g. LOEB, V. HATZKEHN, SCHATTNER, VON J. CH. IFF, KERN, etc., later HALLER, CHUDORF and others). The unchecked economic political measures of the departments, which were more or less all guided by considerations of the armaments industry, led to the ever-increasing employment of leading industrialists. The more important the undertaking, the sooner it was noticed, and so became known, that the leaders of the State were no longer reckoning only with defensive localized warfare. It became evident that this was a gambler's policy. How else could the increasing demands of State offices to the I. G. for the supply of self-confessed armaments production be interpreted or explained on general grounds?

(page 8 of original)

Every honest observer of economic proceedings would be forced to recognize this, even if he did not take into consideration the slick methods of foreign policy.

WIF

(Economic Research Company)

To the best of my knowledge it was founded in 1934/35 by the Reich Ministry of Economics on the orders of the Reich War Ministry and in particular the Air Ministry. Its first manager (Geschäftsführer) was the Braunauister LEHLING. Purpose of the Company: Erection of storage plants (tank storage dumps) for fuels of every sort in accordance with military economic requirements and the directions of the military department; construction of armaments factories; filling of tanks in storage dump after completion.

WIF did its work in the closest contact with the military authorities, who, in particular, decided on the site after testing all security measures (camouflage). After completion, the individual plants were stocked with various fuels, each in accordance with the demands of the military authorities and with the facilities available. The problems connected with the provision and allocation of fuels were solved by the Reich Ministry of Economics in cooperation with the I. G. and the Reich office for mineral oil.

The I.G. was interested in this project in so far as it was the most important firm in the synthetic gasoline production industry and also by reason of its share in the Gasolin A.G.

(page 9 of original)

In my opinion, as the I.G. did not itself possess extensive storage plants or similar facilities, the necessity of erecting such plants arose, because the military authorities demanded it. For the rest, Herr KRAUCK was, I believe since 1934, the Wehrmacht's General expert on armaments questions and it can be assumed that he was also employed in an advisory capacity for work connected with this.

(page 9 of original cont'd)

I have carefully read through each of the 9 (nine) pages of this affidavit and countersigned them with my own hand, have made the necessary corrections in my own handwriting and countersigned them with my initials and I herewith declare on oath that to the best of my knowledge and belief I have stated the absolute truth in this affidavit.

Signature: Dr. Helmut Neack
Dr. Helmut Neack

Sworn to and signed before me this 22nd day of July 1947 at Nuremberg by Dr. Helmut Neack, known to me to be the person making the above affidavit.

(Signature:) Arthur T. Cooper
ARTHUR T. COOPER
U. S. Civilian AGC number D 434 534
Interrogator, Office of Chief of
Counsel for War Crimes
U. S. War Department.

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

18 August 1947

I, PATRICIA E. C. MOOD, ETC No. 20139, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of the document no. NI-9051.

PATRICIA E. C. MOOD, ETC No. 20139

(Rubber Stamp) Secret Reich Matter

H 121 g Re

5 copies
Copy No. 4

Minutes

of the Consultation of 14 December 1937 at the Reich War Ministry on
Mobilization Task of the I.G. Farbenindustrie-Aktiengesellschaft, Knep-
sack Plant: Case A.

Present: from the Reich War Ministry: Regierungsrat Dr. Mureck,
Dr. Rorberg,
Dipl. Ing. Schwabe
Boose,
from the Reich Ministry of Economics: Bergrat Morhorn,
from the Control Office "Chemistry": Dr. Hagert.

The consultation establishes for the Knapsack Plant of the I.G. Farben-
industrie A.G. the Mobilization Task for case "A", i.e., the Total
War Case in accordance with the Mobilization Session of 13 December 1937.

	<u>Mobilization Task</u>	<u>Remarks</u>
1. Carbide	8,700 tons per month	only for acetaldehyde (4000 tons per month as in case B; of this 2400 tons per month converted carbide fur- naces 11, 12 and 13, 2200 tons per month from Elektrowerk.
2. Ferrosilicon 45 %	4,600 tons per month	
3. Nitrogen of line	none	
4. Acetaldehyde	4000 tons per month	as in case B; of this 2300 tons per month to Hoechst (solvent), 1200 tons per month of acetic acid, 500 tons per month for direct anhydride process.
5.		
5a. Acetic acid, raw 100 %	1800 tons per month	as in case B; of this 300 tons per month for direct anhydride pro- cess; provisions for 840 tons per month for No. 5b, 300 tons per month for No. 5c, 660 tons per month for No. 6.
5b. Acetic acid, commercially pure	- -	as in case B out of 840 tons per month acetic acid, raw, of which 540 tons per month for No. 6, 40 tons per month for No. 7, Balan- for No. 5c.

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT No. NI-8883
CONTINUED

(page 2 of original)

	<u>Mobilization</u> <u>Task</u>	<u>Remarks</u>
5c. Acetic acid, pure	- -	as in case B. yet to be determined. 1. Out of 300 tons per month acetic acid, raw (direct anhydride process), 2. out of 200 tons per month from No. 5b.
6. Acetic acid anhydride	640 tons per month	as in case B; of this 440 tons per month from acetic acid commercial pure, 200 tons from direct anhydride process as in case B.
7. Acetyl chloride	50 tons per month	
8. Acetone	300 tons per month	as in case B; for which 660 tons per month of acetic acid.
9. Phosgene	300 tons per month	
10. Hydrochloric acid 30 %		Figure still to be indicated corresponding to 440 tons per month of anhydride.-- Obligatory by-product As in case B.
11. Activated Carbon	none	

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

27 June 1947

I, VICTORIA ORTON, No. 20129, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages and that the above is a true and correct translation of the document No. NI-8883.

VICTORIA ORTON, No. 20129.

Handwritten : D 128 grs (Top Secret) Wm-Ch

2 copies
2nd copy

(Rubber Stamp:) (signed) Dietrich

1. This is a State secret within the meaning of Article 86 of the German Penal Code under the Law of 24 April 1934 (Reich Law Gazette Art. 241 5)
2. Only to be handed over personally or be sent personally addressed under double cover and a receipt required.
3. To be forwarded where possible by courier or by confidential agent; if sent by post to be insured (value 1050 RM).
4. Reproduction of any kind and making of extracts forbidden.
5. Recipient is responsible for safe keeping. Neglect in this respect will be subject to severe punishment.

I. G. FARBENINDUSTRIE AKTIONGESELLSCHAFT

Notice concerning Mobilization Task of the I.G. Farbenindustrie
Aktiengesellschaft, Knapsack Works, Fall "A",
in accordance with Discussion of 14 December 1937 in the
Reich War Ministry (RMW).

	<u>Mobilization-Task</u>	<u>Remarks:</u>
1. Carbide	3,700 tons per month	Only for acetaldehyde (4,000 tons per month).
2. Ferrosilicon 45%	4,600 tons per month	As in Fall B; of which 2,400 t.p.m. from converted Carbide ovens 11, 12 and 13, 2,200 t.p.m. from Electroworks
3. Calcium Nitrate	None	
4. Acetaldehyde	4,000 tons per month	As in Fall B; of which 2,300 tons per month for Hoechst (solvents), 1,200 tons per month for Acetic Acid 500 tons per month for direct anhydrous process

(page 1 of original, cont'd)

<u>Mobilization Task</u>	<u>Remarks</u>
5.	
5a. Acetic acid crude 100% 1,800 tons per month	As in Fall B; of which 300 tons per month from direct anhydrous process; provision for 840 tons per mth for No. 5 300 tons per mth for No. 5 660 tons per mth for No. 8
5b. Acetic acid, technically pure —	As in Fall B; out of 840 tons per mth Acetic acid, crude, of which 540 tons per mth for No. 1 40 tons per mth for No. 7 Remainder for No. 5c.
5c. Acetic acid, pure —	As in Fall B; still to be fixed. 1. Out of 300 tons per mth Acetic acid, crude, (direct anhydrous process) 2. Out of 200 tons per mth from No. 5b.
6. Anhydrous acetic acid 640 tons per month	As in Fall B; of which 440 tons per month out of Acetic acid technically pure, 200 tons per month out of direct anhydrous process,
7. Acetyl Chloride 50 tons per month	As in Fall B
8. acetone 300 tons per month	As in Fall B for which 660 tons per mth Acetic acid.
9. Chlorine Carbon Monoxide (Chlorkohlenoxyd) 300 tons per month	
10. Hydrochloric Acid 30%	Number corresponding to 440 tons per month Anhydride still to be stated. Obligatory yield. As in Fall B.
11. Activated-Charcoal (A-Kohle) None.	

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

20 June 1947

I, Victoria ORTON, No. 20 129, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages and that the above is a true and correct translation of the document No. NI-8503.

Victoria ORTON,
No. 20 129

(Rubber Stamp) Secret Reich Matter H 197 g Rs

5 copies
Copy No. 5

Minutes
of the Consultation of 25 January 1936 with the firm of I.G. Farben-
industrie A.G., Knapsack Plant

Present: from the Reich War Ministry	Dr. Thierck
	Dr. Angerer,
from the Reich Ministry of Economics	Regierungsrat Lenz,
	Bergrat Harhoff,
from the Control Office "Chemistry"	Dr. Ungewitter,
	Dr. Dietrich,
	Dr. Ing. Hagert,
	Dr. Ing. Hoyl,
on the behalf of the I.G. Farben-	Dr. Dickmann) Vermitt-
industrie	Dr. Pfundler) lungsstel-
	Dipl. Ing. Neumann) le W.
	Dir. Dr. Hohnor) Ludwigs-
	Dr. Holl) hafen
	Dir. Dr. Bachmann) Knapsack
	Dr. Hegels) Plant

Dr. Bachmann requests clarification of the contradictions which, in his opinion, result from the establishment of various war production plans for Knapsack. His interpretation is that it is not possible simply to exclude Knapsack in the A-case. Moreover it is not understood, for instance why, if Knapsack is considered to be endangered, on the one hand via Ferrosilicon 3/4 of the total iron industry is attached to Knapsack, whereas on the other hand the production of carbide is reduced to an insupportable minimum.

Detailed explanations are made to Dr. B. that in accordance with the existing directions a mobilization requisitioning of Knapsack is not possible, since it is located in the endangered region. But the war production commission has gone out of its way to discuss in a purely theoretical way to start with, two further cases that might arise for the plant, since it specialises in the production of particularly important and indispensable products; namely case A under the assumption that the Knapsack Plant still has certain possibilities of working

(page 2 of original)

for a few days or weeks, despite endangerment of the western border; or case B, under the assumption that the western border of the Reich is not endangered.

Regierungsrat Dr. Lenz then makes detailed explanations to Dr. B. concerning the aim and purpose of the work of the commission, the orders which it has to carry out, and the delimitation of the work with respect to the range of authority of the branch offices.

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT No. NI-8881
CONTINUED

(page 2 of original cont'd)

On the basis of the debate which arose, the commission expresses the intention of withdrawing the limited proposal of war production for Knapsack and of confining itself solely to the normal case (Normalfall) for the I.G. Works. But Dr. B. requests that this should not be done.

In response to the objection with reference to placing the personnel for the I.G. Works which are located in the endangered area on the indispensable list, it is again pointed out that only the normal case can be used as a basis for this. For instance, for the current year no changes would be made via the branch offices with reference to personnel of the plants in question which had already been put on the indispensable list.

Berlin, 28 January 1938
Dr. Hy/Gst.

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

27 June 1947

I, VICTORIA ORTON, No. 20129, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages and that the above is a true and correct translation of the document No. NI-8881.

VICTORIA ORTON, No. 20129.

D 366 Top Secret

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TOP SECRET

Note in ink : Altered 23 October 1939
Dietrich

M I N U T E S

of the Discussion on 10 February 1938

Present :

From the High Command of the Wehrmacht - Dr. Thieror
Dr. Angerer

From Reich Ministry for Economics
(RMI) -

Regierungsrat Dr. Lenz,
Bergrat Harhenn,

From the Branch Office Berlin
of the Reich Ministry for
Economics.

- Dr. Ing. Ganster,

From the Control Office
Chemistry

("Ueberwachungsstelle" Chemie ") - Dr. Ungewitter
Dr. Dietrich
Dr. Ing. Hagert
Dr. Ing. Heyl

The RMI (Reich War Ministry) states that those works lying in the territory marked red, are also to receive a mobilization task. The basis for this is to be the special case discussed on various occasions, namely, the non-endangerment of the west frontier.

The Ministry for Economics (RMI) states that the Factory File Cabinet of the Reich Office for Statistics is now available for the work of " Chemie ". It is however necessary that " Chemie " should state precisely its requirements, as, owing to the size of the file and its special arrangement, it is not possible to make a systematic copy. The Reich Ministry for Economics recommends getting into personal touch with Dr. Leisse. As the Reich War Ministry (RMI) is also interested in the matter, a general discussion is arranged to take place at the office of Dir. Leisse on 14 February 1938 at 11 o'clock.

(page 1 of original, cont'd)

Concerning the Oxygen program, it is decided now to strike an Oxygen balance. The requirement of the Wehrmacht, excluding East Prussia and including Navy, Medical Supplies Depot and civil air raid precautions, amounts to 1.7 million cbm monthly. East Prussia is treated separately.

(page 2 of original)

After communication with the firm of Linde, "Chemie" will send questionnaires to the producers who supply Oxygen to the market. Inquiries will be made concerning the capacity, on a 24 hours basis, production, own requirements and the quantities of Oxygen at free disposal. The bottleneck will probably not be in the production of Oxygen itself but in the supply of cylinders.

The question is again discussed as to whether the Hombach Works of the HLAG are in the red territory, as Hombach belongs to the municipal district of Mainz. RRG will clarify this.

The following dates for the next discussions were agreed:

15 February 1938 - 16 o'clock	Dessau Sugar Refinery
" " " 16.30 "	Nitrite Factory,
	Koeppenick
18 February 1938 - 16 o'clock	Chemische Fabrik Kalk
" " " - 17 o'clock	Scheidemandel
21 February 1938 - 16 o'clock	Chemische van Heyden
" " " - 17 o'clock	Dyck Guldenwerke

Berlin, 14th February 1938
Dr. Hy/Gst.

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

20 June 1947

I, Victoria ORTON, No. 20 129, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages and that the above is a true and correct translation of the document No. NI-8504.

Victoria ORTON
No. 20 129

I.G. Farbenindustrie
Aktiengesellschaft

Vermittlungsstelle W

Reich War Ministry
W-Stab

For the attention of Regierungsrat
Dr. MUECKE

Berlin - W 35,
Tirpitzufer 72/76

1. This is a state secret within the meaning of Article 88 of the Reich Penal Code.
2. To be handed over only under seal, or forwarded by registered mail.
3. To be kept, on the responsibility of the addressee, under lock and key.

received 4 January 1938

(tick) H(cyl) 95 G

Dr. DIETMAR/Clerk 23 December 1937

Production Schedule at Piesteritz

As agreed, we send you in enclosure the data for the production schedule of the Piesteritz works. The Bayerische Stickstoffwerke are responsible for the production of carbide, nitrogen of lime and highly concentrated nitric acid, while the plants for the manufacture of phosphorus products are subordinate to the IG Farbenindustrie A.G. management. The suggestion for the production schedule, which from the technical and administrative point of view is to be considered as a whole, has been adopted after discussion and in agreement with the Bayerische Stickstoffwerke.

Heil Hitler!

VERMITTLUNGSSTELLE W

Enclosure

Signed: DIETMAR

To the Supervisory Department for chemistry
For the attention of Dr. HEYL

REGISTER!
5:

Production-Plan

Plant Piesteritz from 1 April 1938
to 31 March 1939.

Secret!

1. This is a state secret within the meaning of Article 88 of the Reich Penal Code.
2. To be handed over only under seal, or forwarded by registered mail.
3. To be kept, on the responsibility of the addressee, under lock and key.

Serial No.:	Product	Alternative tons output per month	Average production 1936		Production tons per month	Remarks
			Quantity/month tons per month	Principal sphere of use		
1.	Carbide	14,000	13,000	Serial No. 2	13,000	full capacity limited only by electricity supply
2.	Nitrogen of lime	4,500 N	4,200 N	Fertilizer	4,200 N	
3.	Highly concentrated nitric acid	550 N	---	Explosives	550 N	wifo plant
4.	Phosphorus	1,800 P	1,500 P	Serial No. 5, 6, 7	1,600 P	120 tons per month for military use, remainder intermediate products for Serial No. 5, 6, 7.
5.	Phosphoric acid	4,100 P ₂ O ₅	3,300 P ₂ O ₅	2/3 Serial No. 6 and 7 1/3 Cleansing fluids	3,400 P ₂ O ₅	about half for technical purposes (Cleansing fluids, and half for Serial No. 6 and 7.
6.	Phosphate fertilizers	2,500 N	2,000 N	Fertilizer	2,500 1,500	Nitric acid liberation in addition to electrothermic phosphate liberation.
7.	Ammonium phosphate, industrial	200	150	Fermentation, Depreciation, Paper and Textile Industry	150	

23 December 1937
Dr. Diekmann/Werk. 6x

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT No. HI-8885
CONTINUED

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

9 July 1947

I, Arthur MACIMARA, WFO-20191, hereby certify that I am
thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages
and that the above is a true and correct translation of the original
document No. HI-8885.

Arthur MACIMARA
WFO-20191

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT No. NI-8886
OFFICE OF CHIEF OF COUNSEL FOR WAR CRIMES

(Transl. Note) Stamp
TOP SECRET

6 copies.
5th copy.

R e c o r d

of the conference on 11 January 1938 with I.G. Farbenindustrie-Aktiengesellschaft & "Chemistry" concerning the Piesteritz Plant.

Present: from the Reich War Ministry Regierungsrat Dr. MURECK,
Dr. ROMBERG,
Dr. ANGERER,

from the Reich Ministry of Economics Regierungsrat Dr. LENZ
Bergrat MURHEIM,

from the "Chemistry" Control Office Dr. UNGEWITTER,
(Ueberwachungsstelle "Chemie") Dr. Ing. HAGERT,
Dr. Ing. HEYL,

from the I.G. Farben Dipl. Ing. MEULIANN,
Dr. DIEMANN,
Dr. VOLBE.

(Transl. Note: Handwritten Marginal Note: H 118 g Rs)

	<u>Production in Case of War.</u>	<u>Remarks:</u>
1. Carbide	13,000 tons a month	of which 7,800 tons per month for item 2) 5200 tons each month for technical purposes. The Mobilization Program of the factory provides for prompt assembly of the required barrels, if necessary from Knapsack.
2. Nitrogen of lime	2,500 tons a month "N"	
3. Highly concentrated nitric acid	550 tons a month "N"	Wifo Plant
4. Phosphorus	demand for No. 5, 6 & 7 plus 50 tons per month for military purposes	The phosphorus for military purposes will be sent to Bitterfeld for refining. I.G. will furnish exact figures later.

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT No. NI-8886
CONTINUED

(page 1 of original cont'd)

- 5. Phosphate 1200 tons a month plus re-
quirements for No. 6 and 7.
- 6. Phosphate Ferti-1.500 tons a month "N" plus
lizer requirements for Nos. 6 and
7
- 7. Ammonium phosphate, 150 tons a month "N" plus
technical requirements for Nos. 6 & 7.

(page 2 of original)

When making preparations for production in case of war, in future all products that are manufactured in the plant in question are to be listed. With regard to Piesteritz I.G. will later also state the various stages of nitrogen, for instance diluted nitric acid. In the statement that has been sent in moreover the colour salts and ferrous phosphorus have been omitted.

I.G. states that the phosphorus refining plant at Bitterfeld will even then suffice when 50 tons phosphorus a month from Piesteritz will also be processed.

The planned war production for the Bitterfeld works will be changed to 200 tons a month, 50 tons of which per month to be intermediates from Piesteritz; 120 tons a month for military purposes.

Berlin, 14 January 1936
Dr. Hy/Br.

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

8 July 1947

I, Dorothy L. GALEWSKI, ETO-34079, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages and that the above is a true and correct translation of the original document No. NI-8886.

Dorothy L. GALEWSKI
ETO-34 079.

(Trans.Note: Stamp)
Top Secret Reich Matter

5 copies
5th copy

M i n u t e s

of the Discussion of 17 January 1938 concerning
mobilization requirements for the I. G. Farbenindustrie-
Aktiengesellschaft, Griesheim works at the Control
Office (Ueberwachungsstelle) "Chemistry" ("Chemie").

Present:

From the Reich War Ministry - Dr. Angerer,
Dr. Rosenberg,
from the Reich Ministry of Economics Bergrat Kurhenn,
on the part of "Chemistry" - Dr. Ungewitter
Dr. Dietrich,
Dr. Ing. Hagert,
Dr. Ing. Hoyl,
on the part of I. G. Farben - Dipl. Ing. Neumann,
Dr. Diekmann,
Dr. Eichwede,
Dr. Bruening,
Dr. Meyer.

<u>Inorganic Products</u>	<u>Mobilization Requirements</u>	<u>Remarks</u>
1. Bleaching lye	125 tons per month	
2. Iron oxide	necessary yield	I.G. will indicate the figure later.
3. Zinc oxide	" "	" "
<u>Organic Products</u>		
4. Pure benzol/pure toluol	500 tons per month	
5. Nitrobenzol	350 " "	
6. Nitrotoluol, raw, mixture	1,500 " "	
7. Nitrotoluol o-, m-, p-,	1,000 " "	
8. Dinitrotoluol (various kinds)	50 tons per month/contract	War delivery covering 1000 tons per month is on hand. Enlargement of the plant is planned.
9. Dinitrobenzol 88/89	63 tons per month	
10. o-and p-nitrochlorbenzol	I.G. requirements	(I.G. will indicate the exact figure later)
11. Dinitrochlorbenzol	500 tons per month	
12. Nitro-p-Dichlorbenzol		
13. o-, p-chlorotoluol		
14. Chlorination products		
15. Amines		
16. Benzidine/tolidine/dianisidine	I.G. requirements	I.G. will indicate the exact figure later
17. p - Nitrophenol		
18. Nitranisole		

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT No. NI-889
CONTINUED

(Page 2 of original)

<u>Product</u>	<u>Mobilization requirements</u>	<u>Remarks</u>
19. Hydroquinone other and nitrohydroquinone other)	IG will indicate exact figure later
20. Nitroorthosino and salt) I.G.	
21. Salts of bases)	
22. Various products of the benzol series)	

Various products

23. Carbon electrodes	750 tons per month
24. Anti-corrosive agents (Atrament)	30 " " "
25. Flotation chemicals	150 " " "
26. Drying agents	60 " " "
27. Cobalt salts	22 " " "
28. Stearates	15 " " "

Berlin, 21 January 1938
Dr. Hy/Hw.

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

7 July 1947

I, Dorothea L. GALEWSKI, ETO No. 34079, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages and that the above is a true and correct translation of document No. NI-8890.

DOROTHEA L. GALEWSKI
ETO-No. 34079

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT No. NI-8780
OFFICE OF CHIEF OF COUNSEL FOR WAR CRIMES

I.G. Farbenindustrie Aktiengesellschaft
Vermittlungsstelle W

Received:
28 January 1938

Ms.: V 107

Berlin NW 7
Unter den Linden 82
120021

Dr. Hirschol
I.G. Farbenindustrie Aktiengesellschaft
Frankfurt/Main - Hoechst

Secret!

*only

1. This is a state secret within the meaning of Article 88 of the Reich Penal Code.
2. To be forwarded under seal, if sent by post, to be "registered".
3. To be kept, at responsibility of addressee, under lock and key.

Your reference: your letter of: our reference:
(to be quoted when replying)
N/h

Berlin,
26 January 1938

Subject: Operational Schedules.

After consultation with the Control Office Chemistry (Ueberwachungsstelle) we should like to inform you that the second reading of the operational schedules for the Hoechst plant and the plants connected with it will most probably take place during the week following 20 February 1938. We shall let you know the exact date in about two weeks.

You will receive more detailed instructions on the treatment of the intermediate products necessary for the production of dyestuffs, from the Office of the Technical Committee.

Will you please see to it that our counter-proposals for the production schedule, if any, are completed by the given date, together with reasons for each one.

VERMITTLUNGSSTELLE W
(Signature) Neumann

Postscript: The pharmaceutical products are to be entered as 100% of last year's production. In the case of individual products, the Wehrmacht will require goods in excess of that amount. The Military Economic Staff (Wehrwirtschaftsstab) has promised to inform us of this; we shall inform you of it as soon as the report reaches us.

Signed as above

Registered!

Initialed: B

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

12 July 1947

I, BERYL C. BESWICK, No. D 427459, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages and that the above is a true and correct translation of the document No. NI-8780.

BERYL C. BESWICK, No. D 427459.

-1-
"END"

44

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT No. NI-7426
OFFICE OF CHIEF OF COUNSEL FOR WAR CRIMES

Berlin, 5 March 1938

Dear Dr. Ambros,

Further to my letter of today's date on the subject of "Huols", I should like - for the sake of completeness - to mention another point which is obvious in itself, namely the continued preparedness for mobilization in the period following 1944, that is to say at the time when the guarantees given for sales of ethylene-oxide in excess of 50,000 tons are either fulfilled or lapse.

No special mention is needed of the fact that in the event of mobilization after 1944, our mustard gas and diglycol plants will be supplied, as priority plants, and to 100 percent of their requirements, with ethylene-oxide, chlorine, electric current, steam power etc. in quantities sufficient for the production of

600 tons of Cxel - L per month
200 tons of D - L per month
600 tons of diglycol per month.

Were this not guaranteed, the plants as a whole and the money invested therein would have a very restricted value only, and a guarantee of sales for the period 1940 - 1944 would never be justified. I assume that we are all in absolute agreement on this principle.

With kind regards,

Yours,

Signature: Dr. Zahn.

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
of Document No. NI-7426

24 July 1947

I, BERYL C. BESWICK, ^{D/}427459, herewith certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of the document no. NI-7426.

BERYL C. BESWICK
D 427459

END

48

Secret!

1. This is a state secret within the meaning of Article 88 of the Reich Penal Code.
2. To be handed over only under seal, or forwarded by registered mail.
3. To be kept, on the responsibility of the addressee, under lock and key.

File Memorandum

of a discussion on 8 March 1938 in Hoechst
between

Qualified Engineer RANSFELDER, Military Economy Office
Frankfurt on Main

Dr. HIRSCHL
Dr. von BRUNNING

Herr RANSFELDER submitted 3 contracts for war supplies:

- 1) 1000 tons per month of dinitrobenzene for (Griesheim)
- 2) 65 " " " " of "acid smoke" " Hoechst
- 3) 310 " " " " " " " " Hoechst

on 1) Dr. HIRSCHL will personally get in touch with Mr. TUGGLEBARTZ.

On 2) and 3). According to the Mobilisation Plan, the Hoechst acid smoke capacity amounts to 375 tons per month. Thus the possibility of concluding these contracts for war supplies does exist. It still remains undecided how, after their conclusion, the demand for chlorosulphonic acid for Holindon-Lyes, benzenesulphonic chloride and Meinkar should be met. BRUNNING is to find out whether factory space for production of these items can be made available at short notice.

Mr. RANSFELDER asked for the following information:

Supplies held in Hoechst of alkaloide, salversen, iodine salts and bismuth salts. The following points are to be dealt with on these products.

- 1) Serial number
- 2) Dispatching center
- 3) Dispatching service
- 4) Transportation by train or ship
- 5) Loading office, siding, station
- 10) - 13) Type and quantity of vehicle needed
- 14) Shipping space needed
- 15) - 16) Necessary personnel for loading (present or to be provided)
- 17) - 18) Means of transport needed for loading (available or to be provided).

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT No. HI-8879
CONTINUED

(page 2 of original)

- 19) - 21) Time of loading: Earliest start, date of dispatch,
hour, probable loading period.
- 22) Whether or not attendant personnel are needed.
- 23) Storing place
- 24) Storing service
- 25) Unloading center
- 26) Personnel needed for unloading
- 27) Unloading period

For quantities rough averages for the year are to be taken.

Signature: BROUENING

Dr. BROUENING (arrow, initials) Handed over personally by me to Dr. FEHRLICH
on 8 March 1938

Signature: HIRSCHL

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

9 July 1947

I, Arthur MACHAMARA, WFO-20191, hereby certify that I am thoroughly
conversant with the English and German languages and that the above
is a true and correct translation of the original document No. HI-8879.

Arthur MACHAMARA.
WFO-20191

-3-
"END"

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT No. NI-8878
OFFICE OF CHIEF OF COUNSEL FOR THE C.G.

(MS) I.G. HOECHST/DIRECTORATE

12 March 1938

Rubber Stamp:

Secret !

1. This is a secret matter within the meaning of Article 33 of the Reich Penal Code.
2. To be transmitted only under cover, if sent by post, to be registered.
3. To be kept, at the responsibility of addressee, under lock and key.

To the
Military Economy Office (Lehrwirtschaftsstelle)
Attention: Major Klein or deputy.

Frankfurt/Main
Boerschenplatz

Stamp: REGISTERED

With reference to the conference with Herr Dielma-Ingenieur
KUNSPERGER on 8 March 1938 in Hoechst we inform you that the Hoechst
works are in a position to agree to the war contract (Kriegsliefer-
ungsvertrag) for

65 tons per month of smoke-producing acid
and 310 " " " " " " " "
375 tons per month of smoke-producing acid

The Griesheim works cannot express any view yet as to the Gries-
heim war contract for 1,000 tons per month of dinitrobenzene in as
much as the production capacity for dinitrobenzene with a solidifica-
tion point of 88/89 is a limited one. A final opinion can be express-
ed only after some time.

In answer to your question as regards storage transfers of alka-
loids, Salvarsan, iodine salts and bismuth salts, we note that only
stocks of Salvarsan and bismuth salt come into consideration. We
have answered the individual items of the questionnaire in the
enclosure.

Heil Hitler !

I.G. FARBEINDUSTRIE ANTIKREUZKRAFT
(stamp) (signed) BRUNNEN
signed: p.o. Brunn

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT No. NI-8878
CONTINUED

(page 2 of original)

DEPARTMENT OF THE DIRECTORATE

Please keep this carefully

The sender is requested to fill in the framed part only

RECEIPT

Subject ...1.4.... Letter* No.

C.O.D.	RM.	Rpf.	Weight	k .	p.
Value or Amount	Registered		RM		
Addressee:	Military Economy Office (Vehrwirtschaftsstelle) Attention: Major Klein or deputy				
Destina- tion:	Frankfurt / Main				

receiving Post Office

signature illegible

Stamp: Frankfurt (Main)
11 March 1938
Roachst H.

*) For explanation of abbreviations see reverse side

G 52 (1.31)
Din 476

EXTRA 12

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

11 August 1947

I, Patricia WOOD, No. 20139, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages and that the above is a true and correct translation of the document No. NI-8878.

Patricia WOOD, No. 20139

51a

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT No. NI-8774
OFFICE OF CHIEF OF COUNSEL FOR WAR CRIMES

I.G. Farbenindustrie Aktiengesellschaft
Vermittlungsstelle W

Translator's note: initial
stamp: Received check mark
14 March 1938

Berlin NW 7
Unter den Linden 82
12 00 21

SECRET

1. This is a state secret according to the meaning of Article 86, Reich Penal Code.
2. To be passed on in envelope on when mailed to be "registered"
3. Safeguarding under lock and key is receiver's responsibility

To

I.G. Farbenindustrie Aktiengesellschaft
attention: Dr. von BRUENING

Frankfurt (Main)
Hoechst.

Your reference Your letter of Our reference (give
when answering)
N./Wr.

Berlin,
12 March 1938

Gentlemen:

Subject: Planning work.

In the talks which took place in the last three months at the Ueberwachungsstelle Chemie (Control Office Chemistry), in which the Reich War Ministry and the Reich Ministry of Economics participated, the preliminary operation plans were with few exceptions determined. The operations figures were in a first approach established according to the estimated requirements of I.G. products at home and abroad; in this connection the question of how far the available raw materials, electrical energies etc. will suffice for handling the mobilization tasks set forth by the operations plans was only superficially broached.

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT No. NF-8774
CONTINUED

(page 1 of original, cont'd)

A next step in our planning must be the more exact determination of our raw materials requirement and the examination of possibilities for procuring them. We therefore request you to let us have for this purpose the raw materials requirement and the raw materials sources for the individual products covered by the operations plans and in that connection to consider the following:

- 1.) The items and quantities of the operations plans of the second version are decisive. - For items concerning dyes and initial products the determination of quantities within the frame of the proposed operations total (50% of the 1936 production) was left to I.G.;

(page 2 of original)

I.G. Farbenindustrie Aktiengesellschaft
Vermittlungsstelle W

Berlin, 12 March 1938

as soon as the break-down into the individual types of dyes have been completed we shall give you the operations figures for the dyes and initial products. Also we shall give you the operations figures for the pharmaceutical products as soon as we know the requirements of the Wehrmacht which - together with the 1936 production - constitutes the total requirement of pharmaceutical products.

- 2.) As a rule the raw materials requirements and the supply sources (name and residence of the supplier's firm) should be given for each individual item of the operations plans; this applies for all raw materials and initial products which are being supplied to the plant; small quantities can be neglected (as quantity range (Groessenordnung) we define this as: quantities smaller than 1 ton per month) provided this involves raw materials or initial products the procurement of which will cause no difficulties in the case of mobilization. If other I.G. plants are the purveyors, the name of the respective plant and not of I.G. should be given as

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT No. NI-8774
CONTINUED

(page 2 of original, cont'd)

purveyor. - If for some individual production groups it is very difficult to state the raw materials requirements for each individual item - because of the interlacing of the products among themselves - the raw materials requirement can be given summarily for the whole production group, as an exception.

Although you cannot proceed to make the complete establishment of the raw materials requirement until after you will have received the operations figures for dyes and pharmaceutical products, we already now inform you about the continuation of the mobilization work so as to

(page 3 of original)

I.G. Farbenindustrie Aktiengesellschaft
Vermittlungsstelle W

Berlin, 12 March 1938

enable you to prepare the work and to start in the departments where the raw materials requirement is not contingent upon the production of dyes and pharmaceutical products, or to an unessential degree only.

Vermittlungsstelle W
(Signature) NEUMANN

Registered

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

16 July 1947

I, H.C. KNUTH, Civ. No. 046 355, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages and that the above is a true and correct translation of the document No. NI-8774.

H.C. KNUTH,
Civ. No. 046 355

- 3 -
"END"

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT No. NI - 8773
OFFICE OF CHIEF OF COUNSEL FOR WAR CRIMES

I.G. FARBEINDUSTRIE AKTIENGESELLSCHAFT
VERMITTLUNGSSTELLE W

received:
13 April 1938

Berlin NW 7
Unter den Linden 82
120021

Dr. v. BRUENING
I.G. Farbenindustrie Aktien-
gesellschaft
for plant Hoechst

Secret !

1. This is a State secret within the meaning of article 88 of the Reich Penal Code.
2. to be transmitted only under seal, if dispatched by mail, to be registered.
3. To be kept, at responsibility of addressee under lock and key.

FRANKFURT / M. - HOECHST

Your reference:	Your letter dated:	Our reference (to be quoted when replying)	Berlin,
		N./chr.	8 April 1938

subject: Planning.

Our circular dated 12 March 1938 outlined the purpose and scope of that section of our Mobilization plan which is to be embarked upon shortly. In the following, we submit further supplementary instructions, which should enable you to go ahead with the work immediately.

In view of the fact that the Control Office Chemistry (Ueberwachungsstelle Chemie) has, on several occasions requested that the work outlined in these instructions be accelerated, we ask you kindly to complete and return the enclosed forms as soon as possible.

Enclosure

Registered !

Vermittlungsstelle W

Signature: NEUMANN

SECRET !

1. This is a State secret within the meaning of article 88 of the Reich Penal Code.
2. To be transmitted only under seal, if dispatched by mail, to "Registered."
3. To be kept, at responsibility of addresses, under lock and key.

Berlin, 8 April 1938
H./chr.

Instructions for the ascertainment of raw material and preliminary product requirements.

(Supplement to our circular dated 12 March 1938)

- 1.) In order to ascertain the raw material and preliminary product requirements of the individual I.G. plants, the enclosed forms are to be completed. The term "Raw materials", as used in these inquiries, covers all products to be obtained from outside firms with the exception of auxiliary materials; the term "preliminary products" covers products to be obtained from other production plants of the factory and all products to be obtained from other I.G. plants, with the exception of technical machine material, even if, as in the case of electrodes, they are classified as auxiliary materials; in all other instances see paragraph 2 of our circular dated 12 March.

In addition, the utilization of information given on the completed forms is to facilitate an agreement on the operational schedules of the plants within I.G., and if necessary, the proposal of modifications in the operational schedules, and to ascertain which products and what quantities of those products can be placed at the disposal of German industry by the individual plants and by the entire I.G., after deduction of their own requirements.

- 2.) A form is attached for almost every item of the provisional operational schedule discussed with the Control Office Chemistry (Ueberwachungsstelle Chemie); no forms were, however, prepared for those preliminary products, which are used exclusively by I.G. plants for the manufacture of dye-stuffs;

(Page 3 of original)

in addition summaries were prepared on dye-stuffs and pharmaceuticals; this special treatment is based on special regulations covering the control of raw materials for dye-stuffs and pharmaceuticals, which regulations are explained in the following paragraphs 5 and 6.

- 3.) In columns 2 and 3, only such preliminary products of the plant concerned are to be entered, as are listed as products in the provisional operational schedule, duly marked with an item number. If for the manufacture of a product, other preliminary products are required, - which are not listed in the operational schedule as products of the plant, because they are all, or with the exception of small, insignificant quantities processed within the plant itself, - then instead of these, the preliminary products or raw materials required for their production, and which are to be obtained from other I.G. plants or outside firms are to be entered in columns 6 and 9.
- 4.) The total of all quantities entered in columns 2 and 3 of all forms, is to represent the plant's total requirements of its own preliminary products, in as far as they are listed in the operational schedule. Similarly, the total of all quantities entered in columns 5 and 6, is to represent the plant's total requirements of preliminary products of other I.G. plants, and the total of all quantities entered in columns 8 and 9 is to represent the plant's total requirements of raw materials and preliminary products to be obtained from outside firms. Thus, raw materials or preliminary products which serve as basic material for two or more products manufactured by the same process, may be entered for one product only, a brief reference only being made to the raw material concerned in connection with the other products. For instance, in the case of electrolysis rock salt it is entered as raw material either for chlorine or for caustic soda only; if entered as raw material for chlorine, a short reference will be made to it in connection with caustic soda and hydrogen.

As can be seen from paragraph 5, the contents of this paragraph apply to dye-stuffs to a limited extent only.

- 5.) The raw material requirements for the total dye-stuffs production of I.G. as well as for the dye-stuffs production of the individual plants will be

(Page 4 of original)

ascertained by the Office of the Technical Committee the figures to be based on the distribution scheme for dye-stuffs production drawn up by this office - and a report sent to Vermittlungsstelle W. The same applies also to the most important preliminary products, which are obtained by the dye-stuffs departments of the individual factories from other plants of the factory or from other I.G. factories. Some of the items listed in the operational schedules will be used exclusively for dye-stuffs production; in accordance with paragraph 2, no forms are attached for these items. Others of the items listed in the operational schedules will be partly required for the dye-stuffs production of I.G. either within the same plant or in other I.G. plants. Forms are attached for these items, on which the total requirements of raw materials and preliminary products should be entered, including those to be used in the production of dye-stuffs. The Office of the Technical Committee will reduce the quantity of these raw materials and preliminary products in order to eliminate the share apportioned to dye-stuffs and thus to avoid double listing of raw materials and preliminary products.

- 6.) Pharmaceutical products should be handled, in conformity with the results of the investigations already conducted by Elberfeld, in the following manner:

In ascertaining raw material requirements, the pharmaceutical items, listed in the operational schedule, will at first be considered one item, to which paragraphs 3 and 4 of these instructions apply in the same manner as to the other items. The 1936 production increased by the quantities required in accordance with the war contracts now on hand, is to be entered as production for the pharmaceutical departments of the plants Elberfeld will be notified of these quantities in a special letter.

Both the Supreme Command of the Wehrmacht and the Control Office Chemistry (Ueberwachungsstelle Chemie) are aware of the inaccuracy of this provisional procedure. The exact ascertainment of mobilization requirements of pharmaceutical products, which has been embarked upon in the meantime, will still take too long, and it has now been decided, therefore to include only a minimum requirement of pharmaceutical products in the provisional general mobilization program of I.G.

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT No. NI - 8773
CONTINUED

(Page 5 of original)

By agreement with Elberfeld the forms for the pharmaceutical departments of the plants Leverkusen and Hoechst will likewise be completed by Elberfeld.

- 7.) It is desirable and recommendable for reasons of internal control to list in column 11, in addition to any notes which may be necessary, those plants of the factory, which are consumers of the products concerned, and to indicate at the same time the quantities required by those consumers, in tons per month. Thus on the Bitterfeld production form for instance the entry in column 11 for chlorine gas will read as follows:
calcium hypochlorite: 52, Iosentin: 565, ferric chloride: 100 etc...

Vermittlungstelle W
Signatur: NEUMANN

Enclosures

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

16 July 1947

I, DESWICK Beryl, Civ. No. AGO D - 427 459, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages and that the above is a true and correct translation of the document No. NI - 8773.

DESWICK Beryl,
AGO D-427 459.

- 5 -
"END"

Merseburg Ammonia Plant
Gesellschaft mit beschränkter Haftung
Luna Works (Kreis Merseburg)

(handwritten) Secret

Our Ref. Day Shoot
Legal Department 10.5.38

Management Department
Leverkusen
14 May 1938

Since the work of securing personnel for the Merseburg Ammonia Plant in case of mobilization (Mob-Fall) is more or less concluded, we would like to invite you to attend a discussion, as planned at the last meeting, to be held at our plant on Wednesday, 18 May 1938, at 10 o'clock.

The following will be discussed:

1. Securing of personnel in case of mobilization (Mob-Fall). Position as regards the work.
2. Distribution of living quarters and importance of the traffic problem.
3. Difficulties resulting from duplicate registration (Red Cross, fire service duty, security and emergency service (Sicherheits- und Hilfsdienst Reich Railroad).
4. Miscellaneous; such as, formulation of the new application form for exemption (IIIa,b,c).
5. Demonstration of the new address-printing machine in connection with a filing system (perforated card).

Please let us know whether we may expect to see you or a deputy.

Heil Hitler!

(signature) M. Mathy

(signature) Dr. Warnecke

NW

(signature) Abbey (?)

(handwritten)

Hr. Dr. Warnecke

Luna has been informed that you will be present.

Huss (?)

Won (?) - V

14.5.38 Huss (?)

(page 2 of original)

Merseburg Ammonia Plant
Gesellschaft mit beschränkter Haftung
Luna Works (Kreis Merseburg)

Our Ref. Day Shoot
Legal Department 10.5.38

Distribution

Major-General Gabeko,
Colonel Frhr. v. Duering,
Colonel Grun,
Colonel (E) Raven,

Military Reserve Review, Leipzig
Military District Halle
Military District Naumburg
Military Economic Office (Wehrwirtschaftsstelle) Halle

-1-

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT No. NI-6398
CONTINUED

(page 2 of original cont'd)

Ministerialdirektor Dr. Sarnow,	Reich Ministry of Economics
OKR Nolte,	Reich Ministry of Labor
OKR Eckelmann,	Reich Ministry of Labor
OKR Schultze,	Dresden Branch Office of the Reich Ministry of Labor
RR Gaeiner,	Dresden Branch Office of the Reich Ministry of Economics
President Gehrt. Dr. Loeblich,	Regional Labor Office, Erfurt
OKR Dr. Jordan,	Labor Office, Halle/S.
Management of Reichsbahn,	Halle/S.
Dr. Diekmann,	I.G. Farbenindustrie, Berlin
Neumann,	"
Baasch,	"
Dr. Meyer,	" ; Wolfen-Fl.;
Director von der Bey,	" ; Bitterfeld;
Director Schwanborn,	" ; Hoechst/M.;
Dr. Popp,	" ; Leverkusen,
Dr. Moll;	I.G. Farbenindustrie, Ludwigshafen
Dr. Ross,	I.G. Farbenindustrie, Wolfen
Dr. Hoening,	Buna Works, GmbH., Schkopau

(page 3 of original)

Participants

in the discussion of 18.5.1938 at the Leuna Plants.

Major General Gabeke }	Military Reserve Inspection
Major v. Bomhard }	Leipzig
Major (E) Albrand }	Military District, Halle/S
Major (retired) Hertzberg }	
Captain Schall }	Military District, Naumburg/S
Colonel Raven }	Military Economic Office
Lieut.-Commander Ing. Rothstock }	(Wehrwirtschaftsstelle) District Hall S.
Captain v. Haugk,	Military Economic Office (Wehrwirtschaftsstelle) District Leipzig
Major Noef,	Military Economic Staff (Wehrwirtschaftsstab) Berlin
RR Gaeiner }	Dresden Branch Office of the Reich Ministry of Economics
D.-Ing. Klare }	Dresden Branch Office of the Reich Ministry of Labor
OKR Schultze }	Regional Labor Office, Erfurt
Director Kuchne }	
RR D.-Ing. Tuebber }	Labor Office, Halle/S
OKR Jordan }	
RR Raith }	Management of Reichsbahn, Halle/S.
ROH Bracuningor }	Buna Works, Schkopau
Dr. Hoenig }	
Dr. Diekmann }	I.G., Vermittlungsstelle W, Berlin
D.-Ing. Neumann }	
Baasch }	I.G., Bitterfeld
Director von der Bey }	
Boehm }	
Houser }	I.G. Frankfurt-Hoechst
Dr. Warnocko }	I.G. Leverkusen
Dr. Moll }	I.G. Ludwigshafen
Dr. Meyer }	I.G.; Sparte III, Wolfen
Dr. Ross }	I.G., Wolfen
v. Dohn-Rotfelsor,	Leuna
Dr. Polster,	Leuna
Dr. Schwarzkopf,	Leuna

(page 3 of original cont'd)

Mathy,
Goessler,

Louna
Louna

(page 4 of original)

List of persons present

serial No.	Plant	Name
1.	Bitterfeld	Dr. Vorlaender
2.		Boehra
3.	Hoechst	Dr. Hirschel
4.	Leverkusen	Dr. Warnecke
5.	Ludwigshafen	Dir. Dr. Mohner
6.		Dr. Moll
7.	Hersburg	Dr. Schwartzkopf
8.		Mathy
9.		v. Dohn Rotfelson
10.	Oppau	Dipl. Ing. Irgang
11.		Kuhn
12.	Wolfen-Film	Dr. Meyer
13.		Dr. Ross
14.	Management Office, Sparte I	Dr. Goldberg
15.	Stand-by Plants	Dr. Duellberg
16.	Vermittlungsstelle W Security (Abwehr)	Faubel
17.	Sparte I	Dr. Dickmann
18.		Dr. Pfandlor
19.	Sparte II	Dr. Gorr
20.		Dr. Kaiser
21.		Dr. Wagner

(page 5 of original)

Program

of the discussion on mobilization planning to be held on 15.3.1939
at Berlin NW 7, Unter den Linden 82.

1. General military economic preparations of various nations
.....Dr. Dickmann
2. Preparations for mobilization by German Industry.
State of mobilization preparations at the I.G. Plants
.....Dr. Kayser
3. Preparation for mobilization and protection of plants against
air attack.
Transportation problemsDr. Pfandlor
4. Securing of personnelDr. Vorlaender
5. Preparations for mobilization and security matters
.....Faubel

(page 5 of original cont'd)

6. Preparatory work for the smooth change over of our plants from
peace time production to mobilization production.
Mobilization order;
Change of shifts;
Transportation for employees;
Change of quarters Dr. Schwarzkopf.
-

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

19 June 1947

I, VICTORIA ORTON, No. 20129, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages and that the above is a true and correct translation of the document No. NI-6398.

.....
VICTORIA ORTON, No. 20129.

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT No. NI-8/75
OFFICE OF CHIEF OF COUNSEL FOR WAR CRIMES

I.G. Farbenindustrie Aktiengesellschaft
Vermittlungsstelle W

Rubber Stamp
In: 14 June 1938

Berlin NW 7
Unter den Linden 82
120021

Rubber Stamp: Secret!

1. This is a state secret within the meaning of article 88 of the Reich Penal Code.
2. To be forwarded only under seal, if sent by post, as "registered".
3. To be kept, at responsibility of addressee, under lock and key.

To:
Dr. G. von Bruchning
I.G. Farbenindustrie A.G.
Frankfurt (Main) - Hoechst

Your reference Your letter of our reference (to be Berlin,
quoted in your answer) 11 June 1938
H/Sch.

Subject: Planning.

The correlation which has taken place in the meantime, of the output figures established by the Economic Group Chemical Industry, with I.G.'s own consumption, has shown the following:

- I. In the case of several products, the requirements of I.G. works are greater than the output of the works producing the product in question, or - if only one plant produces the product in question - greater than the output of this one plant. In this case the output figures must be adapted to the requirement of the plants. - In many cases it has proved expedient for various reasons, to undertake, without necessitating the alteration of I.G. production as a whole, a regulation of production, whereby the output figures for a product were raised in one plant and correspondingly lowered in another plant. The adjustments affecting your plant, as indicated in I. above are listed in enclosure 1. Please make the necessary alterations in your records.
- II. In many cases, the list of the raw materials and preliminary products required by individual I.G. works for the fulfillment of the mobilization plan, has registered requests to another plant for preliminary products

(page 2 of original)

which were not quoted as items in the operational schedule of this plant. These preliminary products will also have to be quoted in the operational schedule from now on. The new items proscribed for your plant as a result of these measures are listed in enclosure 2. The quantities quoted include

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT No. NI-8775
CONTINUED

(page 2 of original cont'd)

only the demands made by other I.G. works on your plant. The requirements of your own plant of the preliminary product concerned are to be added, and the sum of the two to be entered as the total output-figures. We enclose blank forms for the new items with the request that you return one copy of these to us as soon as possible, having entered the production figures, production potential and raw material and preliminary product requirements.

- III. All demands on the Ludwigshafen and Oppau plants must be transferred to other plants. The preliminary products requested by your plant from Ludwigshafen and Oppau are listed in enclosure 3. Please let us know the following:
- a) Can another plant (be it I.G. plant or outside firm) be considered for the supply?
 - b) If question a) is answered in the negative, can another preliminary product be used instead of the requested one, a product which does not have to be drawn from Ludwigshafen or Oppau? Which preliminary product can be considered as substitute and which firm could conveniently supply it?
 - c) If questions a) and b) are answered in the negative, is there any other possibility of keeping pace with the mobilization program without the help of the preliminary products requested from Ludwigshafen and Oppau? Of what does this possibility consist?

Should consideration of the instructions explained under I. - III. entail considerable alterations to the forms sent to us, drafted with a view to determining the raw materials and preliminary products required for the execution of the mobilization program,

(page 3 of original)

we request you to communicate these alterations to us in detail. We ask you also to note that if, in accordance with paragraph II., new forms have to be filled in, in many cases in which supplies of the preliminary product concerned are required for your own use, the raw materials and preliminary products appearing on these new blanks will have to be deducted proportionally from the blanks previously filled in.

Will you please make the alterations arising out of the above as soon as possible? The undersigned will contact you within the next few days to arrange a date for the delivery of the required documents.

Enclosures

Vermittlungsstelle W
(Signature) Neumann

Registered

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

11 July 1947

I, BERYL C. BESICK, No. D 427459, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages and that the above is a true and correct translation of the document No. NI-8775.

BERYL C. BESICK, No. D 427459.

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT No. NI-7427
OFFICE OF CHIEF OF COUNSEL FOR WAR CRIMES

High Command of the Army
File No. 74 o 29 - 17 Ordnance Office
J Armament 9 VII
No. 717/38 topsecret

OV

Berlin / 35, 25 June 1938
Tirpitzufer 72 - 76
Telephone: 310012

(Please quote above reference No.,
in reply date and subject.

in pencil: confirmed
12 July 1938 /Dr. Bock/S.

(Rubber stamp);

TOP SECRET!

1. This is a state secret within the meaning of Article 88 of the Reich Penal Code.
2. Only to be handed over personally^{or} delivered, under double cover against receipt, to a personal address.
3. To be forwarded, if possible, by courier or a trustworthy person; if sent by post, value to be quoted as over RM 1,000.--
4. Duplication of every sort including preparation of excerpts forbidden.
5. To be kept, at responsibility of addressee in a safe, in exceptional cases in a steel cabinet with combination-lock.
6. Offences against these orders will result in most severe punishment.

To the
I.G. Farbenindustrie A.G.
Ludwigshafen plant
for the attention of Director Dr. AMBROS
or deputy
Ludwigshafen/Rhine

(stamp):

In: 30 June 1938
Vermittlungsstelle /
Out: 30 June 1938

PRELIMINARY INSTRUCTIONS.

Subject: Project "SCHKOPAU".
Order No. 9/VII-247-0104/38.

The High Command of the Army refers to the various preliminary discussions which have taken place between Director Dr. Ambros, Dr. BOCKLER and Dr. JITTNER as well as Ministerialrat Dr. ZAHN, and confirms that for the purpose of the defense of the country the setting up of mobilization stand-by plants for the following products is necessary:

- 1.) Ethylene factory
- 2.) Concentration plant for hydrogenation ethylene according to Lindo
- 3.) Refrigeration plant for the production of brine for the works and the Lindo installation
- 4.) Ethylene oxide plant with a production capacity of 500 tons per month
- 5.) Diglycol plant with a production capacity of 500 tons per month (described on the plan as glycoline plant)
- 6.) The storage tanks and transformer station necessary for that purpose.

Your Schkepsu plant has been proposed as the place to set up these emergency plants, that is, the "glycol block" between the factory lanes IV - V - F - G according to the building layout Ae 3044 - 2, which you submitted.

(page 2 of original)

You are herewith given the order to carry out the following projects:

- The construction of the ethylene factory is to be postponed until about September, when the experiments in connection with the production of ethylene from acetylene will be completed and when it can be decided whether alcohol or acetylene will be finally accepted as ethylene basis.

(page 2 of original, cont'd)

For a speedy execution of these projects you are requested to submit the necessary plans and estimates as soon as possible. The iron and steel requirements necessary for these projects have to be determined as quickly as possible.

The fence for the terrain in question - if necessary and not yet existent - the levelling and clearing of the ground, the building of factory lanes and sidings as well as other preparatory construction work etc. have to be commenced immediately under approval by Ordnance Office J Paragraph 9.

For the entire execution of the building project, the directives of the cover agreement to be concluded, or the arrangements of the individual agreements to be concluded on the basis of the cover agreement, are the authoritative basis. Among others the following will be laid down in the cover agreement:

- 1.) For the orders to be given by you three estimates should be obtained in each case, if it does not involve special qualities. The lowest estimate is to be considered; if this cannot be used the reason must be stated.

(page 3 of original)

- 2.) Payments will be made to you, on the basis of provisional claims to the extent to which you yourself have to make payments, by treasury bonds as per leaflet 1938 attached.
- 3.) The Price Control Office of the Army High Command shall be entitled to check the prices prior to final settlement. This check shall be carried out through submission of the entry vouchers, the original invoices of third parties and on proof of the actual costs according to the cost price estimates.
- 4.) The public invitation to submit tenders, the execution and settlement of the construction work are to be based on the directives relating to the execution of public orders for construction work.

As soon as the location and the design of the building to be erected have been laid down and checked by the High Command of the Army, the approval for its execution has to be obtained from the competent military and civilian offices for air raid protection.

Written confirmation of these preliminary instruction is requested.

initialled Zu.

1 Enclosure (Leaflet 1935)

By order of
(signature) illegible

for REER
GUEL
BOEHLER
(illegible)
WITTLER
WULF
BIESENHOFF

(page 4 of original)

Enclosure to No. 717/38 top secret
Ordinance Office J. Arrvment 9

March 1938 edition

Leaflet 1938

relating to Treasury Bonds for Bonds Delivered.

1. General

From 1 April 1938 on the supplier receives for supplies paid for up to now under the MEFO-procedure a treasury bond payable after approx. 6 months - so-called delivery treasury bonds. The interest for the validity period of the treasury bonds is payable when they are issued.

In case the supplier is forced to sell the treasury bonds in order to make working capital available, the possibility for realization is guaranteed owing to the present capacity of the market to absorb them. The banks and other credit institutions have been informed.

2. Ordering of the Treasury Bonds (Treasury Bonds for Bonds Delivered).

a) Debtor: The German Reich, represented by the Administration of Reich Debts in Berlin,

b) Creditor: The bearer of the treasury bond,

c) Transfer: As the treasury bond is a bearer's bond and not a bill of exchange it must not be marked in case of a transfer with a giro endorsement or any other note indicating a transfer. The name of the supplier serves economic statistical purposes and is of no importance in regard to the rights from the treasury bond.

d) Pay Office: Reichsschuldenkasse in Berlin, Odenstr. 106-109.

e) Amount: The treasury bonds are made out for:

5.000.-- RM
10.000.-- RM
50.000.-- RM
100.000.-- RM
500.000.-- RM
1.000.000.-- RM

(page 5 of original)

3. Submission of the invoices and dispatch of the treasury bonds.

The supplier submits his invoice to the office which has given the order, stating

- a) where the treasury bonds are to be sent,
- b) where (to which account) the remaining amount and the interest have to be transferred. *)

Submission to other offices is likely to cause delays.

After the invoice has been checked the Metallurgische Versuchungsgesellschaft m. b. H., Berlin NW 7, Dorotheenstr. 4, dispatches the treasury bonds. The creditor also receives the remaining amount of the claim and the interest (3% per annum).

4. Maturity
bonds

The treasury bonds become payable on the 20th of the 6th month after the month in which they were issued and are redeemed at their nominal value by the Reichsschuldenkasse in Berlin.

5. Expenses

No expenses occur to the supplier through the issue, forwarding of the treasury bond and immediate redemption of the treasury bond at the Reichsschuldenkasse.

6. Security

The Reich is security for the treasury bonds in accordance with the law relating to Reich debts of 13 February 1924 (Reich Law Gazette I page 95).

7. Sample Form

Following is a copy of the treasury bond.

*) Remaining amount is the amount which remains after rounding off downwards the amount invoiced to the nearest even RM 5.000.--

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT No. NI-7427
CONTINUED

Due on 20 October 1938

(page 6 of original)
1 000 000 RM

Series L 4 Lit. A No. 0000

Treasury Bond of the German Reich issue 1938, bearing no interest
Issued on the basis of the law of 19 February 1935 (Reich Law Gazette I,
page 198).

The Reichsschuldenkasse in Berlin pays the bearer of this Treasury Bond for Goods Delivered on 20 Oct.
1938

ONE MILLION REICHSMARK

Berlin, 1 April 1938

Reichsschuldenverwaltung

(Signatures).

Series L 4
Lit. A
No. 0000

Issued to

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT No. NI-7427
CONTINUED

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT No. NI-7427
CONTINUED

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

8 August 1947

I, Brigitte TURK, Civ. No. 35 130, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages and that the above is a true and correct translation of the original document No. NI-7427.

.....
Brigitte TURK
Civ. No. 35 130.

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT No. NI-7428
OFFICE OF CHIEF OF COUNSEL FOR WAR CRIMES

Dr. C. KRAUCH

Berlin W9, 26 August 1938
Sackendstr. 128

(stamp):

Dr. C. KRAUCH
Plenipotentiary of
Ministerpräsident
Fieldmarshal Goering
for Special Problems of
Chemical Production

in pencil: Confirmed on 5 Sept. 1938

OV initial: IK

To

I.G. Farbenindustrie A.G.

LUDWIGSHAFEN / Rhine

Subject: Diglycol Expansion, Ethylene Experimental Plant
Sodingen, D-L Experiments.

In accordance with the decision of Fieldmarshal GOERING of 22 August 1938 I give you the additional information that the building projects for diglycol expansion, ethylene experimental plant Sodingen, D-L experiments (translator's note: direct-mustard gas ?) have been classified as pressing, urgent building projects, for which no postponement of the deadline set for their completion can be tolerated.

Fieldmarshal GOERING has appointed me his plenipotentiary in this sphere of work. My task is

"most emphatically to further the execution of the production programs, constantly to control the work necessary to carry this out, to remove all obstacles which might arise, as quickly as possible and to create all conditions necessary to carry on the work in accordance with instructions".

Some time ago you already received an order from the Army Ordnance Office for the expansion of the plants mentioned above.

I am responsible for the procurement of the steel, the funds and the workers as well as the supervision of the construction work.

Individual settlements with you in your capacity as trustee as well as individual allocation of steel will also in future be made in the same manner used hitherto by the High Command of the Army, Ordnance Office.

For the orders in regard to the building projects mentioned above a special code-number will be supplied, which I shall make available to you exclusively for the orders pertaining to the building projects mentioned above.

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT No. NI-7428
CONTINUED

(page 2 of original)

You are responsible to me for misuse of the code-number.

The iron producing and iron processing industry has been instructed by the Control Office Iron and Steel (Ueberwachungsstelle fuer Eisen und Stahl), that all orders bearing a code-number have priority over all inland orders. In case your orders interfere with the suppliers' export orders I request you to contact me at once in order to clarify immediately the case in question with the consent of the Reich Ministry of Economics and to decide the sequence of execution.

I have created a building staff to assist me and charged Dr. AHL with the management of the work in the field mentioned above.

Furthermore, I have commissioned Dr. Max JITTNER, Ludwigshafen/Rhine with the technical advice and supervision of all building projects in the sphere of organic-chemical preliminary products, with the consent of the High Command of the Army (He) and the Supreme Command of the Wehrmacht (Stb). Dr. JITTNER is responsible to me for the correct planning of the output and technical procedures, and he has to provide for the technically expedient execution of the projects in regard to location and the layout of the factory. He has to advise and support you continually on the construction of the plants. Basic changes and expansions of the plants have to be discussed beforehand by you with Dr. JITTNER.

I request you to name the technician in charge whom you have charged with the construction of the plants mentioned above. He is responsible for the completion of projects at the given date and has to inform Dr. JITTNER or Dr. AHL respectively at once of possible obstacles such as delivery delays, difficulties in negotiations with the authorities etc. and keep him currently informed.

(page 3 of original)

I also should like to mention that in accordance with an order by the Field Marshal future planning will take place under my direction in close co-operation with the Wehrmacht, and I therefore request you immediately to inform me in future of any questions arising in the field of production of organic-chemical preliminary products. The questions will then be dealt with in closest collaboration with the Wehrmacht offices concerned.

Heil Hitler!

(signature) Dr. C. KRAUCH.

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT No. NI-7428
CONTINUED

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

8 August 1947

I, Brigitte TURK, Civ. No. 35 130, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages and that the above is a true and correct translation of the original document No. NI- 7428.

.....
Brigitte TURK
Civ.No. 35 130.

Secret !

1. This is a state secret within the meaning of Article 88 of the Reich Penal Code.
2. To be handed on only under cover, if sent by post, to be registered.
3. To be kept, at responsibility of addressee, under lock and key.

Berlin, 6 September 1938
N/Sch

Direction for the continuation of planning work

After the coordination of the operational schedule of I.G. has been carried out with the help of the raw materials and preliminary products requirement sheets submitted by the plants, the operational schedules will be sent to the plants in the form of a mobilization plan. To the mobilization plan will be added 8 enclosures, which will serve primarily for the listing of raw materials, auxiliary materials, fuel, transport and power requirements. On the subject of this work, which, on the instructions of the Supreme Command of the Wehrmacht and the Reich Commissioner for Chemistry, must be completed with the utmost speed, we make the following observations:

1. Assessment of raw material requirements

Raw materials in this connection comprise the actual raw materials and the preliminary products, which were dealt with individually in our circular letter of 8 April 1938. The raw material requirements, of which a census has already been taken by the Vermittlungsstelle W as a basis for the internal coordination of the plants, will be set out by the Vermittlungsstelle W on the prescribed forms. As various changes have arisen as a result of internal coordination, we will submit the completed forms to the plants for a final revision before handing them over to the Reich Commissioner for Chemistry.

2. Assessment of the auxiliary material requirements.

While the raw material requirements must be broken down according to individual items or related groups of raw material items in the Mobilization Plan, it will be sufficient to assess the auxiliary material requirements for all items in the Mobilization Plan as a whole. As the auxiliary material requirement really depends in part on the number and type of interruptions which occur in the normal course of production, this can be estimated only very approximately. The

(page 2 of original)

average rate of consumption in individual plants is not likely to vary appreciably during the war. Thus an estimate can be made on the basis of the peace time ratio; it will be most suitable to work on the average quantities for 1937, expressed in monthly amounts and rounded off to the nearest higher integer.

The appended list can be used as a guideline for the breakdown of auxiliary materials; this list comprises the raw materials in groups according to spheres of supervision. This breakdown has been recognized as suitable by the authorities.

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT No. NI-8601
CONTINUED

(page 2 of original cont'd)

As the peace-time requirement is to be taken as a basis, this work can be begun at once. Please inform us if it is believed in individual works that in consequence of major changes, decrease or increase of production, the auxiliary material requirement cannot be gauged on the basis of the peace-time requirement.

(MS marginal) Notes on the back of the form should be made only on those auxiliary materials whose production in the event of mobilization involves "considerable" difficulties.

3. Assessment of fuel requirements.

The fuel requirement, like the auxiliary material requirement, will be assessed for all items in the mobilization plan as a whole; it is dependant on the power requirement (see point 5).

4. Transportation requirements.

Transportation requirement is to be subdivided according to the goods to be transported.

When the full quantities of transportation required cannot be expressed on a 24 hour basis, an appropriately longer space of time is to be taken as a reference period, e.g. 3 freight cars in 2 days.

Instruction 3 on the back of page 6, which will be appended to the Mobilization Plan, means that only those vehicles which are required in addition to those owned by I.G. are to be indicated as a requirement. If, however, larger shipments

(page 3 of original)

with I.G.-owned vehicles are contemplated; then, in order to ensure the availability of the necessary locomotives, the number of the I.G.-owned vehicles to be moved should also be given on a separate sheet.

5. Power requirement.

The power requirement is to be assessed for all items of the Mobilization Plan.

Notes for the treatment of sheets 8 and 9, which are enclosed as appendices to the Mobilization Plan, will follow shortly.

1 Enclosure.

VERMITTLUNGSSTELLE 7
Signature: Neumann.

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

11. July 1947

I, ARTHUR MICHELLER, Civ. No. 20191, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages and that the above is a true and correct translation of the document No. NI-8601.

ARTHUR MICHELLER, Civ. No. 20191.

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT No. NI-8889
OFFICE OF CHIEF OF COUNSEL FOR WAR CRIMES

9 September 1938.
Bo/Kr.

Stamp: Secret!

1. This is a state secret within the meaning of article 88 of the Reich Penal Code.
2. To be transmitted in sealed envelope only; if sent by post, to be REGISTERED.
3. To be kept, at the responsibility of the addressee, under lock and key.

To: Dr. ENGELBERTZ Griesheim
Dr. KRAUSS Mainkur
Dipl. Ing. KOCH Offenbach

I enclose one copy each of the regulations for the handling of mobilization contracts, war contracts and war sub-contracts. The regulations have been worked out by the Vermittlungsstelle W in co-operation with the appropriate authorities in order to guarantee the uniform handling within the I.G. of all such orders, the number of which will increase in the future.

Signature: HIRSCHEL

1 enclosure !

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT No. NI-8889
CONTINUED

(page 2 of original)

I.G. Hoechst
Department of the Directorate T

Secret!

Receipt

....1... document in original "copy" deleted
 copy in original

with regulations and schedule

from ..I.G..Frankfurt/Main..Hoechst,.Department.....

.....of.the.Direcatorate.T.....

to ..Dr..ENGELBERTZ,.Griesheim.....

dated ..9.September.1938 Reference ..Bo/Kr.....

Subject ..Regulations.for.the.handling.of.mobilization

.....contracts.....

received ..10.September.1938

to: Dr. ENGELBERTZ

(Signature:).ENGELBERTZ....

signature

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT No. NI-8889
CONTINUED

(page 2 of original, cont'd)

I.G. Hoechst
Department of the Directorate T

Secret!

Receipt

.....1.... document in original
 copy "copy" deleted
 in original

with regulations and schedule

I.G. Frankfurt/Main - Hoechst, Department
from:
 of the Directorate T.....
to Dr. KRAUSS, Mainkur.....
dated 9 September 1938 Reference Bo/Kr.....
Subject Regulations for the handling of
 mobilization contracts
received 10 September 1938.....

(Signature:) Dr. C. KRAUSS
.....

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT No. NI-8889
CONTINUED

(page 2 of original, cont'd)

I.G. Hoechst
Department of the Directorate T

Secret!

Receipt

.....¹..... document in original "copy" deleted
 copy in original

with regulations and schedule

from I.G. Frankfurt/Main - Hoechst, Department
 of the Directorate T

to Dipl. Ing. KOCH, Offenbach

dated 9 September 1938 Reference Bo/Kr.

Subject Regulations for the handling of
 mobilization contracts

received 10 September 1938

(Signature:) for i.v.
 VEIGMANN

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT No. NI-8889
CONTINUED

(page 3 of original)

I.G. Farbenindustrie Aktiengesellschaft
Vermittlungsstelle W
BERLIN NW 7, UNTER DEN LINDEN 82
Telephone: 120021

STAMP: Secret!

To:
Director Dr. v. BRUENING
I.G. Farbenindustrie Aktiengesell-
schaft

Frankfurt/Main - HÖCHST.

1. This is a state secret within the meaning of article 88 of the Reich Penal Code.
2. To be transmitted in sealed envelope only; if SENT BY POST, to be REGISTERED.
3. To be kept, at the responsibility of the addressee, under lock and key.

Your reference	Your letter of	Our reference (to be quoted in the reply) N/soc.
	Berlin, 6 September 1938	
Subject: Handling of mobilization contracts, war contracts and war sub-contracts.		

The mobilization contracts (Mob-Auf-
trage) war contracts (Kriegslieferungs-
vertrage, KLV) and war sub-contracts
(Unterlieferungsvertrage, ULV)
define I.G.'s obligations either direct

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT No. NI-8889
CONTINUED

(page 3 of original, cont'd)

(mobilization contracts, and war contracts,) or indirect (war sub-contracts) towards the Wehrmacht.

The fact that an ever-increasing number of such mobilization contracts, war contracts and war sub-contracts is to be expected, makes it appear expedient to prescribe uniform handling within the I.G.

We enclose, therefore, regulations compiled with due regard to the instructions recently issued and request you to act in accordance with these regulations.

VERMITTLUNGSSTELLE W

Ms: The copies of this letter addressed to the Maingau Works were destroyed since the regulations were sent, with a separate covering letter, to the 3 confidential agents (Vertrauenspersonen) by Dr. HIRSCHEL.

signature:
NEUMANN

9./9. W.

1 Enclosure.

Stamp: Registered!

(page 4 of original)

STAMP: Secret!

1. This is a STATE SECRET within the meaning of article 88 of the Reich Penal Code.
2. To be transmitted in sealed envelope only; if sent by post, to be REGISTERED.
3. To be kept, at the responsibility of the addressee, under lock and key.

GENERAL REGULATIONS

for the Handling of Mobilization Contracts,
war contracts, and War Sub-Contracts.

- 1) The definition of the terms "operational schedule and mobilization tasks" on the one hand and "mobilization contracts, war contracts (KLV), and war sub-contracts (ULV)" on the other.

The operational schedules which have been worked out during the last few months in collaboration with the plants assume, for the plants, the character of Government orders as soon as they reach the plants in the form of mobilization commissions.

The mobilization tasks constitute the total claims made on the production capacity of the plant concerned; they represent the sum total of the estimated direct and indirect requirements of the Wehrmacht, the estimated civilian requirements for home consumption and the estimated export requirements.

(page 4 of original, cont'd)

Whereas the mobilization tasks are to be considered as comprehensive production programs for the plants in the event of mobilization, mobilization contracts, war contracts (KLV) and war sub-contracts (ULV) are concluded for specific products and represent binding agreements for the delivery and acceptance of goods. The direct demands made by the Wehrmacht on armament factories are specified and fixed in mobilization contracts, the direct demands made by the Wehrmacht on plants set up for war-time production (KL-Betriebe) are specified and fixed in war contracts. By indirect requirements of the Wehrmacht is understood those orders which are given to other firms by armament factories (R-Betriebe) in order to fulfill their own mobilization contracts and by plants set up for war-time production (KL-Betriebe) in order to fulfill their war contracts; as a rule, they are specified and fixed in war sub-contracts (ULV).

The total of mobilization contracts, war contracts and war sub-contracts includes neither the requirements of the civilian sector of industry nor supply for export. Whereas the placing of mobilization contracts for our plants is almost complete, war contracts have so far been issued by individual Wehrmacht offices and for individual products only; similarly,

MS: illeg-
ible,
possibly:
"with us
for
artificial
fog
only"

(page 5 of original)

only a small number of war sub-contracts have been received. We must therefore expect to receive further war contracts and war sub-contracts (KLV and ULV).

The total of the mobilization contracts, war contracts and war sub-contracts even if complete, will form only part, but the most important part of the mobilization task of the plants set up for war-time production.

(page 5 of original, cont'd)

2) Duties of the Vermittlungsstelle W

By order of OKW, all mobilization contracts and war contracts destined for I.G. are in future to be submitted to the Military Economy Staff (W-Stab) and by then to the Vermittlungsstelle W for examination.

It is the responsibility of Vermittlungsstelle W to examine, in collaboration with the appropriate departments of I.G., the proposed operational schedules (Belegungen) as to their feasibility, to distribute, if necessary, the sum total of jobs (Gesamtbelegung) among the various plants and to draw up analysis sheets of all mobilization contracts and war contracts. After examination, the mobilization contracts and war contracts will be forwarded to the appropriate War Economy Inspectorate and from there, to the plants. In the case of armaments plants, they will go direct, and in the case of plants set up for war-production, by way of the Branch Offices of the Reich Ministry of Economics.

In order to obtain a complete survey of all the obligations of the I.G. in the event of war, the Vermittlungsstelle W is also to be kept informed of all existing war sub-contracts. For this reason, the plants and the sales departments are requested to report all war sub-contracts now placed, to Vermittlungsstelle W and to inform Vermittlungsstelle W in future of all war sub-contracts received before work on them is commenced.

MS marginal:
Sovinal
(?Sorinal?)
plastic material
116 for example
is delivered by
us to armament
factories and
plants set up
for war-time
production;
Frankfurt/Main
20 (?) would
know that it
would have to
submit any
contracts to the
Vermittlungsstelle.

3) Duties of the mobilization offices in the plants.

Although Vermittlungsstelle W examines the mobilization contracts,

(page 6 of original)

war contracts and war sub-contracts as soon as they are submitted for the first time, in order to place and distribute them, (see paragraph 2) the mobilization office is to re-examine the mobilization contracts, war contracts and war sub-contracts when they arrive. (For this purpose, we propose the use of analysis sheets on the lines of the attached specimen which has proved useful in the work of the Vermittlungsstelle W). For this examination, it is necessary to know the demands made upon the particular plant by other I.G. works for the purpose of carrying out their own operational schedule; the relevant papers will be supplied to the mobilization offices by the Vermittlungsstelle W. If the examination shows that the mobilization contract, war contract or war sub-contract can be carried out, the following measures are to be taken:

- a) Mobilization contracts. The branch of the Wehrmacht which places the order will issue instructions as to the form in which confirmation of the fact that the order can be carried out is to be given. Such confirmation is to be reported immediately to the chief of the sales department and to Vermittlungsstelle W.
- b) War contracts. Confirmation of the fact that the contract can be carried out is given by the appendage of the necessary signatures and the return of all copies to the Office proscribed in the contract. The signatures are to be those of the manager of the plant which is to carry out the contract and the chief of the sales department concerned or their deputies. The mobilization office is, therefore, to get in touch not only with the manager of the plant but also with the chief of the sales department concerned. The war contract becomes valid only when a copy of the contract normally the second one, is returned to the plant. This copy is to be kept at the plant. The chief of the sales department concerned and Vermittlungsstelle W are to be informed when the war contract becomes valid.

MS: This has
not as yet
occurred

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT No. NI-8889
CONTINUED

(page 6 of original, cont'd)

- c) War sub-contracts become valid as soon as the prescribed form confirming the fact that the contract can be carried out is returned, duly signed. Whereas the Wehrmacht or a branch

(page 7 of original)

of the Wehrmacht is the customer in mobilization contracts and war contracts, individual armaments factories ~~plants set up for war-time production~~ plants are the customers in war sub-contracts. On the one hand, therefore, there will be far more war sub-contracts than mobilization or war contracts; on the other, they will be for small, frequently even very small quantities. In many cases, war sub-contracts will be placed by firms which were supplied by I.G. with the same products in peacetime as well. For this reason, the war sub-contracts are to be sent by the Vermittlungsstelle to the plants via the sales departments which distribute them among the various plants. The confirmation of the fact that the contract can be carried out will be sent back, signed by the plant manager or his deputy, to Vermittlungsstelle W via the sales department concerned.

If it appears that a mobilization contract, war contract or war sub-contract cannot be carried out, this fact is to be reported to Vermittlungsstelle W and its reply awaited.

4) Duties of the Chiefs of Sales Departments.

(MS marginal illegible) The sales departments too are to examine the question of whether the mobilization contract, war contract or war sub-contract can be carried out, as soon as they receive the appropriate notification. No. 3, paragraph 1 of these regulations applies in this case as well.

If, as a result of the examination, it appears that the mobilization contract, war contract or war sub-contract can be carried out, the following measures are to be taken:

(page 7 of original, cont'd)

- a) Mobilization Contracts. The plant with which the mobilization contract is placed, and which duly notifies the sales department thereof, is to receive acknowledgment of the said notification.
- b) War contracts are to be duly signed by the chief of the department or his deputy. If price control schedules which cannot be accepted, are attached, application for alteration of the prices is to be made. Such alteration is, however, not necessary in the case of insignificant differences between the current market price and the price quoted in the price control schedule, since these prices are to be considered as

(page 8 of original)

provisional standard prices. If prices should change considerably after the contracts have become valid, application for adjustment of the price control schedules is to be made via Vermittlungsstelle before the 1 April of each year.

The war contract is to be returned, duly signed, to the plant from which it was originally sent in.

- c) War sub-contracts which are sent by Vermittlungsstelle W direct to the sales departments are to be distributed among the plants manufacturing the products in question; the actual war sub-contract agreements are then to be sent to these plants.

The contract having been returned by the plant to the sales department, the second signature is to be appended there. The contract is then to be dispatched to Vermittlungsstelle W.

Should it transpire that it is impossible to carry out the mobilization contract, war contract or war sub-contract, this

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT No. NI-8889
CONTINUED

(page 8 of original, cont'd)

fact is to be reported to Vermittlungsstelle W, and
its reply awaited.

VERMITTLUNGSSTELLE W

signature: NEUMANN

1 enclosure.

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

10 July 1947

I, Beryl BESWICK, Civ., AGO-D 427 459, hereby certify
that I am thoroughly conversant with the English
and German languages and that the above is a true
and correct translation of the document No. NI-8889.

Beryl BESWICK
Civ., AGO-D 427 459

-13-
"END"

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT No. NI-7267
OFFICE OF CHIEF OF COUNSEL FOR MR. CMI

I.G. Farbenindustrie Aktiengesellschaft
Vermittlungsstelle W

Received
12 Sep. 1938
Berlin NW 7
Unter den Linden 82
120021

Herrn
Direktor Dr. von Bruening
I.G. Farbenindustrie Aktiengesellschaft
Frankfurt/Main - Hoechst.

Secret !

1. This is a secret matter within the meaning of Article 36 of the Reich Penal Code.
2. To be transmitted only under cover; if sent by post, to be registered.
3. To be kept, at the responsibility of the addressee, under lock and key.

Your Ref

Your communication
of

Our Ref : Berlin,
(To be quoted 10.9.38
in your reply)

N/scc.

Subject: Mobilization Task.

We are enclosing the mobilization task for the Hoechst plant.

We wish to add the following:

1.) When the mobilization task reaches your plant, it assumes the character of an official order and, on the orders of the Armed Forces High Command and the Reich Plenipotentiary for Chemistry, the measures required for the implementation of the production schedule contained in the mobilization task must be initiated at once - where this has not already been done - and brought to a rapid completion. When carrying out the work which this entails for you, you should be guided by our circular letter of the 6 Sept. 38 (Continuation of Planning).

Note: According to the Military Economy Staff (W-Stabes), all plants essential to the war effort (KL-Betriebe) which belong to Economic Group Chemistry, will receive from the Reich Plenipotentiary for Chemistry a communication concerning Mobilization Tasks which will deal with regulating the transition. This communication is being sent because it was originally intended that mobilization tasks should become effective only after all the mobilization tasks had been co-ordinated within the whole chemistry sector. The communication of the Reich Plenipotentiary for Chemistry now stipulates that the co-ordination which the latter is going to effect within the whole chemical industry may bring about changes in the individual phases of the mobilization task, but, that until further notice, the mobilization tasks in their present form continue to be effective.

(page 2 of original)

2.) In some plants, the war production figures of the mobilization tasks do not agree with the corresponding figures of previously made war production schedules, partly because the co-ordination within the I.G. brought about changes, partly because the preliminary products now obtained from Ludwigshafen, Oppau and Rheinfelden were switched over to other plants whenever possible, partly because the Reich Plenipotentiary for Chemistry, right from the beginning released certain raw materials or preliminary products in limited quantities only; for instance, on orders of the Reich Plenipotentiary for Chemistry, the war production figures for nitrobenzol, chlorbenzol and dinitrochlorbenzol were lowered to such an extent that, in case of mobilization, only I.G.'s own requirements can be met.

3.) We are not sending you the appendix, sheet 2, (raw material supply), which is part of the mobilization task, because we are working on it here. For this appendix we have taken the quantities and suppliers' addresses from the requirement forms for raw material and preliminary products sent by you. Since various war production figures were changed for reasons explained in 2.), the requirement figures for raw materials and preliminary products had to be changed, accordingly. We are, therefore, returning you the requirement forms for raw materials and preliminary products for re-checking and request that you keep in mind the following:

a) The preliminary products (columns 5 and 6) and raw materials (columns 8 and 9) listed in the requirement forms must be complete, i.e., those raw materials, apart from small amounts of materials which can be obtained easily (compare our circular letter of 12.3.38, section 2)

(page 3 of original)

must suffice to carry out the mobilization task.

b) In some cases names of suppliers are incomplete. Please complete them and, at the same time, add the probable stations of departure wherever they are not given, since they also must be entered in sheet 2 of the appendix. As the Reich Plenipotentiary for Chemistry has ordered us to return the appendix, sheet 2 (raw material supply) to him by the middle of the month, we request you to return the revised requirement forms for raw materials and preliminary products on or before the 17 Sep. 1938.

4.) If it is found that, for any reason whatever, the mobilization task cannot be accomplished, please notify us immediately. In future, the mobilization office will keep a constant watch to see whether the mobilization task can be carried out or not.

VERMITTLUNGSSTELLE W

(signature) Neumann

Enclosures:

Mobilization tasks with appendices

Requirement forms for raw materials and preliminary products

Registered!

(page 4 of original)

The Reich and Prussian
Minister of Economics

Berlin, 30 August 1936
Dr. Hy/Sehn.

All inquiries, forms etc.
to be addressed to:
the Reich Plenipotentiary for
Chemistry
Dr. Claus Ungewitter,
(or deputy, o.V.i.A.)

Secret!

1. This is a secret matter within the meaning of Article 80 of the Reich Penal Code
2. To be transmitted only under cover if sent by post, to be registered
3. To be kept, at the responsibility of the addressee, under lock and key.

Firm I.G. Farbenindustrie A.G. Berlin NW 7, U.d.Linden 82
Plant * Hoechst
for attention of: Dipl. Ing. Neumann or deputy
(confidential agent - Vertrauensperson)

Enclosed are five copies (2 white, 1 each yellow, blue and pink)
of the mobilization task (sheet 1) for your above-named plant.
Each copy is accompanied by 8 forms (sheets 2-9) of the same color

The object of the mobilization task is to issue exact instructions
to every plant concerning the production programme to be carried
out in case of mobilization (Mob-Fall). The mobilization calendar
(sheet 2) gives a chronological list of the measures to be taken
for the carrying out of the Mob task when the Mob Fall (mobilization)
comes into operation.

Should it appear to be impossible to implement the mobilization
task shown on sheet 1 with the technical equipment available, the
above office is to be contacted immediately so that the position
can be made clear. Letters should be submitted in duplicate.

The mobilization task can be worked out still farther by carefully
filling in the enclosed forms (sheets 2-9) and for this purpose
the necessary instructions for the completion of each sheet are
contained on the back. The above-mentioned office will explain
anything which may not be clear. Further, the mobilization task
is the basis for securing personnel, particularly indispensable
specialists in case of mobilization and any work to this end should
be undertaken in conjunction with the branch office of the Reich
Ministry of Economics concerned.

The completed forms (sheets 1-9) should be sent in quadruplicate
(1 each of the white, yellow, blue and pink form) to the above
office for checking purposes. Upon request, this office will send
a further supply of forms.

p.t. o.

(page 5 of original)

if the space for the information required on the individual sheets is insufficient. The fact that these are additional sheets, should be indicated by a small letter (for instance, sheet 2 a). Meanwhile, one of the white forms should be kept by the confidential agent (Vertrauensperson), as a draft copy. After remedying any inaccuracies in the filling out of the form, the plant will receive one copy (white) of the final mobilization task, upon surrender of the draft copy which had been retained by the plant. This task consists of bound sheets 1-9, with a cover page, which bears a note to the effect that official approval has been given.

Care must be taken to see that the documents are kept in an armour-plate safe or a safe so that no unauthorized person has access to them. The confidential agent (Vertrauensperson) entrusted with the working out of Mob task is responsible for the safe custody of the documents.

I... .

Godlewski.

70 §§ § Enclosures.

Note. Until final approval of the mobilization task, the production schedule listed in sheet 1 of the appendix holds good. If mobilization should be proclaimed before final approval, the provisional schedule is to be adhered to.

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

14 July 1947

I, Victoria ORTON, No. 20 129, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages and that the above is a true and correct translation of the document No. NI-7287.

Victoria ORTON
No. 20 129

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT No. NI-4630
OFFICE OF CHIEF OF COUNSEL FOR WAR CRIMES

I.G. FARBENINDUSTRIE AKTIENGESELLSCHAFT
Vermittlungsstelle W
Sparte III

Postal Address:	Telegraphic Address:	Business Hours:
I.G. Farbenindustrie	Filmfabrik Wolfen	Monday to
Aktiengesellschaft	Kr. Bitterfeld	Friday
Vermittlungsstelle W	office 2153	8-16 ³⁰
Sparte III;		Saturday 8-12
Filmfabrik,		
Wolfen (Kr. Bitterfeld)		

Secret!

Herr
Dr. Warnecke or deputy
Leverhausen Management Department
Leverhausen.
I.G. Werk

1. This is a state secret within the meaning of par. 88 of the Reich Penal Code.
2. To be forwarded only under sealed cover, to be registered if sent by post.
3. To be kept in a safely locked place at the responsibility of the addressee.

Your reference:	Your letter of	Our reference	Wolfen
		(to be quoted in	(Kr. Bitterfeld)
		reply)	17 Sept. 1938
		v.E./At.	

Subject : War Deliveries Contract

Enclosed we are sending you, for the Leverhausen photographic paper factory the second copy of the War Deliveries Contract (file number : Az 65 d20 No. 4546/38. g LC III 3r) of May 1938 which has become effective and we request further action.

Vermittlungsstelle W
Sparte III

Signature: Illegible

Value : RM 1,100.-

2 Appendices.

Handwritten Note :
photostat of the contract and the appendix to
G.Dir. Dr. Albers for filing.
dealt with 20/9.38

2x Wn + Ko

(page 2 of original)

Delivered by
I.G. Farbenindustrie A.G.
Berlin W
Unter den Linden 82

7 copies
2nd copy

17224/389

(File reference and No. of the party
awarding the contract)
As 65 d 20 Nr. 4546/38. G.
IC III 3r

WJn III, Berlin
for plant : I.G. Farbenindustrie, Leverkusen.

War Deliveries Contract.

Secret 1

1. This is a state secret within the meaning of par. 88 of the Reich Penal Code.
2. To be forwarded only under sealed cover; to be registered if sent by post.
3. To be kept in a safely locked place at responsibility of addressee.

Under the terms of this contract you undertake delivery, until otherwise instructed, of the following quantities of apparatus and/or materials per month, in the event of mobilization (Mob.Fall):

As per appendix

As price for delivery you will be paid

to be fixed in the event of mobilization (Mob-Fall)

whereby the right has been retained to carry out examinations at any time, through the Wehrmacht offices for the administration of contracts and price-control, which inspections and audits are to be made on the basis of your factory surveys and account-books.

Delivery must conform exactly to the technical conditions of delivery.

Quality-test (acceptance if usable) will follow upon completion at your factory or after receipt of consignment by the consignee.

(page 2 of original, cont'd)

Monthly deliveries shall be made in appropriately apportioned part-consignments. The responsible Wehrmacht Engineer (W.In) shall be notified in good time, when these part-consignments are ready for dispatch, or, if delivery is to be made to the consignee the latter is to be informed so that the quality-test can be made and dispatch instructions be issued.

Consignee: On demand, through Reich Air Ministry, Section LC III 3

Appendix ..2...of No.2171/38 secret

(page 3 of original)

The delivery notes, in duplicate, shall be forwarded to the consignee at the time of dispatch, one copy, in so far as delivery is accepted in your factory, to be provided with a statement of acceptance (certificate of quantity and usefulness).

Invoices shall be sent to the customer in duplicate. Any possible packing expenses shall be charged separately.

Final acceptance (taking over) shall take place after delivery of the consignment to the consignee.

Payment shall be made in accordance with the general conditions laid down by the Wehrmacht for deliveries in the event of mobilization (Mob.Fall)

This contract will be forwarded to you, in duplicate, signed by the party awarding the contract. All copies are to be signed by you, also, and the

1st copy is to be forwarded to the

responsible Department, LC III 3 of the

Reich Ministry of Aviation
(Address of the responsible Military Economy Supervisory
or Branch office of the ministry concerned)

The second copy is intended for you.

On signing the contract, the firm has accepted responsibility for delivery of the above-mentioned materials in the event of mobilization (Mob.Fall) Violations of this contract shall be punished in accordance with the provision of the law and the special regulations governing deliveries in the event of mobilization (Mob.Fall)

(page 3 of original, cont'd)

Until further notice the prices of this agreement shall be considered, excluding price reservations, as provisional (guiding) prices for calculating any partial payments or installments that may be paid. The consigner may apply to the office awarding the contract by the 1st of each April for amendment of the price agreement, if the provisional (guiding) prices are greatly at variance with the latest, average daily prices.

Signature of party
awarding contract

for

the Reich Minister for Air
and Commander-in-Chief of the
Luftwaffe

signature

Berlin, May 1938

Signature of delivering party:

I.G. FARBEINDUSTRIE AKTIENGESELLSCHAFT

Handwritten: Signature Uhl Dr. Albers

(signed: Uhl) (signed: Dr. Albers)

Lev.-I.G. Works, 22 June 1938
Berlin SO 36, the 30.6.1938

(page 4 of original)

The Reich Minister for Air and
Commander-in-Chief of the Luftwaffe.

Appendix

to the War Deliveries Contract.

(Az. 65 d 20 No. 4546/38 geh.)
LC III 3r.

for the firm of I.G. Farbenindustrie A.G., Leverkusen

(via Vermittlungsstelle W, Berlin)

1) Silver Bromide paper:

a) 18 x 24 soft, semi-matt	7360 Sheets
standard, " "	6880 Sheets
hard, " "	7080 Sheets
b) 24 x 30 soft, semi-matt	6000 Sheets
standard " "	6000 Sheets
hard " "	6000 Sheets
c) 50 x 50 soft, ^{matt} / , non-stretch	2600 Sheets
d) in rolls of 0,64 x 10 metr.	
soft, smooth matt	45 rolls
standard " "	45 rolls
hard " "	45 rolls

2) Non-stretching enlarging paper:

a) 30 x 40 soft, semi-matt	11600 Sheets
standard " "	17300 Sheets
b) 40 x 50 soft, semi-matt	600 Sheets
standard " "	600 Sheets
c) 50 x 50 hard, semi-matt	5700 Sheets
soft " "	16900 Sheets
standard " "	20250 Sheets
d) 50 x 60 soft, semi-matt	600 Sheets
standard " "	600 Sheets

3) Contact paper :

a) 13 x 18 soft, glossy	1600 Sheets
soft, semi-matt	27000 Sheets
standard " "	71600 Sheets
hard " "	33350 Sheets
extra hard " "	33350 Sheets

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT No. NI-4630
CONTINUED

(page 4 of original, cont'd)

b) 20 x 20	extra soft, semi-matt	1600 Sheets
	soft, " "	44400 Sheets
	standard " "	88400 Sheets
	hard, " "	33350 Sheets
	extra hard, " "	32800 Sheets

.....

-.-.-.-.-

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

7 June 1947

I, John FOSBERY, Civ.No. 20 179, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages and that the above is a true and correct translation of the document No. NI-4630.

John FOSBERY,
Civ.No. 20 179

Secret!

1. This is a state secret within the meaning of Article 68 of the Reich Penal Code.
2. To be handed on only under cover, if sent by post, to be registered.
3. To be kept at responsibility of addressee under lock and key.

File Memorandum

on a discussion with Engineer Neumann of the Vermittlungsstelle W
on 14 September 1938.

1. Dyestuffs program.

The plants must consider what dyes are to be produced for the mobilization project, and what intermediary products will be needed. In this the summarized instructions of the Office of the Technical Committee should be adhered to. Dr. Hirschel drew attention to the fact that general principles were of no use here in Hoechst, whereupon Herr Neumann offered to draw up a program himself within the framework of these summarized instructions, which would not, however, prove as simple in Hoechst as in other plants where relatively few products had to be dealt with. The most appropriate solution would be to ask Dr. Walther and the leading Frankfurt business men what dyes Hoechst would have to produce. Herr Koenig of the Office of the Technical Committee has already done some preparatory work with the chiefs of the dye factories, but on the other hand he has told Herr Neumann that he could not guarantee the completion of the work this year. Dr. Hirschel suggested in the interests of speeding up the work that manufacture of some of the present products should be increased or reduced proportionately, and Herr Neumann saw no objections to this, as this method would make little difference to the raw material estimates. In this case the five dyestuffs sub-groups would have to be considered as five items, and the raw material requirements for these five items would be included under one item. Here only those raw materials should be taken into consideration which go into our own dye-stuff production, that is, those from other firms as well as those from our own factories, though the latter only if it involves a specified item on our own Mobilization Plan, if that is not the case. If production of the preliminary product which is called for by the plan would have to be taken up.

Herr Neumann expressly indicated that the present discussion applied only to the second plan which is to be newly drawn up.

2. The planning work now on hand for auxiliary materials, power

(page 2 of original)

etc. is not quite so urgent. Even if the material is needed only in 6 - weeks time, the work should still be begun at once, and what is ready should be delivered. Everything bought in 1937 is to be included in the auxiliary materials return. Should there be more items in existence than are mentioned in the lists appended by the Vermittlungsstelle, these too should be listed. Roughly what is needed is intended to be gathered

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT No. NI-8600
CONTINUED

(page 2 of original cont'd)

from this data.

3. Tactical exercise.

Herr Neumann wants to know whether the department chiefs of the plants could be informed that a tactical exercise of the armaments industry will take place on 26 September. Dr. Hirschel considered this necessary, so that the people concerned could arrange to be free on this day and so that they could start forming general ideas as to what would happen if one or another of their plants should be put out of action.

Initialled: NI

19 September 1938

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

11 July 1947

I, ARTHUR MACNEILARA, Civ. No. 20191, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages and that the above is a true and correct translation of the document No. NI-8600.

ARTHUR MACNEILARA, Civ. No. 20191.

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT No. NI-7213
OFFICE OF CHIEF OF COUNSEL FOR WAR CRIMES

(Rubber Stamp) Received
Office of Prof. I
21 Sept. 1958

I.G. Farbenindustrie
Aktiengesellschaft
Office of the Technical
Committee

- (Rubber Stamp) Secret!
1. This is a secret matter within the meaning of Article 88 of the Reich Penal Code.
 2. To be transmitted only under cover; if sent by post, to be registered.
 3. To be kept, at the responsibility of the addressee, under lock and key.

20 September 38

Herrn Dir. Dr. WURSTER,
Herrn Dir. WEISS, Einkauf
Herrn Prof. Dr. LAUTENSCHLAGER,
Herrn Dir. Dr. JACOBI,
Herrn Dir. Dr. KUEHE,
Herrn Dir. Dr. HABERLAND,
Herrn Dir. Dr. BUECHER,
Herrn Dir. Dr. SCHNEIDER,

Ludwigshafen
Ludwigshafen
Hoechst
Griesheim
Leverkusen
Urdingen
Bitterfeld
Jelfen

Subject: Deliveries in Case of Mobilization/Transportation Orders

We learn that in the first days of mobilization the Reichsbahn will accept goods for shipment only when "transportation orders" for them are presented. The plant making delivery should apply to the proper Military Economy Inspection Office for the "transportation orders".

The application should be submitted in triplicate, according to the following scheme:

Transportation Report No.							
Transmitting Company				Receiving Company			
Name :				Place :			
No. of empty cars required				No. of empty cars required			
Mob. Day	Time	Number and type	Railroad station (conn. track)	Time required for loading	Type of load	Name, place	Railroad station (connecting track)
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
Reason for urgency:				Remarks:			

In column 5 there is to be inserted, in the case of carload lots, the Reichsbahn designation (O, G, R cars), in the case of less-than-carload lots the word "less-than-carload lot".

This regulation means that the plants will receive no shipments for about 10-14 days, if the companies making shipments to them do not have transportation orders for the amounts required during this time.

In order that there may not be any loss of time, we request that you do not first check through all required raw materials with regard to the need of delivering or storing them, but that you irmediately order the most important items, of which we know off-hand that their production will continue, for instance the electrolyses. For this one should, for instance, irmediately request the suppliers of the salt, coal, coke, etc. to apply to their Military Economy Inspection Offices for the transportation orders.

In addition the plants must irmediately apply to their own Military Economy Inspection Offices for all freight cars which are to leave the plants during this period of time, for instance for the chlorine tank cars and the tank cars for sulphuric acid.

Similarly application must be made for transportation orders for the return of the empty freight cars to the plant.

In order to avoid overlapping, chlorine will be handled centrally for all plants by Dr. VONLANDER, Bitterfeld, sulphuric acid by Mr. SCHAAF, Div. S, Frankfurt, who will in turn contact the plants.

For the goods which are delivered for export, transportation orders must also be applied for. In order to maintain uniformity we request that one starts with the assumption that deliveries cannot be made to Czechoslovakia, Russia, France, England and countries overseas.

We are informing you of the contents of this letter briefly today already by telephone.

Office of the Technical Committee

signature : STUBS

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT No. NI-7213
CONTINUED

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

2 August 1947

I, Herbert RODECK, D - 397 499, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages and that the above is a true and correct translation of the document No. NI-7213.

Herbert RODECK
D - 397 499

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT No. NI-7213
CONTINUED

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

2 August 1947

I, Herbert RODECK, D - 397 499, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages and that the above is a true and correct translation of the document No. NI-7213.

Herbert RODECK
D - 397 499

TRANSLATION OF EXCERPTS FROM DOCUMENT No. NI-7214
OFFICE OF CHIEF OF COUNSEL FOR WAR CRIMES

I.G. Farbenindustrie Aktiengesellschaft
Vermittlungsstelle W

Received 26 Sep 1938

Berlin NW 7
Unter den Linden 82
120 021

SECRET !

1. This is a secret matter within the meaning of Article 38 of the Reich Penal Code.
2. To be transmitted only under cover; if sent by post, to be registered.
3. To be kept, at the responsibility of the addressee, under lock and key.

To:
Direktor Dr. G. von BRUNING
I.G. Farbenindustrie Aktiengesellschaft
Frankfurt/M - Hoechst

Your Ref: Your communication of: Our Ref: (to be given in your reply)

H./Sch. Berlin,
24 September 1938

Subject: Securing the Means of Transportation in Case of
Mobilization (Mob-Fall).

The circular letter of 20 September 1938 from the Office of the Technical Committee, addressed to:

Messrs.	Dir. Dr. WUNSTER,	Ludwigshafen
	Dir. WEISS, Purchasing,	Ludwigshafen
	Prof. Dr. LAUTENSCHLAGER,	Hoechst
	Dir. Dr. JACOBI,	Griesheim
	Dir. Dr. KUHNE,	Leverkusen
	Dr. HABERLAND,	Urdingen
	Dr. Dr. BUERGIN,	Ritterfold
	Dir. Dr. SCHONER,	Wolfen

is in part superseded. Having discussed the matter with the Reich Ministry of Economics and the Reich Ministry of Transport, we give you the following information concerning the securing of transportation in case of mobilization:

- A) All plants essential to the war effort (K.L.-plants) should enter on form No. 6 appended to the Mobilization Task the average amount of transport required by them in case of mobilization. The Reich Plenipotentiary for Chemistry requests that these forms be submitted as soon as possible, via Vermittlungsstelle W, even if the remaining forms appended to the Mobilization Task have not been completed.
- B) Since it has become known that in the first ten days of mobilization,

(page 2 of original)

only those goods can be transported which on the one hand it is not possible to store, but on the other, are absolutely essential to the armaments plants and "plants essential to the war effort" for the fulfillment of their mobilization task, the necessity arises for making a transportation plan for the first mobilization month, sub-divided into mobilization days, independent of the notice in Section A). Since these transportation plans will lead to extremely important measures for the first mobilization days, they must be compiled and submitted without delay. In this connection the following must be kept in mind:

- 1) In order to obtain a general view of the situation, one notice of transportation requirements for each item of freight should be completed. We are enclosing a four page form:

Page 1 serves as notice of transportation requirements for outgoing goods, to be transported by rail;

Page 2 serves as notice of transportation requirements for outgoing goods to be transported by water;

Page 3 serves as notice of transportation requirements for incoming goods to be transported by rail;

Page 4 serves as notice of transportation requirements for incoming goods to be transported by water.

- 2) Outgoing Goods:

A transportation plan is to be made for all those goods,

- a) delivery of which is already scheduled to take place in the first month of mobilization;

(page 3 of original)

- b) of which it is known that the mobilization consignee has less than a 30-days supply.

- c) of which a 30-day production, over and above the normal supply, cannot be stored.

If it is known that the supply of an item will last the mobilization consignee less than three weeks, transportation of this item must also be carried out in the first ten days, otherwise the consignee will have only a small supply, or none at all, after the tenth day, which means that it will no longer be possible to tide over any interruption.

TRANSLATION OF EXCERPTS FROM DOCUMENT No. NI-7214
CONTINUED

(page 3 of original cont'd)

For the same reason, those goods, of which the production during the first 21 mobilization days cannot be stored, must be transported in the first ten days. These goods, of which the consignee's supply will last more than three weeks but less than 30 days, need not be sent off in the first ten days; however, the decrease in the consignee's supply must be made up in the succeeding 20 days by increased deliveries. The same applies to goods of which the production of the first 21-30 days can be stored.

For the remaining goods, which do not belong to categories 2a, 2b or 2c, it is not necessary to make a transportation plan sub-divided into days; a bulk report spread over the first mobilization month will suffice.

The plans for transportation requirements for goods, of which less than a 10-day production can be stored, are to be conspicuously marked in red:

"Storage only possible for less than 10 days".

The plans for transportation requirements for outgoing goods in categories 2a and 2b to remain in the Mobilization Office until they are asked for by the Military Economic Department of the Oberpraesident (formerly the branch office of the Reich Ministry of Economics).

(page 4 of original)

The Military Economic Department of the Oberpraesident to be notified of the completion of these plans. The plans for transportation requirements for outgoing goods in category 2c are to be sent to the Military-Economic Department of the Oberpraesident UNTER whose jurisdiction your plant comes. As, according to our information, the above office has lately been concerned mainly with securing transportation for incoming goods, an accompanying letter should point out that it is just as important to secure transportation for outgoing goods with limited possibilities of storage, as it is to secure transport for incoming goods, and that it can have disastrous consequences if the Military Economic Department of the Oberpraesident waits until it has received the transportation demands of the receiving plants, before proceeding to secure the transportation required for these outgoing goods; the more so, as it may happen that the receiving works might not give notice of any transportation requirements at all in the first days or weeks of mobilization, either because it has sufficient supplies or else does not yet know its mobilization task.

(page 4 of original cont'd)

3) Incoming Goods:

A transportation plan is to be made for all those goods of which there is less than a 30-day supply. Not only those goods of which there is less than a 10-day supply but also goods of which there is a supply for more than 10, but less than 21 days, must be transported during the first 10 mobilization days, otherwise there will be only a small supply, or none at all, after the tenth day, and it will no longer be possible to tide over any interruptions. (We take this opportunity to point out that many plants have already been instructed whenever possible to store up 3-4 weeks' supply of all raw materials.

(page 5 of original)

In general, therefore, the shipments to be reported in the first 10 days of mobilization can only concern goods for which compelling reasons forbid the storing of more than a 20-day supply.) These goods, of which the supply is sufficient for more than 3 weeks, but less than 30 days, need not be brought in during the first 10 days of mobilization; however, the decrease in the supply must be made good in the succeeding 20 days by increased incoming shipments.

For goods, of which the supply is sufficient for more than 30 days, no transportation plans, sub-divided into days need be made; a bulk report of transportation requirements spread over the first mobilization month will suffice.

The notices of transportation requirements of goods, for which there is less than a 10-day supply, are to be conspicuously marked in red:

"Sufficient supply for less than 10 days."

The plans for transportation requirements for incoming goods should be forwarded to the military-economic Department of the Oberpräsident (formerly, branch office of the Reich Ministry of Economics) in your area.

- 4) The plants should also work out reports of transportation requirements for incoming and outgoing shipments of chlorine and sulphuric acid.
- 5) In the columns marked 2 on the enclosed forms it will suffice to make such general entries as before noon or between 6-10 o'clock
- 6) The measures, the purpose of which is to secure the necessary trucks, will not be affected by this letter.

TRANSLATION OF EXCERPTS FROM DOCUMENT No. NI-7214
CONTINUED

(page 6 of original)

Incidentally, we learned at the last conference at the Reich Ministry of Transport that all Reich Railroad Offices are being instructed to accord transportation priority to all tank cars in the first few days of mobilization.

Wherever the contents of this letter are in conflict with the letter dated 20th instant from the Office of the Technical Committee, this letter will be adhered to.

Vermittlungsstelle W

signature NEEMANN

4 Appendices

REGISTERED

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

17 July 1947

I, Victoria ORTON, Civ. No. 20 129, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages and that the above is a true and correct translation of the document No. NI-7214.

.....
Victoria ORTON
Civ. No. 20 129

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT No. NI-8877
OFFICE OF CHIEF OF COUNSEL FOR WAR CRIMES

I.G. Frankfurt
Sales Combine Chemicals

Trans. Note: Stamps
Received 29 September 1938
illegible initial 321

To
Technical Management Hoechst
Technical Management Ludwigsh.

Secret.

1. This is a state secret in the meaning of section 88 of the Reich Penal Code.
2. To be handed over in a sealed envelope, when mailed to be registered.
3. To be kept at responsibility of addressee in a safe place.

Your Ref.	Your letter	Our Ref. (to be	Report No.	Date:
	of	quoted in reply)		28 September 1938
		Dept. L K/W		
		Folder No.		

Subject: Solvent E 23/ Methylanon (Trans. Note: Handwr. Note: Cover
name for E 13)
Mobilization Contract No. 02 00380 Adler & Oppenheimer,
Neustadt/Cleve

We are enclosing copies of two secret letters of the 24 and 27 of the month with appendices and request you to complete the war production schedule for subcontractors in the manner indicated and to return it to us in quadruplicate, each copy signed by you. Also, please return the list of mobilization customers, signed by you as well, for our reference.

CHEMICALS SALES
Department L

(2 illegible signatures)

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT No. HI-8877
CONTINUED

I.G. FARBENINDUSTRIE ANTIKINGSELSCHAFT, FRANKFURT (MAIN) 20

Copy

Trans Note: Stamp.

Secret.

1. This is a state secret within the meaning of section 88 of the Reich Penal Code.
2. To be handed over in sealed envelope, when mailed, to be registered.
3. To be kept at responsibility of addressee in a safe place.

I.G. Sales Combine Chemicals
v.E./Sth.

Frankfurt (M) 24.9.38

to Department L, Frankfurt (M)

Enclosed is a list of mobilization customers with the War Production Schedules for Sub-contractors (U.B.P.). These schedules are in the form of itemized columns. The right space contains the plant mobilization number which in each case is stated in front of the list of mobilization customers. In the middle of the columns you will find:

Mob W

a.

b.

b^x (*Transl. Note: Context reveals that this should have been c)

Mob W means mobilization week. The following 8 spaces refer to the first eight weeks of mobilization. We are only required to deliver the amounts contained in space c), therefore, we need not concern ourselves with spaces a) & b).

After the 8 spaces for the first 8 weeks of mobilization, a wider space follows. The figures contained therein signify the quantities to be delivered monthly at the end of the eighth mobilization week. Here again we are only concerned with space c).

After you have noted down the contract in a special secret file, please mail the list of mobilization customers with the schedule forms, as well as this accompanying letter, to the management of the contracting plants concerned (for products manufactured in several plants, to the plant with the most favorable delivery rates) in two envelopes, "Registered", with the inner (not the outer) envelope marked "Secret". The flap of the inner envelope must be glued down, and the address on it must be written in indelible pencil.

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT No. NI-8877
CONTINUED

(page 1 of original, cont'd)

The mobilization office of the contracting plant shall enter this contract in its books and fill in a new war production schedule for sub-contractors (U.B.P.) according to the enclosed form and, when the contracts have been accepted, return the signed list of mobilization customers to the Sales Department.

(page 2 of original)

I.G. Farben Industrie Aktiengesellschaft Frankfurt (Main) 20

Contracts which for some reason cannot be accepted shall be struck off the list of mobilization customers by the contracting plant; the contracting plant shall return the itemized schedule forms for these contracts. The contracting plant shall indicate on the list of mobilization customers the reason for the cancellation. If delivery dates cannot be met, the contracts are not to be struck off the list; rather, it is to be stated on the back of the schedule forms what quantities can be delivered and at what dates. The forms with this information are also to be returned, via the Sales Department, to Vermittlungsstelle W, which will take further action. For the rest, we refer you to the enclosed copy of the circular letter of 15 August 1938 of the Military Economic Office (Wehrwirtschaftsstelle) of District Berlin III.

The Sales Department will note down acceptance of contracts in its secret file, put a second signature on the list of mobilization customers and send it immediately to Vermittlungsstelle W.

The Sales Departments which have no steel safes for the secret files will please hand them over to Dr. SCHULZE or, in the latter's absence, to von KRIEGSTEIN for safe-keeping.

Please expedite this matter as much as possible. Inquiries are to be addressed to v. KRIEGSTEIN. (Telephone No. 2374)

SALES COMBINE CHEMICALS

signed: v. HEIDER.

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT No. NI-8877
CONTINUED

I.G. FARBEN AKTIENGESELLSCHAFT FRANKFURT (MAIN) 20

(Trans. Note. Stamp)

Copy

Secret.

1. This is a state secret in the meaning of section 88 of the Reich Penal Code.
2. To be handed over in sealed envelope, when mailed, as "registered".
3. To be kept at responsibility of addressee in a safe place.

I.G. Sales Combine Chemicals,
v.K./Hz.

Frankfurt (M), 27 September 1938

To Dept. L. Frankfurt

Subject: War Production Schedules for Sub-contractors (U.B.P.)
Our Circular letter of the 24th of this Month.

Vermittlungsstelle W has just informed us that the customer lists are not to be returned, but that the War Production Schedules for Sub-contractors (U.B.P.) are to be signed and returned to Vermittlungsstelle W.

SALES COMBINE CHEMICALS
signed: v. HEIDER.

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

9 July 1947

I, Dorothea L. GALEWSKI, ETO No. 34079, I hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages and that the above is a true and correct translation of the document No. NI-8877.

Dorothea L. GALEWSKI
ETO No. 34079.

Initial "S"

Berlin, 7 October 1938

Stamp:
SECRET!

1. This is a State secret in accordance with Art. 88 of the RStGB (Reich Penal Code).
2. Forwarding, sealed only and registered if forwarded by mail.
3. To be kept in a safe place at the responsibility of the addressee.

N o t e

Conversation with Dr. PFAUNDLER re letter of 20/9/1938. Sub-contractor's Order Placement Chart (Unterlieferer Belegungsplan) and position strips (Positions streifen).

Explanation of position strips:

The outer, righthand side number on the individual strips is the identification number for the plant to which delivery is to be made. The names of the plants will be given each time in a separate letter. The position strips show different columns a, b and c.

Column a does not concern us. The figures given in this column indicate the quantities which the plants to which delivery is to be made must always have in stock.

Column c is important for us. It gives the quantities which we have to supply in the actual case.

The plant making the deliveries must certify on the position strips which are to be sent to the plants, which make deliveries that measures guaranteeing the delivery have been taken. The position strips remain with plants which make deliveries.

Sub-Contractors' Order Placement Chart:

The charts are to be filled out and sent to the plant which is to make delivery, the plant which if the case arises will make delivery, or the plant where the quantities under discussion are being reserved. The sub-contractors' order placement charts are on their reverse side to be provided

with an appropriate notation by the plant which makes the delivery,
to be signed by the Betriebsführer (Plant Manager),
to be returned to us (Batestick) (Nitrogen Statistical Department of N.W. 7),
to be signed by us,
and then to be forwarded to Vermittlungsstelle W

Gr/Hu.

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO. NI-4986
Cont'd

(Page 2 of original)

The addresses of the experts of the individual plants making delivery who are in charge of "Mob" (Translator's Note: "Mob" is code word for mobilization) are the following:

Leuna
Oppau
Hoechst
Wolfen

"Mob" Handled by:
Herr DEHN-ROTFELDER
Dr. GOLDBERG
Dr. HIRSCHEL
Dr. PETERSEN

During the conversation with Herr PFAUNDLER there was general agreement to the effect that quantities as small as called for on some of the position strips cannot be accepted by the plants making deliveries for I.G. The setting aside of these quantities is to be handled by jobber firms, or the firms which use the material must be held to keep such quantities in stock, especially if products are concerned which are well suited for being stored. Decisive is the fact that during the first 12 days of mobilization, the railways must not be burdened with such deliveries.

Copy: Director HANSER
" LOECKLE

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

I, HERTHA C. KNUTH, AGO NO. X 046355, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document No. NI - 4986.

HERTHA C. KNUTH
U. S. Civilian
AGO NO. X 046355

END

(Stamp)

Secret!

1. This is a secret matter within the meaning of Article 88 of the Reich Penal Code.
2. To be transmitted only under cover; if sent by post, to be registered.
3. To be kept, at the responsibility of the addressee, under lock and key.

Memorandum for the Files

on a meeting with Mr. Schneider and Dr. Geller from the Military-Economy Department of the Oberpraesidium in Kassel on Friday 4 November 1938 in Frankfurt/Main-Hoechst.

Present from the Maingau:

	Dr. Engelbertz and Gersbach	from Griesheim
	Dr. Krauss and Boscher	" Mainkur
	Dr. Weigmann and Dohn	" Offenbach
	Dr. Hirschel and Bornmann	" Hoechst
later	Dir. Schwanborn and Heuser	" Hoechst

also the Plenipotentiary for Mobilization from the Military-Economy Department at the Chamber of Industry and Commerce Frankfurt/Main, Mr. Linnenkohl.

Dr. Hirschel opens the conference at 11.15 hours by welcoming the gentlemen from Kassel as well as Mr. Linnenkohl and gives the floor at first to Mr. Schneider :

- 1.) Schneider, the expert for questions of transportation in the military-economy department, points out at first that classification of the requisition forms for transportation which had been submitted, has disclosed that it is impossible to make the required freight cars or engines available during the first two mobilization weeks. Purpose of his visit is, to try together with the applicants, to reduce the number of the vehicles required for the first two weeks. Dr. Hirschel then explains our attitude in regard to making our requisitions, according to which we have restricted ourselves to apply for transportation only in such cases where we cannot store supplies for 30 days for technical reasons. Here he informs us of a request by the Reich Ministry of Economics which just arrived today, and which desires us to state exactly to what extent the I.G. works can store supplies and products, and to give detailed explanations in all cases where stockpiling for three weeks is not possible.

(page 1 of original, cont'd)

Then the individual applications of the Maingau-works are examined and a number of postponements of applications until the 15th mobilization day is made. In the case of other applications

(page 2 of original)

another examination on the part of the I.G. is promised; with regard to a number of raw materials and preliminary products which are needed by all, the individual firms will come to an understanding in order to arrange for deliveries for the same days if possible.

- 2.) Dr. Geller, expert for the allocation of labor, requests the individual Maingau works to describe their experiences made up to now in regard to the whole situation as well to leading persons. Then the individual experts describe how many of the present staff are directly available to the Armed Forces, for how many men applications for military exemption have been submitted, how many of these were accepted, how many appeals were made against rejections. Then Dr. Geller informs us that in future appeals against decisions by the recruiting offices, are not to be sent directly to Kassel by the labor offices but to the plenipotentiary for mobilization at the Chamber for Industry and Commerce (Mr. Linnenkohl), for opinion. To speed up the procedure, Dr. Geller recommends to send in each case a copy of the appeals submitted to the labor offices, directly to Mr. Linnenkohl. An inquiry by Dr. Krauss, whether it is of any use to contact the military-economy department once more if the plenipotentiary for mobilization at the Chamber has rejected the appeal, is answered by Dr. Geller to the effect that the labor offices themselves would forward the application to Kassel in such cases.

Dr. Geller sums up the outcome of the meeting in regard to the experiences made, by saying that on the whole the necessary personnel is guaranteed.

On the occasion of Dr. Geller's question, whether the works have already applied at the labor offices for replacements, which was answered in the negative, Dr. Geller admitted that no objections could be raised if the applications allowed for a certain amount of reserve labor, whereby it should not be forgotten, however, that the interests of the Wehrmacht must not be impaired by such action.

In reply to Heuser's questions Dr. Geller states that the applications for military exemption which are approved at present are valid until 30 March 1939; at present negotiations are pending between the Wehrmacht and the Reich Ministry of Economics to extend their validity once more.

(page 3 of original)

I.G. Hoechst
Directorate Department T

Secret 1

Receipt

1 Excerpt from a memorandum for the files
from Directorate Department T
to Director Schwaborn

dated 7 November 1938

Reference

Subject: Memorandum for the files on a conference with
gentlemen from the military- economy department
Kassel.

received on 9 November 1938

(signature) Illegible

(page 4 of original)

It seems that the Wehrmacht does not wish to disregard this request on the part of the Reich Ministry of Economics.

At 13.45 hours Dr. Hirschel closes the meeting by thanking the gentlemen from Kassel.

(signature) Hirschel * (signature) Bormann

Frankfurt/Main - Hoechst

7 November 1938

Ø Vermittlungsstelle W
Director Schwarborn (Point 2)

(page 5 of original)

I.G. Hoechst

Directorate Department T

Receipt

Secret

1 Memorandum for the files

from Directorate Department T, I.G. Hoechst

to Vermittlungsstelle W, I.G. Berlin

dated 7 November 1938

Reference

Subject : Memorandum for the files on a meeting in regard to
questions concerning transportation and allocation
of labor

received on 10 November 1938

(signature) illegible

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

29 July 1947

I, Brigitte TURK, ETO 35130, hereby certify that I am
thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages and
that the above is a true and correct translation of the
document No. NI-8599.

Brigitte TURK
ETO 35130

(Trans. Note Stamp)

Top Secret Reich Matter

2 copies

1. copy

(handwritten note)

H 2194 g Rs

M i n u t e s

of the Discussion with I. G. Farbenindustrie, concerning
the Knapsack Plant, on 14 November 1938.

Present: From the Reich Ministry of Economics -
Oberregierungsrat Dr. Lenz,
Dr. Kraft,
from the High Command of the Armed Forces -
Regierungsrat Dr. Romberg,
Munich
from "Chemistry" (Chemie) -
Dr. Hagert,
Dr. Hellberger,
Dr. Heyl,
from the I. G.-Dipl.-Ing. Neumann,
Dr. Kaiser,
Dr. Hegels.

The firm states that with the present mobilization requisitioning of the Knapsack plant, above all for carbide it fears that in case of war it could not cover all demand. Carbide production is at present already 24,000 tons per month; demands of considerable size would include above all deliveries to Rheinfelden and Ludwigshafen. The Military Economic Division Stuttgart has demanded the guaranteeing of 700 tons of carbide per month for Rheinfelden. In addition the requisitioning of acetone is low; the present production is 600 tons per month. The capacity for acetone is to be enlarged since there is an increased demand for synthetic materials, solvents and other materials. The present production of acetaldehyde is already 5,000 tons per month.

The regulation of the conversion of carbide furnaces 11, 12 and 13 to the production of ferrosilicium in case of mobilization, which is planned at present, is unfortunate in so far as for one thing the time required for conversion is 4 - 6 weeks and, in addition, only 45% ferrosilicium can be obtained with these furnaces. The furnaces date from the last war and are out-of-date; in addition it is doubted whether the supply of power is sufficient. It would be better for "Chemistry" to draw on the Bayerische Kraftwerke for the production of ferrosilicium.

(Page 1 of original, cont'd)

As against the statements made by the firm it is found that the additional demands made on the Knapsack plant for carbide and other products either affect plants which will not receive (Transl. Note: correction in handwriting: have not received) any mobilization duties from "Chemistry" and therefore will also not have (Transl. Note: correction in handwriting: also do not have), any raw material requirements to be assured, or other branches of industry, (Transl. Note: in handwriting: which) would have to take second place with respect to their requirements of ferrosilicium. It is decided to maintain

(Page 2 of original)

the present mobilization requisitioning at least for the current mobilization year. If, in case of mobilization the carbide production of Knapsack should actually not be sufficient, the production of nitrogen of lime would have to be decreased.

On this occasion the High Command of the Wehrmacht once more expressly states that requisitioning of Ludwigshafen must continue not to take place until final clarification of the question of safety. In answer to an express question with reference to the supply of power for the Knapsack Plant, the I. G. announces that the required amount of 110,000 kw indicated on page 7 of the Mobilization form is calculated on the basis of the mobilization duty and suffices for carrying out the program. The amount agreed upon as per contract mentioned on the same page, is to be delivered to Degussa and is not included in the required amount. The firm's attention is called to the fact that here, in order to avoid errors, the non-inclusion of the amount agreed upon as per contract should be expressly noted.

I. G. then inquires whether it can omit filling in pages 8 and 9 if the plant is running under peace-time conditions in exactly the same way as is provided for in case of mobilization. The firm's attention is called to the fact that it is absolutely necessary that a mobilization calendar be kept, and that it is required that all those measures which the Betriebsführer has to undertake in case of mobilization be recorded according to key-words this to include for instance personnel measures. Page 9 should also contain information as to the conversion of the carbide furnaces, showing the length of time and the individual phases of the conversion. The Knapsack plant should once more check over the statements made in 1937 with reference to power conditions and to hand in a corrected version.

(Page 2 of original, cont'd)

It is then mentioned that a few months ago the I.G. Farbenindustrie applied to the Reich Ministry of Economics with proposals for the conversion for guaranteeing the means of transportation. In accordance with these proposals the requirements for transportation are no longer to be guaranteed by the party making delivery but by the recipient. "Chemistry" and the High Command of the Wehrmacht declare emphatically that this method, even though at the present state of the mobilization work it SEEMS to offer advantages, must be turned down as being absolutely unsuitable.

15.11. 1938
Dr. Hy/Br

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

7 July 1947

I, Dorothea L. GALEWSKI, ETO No. 34079, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages and that the above is a true and correct translation of document No. NI-8891.

DOROTHEA L. G. LEWSKI
ETO No. 34079

V Ro III (a)
As 11 d

Berlin, 8 December 1938

MINUTES

of a conference at the supervisory agency chemistry
("Chemie") on 6 December 1938.

Present: Ob.Reg. Rat Dr. LENZ)
Dr. KRAFT) Reich Ministry for Economics

Dr. HAGEN) Supervisory agency "Chemie"

Reg. Rat. Dr. MUECK)
Reg. Rat. Dr. THIERER) OKW

Dr. MOLL)
Lipl.-Ing. NEUMANN) I.G. Farbenindustrie A.G.

Subject: Use of Ludwigshafen in case of mobilization.

I.G. Farbenindustrie had approached the supervisory office "Chemie" with the question, whether Ludwigshafen could continue production in case of mobilization and if it could be counted upon, that Ludwigshafen would be furnished raw materials for the products which are to be manufactured. Concerning the question of raw-material the gentlemen of the I.G. stated that Ludwigshafen themselves were able to manufacture all raw-material for their products, with the exception of Benzol and Toluol, for which Ludwigshafen was dependent upon delivery from other places. The allocation for Benzol-requirements from the I.G. appears as follows:

for dyes	160 tons
" polystyrol	182 tons
" styrol (for Buna)	140 tons
" beta-phenylpropylamin	70 tons
" onegusalt	75 tons
" dinitrodiphenylamin	50 tons

The total requirements, according to the reports of the I.G., would amount to 805 meto of 90% Benzol; Toluol for Ludwigshafen could be produced from this

In order to have an overall picture of the requirements of raw-material and labor, those products which can only be manufactured, exclusively in Ludwigshafen were largely compiled in the following plan for the use of Ludwigshafen in case of mobilization:

athylenchlorhydrin: base-product for the products of Roehm & Haas
athylenoxyd: from spirits: for diglykol and thiodiglykol, also for glykol
aluminiumchloride: for chloracetophenon
synthesis of arsenic acid
chloroethyl, capacity 250 meto
cyanatrium
diglykol
formaldehyd: raw-material for pentaerythrit-tennigane
oxol: already figured in thiodiglykol
M.F.-material: capacity 150 meto

nekel-powder: shall only be considered as far as it will be needed in the production of emulgator 1000 for Buna
omega - salt
palatinol
penterithrit: shall only be considered until plants in Central-Germany are set up
styrol: 300 moto capacity, of that 100 could be polymerised to polysterol
sulf-chloride: raw-material for natriumhydrosulfid
iron powder
urea, as far as it is needed for cowry-glue
vitaminiac
cowry glue
resinol
chlorosulfon-acid: as to this substance it must be checked, if it should be placed in Ludwigshafen at all.

So far a war supply contract (K.L.V.) of the Navy, amounting to 330 tons of smoke acid is earmarked for Ludwigshafen. Likewise it is to be found out whether dimethylanilin, which normally is used for the production of dyestuff, can be used as an explosive. So far, dimethylanilin was not requested by the Wehrmacht as raw material for explosives.

It is further to be checked, to what extent brown-oxide can be used as contact for the Mineral-oil industry.

In addition to the materials mentioned above I.G. produces a production of the materials listed below, if workers could be made available:

Active soda
natriumsulfid and-bisulfid
SO₂: gaseous and liquid
chlorine for Hg, ykcl; liquid for own needs
hydrochloric acid; own needs for chloroethyl liquid
chromalaun, waste lye from the production of wax at I.G. in Oppau
nitrobenzol: the supposition for this is, that the I.G. receives the necessary benzol
benzoic acid: can be manufactured on the basis naphtalin
lannigae extra (DX): raw-materials are urea, phenol, kresol; carbide-spirit. 500 moto for own needs
cylcheranol: artificial resin and anon-resin
phal-acid-glyzeride: in Ludwigshafen, only partial esterization further processing takes place in Uerdingen. But there also, a first step of esterization can be done.
dyes: only those, which cannot be manufactured in other I.G. factories.
aethylendinitrat: to be checked, whether it could be used as an explosive in the case of mobilization.
dinitronaphtalin: here the same as for aethylendinitrat. So far neither aethylendinitrat nor dinitronaphtalin were intended as base-products for explosives.

I.G. Farbenindustrie (Dr. MOHL) asked the question whether the manufacturing of fertilizers should continue in Oppau. For that mainly nitric acid is needed as a raw-material, so that also the nitric-acid plant must run full swing. As to nitric acid, Dr. MOHL stated, that Dr. KRAUCH, Ludwigshafen, gave instructions to manufacture concentrated nitric acid in case of mobilization. W Stb stated that the production of powder and explosives was not dependent on the delivery of concentrated nitric acid from Ludwigshafen.

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO. EC 97
Cont'd

It can generally be said of this presented plan of production that it presupposes the use of all installations for the production of the most important chemical raw-materials, such as sulphuric acid, nitric acid, chlorine, hydrochloric acid. This would mean in this opinion, that only a small percentage of the workers presently employed in Ludwigshafen would be available in case of mobilization.

It is therefore proposed, in case Ludwigshafen received a mobilization task at all, to limit this to the first named products and to consider the larger mobilization task for only an east-incident (Ostfall).

W. R. 171 (a)
As d

Berlin, 8 December 1938

NOTE

concerning a conference at the Supervisory Office "Chemistry" on 6 December 1938.

Present:	Ob.-Reg.-Rat Dr. LENZ)	
	Dr. KRAFT)	Reich Ministry of Economics
	Dr. HAGEMT		Supervisory Office "Chemistry"
	Reg.-Rat, Dr. MARECK)	
	Reg.-Rat, Dr. THEISEL)	High Command of the Wehrmacht
	Dr. KELL)	
	Dipl.-Ing. NEUMANN)	I.G. Farbenindustrie A.G.

Subject: Mob-(mobilization) Requisition of Ludwigshafen works.

I.G. Farbenindustrie had approached the Supervisory Office "Chemistry" asking whether Ludwigshafen could produce in case of mobilization, and whether it could be reckoned with that Ludwigshafen would be supplied with raw materials for its productions. As to the question of raw materials, the representatives of the I.G. stated that Ludwigshafen would be in a position to produce by itself all raw materials for its products with the exception of Benzol and Toluol; with regard to these Ludwigshafen would depend on the purchase from outside. In detail the Benzol requirements are stated by the I.G. as follows:

for colors	160 t
" polyacryl	182 t
" styrol (for Bann)	140 t
" betaphenylpropytilamin	70 t
" Omega salt	75 t
" dinitrodiphenylamin	50 t

According to the statements of I.G., the total requirements will amount to 805 tons 90 percent Benzol, Toluol for Ludwigshafen would be obtained from the latter.

In order to obtain a general view of the requirements of raw material and workmen, those products, which can be manufactured exclusively or for the greater part only in Ludwigshafen were taken as a basis for the plan shown below regarding the requisition of the Ludwigshafen works in case of mobilization (Mobilisierung):

(Page 2 of original)

Acetylenchlorhydrin: Preliminary product for the productions of ROEHM & HAAS
Acetylenoxyd from alcohol: for diglykol and thiodiglykol, also for glykol
Zinnchloride: for chloracetophenon

Wash up of arsen cleansing

Chloroethyl: efficiency 250 moto

Cyanatrium

Diglykol

Formaldehyd: raw material for pentaerythrit-Tannigames

Oxol: considered with thiodiglykol

M.P. material, capacity 150 moto

Nebel powder: is to be considered only as far as it is required for the production of emulwater 1000 for buna

Omega salt

Palatinol

Pentaerythrit: is to be considered as long as plants are provided in Inner Germany

Styrol: 300 moto efficiency; wherefrom 100 can be polymerized to polysterol

Zinnchloride: raw material for Natriumhydroxyd

Iron Powder

Urea: as far as it is used for Kaurit glue

Sal-ammoniac

Kaurit glue

Oppanol

Chlorsulfon acid: This material has to be tested to that effect whether it is to be transferred at all to Ludwigshafen.

Up to this date, a K.L.V. of the navy, made out to 330 t Nebel acid is provided. Just as well with regard to

Dimethylanilin, which normally is used for the production of dye-stuffs, it is to be tested whether it can be employed as explosive. Up to now, Dimethylanilin has not been required by the Wehrmacht as raw material for explosives.

Furthermore it must be tested to which extent

Thaunoxyd could be considered as a contact for the mineral oil industry.

(Page 3 of original)

Apart from the above mentioned materials, the I.G. suggests a production with regard to the following materials, under the condition that workmen will be released for this purpose.

Aktivruß (active soot)

Sodium sulfide and -bisulfide

SO₂, gaseous and liquid

Chloral for Diglykol, liquid for own requirements

Hydrochloric acid, own requirements for chloroethyl liquid

Chromalum, wast alkaline at the I.G. production of wax in Oppau

Nitrobenzol: at the condition that I.G. obtain the necessary benzol

Benzoe acid: can be produced on the basis of naphthalene

Tannigame extra (DX): Raw materials are urea, phenol, cresol, carbide spirit. 500 moto for own requirements

Cyclohexanol: for artificial resins and anone resin

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO. EC 97
Cont'd

Phthal acid glycerides: In Ludwigshafen only part esterification, further manufacturing is done in Uerdingen. But there a first stage of esterification can equally be performed.

Dyes: Only those which cannot be produced in other I.G. works.

Aethylendinitrate: It has to be examined whether in case of mobilization it is to be used for explosives.

Dinitronaphthalene: Here the same applies as for aethylendinitrate. Up to this date, neither aethylendinitrate nor dinitronaphthalene have been provided as preliminary products for explosives.

I.G. Farbenindustrie (Dr. MOHL) asked further whether the manufacturing of fertilizers was to be carried on in Oppau. For this manufacturing chiefly nitric acid is used as raw material so that the plant for the production of nitric acid had also to be kept in operation in full. As to nitric acid, Dr. MOHL further stated that Dr. KRAUCH, Ludwigshafen, had given orders to produce concentrated nitric acid in the case of mobilization. W Stb stated that the production of powder and explosives was not dependent on the supply of concentrated nitric acid from Ludwigshafen.

With regard to the above production plan, it can be said in general that it is conditioned upon the putting into operation of all plants for the production of the most important chemical raw materials, as sulphuric acid, nitric acid, chloride, hydrochloric acid. This would mean that only a small percentage of the workmen employed today in Ludwigshafen, would be available in case of mobilization.

(Page 4 of original)

Therefore it is suggested, in case Ludwigshafen is to receive a mobilization task at all to confine it to the first named products and to provide the greater mobilization task for an event in the East (Ostfall).

(Initialed) THI

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

I, Dr. HORN, 20004, herewith certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document No. EC 97.

Dr. HORN
20004

END

Copy

The Reich Minister of Economics
II Chem. 3637/39 g
You are requested to quote this reference
and the subject in future correspondence.

Berlin W 8, 5 July 1939
Behrenstrasse 43
Telephone: General No. 16 43
(lis): KC/106

(Stamp): Secret

To I.G. Farbenindustrie,
for the attention of Dr. Gorr
- or his deputy -
Berlin W 8
Unter den Linden 82.

Subject: IG-Farben, Ludwigshafen/Oppau Works.

13
marginal
22 June The situation in your Ludwigshafen/Oppau Works which, from the point of view of military economy, must be considered most perilous, and which has often been discussed with the officials of Vermittlungsstelle W already, has led to the discussion of the problems arising from it in a Reich Ministry of Economics' conference in conjunction with representatives of the Supreme Command of the Wehrmacht and the Reich Commissioners for Chemistry. This discussion took place on 26 June under the chairmanship of Ministerialdirigent Mulert in the presence of representatives of I.G. Farbenindustrie.

Firstly, it was explained that all the main building projects in Ludwigshafen/Oppau, except the Oppanol plant, the fatty acid plant and the nitrogen extension are practically completed. The plant for the production of polysuperamide has only just been started.

In order to ensure that further additions to the Ludwigshafen/Oppau Works shall in no circumstances be made if considerations of military economy make this seem inadvisable, I request that in future the Reich Ministry of Economics be informed of all new plans for expansion in sufficiently good time for objections to be made to the execution of these plans and for the extension to be held up, in so far as this is necessary for reasons of military economy. Letters on the subject are to be sent direct to the Reich Ministry of Economics for the attention of Ministerialdirigent Dr. Mulert, quoting the subject heading, "Examination of Building Projects, from the point of view of Military Economy."

In the discussion of individual products produced in the plant, which are 100% or almost 100% produced in Ludwigshafen/Oppau,

(page 2 of original)

it became apparent that an improvement of this situation which, from the point of view of mobilization is extremely grave, is possible only in part. In connection with this, the following courses are to be differentiated:

- I. Products, the production of which can be transferred by I.G. Farben to other works in peace time.

(page 2 of original cont'd)

- II. Products, the production of which can be instituted without much difficulty in other I.G. works in the event of mobilization.
- III. Products, the production of which cannot be transferred at short notice, but of which it is possible by means of increased production in the plants at present not fully exploited, to make supplies available for stock-piling.

Independently of the possibilities already discussed for individual materials, I should like to examine rapidly what measures you would consider and suggest it expedient and possible to take in connection with the products concerned. In view of the fact that the appended list, compiled from the data available here is incomplete,

I request you to supplement available information wherever necessary. With regard to the materials which definitely come into question for stock-piling, I repeat that the quantity of urea to be stored is to be estimated at 10,000 tons and of ethylene glycol probably 1,000 tons.

As resolved during the conference, the relatively large share taken by the Ludwigshafen/Oppau Works as late as 1933 in the production of

dinitro diphenyl amine
beta naphthol
dimethylaniline
pure nickel and
brown oxide

should have been considerably reduced in the meantime by the extensions and stand-by plants. I request detailed confirmation of this.

In view of the urgency of the situation I should be grateful for immediate action.

By order
(signed): Dr. Lenz

Berlin

(page 3 of original)

(Stamp): Secret!

Berlin, 5 July 1939

To
the Supreme Command of the Wehrmacht
for the attention of Colonel Becht
-or deputy -

Berlin W 62
Kurfuerstenstrasse 125

(Illegible initials)
(Date 10 July)

(Wehrmacht staff Pw-III
7 July 1939
Number 2968739 G

Subject: I.G. Farben Works Ludwigshafen and Oppau

Urgent!

I enclose for your kind attention a copy of my letter to I.G. Farben in Paris dated 5 July.

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT No. NI-7121
CONTINUED

(page 3 of original cont'd)

By order
(signed): Dr. Lenz.

Stamp:
Reich Ministry of Economics

Certified
Signature: Foll
Clerk

(page 4 of original)

To II Chem. 3627/39 R. (Stamp): Secret! Berlin 5 July 1939

List of the products which are wholly or principally produced
in the I.G. Works Ludwigshafen and Oppau.

Initial a

Urea
Kaurit glue
Sodium hydrosulphite
Sodium sulphite
Zinc chloride
Carbonyl iron
Carbonyl nickel (without Froso)
Ammonium chloride
Ammonium carbonate
(Hartshorn salt)
Vanadic contacts
Brown oxide for ammonia oxidation
Ethylene glycol
Butyl alcohol
Cyclohexanol
Cyclohexanone
Palatinols (A.H.C.)
Malic acid
Betanaphthol
Phenyl betanaphthylamine
Nekalo (emulsifier 1000)
Dinitro diphenylamine
Acrylic acid ester
Dinitrothylaniline
Igolit IP
Oppanol
Polystyrene
Ramsite (for the water-proofing of fabrics)
o.- and p.-toluene sulfonide

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT No. NI-7121
CONTINUED

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

15 July 1947

I, BERYL C. BESNICK, No. D 427459, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages and that the above is a true and correct translation of the document No. NI-7121.

BERYL C. BESNICK, No. D 427459.

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT No. NI-7125
OFFICE OF CHIEF OF COUNSEL FOR WAR CRIMES

Rubber Stamp: Secret !

1. This is a secret matter within the meaning of Article 88 of the Reich Penal Code.
2. To be transmitted only under cover; if sent by post, to be registered.
3. To be kept, at the responsibility of the addressee, under lock and key.

I.G. Farbenindustrie Aktiengesellschaft
Vermittlungsstelle W

Reich Ministry of Economics
Attention: Min. Dirigent MUELT

Berlin - W 8
Behrenstr. 43

Rubber Stamp:

WStb
7 July 1939
Az.
Nr. 2955/39 f. Append...1

Dr.Di./Sch.

5 July 1939

Removal of important military products from Ludwigshafen
and Oppau to another place.

Having talked the matter over with the specialists of our plants, we want to tell you the following concerning the various Oppau products, which were discussed from a military view at our conference on 22 June 1939 at the Reich Ministry of Economics:

- 1) Urea. The urea factory at Oppau is idle at present, for lack of a market, but can start operating at any time. Urea requirements for feeding are estimated at 4-5,000 tons N per year for the current year and urea requirements for technical purposes are estimated at 3-4,000 tons N per year, while the urea requirement for fertilizing purposes need not be taken into account since urea can be substituted by other nitrogen fertilizers without disadvantage.

For a judgment of the military importance of urea for technical purposes we refer you to our letter of 1.9.1936 to Supervisory Office 'Chemistry' (Appendix 1), copies of which were sent to Ob.Reg.Rat Dr. Lenz and Ob.Reg.Rat Dr. Murek and which contains a list of the 15 or 20 most important consumers subdivided into firms or plants and purposes for which the product is used.

About 4,000 tons Nitrogen of the urea supply of the last production period at present being stocked at Oppau can be freed immediately for feeding and technical purposes;

(page 2 of original)

If additional quantities are to be stocked the following amounts would be available, in accordance with the Oppau production schedule:

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT No. WI-7125
CONTINUED

(page 2 of original, cont'd)

by December 1939, a further 1,500 tons Nitrogen
by March 1940, a further 1,500 tons Nitrogen
by June 1940, a further 3,000 tons Nitrogen.

I.G. is not planning the construction of another urea plant because the production facilities at Oppau are not utilized to the full. Concerning the construction of a stand-by plant, we refer you to our letters of 2 February 1937 to the Reich War Ministry and 7 February 1938 to the Reich War Ministry (Appendices 2 + 3).

In case of war (Ersatzfall) the best way of starting up production of urea would be by transferring certain machines and apparatus units from Oppau to Herseburg and joining them to the local nitrogen and carbonic acid production.

The urea supply stocked at Gertha, Doeberitz, Hamburg etc. a year ago had to be almost completely turned over for consumption. Because of the expected scarcity of nitrogen a urea stockpiling of 5-10,000 tons of nitrogen per year, which would have to be withdrawn from current consumption, would have to be discussed with the Reich Food Estate.

- 2) Kaurit-blue. Present production amounts to about 600 tons per month, of which about 100 tons per month can be diverted for stockpiling. The immediately available supply at Oppau, which might have to be transferred elsewhere, amounts to 300 tons. Since it is possible, in the opinion of the Oppau specialists, to build the facilities for production of Kaurit-blue from urea stocks on hand at any industrialized site in about 3 months, efforts should be made to obtain a stockpile of about 1,500 tons of Kaurit-blue powder, which keeps well.

(page 3 of original)

Whether it is necessary to stockpile other urea products, such as Plastopal for resin and lacquer production, Isorka as a cork substitute and others, can only be judged according to the military importance of the use to which they will be put, i.e. by questioning the customers concerning the products.

- 3) Ammonium chloride. Of present requirements for technical purposes amounting to about 4,000 tons Nitrogen per year, half is sent abroad and is mostly supplied by Oppau. In addition, Solvay/Bornburg as well as Langtzen/Bochum (sublimated NH_4Cl) can produce considerable quantities of ammonium chloride; further, Lussig, with a very small production for the present, it is true, as well as the firm of Blasberg + Rindskopf, Zuckmantel/Sudetenau (about 100 tons of nitrogen per year) could be employed.

As ammonium chloride lyes are plentiful in the soda factories and are mostly disintegrated, sizable productive facilities for ammonium chloride could be constructed pretty quickly in an emergency

(page 3 of original, cont'd)

by assembling additional crystallizing and evaporating sets, if necessary, from Oppau installations. Besides, an auxiliary production of pure ammonium chloride could be started by chemical reaction of hydrochloric acid and ammonia used in the chlorine factories. At present there are no supplies of ammonium chloride on hand in our depots; if necessary, however, production at Oppau could be pushed still more in order to free certain quantities for stockpiling, or also, impure ammonium chloride fertilizer could be stocked.

- 4) Ammonium carbonate (Hartshorn salt). Requirements, mainly for baking purposes, amount to about 1,000 tons N per year. The experiences of the Ruhr occupation in 1922 have shown that this production can be transferred in a short time (4-5 weeks) to another plant which has pure carbonic acid, such as is the case at Louna.

(page 4 of original)

The stockpiles stored with the consumers themselves should be adequate for this conversion period, in case of war (Ernstfall), so that additional stockpiling or other stand-by measures seem unnecessary.

- 5) Brown Oxide Contacts, which, besides ferric oxide, contain manganese and bismuth oxide or chroma oxide, are produced in our Wolfen-Farben plant, in addition to the Oppau plant. Owing to the platinum scarcity expected within I.C. in the event of war (Ernstfall) ammonia combustion is not to be completely changed over to the more effective platinum-rhodium contacts; Oppau and Wolfen/Bitterfeld are continuing to use brown oxide contacts in a certain number of ammonia combustion furnaces. The contact manufacturers in the plants themselves can easily meet their own requirements; if it becomes necessary in case of war (Ernstfall) to change over furnaces until now using platinum contacts to brown oxide contacts, the necessary conversion or rebuilding of furnaces would take longer than the construction of new facilities for the production of the required quantities of contacts.

Where brown oxide contacts for the production of water gas is concerned, the hydrogenation works to be constructed mean a considerably increased consumption. The stocks on hand at Gerthe and Wolfen (300 tons) as well as Oppau (200 tons) are sufficient to cover consumption for the coming 6 months. If the Oppau contact plant worked at full production (capacity 200-300 tons per month) it would be possible, in spite of starting operations and a first filling of new hydrogenation plants like Pöchlitz, Scholven and Rheinbenzin, to increase this 6-month supply still further.

If Oppau production is lost in case of war (Ernstfall) it would be best to increase production at Wolfen; besides, there is a possibility of starting a new production in Frose near Aschersleben, for

(page 4 of original, cont'd)

which eventually Oppau has already taken certain preparatory measures.

(page 5 of original)

- 6) Carbonyl Iron. Operation is dependent on the presence of large quantities of purified carbonic acid. Besides Oppau, Leuna comes closest to meeting this prerequisite; if considerably more were spent from additional investments (pure CO production) carbonyl iron production facilities, for instance for stand-by purposes, could also be constructed in Döberitz. In that case carbonic oxide would have to be drawn from the generators of the Hoko (high concentration) plant at Döberitz-Ost while comparatively favorable conditions for the manufacture of carbonyl in high pressure apparatuses and for the thermic disintegration would have to be created in the adjoining Gopel-Werd plant with regard to apparatuses and personnel.

In the case of war (Einsatzfall), carbonyl iron could be produced in Leuna on an auxiliary basis, and if necessary, thermic splitting to obtain pure iron could be done in disintegration furnaces to be constructed for that purpose at another site.

Owing to the continued great demand, supplies of any size for stockpiling unfortunately cannot be provided by Oppau until the end of the year. In view of the precarious situation of most non-ferrous metals, as seen from the military-economic point of view, the above-mentioned conditions, together with the modest supplies held by the main consumers of carbonyl iron (electrical firms) should sufficiently insure the continuance of supply and the possibility of substituting.

Concerning carbonyl nickel, our specialists have so far discovered no customer who absolutely depends on carbonyl nickel in powder form, as it can only be produced at Oppau. As far as we know today, the electrolytic nickel to be produced at our ^{new} plant in Frose/Aschersleben can be used for all important military purposes without any disadvantage. Stockpiling of nickel can only be started after the completion of the new plant at Frose, i.e. at about the end of the year.

(page 6 of original)

- 7) Oppanol. At present, Oppau is occupied with testing the process for producing Oppanol, which has until now been developed in a small, temporary installation, in the large experimental plant which has been built in the meantime. It is hoped to reach a production of 300 tons per month.

The necessary large production plant is planned in connection with a large plant for the production of iso-octane projected by the Reich Air Ministry, since both processes are based on the same pro-

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT, No. RI-7125
CONTINUED

(page 6 of original, cont'd)

liminary and intermediate products ($\text{CO} + \text{H}_2$ - gas and isobutyl oil). The site for these plants has not yet been determined. The neighbourhood of Bruex/Sudetenland is being considered; at any rate it can only be a site to which there are no objections from the military viewpoint. In view of the disproportion between supply and demand stockpiling is out of the question for the time being.

We request your opinion as soon as possible as to which of the methods for securing the above mentioned products for the military economy should be followed up in our Oppau plant. Our inquiries about storage possibilities have shown that the aim can probably be reached without building additional depots, as several depots in Central Germany, as well as our own idle Gerthe plant, can accommodate large additional quantities. Since the loading and transporting of the production to be stored, mentioned during the discussion of 22 June 1939, would take several months, it is very urgent that decisions concerning stockpiling be made soon.

For the actual carrying out of the stockpiling we assure, that, in the same way as was done last year with the removal work undertaken with the Wifo, the extra costs incurred by transfer to, or storage in a place, which while suitable from the military economic viewpoint, is unsuitable as a place of storage and disadvantageous as regards freight, will be refunded to us, while the goods themselves remain the property of I.G. and are at its disposal. Should

(page 7 of original)

large funds of I.G. have to be tied up by the demand for regular maintenance of the stocks by replenishing them from current production in case of deliveries to consumers, for instance, should the suggested urea stockpiling of 10,000 tons Nitrogen require about 6,000,000.- RM, a compensation would have to be made for impairing the liquid assets of I.G., and interest paid on this capital.

For the moment, we have tried to answer those questions with regard to Oppau products which were not adequately clarified at the discussion mentioned. For the Ludwigshafen products to be considered we shall submit the relevant data as soon as possible. Should the carrying out of the measures to be taken by you require the following up of individual questions concerning the requirements of the various projects in the way of personnel, materials, finance and time, or a detailed break-down of the consumers of the products listed, we shall be glad to help you.

Heil Hitler!

VERMITTLUNGSGEHEIM

(Rubber stamp)
signed: DIETMAR

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT No. NI-7125
CONTINUED

(page 7 of original, cont'd)

3 Appendices

Ø Oberreg.Rat Dr. Mareck, W-Stab,
Regierungsrat Dr. Lenz, Reich Ministry of Economics,
Dr. Ungewitter, Ue.St. Chemistry,
Management Office, Sparta I, Oppau,
Direktor Dr. Mueller-Cunradi, Oppau.

REGISTERED !

(page 8 of original)

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Secret !

1. This is a secret matter within the meaning of Article 88 of the Reich Penal Code.
2. To be transmitted only under cover; if sent by post, to be registered.
3. To be kept, at the responsibility of the addressee, under lock and key.

Supervisory Office Chemistry
Attention: Dr. UNGEWITTER

Berlin W 35.
Sigismundstr. 5

Dr.Z./No. 24 Aug. 1938 Dr.Di./Sch. 1 September 1938

Oppau Urea Depot

With reference to your letter of 24 August 1938 we enclose the following appendices:

- 1) Copy of our letter of 7.2.1938 to the W-Stab of the Reich War Ministry, Reg.Rat Dr. Mareck;
- 2) photostatic copy of the letter dated 9.2.1938 from our Oppau plant to the Nitrogen-Syndicate;
- 3) photostatic copy of the letter of 9.8.38 addressed to us by R. Henser.

We further inform you that, at our suggestion, the Nitrogen Syndicate, to safeguard the urea supply, is at present stockpiling large quantities of urea with the main consumers as well as with I.G. depots.

(page 8 of original, cont'd)

The size of the stockpiles should ensure sufficient supplies for the technical requirements for 6-10 months. The action should be finished by the end of next week.

We have brought about a similar stockpiling to secure the requirements of sal-ammoniac and hartshorn salt, which nitrogen products are also produced almost exclusively at Oppau. The urea factory in Oppau has a productive capacity of 35,000 tons N per year. Since present requirements amount to about 4,000 tons per year for technical purposes and about 4,000 tons per year for fertilizers, altogether 8,000 tons N per year, the urea factory in Oppau is only operating with a small part of its facilities or operating fully only periodically for a few months. The following are the main purchasers of urea for technical purposes:

(page 9 of original)

1) Syndicate customers:

Schering A.G., Berlin	550 tons per year	Dealer	
A.G. for chemical products Scheidemantel, Berlin	50 " " "	"	Own consumption
Feldmühle, Stettin	40 " " "	"	Sheet gelatine
Nochtigall, Schkeudan	20 " " "	"	glue manufacture
Anh. Salzworke, Stassfurt- Leopoldshall	20 " " "	"	
Theod. Rotta, Zwickau	50 " " "	"	dyeing purposes in the textile industry
E. Merck, Darmstadt	65 " " "	"	pharmaceutical pre- parations
Knoll, Ludwigshafen	20 " " "	" " "	
Carl Dicks, W.-Barmen	20 " " "	"	dealer
Pfennig-Schumacher, W.-Barmen	60 " " "	"	production of artifi- cial horn

2) Works affiliated with I.G.:

D.I.G., Troisdorf	750 " " "	"	production of pressed articles
Wolff & Co., Talsrode	110 " " "	"	production of cello- phane
Kalle & Co., Wiesbaden	350 " " "	"	production of cello- phane, azalid and soap diluents

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT No. MI-7125
CONTINUED

(page 9 of original, cont'd)

3) I.G.'s own consumption:

Aceta, Berlin	20 tons per year	production of textile raw materials
Elberfeld	25 " " "	production of pharmaceutical preparations
Hoechst	45 " " "	production of tannins and fire extinguishing agents
Ludwigshafen	40 " " "	mainly for Kuerit plus and
Oppau	2,900 " " "	plastopal production
Verdingen	300 " " "	for Four Year Plan products

As a result of the above-mentioned intermittent production the size of urea stockpiles varies very considerably. At present, about 1,000 tons urea are freely available at the Oxnard depot. Current production amounts on an average to 60 tons per day. About 200 tons per day can be stored or transferred elsewhere.

Ø o.l. to Re .Ret Dr. Murock,
"W-Stab of Armed Forces High
Command,
Ø o.l. to Ob.Re .Ret Dr. Lenz
Reich Ministry of Economics

Heil Hitler !

VERMITTLUNGSTELLE W

(Rubber stamp)
(signed) DIECKMANN

Appendices

5x

REGISTERED !

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT No. NI-7125
CONTINUED

(page 10 of original)

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1. This is a secret matter within the meaning of Article 28 of the Reich Penal Code.
2. To be transmitted only under cover; if sent by post, to be registered.
3. To be kept, at the responsibility of the addressee, under lock and key.

Reich War Ministry
W-Stab
Attention: Re. Rat Dr. HUNZICK

Berlin - W 35,

Tirnitzufer 72/76

Dr. Di./Sch.

7 February 1938

Urea Supply.

On the question of securing the urea supply if the present production is lost we would like to say the following:

In our opinion the best way to secure the urea requirements for important military purposes is to keep stocks in a safe place. With regard to space and rail connection the Döberitz-Cst plant seems to be well suited for the construction of such a stand-by depot, while there is no suitable place within the "high concentration" plant at Langelsheim. The construction of a simple wooden warehouse with a surface of 20 x 60 m, an interior height of 4 - 5 m, corresponding to a capacity of about 5,000 tons urea, costs about 100,000.- RM. roughly estimated. To keep down costs, mechanical installations for loading and unloading are not included; however, in case of war (Ernstfall) unloading by hand can be aided by a few moving conveyor belts.

An economically advantageous solution for the setting-up of a urea depot presents itself in our former nitrogen plant at Harna in Westphalia. A few concrete containers have remained from former salt-silos, which would merely have to be completed again. With an outlay of about RM. 120,000.- for construction of low side-walls and a flat roof with supports in between, for a surface of 30 x 60 m, suitable storage premises could be erected here to hold about 10,000 tons urea.

The depots thus provided could be filled with urea salt

(page 11 of original)

in a short time, if necessary, because the large production facilities of the Oppau urea plant are not fully utilized. An estimate of the

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT No. NI-7125
CONTINUED

(page 11 of original, cont'd)

cost would have to be obtained directly from the Nitrogen Syndicate department "Nitrogen for Industrial Purposes".

Concerning the construction of a plant for urea production (see your letter of 22 January 1937, Ref. 66 b 2161/IV V Stb, Dept. V No (III 5) 81/37 5) it can be said in principle that a urea plant would only be practicable in a plant in which a sufficient amount of carbonic acid (CO_2) of relatively high concentration or degree of purity is a by-product of whatever is being produced. Consequently, the existing nitrogen stand-by plants, as well as an ammonia plant producing on a basis of electrolysis, are not suitable for building a plant for urea production. However, a urea factory could be included in one of the large new plants, for instance in the Sueddeutsche Nitrogen plant planned by the Office for German Raw and Industrial Materials.

Please inform us, as to which of the above-mentioned methods for securing the urea supply is to be followed up in case of war (Einsatzfall).

Heil Hitler !

VEREINIGUNGSSTELLE W

(Rubber stamp)
signed: DOKTOR

6 Rec. Ret. Dr. Lenz, Reich Ministry of Economics
6 Management Office of Series I, Orpen
6 Dir. Henser, Berlin NW 7
6 Dr. Ungewitter, Berlin NW 35
on 1.9.1938

REGISTERED 1

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT No. NI-7125
CONTINUED

(page 12 of original)

CONFIDENTIAL

Reich War Ministry
Military-Economic Staff (Wehrwirtschafts-Stab)
Attention: Dr. Mureck

Berlin - 735

Bendlerstr. 27

Dr. Di./Sch.

2 February 1937

Urea plant.

We have forwarded your enquiry for a stand-by plant for urea to our technical office. However, we would like to say briefly already now that we think it would be much more economic to stockpile the required amounts in the safety zone than to build an installation for only 5,000 tons of urea per year.

Since the urea factory at Oppau has been semi-idle for a long time, the desired securing of the urea supply in case of war (Ersatzfall) could be achieved in a far shorter time and at less cost to the national economy by stock-piling, than by creating a suitable production site.

Heil Hitler !

(Rubber stamp:) VERMITTLUNGSEINLEITUNG
SPARTE I
signed: DINGEMAN

Dr. Kneuch
Berlin - W 8

REGISTERED !

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

7 August 1947

I, Samuel S. HORN, No. A.G.O. 443113, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages and that the above is a true and correct translation of the document No. NI-7125.

Samuel S. HORN
A.G.O.-443113

E

I.G. Farbenindustrie Aktiengesellschaft
Vermittlungsstelle W

(Stamp)
WStb. No III
10 July 1939
Ref. No. 65
No. 3029/39 secret Encl.

(Stamp):

Secret!

1. This is a state secret within the meaning of Article 86 of the Reich Penal Code.
2. To be transmitted only under cover; if sent by post, to be registered.
3. To be kept, at the responsibility of the addressee, under lock and key.

Reich Ministry for Economic Affairs
for the attention of Ministerialdirigent Dr. Hulert
Berlin W 8
Behrenstr. 43

Dr.G/S

7 July 1939

Transfer of stores of products essential to military economy
from Ludwigshafen and Oppau.

In pencil;
? inform.
about individual
products
initial:
R?

With reference to the conference at the Reich Ministry for Economic Affairs on 22 June of this year, and further to our letter of the 5th of this month, we send you additional information with regard to the transfer of products essential to military economy from Ludwigshafen.

Unfortunately we have been unable up to date to make more detailed estimates of prospective mobilization requirements with respect to individual products. We have therefore restricted ourselves to taking as a basis for our stockpiling considerations the mobilization production plans, which we submitted some time ago to the Plenipotentiary for Chemistry, Dr. Ungewitter. We ask you therefore to regard the following points as our first suggestions. As for the rest, we consider it most expedient, to store the products concerned, as far as possible, since such a procedure will cost least and is the quickest way of achieving the object. The establishment of new plant by transfer of installations set up elsewhere or by construction of new factories is only recommended by us in those cases in which stockpiling cannot be effected quickly enough or where it cannot be effected at all. In general it would in any case seem irresponsible to build new factories at the moment owing to the existing shortage of materials and skilled labor.

(page 2 of original)

If a stockpiling policy is adopted, we intend to store the reserves at Gerthe, where sufficient storage space is available. But even stockpiling can only be carried out, if the necessary packing materials (Jute bags, wooden or iron casks) or the raw materials for them are allocated to us. In some cases the production for reserve stocks will only be possible, if additional labor will be made available to us to cope with the additional work involved. How much importance we must ascribe to this point, can be seen from the fact, that today we are short of 700 workers already without taking into consideration production for reserve stocks in our Ludwigshafen and Oppau plants which might become necessary.

Our attitude to various projects under discussion is as follows:

(in pencil): la) Polystyrene

Conference

on 18 July

1939 with

Lenz, Kraft,

Gerr,

Hu and Zw.

to
follow

The only producer is Ludwigshafen. A further place of production for monomeric styrene is Schkopau with 700 tons per month. Beyond that the extension of production capacity to 1500 tons per month of monomeric styrene is being carried out. Furthermore, from the middle of 1940 onward, Huels will have attained an equal production capacity of monomeric styrene. We shall report to you shortly about the possibility of setting up a polystyrene plant at Schkopau or Huels. It can be assumed that the necessary quantity of monomeric styrene can be made available from the large productions at Schkopau and Huels.

In the near future stockpiling of styrene only can be considered, which will, however, not be possible before January 1940, with approx. 150 tons per month.

(page 3 of original)

For this 1200 wooden casks with tin-lining per month are required. Furthermore, 18 workers should be made available to us in order to increase the production accordingly.

1b) Polystyrene EF.

Ludwigshafen is the sole producer of this product also, but even now it can be produced at Schkopau in small quantities at any time for the production of

2) Igelit HP.

(in pencil):
stockpiling
150 t incl.
packing
material

At present the only place of production is Ludwigshafen. The setting-up of a new plant would involve extremely large expenses and would require a construction period of many years. We have therefore refrained from estimating the costs for the materials required, all the more, since stockpiling of approx. 100 tons per month will be possible from October of this year onward,

(page 3 of original, cont'd)

For this 3000 lined jute bags per month would be required. Furthermore four workers would have to be assigned to us.

3) Synthetic Resin AE 2.

For most purposes this product can be replaced by the allydals produced in our Uerdingen plant, so that we do not consider it absolutely necessary to secure supplies of this product for the event of mobilization. Besides, a possibility for stockpiling is not possible at present, owing to the lack of appropriate facilities.

4) Ramasit.

A second plant for the production of ramasit apart from Ludwigshafen is not available.

(page 4 of original)

(in pencil): Because of the short life of the product storing of ramasit is out of the question. The setting up of a mobilization plant in Schkopau is being worked on by us. We shall report to you on the project shortly.

(in pencil): 5.) Nekale.

which Ministry
of Economics
Schkopau
according
.....
illegible

Nekant is mainly the brand BXS which is required for the production of the fire-extinguishing agent "Tutogen". As Schkopau is in a position to produce at any time the necessary quantities of nekale BXS in already existing plants, all measures to secure production should be unnecessary.

6.) Palatinols.

Although Ludwigshafen is at present the sole producer, the possibility exists, if necessary, to substitute other softening agents for palatinols, such as tricresyl phosphate. Furthermore, stockpiling of this product up to 50 tons per month is feasible, for which 100 iron drums per month would be required.

7.) Tanigens.

As the products from Ludwigshafen represent only so-called additional tannins, which are used first of all as admixtures to natural tannins to obtain first rate leather, we do not consider it absolutely necessary to take special measures to secure production. In any case stockpiling of 70 tons per month is possible. For this 675 and 400 beech casks per month are required. We also need 12 workers.

(page 5 of original)

I.G. Farbenindustrie Aktiengesellschaft
Vermittlungsstelle W

7.7.1939

8.) Phthalic Acid Anhydride.

At the present time there is already considerable production capacity in Schkopau (about 225 tons per month). Beyond this an expansion of the plant in Schkopau to produce further 150 tons per month has been planned. Stockpiling of the above product is not possible at the present time.

(Pencil:) (just like the ethyl chlorine plant!)

9.) Glycol.

Stockpiling of this product cannot be carried out at the present time. On the other hand, it does seem possible to produce an additional 100 tons per month of glycol, in addition to the amounts of diglycol envisaged, in the stand-by plants Wolfen (in operation), Schkopau (ready for operation at the beginning of 1940) and Huels (ready for operation by the middle of 1940.) The additional amounts of ethylene oxide required for this are available from Zweckel and Holten.

10.) Butanol.

In addition to Hoechst andacker, butanol is also being produced by Schkopau and, beginning with the middle of 1940, by Huels. We consider the position to be so secure that no particular measures are required, particularly since the total production capacity of the plants mentioned is several times as large as that of Ludwigshafen.

11. Anole

12. Anone (cyclohexanone)

Ludwigshafen is not the sole producer. Anole is also being produced by the Dehydraz and by Aassig. Aassig also produces anone. In addition it is at present possible already to produce about 200 tons of anole per month in Leuna.

(page 6 of original)

Particular measures for guaranteeing production therefore do not seem necessary to us.

(page 6 of original, cont'd)

13.) Dinitrodiphenylamine.

The situation here no longer seems critical, since the stand-by plant which is planned in Wolfen will be ready for operation this fall yet, with a monthly capacity of 125 tons. A further stand-by plant will be available beginning in the spring of next year in Doberitz. Capacity also 125 tons per month. If so desired, stockpiling of about 30 tons per month would be possible today already. For this 300 lined jute bags per month would be required. In addition 10 workers would have to be assigned to us.

14. Dimethyl Aniline.

As far as we know, dimethyl aniline is no longer required for the production of explosives. Besides, Uerdingen can produce about 45 tons of this product per month. Stockpiling with about 40 tons per month is also possible, for which 80 iron drums per month would be required and 3 workers would have to be assigned.

15. Orthotoluenesulfonamide.

In addition to Ludwigshafen, there are also production plants at Heyden and Fahlberg-List. If this should soon necessary, about 25 tons per month could be stored. For this 250 lined jute bags per month would be required. In addition 18 workers would have to be assigned to us.

16. Phenylbetanaphthylamine.

At the present time a further plant for the production of the

(page 7 of original)

above product is planned in Huels. We have already stored 600 tons of phenylbetanaphthylamine. Further stockpiling is projected. Concerning the amount of this we shall communicate with you further.

17. Betanaphthol.

Betanaphthol is being produced at Hoechst, as well as at Ludwigshafen. Both have about equally large production capacity. In our judgment, Hoechst is in a position to cover the total mobilization requirements of the above product.

18.) Maleic Acid.

Ludwigshafen is the sole producer. Stockpiling can be carried out comparatively rapidly. 30 tons can be stored per month, for which 200 wooden casks per month would be required. Further measures for guaranteeing production do not seem necessary at the present time.

(page 7 of original, cont'd)

19. Hydrosulphite.

(Pencil):
Hruschau out
of question
since too
close to
border

Ludwigshafen is the principal producer. In addition Englert and Decker, Prague, have a capacity of about 25 tons per month and in Hruschau (Protectorate) of about 200 tons per month. In addition, in our opinion, Bruggemann, Heilbronn, could change over to hydrosulphite. The costs of erecting a plant, including starting material, at another location, will be estimated by us and communicated to you shortly.

As of 1.1.1940, moreover, stockpiling of about 300 tons per month is possible, for which 4000 corrugated iron drums per month would be required. In addition about 20 workers would have to be assigned to us.

(page 8 of original)

Incidentally, at present we have at our disposal 1500 tons of the product.

20. Sodium Sulphite.

(Pencil):
1.No expansion
of
Hoechst
2.Stock
piling of
1000 tons
3. Illegible

In addition to one at Ludwigshafen, there is a production center at Heyden (about 90 tons per month), at Suhr (presumably 60 tons per month), in Aussig (about 40 tons per month) and Tiesing (about 20 tons per month). In case of need there is the possibility of producing at our plants at Hoechst, Leverkusen and Wolfen anhydrous sulphite from material containing water (150 - 200 tons per month). Moreover, beginning immediately stockpiling at the rate of 300 tons per month is possible, for which 1500 corrugated iron drums per month and the assignment of 6 workers would be required.

21.) Zinc chloride.

In addition to Ludwigshafen there are the following producers: Goldschmidt (presumably 500 tons per month) (pencil:) Mariano Hob tasks Marquardt (presumably 40 tons per month) Aussig (about 300 tons per month in the form of lye.)

In case of need zinc chloride could also be produced in Leverkusen, Hoechst and Wolfen (together about 220 tons per month).

(Pencil):
Stores
1800 tons

We propose stockpiling at the rate of 100 tons per month up to a total stockpile of 3000 tons. For this about 500 drums per month would be required, and 10 workers would have to be assigned to us.

22.) Carbon Black.

Since carbon black is being produced at various places outside of Ludwigshafen with presumably more than 2000 tons, we believe

(page 9 of original)

(Pencil:)
nil

that particular guarantees of production are not required. Stockpiling would also be impossible at the moment, due to lack of facilities.

23.) Vanadium Contact.

(Pencil:)
Hruschau drops
out. Find out
how much.....
Dependent there-
on no stock-
piling only....

In addition to Ludwigshafen, vanadium contact is also being produced in Aussig and Hruschau (together about 16 cubic meters per month). 90 cubic meters are already stockpiled at other I.G. plants. We propose further stockpiling at the rate of about 30 cubic meters per month to a total of 240 cubic meters. For this 150 corrugated iron drums would be required. Moreover, the assignment of two workers would be necessary.

Concerning further products, for which there is, in addition to Ludwigshafen, no additional I.G. production point, we shall make a report to you later on.

As already mentioned, we request that you consider the above statements as being an initial statement of opinion on our part.

(Pencil:)
I.G. to make
offers accordingly,
including price
and packing
materials, showing
requirements
of iron

We repeat our proposal that we be informed in sufficient time with regard to which of the above products you feel that it is necessary to take special measures to guarantee production, on the basis of our statements, in order that we may then, preferably in personal interviews, discuss the details of procedure, particularly the regulation of the matter of costs and the questions of obtaining containers and workers.

Zur 18/7

Heil Hitler!

Vermittlungsstelle W
signed Gorr

- ✦ Oberregierungsrat Dr. Hareck, W Staff,
- ✦ Dr. Ungewitter, Control Office Chemistry (U.St.Chemie)
- ✦ Oberreg. Rat Dr. Lenz, Reich Ministry of Economics.

(Translator's note : the original has numerous marginal notes in handwriting, most of them illegible.)

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

24 July 1947

I, Leonard LAWRENCE, No. 20 138, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages and that the above is a true and correct translation of the document No. NI-7124.

Leonard LAWRENCE
No. 20 138

- 7 -
"END"

138

A F F I D A V I T

I, Georg von SCHNITZLER, member of the Vorstand of I. G. Farbenindustrie from 1925 until 1945, after having been warned that I will be liable to punishment for making a false statement herewith state the following under oath of my own free will and without coercion.

1. In the first four paragraphs of my affidavit of 4 March 1947, which I swore to before a representative of the Office of Chief of Counsel for War Crimes, I have stated the true circumstances under which I gave information, by means of statements and interrogations, concerning the I. G. Farbenindustrie and other matters to Allied investigators in 1945. These four paragraphs should also be considered as an introduction to this affidavit. Below I consider further statements or interrogations which I subscribed to during 1945, and which I have been shown and which I have re-read between 18 February 1947 and the present time. When I subscribed to these statements or interrogations in 1945, the matters to which I subscribed were true to the best of my knowledge and belief at that time. The errors I now find after re-reading the statements or interrogations mentioned below are set forth below after the text of each of the statements or interrogations.

VS
VS
VS

1945.

2. On 8 August 1945 I signed an eleven page statement covering many points in the development of the I. G. Farbenindustrie during the Nazi Regime. I worked on this statement for two or three days in seclusion in Frankfurt in August 1945 and wrote it up in longhand. After the statement was typed up from my longhand original, I signed and certified to the truth of the typewritten statement. The text follows:

"The I. G. by force had to follow the general development in Germany. Whatever government ruled Germany, the key position of the I.G. in the whole chemical field undisputed since I.G.'s foundation in 1925 had to play and always played the decisive role in everything which was connected with chemistry. I remember a remark of Strossmann made to me in 1927: 'What have I as a trump in my hands apart of you, the I.G., and the coal people? That I.G. would follow a line, which was not in conformity with the line of the government, was simple

(signed) G v Schnitzler

unimaginable and that I.G. could refrain from an order given by the government or take the attitude of an open or clandestine opposition was out of question - even at a time when Germany was a democratic state and government measures could be openly criticized.

Thus I.G. was "governmental" under Stresemann as well as under Brüning, as under Papen.

When Hitler legally came to power, instituted by old Reichspräsident von Hindenburg, in the beginning the attitude of I.G. in regard of the Nazi government was simply the continuation of the attitude I.G. had taken vis a vis former governments. - But very soon it became evident that the Nazi-regime which had started as a coalition-government together with Deutsch-Nationale Volkspartei - which latter party had 3 ministers in the cabinet - intended to go quite different ways from former governments and by and by we learned what a totalitarian state meant in reality and what consequence that had for us.

The party claimed all power for itself. "Die Partei befiehlt dem Staat" - "The party gives its orders to the state" - was the official device, and the state is the instrument through which the totality of its inhabitants is ruled.

No political influence of professional groups was anymore tolerated - and in short I.G. found itself entirely devoid of all political influence. This state of things in no way was regarded as satisfactory and without a special order given in that direction a large-scale subvention action was started. From the local little bosses up to Hermann Goering personally under the most varied names and through the most varied channels bigger and smaller sums were being given to the party, all with the aim to creating a better atmosphere, because very radical ideas in certain party-circles about the "Gross-Concerns" and particularly about the I.G. were common opinion.

The money was being taken but the result was more or less null and up to the last time of the war I.G. always was suspected to be "a state in the state" and the dismemberment of I.G. never left the clandestine party-program. On the other hand the party in the form of "Adolf-Hitler Spende" and "Winterhilfswerk" - W.H.W. and many other ways converted the subventions given formerly as a sort of bribery into a legal claim. -

When Hitler came to power he had promised to the masses the end of unemployment and he put this part of this program in the foreground.

In order to create work the industry had to get orders, and I.G. undoubtedly was one of the first ones to have advantages of it. As foreign currency was scarce - the great crash of 1931 lay only two years behind - an interior market had to be created and products which had before been imported had now to be manufactured in Germany - with the double aim, to save the foreign currency necessary for the import of textiles, metals, food, etc. and at the same time give additional work to German workmen. Thus, now 12 years later it is difficult to ascertain if the beginning of the "rearmament"-movement was rightout started as a military measure or if the first phase till the end of 1936 was not a primarily economic one in so far as the production of synthetic oil, synthetic rubber, rayon, synthetic fibres, a.s.o. was not only fostered to get materials for warfare but in order to make Germany in those products self-supporting and save the foreign currency for their importation. -

(signed) G v Schnitzler

(Page 2 of the original)

The policy of "autarcy" and "rearmament" was so closely interconnected with one another that it really represents unsurmountable difficulties to distinguish which element of both was the prevalent one.

However it was, I.G. very soon profited by it and whereas in 1932 I.G.'s total expenditure for new plants and equipments was, I think, only 10-12 million marks, it climbed in the years 1934 - 36 rapidly and from thereon took a raging trend.

The technical possibilities being involved in that trend had undoubtedly a great fascination upon our technical people. Plans for which they could not see any practical realisation as long as a normal economy existed, became realisable and the most fascinating prospects seemed to lie in the future. That this development in the last must lead 1) to impoverishment that means to a lowering of the standard of living, 2) to war, nobody did or wanted to realize. Even a man so strictly opposed to the Nazi-regime as Dr. Bosch who was the only one who once has dared to contradict openly Hitler - with disastrous result by the way, as I later on was told, had no hesitation to put Krauch at Goering's disposition, when being asked for a high ranking chemist who should take over the leadership of "Amt für Wirtschaftsaufbau" and Bosch was a convinced democrat, a convinced partisan of a peace-policy.

The whole development of I.G. in the years beginning with 1934 and accelerated since the end of 1936 is entirely due to the close team-work with government and Wehrmacht.

The export-trade remained stationary at some 400 - 450 million marks and the buying-capacity of the civil population was not highered (raised) as the nominally higher incomes in toto were counterbalanced by a loss in the so-called "Realeinkommen" and higher taxes.

Practically the whole augmentation in the turnover of I.G. from a little over 1 billion marks to 3 billions in 1943 is a 100% result of the rearmament and the war policy of the German government.

The totality of Buna, of metals, of high-octane oil, of most chemicals, at least 2/3 of the Nitrogen, and a great percentage of dyestuffs and pharmaceuticals went directly or indirectly to the Wehrmacht. A high percentage of this turnover from the very beginning was more or less guaranteed by the Wehrmacht. Agreements of the most different kind were being concluded but nearly all were based on solid ground insofar as the Reich guaranteed the amortization (light metals) or had arranged for a protective duty (oil, buna) or prescribed the use for the consuming industry (synthetic fibre). The result always was identical after a certain time the factories became or should become I.G.'s unburdened property. This latter result could be achieved with a raised rapidity with the so-called Ostwerke where the whole equipment could be amortized in the year of its investment provided that the owner made sufficient profits in the whole.

The direct consequence hereof was that I.G. notwithstanding that it spent some 500 million marks in the average of the last years had not substantially to augment its capital and that I.G.'s balance sheet under "plants and equipment" shows a practically unchanged figure. This state of things and the apparent splendid situation of I.G.'s balance weakened the central administration. - Young and active technicians like Ambros, Bütetisch, Wurster, but even men in positions not ranking as high like Altwicker and Ziegler in Bitterfeld

(signed) G v Schnitzler

in the metal-field handled on their own, problems of the greatest importance, engaged I.G. in always greater commitments. They used the word "Auflage", - "impost" of Wehrmachtsstelle X, but sometimes it never became quite clear if our technical men themselves had not deliberately induced the Wehrmacht to that "Auflage". The central administration registered the facts, when it

(Page 3 of the original)

came to the settlement of the expenses, but had very little to say in the matter. - To a large extent Krauch's office was a governing factor in these relations as the "Amt" under Goering's responsibility in the domains reserved to it, decided what quantities and where the respective production should be erected. In Sparte I Dr. Blütfisch took the lead in this direction and practically rounded out Dr. Schneider in the oil field, but Dr. Müller-Cunradi in close contact with Dr. Krauch did the same in the different domains being connected with Oppau and including the whole high-pressure field with the exception of the oil - but still Dr. Müller-Cunradi being in charge of the new works in Heydebreck was hereby the head of the so-called Tannol-Anlage, which to the best of my knowledge represented a new high octane fuel. A similar development took place in Sparte II. Dr. Ambros and Dr. Wurster as well as the chemists in Bitterfeld, here mostly in the metal field, but in some other domains of chemistry destined for warfare just as well became entirely independent of the "Spartenleitung" and acted immediately with the different authorities of the Wehrmacht.

But things were very complicated in such a sense as the Wehrmacht had 3 or 4 quite independent departments and apart of the Wehrmacht Reichswirtschaftsministerium and Reichsbeauftragter Chemie had many functions reserved to them.

Between Reichsbeauftragter Chemie (Dr. Ungewitter) and Dr. Krauch quarrelling never ceased, as overlapping of authority happened all the time.

In the last phase of the war following ideas of President Kehrl of the Reichswirtschaftsministerium, the organization of the "Gewerbliche Wirtschaft" became entitled to act to a large extent as a decisive factor and in principle a corporative system was in full creation. The result for I.G. was - although I.G. men generally were not being put in the foreground, because President Kehrl was in strong opposition against I.G. - that the overvalming technical position of I.G. rendered it the deciding factor.

As an example I only may cite Dr. Wurster's activity - he indeed was put in the foreground - in the field of sulphur and sulphuric acid, who in fact ruled that important item of warfare chemistry with sovereignty. This system of corporative development was neither invented nor in principle fostered by I.G. but the facts were stronger than Mr. Kehrl's ideas and the industrial potential of I.G. became bigger and bigger.

Surely personal ambition and the pleasure of expending, mostly of the younger chemists, played its role in that development, but on the whole it was natural consequence of the war becoming more and more "total" and because nobody else than I.G. could handle those problems.

The combination of highly qualified chemists, big laboratories, an enormous potential of patents and experiences and a great financial capacity was too strong as not always being the decisive factor to I.G.'s advantage whenever a problem arose which had to be solved.

Apart of this technical situation the development of I.G. during the last 12 years can't be separated from the Governments foreign policy.

(signed) G v Schnitzler

From the very beginning it was the government's intention to make the "Mitteleuropäische Raum" as far as possible self-supporting and direct German import from overseas to the continent. Intensifying trade-relations to the south and the south-east of Europe even at the price of material sacrifices was the "mot d'ordre"; the next one was the intensification of the South-America business on the basis of barter-trading in order to get from there the products which were not available any more for Germany in the U.S. as the Reichsbank did not dispose of the necessary Dollars. Although I.G. was not in the least a partisan of this policy and would have preferred to develop its great international business on the line of a "most favoured nation"

(Page 4 of the original)

basis it had to follow the new trend - on the simple reason, that there did not exist any other possibility. Occasional suggestions in order to get a better stand were successful in the case of England for instance, but on the whole the official policy was carried through without giving the export-industry a chance to intervene. During the years from 1933 to 1937 I.G.'s expansion outside of Germany did not make a substantial progress. It kept up its position and its participations, but very little as far as I can recollect, had or could have been done or was added to it in entirely new investments, but what has been done, did not yet happen in the S.E. countries but in the countries of I.G.'s old established industrial activities in the Anglo-Saxon and Latin countries, in England f.i. the foundation of the British Magnesium Co. A complete change took place since 1938. Firstly by purely private negotiations of course with the approval of the government with I.G.I. an important agreement was being concluded, the foundation of the Trafford Park Chemical Co.

Much greater problems, however, had to be approached in by the incorporation of Austria and Sudetenland into Germany, with the creation of the so-called "Gross-Deutschland". To both countries I.G. always had exported on a large scale, in both countries a chemical industry existed, of which the
vS "Aussig'er Verein" and Dynamit A.G., Pressburg were old established enterprise built upon a broad basis.

Relations of close team-work with the Aussig'er Verein and I.G. had
vS been operating for decades. In the dyestuff field a cartel agreement with the Verein had been concluded in 1934.

This dyestuff position of the Verein was the key of the whole problem, I.G. being the only producer of dyestuffs in Germany except one small
vS Swiss-owned company in Grengach on the German-Swiss border. Thus I.G. did not want anybody else enter that domain inside the German territory. As Chemische Fabrik V. Heyden had succeeded to get the permission of Reichswirtschaftsministerium to deal with the Verein about the purchase of the works in Aussig and Falkenau, I.G. had firstly to approach v. Heyden. An agreement was reached that both handled the question jointly on a 50:50 basis. In the then following negotiations the group v. Heyden-I.G. acquire the two factories with their coal basis at a fair price, formed a new company, called it Chemische Werke Aussig-Falkenau G.m.b.H. and this latter company leased the dyestuff department by a long-termed agreement to I.G.

The relations with the Verein remained friendly. Not only was the Verein's position in the remaining Tschecho-Slovakia fully recognized, but a joint plant of synthetic fibre on I.G.'s processes was built up in Pressburg with a participation of 40% of the Verein, reserving to the Verein the supply of raw-materials from the Verein's factories in Nowaky and Handlowa.

(signed) G v Schnitzler

Undoubtedly the I.G. as well as v. Heyden took advantage of the cession of the Sudetenland to Germany, but on the other hand the Zivno-Bank and its Generaldirektor Dovrazek were of the opinion that the Verein could not keep the factories under the changed circumstances. Mr. Dovrazek himself took an active part in the negotiations and even helped to find the compromise-formula, upon which the two parties agreed.

Whereas in the Sudetenland no other industrial activity of I.G. became practical the industrialisation of Austria required a substantial participation of I.G. in it. After the Anschluss I.G. had acquired the majority of Skoda Wetzlar works from Wiener Kreditanstalt and transformed this company into the Donau-Chemie A.G. The Donau-Chemie in the future became the stepping stone of the great development which took place in the chemical domain and culminated in the building up of huge installations in Moosbierbaum in the domain of power, sulfuric acid, hydrogenation of oil and magnesium. The latter plant, of course, never came to a start as the Luftwaffe stopped all work on it. In connection with this activity in Austria another great step to industrialisation took place in Slovakia. Since long years the D.A.G. (Dynamit A.G.) had a controlling interest in Dynamit Pressburg. Apart of the main works in Pressburg, D.A.G. owned a couple of smaller factories in Austria and participations in Hungary, Roumania and Jugoslavia.

(Page 5 of the original)

Of the Austrian factories part was consumed in Donau-Chemie (Bruckl and Landeck), the others remained as such in the form of independent Dynamite Cos. Pressburg itself took a gigantic expansion and developed a great export-trade to Hungary and the Balkan countries. - But the development in the S.E. was by far overrun by the industrial development which took place after the war against Poland. Based upon the coal of Upper-Silesia two gigantic works were being taken under construction, the one in Heydebreck on old German territory (recognised as German after the plebiscite of 1921), the other one on Polish territory in Auschwitz, between Kottowitz and Krakow. The factory in Heydebreck entirely belonged to Sparte I, the one in Auschwitz represented a combination of Sparte I and II, under the leadership of Sparte II and with Buna as the main-product. Both works for my opinion made slow progresses and came into fabrication only very late, with more substantial quantities in 1943 and 1944, but they never reached a state of real or full accomplishment. I think, some 800 million marks have been spent on them, half of which nearly, I would say, was written off.

Although at different times Dr. Ambros had invited me to visit Auschwitz, I have never been neither in Auschwitz nor Heydebreck and my knowledge solely reposes on reports given by Dr. Ambros and Dr. Müller-Cunradi. In connection with these works we acquired a controlling interest in a coal-mine - the Fürstengrube - and were just dealing about a further interest in it, when the war entered in its last phase. Apart of this huge enterprises the Pharma had acquired land not so very far from Breslau on the Oder near Dyhrenfurt with the idea to construct there a pharmaceutical factory.

This never materialized and Dr. Ambros at a date unknown to me took over the leadership of that place. There under the firm of Anorgana G.m.b.H. for the account of the Reich I.G. fabricated the new, as I later on heard, in Elberfeld invented poisoned gases. This fabrication, of course, was kept so secret, that only in the beginning of the year 1945 (January to February) I heard for the first time of it, when Dr. Ambros in strictest confidence told me what I have given as my personal knowledge to Major Tilly at the end of April and what consisted of the fact that such gases based upon an inter-

(signed) G v Schnitzler

mediate of Ludwigshafen "Metaphenylendianine" had been made in a special equipment (all in glass) but that the whole production owing to the Russian advance had been shipped to the interior of Germany. Dr. Ambros at the time spoke of the great danger if ever smallest quantities of this product evaded. -

At that time (end of April) I was still under the impression that I.G. as a firm was only indirectly connected with the fabrication of that gas insofar as we had put chemists at the disposition of the Reich and supplied the intermediates. Later on by Major Tilly I heard that Anorgana which ran the plant was 100% I.G. and that the whole fabrication practically was an affair of I.G. He told me furthermore that these gases had been used by the Nazi authorities as a tentative in Auschwitz concentration camp.

In the last quarter of 1944 I should say, it was at the end of November or in the beginning of December, an allusion was made to me confidentially by Dr. Muller-Cunradi that terrible things had happened in the concentration camps of Auschwitz, that gases had been used there to kill people and that I.G. products were of something in it - of course it was only an allusion. Not knowing anything of Dyhrenfurt at the time, I could not bring this allusion in connection with the new gas, but I was so horrified by it that I only reacted "but do other people know that too", which he confirmed, yes, Ambros and the other men in Auschwitz know of these things. To Schmitz I made a remark about terrible things being connected with Auschwitz and Dyhrenfurt but without going into details. How far he was informed about it, I can't say, for my opinion he should have heard about the general happenings regarding Anorgana a.s.o. as financial interests of great importance were connected therewith and Ambros and Muller-Cunradi must have reported to him about the situation under all its aspects. - But that, of course, can only be heard from the 3 men themselves.

(Page 6 of the original)

I myself had never seen the agreement regarding "Anorgana" which was concluded before I took over my activity with the Chemikalien-business. I was of the opinion that the Reich owned plant and equipment of the so-called "Reichsbetriebe" at 100% and that Anorgana was a 50:50 position of Reich and I.G. for the handling of those products which were sold to manufacturers (Weiterver-arbeiter).

How secret all these matters had to be held by the men immediately concerned with them might become evident by the fact that Dr. ter Meer notwithstanding that we always worked together in the dyestuff domain in the closest cooperation never mentioned them to me and I was greatly surprised when I heard by Dr. Loehr only a few days before I was taken in custody (May 7th) that under ter Meer's papers confidential material of this kind had been found. -

What motives induced Dr. Ambros to take over the factory in Dyhrenfurt, which primarily was destined for the management of the Pharma people of Elberfeld, I am completely at a loss to explain. I can only presume that his sometimes illimited technical ambition has driven him in this terrible job.

In Poland furthermore we acquired from Treuhandstelle Ost the Boruta and in connection with the Francolor transaction the Winnica, the latter one had to be liquidated as no economical basis for it was still existent.

Boruta practically belonged to the Polish state, the share capital was lost and a state-owned bank which had given the necessary credits to

(signed) G v Schnitzler

the Boruta was the real owner. As the German government in the parts of Poland which had become incorporated in Germany considered itself as the legal successor of the Polish state, no private interests were hurt by this transaction. This was unfortunately the case with Wola but the owners had to leave the place, fled to Warsaw and nobody was on the spot to look after the place. - The Wola had to be closed down as its economic value in war-times was null and the material, as far as it was transportable, was carried over to Boruta. In an extensive statement made on the Boruta/Wola question I explained the reasons for which it was necessary to acquire these factories. The factory of Wola was not acquired by I.G. The liquid assets had been sold out by the Kommissare and then the General Government Krakau sold the factory to a third party, Binder. As 85% of the dyestuff potential of I.G. was on the borders of the Rhine and as this whole territory had to be considered as endangered by air-raids, every capacity in the centre of the Reich and in the East had to be used.

Notwithstanding their relatively small volume the dyestuff factories of Aussig and Boruta became very valuable for keeping up the plans for the manufacturing of dyestuffs and intermediates. Thus Dr. ter Meer and I after the German troops had entered Poland proposed Dr. Schoner (technical chief of Wolfen) and Direktor Schrab, Frankfurt - commercial leader of dyestuff-business in Poland and Russia to the Reichswirtschaftsministerium as "Kommissare" and later on inaugurated the negotiations with the Treuhandstelle-Ost. In my above mentioned statement I said that I never believed we would keep these factories whenever it came to peace negotiations, still we could not let them fall into the hands of a third party and had to use them during the war in our and in the common interest and this was only possible if we secured for us their property.

About Norway it seems to be superfluous to report as these interests we had taken there in the light-metal field became invalid. The Luftwaffe decided that the works at Herøen scattered by air-raids should not be reconstructed.

In Holland and Belgium, to the best of my knowledge, no interests of importance have been acquired. Our relations with the group Solvay in

(Page 7 of the original)

in Belgium were immediately resumed and we ourselves interfered at the Reichswirtschaftsministerium that in the majority position of the group Solvay in Deutsche Solvaywerke, Bernburg, where Solvay held 75%, I.G. 25% no change should take place. Certain endeavours of the Salzdorf-concern to get part of Deutsche Solvaywerke with the aim to break up Solvay's majority position remained fruitless.

The plans we had elaborated for the handling of the industrial problems in the chemical sector in France are known.

In the first phase after the armistice we thought it necessary that the Government should sequester the whole chemical industry in order to make it work for the German war potential. Later on this policy was changed and after Monthoire the era of collaboration started. I do not think that any seizure had been carried through in this domain. - The key position very soon became the Francolor problem.

The guiding principle in its solution for I.G. was

- 1) the definite reparation of the injustice which I.G. had suffered when its factories in France had been taken away by the Versailles treaty,

(signed) G v Schnitzler)

- 2) a definite peace with the French dyestuff industry granting their industry a full occupation (7000 to of dyestuffs and a substantial development in the most varied fields).

We considered the whole affair as an equitable solution, nobody in France had lost one Franc by this transaction, on the contrary the value of the shares of the so-called mother-houses gained a considerable advance in the stock-exchange - as well as in their intrinsic value; the exchange basis for the I. G. shares being given as a counter-value could not be fairer. - In fact no money has been taken out of France, the dividend-clearing showed a "break-even", the factories not only remained intact but were improved in different domains. The arrangement had been considered by I.G. as a first step to a renewed European dyestuff-cartel, to the negotiating of which the German-French group should appear as one partner and we, that means ter Meer, Waibel, Ambros and I, always understood that Duchemin and Frossard would figure as partners in such negotiations.

The "Führungsanspruch" of I.G. once having been recognized in the handling of dyestuff matters, there was never a contrast or even a friction. I.G. helped Francolor in all its dealings with the Military Commander in France whenever this was possible or necessary and Francolor was a loyal partner. When Dr. Kramer left Paris, he told me, Duchemin said to him: "You have been loyal for us, you will see that we shall be loyal against you." The same principle of fair dealing was the aim of our negotiations with Rhone-Poulenc and Ugine in the field of Buna, plastics and pharmaceuticals. - Not having been an immediate participant in those different negotiations, which were conducted by Dr. ter Meer, v.Knieriem, and Amros or Mann - but having often seen M.Bau as well as H. Painvin, I have never heard the slightest complaint on their part of pressure or unfair dealing. When both gentlemen were in Leverkusen to visit the Buna installations in the late autumn of 1941 or 1942, an atmosphere of cordiality, if I may use that word, and not at all of animosity has reigned between the representatives of both sides.

Always in conformity with the principle of developing the continental Grossraum, I.G. was very active in Spain. The development of the two factories in and near Barcelona FENCE and Flix made substantial progress. In FENCE the installations for the (immediates) intermediates of Azo-dyestuffs were brought to termination, a pharmaceutical factory was in full construction, in Flix the new "Chlorelectrolyse" was gradually improving and plans of making the "Inquiresa" a subsidiary company for the manufacturing of derivatives of Carbure,

(Page 8 of the original)

an active business proposition were being followed. - With "Unquinesa" in Bilbao license agreements in the field of Phenol and Formaldehyde for "Phenoplaste" were concluded and to "Altos Hornos" licenses for Nitrogene with technical help on the whole line were being granted. Apart of that the old friendship to Union Explosives Espanola was cultivated.

In Italy the participations in Acna and Bianchi kept on their normal development in the light-metal field the Samis tried to make progress and the two factories in which Buna was fabricated, came into production.

On the whole in all these countries as well as in the planning for a future industrialization of the South-East, I.G. fostered everywhere the industrial evolution with its patents, experiences and know-how and, as far as the government allowed it to do so, also with capital. The men who did the actual work, mostly did not even think of the political meaning of this development in the direction of "European Grossraum-Wirtschaft" and even inside I.G.'s Vorstand that was often forgotten. Words like "rule" and "dominate" were never

(signed) G v Schnitzler

used, and I am sure that all these people having worked with I.G. in Spain and France, in Norway and Finland, in the South-East as well as in Italy have not had the feeling of being pressed or looted. On the contrary, they nearly all had personal profits of this collaboration and were after us to intensify our help. Dozen of files will and can prove that.

vs Coming back to the general policy: Undoubtedly I.G. had not only followed the government's "Grossraum-Politik" but had drawn substantial profit out of it. In figures as they appear on the balance-sheet an enormous progress has been made. As the export-figures in the whole remained unchanged and only a displacement from overseas to the European continent took place, the turnover in the so-called "Gross-Deutschland" up to the end of 1943 reached nearly four times the size of 1932. - Only part of it could be considered as being a perpetual asset. In Buna, in synthetic fibres and their raw materials and intermediates, in light metals and in hydrogenation many installations to a large extent are to be understood as war-dependent, but as a consequence of the close interdependency of autarkie and rearmament a great deal of the investments made under the four year's plan could be considered as valuable even under a complete peace-policy. - May I give as an example the "Nitrogene". The total German capacity should be - the destruction by air-raids not being taken into account - about 1.000.000 tons of "N". I.G.'s prewar share in N was about 70%. One generally estimated that for agricultural purposes in Gross-Deutschland nearly 700.000 to of N were needed. Thus with all the possibilities in the development of the "Technical Nitrogene" the remaining 300.000 to. should have found a secure market - even without having to press on a forced export! The enormous amortizations which I.G. had been able to carry through would have given it an easy possibility of a revalorisation of its assets without having to lower the figures of its investments as participations on the balance-sheet of the so-called "Handelsbilanz".

Summarizing this part of I.G.'s activity: The close teamwork with Government and Wehrmacht in the joint endeavour to make Germany to a large extent autarchie and rearm her, involved a great amplification of I.G.'s potential and at the same time a substantial increase of her balance-figures.

The collaboration with the Wehrmacht followed two additional lines. In order to keep up a continuous contact in 1934 the Vermittlungsstelle W in Berlin was founded, in 1936 the so-called Abwehr-Delegierten were being designated. The Wehrmacht insisted on the highest secrecy of all its plans

(Page 9 of the original)

vs and let all people being in charge of planning or executing rearmament work, swear that they never let other people know what had been divulged to them in connection with their activity for Wehrmacht purposes. This had gone so far that for instance when Dr. Paul Muller of Dynamit A.G. in 1937 lead the members of Z.A. of I.G. over the Dynamit plant in Troisdorf, he refracted from showing to them entire departments saying "this is under strictest secrecy". Every infringement would have been punished with high penalties of hard labour. So practically everybody of the high-ranking staff was in such a way sworn in, the survey of what I.G. really did make or not make for the Wehrmacht became more and more a pure guess-work and one abstained of asking in order not to put one's technical colleagues in a difficult position. How far Schmitz himself was informed, who had the last responsibility for the balance figures, I am unable to say. My impression was that even he had only partly a more profound knowledge of what really happened and that a full picture of what had been done can only be got when one has heard every single one of the high ranking I.G. technical leaders, and not only the Vorstands-Mitglieder but also most of the Direktors and Prokurists just as well. -

(signed) G v Schnitzler

But speaking of responsibilities in general Schmitz was responsible insofar as he was in charge of the distribution of the different domains of activity to the individual "Vorstands-Mitglieder". Thus each Vorstandmitglied in the case of having to take a graver and far reaching decision was bound to report about it to the chairman, that means to Schmitz. -

Independently of Abwehr and Vermittlungsstelle W the Wehrmacht engaged I.G. in active helps by asking it to get news out of axis and neutral countries. I reported on that matter in a former statement. I.G. put its means at the disposition of the Wehrmacht but it was understood that I.G. people whenever they were asked for such help had not to enter the typically military espionage but only had to report about economic matters in the largest sense. How far the Wehrmacht had made use of I.G.'s readiness to participate in this service can only be guessed by the satisfaction explained by O.K.W. of what had been done. Every individual man acting under secrecy and being prohibited of speaking about it under highest penalties.

A further team-work between Wehrmacht and I.G. developed under the heading "M-Fragen". This comprised all personal questions regarding men to be made free from service, special plans for the distributions of key-commodities to the different branches of I.G.'s technical activity and the so-called "Kriegsspiele", furthermore all questions arising in the military field, eventually not covered by the different activities I have mentioned before.

As I stated in the beginning of this report since 1934 the Wehrmacht first being only an additional factor to the relations having always existed between I.G. and the different Ministerien more and more developed to be the decisive or at least the most important factor.

The Nazi government acted on I.G.'s business through these different Ministerien, but the party itself interfered continuously in the following two directions.

1) After having dissolved all trade-unions, associations of employers a.s.o. the so-called Deutsche Arbeitsfront was constituted. Everybody practically had to participate in it, it became the decisive factor for the handling of all personal problems and found its legal basis in the law "Zur Ordnung der nationalen

(Page 10 of the original)

Arbeit". By this law the responsibility of the owner or undertaker of the Co. was not altered insofar as the conduction of the business and the fulfillment of its financial obligations was concerned but rules for the interior functioning were established which had to be strictly observed. Based on that law and in connection with the so-called Nürnberger Gesetze the party exercised a continuous pressure on all I.G. organizations to fulfil all the clauses of the party program, particularly the Nürnberger Gesetze.

Whilst I.G. was a compliant partner in regard of all demands of the Wehrmacht, it tried to refract with all means from this latter intervention into its relations with its leading as well as the other personal. For years it maintained all its Jewish employees, to begin with Messrs. von Weinberg and Mr. von Simson, being members of the then still existing Verwaltungsrat, the highest institution of I.G. (a committee of the Aufsichtsrat) on their posts and did not dismiss a single one of these individuals, before his living abroad was guaranteed. Thus Mr. Flechtheim, Mr. von Simson, Mr. Kalisches, Mr. Hummel, Mr. Carl von Weinberg, whenever at last it became necessary to suggest to them to leave Germany, it has taken care of them in such a way that they had not to endure emergency. Only

(signed) G v Schnitzler

Mr. Arthur v. Weinbert, who always had believe that they would except him and some other men like Karf, for whom a prepared situation in England in the last moment did not materialize because the owner of that firm retracted or retired, became victim.

The party resented that attitude and gave I.G. continuous warnings that I.G. was not fulfilling the obligations incumbent to it and a state of tension always subsisted.

The same attitude was that being taken by the A.O. of the party in regard to the foreign representatives. In the first years practically nothing had been done on I.G.'s side to alter anything in the existing conditions. By and by by friendly negotiations and with lump sums generously fixed to satisfy them finally I.G. had to sever the connection with those representatives but when going over the files one will recognise that I.G. in every case tried to do its utmost to protect the men who had loyally served it and whom I.G. would never have dismissed if not this hard pressure would have been exercised upon it. That a company at last has to obey its government's orders is inevitable, but I.G. by conviction has always done its best to create as little hardship as possible and often only could get the Governments and the A.O.'s approval to the agreements with these employees by pretending that an ungenerous attitude on the side of I.G. would damage its international prestige. I.G. was driven from A.O. from concession to concession and the agreement made by Mr. Naibel with A.O. in autumn 1937 that in the future only such young men would be sent out who firstly belonged to the vSD.A.F. and secondly were ready to participate in the meetings, a.s.o. on the spot was a compromise on long negotiations by which Mr. Naibel succeeded that at least upon the "old" men on the spot the pressure was lowered.

vs Altogether these relations and negotiations with D.A.F. and A.O. remain and were always a most unpleasant chapter in I.G.'s activity but one may not forget that all the power was with the party and I.G. always was in the position of the defendant.

Apart of these two main domains of party-activity the Gauleiters interfered continuously in local questions but seldom in direct business, mostly in personal questions and then generally in the favour of such employees who were being considered as "confidential men".

(Page 11 of the original)

But up to the last time I.G. could refrain from taking any typical party-men on Vorstand or Aufsichtsrat, a fact which should not be overlooked, as pressure from the most different sides in this direction never has ceased. Gauleiter Sprenger for instance always hinted at Avieny of Metall-Gesellschaft becoming member of the Aufsichtsrat.

I stated at the beginning of this report that after Hitler had come to power and before the official subventions of Adolf Hitler-Spende and W.H.V. had been inaugurated subventions of the most different kind had to be given and were given. I had never heard that I.G. before 1933 had fostered NSDAP financial-ly, as I.G. had always done with the so-called "bourgeois-parties". It is considered vs this as improbable as Dr. Kalle who presided the committee being charged with these questions always was strongly opposed against the Nazi-party. If notwithstanding this had been done in 1932 Geheimrat Schmitz only can explain it, the question never having come to a discussion in the Zentral-Ausschuss.

To summarize the following must be stated:

(signed) G v Schnitzler

1) With the growing of the military interest in the government's program I.G.'s relations to the Wehrmacht firstly became an additional factor in I.G.'s official relations to the different other ministries, by and by the Wehrmacht became by far the most important one, and with the beginning of the 4 years plan the investment-policy of I.G. was not to be separated anymore from the policy of the Wehrmacht. Nearly all investments were made directly or indirectly for the Wehrmacht. I.G. was on the whole a loyal and compliant partner of the Wehrmacht. That the Wehrmacht was not a typical Nazi-institution and only followed itself in material the line prescribed by the party is well known. The higher officers doing their duty as law-abiding officers were not Nazis by conviction, they have proved it on July 20th, 1944.

2.) I.G. followed the "Grossraum-Politik" of the government because there was no other economic policy to be made.

That I.G. itself would have preferred a policy of "most favoured nation treatment" and "world-wide trade" became a pure theory and could not lead to any real consequences.

3.) In the handling with party matters I.G. acted after the policy "Muddling through" with the result that in the last it always had to yield.

vs 4.) Thus in acting as it had done, the I.G. contracted a great responsibility and constituted a substantial and in the chemical domain decisive help to Hitler's foreign policy, which led to war and to the ruin of Germany.

5.) Thus I must conclude that I.G. is largely responsible for Hitler's policy.

Frankfurt, August 8th, 1945.

Signed: G. von Schnitzler."

This statement still appears to me to be entirely true to the best of my knowledge and belief, except that:

(a) Generally speaking, it does not sufficiently separate the pre-war from the war period.

(b) At page two, paragraph 4, it was erroneous to say that "The whole development of I.G. in the years beginning with 1934 and accelerated since the end of 1936 is entirely due to the close team work with government and Wehrmacht." I would say now that this development "is due to the development of chemistry in general, to autarchy, to rearmament and, finally, to the war itself." I would now make the same qualification to the sixth paragraph on page 2, where I said the whole augmentation of I.G.'s turnover "is a 100% result of the rearmament and the war

(signed) G v Schnitzler

policy of the German government."

(c) In the last paragraph on page 2, I meant no reproach against the technical men of I.G. when I said "It never became quite clear if our technical men themselves had not deliberately induced the Wehrmacht to that "Auflage." An "Auflage" was more or less an order to or imposition of a task upon a concern or plant by the Wehrmacht. In working upon the "Auflage" as team workers with the Wehrmacht, I.G.'s technical men had the opportunity to suggest modifications of an old "Auflage" or to suggest a further project which later became an "Auflage."

(d) At the top of page 3, I should qualify the statement that the various plants became independent of the leadership of the Sparte heads and acted directly with the different Wehrmacht authorities. This result came completely to a head only after the war began, although it began as early as 1938, particularly after the Anschluss in March 1938.

(e) In the last paragraph of page 5, I wish to make some corrections. I stated here that Dr. Muller-Cunradi made "an allusion" in late 1944 that gases had been used in Auschwitz concentration camps to kill people and that I.G. products "were something in it." By this I meant I.G. products could have something to do with it. This was more of a reference to a rumour than it was an "allusion" to the fact. Since August 1945, I have talked to Schmitz and he does not recall that I ever mentioned the matter to him. However, my recollection is that I mentioned the matter to Dr. Schmitz at a lunch in Heidelberg when we were there for a Vorstand meeting in January or February 1945. Schmitz did not say anything at the time and since the Russians at that time were before the doors of Auschwitz, nothing thereafter could have been done about the matter.

(f) At page 6, paragraph 3, I stated that I could only presume that the unlimited technical ambition of Dr. Ambros had driven him to take
(signed) G v Schnitzler

over the factory in Dyhernfurt. That was my impression in August 1945. But in the meantime I have learned that this was not because of the ambition of Dr. Ambros, but because of an "Auflage" from the Wehrmacht.

(g) At page 6, paragraph 5, I stated that the raw materials of the WOLA plant in Poland "was carried over to" the BORUTA plant in so far as it was transportable. It should be added that this was done before I.G. acquired control of the BORUTA plant during the period when the Reichkommissars Schoener and Schwab were administering the Polish chemical plants for the Reich. I.G. had suggested that Schoener and Schwab, who were I.G. officials, be appointed as experts to administer the Polish chemical plants for the Reich. I also wrote in the statement that I had made an extensive statement as to why it was necessary to acquire "these factories". Instead of "these factories" I should have said "the BORUTA factory." As far as the WOLA is concerned, the owner, old Mr. Szpielvogel with his family, had fled to Warsaw. The place had remained deserted.

VS The "Kommissare" for the "Reichs-account" liquidated the dyestuffs-department. The whole property, as Schwab had stated, was later on sold out by the General Government, Krakow, to a third party, whose name I only heard in the summer of 1945: Binder. Shortly after the occupation of Poland I once gave a hint to Schwab that he should try to assist the old
VS gentleman if ever possible, and I think he did something, but later on all traces of him were lost.

(h) On page 9, second full paragraph, the reports of the Vermittlungsstelle W and the Sales Organizations to the Abwehr were reports about economic matters which I.G. acquired in the normal course of business. It was not a typical military espionage. Of course where the Wehrmacht chose and engaged an individual of our sales organizations for its special purposes, I.G. could not influence that and the individual was sworn to secrecy. It only became evident that an I.G. representative

(signed) G v Schnitzler

abroad had Abwehr duties when we sought to recall the man or to free him for military service and then came a general order that we should keep him. VOWI must be dealt with separately, since the Wehrmacht at first wanted to take over VOWI's entire organization at the beginning of the war and Dr. Kurt Krueger, then head of Berlin N.W. 7, was at the same time mobilized as an officer with the Wehrmacht.

(i) On page 9, third paragraph from the bottom, I overstated by saying, without qualification, that the Wehrmacht became the decisive or at least the most important factor in I.G.'s development. I should have said "during the war." The Wehrmacht War Ministry was an important agency after 1934, but between 1934 and 1939, the Ministry of Economics, and between 1936 and 1939, the Four Year Plan were the principal agencies with which I.G. dealt. I might also point out that Hans Kehrl of the Ministry of Economics had continuous frictions with Krauch of the Four Year Plan.

(j) On page 10, paragraph 2, I believe the typist miscopied my longhand at one point. I wrote "refrain" and she typed "refract."

(k) On page 11, paragraph 3, subheading 1), I made a mistake due to my lack of more detailed knowledge of technical matters. The technical development of I.G. concerning buna, artificial fibres, and synthetic oil was not as dependent upon the Wehrmacht's intentions as I thought in 1945. As I have since found out by discussions with my technical colleagues, these matters were developed under the Autarchy Program with the Ministry of Economics and the Four Year Plan and the Wehrmacht did not interfere at all. However, with magnesium, the Wehrmacht had a direct interest from the very beginning. In the other fields the Wehrmacht only became by and by more interested and, of course, interested overwhelmingly when the war broke out.

(l) On page 11, paragraph 3, subheading 1), I said the Wehrmacht followed the party line "in material." I meant in the Latin "in Materia" -
(signed) G v Schnitzler

or in the German "in der Sache, aber nicht in der Ueberzeugung," which can be translated "in the fact but not with conviction."

(m) On page 11, paragraph 3, subheadings 4) and 5), I must now make the following qualifications: I believe that I and I.G. Farben as a whole have contracted a great responsibility before God in that our acts constituted a substantial help to Hitler's foreign policy. However, I did not mean that I accept any responsibility in the legal sense. To the best of my conviction we never did anything unlawful against humanity. But we were in this terrible boat with Hitler, and since we have participated in handling this boat, we have a responsibility before God and consequently before mankind. I can explain this in the words of the "Matthaeus Evangelium": There are two duties for a Christian, the love of God and the love for your neighbor. Concerning mankind, we acted against the love of our neighbor, and that is what I mean when I say we consequently have a responsibility before mankind. The last two paragraphs were inserted because I felt a moral, but not a legal responsibility, because I.G. had contributed a substantial, and in the chemical domain a decisive, help to Hitler's foreign policy which led to war and to the ruin of Germany and Europe, by the mere fact that without a substantial chemical industry modern warfare is impossible. It would not have been possible to carry through in the years 1939 to 1945 without the potential of the chemical industry. By this I do not mean to indicate a graver moral responsibility for I.G. than I believe should also be accepted by other Germans or other German concerns who made a comparable contribution with the necessary implements of warfare in the broadest sense.

3. On 15 August 1945, Dr. Max Ilgner and I signed a one-page statement simply entitled "Statement," the text of which follows:

"Since 1936, I.G. officials paid by I. G. and assisted by a large staff of technicians and personnel all paid by I. G., planned for the Nazi Government, the Rearmament phase in the

(signed) G v Schnitzler

chemical sector with concentration on the building up of such war industries as magnesium, synthetic rubber, oils, etcetera. This was handled by the Reichsamt für Wirtschaftsausbau and the Generalbevollmächtigter für Sonderfragen der Chemischen Erzeugung, under Mr. Krauch.

(signed) G. v Schnitzler

(signed) H. Ilgner

Frankfort on the Main
August 15, 1945.

This statement still appears to me to be entirely true and correct, except that I would now qualify it in two places as follows:

(a) For the words "The rearmament phase" I would substitute "the autarchy and rearmament phase."

(b) For the phrase "such war industries as magnesium, synthetic rubber, oils, etcetera," I would substitute the words "such industries as magnesium, synthetic rubber, oils, etcetera, which were important industries for the autarchy program and the rearmament program and which we also hoped would be economically workable under a peace time regime."

4. On 21 August 1945, I signed a one-page statement entitled "Statement re Mobilization in the Summer of 1938," the text of which follows:

VS "Since the peaceful invasion into Austria the whole German country practically was on the foot of mobilization.

This state of things became even more accentuated, when Hitler had entered into Prague and preparations for a campaign against Poland were started. Since July 1939 many of our employees and particularly the officers of the reserve of the so-called new army were called to their regiments and lined upon the Polish frontier.

Simultaneously the industry was mobilized. Mobilization-plans that in the case of war was allowed or ordered to be produced, had a long time ago been prepared.

These plans, which beginning with 1934 had been made up by individual firms in close team-work with Wirtschaftsgruppe Chemie and the competent ministries - became effective in such a way, that Tigrü returned them to the individual firm with his approval stamped on them.

(signed) G v Schnitzler

For my opinion the respective plans had been handed over to the firms in the current of the summer 1939, mostly with the instruction that they should be applicable at the moment of the outbreak of the war. Thus the plan for dyestuffs as far as I can remember
VS became effective the first of September. For some commodities of purely military character, as the so-called implements of war, the mobilisation-order must have become effective to a much earlier date.

I should say, beginning with the spring of 1939, one after another of these latter products or objects has been put in the state of mobilization. The orders by Wigrü-Chemie did not pass through the hands of the commercial administration; or they were sent straight to the producing works or passed through Tea-Büro. - I myself was so firmly convinced, that at the last moment an agreement about Danzig and the so-called Corridor would be reached, that I left Frankfurt about August 11th or 12th on a vacation-trip by car with my wife and my unmarried daughter to Jugoslavia - and was called back about the 27th or 28th of August from Bled.

Frankfurt, Aug. 21st 1945.

(signed) G. von Schnitzler."

This statement still appears to me to be entirely true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief, except that:

(a) Instead of the word "mobilization" in the title, and in the first paragraph, I would now use the word "preparedness." The mobilization (in the German "Mobilmachung") had been prepared, both personnel and war materials being mobilized in a certain sense, but the order placing the mobilization plans in final effect was not given until war broke out, as I have been informed since 1945. Therefore, the use of the word mobilization ("MOBILMACHUNG" in the German is a technical term) without qualification might be misleading.

(b) In the second line, first paragraph, I meant to use the word "feeting" instead of the word "foot."

5. On 28 August 1945, I signed two one-page statements, the longer one entitled "Statement re 'Tense Situation' in Summer 1939" and the shorter one entitled simply "Statement by Dr. von Schnitzler." These statements are complementary and can be properly commented upon together. The text of each follows:

(signed) G v Schnitzler

"28 August 1945

Statement by Dr. von Schnitzler

I would say that in my capacity as Deputy Chairman of the Wirtschaft Gruppe Chemie I had occasion to meet with Mr. Ungewitter at least once a month in Berlin. There we discussed official business regarding the different matters concerning the chemical industry. It was in July 1939 at one of these meetings in the presence of Mr. Barmann, Deputy to Ungewitter, that Mr. Ungewitter told me that Hitler was determined to invade Poland and that, in view of the assurance given by England and France to Poland, we must be prepared for an attack on our western front. There could be no doubt in my mind from the manner in which Mr. Ungewitter spoke that the attack would take place as soon as the harvest was collected, which meant some time in September. Ungewitter told me also that the Ministry of War and the Ministry of Economics had informed him that our "Kriegswichtigen", that is, the Ludwigshafen and Oppau works must be moved from the western frontier because they were too close. We feared also that they might have guns which could shoot over the 80 km. distance between our factories and the French frontier. I said at once to Mr. Ungewitter that this idea of moving the works seemed quite impossible to me. When I spoke to Dr. Ter Meer one of the next days, he told me that he was well aware of the plan and he confirmed that it was impossible to move the works and I am certain that Mr. Ungewitter has talked over these questions much more strongly with Dr. Wurster and Dr. Ambros than he did it with me, who was not responsible for the Ludwigshafen - Oppau works. It is incontestable that Mr. Ungewitter acted on behalf of the government, that means the Vier Jahres Plan, when he informed me in the beforementioned way.

(signed) G. von Schnitzler"

"Statement re "Tense Situation" in Summer 1939

When Hitler had entered into Prague, one could not have any doubts that he was ready to go for war. The tension which since the Anschluss of Austria lay over Europe, became nearly intolerable. The German country was in a continuous state of mobilization. This had gone so far that even men like myself being not under any military obligation in March 1939 got a "Mobilmachungs-Order" to be in the case of war, at the disposition of their firm. The plans for the mobilization of the key-industries were handed out to the individual firms, partly, for the so-called implements of war, they at once had to become efficient, for other domains it was provided for that they should enter in force with the outbreak of war — this applied for instance to the best of my knowledge for dyestuffs.

Shortly afterwards, it may be in June, the first incidents were provoked at the German/Polish border, riots in Danzig were "arranged" and as we know from last year in the Sudetenland, how such things were being managed, we were absolutely sure that Hitler would attack Poland, if Poland should not accept his demands.

Optimists like myself remained hopeful that at the last moment an arrangement should be found but the earnestness of the situation could not be hidden as the guaranty of England for Poland was a fact. The public about this was misled by the announcement of the great apothosis which should happen in Tannenberg at the end of August in order to celebrate the anniversary of the battle of Tannenberg as well as to disclose the sepulchrum for old Marshall Hindenburg.

(signed) G v Schnitzler

I think it was in July 1939 that I had in Berlin a conversation with Dr. Ungewitter in the presence of his deputy, Mr. Ehrmann. In this conversation, Dr. Ungewitter informed me that the conflict with Poland could break out at any time and that after the opinion of the competent ministerium in principle the manufacturing of all chemical products important for warfare should be removed from Ludwigshafen/Oppau and be transferred to other works not so near to the French frontier.

I said at once to Dr. Ungewitter that this seemed quite impossible to me as such producing capacities in the other works were not existent.

The same was confirmed one of the next days by Dr. Ter Meer when I talked to him about that conversation and I am certain that Dr. Ungewitter had talked over those questions much more thoroughly with Dr. Wurster and Dr. Ambros, than he did it with me, who was not responsible for Ludwigshafen/Oppau. It is incontestable that Dr. Ungewitter acted on behalf of the government, that means the "Vier Jahres - Plan," when he informed me in the before-mentioned way.

Frankfurt, Aug. 28th, 1945

(signed) G. von Schnitzler"

Both these statements were made upon the basis of a strong impression I had in August 1945 and they were firmly written in my recollection. The statements both still appear to me to be entirely true to the best of my knowledge and belief except that I would like to make the following explanations:

(a) Recollecting all my anxieties of that summer of 1939, all the wild fury which I felt against Hitler's policy, I am inclined to believe that unknowingly or subconsciously I might have interpolated (untergeschoben) certain of my own worries and concerns to Dr. Ungewitter and I believe that this is a psychological and understandable error! Ever since the invasion of Prague, which happened the very day when we were sitting in Dusseldorf on the so-called Anglo-German industrial committee, and after having exchanged reactions on that event with Sir Francis Larkes, the head of the British steel industry, my anxieties about the future steps which Hitler might take never came to an end. Apart from some personal friends not being connected with I.G., I only showed from time to time my deep worries and concerns to Carl von Weinberg, Dr. Hans Kugler, and Richard von Szilvinyi.

(signed) G v Schnitzler

(b) It is clear that I had a specific conversation with Dr. Ungewitter in about July 1939 in which he stated that it was opinion of the competent Reich authorities that the Ludwigshafen/Oppau plant would have to be closed down because they were too close to the French frontier. But as I now view it, he must have meant and must have stated that this order was prepared so that it would go into effect in case of war. Moreover, I am now doubtful if Dr. Ungewitter actually said that Hitler was determined to attack Poland. He could not have known this then. However, since he was the link between the government and the chemical industry, I know he was speaking on behalf of the Four-Year plan concerning the closing down of Ludwigshafen/Oppau plant and I was very impressed by the manner in which he spoke. When he additionally expressed himself to the effect that the international situation was grave and that it was quite possible there could be a war with Poland, which would involve France and England, I probably read into his statement that he said Hitler was determined to attack Poland.

(c) In the second paragraph of the longer statement, I said "we were absolutely sure that Hitler would attack Poland". This was my firm impression in August 1945, but I should have only spoken for myself and not said "we". Moreover, I thought Hitler's foreign policy of bluff backed by the strong fist would probably cause Poland to give in to his demands. However, I was a very worried man, particularly after the invasion of Prague, since I felt that England, France and America were bound to take a stiffer attitude to Hitler's words and actions, and that ultimately Hitler's policy would bring Europe to war and ruin.

6. On 22 August 1945, I signed a one-page statement concerning war preparations, the text of which follows:

"Even without being directly informed that the government intended to wage war, it was impossible for officials of I.G. or any other industrialists to believe that the enormous production of armaments and preparation for war starting from the coming into power of Hitler accelerated in 1936 and reaching unbelievable proportions in 1938 could have any other meaning but that Hitler and the Nazi Government intended to wage war come what may. In

(signed) G v Schnitzler

view of the enormous concentration on military production and of the intensify military preparation, no person of I.G. or any other industrial leader could believe that this was being done for defensive purposes. We of I.G. were well aware of this fact as were all German industrialists and on a commercial side, shortly after the Anschluss in 1938, I.G. took measures to protect its foreign assets in France and the British Empire.

(signed) G. von Schnitzler"

This statement represents my impression in August 1945. This statement offers an appropriate basis for making some additional statements concerning the feelings I held before the outbreak of war in September 1939. I resented Hitler's rearmament policy, and I was terribly oppressed by it. I mentioned my feelings confidentially to my close collaborators and to my personal friends, such as Professor Russell, Carl von Weinberg, Richard von Szilvinyi, and Dr. Hans Eugler. I often said confidentially that that man (referring to Hitler) would bring us to ruin because the world in the long run would not tolerate his actions and his offensive speeches. I disapproved of the movement of troops into both Austria and Czechoslovakia. However, my feelings concerning the use of force to effect the Anschluss were influenced by a strong feeling, which I held to this day, that Austria and Germany are basically one nation and that the Austrians wanted a union with Germany. Therefore, the propaganda and the reports which came out concerning Austria, just before and just after the Anschluss, did not necessarily appear exaggerated to me. The military occupation of Czechoslovakia (leaving aside the occupation of the Sudetenland after the Munich Agreement) in March, 1939, was an entirely different matter for me. This military invasion singly shocked me to the deepest depths of my heart. The occupation occurred when I was in Düsseldorf at the German-English Conference of industrialists. On the way to a luncheon party at this time Sir Francis Larko of England gave his reaction to this terrible step. My opinion was identical to his. I was just as shocked as he was and had neither an explanation nor an excuse. I always considered that Czechoslovakia was a godchild of the United States and that this occupation would deeply offend America. The 13th of March 1939 is the decisive date for me with respect to the foreign policy of the Hitler Regime. On that date it

(signed) G v Schnitzler

became absolutely clear to me that Hitler would lead Europe to ruin. I so expressed myself to my close friends, and proof of this can be obtained from them. From the very first moment it was clear to me that it was a terrible wrong to mankind which was done by the occupation of Prague. I know only too well many Czech people not to be fully aware that they were not Germans and that they did not want to have a German domination. After the Sudetenland was incorporated into the German Reich, I did not believe a word of the propaganda against Czechoslovakia. With respect to the Polish question, I distinctly disapproved from the first moment of any coercive or forceful measure. I didn't accept the Polish border "incidents" as true nor did I accept the propaganda concerning Poland. But, on the other hand, I didn't believe them to be as artificial as I recognized them to be after the collapse of Germany, because I felt that hatred was being made by both sides and that there was injustice concerning the Polish Corridor and East Prussia. I did not think the Polish question would come to war because I thought Hitler, following his policy of bluff, backed up by the strong fist, would secure his demands of the Poles by his bluff. However, I was among that group of Germans who were worried that Hitler might not get away with his bluff toward Poland and that this would mean war not only with Poland but as well with France and England. After Ungewitter had told me in July 1939, that the government was concerned about the proximity of the Ludwigshafen/Oppau plant to the the French border, I was worried by the prospect of war. As head of the Kaufmannische Ausschuss of I.G., and as the person in charge of the biggest part of I.G.'s export trade, the dyestuffs field, I quite naturally took every precaution of a cautious and considerate business man in case a clash should occur. I was not a gambler myself, and I considered gambling too mild a word to describe Hitler's foreign policy. I then considered Hitler's foreign policy a matter of "Vorbereicherisches Spekulieren", which can properly be translated as criminal speculations. The steps I took to protect I.G.'s

(signed) G v Schnitzler

foreign assets abroad were the natural protective steps of a cautious business man against this criminal speculation. At the time in 1939, I felt that a captain should stay with his ship, that I owed certain obligations to my employees, and that I had a responsibility to I. G. Farben, in total, including the shareholders. For these reasons I did not resign or withdrew to an unimportant position in spite of my aversion feelings concerning Hitler's policy.

7. I have carefully read each of the 25 pages of this declaration and have placed my signature at the bottom of each page. I have made the necessary corrections in my own handwriting and initialed each correction in the margin of the page. I declare herewith under oath that I have stated the full truth to the best of my knowledge and belief.

(signed) Georg von Schnitzler
GEORG VON SCHNITZLER

Sworn to and signed before me this 18th day of March 1947, at the Palace of Justice in Nurnberg, Germany, by Georg von Schnitzler, known to me to be the person making the above affidavit.

(signed) Drexel A. Sprecher
DREXEL A. SPEECHER

U. S. Civilian, Attorney, AGO No. 473307
Office of Chief of Counsel for War Crimes

CERTIFICATION

I, ERNA E. UIBERALL, AGO No. D-150096, hereby certify that the above is a true and correct copy of Document No. NI-5196, the original of which is in the English language.

ERNA E. UIBERALL
U. S. Civilian
AGO No. D-150096

end

AFFIDAVIT

I, Dr. ERNST STRUSS, Director of I.G. Farben, Chief of TEA Bureau of I.G., Secretary of the Technical Committee of the Vorstand of I.G., Manager of Division II (Sparte II) of the Vermittlungsstelle W, and, since 1943, Production Manager of the entire German dyes tuffs industry within the framework of the Economic Group Chemical Industry, after having first been warned that I will be liable for punishment for making a false statement, state herewith under oath, of my own free will and without coercion, the following:

Already in 1933 it was obvious that the German military authorities had decided on concentrating German industry in Central Germany and restricting the building of plants in the frontier districts. No specific order was issued to this effect. However, when the military authorities selected a site, it was always situated as far from the frontiers as possible. Moreover, when I.G. decided to extend an existing plant in the frontier district, I.G. was refused the necessary building material.

I mention the following examples: When the Luftwaffe gave orders to I.G. in 1933 and 1934 to build two magnesium plants, the Luftwaffe selected as sites two places in Central Germany, viz. Aken and Stassfurt. When, a few years later, I.G. intended to extend its plants Ludwigshafen, Hoechst and Leverkusen all situated near the German-French frontier, the Reichs Office for Economic Development rejected our applications for iron allocation.

(Page 2 of original)

Shadow plants always had to be built in Central Germany, especially for products which were manufactured in places near the frontier. In 1935, by order of the highcommand of the army I.G. had to build a stabilizer plant at Wolfen

in Central Germany, although the existing I.G. plant Uerdingen near the Belgian frontier could fully cover Germany's need in stabilizers.

From all that it was clear to the leading I.G. men at that time that a district of about 80 miles along Germany's western frontier was to be dis-industrialized, the obvious reasoning being that French and Belgian guns could shoot that far. I remember having drawn a map at that time showing the western area affected by the building restrictions.

Similar restrictions applied to Germany's eastern frontier.

I have carefully read each of the two pages of this declaration and have signed them personally. I have made the necessary corrections in my own handwriting and initialed them and I declare herewith under oath that I have given the pure truth to the best of my knowledge and conscience.

gez.: Dr. Ernst A. Struss

DR. ERNST STRUSS

Sworn to and signed before me this 29 day of May 1947
at Frankfurt/Main by Dr. Ernst STRUSS known to me to be
the person making the above affidavit.

gez.: Otto Heilbrunn

DR. OTTO HEILBRUNN
Civilian, ETO 30140
Office of Chief of Counsel
for War Crimes
U.S. War Department

"A CERTIFIED TRUE COPY "

- 2 -
E N D

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT No NI-5764
OFFICE OF CHIEF OF COUNSEL FOR WAR CRIMES

N o t e .

In the Technical Committee Meeting of 30 June Dr. PFLEIDERER, Ludwigshafen, reported about modern industrial power stations. It is well known that the I.G. has made especially large contribution to the development and to the construction of high pressure power stations. While the energy which the I.G. produces from hard and brown coal is at the moment about 15 % of the total German production of energy derived from coal, and when the large plants in the West have been finished it will rise to about 18 to 20 %, I.G.'s share in German high pressure power stations is about 90 %.

Dr. VON KNEBELM reports about the measures which are to be taken in order to adjust the procedure concerning the grant of patents to war-time conditions. He furthermore describes in detail the procedure which the I.G. adopts towards its employees in pursuance of the "Ordinance concerning the handling of inventions made by employees", dated 12 February 1942, and of the relevant carrying-out order. It is planned to inform the university trained employees (also the directors and the "Forschungsleiter") that the new ordinances concerning inventions made by employees will take the place of the regulations contained in their employment contracts up to now, this concerns such inventions as are reported after 23 July 1942. For the rest it is intended to continue the usual payments for inventions made by employees by granting or raising special additional payments.

In connexion with a report regarding the air-raid on Ruhr, Dr. MEYER comments upon additional measures that have to be taken in the other plants. Furthermore the situation resulting from the recent air-raids on cities situated on the Rhine are discussed in reference to the Plants Leverkusen, Uerdingen, and Silberfeld. Dr. STUSS discusses a report of the Office of the Technical Committee concerning the shifting and safe-guarding of production of military importance. This report is to be supplemented by information about inorganic production. As copies of the report are not to be distributed for reasons of secrecy, the colleagues from the commercial side on the Vorstand are requested to read it in the plants in order to inform themselves about the removal elsewhere of production of military importance which was effected by the I.G. long before the war broke out. Credits of 34.3 millions were at the disposal of the Technical Committee. Added to this there will be in the next few months considerable increases in the total expenditure planned for the plant at Heydelsheim, Auschwitz and Monheim. The monthly expenditure had up till now been regularly higher than those of the preceding year, and in May it exceeded 60 million.

Frankfurt am Main, 5 July 1943

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

May 23, 1947

I, Annette Wallach, 20101, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages and that the above is a true and correct translation of the document No NI-5764.

Annette Wallach
No. 20101

"END"

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT No. NI-7284
OFFICE OF CHIEF OF COUNSEL FOR THE ARMY

(Rubber Stamp) Received 15 Feb. 1939

I.G. GRIESHEIM

Secret!

To
Department of the Directorate
Frankfurt/M. - Hoechst

1. This is a secret matter within the meaning of Article 88 of the Reich Penal Code.
2. To be transmittted only under cover; if sent by post, to be registered.
3. To be kept, at the responsibility of the addressee, under lock and key.

Your File No.	Your communication	Our reference	Report No.	Date
	of 3. Feb.	Dr. E. I/C.	./.	15 Feb. 1939
		to be used in reply		

Subject: Mobilization Task

Referring to the above letter, we wish to advise that we have checked over our mobilization task. As far as can be judged from here, the following changes must be made therein:

- 1.) Nitrotoluol. According to the information available here, there must be full production of this in case of mobilization. The mobilization task for nitrotoluol raw mixture must therefore be set at 1800 tons per month. Of this 500 tons would go directly to explosives factories, whereas the balance would be processed in our separation plant into o, r, p-nitrotoluol. Its mobilization task would therefore have to be increased from 1000 tons per month to 1270 tons per month.
- 2.) Dinitrobenzol. After conferring with Ministerialrat Dr. ZAMM of the Army Ordnance Office the I.G. is to prepare first of all for a monthly production of 500 tons of dinitrobenzol 88/89 for the event of mobilization. One-half of this production will be handled by each of the I.G. plants Griesheim and Leverkusen. The Gr. mobilization task should therefore be increased from 63 tons per month to 250 tons per month. The facilities required will be made secure in Gr. by rearrangement of the equipment now on hand.
- 3.) Dinitroethyl aniline. About 20 tons per month of dinitroethyl aniline are required for the production of tetryl. The production of 20 tons per month of dinitroethyl aniline should therefore be included in the Griesheim mobilization task.

I. G. GRIESHEIM

To
Department of the Directorate
Frankfurt/M. - H o c c h s t

- 2 -

Your File No.	Your communication	Our reference	Report No.	Date
			./.	13 Feb. 1959
		to be used in reply		

Subject:

- 4.) Dinitrochlorbenzol. For the production of 20 tons per month of dinitroethyl aniline there are required 21 tons per month of dinitrochlorbenzol, whose production should also be included in the Griesheim mobilization task.
- 5.) Benzol derivatives: Pure benzol / pure toluol.
Due to increased dinitrobenzol production there should be included in the Griesheim task 145 tons per month of pure benzol instead of 60 tons per month.
- 6.) Rust resisting agents. Since production has substantially increased in the years 1937 and 1938, it may be assumed that in the case of mobilization there will also be substantially higher requirements. We therefore request a re-check of the mobilization task, since this cannot be done from here.

The changes in raw material requirements conditioned by the changes which have been ordered are listed on the enclosed raw material sheets.

(in handwriting)
Supplies from Hoeschst
have been noted
15/2 Bo

signature : ENGELBACH
A

Enclosures.

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT No. NI-7284
CONTINUED

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

2 August 1947

I, Herbert RODECK, D - 397 499, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages and that the above is a true and correct translation of the document No. NI-7284.

Herbert RODECK
D - 397 499

(page 1 of original, cont'd)

- 4.) Ensuring supply of labour, calculating requirements; U-process, effects of placing of the 1906/07 and 1908/09 classes under military supervisory control.
- 5.) U.B.P. process for securing raw and auxiliary materials.
- 6.) Co-operation of mobilization workers with works air-raid protection organizations and Abwehr.
- 7.) Preparatory work for the smooth conversion of our plants from peace production to war production, mobilization order, change of shifts; transportation of employees; change of quarters.

Vermittlungsstelle W

signature : Keuper (?)

Registered!

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

16 June 1947

I, John FOSBERRY, Civ.No. 20 179, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages and that the above is a true and correct translation of the document No. NI-4620.

John FOSBERRY
Civ.No. 20 179

MICROCOPY

892

ROLL

36

